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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Su; very. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additiona! copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through Haison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the CentrA Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF c. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- mentor international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Surrey. .p Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) SecrE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 U*S*S*R.0 CQNTENTS This chapter .mpersedes the armed forces cover- age to the Genav Survey doted march 2971. A. Defense establishment 1 1. Military history 1 2. Command structure 3 a. joint agencies 4 b. I:orca components S c. Operational commands 5 d. Militarized security forces 6 B. Joint activities 6 I. Military manpower 8 2. Strength trends 8 3. Training 8 4. Military budget 9 a. Economic support 9 b. MilitarZ budget 10 5. Logistics 11 S. Uniforms and insignia it a. Uniforms 12 b. Insignia 12 Szcr.r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 Page C. Ground forces 17 1. Organization 18 2. Strength, composition, and disposition 21 3. Training 21 4. Logistics 22 D. Naval forces 23 1. Organization 30 2. Strength, composition, and disposition 31 3. Training 31 4. Logistics 32 5. Naval aviation 32 E. Air and air defense forces 34 1. Soviet Air Forces 34 a. Organization 37 Page b. Strength, composition, and disposition 38 c. Training 39 (1) Preoperational 39 (2) Operational 39 d. Logistics 41 2. Soviet Strategic Defense Forces 42 a. Organization 42 b. Strength, composition, and disposition 42 c. Training 44 d. Logistics 44 F. Rocket troops 45 I. Organization 45 2. Strength, composition, and disposition 47 3. Training 47 4. Logistics 48 G. Militarized security forces 49 1. Frontier troops 49 2. Interior troops 50 FIGURES ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 Page Fig. 1 Armed forces high command chart) 3 Fig. 2 Personnel strength of the armed forces photo) 26 (table) 8 Fig. 3 Estimated value of military patrol gunboat photo) 26 expenditures (table) 11 Fig. 4. Officers' uniforms and insignia cruiser photo) 27 (chart) 13 Fig. 5 Enlisted men's uniforms and insignia cruise missile submarine (photo). 28 (chart) 15 Fig. 6 Shoulderboards and insignia of submarine photo) 28 warrant officers chart) 17 Fig. 7 MAZ -537 truck with trailer carrying ballistic missile submarine photo) 28 T -62 tank (photo) 20 Fig. 8 GANEF (SA -4) surface -to -air missile submarine photo) 29 system (photo) 20 Fig. 9 Light amphibious armored vehicle Naval aviation BADGER G (photo). 33 (photo) 20 Fig. 10 122 -mm multiple rocket launcher (photo) 33 (photo) 20 Fig. 11 ZSU -23 -4 antiaircraft weapon photo) 21 Fig. 12 KRESTA I class guided missile light Naval aviation HORMONE A ASW cruiser photo) 25 Fig. 13 KRESTA II class guided missile light Long Range Aviation BEAR B cruiser photo) 25 Fig. 14 Moskva guided missile helicopter ship Long Range Aviation BISON B (photo) 26 ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 Page Fig. 15 KANIN class guided missile destroyer photo) 26 Fig. 16 NANUCHKA class guided missile patrol gunboat photo) 26 Fig. 17 KARA class guided missile light cruiser photo) 27 Fig. 18 CHARLIE class nuclear- powered cruise missile submarine (photo). 28 Fig. 19 VICTOR class nuclear powered submarine photo) 28 Fig. 20 DELTA class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine photo) 28 Fig. 21 GOLF class ballistic missile submarine photo) 29 Fig. 22 Disposition of navy units table) 32 Fig. 23 Naval aviation BADGER G (photo). 33 Fig. 24 Naval aviation MAIL ASW) aircraft (photo) 33 Fig. 25 Naval aviation MAY ASW) aircraft (photo) 33 Fig. 26 Naval aviation HORMONE A ASW aircraft (photo) 33 Fig. 27 Long Range Aviation BEAR B (photo) 34 Fig. 28 Long Range Aviation BISON B (photo) 34 ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 Page Fig. 29 BADGER A used in Long Range Aviation and Soviet Naval Aviation 43 Fig. 41 (photo) 35 Fig. 30 FISHBED MiG -2. used in Soviet 43 Fig. 42 Tactical Aviation photo) 35 Fig. 31 FITTER (Su -7) used in Soviet Tactical Aviation photo) 35 Fig. 32 BREWER (Yak -28) used in Soviet Tactical Aviation photo) 35 Fig. 33 Military Transport Aviation CUB 43 Fig. 44 (An -12) (photo) 37 Fig. 34 Military Transport Aviation CAMP 43 Fig. 45 (An-8) (photo) 37 Fig. 35 Military Transport Aviation COCK 44 Fig, 46 (An -22) photo) 37 Fig. 36 Military Transport Aviation HOOK 44 Fig. 47 (Mi-6) photo) 37 Fig. 37 Military Transport Aviation HIP (Mi-8) photo) 37 Fig. 38 Aviation of Air Defense FIREBAR (Yak -28P) (photo) 42 Fig. 39 Aviation of Air Defense FLAGON 45 Fig. 49 A (Su -15) (photo) 42 iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 Page Fig. 40 Aviation of Air Defense FOXBAT MiG -25) photo) 43 Fig. 41 Aviation of Air Defense MOSS (Tu -124) (photo) 43 Fig. 42 FARMER (MiG -19) employed in Aviation of Air Defense and in Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo). 43 Fig. 43 FRESCO MiG -17) employed in Aviation of Air Defense and in Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo). 43 Fig. 44 GUIDELINE (SA -2) surface -to -air missile photo) 43 Fig. 45 GALOSH ABM -1) antiballistic missile photo) 44 Fig, 46 TALL KING early warning radar !photo) 44 Fig. 47 BAR LOCK early warning radar and SIDE NET height- finder radar (photo) 45 Fig. 48 BAR LOCK early warning radar and ODD PAIR height- finder radar (photo) 45 Fig. 49 SAVAGE (SS -13) intercontinental ballistic missile photo) 46 iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 Armed Forces A. Defense establishment (S) The Soviet Armed Forces, as presently constituted, consist of ground, naval, air, air defense, and rocket forces. The main purpose of each of these is to develop combat forces along functional lines for coordinated operations; all five components are highly inter- dependent. The personnel strength of the armed forces is estimated at about 3.8 million men. Personnel assigned to the ground forces represent about two thirds of the total military manpower approximately 2 million, including about 345,000 assigned to ground elements of the strategic defense forces. Of this total, about 1,600,000 constitute the general- purpose ground forces. Approximately 400,000 personnel are assigned to ground forces command and general support. The remainder of the military personnel are believed assigned as follows: navy, 470,000 (including 394,000 in general- purpose naval forces, 12,000 in strategic attack forces, and 64,000 in navy command and general support); air forces, 575,000 (including 287,000 in general purpose air forces, 130,000 in strategic defense forces, 57,000 in strategic attack forces, and 101,000 in air forces command and general support); strategic rocket forces, 375,500 (including 300,500 in strategic attack forces and 75,000 in rocket forces command and general support). In addition, the border and internal troops of the security forces have a personnel strength of about 250,000. The main units of the general purpose ground forces include 21 armies, 12 corps, 169 line divisions (motorized rifle, tank, and airborne), and 17 artillery divisions. Major naval surface combatants total over 210, and submarines number about 340. In addition, there are over 2,000 other surface combatants and auxiliaries. There are over 1,000 combat and reconnaissance aircraft in naval aviation. The long range air force has approximately 875 bombers and tankers, and tactical aviation comprises some 4,600 fighters and light bombers. About 2,700 fighters are assigned to the air defense forces. An estimated operational inventory of approximately 1,500 intercontinental ballistic missile launchers (over 1,600 missiles) and more than 500 intermediate- and medium -range missile launchers (over 1,000 missiles) are in the hands of the strategic rocket forces. In addition to the strength of its own armed forces, the Soviet leadership regards the military capabilities of other Warsaw Pact states as an important element in the strategic position of the U. S. S. R. Other Warsaw Pact forces help maintain Soviet hegemony in these countries; increase Soviet war potential; and, with groups of Soviet forces in the area, provide a forward line of defense against NATO forces. Since the mid 1950's the Soviet Union has increased the other Warsaw Pact countries' capabilities for independent military action by providing them with modern equipment and giving them greater control over their own forces than they enjoyed in the past. The Warsaw Pact organization, however, is the structure for organizational and command control of these forces; in wartime the Soviet high command would exercise ultimate control. 1. Military history The Soviet Armed Forces date officially from 1918. Aft^r the civil war, in which the Soviet regime defended itself against internal and foreign APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 opposition, development of the armed forces was influenced by two major factors. The first was it series of reforms, including the establishment of military schools and academies, reorganization of the military establishment along territorial lines, and the assignment of more responsibility to tactical corn manders. These reforms, which laid the groundwork for it moder military establishment, were carried out by Mikhail V. Frunze. Trotsky's successor as Peoples Commissar of Defense. The second factor was rapid industrialization of the U.S.S.R., which began in the early 1930's and enabled the Soviet Union to reequip its forces with modern weapons and materiel. The modernized armed forces faced their first test in Manchuria with the successful frontier engagements against the Japanese. in 1938 and 1039. In the attack on Finland in late 1939, poorly trained Soviet troops suffered it series of humiliating defeats. Early in 1940, however, Finnish resistance was crushed by Soviet units well trained in winter warfare. World War 11 represents to the U.S.S.R. its greatest military triumph. Despite initial defeats which caused severe losses in men and materiel, its forces held against the German offensive in 1941 and launched it counteroffensive in the winter of 1942. 'The Nazis were gradually repulsed, and in January 1943 the U.S.S.R. unleashed the final offensive which opened the way to Berlin. Since the end of World War 11, the U.S.S.R. has made it sustained effort to modernize its alined forces. The ground forces, though reduced in number,. have been reequipped on a scale exceeding that of any other land force in the world, with it wide variety of modern weapons and equipment ranging from small arms to tanks and guided missiles. Notable advances have been made in mechanization, communications, and the development of amphibious equipment. Reor- ganization and development have ,resulted in it narked increase in the mobility and firepower of the ground forces. In the 1945-54 period the U.S.S.R. also devoted considerable effort to it quantitative rebuilding of its naval forces, both surface ships and submarines. [wring this period, units such as the SKORYY class destroyer, RIGA class destroyer escort, and WIIISKEY class submarine were built in largo m-nibers. The navy that resulted, though second only t 1 1 the U.S. Navy in size, was still largely equipped with World War II- type ships which neither supported the U.S.S.R.'s aspirations to status as it great seapower nor met their defense needs. In the 1956 -65 period the Soviets began to apply modern technology to ship and submarine a design to produce fewer, but qualitatively improved, naval units. This emphasis on duality and modern technology produced l): ellistic- missile equipped submarines, cruise missile equipped surface ships and submarines, surface -to- air missile configured surface combatants, nuclear power for submarines, and an advanced gas turbine propulsion plant for surface ships. The late 1960's introduced to the operational inventory even more advanced naval -weapon systems and units for the qualitative upgrading of the force. New technology in shipbuilding permitted the U.S.S. R. to produce ships at a rapid pace while adding new electronics and weaponry. In the 1966 -73 period six new classes of major surface combatants, five new classes of submarines, and three one -of -a -kind submarine units were constructed. The Soviets have continued to produce advanced- design submarines and missile equipped oceangoing surface ships and have begun construction of their first aircraft carrier Which is expected to carry vertical or short take -off and landing aircraft and helicopters. Competent strategic bomber, tactical air, and defensive air forces have been trained. Among the most significant developments in the air forces since 1960 have been the introduction of new equipment, including a lieu- medium bomber, it new light bomber, air warning and control aircraft, and neuv fighters and transports; more v use of air -to- surface missiles; and additional in- flight refueling capabilities for heavy bombers. The Strategic Defense Forces (PVO Strany occupy a position of equal status with the ground, naval, air, and strategic rockei components. This organization is made up of Radio 'Technical 'Troops (aircraft control and warning radar), Surface -to -Air Missile "Troops (SAM sites), Aviation of Air Defense (fighter aircraft), and possibly the Antiballistic Missile Troops (ABM sites). This overall organiz -1tion is continually undergoing transition. Significantly improved capability has resulted from rapid deployment of surface -to -air missiles (SAPA) and the introduction of improved electronic devices and armament in both interceptors and ground equipment. The Strategic Rocket 'Troops, established in 1960 and placed on an equal organizational level with the other force components, constitute the main strategic force of the U.S.S.R. The development of strategic surface -to- surface missiles (SSM) and their introduc- tion into operational inventories provide the Soviets with un intercontinental strike capability which can be employed with minimum warning. Within the next few years strategic missiles probably will account for an increasing portion of Soviet nuclear offensive capability. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 Command structure The Soviet Armed Forces are controlled I)v the Ministry of Defense, headed by a minister %%ho is normally a military officer on active duty. The Minister of Defense is a member of the Council of `linisters within the Soviet Government and is responsible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The minister advises the Council of Ministers and the Party Central Committee on the requirements and capabilities of the armed forces and is responsible for implementing Chief of the CINC General Staff Warsaw Pact Forces (First Deputy Minister) (First Deputy Minister Army General MSU* Yakuhovskiy V. G. Kulikov Deputy Minister for Construction and Billeting Colonel General Komarovskiy CINC Ground Forces (Deputy Minister) Army General Pavlovskiy decisions of the political leaders. Operational command and overall administrative control of the armed forces are exercised by the Minister of Defense through the high command (Figure 1). The Supreme Military Council, formed by Khrlshchev and interposed behyeen the Party Central Committee and the Ministry of Defense, was composed of key party and military personnel and it probably still exists. This council, in the past, %vas presided over by the civilian Supreme I -ligh Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces, usually the General Secretary of the Communist Party. It served as Minister of Defense MSU* Grechko 1 Chief of the Main Inspectorate (Deputy Minister) MSU* Moskalenko Chief of the Main Political Directorate Army General Yepishev Chief of the Rear (Deputy Minister) Army General K u rkotk i n I I CINC Navy CINC Strategic (Deputy Minister) Defense Forces Admiral of the Fleet (Deputy Minister) Gorshkov MSU* Batitskiy MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION *The exact relationship between General Yepishev and the Minister of Defense; and the Political Directorate and other elej, of the high command is not completely clear. In some matters Yepishev Is probably subordinate to Marshal Grechko. In many political matters he undoubtedly reports directly to the Party Central Committee. *ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET OF THE SOVIET UNION Note: There is a third First uty Minister (Army General Sokolov) whose functions are unknown. Since Army General Penkovskiy's death no Incumbent has been identified with the position of Deputy Minister for Combat Training. Whether the position still exists is uncertain. FIGURE 1. Armed forces high command (S) 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 CINC Air Forces CINC Strategic (Deputy Minister) Rocket Troops Marshal of Aviation (Deputy Minister) Kutakhov Army General I I CINC Navy CINC Strategic (Deputy Minister) Defense Forces Admiral of the Fleet (Deputy Minister) Gorshkov MSU* Batitskiy MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION *The exact relationship between General Yepishev and the Minister of Defense; and the Political Directorate and other elej, of the high command is not completely clear. In some matters Yepishev Is probably subordinate to Marshal Grechko. In many political matters he undoubtedly reports directly to the Party Central Committee. *ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET OF THE SOVIET UNION Note: There is a third First uty Minister (Army General Sokolov) whose functions are unknown. Since Army General Penkovskiy's death no Incumbent has been identified with the position of Deputy Minister for Combat Training. Whether the position still exists is uncertain. FIGURE 1. Armed forces high command (S) 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 the highest organ for national defense policy and planning. Other military councils exist at major echelons of the military establishment from army_ or equivalent level up through the headquarters of the force components. 'These councils serve as advisory organs to the commander at each echelon. "I'he� Soviet high command consists of the Minister of Defense and his deputies. At the present time there are three first deputy ministers, nine deputy ministers, and it political directorate. The political chief is not ranked as it deputy minister, possibly because he is also an official in the part secretariat, where lie is subordinate to the General Secretary of the Communist Parh. "there are several joint agencies of an administrative or technical nature within the Ministry of Defense which direct;: support the high command. Some of these agencies, such as the Main Personnel Directorate, arc directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, others, such as the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate, the Main "Tank Directorate, the central Motor Vehicle- Tractor Directorate, and the Central Finance Directorate, are subordinate to the various deputy ministers comprising the high command. The major elements of the Soviet high command and the major operational commands are shown in Figure I. The Soviet Armed Forces are divided into five force components� ground, navy, air, air defense, and rocket forces. I'.ach is headed by it deputy minister of defense who is also commander in chief and the administrative head of his component. Operational control is the prerogative of the Minister of Defense, though he has apparently delegated varying degrees of operational control to force commanders. n. Joint agencies The General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, headed I)v it \Marshal of the Soviet Union, plans the coordinated development and employment of ground, naval, air, air defense, and rocket forces and issues directives to the major operational commands in the name of the Minister of Defense. The general staff formulates the� military progr in in peacetime and directly supervises its implementation in time of war. It is closely involved in the direction of combat operations in all theaters. The general staff includes directorates for operations, intelligence, signal cornmtinications, organization and mobilization, military transportation, mil iL.r� topography, crptography, military history, and others. I'he Warsaw Pact, promulgated in 1955, establishes a combined command for Soviet arc certain Eastern European Communist forces. The headquarters is in Moscow, and the chief of the Warsim Pact Forces is it Marshal of the Soviet Union. The Chief of the Main Inspectorate, with a staff of senior officers, is responsihle for evaluating the state of preparedness and the comba' efficiency of the armed forces. I'll(- inspectors make periodic visits to the major operational commands and present critiques on the state of combat readiness and other natters to the commanders concerned and to the appropriate agencies within the Ministry of Defense. The Chief of the Rear is responsil,le for all logistic functions common to the armed forces and participates in the logistical aspects of high -level planning. lie has control of service and supply functions common to all the services, including budget. pay, accounting, food, clothing, other quartermaster equip rent, fuel and lubricants, medical and veterinar; services, military transporta- tion, and the direction of the activities of the Central Motor Vehicle- Tractor Directorate. These functions include research and development, procurement, storage, issue, and maintenance of common -use items. The Chief of the Rear also coordinates the various specialized procurement agencies (such as those for aviation, engineer, naval, ordnance, and signal equipment) which are either directly under the Minister of Defense or under the force components. 'I'll(- Deputy Minister of Defense for construction and Billeting coordinates the activities of specialized construction and quartering agencies at all chelons of the military establishment. Through his subordinate directorates he allocates materials, equipment, and personnel for construction activities and exercises policy control over the acquisition, provision, assignment, till(] repair of military hotising as well as service and cultural facilities. He also coordinates the activities of military and nonmilitary construction agencies and authorizes the use of military construction troops for m miditar- projects when necessary. The principal lirectorates within the Ministry of Defense directly subordini&- to the Deputy Minister for Construction and Billeting are the Main Military Construction Directorate, the Billeting and Maintenance Directorate, and the Technical Directorate for Capital Construction. The Chief of the Main Directorate of Military Training Establishments supervises and coordinates the overall military school systems, although specific control of service schools and academies (other than the higher Military Academy of the General Staff) and their ciirriculunis rests with the various force components and troop branches. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Nave is the principal instrument used by the Central Committee of the Conrrnunist Party to maintain political control over the a, .,led forces, including rigid adherence to party policies and dircc�i;ves. The political apparatus is an integral part of all Ieadquarters above company level throughout the military forces. It trains, administers, and directs the activities of the political officers responsible for political indoctrination of all personnel_ morale Imilding programs, surveillance of political reliabilit%- and the disciplinary and administrative control of inernbers of the Communist Part and the Communist Youth Leagne Komsomol Othci joint agencies within the Ministry of Defense which support the high command include the Main Personnel Directorate, the Ilcadquarters for Civil Defense, the Office of the Main Military Procurator, and the Milihan Publishing House. Another organization closely allied with the armed forces cut not actually a part of the Ministry of Defense is the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and the Fleet (DOSAAF). Ileadud by the� chairman of the Central Committee for DOSAAF, this nationwide organization provides specialist training of a military nature to ycueng men of draft and predraft age. DUSA ;IF also assists in the civil defense training p rog ra rn. There arc three principal ordnance -type agencies which are not directly subordinate to the high c These are the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate subordinate to the Commander of Missile and Artillery Troops of the Crounc: Forces, the Main "Tank Directorate subordinate to the Chief of 'Tank Troop,, and the Central Motor Vehicle- Tractor Directorate subordinate to the Chief of the Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces. "These three agencies supervise research and development, determine design spec�ificaiions of materiel, place orders with factories, ,crept items as they are produced, operate central depots, allocate and issue material to major operational commands, and control maintenance. For example, the `lain Missile and Artillery Directorate deals with all t pis of weapons, including such varied itens as aircraft arnranient, naval guns, small arms, and tactical missiles. b. Force .-ornponents I'll( commanders in chief of ground, naval, air, air defense, and rocket forces ;,re generally concerned with organization, doctrine, manning, training. administration, and logistic requirements for their respective arms. Fach conunander in chief has a main staff, corresponding to the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, and counterparts of the various directorates of the Ministry of Defense to formulate policies and adapt instructions from above to their respective arms. 'Their participation in the operational command of troops is limited by varying degrees of command authority retained by the Minister of Defense. The minister has delegated operational control to the Commander in Chief of Strategic Defense Forces and probably, in large measure, to the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket 'Troops beemise of the quick reaction time required of their missions. I'll(! Commander in Chief of the Navy has a degree of operational control over naval forces because of the specialized nature of such operations. The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, as a deputy minister, probably advises and assists the Minister of Defense in the operational control of the several air forces, and for air matters he possible is in the line of control to commanders of the military districts and groups of forces. The position of commander in chief and the headquarters and main staff of the ground forces, abolished in 1961, were reestablished late in 1967. Whether the Commander in :thief of the Ground Forces exercises operational control in any degree is not known. Accordin to Soviet military concepts, all five force components would be employed in a coordinated effort in wartime. Operationally, forces prepared for cornbat by functional components of the Soviet Armed Forces are organized into major commands which are controlled directly by the Minister of Defense. Administratively, the force components depend heavily for funding, logistic, and personnel support on high command agencies such as the Main Personnel Directorate, the Chief of the Rear, the various main directorates for armament, and the numerous other administrative and technical agencies directed by the Minister of Defense. c. Operational commands '1'h^ principal operational commands outside the high command are military districts and groups of forces, naval fleets and flotillas, long -range aviation, military transport aviation, air defense districts, and strategic rocket forces. The majority of land -based forces are organized into military districts and groups of forces, whose command apparatus can have a. relatively flexible span of control, including operations of major line units, combat and service support units, and tactical air elements. Similarly, in the major nasal commands the fleet headquarters for command of forces afloat 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 also controls a supporting shore establishment, encompassing coastal defense forces and land -based fleet air forces. The remaining operational commands have more specialized missions as indicated by their designations. The Commander in Chief of Strategic Defense Forces serves as a channel of operational control. Similarly, the Comrander of Long Range Aviation in Moscow. although administratively subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, is believed to serve as an operational channel between the ministry and the long -range air armies. Essentially this is also true for the Commander of Military Transport Aviation. The same type of channel, furnished by the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops, may link the ministry with strategic rocket units in the field. Airborne units are believed to comprise a separate operational command only so long as they are held as a reserve of the high command. When assigned to military districts or groups of forces, operational control of airborne units passes to the commander of the force to which they are assigned. d. Militarized security forces In addition to its regular land, sea, and air forces, the Soviet Union has approximately 250,000 militarized security personnel (frontier troops and interior troops) who are organized into military units to guard the borders, maintain domestic security, and guard important establishments, persons, and shipments. Some 175,000 Soviet Frontier Troops of the Committee for State Security (KGB) are responsible for securing the land and sea frontiers of the U.S.S.R. The Main Directorate of Frontier Troops of the KGB, in Moscow, exercises general supervision and control over the frontier districts. Also und. KCB control are special signal troops who are r. �ponsible for the installation, maintenance, and security of com- munication facilities (telephone and telegraph) between Moscow and high -level military headquar- ters, such as military district and group of forces headquarters. The Soviet Interior Troops, consisting of internal security forces and convoy troops, and numbering 75,000, are subordinate to the ministries for maintenance of public order of the constituent republics in .which they are located. Internal security troops are combat -type units responsible for suppressing dissident and subversive elements, quelling revolts and strikes, and controlling the civil populace in the event of disaster. Convoy troops are responsible for guarding deportees and prisoners en route between prisons and labor camps, and for the security of shipments of strategic materials. B. Joint activities I. Military manpower (S) There were approximately 63,088,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49 as of i January 1973. Of these, about 80% were considered fit for military service; their distribution by age groups was as follows: Total, 15 -49 63,088,000 50,180,000 The average number of males who will reach military registration age (17) annually, 1973 through 1977, is about 2,323,000. The annual draft contingent is about I million and is expected to remain constant fc the near future. The manpower pool is sufficient to meet the demands of the armed forces and is adequate to support essential defense industries in an all -out war effort. Particularly notable is the fact that even in time of peace the economy relies heavily on work performed by women in sections of the economy in which female labor is not typically employed in most other countries. The quality of military manpower, particularly of the Russian element, is generally good. The educational levels have been substantially raised, particularly in the technical fields. T!te high quality of training in military service also tends to increase technical proficiency. Typical of most military personnel is their willingness and ability to endure hardships. The armed forces are loyal to the regime, and morale is considered to be high, especially in certain elite groups such as paratroopers, pilots, strategic rocket tr lers, and submariners. Conditions of ice are generally good. Beginning with World War II, the pay and privileges of officers have placed them in the same category as engineers, party dignitaries, and other favorites of the state. To a lesser extent, the enlisted personnel on extended service also enjoy a higher prestige and status in the armed forces than they might attain in civili: life. Individuals may improve their professional knowledge APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 TOTAL MAXIMUM NUN16ER NUMBER FIT FOR ACE OF MALES MILITARY SERVICE 15 -19 12,086,000 1 l ,i +60,000 20 -24 10,702,000 9,460,000 25 -29 6,349,000 5,160,000 30 -34 9,285,000 7,365,000 35 -39 8,746,000 6,640,000 40 -44 8 5,910,000 4549 7,070,000 4,285,000 Total, 15 -49 63,088,000 50,180,000 The average number of males who will reach military registration age (17) annually, 1973 through 1977, is about 2,323,000. The annual draft contingent is about I million and is expected to remain constant fc the near future. The manpower pool is sufficient to meet the demands of the armed forces and is adequate to support essential defense industries in an all -out war effort. Particularly notable is the fact that even in time of peace the economy relies heavily on work performed by women in sections of the economy in which female labor is not typically employed in most other countries. The quality of military manpower, particularly of the Russian element, is generally good. The educational levels have been substantially raised, particularly in the technical fields. T!te high quality of training in military service also tends to increase technical proficiency. Typical of most military personnel is their willingness and ability to endure hardships. The armed forces are loyal to the regime, and morale is considered to be high, especially in certain elite groups such as paratroopers, pilots, strategic rocket tr lers, and submariners. Conditions of ice are generally good. Beginning with World War II, the pay and privileges of officers have placed them in the same category as engineers, party dignitaries, and other favorites of the state. To a lesser extent, the enlisted personnel on extended service also enjoy a higher prestige and status in the armed forces than they might attain in civili: life. Individuals may improve their professional knowledge APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 and skills, but advancement is largeiy contingent upon au Live n_:-iicipation in party programs. It is estimated that 825 of armed forces personnel are party or Komsomol members. The military personnel procurement system is based on the Universal Military Service Law of 1967, which provides for mandatory conscription of enlisted personnel for the nilitary establishment. Under this law it new conscript class (afte group) is called up for service each year in equai semiannual increments (during May and June and during November and December) as an older class is r Teased. Enlisted conscripts complete terms of 2 years in the ground and air forces as do naval air and shore -based personnel. Naval personnel aboard ships serve for 3 years. Inductees with a higher education are required to serve only I year regardless of branch of the armed forces; this applies also to frontier and security troops. Professional enlisted Wen are procured on a voluntary basis. "The broad category of extended- service personnel was replaced in 1972 by the institution of michrrua/praporshchik. Ilowever. personnel pres- ently serving on extended service tours are permitted to serve out their terms if they elect not to apply for the new ranks. The creation of the tea� ranks has not satisfied the requirements for quality career personnel. The initial term of scrvi-�e for michman1praporshchik is 5 years. It cyan he extended for periods of 3 or 5 years until the mandatory retirement age of 50. Officers enter active commissioned service in several wuys. Most are -htained through graduation from one of the various officer candidate schools maintained by each arm or service. Officers are also obtained for active duty service by cailup from the reserve. Reserve commissions can be acquired either directly from civilian life, through participation in an ROTC -hype program in institutions of high education, or, in the c�:: e of enlisted personnel with a high education, by passing the prescribed examination upon completion of their mandatory tours of active duty. It is also possible to be commissioned directly from civilian life and placed immediately on active duty. 'Three distinct groups enter OCS: graduates of Suvorov or Naklibnov cadet schools, young Wren who apply directly front civilian status, and noncommissioned officers on active duty who seek careers its officers. Officers serve at the convenience of the government rather than for specified periods. Officers can he called up front the reserves on it voluntary basis or by conscription for to 3 -year periods in the case of officers tinder 30 wars of age. Of approximately 3.8 million officers and enlisted rues in the armed forces, approximately 75% are enlisted conscripts, I05c arc extended service personnel, and IWi are officers. The standards of physical fitness for service in peacetime are revised frequently depending on the number of men required for a. given year as compared with the number available and the physical conditions of the mein in the recruitment age group. Potential conscripts can receive permanent exemptions or temporary deferments from military service. Between 5Sfi and 10% of it given class is usually determined to he physically unfit for peacetime military service. Exemptions are give to these having family hardship cases, and deferments are granted to those attending institutions of higher learning. The Soviet Union, through the application of its Universal Military Service L.a%%, has developed an effective reserve system. The provides for two categories of reservists. Category I consists of all men who have served at least I year of .:dive cluty in the armed forces. Category 11 reservists are� those who have served less than 1 year or who for various reasons were not called up for active duty. Reservists (ages 18 to 50) are estimated to number about 20 million -10 million each in Category I and Category II. Postservice training requirements are established by tite Universal Milt any Service Law for both officer and enikled Category I and Category 11 reservists. The frequency of cal!up for training and the duration of training periods vary according to age group within each category. The voyenl onzal or military commissariat system, existing at r(-public, oblast, and ration administrative levels throughout the U.S.S.R., is an effective instrume�.` for mobilization of manpower. The district military commissariat, at the base of the mobilization apparatus, makes mobilization assignments in accordance with specialist qualifications. The district military commissariat would be informed of general mobilization probably within 2 or 3 hours following the decision to mobilize. Couri ^rs would he sent out immediately to notify reserve personnel being called up in the first stage of mobilization. Insofar as possible, reservists are assigned to units located near their homes. About 1.7�") million reservists would be required to bring the existing ground forces up to wartime strength. This could he accomplished within a very short time using only Category I reservists who have completed active duty tours within the past 5 years. By utilizing all remaining Category I as well as Category II reservists, several hundred additional divisions could he formed. I lowever, the time re(Inired to equip these divisions would depend entirel- on production capacity since there is no evidence of ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 mobilization equipment stocks currently available to supply more than the existing units of the ground forces. It is believed that in time of war the Soviet merchant fleet would he subordinate to the navy. Many merchant marine crewmen are believed to have assignments as naval reservists, and most merchant marine officers hold commissions in the naval reserve. The manpower in the Soviet fishing and river fleets also would provide the navy with a reservoir of experienced seamen to draw upon in wartime. 2. Strength trends (S) "Trends in the number of men under arms are shown iu Figure 2. Included are estimated levels of uniformed personnel during each of several significant years since 1945 in the ground, naval, air, and rocket forces, the regular military establishment as it whole, and the militarized security forces represented by frontier and interior troops of various state security agencies. Motivated by political, economic, and strategic considerations, Khrushchev in early 1960 announced his plan to reduce total military manpower. By early 1961 the Soviet forces had been reduced to approximately 3.2 million. Here reductions stopped temporarily; actually the impulse of the Berlin crisis, followed the next year by the Cuban confrontation, caused temporary increases. The downward trend was resumed in late 19C. During the next 3 years the air defense forces and strategic missile forces were expanded, while decreases took place in the theater field forces. 3. Training (S) The generally high quality of the military forces results in large measure from the coordinated training Of all components. Ground, naval, and air elements ore provided with good training facilities and are almost continually engaged in individual training and unit field exercises, culminating in frequent joint activity. Most common are ground -air and sea -air exercises, with cooperation among all three types of forces limited generally to air defense and occasional amphibious exercises. Under the Universal Military Service Law all youths must receive introductory military training prior to callup for active service. Th training is to be conducted at general- education sell. )Is beginning in FIGURE 2. Personnel strengths of the armed forces (S) (Thousands) ue Data not available. 'For this year only, naval air persuanel included in air forces strength. H APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 STRATEGIC GROUND NAVAL AIR ROCKET ESTIMATED SECURITY DATE FORCES FORCES FORCES TROOPS TOTALS FORCES World War II peak (May 1945) 10,000 600 1,000 11,600 700 January 1946........... 5,000 695 705 6,400 600 January 1947........... 2,8(`0 695 555 4,050 500 Janu -y 1948........... 2,600 695 505 3,800 400 January 1950........... 2,650 695 555 3,900 400 Jrnuar, 1951........... 3,400 695 605 4,700 400 January 1953........... 3,400 745 655 4,800 400 January 1955........... 3,000 7P5 705 4,500 na January 1958........... 2,700 660 640 4,000 300 January 1960........... 2,500 560 590 3,650 250 January 1961........... 2,200 480 535 3,215 250 January 1963........... 2,000 505 540 185 3,230 225 January 1965........... 1,700 450 510 200 2,860 225 January 1967........... 1,950 455 500 230 3,135 225 January 1968........... 2,035 465 500 325 3,325 225 January 1909........... 2,200 470 477 336 3,483 225 January 1970........... 1,149 470 5':0 339 3,468 225 July 1970 2,139 470 510 375 3,494 250 July 1971 2,245 470 510 375 3,600 250 July 1971 2,245 470 555 375 3,645 250 June 1973 2,330 470 573 :375 3,748 250 ue Data not available. 'For this year only, naval air persuanel included in air forces strength. H APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 the ninth grade, in specialized secondary educational institutions, and in ,nnical vocational schools. Instructors are to be military personnel. Young boys not in schoo, arc to receive introductory military training at training centers set up at factories, iiistitutions, and organizations, and on collective farms. For training of specialists and reservists, the Soviet Union relies heavily on the joint scmimilitary organization DOSAAF. DOSAAF activities, strongly supplemented by propaganda, promote popular support for the armed forces, especially through the various programs conducted for youth. The curriculums ii,clude extensive studies in military science as well as training in marksmanship, vehicle driving and maintenance, communication techniques, and many other areas, which help to produce it large reservoir of trained and se�nitrained personnel available to the armed forces. The clubs of DOSAAF also provide annual proficiency tests for reservists. The armed forces conduct well organized and effective officer training programs through a .wide network of branch and higher level schools, where personnel are thoroughly educated in political and military subjects. Although centrally coordinated, the majority of military schools are organized and administered by the individual branches, with relatively few institutions devoted to the training of all arms and services. A notable exception to this division in military education is the Higher Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R, (formerly knowp as the Voroshilov Higher Military Academy). 'this is the highest level military institution, and it is attended by high ranking officers of all branches of the armed forces. Interarm cooperation is taught at the other military educational establishments, but as it subsidiary aspect of branch training. Officers of some foreign military forces are trained in Soviet military schools. The majority of such personnel represent Communist states, particularly those of Eastern Europe, with sonic Middle East Arab and nonaligned states represented. Inasmuch as "Tactical Aviation �a component cf the Soviet Air Forces �is assigned to military districts and groups of forces, field training for land warfare includes extensive activity featuring joint ground -air operations. Ground forces offensive and defensive missions in all large -scale exercises and maneuvers are supported by fighter aril bomber aircraft of tactical air armies. Moreover, as evidenced by observation of the Soviet forces in East Germany, the yearly training cycles of both tactical air and ground forces closely coincide. This correlation of training programs also prevails within the U.S.S.R., and at times other components of the air forces are employed to support tactical components. joint training is considered at least as important in the navy as in the ground forces. The naval fleets each have organic fleet air forces of land -haled bomber, mine- torpedo, reconnaissance, and transport aircraft, -is well as helicopters. Cooperation is regularly practiced betwee this shore -based naval aviation and the surface and submarine units afloat. The operational training of airborne and air defense forces always involves closely coordinated activity. In both cases, surface and air elements are organized with the aim of insuring and increasing the efficiency of joint operations. Airborne elements conduct field training with their assigned transport aviation, including fixed and rotary-wing units. Air defense forces, in concert with elements of the ground and tactical air armies in tho field, regularly engage in practice alerts in which surface -to -air missile units, and fighter aircraft act together in defense against simulated enemy attack. Naval surface units also cooperate with vir defense forces, conducting early warning and intercept operations over water, ports, and naval shore installations. Despite its limited and unsatisfactory war experience in amphibious operations, the U.S.S.R. is showing renewed interest in this form of offensive action in tr :Aining programs, particularly since the reactivation of the naval infantry in all four fleets. Evidence suggests there are only small numbers of exercises and maneuvers to train ground, naval, and air components in joint amphibious assaults. However, the amphibious training program ap- parently is current and well developed, including, for example, simulated atomic play. 4. Military 'budget (S) u. Economic support 'Che strength of the economy is a key elemer', of Soviet military power, with the defense establishment enjoying it high priority in the allocation of resources. The U.S.S.R., with the world's second largest industrial base, is virtually self- sufficient in food, industrial raw materials, and fuels. 'There is relatively little dependence on foreign trade. Economic growth of about 5% to 6% annually enables the U.S.S.R. to increase its military programs at a similar rate. The gro: forces materiel industry produces large quantities of weapons and equipment for Soviet forces as well as the hulk of materiel for other Warsaw Pact 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 countries. Of the complexes producing ground forces weapons, some 16 sizable plants are at least partially engaged in producing armored personnel carriers, armored tracked prince movers, artillery, infantry weapons, and tanks. Of these plants, three are final assembly plants for tanks, four for armored personnel carriers, and nine for the manufacture of artillery and infantry weapons. Ammunition production facilities are extensive: 37 final assemblers are supported by numerous plants making components, explosives, and propellants. About 50 plants in the large electronic/ telecommunication industry produce the hulk of milit wire, radio radar, aucl other electronic equipment. Military output, ranging from simple components to highly complex devices, accounts for nearly 75i of total domestic electronics production. The motor vehicle industry has nine major plants proder -img vehicles used by the military. Other segments of industry provide the chemical, engineer, medical and quartermaster equipment and supplies required by the awned forces. Most of these plants are dual- purpose facilities, manufacturing both military items and consumer goods, and constitute it large industrial rnobilizration base. In case of %var, the U. S. S. R. would he capable of meeting its own requirements for ground forces weapons and equiprent and, in addition, could supply substantial quantities of materiel to other members of the W arsaw Pact. All ships added to the naval inventory in recent years have been built in Soviet shipyards, except for it few class_s of amphibious and auxiliary ships r;; East European origin. Naval shipbuilding is performed both in yards specializing in naval construction and in yards building both na..0 and merchant ships. Current construction programs include nuclear and conventionally pow submarines, an aircraft carrier, guided missile cruisers and destroyers, escorts, submarine chasers, mine w ;.rfare craft, amphibious craft, and auxiliaries. New constnucti �u programs are being augmented by subnmritue and surface ship conversion programs. A number of naval repair yards arc� available, though hard pressed, to support the expanding Soviet fleet. In the event of mobilization, there is sufficient shipyard capability to satisfy itch:, .-.sell demands on the ship construction and repair industry. The aircraft industry, second in size only to of the United states, is capable of producing aircraft of all hypes and complexities. It is a high- priority industry which claims a large investment in production and research facilities and employs a significant share of the country's engineering and technical personnel. The industry not only fulfills domestic military and civilian requirements for aircraft but also provides military and transport aircraft for sale abroad. Most airframe and engine plants have some capacity for the manufacture of consumer goods, production of which helps provide: stable employment for labor in an industry noted for wide fluctuations in output. 'rhe facilities are believed to be sufficiently balanced so that engines and components would be available to support it maximum production effort in the airframe plants. [n general, the industry makes use of it fairly narrow range of off- the -shelf engine types to power its military and civil aircraft. The industry is striving for and attaining improved quality in the aircraft heing produced. Soviet production of aircraft since World War 11 has been characterized by a decline in numbers and a substantial increase in airframe weight. The newer aircraft have improved capabilities, greater efficiency, and longer service life. As a matter of policy, the U.S.S.R. satisfies many of its light aircraft needs by imports from other Warsaw Pact countries. Tile U.S.S.R. produces space launch vehicles and surface -to- surface, air -to- surface, and air -to -air missiles of great sophistication and in sufficient quantity to satisfy both domestic and export requirements. h. MiYtary budget The military budget is prepared annually by the Minister of Defense in coordination Nvith the Chairman of the State Planning Committee and the Chairman of the Military Industrial Committee. As a portion of the state budget, the military's planned expenditure is reviewed by the Council of Ministers. This organization then presents the state budget to the Supreme Soviet for approval. After approval, a single defense budget figure is published for public consumption. 'I'hc announced military budgets for the years 1970 through 1973 were a constant 17.9 billion rubles, an increase of only 0.2 billion rubles over 1969 and 1.2 l.illion rubles over 1968. The-budget for 1974 is slightly less, at 17.6 billion rubles. These announced figures do not include the entire cost of the military establishment, and provide no indication of the distribution of funds to various programs or missions. Additional military funds, mainly research and development, are carried in other budget categories. Because no useful military budget data are published by the Soviet Union, estimates are prepared by U.S. officials using indirect methods of analysis. These methods are not undergoing review because of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 concern in the U.S. intelligence community over the reliability of the results they have provided. Figure 3 shows U.S. estimates of the equivalent dollar value of Soviet military spending for the years 1968 -72. These estimates excluae all RDT &E (research, development, test, and evaluation), military assistance, and nuclea- warhead costs. For all the above reasons, these figures should be viewed only as it rough approximation of the equivalent dollar value and trends of Soviet military spending. 5. Logistics (S) The Chief of the Rear, who is it Deputy Minister of Defense, either directly controls or coordinates all logistic functions in the armed forces. His staff is one of the principal armed force policy staffs and is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense. Subordinate rear service directorates and departments are found in the headquarters of the five force components aril in all lower headquarters clown to and including regiments. The counterpart of the Chief of the Rear at subordinate echelons is called the deputy commander for the rear and is, in effect, commander of the rear area. At each level the deputy commander for the rear coordinates and /or supervises all logistic activities. fie is responsible for the locati,rn of all installations and units v ithin the rear area, and he supervises transportation and local security. Specific respon- sibilities of the deputy commander for the rear include procurement and supply of fuel, lubricants, food. and clothing; supervision of medical services, veterinary services, salvage, and military labor; transportation by road and supervision of road and rail maintenance; and finance and pay of all personnel. His functions apply not only to his own supply and service units, but to those of the various combat arms and services as well. At front level (the largest field command in FIGURE 3. Estimated dollar value of Soviet military expenditures* (S) (Billions of 7972 dollars) MISSION PROGRAM 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Strategic attack........... 9.5 10.0 9.5 8.0 8.0 Strategic defense.......... 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 9.5 General purpose........... 25.5 25.0 26.0 27.0 27.5 Command and support..... 23.5 24.0 24.0 24.5 24.0 Total 66.5 67.5 68.5 69.0 69.0 *These estimates exclude all RDT &E, military assistance, and nuclear warhead costs. These figures should be iewed only as a rough approximation of the equivalent dollar level and trends of Soviet military spending (see text). wartime) the deputy com.ander for the rear supervises it number of services which perform functions of common support for the ground, naval, air, aril rocket forces and also supports and coordinates their respective technical services. Services and supplies other than the cornmon -use items provided by the Chief of the Rear are normally furnished by the troop headquarters of the vari-us arms and services. For example, engineer equipment is procured directly by the engineer troops, ships are procured by the t,aval forces, and aircraft by the air forces. Artillery and armored vehicle supply also are accomplished by the appropriate troop headquarters. Artillery supply, in the Soviet sense, includes all weapons and ammunition ranging from small arms up through the heaviest artillery, including tactical missiles, naval ordnance, and aircraft armament. P.esponsibility for the procurement of these items is centered in the r gain Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of DefenI e. The procurement of armored vehicles is also handled within the Ministry of Defense by a technical directorate, the Main Tank Directorate. At lower echelons of command the supply of armored vehicles is the responsibility of the Chief of Tank "Troops. The procurement programs, as planned by the various arms and services and by the directorates within the staff of the Chief of the Rear, are consolidated by the Ministry of Defense and then coordinated with the various civilian ministries which are concerned with production. Military inspectors check production at factories and take over materiel upon completion. Equipment is stored in central storage depots in the interior of the country under the control of the Ministry o,' Defense or of military districts. 6. Uniforms and insignia (U /OU) A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., effective 1 January 1972, established the new military ranks of praporshchik (ensign) and michman (warrant officer), to rephlce the category of extended service personnel in the Soviet Armed Forces. Personnel prese;ltly serving on extended service tours are permitted to serve out their terms if they elect not to apply for the ,new ranks of ensign or warrant officer. The rank of praporshchik is used in the Soviet Army, in coastal and aviation units of the naval forces, and in the border and internal security troops. The rank of niichman is used aboard ships and vessels, in naval support coastal units, and in naval units of the border 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 troops. The decree also established the rank of glavnyy korabelnyy starshina (chief ship's petty officer) to replace the rink of michman in its former sense (warrant officer) for petty officers aboard ships and vessels, in naval support coastal units, and naval units of the border troops. The title praporshchik is properly translated as "ensign." However, because "ensign" implies commissioned officer status and is currently used as a commissioned rank in the United States Navy, it is more appropriately translated as "warrant officer." The rank of glavnyy korabelnyy starshina can also be more appropriately translated as "senior chief petty officer" in order to conform to an accepted usage within the petty officers' rank structu,c. a. Uniforms Soviet Armed Forces uniforms, other than the field uniform, may be grouped in three categories on the basis of general design: for marshals, generals, and admirals; for officers, warrant officers, and extended service non commissioned officers; and for other (conscript) personnel. Many changes have taken place since the first regulations for the wearing of military uniforms were published in February 1926. In July 1969 the Ministry of Defense published new regulations which introduced several new uniforms Ind uniform changes. New and improved fabrics are now being used in the manufacture of uniforms. Officers, warrant officers, and extended service noncommissioned officers in the Soviet Army were authorized a new parade off -duty uniform which is blue -green for grou-cl forces and blue for airborne troops and air forces personnel. An additional off -duty uniform for marshals and generals includes a light gray, double- breasted, open collar coat; white shirt; black tie; and blue trousers. Conscript personnel, students at military schools of the ground forces, and military construction troops wear a new olive -drab parade off -duty uniform consisting of a single breasted, open collar coat; matching trousers; and olive -drab shirt and tie. The basic change to the service and field uniforms was the replacement of the pullover tunic with standing collar by a single breasted, open- collar coat. Shoulderboards aril collar tabs on the service uniform are in the color of the branch of service; on the field uniform they are olive drab. The uniforms of naval forces personnel remain unchanged on the whole, except for the summer service uniform worn by office:, warrant officers, and extended service noncommissioned officers, c, hose white and blue, standing- collar coats were replaced by 12 a white, double breasted, open- collar coax and a blue, open- collar tunic, respectively. White shin. and black ties are worn with the coat and tunic. The new parade off -duty uniforms for officers :.nd enlisted men in the ground and air forces and the service uniforms for officers and enlisted men in the naval forces are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. b. Insignia Soviet personnel wear a variety of insignia to indicate grade and branch of service. The grade of officers is shown by varying numbers of stars and stripes on the shoulderboards, the stars differing in size and number according to the grade. In addition, naval officers wear sleeve insignia of grade on several of their uniforms. The rank of warrant officer in the ground, naval, and air forces is indicated by two sm. stars displayed on the shoulderboards. The stars may be either gold or field -green ;n color, depending on the service affiliation or the type of uniform worn. Warra_it officers also wear insignia (chevrons and stars) of gold braid on the left sleeve of the uniform to indicate the number of years in service, as follows: one narrow chevron -1 year; two narrow chevrons -2 years; three narrow chevrons -3 years; one wide chevron -4 years; one wide chevron and one star -5 to 9 years; and one wide chevron and two stars for 10 or more years. The ranks of other enlisted personnel are indicated by transverse stripes on the shoulder- boards. Insignia are illustrated in Figures 4, 5, and 6. Branch -of- service insignia are usually worn on collar tabs. When the uniform does not include collar tabs, the insignia are worn on the shoulderboards. Branch of service also is indicated by the use of various colors for the shoulderboards, collar tabs, cap bands on service and dress caps, and piping c:n shoulderboards, collar tabs, cap crowns, overcoats, and trousers or breeches. Branch -of- service colors include: red for motorized rifle troops; black for artillery, engineer, and tank troops; and light -blue for airborne troops and personnel of the air forces. Marshals, generals, and admirals wear distinctive ornamentation on coat collar lapels in lieu of collar tabs. The shoulderboards of warrant officers in the ground and air forces are made of colored braid -ed, black, or light -blue) depending on the service affiliation and component. The shoulderboards of naval warrant officers aboard ships and vessels are made of black braid with white piping. When shore- based, including the naval infantry, they are black with red piping; for naval aviation they are light -blue without piping. Enlisted personnel in the ground forces display the metallic letters "CA" (Soviet Army) on the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 PARADE -OFF DUTY UNIFORM SERVICE UNIFORM PARADE -OFF DUTY UNIFORM 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 GROUND FORCES PARADE -OFF DUTY UNIFORM CONSCRIPT i MASTER SENIOR SERGEANT SERGEANT PRIVATE PRIVATE IST CLASS SERGEANT JUNIOR SERGEANT L NAVAL FORCES SERVICE UNIFORM SENIOF CHIEF PETTY OFFICER PARADE-OFF DUTY UNIFORM CAREER NCO SENIOR CHIEF CHICF PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS 1D CLASS I I SENIOR SEAMAN CAP INSIGNIA SEAMAN JUNIOR PETTY OFFICERS AND SEAMEN AIR FORCES 1 MASTER SENIOR SERGEANT SERGEANT SERGEANT PRIVATE 1ST CLASS SERVICE UNIFORM AIRBORNE TROOPS SERVICE UNIFORM JUNIOR PE7t OFFICERS ANn SEAMEN 7 C 77 r FIGURE 5. Enlisted men's uniforms and insignia (U /OU) 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 GROUND FORCES NAVAL FORCES AIR FORCES, (MOTORIZED (ABOARD SHIPS AIRBORNE TROOPS, Wd TROOPS) AND VESSELS( NAVAL AVIATION FIGURE 6. Shoulderboards and insignia warrant officers (U/OU) shoulderboards. Enlisted personnel in the ground and air forces also wear a distinctive shoulderpatch, which portrays the insignia of the combat arm or service, or the upper left sleeve of the parade and parade off duty uniforms. Students at military schools of the ground forces wear service stripes on the upper left sleeve below the shoulder patch; the number of stripes corresponds to the number of years completed. Students at naval schools wear inverted chevrons on the upper left sleeve to indicate the number of years completed. C. Ground forces (S) The ground forces have been designed primarily for exploitation of nuclear strikes and conduct of swift offensive operations to defeat enemy troops and seize enemy territory. In the European theater of operations the ground forces are to destroy NATO troops and rapidly dominate Western Europe. Their capability to fulfill their doctrinal missions relies heavily on the achievement of surprise and success of the strategic strikes. The ground forces have been undergoing a continuous program of modernization and reorganiza- tion since World War 11. Changes have been based primarily on the development of new weapons and equipment, modifications in organizational concepts, and the formulation of new operational and tactical doctrine designed for the conduct of war in a nuclear environment. The most significant aspect of the modernization and reorganization program in recent years has been the emphasis on tanks and armored personnel carriers, which has made both the motorized rifle division and the tank division formidable armored organizations by Western standards. In addition, the introduction of new weapons and additional standard weapons has given the ground forces substantial increases in firepower at division and army levels. This has been especially evident in three important areas of artillery: field, antitank, and antiaircraft. Soviet field artillery continues to be increased in both quantity and quality. The D-30 122mm howitzer found in the motorized rifle regiments and artillery regiments of the motorized rifle and tank divisions continues to replace the older M -30. It is now considered the standard 122mm howitzer in those units. Some motorized rifle regiments have one or two ext-a 122mm howitzer batteries for a total of 12 to 18 guns. lb.(152mm D -1 howitzers are considered standard only in the artillery regiment of the motorized rifle division. The rocket launcher strength iLL both motorized rifle and tank divisions is presently assessed as a standard 18 launchers. The 122mm BM -21 (40 -tube launcher on a URAL -375 truck) is replacing both the 16/17 tube 140mm and the 12 -tube 240mm systems formerly standard in motorized rifle and tank divisions, respectively. The older types are still observed in service, sometimes in a mix with BM -21's. A number of the old 132mm BM -13 launchers are also present in some units but are believed to be training weapons. Soviet ground forces continue to improve antitank gun and guided missile capabilities. The standard assessed antitank equipment holdings of the motorized rifle division include: 318 RPG AT grenade launchers, 18 manpack antitank guided missiles SAGGER), 27 antitank guided missile launcher vehicles (either SWATTER or SAGGER), 18x73mm recoilless guns (SPG -9), and 18x100mm antitank guns (M -55 or T- 12). Antitank capabilities are further increased in those units possessing a full complement of the BMP armored personnel carrier which, in addition to its main gun and coaxial machinegun, is ca -able of mounting a SAGGER missile. Air defenses of the Soviet ground forces are continually being upgraded by t introduction of new weaponry, some conventional and some sophisticated. At motorized rifle and tank divisional level, the 24x57mm (S -60) antiaircraft gun, with its radar caatmiled FLAP WHEEL fire control system, is consider. standard. Some of the T -55 and T -62 tanks have been retrofitted which allows the mounting of a 12.7mm antiaircraft machinegun on the loader's hatch position to increase air defense protection. Similar modifications have been noted to some of the ASU -85 airborne assault guns. The QUAD 23mm radar controlled ZSU -23 -4, while not fully issued to all Soviet divisions, is now accepted as standard in the self propelled antiaircraft batteries of both the motorized rifle and tank regiments. Some tank regiments still retain their ZSU -57 -2 and some motorized rifle regiments also retain their towed antiaircraft machinegun batteries. However, the short- 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 range, IR- seeking missile BRDM -2 SAM system is replacing the ZSU -2 and the towed antiaircraft rnachineguns, thus giving the combat regiments a mixed gun missile -air defense capability. The ZSU -23- 4 and BRDM -2 SAM's may in fact be organized into respective regimental air defense battalions. The SA -7 man portable air defense missile system is issued down to combat company and battery level in most cf divisions. The Soviets have deployed the highly mobile, low altitude SA -6 tactical air defense system with their ground forces. This system organized as a regimental level consisting of five firing batteries is normally subordinate to the field army. The SA -4 provides medium to high altitude air defense for the ground forces. The wain contribution of the SA -4 to the defense of tF, ground forces lies in its mobility. Tire SA -4 system is replacing the SA -2 system at the front arid army level. By replacing the SA -2 with the SA -4, the Soviets in effect triple a SAM battalion's firepow without a comparable increase in manpower. Organized in brigade size units, consisting of three battalions :rf three firing butteries each, the SA -4 will normally be deployed at both front and army level. Another new mobile low altitude SAM system, the SA -8, is estimated to have performance characteristics similar to those of the SA -N -4 naval SAM systern. Although the organization of the SA -8 unit is still speculative, it probably will be deployed at the combat divisional level. As the modernization of the ground forces has progressed, Soviet helicopter forces have developed increased flexibility. The heavy -lift helicopters already have a greater lift capacity than any other helicopter in the world. The present Soviet concept for the employment of helicopter borne forces apparently utilizes motorized rifle troops in coordination with helicopter regiments. Approximately 1,250 helicopters -260 (Mi- 6), 8 HARKS (Mi -10), 430 HOUND (Mi -4), 140 HIP (Mi -8), and 420 HARE (Mi I and HOPLITE (M i-2) are allocated by Military Transport Aviation (VTA) to the tactical air armies within the U.S.S.R. and to the Soviet groups of forces in Eastern Europe. Most of these aircraft are unequally distributed among 19 known helicopter regiments. HOOK, FIARKE, HOUND, and IIIP provide the basic heavy -lift and assault capabilities. The smaller lift characteristics of HARE and HOPLITL make therm more suitable for liaison, reconnaissance, artillery fire direction, and antitank warfare. Helicopter -borne assaults, as demonstrated in Warsaw Part exercises, probably would he employed in time of war to seize key areas 18 ahead of advancing armor. Exercises indicate that the Soviets consider a reinforced motorized rifle battalion as most adaptable for such a mission. With the increased conventional artillery and helicopter -borne assault capabilities, the Soviets have exhibited a flexibility in practice which lends substance to the possibility that war with NATO may be, initially at least, conventional. Concurrently, there have been improvements in the missile and rocket systems available to provide nuclear and chemical, as well as conventional, fires. FROG battalions, standard in both motorized rifle and tank divisions, are mostly equipped with four launchers, either the FROG 3 or 7. SCUD tactical missile brigades in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), and probably those in the Soviet western border areas and along the Sino- Soviet border have acquired a third battalion, increase ig the number of launch vehicles from six to nine. In addition, five of the brigades in the GSFG, at least, appear to have 12 launch vehicles each. To satisfy the need for a tactical missile system with the range and mobility suited to the needs of the front, the Soviets have developed a 300- nautical -mile mobile missile, the SS -12 SCALEBOARD. Equipment for the SCALEBOARD has been observed at gr rand forces installations, and it is likely that it would be used in support of theater of operations. The increasing availability of these varied rocket and missile systems provides the theater forces with import i delivery capabilities 'nor nuclear, chemical, and high explosive warheads. The requirement for improved logistical support increased sharply with modernization and increased mechanization of the ground forces. Soviet efforts to modernize th--ir support elements as well as their maneuver units have led to the introduction of tactical pipeline units; greater emphasis on helicopters; the appearance of new and better vehicles, including tank transporters (Figure 7); and the development of improved bridging equipment. The operating range of vehicles throughout the theater forces has been improved through the extensive addition of auxiliary fuel tanks for the vehicles. 1. Organization The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces participates in operational planning but is not in the operational chain of command. Within the Ministry of Defense, the responsibilities of the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces include administration of the ground combat and certain technical arms, development of tactical APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 doctrine and training programs, and supervision of training. In the event of a major war, it is considered likely that un intermediate headquarters would be found between the General Staff and the fronts in order to alleviate some of the command and control responsibilities at the Moscow level. The So% i -ts have used the term "Theater of Military Operations TVIY which appears to apply to this organizational concept. The largest field command in wartime is the front, formed from certain military districts and groups of forces. It is a tactical and administrative unit consisting of several ground armies, an air army, and supporting combat and service units. In peacetime, forces stationed outside the country, except for two divisions in Mongolia, are under groups of forces headquarters �one each in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. The two divisions in Mongolia apparently report to the Transbaykal Military District. Directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense in both peace and war are the 16 military districts of the U. S. S. R. These are tactical and administrative commands, organizationally similar to the groups of forces. Being territorial in nature, military districts are charged with severed housekeeping responsibilities such as logistic support for schools, depots, and miscellaneous military activities, as well as the administration of conscription, reserve training, and mobilization activities. Ground armies are of two basic types combined arms and tank; a typical combined -arms army would consist of three motorized rifle divisions and one tank division; a typical tank army would consist of three tank divisions and one nsrtorized rifle division. Combat support units in both types include a surface to- surface guided missile brigade SCUD (SS -1), one or two SAM regiments and /or brigades, one artillery division (Type B) or brigade, an engineer regiment/ brigade, it ponton bridge regiment, an assault crossing battalion, a signal regirnent, two signal intercept battalions, an early warning battalion, a long -range reconnaissance company, a chemical battalion, a motor transport regiment, and intelligence elements. Service support, including medical and quartermaster, is provided in both types of armies by numerous units subordinate to the deputy commander for the rear. Many of the support units listed above at army level also may be found directly subordinate to groups of forces, military districts, and to the Ministry of Defense. These v.;nuld be expected to become front level units in wartime. A typical front would have an artillery division armed with 152-mm gun howitzers and 130 -mm guns. Two SS -1 brigades (or it follow -on system) would provide front surface -to- surface missile support with two SAM regiments and /or brigades providing air defense. The SA -4 air defense missile system utilizing the GANEF missile is used with the field forces (Figure 8). Comhat engineer support of a front would include a general- purpose engineer brigade, two ponton bridge regiments, and three assault- crossing battalions. Signal support would be provided b.y a signal brigade, two signal intercept regiments, and two ECM battalions and an early warning regiment. A chemical battalion and intelligence elements complete: the combat support elements of a front. Service support would be provided by a multitude of directorates, agencies, and units subordinate to the front deputy commander fbr the rear. 'rhe majority of line divisions are of two basic types �the motorized rifle division and the tank division. The main fire and maneuver elements of the motorized rifle division are three motorized rifle regiments, each of which consists of three motorized rifle battalions transported in armored carriers, supported by regimental reconnaissance and artillery units and a battalion of medium tanks; a tank regiment with three tank battalions; and it reconnaissance battalion equipped with seven light amphibious tanks (Figure 9). Division combat support elements include an artillery regiment, a FROG battalion, an antitank battalion, an antiaircraft artillery regiment, a multiple rocket launcher battalion (Figure 10), an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, and a chemical defense company. Division service support elements consist of a medical battalion, a motor transport battalion, a maintenance battalion, and other rear service elements. The principal combat elements of the tank division are three medium tank regiments, a motorized rifle regiment, and a reconnaissance battalion. All these units are practically identical in organization to their counterparts in the motorized rifle division. Divisional combat support includes an artillery regiment, a FROG battalion, an antiaircraft artillery regiment, it multiple rocket launcher battalion, an engineer battalion, a si -nal battalion, and a chemical defense company. Division service support consists of a medical battalion, a motor transport hattalion, a maintenance battalion, and other rear service elements. The ground f;rrces also have an airborne division organized around three parachute regiments. Supporting elements include an artillery regiment with howitzer, assault gun, antiaircraft, and rocket 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 10. 1 22 -mm 40 -round rocket launcher on URAL -375 M1964 truck (C) i /f avow FIGURE 8. GANEF (SA -4) surface -to -air missile system (C) launcher battalions organic to it. Medical, signal, engineer, chemical defense, reconnaissance, and service elenwitts complete the organization structure. Some of the most significant developments within the tank and motorized rifle divisions are expected to occur in motorized rifle regiments. Following a trend initially noted in 1971, many motorized rifle regiments 20 now have tank hath_!ions with 4! rather than 31 tanks. ['his organizational change increases the total tank count in it motorized rifle division to 218 tanks, bringing it more on a par with it U.S. mechanized division which has 216 medium tanks. The Soviets have shown an increasing willingness in recent years to tailor the rifle regiment. Examples of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 7. MAZ -537 truck with lowboy trailer carrying T -62 medium tank (C) FIGURE 9. Amphibious armored infantry cva .6at vehicle, M 1967 (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 this are evident in those units to which additional artillery, antitank guns, or an additional maneuver battalion has i: subordinated. Additionally, the low altitude BRDM -2 SAM system has been introduced to replace the toyed antiaircraft machinegun battery. The ZSU -23 -4 and BRDM -2 SAN1 tornbination greatly increases the air defense capability Figure 1 1 The Soviets can he expected to continue the modernization of ground forces while increasing their capa.bilit� to fight both a conventional and it nuclear ar in response to doctrinal requirements. The trend to develop this capability can hest he observed within the tank and motorized rifle divisions, where an inereasin.; emphasis is being placed upon improving the combat and service support capabilities. This trend is evidenced by the improvements in equipment and a corresponding increase in the size of the divisions' logistical tail. The quantity and duality of general- purpose cargo and special- purpose trucks continues to increase. Also, certain units, such as the division chemical company, have been enlarged in order to provide more suup.?rt to t;w division. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition' Personnel strength of the general- purpose ground forces is about 1,570,000 Principal ground forces organizations are: 21 combined -arms armies in(] tank armies, 10 army corps, 109 motorized rifle divisions, 31 tank divisions, and 7 airborne divisions. The euncnit deployment of t forces places the najority of the divisions either in the groups of forces in Eastern Europe or in the more strategic horder areas of the 'For detailed identification and locations of unit~ of the So% Ground Forces. sec the current issue of the military Intelligence Summary and Order of Battle Sunnmary, Foreign Ground Forces, both published be the Defense Ink- Iligence Agency'. FIGURE 11. ZSU -23 -4 anti- aircraft weapon (C) U.S.S.R., the greatest concentration being in the western border districts and along the Sine Soviet border. All command and control headquarters are also in peripheral areas. :3. Training Training procedures, in genera, emphasize the fundamentals of soldiering. Prior to the enactment of the military service law cf t967, the conscript underwent three I -year training cycles before he was released from active duty. Under the 1967 law, conscripts serve only 2 years; the biannual induction has required an adjustment in the training cycle. Noncommissioned officers in the ground forces receive their training primarily within schools of the regiments and separate battalions of divisions. In peacetime, all regiments operate these schools to suj; Ly noncommissioned officers for line duty within subordinate units of the division's main arm. Technical service noncommissioned officers for all units of the divisions are provided by noncommis- sioned officer schools operated by the ancillary units of the division, such as the engineer, motor transport, and signal battalions. In addition to the unit school system, each military district and group of forces has its own training units or schools which graduate noncommissioned officers for the special troops of the military district or group. Officers are trained through a progressive system of military schools. This network begins with cadet and officer candidate schools or academies to the highest military academies in the U.S.S.R. Among the more important schools are the M. V. Frunze Military Academy, the Military Academy of Chemical Defense, the V. I. Lenin Military Political Acadeim, and the Military Academy of Armored Troops. 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 Courses range from 3 to i years. All activities of these schools and academies are supervised by a special directorate for military educational institutions in the Ministry of Defense. In general, the military school system has proved successful in developing highly qualified leadership. The sernirnilitary organization DOSAAF serves the ground forces in two chief ways. First, since all citizens above the age of 15 are urged to join DOSAAF, it is able to provide preinduction training of an elementary nature for several years prior to most youths actual induction into military service. Second, this civilian society develops for members of all ages certain s;,ecialist skills which are of potential value to the ground forces, such as motorcycling, driving, skiing, parachuting, glider training, small -arms marksman- ship, horsemanship, vehicular maintenance and repair, and the operation of signal equipment. Local chapters or clubs of DOSAAF usually stress those skills applicable to a particular branch of service. Appropriate equipment, as needed, is made available from nearby military units. DOSAAF pla, an important part in the compulsory military training dictated by the 196; military service law. Field training in the ground forces is conducted according to an annual training program. Because of the biannual induction, the training program has been adjusted somewhat to include two 1 -month training periods for inductees on arrival at their new unit. This training is conducted separately and does not significantly interfere with the simultaneous execution of the regular training schedule. Regular units of the division which contain trained troops may leave the garrison area for field exercises, leaving the recruits behind under it cadre of instructors to continue basic training. On completion of each of the I -month training periods, the recruits are integrated into their assigned units and thereafter participate in the annual training program. Under this concept, tactical combat training up to army level may be carried out at all times of the year. High -level combined and joint exercises and both command post and field training exercises also are held at any time during the year. This training insures year -round combat readiness and utilizes training areas, particularly those in Eastern Europe, to the maximum. The nature of the training program is essentially the same each year, except that exercises are scheduled at different times and at different locations and may emphasize different aspects of tactics and operations. During the period 1953 -65 ground forces training featured nuclear settings, and all offensive and d fensive field exercises were based on nuclear 22 scenarios. In 1965 the Soviets introduced a form of flexible response to supplement their nuclear concept. This plan calls for the use of conventional weapons during the initial stages of a war with NATO and has been evidenced by recent increases in conventional artillery with ground forces divisions. The shift toward a flexible response has not reduced the importance of nuclear firepower nor has it changed the mobile dispersal posture of the battlefield for tactical operations. Warsaw Pact exercises also represent a major feature of the training program. These exercises generally involve ground forces of at least two or more Warsaw Pact countries training together several times a year. Normally these exercises will be capped by one major Warsaw Pact exercise directed by the Warsaw Pact command or the General Staff in Moscow. These types of exercises familiarize East European personnel with Soviet communications systems and procedures as well as increase the competence of staff personnel in all aspects of combat operations. The Warsaw Pacts conduct of numerous exercises over widespread areas indicates interest in the testing of contingency plans in all areas opposite NATO. Overall, a comprehensive program of training and exercises insures the maintenance of the combat readiness of the ground forces, particularly in units in Eastern Europe opposite NATO. 4. Logistics In the U.S.S.R., logistic support is planned in the Ministry of Defr by the Chief of the Rear on the basis of plans drawn up by the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. At each echelon from front down through regiment, the deputy commander for the rear coordin�tes and supervises all logistic activities, whether performed by elements directly subordinate to him or by other elements of the headquarters and staff. He provides the logistic part of staff planning and directs the use of all transportation facilities. He is directly responsible for the supply of common -use items such as rations, clothing, fuel, and medical supplies. He coordinates and supports the supply and service functions performed by combat arms (such as supi:ly of weapons and ammunition by the artillery arms). Each military district commander has administra- tive control over units located within his area. He provides logistic support for them through a system of military district depots under the deputy commander for the rear of the district. These depots draw from the central depots of the Ministry of Defense which are APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 strategically disposed throughout the U.S.S.R. The hulk of the strategic reserves of military mat, riel and suppiies is maintained in the central depots, while unit mobilization reserves are kept either with the units or in the military district depots. Wartime supply of troops in the field is accomplished through depois assigned at front and field army levels. Front level depots may deliver their stores to army forward or rear depots or divisional supply points. The impetus of supply is forward; rail transportation is used as far forward as possible, although increased motorization at all levels and product pipelines have materially increased transpor- tation capabilities. Recent doctrinal, organizational, and logistic developments indicate the increasing importance of road transportation for unit movement. Roads are considered to be less vulnerable to permanent disruption than railroads, arm more easily repaired, and provide alternate routes and bypasses in greater number than rail. The increased emphasis on mobility has led the Soviet Union to develop and produce a new generation of vehicles with good cross country performance and greater load capabilities. Trucks now issued to troops range in size from light weight, air droppable vehicles to large 8x8 vehicles capable of transporting tactical missiles and their launchers, and of towing heavy missile systems, artillery, and tank transporters. The predominant load carrier now in the Soviet Groups of Forces' motor transport units is the 6x6 UI[A1. 375 (4.5MT capacity) with a 5MT trailer; however, the U11nr.,377 (7.5MT capacity), a 6x1 version of the URAL 375, is appearing in increasing numbers in the GSFG. The 'Ln., GAZ, and KRAZ Variety of trucks continues to be employed throughout the Soviet Army. The maintenance system has undergone consider- able modernization since World War II. Not only are repair facilities more numerous and extensive, but their technology, versatility, and general efficiency have increased. The system appears adequate For pr- -sent needs of the ground forces. Modern repair and recovery units are at all echelons, and continuing emphasis has been placed on the training and procurement ,f technicians. Maintenance Iactrinc emphasizes the repair of equipment and vehicles as close to the front lir� as possible, either by the users of the equipment or by mobile repair crews sent out by the parent unit or a higher echelon. Where on- the -spot repair is riot feasible, speedy evacuation is emphasized. Separate evacuation battalions are organized at army level for removing damaged vehicles to repair bases at division and higher echelons. Heavily damaged tanks, truck,, and field artillery pieces are evacuated to plants in the interior for rebuilding or scrapping. Military stockpiles of ground forces materiel are believed to be sufficient to equip fully the lin divisions at wartime strength, although ;n some divisions, as well as nondivisional support units, certain motor transport and engineer items would have to be mobilized from civilian resources. Since World War II the quality of ground forces materiel has continually improved with the introduction of a wide range of new types of equipment, including missile and combat vehicles. Due to the uneven distribution pattern of equipment, however, many of the older models remain in service. D. Naval forces (S) Soviet naval policy has three broad objectives: to contribute to the national deterrence capability, to defend the Soviet Union from maritime attack, and to support Soviet interests abroad and at sea. To meet these objectives the missions of the navy are to: counter the threat from hostile strategic forces and hostile naval forces generally; interdict sea lines of communication; defend the offshore zone; support land operations; contribute to strategic deterrence and, upon commencement of hostilities, attack strategic land targets; and support Soviet policies abroad. The navy's main operational forces are divided into four fleets Baltic, Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific. The majority of the missile and long -range attack submarines are based in the Northern and Pacify;: fleets. While each of the fleets is capable of accomplishing its assigned missions without recourse to immediate support from another area, geographic and climatic factors limit Soviet access to the open ocean and prevent pid reinforcement and resupply among the four widely dispersed fleet areas. Despite the large naval forces available to them at the outbreak of World War 11, the Soviets, generally regarding their navy as the seaward extension of the ground forces, failed to make effective use of their seapower. After the war, the Soviet Union set about reconstruction of its devastated naval and shipbuild- ing facilities embarked upon an extensive naval construction rogram designed to transform the U.S.S.R. into a major naval power. This program concentrated on producing large numbers of cruisers, destroyers, mine warfare ships, and long -range submarines. Current ship construction programs encompass guided missile cruisers, frigates, destroyers, 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 and patrol boats; armphibious and mine warfare ships; logistic support ships; and nuclear powered ballistic missile, cruise missile, and torpedo attack submarines. Construction is also underway on an aircraft carrier which is expected to c�arrw ve rtical or short -take -off and landing /S't'Ol.) aircraft and helicopters. Its specific role is its vet unknown. Present :vnstruction reflects Soviet determination not only to meet their needs for dete rrence and wartime defense of the homeland, but also to have the capability to deploy creditable naval forces wvorldvd(i, in support of foreign policy. During the period 1947 -57, the Soviets completed 19 cruisers, more than 100 destrovers, 72 destrover escorts, nearly 1,000 patrol craft of various types, about 330 tn�nesweepers, a number of auxiliary types, and about 350 submarines (m ore than three- fourths of which were of postwar design). This program had actually begun to level off in about 1956, wht the changes in Soviet naval thinking that probably followed upon Stalin's dcath in 1953 began to take practical 41'Cet. These changes took into account the advance~ in naval technology, particularly nuclear propulsion for submarines, nuclear- arined missiles, and modern electronics, and aimed at the qualitative rather than quantitative improvement of Soviet naval capabilities. The naval building program declined sharply after 1956, but by 1958 the first missile equipped surface ships and submarines began to, appear. In the raid- 1950's two of the Sverdlov class light cruisers ware converted to SAM guided missile cruisers. One was subsequently scrapped; the other still serves the Black Sea Fleet. By late 1959 two classes of guided missile destro\ers and two classes of guided missile patrol boats were in service. "I'bc KII,DIN, was constructed oil a KOTIJN hull, served as the first guided missile destroyer (D)GS). It was followed by the KRUPNYY class DDGS (the first seriallw c�onstrurted DDGS built as such from the keel up), .which is armed with a single SSM launcher fore and aft. Since 1959 the development of missile arnainent in the navy has proceeded at it rapid pact'. In 1962 the first of four k)*NI: 1 class guided missile light cruisers (CLUM) was completed. It incorporated both SSM (eight missile launchers) and SAM (one twin SA -N -1 launcher) annanlent. The SSM is the SS -N -31), which has o likely maximum operational range of 150 V;1'fo code na:n:�s assii,ned to ship topes, missiles, aircraft, and electroni.� near are indicated hs the use of caps. Ship classes hued nn knm%n name. of Sosiet ships are italicized (e.t;.. Scerdloc clues li�ht croiu�r!. 24 nautical miles. Also in 1962, the first KOTLIN clan destroyer was converted to carry a hvin SA -N -I launcher aft. In 1963 a new gas turbine- propelled guided missile frigate (DLG), the KASHIN class, was completed. I'� armament includes two twin SS -N -1 SAM launchers. The KRESTA I class CLGM, which has two twin SS -N -3 SSM launchers and two twin SA- N -1 SAM launchers, was completed in 1967 (Figure 12). Four KRESTA I class CLGM are now operational and class construction has terminated. In 1967, the first modified KRESTA I class CLGM, designated KRESTA 11, was launched (Figure 13). The KRESTA II is fitted with an improved SAM system, the SA -N -3 G0B1,ET. In 1968 the Moskva, the first guided missile helicopter ship (CHG) (Figure 14), became operational; a second, Leningrad, became operational in mid 1969. 'These units are armed with two twin SA- N-3 GOBLET launchers and a twin SUW -N -I antisubmarine launcher which fires the FRAS -1 weapon. The primary mission of the helicopter ship is ASW, but it is capable also of significant antiair .warfare (AAW) and task force command ship functions. Als.1 in 1968, the first conversion of a KRUPNYY class ;uided missile destroyer (DDGS) to a SAM configur was con and given the class name KANIN (Figure 15). All SSM armament was removed and replaced by additions! t=uns, ASW armament, and SA -N -I SAM launchers. 'Phis conversion progr will be completed when two units in the Pacific are finished about 1975. 'The next oddition in missile -armed combatants was the NANUCIIKA class guided missile patrol gunboat (P(;G) (Figure 16). The first of these became operational in the summer of 1969. NANUCHKA's surface -to- surface missile, housed in two triple -tube launchers, is believed to represent it modification of the SS -N -3. "I'hc horizon range capability of this SSM is probably about 30 nautical miles. Using a [SEAR (Tu 95), another ship or submarine, or a HORMONE (Ka -25) helicopter for target indication, this weapon could he fired to .I range of about 100 nautical miles. A new destroyer class of about 400 feet, designated KRIVAK class, carries one probable SSM launcher and a point defense Sn Vi launcher forward and aft. In early 1972, the first unit of the KARA class Figure 17) guide(] missile light cruiser became operational. This class, .which is similar to the KRESTA 11 class, is the world's first ship to he cgttipped with three missile systems (SS -N -10, SA -N -3, Si; -N -4). APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 12. KRESTA I class guided missile light cruiser (C) z a:u ':r^'.,.. ',r ,�r ','a,w.r *',max-- y..+': .a.:. :...J.o- ,rr�... Jlr " -.r V t'wOt As of April 1973 the submarine force consisted of 24 classes, of which 13 were equipped either With cruise or ballistic missiles. Since 1968, six new classes have been added to the operational inventory: YANKEE cl ass, nuclear powered, ballistic missile (SSBN); CHARLIE class, nuclear powered, cruise missile (SSGN) (Figure 18); V1C "COR class, nuclear- powered (SSN) (Figure 19); ALFA class, nuclear powered (SSN); PAPA class, nuclear- powered (SSGN); and BRAVO class (SS). Three (the YANKEE, CHARLIE, and N'ICTOR) of the sir new classes titre second- gene ration nuclear por:ered submarines, and the ALFA and PAPA may he third generation nuclear powered submarines. The PAPA appears to he similar to but considerable larger than the (AIARLIE. Although it was once in series production at Severildvinsk in the Northern Fleet area and at Konisomolsk" in the Pacific area, the YANKEE: class SSGN is now constructed only at the latter vard. Production at Severodvinsk has been discontinued in favor of the newest member in the Soviet submarine "For diacritics on place nanu�s see the list of n ;ones un the atnon of the surnmary %iap and the map itself in the Countr Profile chapter. inventory, the DELTA class SSBN (Figure 20). It is 25 feet longer than the YANKEE class and is also expected to he built at Komsomolsk. The YANKEE class carries 16 1,300- nautical -mile, submerged launched SS -N -6 ballistic missiles; the DELTA class probably carries 12 4,200- nautical -mile, submerged launched SS -N -8 ballistic missiles. Unique to the navy is the diesel- electric or nuclear powered cruise missile submarine. The navy's latest entries into the cruise missile force are the CHARLIE and PAPA SSGN classes. The first evidence of the CHARLIE class was early in 1968 in the Northern Fleet. The PAPA class was first observed in the same area early in 1971. The CHARLIE class carries eight SS -N -7 missiles in its bulbous how. The PAPA class, which has a similar but larger bow, is estimated to carry antiship cruise missiles also, although they have not been identified. Unlike ether nuclear- powered cruise missile submarines, the CFIARLIE and PAPA classes are believed to have submerged- launch capabilities. The range of the SS -N -7 is estimated to be tiv to 40 nautical miles, but the range of the PAPA class missile is not known. Follow-on to the NOVENIBER Class nuclear powered submarine is the VICT011 class, first observed under construction at the Admiraltv 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 13. KRESTA II class guided missile light cruiser (S) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 15. KANIN class guided missile destroyer (C) At pierside, with missile launcher and 57 -mm antiaircraft mount covered by canvas At sea, with equipment unshrouded 26 FIGURE 14. Moskva guided missile helicopter ship (C) FIGURE 16. NANUCHKA class guided missile patrol gunboat (S) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 Ship;crd in Leningrad. Like the (:l1ARLID' class SSG1. the VICT011 became oper;tlional in 15168, it is estiEri:ited to be the h istest sethmarine ill Ilse %vurld. �.ith it inasi n�ton subinvi ged speed of i ll Ivast knots The 1'1(:T011 class is in seriv production, 12 units lta itig been built as of April 197.1 '11114. 1311AVO c�]ass sul>natrine. a small submarine ilipr.iximutt I 220 Fret long. is probahlt tinder votisin �c�tion it Kornsomolsk S11iptani. The 13111wo vlass propu[sion ,Sce for %uhuierted operations and the mission of the I3RAVO-c�laaarc� inickermined. It is 1 that the 11IIAVO class utilize. diesel prnlmisieen in a %orfaved Coodition is eif 1pril M73, ool% one unit of the A�]'A class had ln�en observed, It is pruhablt nuclear J)"mc -rt,d. \tthousat its cruet mission is not knouri. (11(� ALFA cla is prob:thk :r prolottpe te platform for flit Hurd Mi-nerition of nuclear %tibmitrines- N nest vkl Soriet subinarint, vas sighted IZtle� ire 1970 olit�raflug at sea in Northern Fleet waters The siebn �arine ;is sivIlled on the surface o perating; indepcndenih and could lint I)v co rrelated to ans knnnn 5oviel mlimarinv%. The hull of (1�t, sitbrnarirte was rep orted to reseinhle that of it l, class nuclear powered cruise missile submarine (5SGX). The oh%vrvc d length of 350 feet. howet er, ;ts much kn9vr than Hie CIIAIiLIE c�luss length of 3(1R fret. The s;til of th is tinit wits sirriilur to 111;11 of an 1:(:110 class SS {a', all(] the bow %ii s extremd\ brciad and btikbom. Neither the propulsion nor the weapon system oil this unit is kni mn; however, litielear- po-wered propulsion is estimated. Became cif its resvitiWanrt, to (he CIIA111.11: Class SSG\, it is possible that this class mat incorporate a cruise- missile� systein in the area Forward of the sail. Orile ..:tv unit of the class has been observvil to date. Although [lo data available indicate that the chm, is ill series procitictioii, this stibrnarine has bec�rt desil;Eaatc�(I !':11' 1 chess SSG first- geoerltion ballistic titiss"Ie subnuerinos (SS13) ;t�id nuclear- I)overed ballistic missile- submarines (SS(:\) remain active its naval operif]onal tinits. The C]U'l'I:I: to I!()'I'l:i. !I SSHN c�onvemion prorirn as c�one�lncled earls ill 1970. whily the (.0 [.1 I to COL. SS13 program continues (Figury 21 13 April 197 :3. 12 units had been converted to tbc� configuration. While the GOI.F -I carries three� 300 n:tittic�al- rnilc�. su rfaced- ]nanrhrd SS -'I ballistic missiles. both the- COIF -I I and 1 iO 1'1:1: II e�iurr tlire�r 7(H)- Efall(ic4l eililc suhinerged- launched Two G01.1 units are unclerg;oii an e% eiulvil modifica- tion indicating that file will he corifitgurvilcither than the normal conversion to it COLF 11. One 1 10 1 1�;1. -I tiiiit i estirnutt,c! tit hove peen converted (.e cnrr .is missile. lu�tnchvrs. 17e�sig;iratcil 1i() "1'1.1: iI[. this Class is probahly a n�soarch aitcl deveiopmelit missile� test platform and as prokn wwd for the net -1?00- 2; APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 17. KARA class guided missile light cruiser W/0U) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 18. CHARLIE class nuclear powered cruise missile sub- marine (U /OU) 28 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 20. DELTA class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 21. GOLF class ballistic missile submarine (C) nautical -mile SS -N -8 SLBM believed now operational in the 13ELTA class. Similar conversion of HOTEL -II to HOTEL -III are not expected. The last active ZULU Conversion class SSB was placed in it reserve training status in December 1972. The "LULU Conversion carries two SS -N -4 missiles. The Jder cruise missile submarines are the ECHO -I and ECHO -I1, JULIETT, and WHISKEY etas- ^s. Two Pacific Fleet ECHO -I nuclear- powered cruse missile submarines have had their missile pubes removed in the course of conversion to nuclear attack submarines. The remaining three Pacific Fleet ECHO I's will probably be converted to the ECHO -I SSN configuration. The ECH04 SSGN carries six SS -N -3 cruise missiles. The ECHO -I follow -on, the ECHO -11, carries eight SS -N -Ts. The maximum operational range of the SS -N -3 is 220 nautical iniics. The JULIETT class cruise missile submarine (SSG) program concluded in 1969 with a total of 16 units constructed. The JULIETT class carries four SS -N -3a missiles and is the only diesel- powered cruise missile submarine (SSG) actively engaged in out -of -area operations. The navy's oldest operational SSG, the WHISKEY class LONG BIN (four launcher) and TWIN CYLINDER configurations, have not been deployed out -of -area in recent years. The W1IT.SKEY class SSG's have been restricted to in -area waters �the Sea of Japan and the Baltic, Barents, and Black Seas. Qualitative improvements in capabilities have been evident in areas other than missile armament and nuclear propulsion. Research and development efforts in ASW since 1960 are apparent in the employment of improved sensors and weapons. New models have been installed in some units. For example, low frequency sonars of 3.0 and 4.5 K1 1z plus it ,ariable depth sonar (VDS) are fitted on the Moskva and KARA classes, and 8.0 K11z bo%v sonars probably have been fitted on KANIN and KRESTA II and KRIVAK class combatants. The Moskva class has also been equipped with the SUW -N -1 long- range(16- nautical- mile) antisubmarine warfare (ASW) rocket. Con- version of KRUPNYY SSM (SS -N -1) configured guided missile destrovers to KANIN class SAM (SA -N- 1) configured guided missile destroyers, with improved ASW dualities, continw i. Additional units of the KASHIN guided missile frigate are under construc- tion. A program to retrofit the KASHIN class with a variable depth sonar and a helicopter platform is underway. The stew general- purpose destroyer KRIVAK, carrying both surface -!o -air and surface -to- surface missiles, along with improved ASW equipment, may serve as the replacement for the aging Soviet conventional destrover and destrover escort force and substantially upgrade Soviet open -ocean capabilities. More important, new equipment is seen as standard on the classes of ships in current production. Mine warfare has had it significant share of research effort, resulting in a new acoustic- rising mine with a considerable capability of selecting its target, and which presents mine countermeasure problems. Developments of Soviet mine countermeasure forces have centered on the wooden hulled VANYA class coastal minehunter, which first appeared in 1961. A new minesweeper, designated ZHENYA, was added to the navaistrength in 1970. This 143 -foot vessel may be constructed of wood- reinforced fiber glass; if so, it would be the largest ship in the world to be so constructed. Only two ZUIENYA were produced and it is believed they were prototypes for a glass- reinforced, plastic -hull minesweeper. During the 1960's, the gas turbine and combined diesel and gas turbine propulsion systems were introduced, and great strides were made in the quality of support ships and auxiliaries. Improvements have taken place in electronic equipment, particularly in air search radar, communications, and electronic countermeasures. After languishing for almost two decades following World War 11, the naval infantry was reactivated in 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 1963 to provide it specially trained and equipped force to spearhead amphibious landing operations. In addition to this offensive mission, this elite force is also assigned the defensive role of repulsing enemy amphibious assaults. Since 1963, the Soviets have gradually expanded their amphibious strength and capability. The current strength is about 9,000 men organized into about five regiments of about 1,800 men each with one regiment assigned to each fleet, except the Pacific Fleet, which has two. Even though the naval infantry force is small, it is growing steadily, and landing exercises since 1968 indicate that the Soviets are systematically developing the effectiveness of the force. The equipment used by the naval infantry is modern and of the best in use by the infante and motorized rifle forces of the Soviet Union. At this time the Soviet amphibious forces are structured and located for operations on the periphery of the U.S.S.R. They have only it limited, long -range seaborne assault capability. In certain circumstances they could carry out small- scale, unopposed landings. However, against significant opposition such a force would have little utility. Amphibious units do frequently deploy to distant areas. Since the end of the Arab- Israeli War in 1967, the Soviets have normally maintained one tank landing ship and two medium landing si'nps in the Mediterranean. This represents an amphibious lift capability of one battalion landing team (433 men and associated equipment), although it is riot known if such a team is actually embarked in the Mediterranean ships. Soviet Navy coasted defense forces comprise the primary combat forces and equipment activated for the defense of important installations in coastal sectors. "These forces include personnel at coastal gun and missile sites and their supporting echelons. Although missiles constitute the bulk of the forces, some naval bases remain partially dependent on gums for their protection. The initial missile in the coastal defense forces was the SSC -21) (SAMLET) missile. This highly accurate system still provides protection for major naval installations and straits on it point- defense principle out to a distance of 25 to =15 nautical miles from the coast. Improved capabilities have been realized xvith the SSC -lb (SHADDOCK), a transporter erector launcher -type 250- nautical -mile missile, which is deployed in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific fleet areas. Against this buildup of naval strength are arrayed it number of weaknesses. The navy is handicapped mostly by lack of adequate construction and repair facilities in each fleet area. The physical separation 30 and the dependence on two fleets to provide most major construction is one of the major weaknesses. A limited open -ocean ASW capability and a vulnerabil- ity to carrier launched air attacks remain a problem. Current construction and conversion programs, however, have emphasized ship and weapon production designed to lessen these: problem areas. The Soviet Navy also lacks it high -speed underway replenishment capability. Underway replenishment is usually accomplished by the stern -to -bow or bow -to- stern methods, which are time consuming. Although the navy is able to provide adequate logistic support in peacetime with a combination of naval and merchant ships, its lack of proficiency in alongside underway refueling reduces flexibility and, in it conventional war, would make the ships vulnerable to attack during it replenishment operation. The quality of naval personnel is generally high. The top echelons of command have been infused with dynamic and apparently well qualified younger men. Rapidly advancing technology has placed a high premium on profession- ulism, and junior officers have found incentives and room for advancement. Continued emphasis on complex exercises and realistic out -of -area training will improve personnel efficiency. 1. Organization Since March 19-33, the navy, as well as all other services, has been under overall operational control of the Minister of Defense. The Commander in Chief of the Navy concurrently holds the position of a deputy minister of defense. In this capacity he participates in the formulation of top -level military policy decisions. Within the framework of the Ministry of Defense policy, the Commander in Chief of the Navy is responsible for the overall control, administration, development, training, and general state of combat readiness of the naval forces. He exercises this control through it main naval staff, a number of main naval directorates, and the commanders of the several fleets and flotillas. The Main Naval Staff is the operations and planning organ of the Commander in Chief of the Navy. It is composed of it dozen 'or more subordinate directorates and departments, each of which is designated by a number as well as it title. The directorates of the Main Naval Staff which have been identified are: Operations (Ist); Intelligence (2d); Observation and Coin munications (3d); Organization Nth); Electronics (5th); Military Transportation (7th); Cryptography (8th); Combat Training; Personnel; and Training and Replacements. The Main Naval Staff maintains close liaison with the General Staff of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as with the staffs of the several fleets and the one independent flotilla command. Detailed information on the functions of the Main Naval Staff is not available. There are four other principal groupings of naval services and directorates: Political, Naval Training Establishments, Shipbuilding and Armaments, and the Rear Services. Each group is heade t y a Deputy Commander i- `hief. 'I he major operational forces are divided into four fleets, one for each of the principal maritime approaches to the U.S.S.R. These fleets are named .'ter their respective geographic areas Baltic, Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific. Each fleet is practically a self contained force, having elements of naval aviation, coastal and antiaircraft defense, naval infantry, and the necessary rear services to support all the forces ashore and afloat. The organizational structure of it N :et headquarters parallels that of the navy as a whole, with the fleet commander responsible for all matters pertaining to his command. There are, in addition, two independent commands: the Caspian Sea Flotilla and lh- Leningrad Naval District. 'These hav^ independent status directly subordinate, at least in peacetime, to the Commander in Chief of the Navy. In time of war they Would probably be subordinated to the nearest major fleet. Since 1964, the Soviets have maintain: -d a naval fork in the Mediterranean called a squadron (eskatlra). It has grown steadily in size and capability. In 1972 it averaged 49 surface ships and submarines. The political impact of the presence of this squadron has given it international status roughly quivalent to that of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. It is probable that the Soviet Medi terra new i Squadron is now a permanent force directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Navy. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition' The personnel strength of the navy has remained fairly stable at about 470,000 for several years. The major fleet and flotilla strength consists of two guided missile helicopter ships; 12 light cruisers; 14 missile cruisers; 2 old heavy cruisers; -10 guided missile destroyers; 38 destroyers; 105 destroyer escorts; and 310 submarines, including 63 ballistic missile submarines and 66 cruise missile submarines. In addition, there are 769 minor surface combatants, 370 mine warfare types, 229 amphibious ships and craft, 'Fur detailed information see the current issue of .Military Intelligence Summary and the Automated :Vocal Order of Battle, Volume 1, both published by the llefeuse Intelligence Agency. and 725 auxiliary types. Some additional surface ships are in reserve status (one cruiser, 23 destroyers, 14 destroye- escorts, and some minor combatants and auxiliz Also, 73 medium- and short -range submaroi� are believed inactive. These units could he restored to active service if required. In terms of total number of naval ships (but not total tonnage) the Soviet Navy is the largest in the world. Figure 22 shows the disposition of the Soviet Navy. The Soviets repeatedly have stated that nuciear- powered missile- equipped submarines are tie main striking force of their navy, and construction programs reflect this. There is ample evidence, also, of efforts to improve the ASW capabilities of the submarine force. The VICTOR class has been built for an antisub- marine submarine role. 3. Training The navy operates a large netv.ork of training establishments. All fleet areas contain schools for enlisted men, officers, and future officers. Leningrad is the chief center of training for naval officers and officer candidates. Severomorsk, Sevastopol, and Vladivostok are also important training centers. More than 100 separate training establishments are estimated to be in operation. Unit training afloat and ashore is conducted in accordance with tactical and operational doctrine established for the navy as a Whole. Training is constantly underway, is rigorously supervised, and ranges in scope from squad drill to combined exercises among the fleets of the Soviet European Communist countries. Competitions and awards are liberally employed as incentives for individuals and units to attain high training standards. Specialization is a basic principle of trainin;. Separate higher naval schools train future officers for line, line- engineering, shore engineering, submarine, communications, aviation, coast artillery, and political specialities, among others. It is usual for an officer to serve his entire career within the specialty for which he has been trained. Advanced specialization is just as much a goal of enlisted training as it is of officer training. Political indoctrination is another important aspect of training, just as it is in the everyday life of all Soviet citizens. It is a standard feature in training afloat as well as in units and schools ashore and occupies a prominent part of all curriculums, training schedules, and leisure activities. Inductees iin it relatively short period of recruit training, after which they are assigned to operational units. The best qualified Oisted 31 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 22. Disposition of active units of the Soviet navy (S) BALTIC BLACK SEA NORTHERN PACIFIC FLEET FLEET FLEET FLEET TOTALS Helicopter ships 0 2 0 0 2 Cruisers 6 10 6 6 28 Destroyer and escort types........... 43 *53 40 47 183 Minor combatant, mine warfare, and amphibious types 422 *420 195 331 1,368 Auxiliary types 160 *172 200 193 725 Submarines 29 28 177 106 340 Total 660 685 618 583 2,646 *Includes three destroyer escorts in the Caspian Sea. **Includes 95 units in the Caspian Sea. *Includes 16 units in the Caspian Sea. personnel may be sent to specialist schools, with consequent opportunities for advancement to petty officer. Outstanding enlisted personnel are permitted to apply for officer training in a higher naval school. Until recently, however, preference was given to graduates of naval preparatory schools or civilian secondary schools. Advanced training for officers is conducted at officer specialist schools on a level equivalent to that of the U.S. Navy postgraduate schools. One naval academy in Leningrad, the Order of Lenin Naval Academy, takes officers under the age of 36 who have served in the fleet between 6 and 10 years and trains them for senior staff appointments. A number of naval repair yards are available, though hard pressed, to support the expanding Soviet fleet. Major naval repair yards are located at Kronshtadt, Liepaya, Rosta, Severodvinsk, Sevastopol, Vladivostok, and Petrovka. These repair yards are able to provide all types of repairs, conversions, modifications, routine maintenance, and overhauls. The Soviets have and will. retain the capability to build and maintain their fleet at a level which meets their national requirements. In the event of mobilization, there is sufficient shipyard capability to satisfy increased demands on the ship construction and repair industry. 5. Naval aviation 4. Logistics All ships added to the Soviet naval inventory in recent years have been built in Soviet shipyards, except for a few classes of amphibious and auxiliary ships of East European origin. Naval shipbuilding is performed in yards specializing in naval construction and in yards building both naval and merchant ships. Current construction programs include both nuclear and conventionally powered submarines; a large air associated combatant; guided missile cruisers and destroyers with increased ASW, antiair warfare, and extended range cruising capabilities; escorts, sub- marine chasers, mine warfare craft, amphibious craft, and auxiliaries. New construction programs are being augmented by submaune and surface ship conversion programs. Key naval ship construction yards are located at Leningrad, Kaliningrad, Severodvinsk, Gorkiv, Nikolayev, Kerch, Komsomolsk, Khabarovsk, and Zelenodolsk. 32 Soviet Naval Aviation (Aviatsiya Voyenno- Morskogo Flota), basically a land -based force, is an integral component of the Soviet Navv. Naval aviation has both tactical and strategic roles, but its primary mission is the destruction of hostile surface forces, with emphasis on the fast carrier strike force. Additional missions include maritime reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, destruction of enemy port facilities, protection of the seaward flanks of the ground forces from hostile surface forces, minelaying, and, under certain circumstances, support of amphibious operations. Naval aviation crews are believed to be highly trained in air -to- surface missile attacks against hostile naval forces, and the acquisition of BEAR D aircraft has greatly increased the naval aviation reconnais- sance capability. In recent years considerable emphasis has been directed toward improving air antisubmarine v. arfare capabilities through the introduction of new aircraft, weapons, and sensors. In offshore areas these APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 capabilities have been enhanced; however, despite the introduction of the long -range BEAR F aircraft, Naval Aviation open -ocean antisubmarine warfare capabili- ties remain extremely limited. The fleet air forces are administratively subordinate to headquarters, Soviet Naval Aviation, Moscow, through the Commander of Naval Aviation, who is it deputy of the Commander in Chief of the Navy. The four fleet air forces Baltic Flect Air Force, Black Sea Fleet Air Force. Northern Fleet :fir Force, and the I'acific Fleet Air Force �are operationally subordinate to the respective fleet commanders. Within the fleet areas the operational units are organized into divisions, regiments, and squadrons. While the division concept is evident in all fleets among the medium bomber strike units, the organization of reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare resources are oriented toward independent units directly subordinate to the fleet headquarters rather than to it division. As of 1 April 1973, the combat aircraft strength of :iaval aviation was estimated at 1,029 aircraft, which is approximately evenly distributed among the four fleet air forces, with emphasis on the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas. The aircraft i�:, iude 45 heavy reconnaissance BEAR D aircri 525 medium jet bombers, 34 light jet bombers, 10 BEAR F long -range ASW aircraft, 44 Mr11' land -based ASW aircraft, 93 MAIL ASW amphibians, and 278 MOUND and 1I01ILMONE helicopters employed primarily in the ASW role. The BADGER C, which carries one KIPPER (AS -2) missile or with it modification thus far observed only in the Northern Fleet area, two KELT (AS -5) or AS -6 air -to- surface missiles, and the BADGER G (Figure 23), configured for delivery of two A,S -5 or AS -6 missiles, constitute the primary striking force of Soviet Naval Aviation. The MAIL (Figure 2 -1), XIAY (Figure 25), and HORMONE A (Figure 26) are all employed in the ASW role. FIGURE 24. Naval aviation MAIL (ASW) aircraft (C) FIGURE 25. Naval aviation MAY (ASW) aircraft (U /OU) '7r+ tom FIGURE 26. Naval aviation HORMONE A (ASW) aircraft (U /OU) There are, in addition, about 190 transport aircraft of various hypes assigned to the fleet air forces by Military Transport Aviation. There are an estimated 45,000 personnel assigned to naval aviation, of which 10,000 are in operational units and support elements, and 5,000 are at the Ministry of Defense level and in preoperational training. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 23. Naval aviation BADGER G (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 E. Air and air defense forces 1. Soviet Air Forces (S) The Soviet Air Forces' (\'oyenno- vozdnshnyye Silt'� \'S) consist of bong Range Aviation, Tactical Aviation, Aviation of Air Defense, and Military Transport Aviation. These forces are being steadily modernized and have strong offensive and defensive capabilities. Long Range Aviation (Oalnaya Aviatsiya- 1,13A),' one of the three strategic offensive forces, has the mission of striking targets of potential enemies with nuclear or conventional weapons, performing armed reconnaissance and homh- damage assessment, and supporting naval and front commanders, as required. I,RA crews are believed to be highly proficient in all the basic aspects of strategic air operations: navigation; bombing; air -to- surface missile (ASM) strike procedures; staging; penetration tactics: employment of electronic countermeasures (ECM); and, for most heave bomber crews, in- flight refueling. The total number of aircraft in the LRA bomber inventory has gradually decreased, primarily through BADGER attrition, but the BLINDER, BEAR, and BISON inventory has retrained fairly stable since 1969. The capabilities of the force have been improved by the introduction of the supersonic -clash medium jet bomber BLINDEII (free -fall bomber and ASM carrier) in 1962, the acquisition of an in- flight refueling capability for about -10 of the BEAD force, the introduction of the :350- nautical -mile KANGA- ROO ASNI tQo BEAR units, the 250 nautical -mile KITCHEN ASM into BLINDER units, the 120 nautical -mile KEI,T ASM and, more recently, the i00- nautical -mile AS -6 into BADGER units. Figure 27 shows the LRA BEAR B aircraft. 13ISON (Figure 28), the jet heavy bomber, is assigned only to LRA. About 55,0 of the BADGERS (Figure 29) are in I,RA; the remainder are assigned to naval aviation. Tacuc.,l Aviation (Fronlovaya Aviatsiya, literally Aviation of the Front) is it multipurpose force. Its mission is to provide counterair and close air support for ground forces and probably to supp IWO Strany in strategic air defense. Its employ, doctrine stresses mobility and flexibility. It has i t good capability for both tactical strike and defensive. operations with either conventional or nuclear weapons. 'fhe term Soviet Air Forces turd throughout this section dues not include naval illation, an integral part of the Soviel Nav "Additional detaik on this subjvct arc contained in the Def -mv Intellegrncc Agency study Soriet long Range Aviation (AP- 2.10 -6- I- 68 -INT), amended in April 1970. 3.1 FIGURE 27. Long Range Aviation BEAR B (C) FIGURE 28. Long Range Aviation BISON B (C) The overall strength of Tactical Aviation has increased by 600 aircraft since 1968. This buildup has been primarily along the Sino- Soviet border, including four Soviet fighter units in Mongolia. The inc.-ase consists mainly of older generation aircraft withdrawn from storage and assigned to operational units. "There has also [)evil a gradual increase throughout Tactical Aviation of new reconnaissance units equipped with late -model aircraft. The reequipment of "Tactical Aviation with current model aircraft is continuing but at it slow rate. Fighter aircraft include the FARMER (MiG -19), FISIIBED (Mi(;-21) (Figure 30), FITTER (Su -7) (Figure 31 FRESCO (MiG -17), it few FIRE M11 (Yak -281)), and some FLOGGER. The light jet bomber force consists of subsonic BEAGLE (11 -28) a,.d supersonic BREWER (Yak -28) aircraft (Figure 1 2). Reconnaissance is performed by MANGROVE (Yak -27), FOKBAT (Mig -25), and by versions of the BEIAGI,E, BREWER, FISI-IBED, and FRESCO. All fighters can he employed in multipurpose roles, i.e., an air defense or ground support role. About 55% of the fighters have un all- weather capability and are used primarily for air defense. Roth the Bl ,AGL,F, and the B111 "WER have an all weather bombing capability, and both these aircraft can reach targets within it radius of about 500 nautical miles. At least four APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 29. BADGER A used in Long Range Aviation and in Soviet Naval Aviation (C) FIGURE 30. FISHBED (MiG -21) used in Soviet Tactical Aviation (C) aircraft types (FISHBED, 14'I "1'TER, BEAGLE, and BREWER) arc capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Aviation of Air Defense (Avialsiya Prolivoyozdttsh- noy Ohorony Slrany �APVO) is one of four functional divisions of the PVO Slrany. Its mission is to provide air defense of the U.S.S.R., especially for major population, industrial, and military centers. About 2i( of the APVO interceptor force is composed of fighters introduced in 1957 or earlier: the FR1? and FARMER. These subsonic or low supersonic models are largely gun armed, limited to tail attacks at ranges of a half mile or less, and have little capability above 50,000 feet. 'I'hesc older fighters are gradually being phased out of active units but may be retained in a reserve status. A limited number of FARMERS and FRESCOS are armed with AA -lb (ALKALI) or AA -21) (ATOLL) missiles, providing these aircraft with an air -to -air capability in the range of 2 to 4 miles. Some 25% of the interceptor force consists of the Mach 2 FISHPO"I'. 7'hc FISHPOT B is armed with a first generation air -to -air missile (AAM which limits this aircraft to tail attacks within a range of 2 to 4 miles. 'I'hc FISF C, of which there may FIGURE 31. FITTER (Su -7) used in Soviet Tactical Aviation (C) 33 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 32. BREWER (Yak -28) used in Soviet Tactical Aviation (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 he as many as 100, is fitted with an improved air -to -air missile and probably with it compatible airborne intercept radar which may permit head -on attacks. The remainder of the force is composed of new interceptors introduced Ance 1964. The weapon systems carried by these interceptors have longer ronges and can be used in tw or more att ack modes, thus significantly increasing Soviet air defense capabilities. The first of the newer aircraft to be deployed was the all weather, low- and medium altitude FIREBAR interceptor. The FIREBAR usually carries two AA -3 ANAB missiles, and sonic are modified to carry two additional missiles. Radar or infrared homing guidance on the ANAB, coupled with the aircraft fire control vstem, enables the FIREBAR to conduct both head on and tail attacks. FIREBAR h also been seen armed with t1te ATOLL missile. The aircraft can achieve speeds near Mach 2 at higher altitudes but is limited to subsonic speeds at low altitude. Production ceased on the FIREBAR in 1967. This aircraft is based primarily on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., along the se award and lowland approaches to strategic targets, for defense: against low altitude penetration. In low altitude defense the FIREBAR is used more effectively over water or relatively flat terrain because of the lirnited ground clutter suppression capability of its radar. The lung- range, medium- and high altitude all weather FIDDLER is another of the newer aircraft. The 1 %DL.ER is armed with four AA -5 ASH missiles which are usually carried in mixed loads of two semi fictive horning or two infrared homing versions. The FIDDLER is capable of attacking targets from any direction. The third of these modern aircraft, the mediunr and high altitude F!-AGON all- weather point- defense interceptor, carries an Al radar and AA- 3 ANAB missiles. It can attack both head -on and from the rear. 1 LAGONs have practiced low altitude intercepts but do so infrequently. The newest aircraft in the interceptor force is the Mach 3 high altitude FOXBAT all- weather fighter, first deployed with a 1 regiment in mid -1970. FOXBAT carries a new air to air missile, the AA 6, which incorporates infrared or semiactive radar horning. There has been no indication that the FOXBAT has it look -down /shoot -down capability, although the aircraft is probably equipped with a new radar. Military Transport Aviation (Voyenno-transport- nal,a Avialsiya� V'I'A) is responsible for deploying men and materiel to meet war and near -war requirements, and it operates an air logistic system to supply deployed forces and support other Soviet 36 interests. VTA is committed to provide air transport support to long- range, tactical, air defense, and naval aviation; airborne troops; rocket troops; and special missions under the control of the Soviet Air Forces. A major recquipment program which began in 1960 has provided VTA with CUB (An -12) medium turboprop assault transports a.,d the COCK (An -22) heavy turboprop logistic transport. The CUB (Figure 33) can move men and materiel in close support of combat areas. Most of these have been used to reequip the element of VTA which supports airborne operations �VTA Central (V'rA /CNT). One regi- ment, at Orrnienburg, East Germany, is equipped with the CAMP (An -8). The CAMP (Figure 34), used for military logistic service and for parachute drop, can operate into and out of selected unimproved fields. The new long range, four engine heavy turboprop transport, the COCK, first displayed in June 1965, entered service in 1967. COCK (Figure 35) is a long -range heavy logistic carrier. This transport will provide it marked increase in airlift capabilities for VTA /CNT. The COCK fulfills it long -term Soviet requirement for a heavy transport capable of rapid, long -range delivery of troops and larger, heavier combat materiel than the CUB and CAMP can handle. CO" is capable of transporting almost any item of ground ordnance equipment, including heavy tanks, radar vans, and tactical missiles. The VTA /CNT, using the CUB as prime carrier, can carry assault elements of two airborne divisions in it parachute drop or airlanded operation to it distance of 760 to 900 nautical miles, or it can transport a division with all equipment in it ferry lift operation to it distance of 1,400 nautical miles. Augmentation of this capability can be provided within limits by the civil air fleet. The CUBS assigned to the civil air fleet are equal to three full- strength transport regiments. Other assigned civil transports could be useful in an initial attack. In addition to transport aircraft, the VTA is assigned various models of helicopters. The HOOK (Mi -6) (Figure 36) is it heavy transport helicopter. The HIP (Mi -8) (Figure 37), it large single rotor helicopter, has appeared in VTA. Military 'Transport Aviation is a service organiza- tion and, as such, is fragmented into transport units deployed to various force commanders of the Soviet Air Forces. The force commanders assume immediate operational control of assigned transport units. Overall operational and administrative control is retained by he V'I'A commander which allows him to recall or re.0 transports as necessary. 'I he operational chain of command of the V'I'A flows from the Ministry of Defense to the Commander in Chief, VTA. The major element of the VTA is APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 '1+4 r.P"Yftfi l Er a 'k+nnt,p�.- W T FIGURE 33. Military Transport Aviation CUB (An -12) (IJ /OU) FIGURE 34. Military Transport Aviation CAMP (An -8) (C) VTA /CNT which supports airborne troops and performs other logistic support as required. VTA retains operational and administrative control of this unit. a. Organization The Commander in Chief of Soviet Air Forces, a Marshal of Aviation, is also one of the deputy ministers of defense, a member of the Party Central Committee, and probably of the Higher Military Council. As a member of the high command, he is believed to participate in the planning and development of strategy for employinent of the air forces in conjunction with other force components and, in this capacity, to participate in the issuance of broad operational directives to the air forces. The Commander it. Chief of Soviet Air Forces provides overall supervision of the component forces in matters relating to doctrine, organization, training, manpower, and logistics. He is assisted by a first deputy commander; three deputy commanders for combat training, aviation engineering services, and rear services; and the chief of the air forces main staff. A subordinate commander for Tactical Aviation has not been identified. Administrative functions related to tactical aviation probably are provided by the air farces main staff and it number of specialized FIGURE 35. Military Transpc!t Aviation COCK (An -22) (C) E4 01 f r FIGURE 36. Military Transport Aviation HOOK (Mi -6) (U /OU) 37 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA RDP01 00707R000200090036 7 FIGURE 37. Military Transport Aviation HIP (Mi -8) (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 directorates within the air force headquarters. One of these is the Military Council of the Air Forces, believed to be an agency of the Communist Party, within the Ministry of Defense. Long Range Aviation is divided by geographic area into three long -range air armies, each of which is organized into medium bomber and heavy bomber regiments. In addition, an arctic command supports LRA aircraft operating in that region. This command is under the operational control of the Minister of Defense; administrative CY lta.a is exercised by the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Forces. The organization of LRA headquarters is similar to that of air forces headquarters, but on a reduced scale. Tactical Aviation is organized into 16 air armies. Tactical air armies are a component of military forces comprising waified or integrated commands assigned to military districts within the U.S.S.R. and to Soviet groups of forces outside the country. The size and composition of each tactical air formation varies according i'o need. The organization of tits systems for command and control of operations of Tactical Aviation ppears well defined. The chain of operational command is from the Ministry of Defense to commanders of military districts, or groups of forces, to which air armies at the field level are operationally subordinate. The Commander in Chief of Soviet Air Forces, as a ranking member of the high command at the ministry level, is almost certainly included in the operational planning and strategic direction of tactical air armies. At the field level, commanders of air armies are believed to be deputies for aviation to the military district, group of forces, or, in wartime, front comm ands. While coordination of weapons systems is provided in these territorial areas through a joint command and control structure, the operational control and employment of aircraft is retained by commanders of air armies so as to insure appropriate utilization of aircraft capabilities and to provide mobility and flexibility in employment. For the strategic air defense function, certain fighter elements of Tactical Aviation respond to orders of the Commander of Soviet .Strategic Defense Forces (PVO Strany) or his subordinate comm anders in air defense territorial areas in which the tactical air elements are located. Soviet forces stationed in East Germanv have a modified command structure for controlling fighter aircraft, principally in an air defense situation. Here, northern and southern corps echelons of command have been introduced. This refinement in control authority in it theater -type deployment of 'Tactical 38 Aviation enhances !rsatility in employment of fighter aircraft. Additionally, it defines more precisely the areas of responsibility in a w eapons saturated environment and may serve as a medium for integrating operations of weapons systems performing an air defense function. This necessitates the Tactical Aviation Commander, acting as Chief of Air Defense of the Ground Forces (PVO Voysk), to have operational control of all air defense forces, i.e., Aviation, c 1M's, AAA, and early warning radars, within his area. Aviation of Air Defense (APVO) is subordinate to PVO S any headquarters near Moscow. The deputy for 0VO is respo� Bible to the PVO Strany commander for the deployment and employment of fighter units and establishes fighter interception procedures for all fighter aircraft, including fighters in Tactical Aviation when needed for air defense purr. iscs. The operational chain oi` command of Military Transport Aviation is from the Minister of Defense to the commander of the vTA. Transport units and their operational control are allocated to commanders of force components by the commander of the VTA for normal air support roles, bui retains overall control and can withdraw or reassign aircraft as necessary for emergency or priority tasks. b. Strength, composition, and disposition' The Soviet Air Forces have about 373,000 personnel and over 11,600 combat and support aircraft, including helicopters, in operational units. Of the personnel, 472,000 are in operational units and support elements of the several forces (including 130,000 in the air defense forces), and 101,000 are in high command in generai zupport, including Ministry of Defense, research and development, and preoperational training. As of 1 October 1973, Long Range Aviation, with an operational personnel strength of 37,000, consisted of 873 bombers and tankers deployed on 27 airfields and organized into 26 medium bomber regiments and 9 heavy bomber regiments in three air armies. The lst Long Range Air Army encompasses the northwestern part of the U.S.S.R., the 2d Long Range Air Army is in the southwestern portion of the country, and the 3d Long Range Air Army is located in the far eastern U. S. S. R. Tactical Aviation consists of over 4,600 combat aircraft organized into over 100 regiments. It has some Tor detailed information on orcG�r of battle for all Soviet Air Forces sec the current issue of the Soviet Aircraft Order of Battle (AP- 2.10 -2 -4 series), published by the Defense Intelligence Agency. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 187,000 personnel assigned to operational units and support elements. Approximately 6,000 pilots are assigned to operational units. An estimated 3.3% of the total personnel are assigned to the air armies in groups of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Approximately 33,000 are assigned to the 16th Tactical Air Army in East Germany. There are 12 air armies in the military_ districts of the U.S.S.R. Aviation of Air Defense has about 90,000 personnel in operational units and support elements. Combat fighter aircraft total about 2,700 in 84 regiments. About 75% o: these fighters tire late models. Military Transport Aviation has approximately 100,000 personnel assigned to its operational units and support elements. Total aircraft strength is about 3, 300. 'file Soviet air facilities' system consists of more than 3,250 airfields vnd a few minor seaplane. stations. About 550 airfields have permanent- surface runways, and 469 airfields have runways which exceed 8,000 feet. The principal airfields used by military aircraft number about 300. There are no active military seaplane stations as Naval Aviation no longer has flying boats in operational units. In general the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist countries each have an adequate, well distributed air facilities system capable of supporting all types of air operations. Construction activity suggests that it continuing military airfield construction program is considered necessary both to accommodate newer aircraft and to provide a more desirable deployment or dispersal capability. However, airbase hardening, primarily aircraft sheltering, has been the main airfield construction activity for the past several years. c. Training (I) Preoperational �With the reduction in term of service for aviation personnel effected by the 1967 Universal Military Service Law, preconscription elementary military training has become compulsory. Training is to begin when youths have reached 17 years of age. It is planned that this training will be done without detaching the individuals from their studies or work. The training is to be accomplished in the general education schools starting Nvith the ninth grade, in 'For current information see Volumes 3:3-39 of Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World, published b% the Defense Intelligence Agenec. Other delails on Soviet air facilities are provided in the Truuportation and' 1'elecommunications chapter of this Ceneral Survey. secondary specialized teaching institutions, and in the teaching institutions of the vocational technical education systems. It is to he directed by the Ministry of Defense and DOSAAF. Training is expected to emphasize vocations and technical specialties similar to certain special military qualifications. For personnel assigned to the air forces, the postinduction period of training will necessarily provide more selective, specialized, and professional training, primarily for those who elect to become careerists. Until about 1967, a total of 27 schools, including two PVO schools, provided this training. "There were two 5 -year higher military aviation engineering schools, 10 -1 -year higher military aviation 1:1:hools for pilots, two 4 -year highet military aviation schools for navigators, a 4 -ycat higher military aviation political school, and nine 3 -year military aviation technical schools. There is also a 2 -year pilot school, probabl;; helicopter, whose graduates are master sergeants with pilot certificates. This contrasts with the 4 -year school graduates who are lieutenants with it pilot engineering degree at a 3d -class pilot level or less. In the past 6 years, six more schools have been opened to try to cope with the increasing demand for a greater number of highly skilled air personnel. The peacetime 4 -year pilot training provides 200 to 250 hours of flight time, depending on the current policy of educational direction. The ground training portion includes studies in mathematics, physics, aerodynamics, chemistry, languages, history, physical education, and Communist Party history. Flight training and related exercises in parachute jumps, strafirig, bombing, and air -to -air interception (simulation) begin in the first year. Long Range Aviation trainees are probably specially selected on the basis of aptitude, and their practical training emphasizes formation flying, navigation, and bombing practice. Total preopera- tional flying time may average :300 to 400 hours per crew. (2) Operational� Combat training of LRA aircrews is accomplished within the operational units its a part of the normal training program. All units are expected to maintain it relatively high standard of operational preparedness. The unit training program covers 12 months of the year, but the individual crew members actually spend 10 months on their flying duties annually; 1 month each is spent on leave and on political and administrative obligations. It is estimated that LRA operational crew training has progressed to a high state of proficiency. The annual training prof* -:im of Tactical Aviation includes all- weather flying, formation, air -to -air 39 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 combat, rocketry, bombing, gunnery, reconnaissance, and deployment exercises. The daily combat readiness of the air units is a continual program, with the wets maintaining varying degrees of alert posture according to assignment. The climax of unit training is a series of extensive maneuvers carried out at military district or groups of forces levels in cooperation with ground forces. These maneuvers are usually held in the autumn. The quality of Soviet pilots is difficult to assess. Flying hours per year, about 100 to 120, are considerably less than that of U.S, pilots. However, extensive pro- and post planning, and mission cri- tique;, coupled %with short distances to ranges, lessen this discrepancy to it certain extent. Flying is conducted under rigid ground control, allowing little independent action. Upon graduation from it 4 -year training school, i t new pilot is assigned to an operational unit its a pilot 3d -class or, in come cases, even it lower category. At this level, pilots are not mission capable or combat ready. After extensive training in it unit, they progress to 2d- class, at which time they are combat capable but not proficient. Further training advances them to 1st -class pilot, or combat proficient. This training cycle takes 7 to 10 years. It is estimated that an average regiment is composed of one squadron with 3el -class pilots, one with 2d, and one with 1st -class pilots. Operational training for Aviation of Air Defense (APVO), in addition to the invaluable training gained from actual scrambles aril intercepts of peripheral non Soviet flights of various kinds, includes it training cycle in which the training exercises for the year begin in February or March. Local joint exercises in spring maneuvers usually provide some fighter training in air ground coordination. Summer months are used to fulfill the assigned syllabus, with heavy air activity during favorable weather. Training culminates in the autumn of each year with large -scale joint maneevers with other air units and ground or naval forces. The operational training program is very detailed and designed to take maximurn advantage of the limited flight time available. Flight training activity ranges from routine flight activity (take -offs and landings, local flight activity, weather reconnaissance flights) to ground controlled intercept /airborne intercept /air -to -air missile train- ing, and mobility training. The air defense or interceptor training syllabus includes some air -to -air gunnery and rocketry as well as durnmy runs, camera gunnery, and firing runs on target sleeves. Practice alerts are staged regularly as well as participation in actual intercept of unidentified targets. Deployment and mobility flights form a significant phase of fighter training. Such flights are often practiced in order to develop a tactical advantage over hostile forces as well as to preclude the destruction of the regiment's complement of aircraft in the event of an attack on the base. The ability to deploy to strengthen fighter defenses in specific areas is an important aspect of the regiment's training tactics. There has probably been an increased emphasis on head -on intercept training as the new interceptors became operational. Soviet operational pilots fly only 100 to 120 hours per year. They are given little opportunity to exercise personal initiative in the air; practice interceptions depend almost entirely on close ground control gather than pilot interception of aircraft. Operational training in Military Transport Aviation is accomplished after officers and crews are integrated into their units. Proficiency in flying transport aircraft through all conditions of weather is acquired under actual flight conditions� instrument training flights in heavy overcast, and winter night flights from airfields covered with snow and from icy runways. It can be assumed that tactical paratroop drops by squadron are part of the routine training. There is evidence that, weather permitting field training exercises in conjunction with airborne troops continue throughout the vear. Crews receive extensive briefing before an operation, and postoperation analysis of errors is conducted. There is evidence that cross- training in heavy transports and helicopters is a requisite for commanders. Commanders are trained for positions one step higher than that which they occupy, so that replacements are always available. It is probable that older combat pilots from fighter and bomber units, after retraining, are transferred to transport aviation. Enlisted technicians in operational and main- tenance units are given on -the -job training or attend special schools which give: 1 to 2-year courses of intensive theoretical and practical training. Technical officers are assigned to operational units after graduation from technical officer candidate schools. These schools provide 3 -year courses with specializa- tion in such fields as special equipment, electronics, instruments, aircraft engines, and armament. Advanced training for officers is accomplished through it number of higher staff schools and academies. These include Lipetsk Air Tactical School, Advanced Officer School, Advanced Navigation School, and the two major air academies �the Military Air Academy and the 'Lhrtkovskiv Air Engineering Academy. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 d. Logistics Rigorous planning is required in determining the Soviet Air Forces' (SAF) materiel requirements. Top level control, planning, and procurement of items peculiar to the SAF components is a primary responsibility of the Directorate of Rear Services of the Air Forces. The Director receives logistic requirements, other than those for complete aircraft, which have been coordinated and forwarded through the various rear services organization channels. Requirements for subordinate units of Long Range Aviation, Aviation of Air Defense, and probably Military Transport Aviation, are compiled by the directorates of rear services at the respective force headquarters. Logistic control and planning for Tactical (Frontal) Aviation occurs at the air army level. The Chief of Rear Services at the tactical r r army level is tasked with the coordination of supply plans and schedules for the army's air units and is responsible for delivery to the operational bases. All requirements are coordinated by the SAF Director of Rear Services who forwards them to his counterpart at the Ministry of Defense for approval prior to procurement. The lowest echelon within the supply and servicing organization is the Air Base Support Battalion (Air Technical Battalion). Such a battalion is located at each operational airfield where a unit of regimental strength is assigned. It performs the housekeeping functions necessary to maintain both the airfield and the air unit in a state of combat readiness. Air Base Support Battalions are comprised of six companies: Headquarters, Guard, Air Traffic Control, Transport (vehicle), Airfield Maintenance, and Technical Support (POL and ammunition upkeep and delivery). An essential elernent of the supply system is an extensive network of depots for storing technical supplies, fuel, and ammunition. Air Forces' depots storing these stocks are established at several echelons �SAF headquarters, air army, and airfield and are under the control of the respective Rear Services chiefs. Common -use items are procured at the Ministry of Defense level for all services and distributed through the military districts from their central supply depots. The Directorate of Engineering Services at SAF headquarters places orders for the procurement of complete aircraft with the Ministry of Aviation Industry, and is responsible for the acceptance, inspection, and allocation of these aircraft. Spare parts kits are provided with each aircraft delivered from the factory. These kits include all spares and special tools required for normal maintenance up to overhaul, at which time the kits are reissued. Individual item requisitions are thus limited to replacing parts that fail, malfunction. or are damaged before expiration of their guaranteed service life. Maintenance and repair of aircraft and associated technical equipment are the responsibility of the Directorate of Engineering Services. At SAF headquarters, the duties of the Director, also known as the Chief Engineer of the Air Forces, encompass supervision of all Aviation of Engineering Services personnel and facilities, in addition to formulating aircraft maintenance policies and procedures in conjunction with the Ministry of Aviation Industry. The Director has a counterpart at every level of the air forces, down to and including the regiment. Each echelon in the chain of command is responsible for inspecting its subordinate units and insuring that these maintenance policies and procedures are strictly enforced. Aircraft maintenance is performed at the regimental level by both squadron mechanics and regimental specialists, at division -level repair shops, and at major aircraft repair bases. At the regimental level, squadron maintenance personnel are responsible for servicing the aircraft, giving preflight inspections, and eliminating minor defects. The regimental specialists are assigned to Technical Exploitation Units whose responsibilities consist of medium aircraft repairs and periodic inspections. These maintenance personnel are trained to work with mobile or potable tools and ground support equipment, and frequently work on aircraft parked in the open. They are accordingly capable of moving quickly to other airfields without degrading their effectiveness. Division -level maintenance specialists primarily perform intermediate -level maintenance, i.e., minor modifications and repairs which are more extensive and time consuming than those performed at regimental level. Major aircraft maintenance and overhaul are accomplished at the aircraft repair bases which are under the control of the air army. The SAF rear organization has proven effective in peacetime and should be adequate to support operational air units in a short conventional or nuclear conflict. The Soviets have placed great emphasis on providing adequate stocks of PO and ammunition in the forward areas where conflicts are likely to occur. The aircraft maintenance system, encompassing the performance of minor or routine regimental maintenance at the operational airfields, with major maintenance and overhaul being accomplished at 41 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 selected repair bases, eliminates the need for the dispersal of extensive maintenance facilities and highly trained specialists. This lack of specialized equipment and personnel at the operational level might well, however, prove detrimental to the SAF combat capability in a sustained wartime environ- ment. 2. Soviet Strategic Defense Forces Soviet Strategic Defense Forces (PVO Strany) are charged with the strategic air and missile defense of the U.S.S.R. The system consists of aircraft control and warning radars manned by Radio Technical Troops (RTV -PVO), SAM sites manned by Surface -to -Air Missile Troops ('!_RV -PVO), air defense aircraft manned by Aviation of Air Defense (APVO), and possibly the ABM sites manned by the Antiballistic Missile Troops (PRO /PVO). Although PVO Strany has improved means of handling defense threat data, it would have great difficulty in coping with large -scale air and missile attacks which employed a variety of weapons and sophisticated tactics. The capability of intercept aircraft and air -to- surface missiles decreases with the altitude, and at very low altitude is limited by the line -of -sight coverage of ground radars and by the difficulty of track ag a target and interceptor through ground clutter. Generally, in the western U.S.S.R. and the approaches to major military industrial centers, the air surveillance network is capable of maintaining it continuous tract of aircraft flying down to about 1,000 feet. Some specially mounted radars may give a coverage capability clown to 500 feet or less. In areas of less dense coverage, Soviet radars are unlikely to be able to accomplish continuous tracking of aircraft below 3,000 feet. The only ABM system, the ABM 16 /GALOSEI, is located around Moscow and its capabilities are limited to protection from only small scale unsophisticated attacks. (S) a. Organization (S) PVO Strarty, an operational and administrative command, implements coordinated air defense plans involving all appropriate elements of the armed forces and supervises operational training and effectiveness. P\'O Strany headquarters includes offices for administration, political affairs, personnel, research and development, training, and a main staff; their precise organizational status is not known. 'There is also a military council, probably for the development of plans and policies, which apparently consists of the commander in chief and his deputies. 42 The U.S.S.R. is divided into 10 air defense districts, which are subdivided into zones and sectors. District commanders coordinate air defense operations, but weapons are assigned at lower levels. b. Strength, composition, end disposition (S) There are about 475,000 persons in the air defense forces. Of this number about 85,000 are in Aviation of Air Defense, 90,000 in air control and warning radar, and 300,000 in the SAM systcm. There are about 2,700 interceptors in Aviation of Air Defense corcentrated mainly in the European U.S.S.R., although large numbers of fighters are deployed in industrial and military areas throughout the U.S.S.R. Most of the FIREBAR aircraft (Yak -28P) (Figure 38) are assigned to APVO. The long -range interceptor, FIDDLER (Tu -128), is operational in the Moscow, Northern, and Trans Siberian air defense districts. The short -range interceptor, FLAGON (Su- 15) (Figure 39), is operational in all air defense districts. The Mach 3 high- altitude FOXBAT (Mig- 'For current information see Soviet Aircraft Order of Rattle (AP- 240 -2 -4 series), published by the Defense Intelligence Agencc. FIGURE 38. Aviation of Air Defense FIREBAR (Yak -28P) (S) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 39. Aviation of Air Defense FLAGON A (Su -15) (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 25) (Figure 40) was first deployed to an APVO regiment in mid -1970. FOXBAT is now operational at four APVO bases in the Western, Moscow, Baku, and Sverdlovsk Air Defense Districts. An airborne warning and control ai:_-raft, MOSS (Tu -124) (Figure 41), is employed in limited numbers over Ovate and in conjunction with long -range interceptors. FIGURE 40. Aviation of Air Defense FOXBAT (MiG -25) (C) FIGURE 44. GUIDELINE (SA -2) sur- face -to -air missile (S) FIGURE 42. FARMER (MiG -19) employed in Aviation of Air Defense and in Soviet Tactical Aviation (S) FIGURE 43. FRESCO (MiG -17) employed in Aviation of Air Defense and in Soviet Tactical Aviation (C) In the U.S.S.R. the FARMER (Mig -19) (Figure 42) and the FRESCO (Mig -17) (Figure 43), in both day fighter and all- weather versions, are being phased out of APVO. Four SAM systems provide air defense protection of vital areas within the U.S.S.R. The SA -I /GUILD is deployed only in the Moscow area, where there are 56 sites. "There are about 1,040 SA -2 /GUIDELINE sites in the U.S.S.R., of which about 640 are believed to he occupied on a more or less permanent basis. The SA -2 Figure 44) is widely deployed in the Soviet Union and 43 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 41. Aviation of Air Defense MOSS (Tu -124) (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 other Communist and non- Commrnist nations. There are about 240 SA -3 /GOA sites in the U.S.S.R., most of which are believed to be occupied on it more or less permanent basis. The SA -5 /GAMMON system is deployed at about 105 complexes (a complex may consist of from one to five firing sites). About 90 of these complexes are believed to be operational, with 15 under construction. The system is a long -range high performance SAM, deployed to counter a high- speed, high altitude aerodynamic threat, and is considered unlikely to have an ABM role, although this possibility cannot he excluded. Evidence has been available for several years that the Soviets have been developing antimissile missile systems. The ABM 1 /GALOSH antiballistic- missile system (Figure 45) is being deployed around Moscow and furnishes a limited defense of the Moscow area. There are more than 4,500 ACW radar sets deployed in about 1,000 sites within the 10 air defense districts of the U.S.S.R. TALL KING (Figure 46) is a long -range early warning radar. BAR LOCK (Figure 47) is the most numerous ea �ly warning radar in the Soviet inventory, and when collocated with a height finder it often functions in a ground controlled interception role. SIDE NET (Figure 47) is the most widely deployed Soviet height finder, and ODD PAIR (Figure 48) is the newest. Training (C) Operational training aims at the effective integration of the various components and other contributing forces into the overall system. Training emphasizes practice in the specialized procedure of the particular components as well as exercises involving the overall system d. Logistics (S) The various components aircraft, surface -to -air missiles, radar �that make up the air defense system are supported by the Chief of the Rear and by the parent organization, i.e., aircraft by the Soviet Air Forces, surface -to -air missiles by the Soviet Ground FIGURE 45. GALOSH (ABM -1) anti- ballistic missile (C) FIGURE 46. TALL KING early warning radar (S) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 47. BAR LOCK early warning radar (left) and SIDE NEf height finder radar (C) Forces, and ACW radar by both ground and air forces, since members of both services are employed in this field. F. Rocket troops (S) The Soviet Strategic Fiocket Troops (Raketnyye uoyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya) constitute the main strategic striking force of the U.S.S.R. The primary mission of this force is to destroy the enemv's means of nuclear attack, main governmental and military control centers, and important industrial concentrations. Constituted in 1960 as a separate force FIGURE 48. BAR LOCK early warning radar (left) and ODD PAIR height finder radar (C) on a command level with ground, navy, air, and air defense forces, the Strategic Rocket "Troops function as one of the instruments in support of Soviet foreign policy, form the main deterrent force, and enable the Soviets to employ the element of maximum surprise in intercontinental strikes. 1. Organization The Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops is responsible for the organization and administration of the organic forces and weapons systems of the command and for implementing operational policy formulated by high authority. Army General V. F. Tolubko is Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops. The headquarters probably consists of the commander, a main staff, and directorates for political affairs; engineering; inspection; rear services; equipment, including technical services and special armament; and combat training. The Main Staff develops operational plans for tlj,: Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops. It includes sections for planning and operations, intelligence, budget and fiscal, personnel and mobilization, communications, and transportation. The Political Directorate, subordinate to the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armv and Navv, is responsible for the orientation and indoctrination of 45 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 rocket troops in Communist ideology. Its control is projected downward through subordinate echelons. The Chief Engineering Directorate is probable responsible for supervision and coordination of launch site construction and maintenance. The Chief Inspectorate administers the inspection system and monitors all aspects of combat readiness and efficiency of the Strategic Rocket "Troops to insure compliance with directives. 'rhe Rear Services Directorate of the Strategic Rocket Troops probably performs functions similar to those of its counterpart at the Ministry of Defense level, administering the procnrernent and distribution of common -use items, probable through several depots conveniently located with respect to the deployed forces. The Missile Troop Equipment Directorate is unique to the Strategic Rocket 'Troops. In addition to the rna "age file lit of items in the strategic missile inventory, it also controls all associated ground support equipment, as w as components and maintenance parts. Its responsibility with respect to strategic missiles is comparable to that of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate with respect to tactical missiles. Coordination between the Missile Troop Equipment Directorate and the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate is effected at the Ministev of Defense level. It is probable that the Special Armaments Service, which is the supply channel for equipment and maintenance clown to battalion level, is subordinate to the Missile Troop Equipment Directorate. The Chief Directorate for Combat "Training is responsible for setting standards of technical training and combat efficiency of troops, including live training exercises at the range. It supervises implementation of the annual training plan in all headquarters, units, and installations, including i t number of combat training schools. Final responsibil- ity for troop training, however, is at the regimental level. ICBM operational units are located at 6 launch complexes, widely deployed along major railroad systems from the Moscow- Leningrad area to the Fur East. In addition, there may he some units at the Plesetsk and Tynratarn Missile and Space Test Centers which could have an operational role. Hach complex is considered to he a division, and may be operationally subordinate to Strategic Rocket 'Troops. Arnny or independent corps echelons arc believed to exist, primarily for administrative purposes. Each complex (division) controls its subordinate units regiments, possibly, and battalions and batteries) and provides the fundamental administra- tive and housekeeping services basic to a parent unit. At soft complexes or parts thereof, each launch pad is probably of battery level; each two -pact soft launch site probably constitutes a battalion. Echelons at hard complexes or parts thereof arc less well defined. The SS -13 (SAVAGE) intercontinental ballistic missile is shown in Figure 49; this missile is among the hypes currently deployed. The IRBM and MRBM force is organized into missile armies, divisions, regiments, battalions, and batteries. Each launch pad is believed to be of battery level. A complex of two or three I RBM or M RBM sites comprises a regiment which is considered the basic command unit or field launching authority under the direct operational control of Strategic Rocket Troops headquarters at Moscow. Battalions and hatterics function as component parts of the regimental command and are completely under regimental control. The role of the IRBM and MRBM armies and division headquarters appears to be primarily coordination of administration, planning, supply, and training. Ilowever, in the event of an alert or actual launch of missiles, these intermediate commands may also perform an operational role in that they authenticate alert and launch orders from Strategic Rocket Troops headquarters and serve as centers for assessnnent and evaluation of the launch units' accomplishments and current status. The relationship of the strategic missile units to the long- es,ablished military district system is similar to that of units of other components of the armed forces. While the launch units are operationally subordinate to the Minister of Defense through headquarters of the Strategic Rocket Troops, the military district commanders function in special administrative and supply roles, such as procurenncnt and warehousing of connrnon -use supplies and equipment. In addition, Strategic Rocket Troops units with appropriate. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 FIGURE 49. SAVAGE (SS -13) intercontinental ballistic missile (S) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 weapons systems might be called upon, in certain circumstances, by military district commanders to render support. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition The personnel strength of the Strategic Rocket Troops has increased steadily since its creation as a separate force in 1960. 'Total personnel strength is believed to he about 375,500, of whom some 300,500 are assigned to operational units, with the remainder in support and training roles. Since the inception of the Strategic Rocket Troops, the Soviets have developed and deployed it family of ballistic missiles capable of reaching any potential enemy. The U.S.S.R. now has three categories of strategic ballistic missiles intercontinental with effective ranges of 2,500 to 6,500 nautical miles (some Soviet ICBM's may be effectively used at ranges as low as 500 nautical miles), intermediate with effective ranges of approximately 2,000 nautical miles, and medium with ranges up to about 1,000 nautical miles. Operational ,'rengtli in these missiles as of 1 October 1973 is estimated as follows: TYPE MISSILES LAUNCHERS ICBM 1,683 1,549 IRBM 129 87 MRBM 916 496 In the ICBM category, the number of missiles exceeds the number of launchers because the soft sites are estimated to have it refire capability whereas the hard sites do not. In addition to the number of ICBM launchers given above, there are about 100 operational launchers which arc ordinarily used for training and research but are suitable for military missile launching. To date, ICBM deployment has been limited to 26 operational launch complexes within the U.S.S.R. Thus far there is no indication that deployment of this system extends beyond the reaches of rail system support. About 95% of the IRBM and MRBM force has been deployed in western U.S.S.R., with lesser concentrations in southern U.S.S.R. hardened launchers constitute about 90% of the operational ICBM force and about 205( of the IRBM and MRBM forces. 3. Training The Strategic Rocket Troops training program emphasizes both individual and unit training. Although it number of schools and training centers are utilized, final training responsibility appears to be focused on the regimental and battalion level of combat units. Cadre training, by which experienced personnel impart learned skills to the recruits, is also emphasized. Preliminary preservice training has been utilized to the greatest possible extent in securing the hest qualified personnel. Graduates of military secondary schools are frequently brought into missile units. Other recruits are obtained from artillery academies, air forces technical training academies, engineering and command schools, and the DOSAAF organization. In addition, the Strategic Rocket "Troops are receiving an increasing number of recruits who have completed secondary school ROTC -type programs, which have been expanded to include additional technical training. Officer training for the Strategic Rocket Troops is carried out primarily at the Dzerzhinskiv Missile Engineering Academy, which is under the direct supervision of the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Troops. The enrollment at this academy is approximately 2,500, and graduating classes number from 450 to 600. Two courses are offered at this academy �a short course of 9 to 12 months, and one of 5 1 /2 years. Selected graduates from the first course are chosen to attend the second. Most graduates of the academy are assigned to the Strategic Rocket Troops, although some go to ground forces tactical missile units. Some graduates of the Artillery Command Academy in Leningrad go to the Strategic Rocket Troops, although this academy is main!; concerned with the training of tactical missile technical officers. Ali unknown number of enlisted personnel assigned to the Strategic Rocket Troops are selected for specialized training and attend programs of instruction at military engineering and artillery schools. Courses in armament, instrumentation, electronics, and engine and airframe maintenance, varying in length from 6 to 18 months, are given these enlisted personnel. In addition to schools, enlisted specialists are sometimes detailed to missile factories for specialized technicai training. Unit training occupies an important role in the missile forces. In fact, for most of the rocket troops unit training under experienced officers and noncommis- sioned officers probably provides the greatest percentage of training. In the Strategic Rocket Troops the period between the original assignment of a unit's cadre until the deployment of the unit at full strength tnav last as long as it year. After it unit has been activated, it begins it training cycle known as integrated weapons system training. During this 47 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 period personnel qualified in individual specialities are combined and trained as a unit in the sequential duties necessary to launch a ballistic missile. This training is conducted at speciO training bases, missile test ranges, or operational sites. Actual missile launchings are probably not mandatory as part of this program. As units develop a high degree of competence they participate in exercises in order to perfect the methods and skills requires; in deploying ground equipment, preparing it for eration, and launching missiles. Certain of these training exercises include actual launch operations. Another feature of unit training is combat support operations, including training of personnel in guarding missile sites against sabotage and agent penetration. Since its inception in 1947, the Kapustin Yar Missil^ Test Range has been the scene of missile training activity for missiles of less than int,.reuntinental range. Actual firings of missiles include those by operational units returning to the range for "confidence firings." Crew training of !CBM personnel is conducted at the Tyuratam Missile Test Center and at the Plesetsk Missile and Space Center, at various special training centers, and at the operational missile sites. Before an operational rocket troops unit can enter combat duty it must be certified as operationally ready by meeting a specified level of proficiency as determined by an evaluation group responsible to the commander in chief. Once a crew has been certified as capable of performing its combat mission, it may be assigned to perform an actual proficiency firing.' In some instances operational units conduct live launchings from their home bases. 4. Logistics Logistic functions of the Strategic Rocket Troops are the responsibility of the Missile Troop Equipment Directorate. However, actual fabrication of missiles and components is accomplished at plants under the direction of the Ministry_ for Defense Industry. ICBM complexes are believed to contain a division supply depot while IRBM and \1RBM complexes contain a regimental -level supply depot, each complete with large reserve stocks of supplies for support of launch sites. Responsibility for supply and maintenance of launch units is believed to be divided among several organizations. Special Armament Service personnel are responsible: for the supply and maintenance of missiles and associated equipment except the reentry vehicle and warhead. "Chey are assigned to all echelons down to battalion. They operate the inspection and 48 maintenance vehicle station, a facility capable o. field and unit -type maintenance on specialized missile handling equipment, and provide on- the -job training to launch crews on utilizatio of equipment and minor maintenance. Repair Technical Base personnel� attached to operational launch units supply, maintain, and assemble reentry vehicles, including nuclear warheads. Committee for State Security (KGB) personnel retain security control over nuclear warheads. Technical Services personnel, under the admini. tive and technical control of the Central Motor Vehicle- Tractor Directorate, Ministry of Defense, are responsible for the procurement and maintenance of heavy equipment, including all types of rigging, cranes, and construction equipment, but excluding missile transporters and special propellant carriers. The Engineering Directorate has responsibility for the installation and maintenance of launch and control equipment and for auxiliary facilities. A deputy commander for the rear at each echelon down to regiment is responsible for the procurement, storage, supply, and transportation of quartermaster and medical supplies. The Soviets depend primarily on their rail system to support their strategic iaunch complexes, on a complex -by- complex basis. Air transport serves in a backup and emergenev support role. Supply and maintenwnce echelons in the Strategic Rocket Troops are believed to go down to battalion level. At the regimental level after the missile has been inspected, assembled, and checked by the Special Armament Service, and a reentry vehicle has been attached under the direction of Repair Technical Base personnel, responsibility for keeping the weapon serviceable belongs to the launch battery. It is believed that when maintenance problems arise which cannot be handled by the Special Armament Service and the Repair Technical Base, the components involved are shipped back to repair plants under the control of the Missile Troop Equipment Directorate. Maintenance personnel usually are selected for assignment to a strategic missile organization after completion of an initial training period at it service connected secondary technical school. It is believed that there are unit schools within operational missile launch complexes for the special training of personnel, and that the everyday work of subunits is constituted in large part in the operation of missile equipment. It has been demonstrated that the Soviet Union has the capacity in many technological fields to produce original and advanced designs. A strong tendency to go along with proven equipment also is apparent. As a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 result, specific. iuoi on many items in the U.S.S.R. are more uniform than in the United States. Furthermore, the Soviets produce simple and often more rugged equipment than that used iu the United States, leading to more simplified maintenance procedures. The supply and maintenance programs within the Strategic Rocket Troops are characterized by highly centralized organizational control and rigidly defined duties and responsibilities. The tightly knit organization enables the Soviets to direct prioWk support and distrihation of essential materials as warranted in the development of their strategic missile force. From the Soviet point of view the supply and mainterance systems are capable of performing the tasks assigned. G. Militarized security forces (S) The security forces constitute a force of an estimated 230,000 men. These forces are divided into two major groups� Soviet Frontier Troops, estimated at 173,000, and Soviet Interior Troops, estimated at 73,000. Enlisted personnel are conscripted on the same basis as personnel for the army and the navy. At the annual Gallup, security troop officers sit with the local draft board and select conscripts for the security troops. Selection is made after consideration of political reliability, social background, education, and general physical health. This selection and the subsequent training provide a force composed of troops who are well prepared for their specific tasks, reliable, and devoted to duty. Basic training acquaints recruits with the forms and methods of hostile activity engaged in by the "enemies of the people" and with foreign espionage. Recruits for the frontier troops receive special training in patrols, traps, ambushes, search groups, and border picket duties, while interior troops receive special training in making individual, group, and mass searches of persons, buildings, and populated localities as well as in rounding up, arresting, and convoying prisoners. About one fourth of the instruction time during basic .raining is devoted to political training. After basic training, recruits receive additional training with their units, and selected enlisted men may take special courses at special training centers and service schools. Each frontier district normally has a noncommissioned officer school. Frontier troops have their own officer candidate schools. No information is available on special officer candidate schools for interior troops. Senior officers are trained at a special institute for security troops in Moscow and at the Moscow Frontier Troops School for the Advanced Training of Officer Personnel. The supply system for the militarized security forces is probably under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense's Chief of the Rear, who reportedly acts through military district channels after receiving projected supply requirements from the Moscow headquarters of the particular security troop agency. 1. Frontier troops The Main Directorate of Soviet Frontier Troops, under the Committee f, r State Security (KGB), is responsible for the prevention of unauthorized entry into or exit from the U.S.S.R., defense of the border against sudden armed attacks, maintenance of general security control of the frontier populace, prevention of smuggling, and patrolling of offshore waters. The Main Directorate has eight staff sections to support and exercise general supervision over the seven border districts or operational groups. The Personnel Directorate plans mobilization and training. The Operations Directorate controls border security, develops operational plans, and designates emplace- ment of guard posts. The Counterintelligence Directorate directs counterintelligence activities among frontier troop personnel. The Political Directorate is responsible for the promulgation of party policy and Communist doctrine among frontier troops. The Intelligence and Agents Section is responsible for gathering intelligence on the frontier zone. The Investigations Section investigates, in conjunction with the Counterintelligence Directorate, all political, military, and criminal charges placed against frontier troops. The Communications Section is responsible for conducting communications intelligence opei_aions against frontier zones of neighboring countries. The Department of the Rear plans and procures supplies. Each frontier district or operational group is responsible for an established sector of the border. The degree of physical seenrity precautions taken and the strength of the frontier trc committed to the sector depend on the degree of friendliness cf the country facing the frontier and the importance of the Soviet installations within the area. Subordinate to the frontier district or operational group, which is usually commanded by a major general or lieutenant general, are frontier detachments, and in some cases separate komendaturas and an air regiment. In coastal areas sea guard squadrons, which are patrol vessel units of komendatura strength, are subordinate to the frontier district and may be attached to the frontier detachment for operational control. Frontier 49 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 SECRET detachments range in strength from 1,000 to 2,000 men and are usually commanded by a colonel or lieutenant colonel. Each is usually composed of three to seven komendaturas. These may he supported by a reserve group and, for cavalry patrol units, it cavalry remount squadron. The frontier komendatura, commanded by a major or lieutenant colonel, has a strength ranging from 200 to 500 personnel. It is the basic tactical unit of the frontier detachment. Subordinate to the komendatura are three to seven infantry or cavalry outposts with a strength of 30 to 65 men. Frontier troop units make defense plans to include anticipated routes of enemy attack; proposed deployment and commitment of local troops; support required; and evacuation plans for the wounded, dependents, and classified documents. Joint plans are also worked out between the ground forces and frontier troop units. Some plans provide that upon notification of attack the nearest division commander designates troops to be a, the disposal of the komendatura commander. After the division commander deplovs his troops and they make contact :th the enemy, the division commander assumes command of the area and all troops. When the situation is stabilized, or upon orders from higher headquarters, the frontier troop unit is relieved to assume its role of rear -area defense. In this role, as in World War 11, frontier troops would form a continuous and mobile protective hand, echeloned in depth, responsible for defense against airborne troops; road and railroad security; military traffic control; security of military depots and storage areas; holding fleeing Soviet troops; apprehending terrorists, saboteurs, and spies; general maintenance of order; and the 50 supervision of the evacuation of civilians from critical areas in cooperation with the interior troops. 2. Interior troops The Soviet Interior "Troops include the internal security troops, the internal and convoy guards, and the government signal troops. Internal security troops are operational units responsible for suppressing dissident and subversive elements, quelling revolts and strikes, and controlling the civil populace in the event of disaster. They are organized into divisions and separate regiments of from 1,650 to 2,000 men each. Their weapons and equipment are similar to those of comparable units of the ground forces. Relatively small detachments are used for guarding important installations and government buildings. These troops are subordinated to the ministries for maintenance of public order of the constituent republics in which they are located. Internal and convoy guards are responsible for the guarding of labor camps, prisons, work parties, and prisoners in transit. Convoy troops are normally organized into regiments, battalions, and companies. The guards are subordinated to the ministries for maintenance of public order of the constituent republics in which they are located. Government signal troops are responsible for the installation, maintenance, and security of com- munication facilities (telephone and telegraphy) between Moscow and high -level headquarters such as military districts and grcaps of forces. They are organized into regiments of approximately 1,000 men and are subordinate to the Committee for State Security (KGB). CONTROLLED DISSEM. SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090036 -7