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X11;101;4 1=14 =F-im= '41I11:1L1I11li[wo] /ed: 111 111111I1111 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the ,provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for officinal pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- Lions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Officio! Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret C APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 I YI-11 Ji I Nll APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 Page C. Army 4 1. Organization 5 Strength, composition, end disposition 0 3 Training 6 4. Logistics 7 D. Navy 8 I. Organization 8 2. Strength, composition, and disposition 9 3. Training and logistics 9 4 Marines 10 E Air force 10 1. Organization 11 2. Strength, composition, and disposition 12 3. Training 12 4. Logistics 12 Fig. 1 Strength trends (table) Fig. 2 Defense budgets (table) Fig. 3 Medical corpsman (photo) Fig. 4 Destroyed trucks (photo) Fig. S Road construction equipment (photo) Fig.` 6 Coastal escorts (photos) Fig. 7 T -6, close- support aircraft (photo) Fig. 8 G-91, used in reconnaissance role FRELIMO (photo) (photo) F. Paramilitary forces 1. Public Security Police 2. Fiscal Guard 3. Protection militia 4. Special Groups and- Special Parachutist G roups 5. Port and Railroad Police B.OPVDCM G. FRELIMO guerrilla forces I. Organization 2. Strength, composition, and disposition 3. Training 4. Logistics FIGURES Page 4 Fig. 9 4 Fig. 10 5 8 Fig. 11 9 Fig. 12 1 0 Fig. 13 Fig. 14 11 page 13 ,i3 13 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 17 17 Page 1lehborne operation (photo) 11 FRELIMO members at a subordi- nate base (photo) 15 FRELIMO strength trends (table) 16 FRELIMO militia (photo) 16 Training platoon in Tanzania (photo) 17 Dual purpose machinegun used by FRELIMO (photo) 18 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 V Arm ed Forces A. Defense establishrxtent Portuguese armed forces stationed. in Mozambique consist of 43,000 army troops, 3,500 naval personnel (including 800 naval riflemen, or "marines").and I8 ships and patrol Craft, and 3,300 air force personnel (including SIN paratmopers),and 105 aircraft (11 jets), Personnel are well trained in counterinsurgency operations, but there are shortage, of pilots and air force technicians; morale is generally good, but there is some disgruntlement among middle officer ranks of the army because of repeated tours in Africa. Much of the equipment is obsolete, and there are shortages of numerous Items, including artillery, engineer and communications equipment, navigational aids, transport aircraft, helicopters, and spare parts for maintenance and overhaul. Available resources have been effectively adapted, however, and are adequate for the present level of insurgency. (S) Approximately 7,000 -8,000 armed, foreign supported, and foreign -based insurgents oppose the Portuguese an active fronts in the three northern districts: Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Tete. Guerrilla attacks and harassment have intensified during the past year, particularly in Tete District, where the main objective is disruption of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project, u few incidents possibly probing attempts aimed at supply lines to Tete and communication lines to Rhodesia �also have occurred south- of Tete in Beim, and Vila Very districts. The Portuguese are capable of continuing to protect construction of the hydroelectric project, which is currently on- schedule. The Portuguese control all population centers and maintain all lines of communication; they are capable of controlling the situation and continuing to maintain their position in Mozambique, although they cannot eliminate the externally supported insurgency. (S) The armed forces are assisted in the maintenance of local security by approximately 41,600 personnel :irk, the various paramilitary farces, as follows: 4,000 in the Special Groups (including '800 in the Special Parachutist Groups); 21,400 Public Secuty Police (PSP), which includes 6,100 In the PSP- proper�w-of whom 60D are from the metropole --and 15,300 in the intervention militia; 700 in the Fiscal Guard '(also called Customs Guard); about 15,000 in the protection militia, which protects the villages and agricultural workers in the fields near the villages; and 500 in the Port and Railroad Police.- An unknown number of armed personnel in self- defense units of the Provincial Organization of Volunteers for the Civil Defense, of Mozambique (OPVDCM) provide protection for public and private institutions, including various commercial firms and oth:.r vulnerable institutions. A special force of 10 groups of 60 men each, largely former guerrillas, is being organized for use in Tete Di.%tdct under the control of the Directorate General of Security; the name of the new force has not been announced. (S) Portuguese counterinsurgency techniques include the use cf a limited fortified village system, which has been developed extensively in Cabo Delgado and Niumn districts and is progressing steadily in Tete District, The program of resettling rural Mozambicans in villages for protection by local militia units also denies sanctuary and support to the insurgents. The army's modest civic action program, which provides food, education, medicine, employment, and other assistance to the rural population, has been helpful In holding the allegiance of the Mozambicans, but resources are lacking for expansion of the army's nonmilitary activities. (C) 1. Military history (S) Portugal's hegemony in Mozambique has been under attack since September 1964, when the Mozambique Liberation Pront(F'REL1MO) launched attacks from Tanzania on settleratenis and military outposts in Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts. The Portuguese confined F'REL IMO activity generally to these districts for almost 4 years, although a few guerrilla attacks occurred in MmbeAat and Tete districts during that period. The principal tactic used in containing the insurgency wins a system of fortfied 'For diacritics on place names sm listbf wmes nn thr. apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile map itself. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 villages, most of which were Ituated near roads to permit rapid assistance from the Portuguese forces Several hundred thousand persons from the border areas affected by the insurgency were moved into the villages, called aldeamentos; protection militia and self defense units were organized, trained, and armed to protect the villagers from subversion and guerrilla attacks. Early in 1968 the insurgents began operations in Tete District and also stepped up the use of road and antipersonnel mines and increased the number of ambushes and mortar attacks against the fortified villages and army outposts in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. In June 1970 the Portuguese initiated an offensive in these districts to seize and hold guerrilla base camps and to cut infiltration and supply routes, particularly in Cabo Delgado. In May 1971 the offensive into Cabo Delgado and Niassa was resumed, and a minor offensive was undertaken in Tetc in an attempt to offset any gains the insurgents might have made during the rainy season. Tete District has been widely affected since the wet season months of 1971, with an increasing number of incidents south of the Zambezi River. The Cabora Basso hydroelectric project is well protected, however, and construction is proceedirg on schedule. The fortified village program is progressing slowly in Tete District, but several thousand persons have been moved into areas not affected by the insurgency, and self defense units are being organized and trained to protect the villages. During the late summer of 1972, ambush attacks occurred south of Tete District at points near Vila Couveia and Macossa in Vila Peru District in central Mozambique, indicating possible probing attempts aimed at Portuguese supply lines to Tete and the lines of communication from Beira to Rhodesia. Guerrilla activity continues in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, although not on an intense scale, and some troops may have been moved from these districts to augment forces in Tete. Many parts of the northern half of Mozambique have not been affected at all by the insurgency; only scattered incidents have occurred in the central region, and the south is. completely unaffected. The insurgents are based in Tanzania and Zambia and transit Malawi between the two nations. They receive a steady flow of support from a variety of sources, but the bulk of their military aid is from China and the U.S.S.R. Thestrength of thePortugucse armed forces in Mozambique has been more than doubled since the insurgency began, but the additional personnel include an increasing number of Mozambicans. FRELIMO's collaboration with Rhodesian national ists �the Zimbabwe African National Union l7ANHI and the 7imhnhwe Afrirron Pennle.'c tlninn (ZAPU) �in the border areas with Tete District has led to small -scale antigucrrilla operations across the border into Mozambique by Rhodesian troops. Some Rhodesian equipment, including helicopters, has been lent to the Portuguese for short periods, but most of Rhodesia's support consists of information and intelligence provided in its close liaison with Portuguese military and police officials. The Portuguese also coordinate items of mutual intelligence interest with South African oUicials. Some supplies are purchased from South Africa for use in Mozambique; these consist chiefly of medical supplies, canned foods, vehicles, and possibly some radios for the army and small quantities of small arms, ammunition, and communications equipment for the police. Assistance from Rhodesia and South Africa has been extremely limited, however. chiefly because Portugal does not seeks aid. 2. Command structure (C) The Commr nder in Chief of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique, currently an army general, is responsible to the Minister of National Defense and Army through the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces in Lisbon; he is subordinate in all matters of policy and civil administration to the Governor General (a civilian), who is the highest authority in the state. The Commander in Chief may be from the army, navy, or air force. He is appointed by the M9nistLr of National Defense and Army, with the approval of the service to which he belongs and the concurrence of the Superior Council of National Defense, which includes [lie Minister of Overseas. The headquarters of the Commander in Chief, organized as a unified command with representation from the three services, is located in Nampula rather than Lourenco Marques, capital of the state. The headquarters consists of a Chief of Staff, a Director of Operations, and five small staff bureaus or sections that are generally comparable in functions to most of the U.S. joint staff system, as follows: Personnel (equates to U.S. J -1), Intelligence U -2), Operations (J- 3), Logistics (J -9), and Psychological Warfare (includes civil affairs and public information). The Director of Operations is a special adviser to the Commander in Chief on various priority projects and activities of a limited duration; his responsibilities are neat ?in conflict with those of the Operations Section of the staff. Personnel and logistics functions are only coordinated and monitored by the joint staff, each scrrice having primary responsibility for hand'hing those matters. The Commander in Chief maintains effertive lint on with the C:nvemnr Cr- -nrrnt in I s Lourenco Marques and personally coordinates important matters, such as policy, but delegates responsibilit� for routine liaison functions to the commander of the army's Southern Territorial Command, which is headquartered in Lourenco Marques. The Commander in Chief has been directed by governmental decree to cooperate vith fhe General Command of Security, which was created by a Ministry of Overseas decree in August 1972 under control of the Governor General toassure coordination of operations by the various security forces. The degree of participation by the Commander in Chief is not known. He controls all units assigned to an intervention role, including being responsible for direct operational command as well as commitment of these units to an operational area or to a spe^ al operation. intervention units include the commando companies, air force paratroop battalions, the special marine detachments, the special groups, and the special parachutists groups; selected army infantry units may be assigned to the intervention forces as required. Mozambique comprises a military region or command for each of the three armed services. The armed forces commander also serves as tha commander of the army's military region. The other service commanders are responsible to the Com- mander in Chief for intelligence and for all joint operations. For matters of personnel, logistics, and training, the service commanders are responsible to their service chiefs of staff in Lisbon. B. Joint activities 1. Military manpower (S) As of 1 July 1973, Mozambique had about 2 117,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49. Of this number, approximately 480 were physically fit for military service. Their distribution by 5 -year age groups was as follows: TorrAr. MA IS-Vis A'UMDER NMIDER FIT FOR ACE OF MALES 111ILMAriY -SE21 CE 15-13 518,004 280 20 -29 431,000 220,000 25.29 277,Q00 135,000 ToW, 15 -09 ?.30,004 2,117,000 1,024,004 1 The number of males reaching military age (20) will i r average 90,000 during the 5 -year period 1973 -77. Portuguese laws of military service apply to Mozambique. The military obligation begins on I January of the year in which male citizens become 18, but in time of peace active compulsory military service does not begin until the men are 21. At age 20, each man is required to report to the draft authorities for medical examination, but classification may be made earlier, depending on defense needs. The. conscription term is 2 years, but the law authorizes exceptions to be made according to the needs of each of the armed forces. The overseas tour for conscripts from the metropole is 2 years, although it can be extended if required. The overseas tour is in addition to the active duty time served tip to the time of embarkation, and most conscripis from metropolitan Portugal spend about 3 years in active military service. Mozambique born conscripts normally serve 3 years; the annual conscript class is usually called up in two increments. No figures on the total number of Mozambique -bom personnel in the armed forces are available, but it is believed that only a negligible number serve in the navy and air force. Approximately 15,000 (35%) of the army's total strength are Mozambique -bom, and it is estimated that between 13,500 14,250 of these are black. in addition to the Mozambicans serving in the army, about 30,300 serve in the militia- 15,300 in the intervention militia, which carries out antiguerrilIa operations under Public Security Police control, and 15,000 in the protection militia, which protects the villages and surrounding agricultural areas. Also, 4,000 Mozambicans are in the special groups and special parachutist groups, which assist the army in combat operations. Plans reportedly call for increasing the strength of these groups to 10,000 men, possibly by the end of 1973. Except for a few officers, all of the personnel in the militia, special groups, and special parachutist groups are black. Morale in the Portuguese armed forces is believed to be generally good. The average Portuguese conscript accepts his military obligation willingly and adapts well to military service. The black troops have performed well in combat operations with the Portuguese, and there are no known problems of loyalty, although it is possible that there have been a few defections. Leadership is generally competent, and officers of all ranks appear to be firm in their conviction that the Portuguese position must be maintained in Mozambique_ They believe that departure of the Portuguese would cause chaos and stress tl:e importance of the military role in the socioeconomic program to develop higher educational and economic levels for the Africans. Repeated tours in Africa have caused some disgruntlement in the officer corps, particularly in the army, which bears the 3 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 brunt of the war. The average rotation of duty assignments runs 2 years in Africa anus. 1 year in the metropole. Continued separation from their families has had an adverse effect on morale, and it is believed that Portugal has moved the families of some of t)%c career officers to Mozambique for the length of thetf tours. Dc.spite personal hardships, however, the officers are patriotic Portuguese and are loyal to Portugal. FIGURE 2. Annual defense budgets (C) (Millions of U.S. dollars) 2. Strength trends (S) Army strength has increased by 9,000 since 1067. The spread of insurgent activity to Tete District in 1968 resulted in a small rise, but the largest increase occurred in 1970 in connection with the Portuguese offensive to cut FRELIMO infiltration and supply routes in Cabo Delgado District, particularly on the Mueda plateau, A slight increase occurred in 1971, probably because of the induction of more Mozambique -born conscripts, although it is possible that a small number of additional troops were sent from the metropole as a result of intensified insurgent activity in Tete District. Navy strength has increased by about 1,700 personnel since 1967. The number of personnel in the air force, after being reduced by 1,200 in 1969, was increased by 900 in 1970 to its present strength of 3,500. Air force strength fluctuation is believed to be caused by temporary deployments. i Strengths for the period 1967 -72 are shown as of 1 October of each year in Figure 1. I Training (U /DU) No joint field training is cos ducted in Mozam- bique, but integration of the three services in the unified command provides experience in joint military operations. The Portuguese Army conducts training for conscripts and for officer and NCO candidates; qualified individuals may attend schools in the metropole, 4. Military budget (C) Annual military budget proposals are prepared by the state govemment in Mozambique and are FIGURE 1. Strength treads (S) 1968 1969 I970 1971 1972 Derense budget........... 29.4 31.6 32.7 34.9 37.7 Defense budget percent of total nallenal budget.... 13.7 13.5 1..5 11.0 10.9 Defense budget as a percent of estirnuted GDP....... 2.S 2.6 2.5 no nf; na Data not Avallable. approved by the Ministry of Overseas in Lisbon. In addition, the Portuguese metropolitan military budget includes funds for the overseas military forces stationed primarily in Angola. Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. Since 1968, annual overseas military budgets have averaged US$139 million, but the amount al)ocated to each overseas state or province is not available. Based upon personnel strength data, Mozambique probably receives less than one -third of the total appropriation. Defense budgets, funded by the state government of Mozambique, for the years 1968 through 1972 are shown in Figure 2. S. Logistics (C) The Logistics Section on the staff of the armed forces Commander in Chief coordinates and moniWrs logistical functions for the armed forces in Mozambique, but each service has responsibility for its own logistical support. A branch of the Military Support Organization, a military production facility controlled by the Secretary of State for Army in Lisbon, is in Lourenco Marques to facilitate procurement of subsistence, medical, and POL supplies from local sources and the Republic of South Africa; some vehicles and possibly a few radios purchased from South Africa are believed to be in use by the army in Mozambique. Storage, distribution, and maintenance facilities in Mozambique are adequate for all classes of supplies. The air force distributes emergency items and performs medical evacuation for the armed forces, it transports troops for the army in an emergency situation and on a routine basis as space is available. Civilian air taxi services are used to deliver supplies and evacuate casualties when necessary. AIR YZAA ARMY NAVY roRCic TOrAL C. A*ny I967......... 34,000 1,800 4,300 40,100 1908........... 36,000 1,SDO 4,300 49,100 The primary mission of the Portuguese Army in 1909........... 30,000 I 3,140 41,000 Mozambique is to protect the territorial integrity of 1970........... 41,000 1,990 3,500 48,400 the state and maintain intemal security. The army has 1971........... 33,004 43,000 3,500 3,540 50,000 had the major role in internal defense operations since 1972........... 3,500 3,508 50,000 armed Insurgency against the Portuguese began in 4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 t r 196.1. It has been unable to eradicate the insurgency because it cannot deprive the insurgents of their rternal support and foreign sanctuaries. Although not able to prevent the spread of guerrilla activity south of the Zambezi River, the Portuguese control :ill population centers and have been able to maintain all lines of communication. The arm' r e50la r ees i n Morunb [lue are limited because of requirements in Portugal's Other two Afric insurgencies, but it is capa of c to f for the Port u guese presence in Nlo7a ntbiclue. Repeated tours in Africa have caused some disgruntlement a mong the middle officer group, but this is not believed to be a limitation on the army's capabilities. 'rhe officers are patriotic, and all appear to )told the cortvictioar that Portugal has a i %oral obligation to remain in X-11ozimbiq there is tic, evidence of any lack of willingness to serve because Of personal hardships. Almost all of the younger officers in lire army have experience to counterinsur- gency situations, and probably 98% of the tot officer corps have served in one or more of the African states during the past t 1 years. maoy have served two or more tours. Army units in i4lozambique are adegnately but not well equipped for the present level of insurgency. The standard weapon of the infantry the primary combat arm �is the Portuguese-pmduced 7.62 -rum 63 rifle. Only a negligible amount of field artillery, consisting of obsolete World War 11 British items, is available, and air defense artillery is lacking. 'There are no tanks, only a few armored cars, and a shortage of signal and engineer equipment. Repair facilities are severely strained to maintain efficient vehicles because of the high .accident rate, and there are shortages of spare parts for all items of cclt%ipmcrtt. the army salvages all parts that earl possibly be used from wornout or danhag:.-d equipment, ipent, particularly vehicles. (S) A considerable portion of the urmy's time is spent in conducting a modest civic action program to assist in the government's overall socioeconomic program to raise the standard of living of the Africans. Although handicapped by inadequate resources, the anny provides food, medical services, employment, education. and other assistance to the local African population. hundreds of Africans have been trained as skilled mechanics and technicians in the army's maintenance facilities and military hospitals. Unit medical officers maintain clinics to provide medical treatment for the local population (F :gure 3), and sonic teach basic hygiene classes for the Africans. The army has operated schools, with classes conducted by bolh African and white CO's during their off -duty hours. 'Training in the metropole has been realistically directed toward preparing the Portuguese soldier for dealing with the Africans on a person -to- person basi,. [clack Mozambicans serve in the army as well as in the vartom paramilitary forces which assist in maintaining internal security. Tire black soldiers have perforined well in conihat operations alongside soldiers front the metmpole and speciA in dependent operations; there have keen no known incidents of disloyally. although there inay have been a few defections (S) 1. Organization (C) Mocambique comprises one of the military regions of the Portuguese Array. The army commander in Mozambique is also the Commander in Chief of the awned forces. He has delegated control of all nonoperational activities of the urnhy to his deputy; the latter is responsible for personnel, recruiting; and conscription, implementation of the training program, and c of all logistical facilities. Tire aTMV regional headquarters isin Nanhpula, with lite unified command headquarters, and most of the army staff officers serve in a dual role --fo, the military region and for lite joint staff. Directives for control of nonoperational matters are transmitted by the Chief :7 ;T. ..q. e- ;3.9'S... :S...,. ;.:G.s c... G:.... 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 FIGURE 3. Salta �ton inedica� corpsman vaccinating children in resettlement village MOM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 of Staff of the Army in Lisbon; operational orders are transmitted from Lisbon. by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces The Military Region of Mozambique is divided into two operational zones (the Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN) and the Tete Military Zone) and Uvo territorial commands (the Central and Southern). The ZIN is subdivided into four operational sectors: A, B, C, and D, with headquarters in Vila Cabral, Porto Amelia, Nampula, and Quelimane, 'respectively. Sector commanders report directly to the joint headquarters in Nampula. The ZIN encompasses Cite districts of Nhisce.. Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, and Zambezia. The fete Military Zone, with headquarters in the township of Tete, includes only the Tete District, which was reduced in size in August 1972 by the transfer of Mungari Circunscricao (a rural administrative subdivision of the district) to Beira District. The military commander of the zone is also the governor of Tote District. For more effective control of counterinsurgency operations, which have intensified over the past 2 years, the zone is subdivided into three operational sectors: F, G, and H, with headquarters in the towns of Tete, Fingoe, and F'urancungo. Most of the training and logistical facilities of the Military Region of Mozambique are located within the two territorial commands, which have no subdivisions. The commander of the Southern Territorial Command, which has headquarters in Lourenco Marquee, serves as liaison for the Commander in Chief with the Covemor General of the state. Inhambane, Gaza, and Lourenco Marques districts are included in this command. The Central Territorial Command, with l in Beira, contains Vila Pery and Beira districts, which were created in August 1972 from the District of Manica and Sofala. 2. Strength, composition, and disposi;:;on" (S) Portuguese Army strength in Mozambique is about 43,000 officers and enlisted men. The number of conscripts is not known, but they probably comprise approximately 95% of the total. It is estimated that 35% of the army consists of Mozambique -barn personnel, of whom all but about 5% are believed to be black. The majority of the paramilitary forces, which supplement the army in performance of its mission in Mozambique, are black. There are 39 rFor current, detailed information, see the Grd�r of Battle Sumraary, Foreign Ground Forces (Portugal), and Military Intelligence Summary (Portugal), both published by the Defenw Intelligence Agency. 6 battalions or battalion equivalents, most of which are infantry. Several units have designations of other combat arms, such as artillery or cavalry, but they operate as infantry; Cite designation has been derived from the traditional arm of the unit which operated the center in Portugal where the battalion was formed and trained. Battalions have no standard size but vary according to the operational needs of the sector in which they are assigned. Combat units in Mozam- bique are divided into two categories: quudricula and intervention. Quaddculu is a term applied to the combat units which are assigned specific boundaries within a sector in which they conduct operations over a long per_od of time. While in this role, ;nits normally are not assigned to an intervention mission. Intervention is the term applied to those combat units which are used for special assignments and are controlled directly by the Commander in Chief. The army's commando battalion and selected infantry companies possibly I2 �are intervention units. Of the tots! units in Mozambique, it is estimated that 26 battalions arc gaadrtcula. Combat support units consist of four battalions (one .artillery, two engineer, one signal), four cavalry (armored cars) troops (companies), and three military police companies. The :artillery battalion, headquartered in Beira, furnishes three batteries (probably four pieces in each battery) of World War II British -made 25- pounder (88 -111m equivalent) gun howitzers for northern Mozam- bique �two batteries in Niassa and one in Cabo Delgado; a few additional artillery pieces are at the training center in Beira, and a battery in Lourenco Marques is believed to have 40 -mm air defense artillery (probably six pieces). The cavalry units are located in Lourenco Marques, Beira, Nampula, and Mueda; they are equipped with pre -World War II British -made armored cats and possibly a few French Panhards which are used for patrol purposes and in parades. Service support unit: ronsist of four battalions (one each of quartermaster, transportation, ordnance, and signal) plus an unknown number of medical detachments. The major concentrations are in the northern districts� Niassa, Cabo Delgado, and Tete �but a small number of units and most of the training centers are in central and southern Mozambique. 3. Training (C) Men who were conscripted in metropolitan Portugal have completed 9 weeks of basic training, plus advanced and unit training, before they arrive in Mozambique. The length of the advanced training period varies from 7 weeks (for infantry) to 49 weeks U APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 for some specialties (such as medical). The final stage of training takes place in the unit that is to be deployed overseas. The length of time spent in unit training depends on the urgency of operational needs but is usually about 12 weeks. Almost every Portuguese conscript serves overseas, either in Africa or the F& East. The normal overseas tour is 2 years; this service is in addition to the active duty time served up to the date of embarkation. The term can be extended as required; however, the average conscript drns aui serve more than 3 years. Most of the conscripts from Portugal remain in the unit to which they were assigned in tl;te metropole, although a few, such as specialists and commandos, may be assigned to locally trained units. The men who have received commando training in the metropole undergo 4 weeks of additional training at the Commando Training Center at Montepuez. At present, however, the majority of the personnel in commando units are Mozambicans. Metropolitan units arriving in Mozambique process through one of the replacement centers, where they receive weapons and field equipment. There are replacement centers in Lourenco Marques and Nampula, and it is likely that a facility has been established In Beira to receive some of the troops moved to Mozambique by air. Units usually serve 12 to 20 months in a sector of active insurgency; the remainder of the normal 2 -year tour is spent in a quiet area. Conscripts barn in Mozambique normally serve a 3- year term, including a minimum of 16 weeks in one of the training centers. Mozambicans normally do not serve outside the state, but qualified personnel may attend schools in metropolitan Portugal. The basic training phase in a training center lasts 9 weeks, during which physical conditioning and basic military skills are stressed. The second cycle cc asists of 7 weeks for those being assigned to infantry units; 9 weeks are required for specialties, such as typing, bugling, and use of machineguns. The length of time spent in training for qualification in other specialties, such as medical aides, is not known. The principal training center is at Boane, with a capacity for training 6,000 men per year. Other training centers are located at Vila Pery, Namialo, Beira. Nampula, Montepuez, and Lourenco Marques. The facilities at Boane include the Driver Training Center and the School of Military Application, which conducts courses for reserve (mflfdar;0) officer and NCO candidates. The 11- week course for offic r candidates begins in August of a A mflreranu officer or NCO equates roughly to a U.S. reserve officer. or NCO on extended active duty. The word m0fefono translates as "militia;' which is not need in order to avoid confusion with the local self-defense forces. each year_ The NCO candidate course also lasts I weeks and begins each January. Locally trained officers and NCO's szrve as instructors at all of the training centers, as well as in combat and othcrduties. The training center at Montepucx trains only commandos and is the home station of the commando battalion in Moxambiclue. Driver training is also conducted at the center in Lourenco Marques, and the only artiller '.nnining provided locally is at the center i n Bei ra. 4. Logiisti -s (C) The army's logistical system in Cite Military Region of Mozambique provides adequate support for the troops conducting, counterinsurgency operations, but its effectiveness is hampered by a lack of spare parts and of north -south rail links, the vulnerability of the cast -west rail lines, and an inadequate road system. Logistical support operations are severe] ha4cap- ped by mud during the wet season, and the unpaved roads are also extremely vulnerable to guerrlllu mining activity at all times. The chief of the 4th Bureau (logistics) nn Cite army commander's staff has nverall responsibility for coordinatio� Iogistical support requirements, which are prepared by the chiefs of the quartermaster, medical, engineer, signal, and ordnance services, also on the army commander's staff ['hc =-hief of the 4th Bureau handles procurement, provides truck transportation, and arranges for distribution of supplies. The service chiefs control storage of supplies and their issue to the troops. A branch of the Military Support Organization, controlled by the Secretary of State for Army in Lisbon, is located in Lourenco Marques to facilitate procurement of items such as uniforms, footwear, food supplies, and, to some extent, POL. The Military Support Organization buys POL products from commercial organizations, which haudle the distribution. Most supplies are obtained from the metropole and are received in Mozambique at one of four ports� Lourenco Marques, Beira, Nacala, and Porto Arnelia. innumerable complica- tions have arisen on the few occasion., that northbound shipments have been inadvertently offloaded in a southern port, or vice versa. A few items, including canned fruit and vegetables and some medical supplies, are obtained from South Africa. During most of the past year, the majority of the troops have been moved by air between the metropole and Mozambique. The transport capability of the air force has not been sufficient to move battalion -size units cohesively, however, and the army is considering the return to the use of ships for routine rotation 7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 007078000200100009 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 Within Movarttbique, must supplies are mover) by trucks (commercial and military), as well as by rail and ships; emergency items art delivered by military or commercial aircraft. Routine troop riunMnuats within tlae regiun are handled chiefly by military trucks, but both military and commercial aircraft arc used eu available, particularly in vniergencies; so ne troops are probably moved by rail and ships. Maintenance is adequate but slow. A nci maintenance facility in Nampula. which became operational in the summer of 1972, handles major repair and rebuild requirements; prior to its opening most of the vcliicles and engines needing major repairs or complete rebuilding had to be sent to Lisbon. A vehicle repair facility in Mueda performs soine tnajor repairs, but its capacity is extremely small. Commercial facilities in Beira are used forsonic major repairs. Military maintenance facilities make extensive use of cannihali7. ation to obtain spare parts, repairing or rebuilding every salvageable item. Vehicle maintenance problems arc numerous because of poor drivers, rough roads, and an increasing number of accidents caused by mines laid by the guerrillas (Figure 4), Units perform as much of their own Maintenance as possible; repairs hcyond their capability are handled by direct support ordnance maintenance detachment�', which also are responsible for forwarding items requiring maintenance in fixed installations. Battlefield casualties are evacuated to the nearest medical aid station and may be moved successively to the higher echelon aid stations, the nearest military or civilian ho and to one of the three major military hospitals �in Nampula. Beira, and Lourenco Marques, T'he .air force performs medical evacuation for the army, but civilian air taxis are also chartered to evacnate casualties, particularly at night, and to deliver medical supplies to isolated units. Critiealty vounded patients are flown to tlic metropole, acce:rtpanied by paratroop nurses. Units in :Mozambique are lightly equipped, but stocks of weapons, equipment, and ammunition are generally adequate to support requirements it the present level of insurgency and could probably support a slight increase. The Must comtnari squall arms used are Pork uguese- rrt;: III factured 7.62 -mini, C.:3 automatic rifles and 1 9 -mm subinachincguns (1111' is derived from the name of the ractorv� F'irbrica Militar fie Breco de Praha �in Lisbon). Artillery is obsolete and consists of all insignificant quantity of British World %'ar II 25- pounder (till -man) gun howitzers and a few antiaircraft naacliinZ guns. Cavalry units in Loun'net Marques, Beira, and Namipula have a few arinored cars that are used for p- Wok they arc chiefly pre -World War I1 British models, although a few arc French Panhards that tray have been procured from South Africa, Some vehicles, principally Y+ -ton trucks have been obtained by Portugal from South Africa, and it is likely that a few are in use in ,titoz uabique. 'rhe principal light truck is [lie I Yi -tot, German Mercedes UNIMOG wilich is assembled in Portugal. Tic standard heavy truck is the French Berliet, also assembled in Portugal. Cormmuraications equipment is in short supply, but a small number of radios may have beeti purchased from South Africa. Engineer equipment consists chiefly of simple machinery for construction and repair of roads (Figure 5). bridges, and landing strips. D. Navy (S) The primary mission of the Portuguese naval forces stationed in tiMaianibique is to safeguard the 1,5$5 rriile coastline along tlic Indian Occan, defend ihe� ports, and patrol the coastal atud itnland v :iten :n s, including; Lake Nyasa. A secondary mission is to protect coastal shit, ping. '['he navy genendly performs its missions effectively. 1. Organization \Mozambique c rnprises ;a naval command of Portugal, Its cornrnarmicr, a rear admiral or coninudore, is subordinate to the Commander in (thief of kite Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200100009 -6 FIGURE 5. Engineers constructing o military rood (U /OU) FIGURE 4. Trucks destroyed by guerrilla rifnes (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100009 -6 eg 3 FIGURE 6. Coastal escorts, the Jacinto Candido (F476) and the General Pereira d'1:ca (F477) (U /DU) for operational matters and to naval headquarters in Lisbon for administrative matters. The naval commander is assisted by a de puty, a chief of staff, and a small staff. The Moiaimbique Naval Command, with headquarters in Nampula, is subdivided into 10 maritime defens commands: Vila de Antonio fines, Mozambique, Nacala, Porto Amelia. L.onreneo Marques, Beira, Inhambane, Quelitnane, Vila do Chinde, and lake Nyasa. with headquarters at Augusto Cardoso (formed) Metangnin). Tile m, itary communication network operated by the navy is linked directly with Lisbon and has five major radio stations located at Loureneo Marques. Porto Amelia, Beira, Nacala, and Augusto Cardoso, as well as 25 minor stations at sites throughout the state. 2. Strength, comp3sition, and disposition' Portuguese Navy strength in Mozambique is approximately 3,500 officers and enlisted men, including some 800 naval riflemen. Virtually all personnel are believed to he metropolitan Portuguese. Tor current. detaileet information. see the Automated Naval Order of itatrle (5hilh). Volume 1 ,Vacal Forces Intelligence Si tidy (Portugal), and ,Military Intelligence Summary (Portugal), all published by the Defense Intelligence Agency. �sl' The rtttmber of ships assigned to Mozambique varies accor to requirements. lit late 197 2, ship strength included two coastal escorts (PCE) (Figure G1, six patrol boats. (i'B), one miseellutteous auxiliary (AG), one surveying ship (AGS), one titility land ing; craft (LCU), four mechanized landing craft (LCM), and three vehicle. personnel landing craft (i,CVP). The PCE's are based at Lourenco Marques and are used for coastal putrid and transport of personnel and equiprivent. Two of the 1 and the L!:U, based at L ourCTIC0 M- ,trrit=es.iimtfctrtoAmelia, respectively. are also used in patrol antl'transpurt roles- both along the coast and on inland w