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SECRET 32A/GS/AF semen (anlaj April 1.973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY SECRET No FOREIGN D /SSEA9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The book unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is 'ne NIS Basic Intelligence Foci' book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook emits some details on the econor the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion ct the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bou,ld into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue, it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING i This document contains information. affecting 'he national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US core, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorised person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 01964). EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES SS (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 y V S: F t f a i WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be r,a- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /Far Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 This section was prepared for the NIS by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was sub- stantially completed in January I973. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 YEMEN (SANW) CONTENTS This General Surcey .supersedes the one dated June 1970, copies of which should be destroyed. A. Defense establishment 1 Summary of stricture, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. Soviet influence and presence. 1. Military history 2 Creation and growth of armeel forces; Egyp- tian troops in the Y.A.R.; foreign aid; dissident tribesmen, border incidents. 2. Defense organization 3 Chain of command and Armed Forces Su- preme Command. SECRET No FOs` ciq DIssEM APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 Page 3. Military manpower 4 Estimated male population by age group and number physically fit; recruitment and morale. 4. Strength trends 5 Armed forces persr onnel strength. 5. Training 5 Summary of foreign training, military educa- tional programs under consideration, and joint service trainh,g. 6. Military budget.... 5 Estimate of military budget for 1968 -71. 7. Logistics 5 Foreign suppliers of military equipment and total dependence on Soviet an-] W--rsaw Pact countries. B. Army 6 Mission and capabilities; so in the army, and tribal conflicts. 1. Organization 7 Armed Forces Supreme Command, chain of cammand, and control of combat units; ad- ministrative provinces and corresponding mili- tary commandr 2. Strengths, composition, and disposition 8 Personnel strength; major breakdown of armed forces; area of troop concentration; arms and equipment, 3. Training 9 Soviet military advisers assign to various military schools and army units; number of personnel undergoing training in the U.S.S.R. and Saudi Arabia; types of military schools. 4. Logistics 9 Deptndenoe on foreign sources; types and amours: of mili' pry equipment received frcm foreign countries; control of equipment and weapons. Page C. Navy 10 1. Organization 10 Command structure and headquarters organi- zation. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition Ship and personnel strengths. 3. Training Soviet and Egyptian advisers; training in the U.S.S.R. 4. Logistics Limited repair facilities. D. Air force Capabilities, mission, and dependence on the U.S.S.R. for aircraft and spare parts; status of aircraft. 1. Organization Command structure and headquarters organi- zation. 2. Strength, composition, and disposition Personnel and aircraft strengths; squadron based assignments; personnel problems. 3. Training Domestic and foreign training by Soviet and Syrian personnel. 4. Logistics Depenue�c.e upon foreign sources; denial of spare parts by Soviets; major supply depot and bulk fuel storage area. E. Paramilitary forces 1. Ministry of Interior security forces Strengths and functions of the Central Se- curity Force and the Office oi; General Se- curity. 2. Zaydi tribal forces Brief discussion of tribes; estimated strengths; arms and equipment. FIGURES 10 10 10 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 ii 4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 Page Page Fig. 1 Tribesmen carrying supplies Fig. 4 Army organization chart) 7 (photo) 3 Fig, 5 Paratroopers (photo) 8 Fig. 2 Defense organization (clout) 4 Fig. 6 Naval force personnel (photo) 10 Fig. 3 Tribal soldiers (;photo) 6 Fig, 7 Armored carrier photo) 13 ii 4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 w. 'ER 1 ,...r �.7 jot A r o APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 N Armed Forces A. Defense establishment 1'he� armed force~ of div vine n :1rab liepublic� c�ensist of ;ill army of about 30.0W. ;u embryonic naval force� of about 250 Wren ;urd five ,peraatinnal small craft, and ati air force of abcrit ;(H) then and 27 aircraft. Parunilitary force~, under the klinistry of Interior, consist of the Central Security Force and the Office of General Security 'These c- ornbined forces total about 4,3(H) mete, In addition, there a re the Gavdi tribal forces >vho have a pit rtnailitary calub ;lii� scilh streugtis rarer exceeding a f v %v 11) tisuncl. {Sl The arnied forces art charged with maintaining internal sec�urit\ and defending the country against foreign aggression. The awned forces of Yemen' are marginall\ capahle of maintaining iutenal sivitrit\, bolt th(-\- would be unable to offer significant resistance to the forc of ;a major power or to conduct successful offensive operations against nc�ighhoring countries. The arnwd forces have been unable to protect Yenten's southern border from forts by Kllrt.). known as Yenen (Aden)�forces. (S) The train external challenge facing the military e- stablishinent is the threat from the� radical Government. Most iailitary leaders ,could like to e.�omrnit their forces, it: rorijrtnctiem with anti -Aden tribal forces and dissident groups, against the Aaeui regirne. Past attempts along these lines indicate such ventures are not likely to be satc�cessful. civilian offickls are divided oil the subivo.- with 1'resident Irani strongly opposing an) such trove. (S) I.uck of 'greater combat effectiveness is due primarily to obsolete e(luiptnent, which hay beet further degraded through iriadecluute rn ;rintenance, lack of spare parts, and the ;absence of 7111 effective traimtig program. The armed forces have been 'The word Yenien refers to the Yemen Arab Repnblic(Y.A.It. or Yettten (San'a'), not to be cvtifused with the Pee,ple's t)ernoc�ratic Republic of Yenu +n (P. 1). It. Y.), or Yernen (Aden). c�omph�tel\ depe�nderil on Warsam fact countries, prin,aril-, the V.S.S li.. for military aid and advisf�rs. Tlv- Soriets, whe� also srtplxrt Ilse c�ornln�ting Yernen (:%deta l armed forces, an� apparentic %ioithholdiiig meet mihtar% dehkeries and spun� parts, wfiile providing greater support to the Adeni regime�. Yenea's rapt rochement kith Saudi .1rabia in 1970. increased cooperation svilh Westerii countries sa_ as 11'e Gcrntauv. and the remunplion of telatiois with Ilse foiled Slate. ill Iul% 1972 have midorebtedls c�ontrilmwd to the decrease in Soviet logistic support. Still farther animoNity has retinlled froth Allowing anti- Yvinen (Ade dis:ielenl organi /a- lions it) c�oraduct insurgent operations from Yemeni territon. Current and near -lean military aid from Sa+tdi Arabia, Egvpl, and Libya \sill not be sufficient to replace the S(;%iel assistance if iI is temi iiiated. (S) Although the mvrsizcd standing arm% cat, rely on ni nbers to maitI;ain internal security, except along the southem border aith Aclen. any major operations would be sv%vrely wAric�ted becaatse of IFie lack of spare parts, esln�cial1% in the� armored units. The oaval force las no c�omhat capabilih and rarer conducts even short-range patrols. In the past, the ;air force has ofv mot tstraIcd its c� ;a Ili biIi, y to bomb slaIinnary (argots and provide limited supporl to ground nnils; however, bec�auu� of its complete reliance o il iioviet ecluipinent, it too is Plagued b litc shortage of spare parts. The V.S.S.K. has supplied earl\ warning and gromid control intercept radar to Yvin �n, hot no effective air defense system cxists.:1ir &.4vuse capability is limited to irtnv antiaircraft units and tribal forces faniIiar wit It light anliaireraft w eapons that were employed during ill( republic�an- ro\:ilist civil war of (1;c 1960%. (S) No formal military alliances are known to exist; however, Yemen has concluded technical and military assistance agreements with the U.S.S.H., litilgari;a, Yugoslavia, Pcople 114-public of C11ina, Czecho- slovakia. Bast German\, and E,gypt. From the beginning of the mpublicatt regime in September 1962 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200100024 -9 Initi) 1%7 F p lit exerci.ed ;�onsiderlble iufltrence eser lc�IJU�JIi g( ve�Jnrru� It, 11 affair.. (n resIifIII e the IItsgIcf (111 nl%allst allentpl to osertbroa the republican goyertimet -l. file I� :ppliaus w�nl lei leutcn it 11 e%pedttiortar% fon�e. %%hic�II reached a maxlrnIIIII of about 60,M). 1. Military hkton Follimirtg indepelldl-nc�e front flu� Turks ill ISMS, Yvmvn's nidinu�ntar% aritwd forc rsoived into ticcir present strucloire undo�: gtticdance, training. and arnis pro%ith-d by a %im0% of foreign immer%. inchiditlg file 1'nited kingdom. Turks�%. S%% (den. l :gspt. I. ill%;:, Syria, :n�choslovakia. and the I S.S. 11 ?1') The army is cseutiall% art mitgrow111 of the tribal levies that functioned as little more flan it paL1.e guard for the linarti 111) to the revolution of Septendwr 1962. Ill that revolution ;1 gro(11) (If %as Ili arms o fficers. livaded b% :ol. :V;d .111ah .d- S:ill:cl.. %%ere able to obtain extensive foreign %lipp uotabli from Egypt, and oyerthre%% lbe reginu�of Imam liadr. From that date the royalists foilghl ;tg.1insl the rep il; WMI forces. B% 1961 the w1mblicall arnn, stipplertertted In recruiting, %%as formed into five nonsho dard 1rig:�.dv% under Soviet and I� :pptian ltitelagl-. I)espiteexl: ns1%e I :9 ptiaII aid, the royalist forces remained in c:ntrol of the highlan(fs %%bile Ihe w1mblic:uls nutiut ;tined a hold on the coastal lowlands. (i' 101' 11'bert the Jurie 196T Arab- Israch ,svr begun. file Fgypti:ut% %yithdre%% %onto troops ate;i equipment from Yo In Augmf 19(17, at the kloartomn Cmiferetice. Sandi Arabia agreed to ce .1se its assistance to the. royalists ill rettirn for F,ppl's promise to recall its forces from Ycrnvu. As the last Epfilial: troops were (Aac�11aIvd in I)ecernber 1967, the rny:disls again seized the initiative, c�aplitring most of the northerii eastern� and ceiitral parts of the country. I)nring die first 2 months of 1966, the royakk laid Beige (o San';, the c�apitid, IIII foiled to cuptim it. The reasons for failure were primarik I%;ofolel. 1leif.11 the 1�:g }�pti:ut troops no longer in Yemen� mam of the rmalists lost much of their tea! for fighting. Others questioned Ihe benefits in restoring the Inlatll:ll(� il spite of Irnani 11adr's promises of reforim, In 1970. Saudi Arabia recognized the 1.;1. H. and terminated all aicl to the royalists. (1j01') The army was further built 111) under the 911id;uuCe (if former Prime Minister U. Gen. Ilasan ul- 'Amri, who Again becalm' the Prime Minister fora short time in 1971. Ile was forced to resign after Its% than 2 weeks in office after he murdewd a Yemeni c�iyiiian in a private quarrel. Since late 1971, the armed forces hove� br en "MI" the Colitrul of till .'0immuuler is (160 of 1114� arntrel Fomes. (;ol. 11J11:ontu