NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 60A; ZAIRE; ARMED FORCES

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• Collection: NIS
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CONFIDENTIAL
60A /GS /AF
z aire
April 1973
NATIONAL INTELLIJENCE SURVEY
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated Sep-
tember 1970, copies of which ,should be destroyed.
A. Defense establishment 1
Armed forces componer-ts and strengths; coin
parisun with neighborin;, forces; mission; general
disposition; logistics situat'on and other weak-
nesses; anti Communist attitude, OAU, ar,d other
foreign relations; domestic role of the military
and the rising competition of the MPR.
1. Military history 2
7;,e Belgian Force Publique and its influence
on Zairian Army; postindependence mutiny
and years of rebellion and national chaos;
U.N. intervention; Secteur Tanganyika and in-
surgency; the air arm, the coast guard.
2. Command structure 3
1972 reorganization; freewheeling actuality
vs. theoretical formal structure; top control
and chain of .ommand.
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Page
B. joint activities 4
I. Military manpower
Male population between 15 and 49 years
old, broken down by 5 -year age groupings;
number coming of military age each year;
women in the armed forces; procurement,
Lovanium University students and incident in
1971; recruiting; tribalism; capacities of re-
cruits; morale; poor discipline; lack of a re-
serve system; the officer corps and its cate-
gories.
2. Strength trends
Summary, sium indepandenco.
3. Traini,'er
Lack of Joint armed forces schools; training
of National Gendarmerie; joint training and
operations.
4. Military budget
Prepr.r ation and size of the budget; tabula-
tion of budgets, 1968 -72.
5. Logistics
Foreign sources and assistance; small potential
cf the domestic economy for military produc-
tion; logistics directorate and role of Belgian
advisers; supply and maintenance problems;
army logistics system; stock levels; transp-irta-
tion; foreign technical assistance.
C. Ground forces
Summary and evaluation.
I. Organization
Components; military regions airborne divi-
sion; armored division; Sec:_aur Tanganyika;
air force; reorganization.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
Personnel strength; number and types of bat-
talions, the primary tactical unit; reconnais-
sance squadrons; composition of a military
region; airborne division and its special im-
portance; composition of Seeteur Tanganyika
force; combat support.
4
Page
3. Training 10
Dependence on foreign training; training
center at Kitona and its training schedule,
retraining of National Gendarmerie's police
component; officer training schools; special
training; paucity of joint training; shortcom-
ings; foreign advisers.
4. Logistics 11
Logistics system's center; evaluation; short
comings.
FIGURES
Page
Fig. 1 Armed foi ces organization chart) 4
Fig. 2 Rifleman with FN /FAL rifly (photo) 7
Fig. 3 jumpmaster photo) 8
Fig. 4 Panhards photos) 9
Fig. 5 Mortarmen and towed mortar photo) 10
ii
Page
Fig. 6 Mortar demonstration at Kitona
(photo) 10
Fig. 7 jeep- mounted 106-mm recoilless rifle
and crew photo) 10
Fig. 8 Aermacchi MB -326GB turbojet air-
craft (photo) 14
Fig. 9 Swift boat (photo) 15
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D. Air force
11
5
Summary and evaluation of this branch of the
army.
6
1. Organization
12
Chain of command; components; Kamina Base
Airfield; liaison.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition
12
6
Personnel strength; present role of foreigners;
tabulation of snits, locations, and aircraft;
lesser airfields used by air force; lack of air
reserve; potential of civil air.
6
3. Training
13
Problem of training Zairians; vital roles of
foreigners; training center. Italian Air Force
training team and Its role.
4. Logistics
13
Dependence on foreigners; maintenance;
7
SODEMAZ; U.S. assistance; brief evaluation;
stock levels; fuel.
8
E. National Gendarmerie
14
Brief summary.
F. Coast guard
14
Summary of the Coas ^iver, and Lake Cuard;
9
As subordination and brief history; inventory of
craft; training of the CRLG in the United States;
mlasion and prospects.
G. Paramilitary
15
Brief summary of military potential of the Dis-
ciplinary Bri;;ade.
FIGURES
Page
Fig. 1 Armed foi ces organization chart) 4
Fig. 2 Rifleman with FN /FAL rifly (photo) 7
Fig. 3 jumpmaster photo) 8
Fig. 4 Panhards photos) 9
Fig. 5 Mortarmen and towed mortar photo) 10
ii
Page
Fig. 6 Mortar demonstration at Kitona
(photo) 10
Fig. 7 jeep- mounted 106-mm recoilless rifle
and crew photo) 10
Fig. 8 Aermacchi MB -326GB turbojet air-
craft (photo) 14
Fig. 9 Swift boat (photo) 15
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A. Defense establishment (C)
The Zairian Armed Forces consist of an army with a
very small air arm plus a gendarmerie and a miniscule
coast guard -type naval force. Collectively they are
sometimes referred to as the Forces Arrnees Zairoises,
or F'AZ, a name that also is often used for the ground
forces alone. The coast guard became operational in
March 1972, and 4 months later a major reorganiza-
tion of the army took place that, among other
changes, established the National Gendarmerie. Of
the components, the ground forces are the largest and
by far the dominant service and are the power base of
the Mobutu regime. Overall, capabilities and
discipline are poor, and th- army is feared and
distrusted by the civil populace. Totl armed forces
personnel strength is about 66.000 men. The Zairian
Army numbers about 35,(XX) and iF basically a light
infantry force of 39 battalions. The air arm, called the
Zairian Air Force has about 760 men and 60 aircraft;
it is drastical:.� short of pilots and, of necessity, relies
on foreigners for maintenance and logistics. The
National Gendarmerie has about 30,000 men. Formed
in July 1972, it incorporates the six gendarme
battalions from the army and the former National
Police, and, partly because of its ex -army units, :t has
more military capability than its name might imply.
The Zairian Coast, River, and Lake Guard (CRI.G)
has about 200 men and a few small craft, most of
which are on Lake Tanganyika; it is a new service,
and most personnel have been trained in the United
States. The armed forces are larger than those of any of
Zaire's many contiguous neighbors (the strengths of
which range between Sudan's 33,000 and the Central
African Republic's 200 except Angola, where
Portugal maintains sonic 65,000 troops. By any
reasonable, modern standard, the armed forces are
deficient; nonetheless, in spite of many major
shortcomings, their size, equipment, and foreign aid
make "Zaire a significant power io central Africa.
The mission of the armed forces is to defend the
territory of Zaire and maintain internal security.
Because of the chaotic state of the country in earlier
years, the second responsiLility had taken virtually all
the energies of the armed forces, which still are
deployed primarily for internal security rather than
strategic considerations. Generally, army units are
spread throughout the country
I but there is a
concentration near Lake. Tanganyika to deal with the
very limited insurgency or banditry that still occurs in
the area. The air force is based at two airfields, one
near Kinshasa and one near Kamina; however, some
tacti aircraft and helicopters are rotated to Kalemie
to support the counterinsurgency operations. Most of
the CRLG is based at Kalemie, to support the
counterinsurgency operations, and the remaining
elements are at Banana and Kinshasa. A major factor
influenci,-ag the armed forces is the fact that they have
to depend on foreign sources for military nateriel,
training, and advice. Fxcept in the air force, where
they are managed chiefly by foreigners, the logistics
and maintenance systems are inefficient, unreliable,
and often corrupt and are among the awned forces'
greatest weaknesses. Overall military capabilities
continue to be seriously undercut by tribal and
regional loyalties, by poor discipline, and by the
hostility of the civilian populace.
Because the Soviet Union and the Pcople's Republic
of China encouraged disruption and surreptitiously
gave aid to antigovernment forces in the 1960'x, the
Zairian Government became very distrustful of those
countries and today continues to be anti- Communist,
although t;ere is evidence of new cordiality. President
Mobutu's fear of "Communist encirclement" has had
considerable influence on defense po heies in the past.
In May 1968, Zaire and Chad agreed to cooperate
in mutual defense and military training and exchange
military intelligence. Actual commitment of 'Zairian
military elements outside the country occurred in May
1972, when a reinforced airborne company, two jet
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aircraft, and sonic ammunition were sent to Burundi
in respemse to a request front the President of that
country. The cor was used for guard duty in
Bujumbura, the aircraft for reconnaissance, and the
ammunition in duelling disorders in southern Burundi.
Since Mobutu assumed power in November 1965.
the armed for.- have remained his base of power,
but, by the same token, (lacy also represent the mo >.t
serious po otential threat to his regime. Probably aiming
to develop a cininterbalanee to the all powerful
military, Mobutu directed in Octn! )er 1971 that all
senior regional officials of the armed forces arid police
he incorporated into the Popular Revolutionary
Movement (MPR). As the MPR grows in influence
and prestige and becomes increasing) the "supremo
institution" in Zaire, it becomes less and less palatable
to the pampered armed forces. Military leaders are
also upset because the ['resident no longer relies on
their counsel to the extent he used to.
1. Military history
The armed forces were formed front elements of the
Force Publique� the reliable, Belgian -led ground force
that had been used to maintain order in the colony
from 1886 onwards. From its beginnings of sonic 200
tnen in 1887 the Force Publique had grown to art
or,anized force of 15,01X1 men by the turn of the
eenturv. Officers and rnosl noncommissioned officers
were Belgians, and the ranks were filled with
Congolese drawn from most of the tribes.
During World War 1, the basic military organiza-
tional structure of the Force Publique changed when
troops of the Belgian Metropolitan Army, along with
more modern weapons and c(!ttipment, were
intr The Force Publique companies were used
in making rap infantry regiments that were reinforced
wiih artillery arid special troops in order to form
suitable units for large -scale operations. These units
then went on to serve creditably with the French forces
in the Cameroons and with the British forces in
German East Africa (now Tanzania). Following the
war, the Force Publique was divided into two
cornponcnts �the Garrison 'Troops component for
general military -type duties arid the Territorial Service
Troops component for constabulary -type duties. in
World War II Congolese units again served
creditably �this time in Ethiopia, Egypt, and Nigeria.
In the Force Publique, as in the present -clay armed
forces, the general language of daily business was
Lingala (a "trade language" developed in the 1880's),
and official communications were written in French.
At the time Belgium granted the Congo its
independence in 1960, all of the army officers (about
I,(XX)) and most of the noncom inissioned officers
(total cx)rps, all races, about 7,6150) still were Belgian
nationals. Virtually the entire Force Publique systern
was carried over into the army of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. the Congolese National Army
(ANC). liowewer, almost imrnediately the African
troops mutinied. Thee demanded higher pay. the
elevation of Congolese to commissioned officer rank.
and the moval of the Belgian commanding general.
Though the Belgian officers had been asked to remain
as advisers, all of them were r.-placed b Africans, after
which discipline and control rapidly deteriorated, the
ANC lost its cohesiveness and split into regional and
tribal grouts, and months of bloody chaos followed.
At the request of the central government. thr Jnited
Nations intervened in July 1960 arid sent troops to try
to deal with the situation. By the end of Octob(- r 1960
the U.N. force in the Congo was over ISOX) men,
representing 29 U.N. mvinher states.
During 1961 and 1962, three separate areas of the
Congo, each with its own army, challenged the
atathority e'. tree central government and hindered the
U.N. force in carrying out its mission of restoring
order. The areas in secession wort, Katanga Province
(now Shaba Region), a rich rniaing area under the
leadership of Moist Tshonbe; the Stanlevville (now
Kisangani) area under the domination of a
Lumumbist faction: arid the area of southern Kasai.
loyal to Albert Kalonji, the Luba leader. By 1963, the
U.N. forces had ended the Katangan secession, arid
the government had gained the upper hand in the
other areas. At the end of June 1964 the U.N. troops
mere withdrawn.
The departure of the U.N. force was (It ickly
followed by the highly disrut)tive "Simha." :clellion in
which much of the eastern part of the country was
caught up in tribal uprisings and :a leftist revolt that
was clandestinely supported by the Soviet l?roion and
China through neighboring African countries.
Starvation arid disease became widespread, thousands
of civilians died, arid around 1(X000 fled the country.
These disorders were a severe test for the poorly
trained, poorly disciplined armed forces, hoot by 1965
(with the help of Belgian advisers, significant Belgian
and U.S. materiel assistance, and a few hundred white
mercenaries), order had been restored, tar-. many
rebels scattered rnto the mountainous, heavily forested
area west of lake 'Tanganyika. in ficid operations
during the uprisings the performance of Congolese
army units was poor, and the troops were fregcaeutly
lacking in aggressiveness �on several occasions units
were routed even though they had superiority in both
numbers all(] firepower. 1 at the highest level, staff
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exxxdination :C:,v implementation of plans fry- quentl:
broke do �u.
In juts� 1966, during counterinsurgency operations.
a regimental force of atxut 3,t X) former gendarmes
from Katanga mutinied in protest over what they
considered (4scriminatory treatment b% higher arny
echelons. The mutineers captured Stanleyville amd
demanded more promotions and redress of assorted
grievances. There the% were besieuvcl by loyal
government tromps and in September were routed The
five mutinying battalions were disbanded. and their
senior officers and tt few Wier leaders were tried by a
military comrt and execu!ed or sentenced to long
prison terms. Subse(iuertly r,(ost of the renairing
mutineers were absorbed into other army battalions.
In July 1967 another rebellion c routed, this one led
by 150 white mercenaries, who were later joined by an
estimated 730 to 1,M) Kalangan gendarmes. By
,August they had seized the city of Bukavu, which :hey
held until early :'November. A U.S. Air Force task force
airlifted troops and materie! in support of the central
government's military operations. The mercenary -led
forces tried but failed to secure significant outside
support Running low on ammunition. they finally
fled into Rwanda, where the% surrendered and were
interned. In November the rebellion ended. rnflicts
over the disposition of those rebels caused 'Zaire and
Rwanda to sever diplomatic relations, but these were
restored in February 1969. Since the 1967 rebellion,
the government has not employed mercenaries.
though it still makes extensive use of foreign military
advisers and technical contract personnel.
Since the late 1960's the armed forces have carried
off a series of counterinsurgency operations
"Operation South," "Operation Eagle,� and Secteur
Tanganyika) in the area west of Lake Tanganyika
against the ;rur�iving remnants of the 1963 Sirmba
rebellion. The Secteur Tanganyika operation keeps
some 9 battalions engaged in the lake area, where the
threat posed by these bandits /rebels does not seen
worth the effort being expended. In the 1960's the
insurgents received outside support, blot since 1970
there has Fc little evidence of any substantial
assistance from any source. The country's continual
state of internal upheaval since indep ondence has
provided years of combat experience for the armed
forces, but this has brought little noticeable
improvement in military capabilities. And on top of
this, the heavyhanded tactics of the army have
fostered considerable hostility toward the ,..,litary on
the part of the civilian populace.
An air arm, subordinate to th.e army but called an
"air force," was activated in 1961. Because the
country is underde%elop ed tet-l.nologicall the earl%
history of life air fiace has !x-en dominated !y
Eump eitim Ir. May 1964. Italian Air Force advisers
carne to supplernent the Belgian air advisers and white
niercewity pilots already there. During the 196o's the
air force a nrsisted �f a tactical unit manned by two
groups ct foreign pilots. an airlift unit of Belgian Air
Force p ers(mnel, two units of Congolese flying trainers
and transport aircraft, aiJ a unit of Congolese
working with the Italian Avisers. As a result of the
"mercenaries reb(dlion' in 19(ii -6h, the government
expelled the foreign contract pilots anti the Belgian AI;
Advisory Group. The air force managed to continue in
operation, however, thanks to the loan of Ethiopian
Air Force pilots and four North American F -h6 Sabre
jet fighter aircraft and seven Chanaian Air force
pilots. This break in dependence on foreign
technicians began something of it trend toward
Zairianization of the air force that is slowly
continuing.
In 1968 the air force was reorganized along the lines
recommended by the Italians. It still is dependent on it
private aircraft maintenance organization. although
the Italian advisory group is performing maintenance
oM its instructional aircraft. 'Through concentrated
efforts on training and tht acquisition of rte\ aircraft.
Zaire now� boasts one of lit(- most sophisticated air
forces in central Africa.
Zaire has no navy. Even though (hiring -ts first 10
years of independent arm% personnel operated some
10 to 13 patrol Imats on the country's enormou,
expanse of waterways, the Coast, Riyer and Lake
Guard was not established until November 1971 and
(lid not become operational until March 1972.
2. Command structure
In July 1972 the armed forces underwent it
reorganization that has strong political overtones and
considerable military implications. Nevertheless, in
Zaire factors such as personal power and tribal pressure
that bear scant relation to government or military
structure often erride formal organization and
procedure. In additi( n, the fact that President
Mobutu also holds the defense post and by
Department of Defense orders re uh, exclusive
right to assign operatic.tal missions ten(k to ccmfuse
tit(- situaetion and perhaps obscure formal theoictical
it rust ure.
Under the new� command structure, abort which
full information is not yet available, the President is
the Supreme Cotnniander of the armed forces, whirl;
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FIGURE 1. Armed Forces Organization (C)
he controls as head of the Del artment c" Defense
Figure I). President Mobutu also hoias tl portfolios
of Plan and Veterans Affairs. Within the Department
of Defense is the Chief of Cabinet (presently it
brigadier general), who coordinates military matters
through "Defense Directorates," one such for
personnel, organization and training, logistics,
transportation, medical services, budget, intelligence
and military security, and supply. This organization is
counterbalanced by the Presidential Special Staff,
which was formed in July 1972. Very little is known
about the actual functioning of this staff, but it seems
to have considerable power over the military purse
strings. Its organization includes sections for the army,
air force, CRLG, svetirity, gendarmerie, presidentia l
aides, and legal matters. The Coast, River and Lake
Guard (CRI,(:) is subordinate to the Presiden..
Although each of the above mentioned staff
organizations is powerful in its respective capacity to
advise the President and although the CRLG has some
power, the real chain of command (where combat
troops are inv:)ived) f! rws from the President to the
Captain General of Cie army. (Captain General,
according to the 1972 r organization announcement,
4
is the� title to be given to the army commander during
1�eacetime, %vhile ire the event of he is to be
designated Commander in Chief. President Mobutu
remains tit(- Supreme Conmande� t all times.)
As the senior service, the arm\ is commanded by a
major general (Captain Generals equivalent rank)
and has its headquarters in Kinshasa. Subordinate to
:rmy headquarters are seven military regions and their
troop units, an airborne division, an armored division
(forming and reportedly approaching brigade size).
the National Gendarmerie, a logistics unit, and the air
f o ree.
B. Joint activities (C)
1. Military manpower
As of Jny 1972, it is estimated that 'Zaire had about
5,713,0W males between the ages of 17 and 49 years
and that some 2,745,000 of them were fit for military
service. In the period from 1972 through 1976 it is
expected that an average of about 240,000 will be
reaching military age (16) each year. At past and
present recruiting levels, this is fi:r in excess of the
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military's nerds. By 5 -year age mpings, the numbers
of males from age 15 to 49 are estimated as follow;:
A token number of women serve in the armed forces in
such fields as administration and nunin.. Sore of
them are airborne qualified and are ass;gneei to the
airborne division.
The ranks of the armed forces are filled with
volunteers. In spite of the widespread hostility against
the army, enough men volunteer because of the
advantages ;r:ct preferential status that military
personnel enjoy. Initial enlistment is for 7 years and at
the end of that term soldiers may be c;?- ;charged or may
ree nlist for successive 3 periods. In the event that
it sufficient number of recruits should not he obtained,
the constitution provides for conserinti;;n. In June
1971, when students at Lovaniurn University (now
"Zaire National Unive-Av), near Kinshasa, dcmoci-
strated in commemoration of the deaths of it dozen
students killed 2 years before iii another demonstra-
tion, President Mobutu had all male Lovamum
students inducted into the armv for y chools. With the retireme of approximate
mine of tho army's senior officers in 1972, many of the
officers in ttc first category have been eliminated from
key leadership positions, thus reducing the number of
individuals upon wham Mobutu considered he could
always trust. In sum, the officer corps lacks
homogeneity and is held together by pampering with
privilege, promotion, arid good and regular pay.
Obviously it is not a body easy for Mobutu to Keep in
line.
2. Strength trends
At dependence, the strength of the army was
about 26 men. In the ensuing years accurate
records were not maintained, but it appears that from
1960 to 1965 the strength fluctuated between 23,000
and 30,000. In 1966 it increased to about 34,000, but
then in 1967 desertion and the elimination of the
mercenaries reduced it to about 31,500. Beginning in
1968, armed forces strength grew steadily arid by 1972
was almost 66,000, including the new National
Gendarmerie. However, there are no plans to recruit
more personnel during the calendar years of 1972 and
1973. Since the economy is in a period of
readjustment, there may be a leveling -off of armed
forces personnel strength for the next several years as
5
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TOT AL
MAale
NUMBER
NUMBER FIT'-OR
P GE
Or MALES
miLI rARY SERVICE
15 -19
1,183,000
6,50,Ow
20 -24
.1,036,000
530,000
25 -29
912,OOG
455,000
3t` -34
739,000
380,00
35 -39
693,(W
305,000
40 -44
593,0x(1
240,000
45 -49
499,000
185,000
Total, 15 -49
5,715,000
2,745,000
A token number of women serve in the armed forces in
such fields as administration and nunin.. Sore of
them are airborne qualified and are ass;gneei to the
airborne division.
The ranks of the armed forces are filled with
volunteers. In spite of the widespread hostility against
the army, enough men volunteer because of the
advantages ;r:ct preferential status that military
personnel enjoy. Initial enlistment is for 7 years and at
the end of that term soldiers may be c;?- ;charged or may
ree nlist for successive 3 periods. In the event that
it sufficient number of recruits should not he obtained,
the constitution provides for conserinti;;n. In June
1971, when students at Lovaniurn University (now
"Zaire National Unive-Av), near Kinshasa, dcmoci-
strated in commemoration of the deaths of it dozen
students killed 2 years before iii another demonstra-
tion, President Mobutu had all male Lovamum
students inducted into the armv for y chools. With the retireme of approximate
mine of tho army's senior officers in 1972, many of the
officers in ttc first category have been eliminated from
key leadership positions, thus reducing the number of
individuals upon wham Mobutu considered he could
always trust. In sum, the officer corps lacks
homogeneity and is held together by pampering with
privilege, promotion, arid good and regular pay.
Obviously it is not a body easy for Mobutu to Keep in
line.
2. Strength trends
At dependence, the strength of the army was
about 26 men. In the ensuing years accurate
records were not maintained, but it appears that from
1960 to 1965 the strength fluctuated between 23,000
and 30,000. In 1966 it increased to about 34,000, but
then in 1967 desertion and the elimination of the
mercenaries reduced it to about 31,500. Beginning in
1968, armed forces strength grew steadily arid by 1972
was almost 66,000, including the new National
Gendarmerie. However, there are no plans to recruit
more personnel during the calendar years of 1972 and
1973. Since the economy is in a period of
readjustment, there may be a leveling -off of armed
forces personnel strength for the next several years as
5
f
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Mobutu gingerly works toward diminishing the strong
role of tile military without antagonizing its leaders to
s ich a degree that they revolt.
3. Training
There are no joint armed forces schools, as such. The
tnen .ind units of the army's gendarmerie battalions,
lately transferred to the National endarmerie, were
trained, of c ourse in the regular army training system.
Men of the former National Police._ the other part of
the new National Gendarmerie, are being retrained in
it military curriculum in the Army Training Center at
Kitonw. In addition, the four former INational Police
training facilities arc to be converted to National
Gendarmerie instruction. Being very new, the CRI.0
do:s n.it yet have it formal training establishment of its
own, and at present all its trainliig at Home is on the
job. joint operations and an oe :asional joint cxvrciv
do afford further training.
When disorder broke out at Kinkuzu in the training
r amp that Zaire provides the Revolutionary
Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), the army sent
in an integrated aviation /ground force, and that force
performed somewhat above the usual haphazard
standard. it was made up of the air force and the
army's 2d Reconnaissance Squadron, 3d Airborne
B. .alion, and 2d Airbr:, -.e Battalion (in reserve).
Other practical field training in 1972 has been
acquired in Sectear Tanganyika in the joint operations
there in which the CRLG has assisted the array. A
formal "live- fire" exercise was staged in July 1972 just
outside of Kinshasa under the supervision of the Israeli
a4v'sers. it included airborne personnel, jet fighter
aircraft, and helicopters and was executed with skill.
4. Military budget
The military budget has regularly bean one of the
largest iterns in the national budget. It is prepared by
the Department of Defense and submitted to the
Department of Finance for analysis and inclusion in
the consolidated central government budget. The total
budget then goes for confirmation to the President,
who presents it to parliament for debate. In practice
few changes occur. Through the years of upheaval the
need for large military budgets was painfully evident
to all, and they were easy to justify. By the early
1970'x, however, with hoth the internal and external
threats greatly diminished and the state of the
economy less than healthy, the top military planners
(even Mobutu himself) Piave riad a difficult time
justifying large expenditures for new weapons and
facilities for the armed forces. Published military
6
bu d gets for the years 1966 through 1972 in egoivaie0
millions of U.S. dollars have been as follows:
In the past, Zaire has obtained virtually all of its
military materiel a assistance front Western sources.
The chief suppliers have been the Uniteu States,
F ranc e. Belgium, and Italy. Other suppliers have been
the United Kingdom, Portugal, South Africa, West
Gernuuiv, Israel, and Ghana. 'Total value of foreign
assistance is tiie equivalent of about US$47 million;
materiel from the Communist world consists of 60
jeep -hype vehicles obtained from Romania in 1972 for
the equivalent of about $200,000. 'I he United Stales
has prov ided about $48 million worth of assistance
and materiel, of which over $26 million was given as
grant aid. U.S. materiel includes small arms and
ammunition, communications equipment, vehicles,
and trainer and transport aircraft. France has supplied
machineguns, mortars, armored cars, trainer aircraft,
helicopter ordnance, and training valued at almost
$24 million. Belgium has provided infantry weapons
(Figure 2), ammunition, artillery, and armor(-(! cars
valued at almost $11 million. Up to 1966 most French
and Belgian assistance was grant aid. Italy has
supplied almost $9 million worth of patrol boats,
trainer aircraft, and training. The amounts of materiel
from other countries have been much smaller,
including about $1.9 million from the United
Kingdom.
For war mobilization the Zairian economy offers
little. in military equipment it produces only a few
quartermaster -type items such as shoes and some
uniforms. "Zaire's transportation infrastructure, which
was fragmented even in the colonial period, was
greatly damaged (both actively and through neglect)
during the political troubles in the i960's.
Rejuvenation of the transportation network has been
slow, and, other than air transport, mobilization
would find the system highly inadequate.
The procurement of military materiel is accom-
plished at the Department of Defense level. The
department's Directorate for Logistics formulates
police, verifies requirements, and issues instructions
for guidance. Belgian advises are involved in all
logistics operations in the Department of Defense. The
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1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
Military budget
37.7
48.0
60.0
72.2
89.5
Military budget as
a percent of na-
tional Iu:rlget
16.6
16.6
I8.3
16.7
13.6
1ltibtwy :,udget as
a percent of esti-
mated GNP
2.7
2.8
3.1
3.5
4.1
5. Logistics
In the past, Zaire has obtained virtually all of its
military materiel a assistance front Western sources.
The chief suppliers have been the Uniteu States,
F ranc e. Belgium, and Italy. Other suppliers have been
the United Kingdom, Portugal, South Africa, West
Gernuuiv, Israel, and Ghana. 'Total value of foreign
assistance is tiie equivalent of about US$47 million;
materiel from the Communist world consists of 60
jeep -hype vehicles obtained from Romania in 1972 for
the equivalent of about $200,000. 'I he United Stales
has prov ided about $48 million worth of assistance
and materiel, of which over $26 million was given as
grant aid. U.S. materiel includes small arms and
ammunition, communications equipment, vehicles,
and trainer and transport aircraft. France has supplied
machineguns, mortars, armored cars, trainer aircraft,
helicopter ordnance, and training valued at almost
$24 million. Belgium has provided infantry weapons
(Figure 2), ammunition, artillery, and armor(-(! cars
valued at almost $11 million. Up to 1966 most French
and Belgian assistance was grant aid. Italy has
supplied almost $9 million worth of patrol boats,
trainer aircraft, and training. The amounts of materiel
from other countries have been much smaller,
including about $1.9 million from the United
Kingdom.
For war mobilization the Zairian economy offers
little. in military equipment it produces only a few
quartermaster -type items such as shoes and some
uniforms. "Zaire's transportation infrastructure, which
was fragmented even in the colonial period, was
greatly damaged (both actively and through neglect)
during the political troubles in the i960's.
Rejuvenation of the transportation network has been
slow, and, other than air transport, mobilization
would find the system highly inadequate.
The procurement of military materiel is accom-
plished at the Department of Defense level. The
department's Directorate for Logistics formulates
police, verifies requirements, and issues instructions
for guidance. Belgian advises are involved in all
logistics operations in the Department of Defense. The
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logistics system is based on the post -World War If
Belgian system, modified somewhat by U.S. influence,
arid, though good ir, theory, in practice it suffers from
poor planning, inept cont!ol, and outdated
procedures, generally bordering on chaos. Heteroge-
neity of equipment gives rise to supply and
maintenance problems, facilities for the movement
and storage: of supplies are inadequate, and
accounting is haphazard. There is a serious shortage of
skilled technicians at all echelons. 'NI ajor servicing of
all classes of equipment has to be done at the capital,
where facilities are available.
The armed forces logistics system and the army
logistics system are one and the same. The system's
headquarters (termed "Logistical Base is at
Kinshasa, and subordinate elements are at military
region level. Desired stock levels are a 2 -year level at
the Logistical Base and a I -year level at the military
region level. At the latter echelon, however, stock
levels range very widely �all the way from a 1 -day
level in some items to a 1 -year level. Bases stock all
classes of supplies except petroleum products, which
are procured from local distributors on a contract
basis. Except for some canned goods, foodst:iffs are
also purchased locally. Storage of supplies is generally
poorly planned, and packaging for shipment is almost
unknown. Any means of transportation available,
civilian or military, may be used to transport materiel.
Frequently, costly air transportation is resorted to to
make up for lack of prior plajrning, a habit that is a
carryover from the 1964 -68 period of rebellions when
the Ui,ited States provided air support. Technical
assistance is provided b% several countries �to the
ground forces by Belgium, to the airborne dig. isic ;ri by
Israel, to the air force by Italy, and to the engineers by
the United Kingdom; .also.. the United Stales gives
some logistics support in communications, transporta-
tion, aad ordnance.
C. Ground forces (C)
The Zairian Army (or FAZ �the same name is often
rased to refer to the Zairian Armed Forces as a whole) is
primarily a light infantry force. By far its chief
irnportaricr has been in providing internal security.
and it remains of first importance in national politics.
constituting the mainstay of the Mobutu regime.
Mobutu himself is a lieutenant genera;, on leave from
the army. After the Nigerian Army, it is the second
largest luny in sub Saharan Africa and for that reason
inspires some caution arriong Zaire's immediate
neighbors. The mission of the army ;.s to he prepared to
defend the country against attack and to assist in
maintaining internal security.
Though the army has had a great deal of field
combat experience through the chaotic Listory of
Zaire, except for its airborne units it has advanced ouly
slightly in its capabilities, effectiveness, tactics, and
doctrine. It could defend the country against the
African forces of its neighbors, but against an
a
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FIGURE 2. Rifleman in training with the Belgian -made 7.62 -mm FN /FAI. rifle (C)

effective, modern force, even one much sr taller, the
army could not stand. It still remains as dependent on
foreign assistance as it was ago. Leadership is
weak and inept, and discipline, though somewhat
better than it was in the 1960's, is still poor. Other
major weaknesses include an ineffective and corrupt
logistics system, a chronic shortage of qualified
technicians, and personnel with little or no formal
education and a record of license and crime that gives
the army an invidious reputation with the populace.
The army is still pretty much "a law unto itself."
I. Organization
The organization of the army is essentially the same
as that of the armed forces, which is described above
under "Command structure." Army Headquarters is
cu- located with Armed Forces Headquarters at
Kinshasa.
The array is composed of its headquarters, seven
military regions, one airborne (parachute) division, an
armored division (still being formed, thus is below
brigade strength), the National Genclarmeric, the
Logistics Base, and -he air force (Figure 1). Tlw
military region systern has replaced the old
groupement system in the 1972 reorganization and
closely resembles it. A military region is a territorial
command whose components consist of a varying
number of infantry and other troop units, co:nlrut
support units, service support units, and logistical
base and is usually commanded by a brigadier
general. The military regions are nimil and the
locations of the headquarters are as follows; Ist
Military Region, Kananga; 2d, Kinshasa; 3d,
Kisangani; 4th, Lubumbashi; 5th, Bukavu; 6th,
Mbandaka; and 7th, Boma. The Airborne Division,
the elite force of the army, consists of three regiments;
headquarters are at the capital, and the commanding
officer is a brigadier general. Having the mobility that
airlift affords, the division serves as the army's quick
reaction reserve force, ready to deal with emergencies
for which units on the scene may be inadequate
(Figure 3). An armored division has been activated
and was still forming at Mbanza- Ngungu out of emits
transferred to it from others, as of late 1972. It is
somewhere between battalion and brigade in size and
is using the new Panhard armored cars and personnel
carriers from France. Secteur Tanganyika, the special
tactical command that has succeeded "Operation
Eagle" in the lingering counterinsurgency ort
against the few remaining insurgents, is under the 5th
Military Region. Secteur Tanganyika's commander is
usually a lieutc. -tan( colonel, his headquarters is at
Kalerme, and the command's area of operation is a
8
triangle based on the lake ith its points at Kalemie,
Liilimim. and Uvira. The air force is a very small arm
whose chief importance is as an air tri!nsport agency
for carrying troops and for logistics.
It is planned to further reorganize the army.
Because of Zaire's present economic difficulties,
developments in this direction have been slow. The
plans call for replacing the seven military regions with
four infantry divisions---t tire(- regional and one at
Kinshasa. It is doubtful that this step will he taken
anytime in the near future. When it is, owever, each
division is to be supported by airborne and armored
units, probably of brigade size. A logistics brigade with
subordinate battalions is to replace the present
logistical bases. Significant steps towards reorganiza-
tion have begun. The armored division forming at
Mbanza- Ngt.ngu is one. No full tracked vehicles have
yet been ordered, but Panhard armored cars Figure 4
were bought from France in 1970; by mid -1972 about
115 had been received. It is also planned that each
infantry division will be supported by a gendarmerie
brigade, and the formation of the National
Gendarmerie may well be the first step in this
direction. The establishment of the third airborne
regimental headquarters, done in 1972, completed the
plan for that division. The reorganization plan calls
for a "navy� which, like the air force, will be
subordinate to the array.
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FIGURE 3. A jumpmoster of the
Airborne Division (C)

2. Strength, composition, and disposition'
Personnel strength of the ground forces is about
350M 111en -1,000 officers, 1,500 %%arraor officers,
and 32,500 enlisted nlen. 1'11c army has 39
battalions -1-4 infantry. -ight guard, fire airborne
(parachute), three cotamaudo, one armored ((-ailed a
division), and eight service. "1'he six kendarinerie
battalion, (trained as infantry) have been tr;,nsferred
to the new Nation(:( Gendarmerie. They, like the
infanta, guard, -Jrborne and commando battalions,
are trained, erluippcd. and used as infanta. ('The
airborne hattalions, like the commando hattalio ns, are
parachute trained. 'I'hrs, 30 of the 38 batt.;!:ons are
infantry units. The hattalion is the arrn prier ;,ry
tactical unit. The armored battalion is r:cy, formed in
1972 and still growing. There are three rcconnaissa n c�e
squadrons, one each "yith the 3d. 4th, -nd 7 th rnilitar
reVions. A military region command is generally
ca:mposeci of 1i si nal compam>, a transportation
company, an engineer cornpan). military police
company, a supple 'maintenance uuit the
"Logistic�al Base" and miscellaneous combat units
that vary from region to region.
'The Airborne Division is made up of tile five
airborne battalions and the three commando
battalions. It serves as a reserve as well as a yuiek-
rcaction force. 'I_aire's poor and de'.criorating
transportation system gives this unit particular
importance. The division's hcad(luarters is it,
Kinshasa, and its three organic regiments are in
Kinshasa. Kamina, and Kisangami� The 3d Regiment
at Kisangani was formed in 1972 and at the end of
that year could not yet he considered operational.
Battalions of the airborne regiments are territorialll
dispersed, as are the units of the military regions. Since
the acquisition of three C -130 aircraft in 1 971, the
army ca lift the assault elements of out airborne
battalion to any area of the country within hours.
Secteur Tanganyika has had a fluctuating strength of
Borne nine battalions (infantry, guard, airborne, and
gendarmerie) that engage the rug -tag and disunited
remnants of the Sitnba rebellion.
Under its present organization, the arm depe,aus
for artillery support almost entirely on some 525
mortars (they range from 60 -inin through 120 -min but
are chiefly 60 -nim and 81 -men) (Figures 5 and 6).
Even though excluding tit( Panhard's 90 inm antitank
guns there are sorne 80 assorted pieces of artillery
'Fur regularly updated information and detailed order of battle
data, see the Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces, and
the Military Intelligence S-:mmary, both published by the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
r
9
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FIGURE 4. Panhards. (Top) Equipped with a 90 -mm
cannon and a machinegun. (Middle) Equipped with a
60 -mm mortar and machineguns. (Bottom) Personnel
carrier NTT), armed with mcchineguns. (C)

(20 -nun through 75 nun) in the about half
()f the imniber are ba.ic�all\ antiairc�i:th \capons. 'I'hc
aniiiiimor c�apabdit%. e\c�luding the I unhand' 90- :im
antitank geins. consists ()f alwtil 250 re coilles, rifles
(;5 -tint and IM -milt) j'igt,rc 7 i, the 90 -milt c�;uuuon
foil sonic� of the Paidiards (F igrin� -3 and rocket
launchers (;i nail. 'file effectkertc�ss ()f the Zairian
artiller mau with ;ill of these \%val,�. its is probably Imp
:1. Training
FIGURE 5. Mortarmen and their towed mortar (U /OU)
FIGURE 7. Jeep mounted
crew. The gun uses a
spotting. (U /OU)
A
y....
106 -mm recoilless rifle and
.50 caliber machinegun ffx
In the past. 'Lain� has been dependent on
furci.. militar\ schools I the training ()f uffiuvrs auel
iv, hnicians. Personnel ha\c been trtiued priinaril\ in
Belgicint but also it, Israel. Fr ncf�. ihc Cnited
Kingdont. ;lit(] ti l'nilcd States. Because Wien mined
abroad are not readil\ ;!ccvptcd hen the�\ return from
()versca, training anel those� \%Im attend Ions, c(mrses
tcuel to lose touch \\ith their cotintr�.. increasing
emphasis is being placed ()n niilitar\ training in Zaire.
All inilitar\ scliools operate sender the siiper, ision of
the I)cpartrn;�rit of Uefetne's I)ircctoratc of'
Organization and Training. Basic training is carried
()sit with Belgian a,sistance at the T..Jiiing Center at
Kitona (t. :l, KI in 1972 there %cerc 14 lielgiaus ()n the
staff. Becruih initially are put through a 10- nuntlh.
five- phase. training coarse A Kit()na. "I'hc first phase
conhists f i mouths ius,rcic�li() n ill tactics ;ud
indk idcial s\vapons training Figure 2). The seccriul
phase, ills() Listing i months, foc�rises ()n the vii
branches \ithin the arniv. 'I'll(- third phase consists. of
2 months of integrating inelkidtials ir�to actual arii,
units. 'I'hc fourth ;,nd fifth phases consist ()f 1 month
of coiupariv and battalion instruction, respec�livcly.
t ?ach \ear the center trains ;ibnnt 2.000 rec�rsiits. On
completion ()f basic training. ill most cases the nice are
;issigne(I as individlUll mplac�cnu�nts: in it fe\\ cases
training battalions have become units in the regular
arm\ (c.g., the Ist and id Infanta Battalions). Since
the 1972 rc()rganiz ition CI'KI has c�()ncvntrated tin
retraining the National Police component of the nee%
National Gendarnieric in basic tnililar\ skills for its
n4v in the new service.
;\n Officer 1'raining School at Kananga has been
training ounh nen for mililar careers in ;t ear
course and has been graeluating classes of about 100
students per Near. 'I'll(- school is selledilled to naive to
Kinshasa in 1973 -74 and to become� the "military
academy." 1n it i nurtith c�ominand course it
C()mpan C(mini-.uule�rs School, also ill Kitnangae
trains Wfice�rs \yho have had 5 to \viers experience.
.M)wit 70 gr;uluatc each year from this school.
The tw() senior military schools in Zaire are the
Battalion G i nriander's School (IWSI ant! the
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FIGURE 6. A mortar firing demonstration at the Training
Center, Kitona (C)

.:ommand and General Staff School (C &GSS), both in
Kinshasa. Students at both are officers with 8 to 1.
years' service. Those who are nominated for these
schools must pass entrance examinations to be
accepted for the 6 -month BCS course or the 1 -year
C &GSS course. Both courses train about 35 students in
each training cycle. All officers schools are staffed
primarily with Belgian instructors.
Special training for the army is riven at a number of
schools in Zaire �at the Armor Training Center and
the Engineer Training Crater, at Mbanza- Ngungu;
the Ordnaace School. the fransportition School, and
the Tailors and Shirtmakers School at Kinshasa; the
military justice School, at Kamina Base; the Signal
School, the Military Construction School, and the
Clerks and Accounts School, at Kananga; the Airborne
Training Center, at Ndjili; and the Commando
School, at Kota Koh. "The Engineer Training Center
may be moved from Mbanza- Ngtmgu to L.ikasi. In
September 1971 fl Airborne Company Coin manders
School was establisFed at the Airborne School near
Ndjili international airfield; is is naffed with Israeli
instructors, and the first class had about 25 student
officers. Soce about 1967, the Israelis have been
prcoviAing yhe Nal year of paratroop training for
about 100 Zairian officers and NCO's it year. in
October 1971, Zairian airborne units began the initial
phases of night parachute qualification an(: airmobde
tra' --rag. Although these activities are still in an
embryonic stage, they are evidence of an attempt to
provide good, modern, realistic training.
The Zairian Army has riot taken part in any
multinational training exercises or maneuvers and has
not participated in any joint maneuvers except with
the new CRLG. Under Israeli supervision, this air
ground live -fire exercise held no r Kinshasa on 20 July
1972 was carried out skillfully. Army units have had
considerable field experience with foreign troops
with U.N. troops from 1960 to 1964 and with small
units of mercenaries in 1964 and 1965.
Training at all levels is hindered by the generally
limited amount of formal education of the men, their
inadequate knowledge of mechanical equipment, and
the pervading disciplinary problems. Men are given
no incentive to increase skills acquired in training.
Offic ^rs returning from training overseas may initially
b e well trained and enthusiastic, but their keenness is
soon d:-lled by the army's general apathy, poor
discipline, and corruption.
Over 300 foreign military personnel were advising
and assisting the army in early 1972 --226 Belgians, 9
British, 9 Israelis, and 43 Americans. Each year some
230 army personnel are sent abroad for instruction.
Zaire (with the aid of Israeli advisers) has provi:'ed
paratroop training for personnel from Chad and
Burundi.
4. Logistics
The army logistics system and the armed forces
logistics system are the same. The center of the
logistics system is the Logistical Base, Kinshasa, which
has administrative, storage, and distribution facilities,
as well as facilities for all levels of maintenance,
including major overhaul of small arms, engineer
equipment, communications equipment, and vehicles.
In addition to this major center, the system includes
with each military region headquarters a logistical
base that is equipped For and performs minor
maintenance. All or nearly afl of these sever: bases are
headed by lieutenant colonels. Below military region
logistical base level, the battalions themselves perform
minor maintenance. If the logistics system lain. out in
military regulations was practiced, it would probabl
serve the an-my adequately, hut, as it is actually
functioning, it is grossly inefficient and is one of the
salient weaknesses of the army. The liberal promotions
of the chaotiv 1960's gave rank to the unqualified, and
the shortage of trained supply officers and NCO's
continues unabated and pervading at all echelons in
the army. By any modern standard, supple and
maintenance are poor, recordkeeping is faulty, and
accountability is weak; these, on top of poor
discipline, have created a climate that takes poor
performance and corruption for granted.
Both the storage and distribution of supplies and
materiel are haphazard at best. Even at Logistical
Base, Kinshasa, long delays occur in the processing of
supply requisitions frorn the military regions, and,
when requisitioned materiel finally does reach the
requester, it is often of the wrong type, size, or
quantity. The variety of vehicles in th inventory
complicates spare parts supply. Another major
weakness in the maintenance systeri and the supply
system is the inadequate national transportation
system.
D. Air force (C)
The Zairian Air Force is not a separate service but is
the air component of the Zairian Armv (Figure 1). It is
called "the air force" anti is accorded separate
treatment in this study for clarity of coverage and the
reader's convenience. This air arm is a very small
component with some transport and reconnaissance
capability and slight close air support and fighter
capability. it continues to be seriously short of Zairian
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pilots, technicians, and supply personnel and could
not carry on operations without its European training
and logistic cadres. The air force's mission is to support
the army in both its national defense and internal
security roles. its specific tasks include providing close
air support of ground forces, airlifting of troops and
materiel, and making liaison and reconnaissance
flights. The air force could provide close air support on
only a minor scale and for only a sho� time, but in
operations against any of 'Zaire's immediate neighbors
it could perform its other tasks in any likely action. For
close air support, appropriate a.reraft are available,
but by mid -1972 only nine of the air force's 55 Zairian
pilots were considered qualified to perform this type of
operation.
With the acquisition of three Lockheed C -130
transports in 1971, the air force's airlift capability
increased markedly, especially Hhen compared with
that of other central African nations. Zaire's poor and
deteriorating road system makes airlift capability
particularly important. The services of the U.S. Air
Force in the widespread operations of the chaotic
1960's acquainted the army with the cotweuience and
speed of airlift; the habit of continuing to rely on
aerial delivery instead of planning ahead and
addressing the problem of developing an effective and
orderly iogistics system still prevails, despite the
extravagance of this approach and the slim resources
of the air force. The acquisition 4 additional air
transport is planned.
.o meet its logistics and training problems, the air
force. uses the expedient of foreign experts and
resources. The flying personnel problem, however,
cannot be evaded, and it is the greatest difficulty that
the air force. faces. Because of the sophisticated ievel of
air force equipment and aviation technology, the low
national educational level poses even greater problems
for the air force than for the army. it is difficult to find
qualified recruits to undertake training for most types
of air force work. The washout rate for Zairian pilot
trainees is extremely high. Even pilots who are
considered trained generally display a lack of
discipline and a careiess disregard for equipment. This
problem is of such magnitude that some fighter pilots
have had to be grounded for retraining� transport
pilots seem to be slightly more responsible, as well as
slightly more proficient. Most aircraft maintenance is
done not by the air force but by a private company
and the air force's European advisers.
1. Organization
As a component of the army, the air force conies
under Army iie,_Jquarters, and the air force
F
commander is subordinate to the armti conimandt.r in
the chain of command. in rank he is a lieutenant
colonel. In October 1972 the air force was reorganized
into a headquarters at Ndolo Airfield, Kinshasa and
three "commands." The Central Operations
Command (COC) is composed of the llth Fighter
Squadron, the 21st logistics Transport Squadron, the
22d Tactical Transport Squadron, and the :31st
Helicopter Squadron. All elements of the COC arc�
located at Ndjili Airfield, near Kinshasa. The Air
Force Schools Command (CEFA) has four subordinate
schools. A flying school and a technical school for
fixed wing aircraft are located at Kamina Base and
two similar schools for rotary wing aircraft which are
forming at Ndolo Airfield, Kinshasa. The third
command is the Technical and Logistics Command
(CGTEL), which controls the Workshop Group, two
Depot Group, and one Service Group based in
Kinshasa but with elements located throughout the
country.
Because of the vital importance of foreigners to all
aspects of the air force, liaison is particularly
significant. The CEFA has a liaison officer to
coordinate activities bt�tyeen the Department of
Defense's Directorate of Organization and Training
and the Italian Air Force Training Mission. The
private maintenance group based at Ndjili Interna-
tional Airfield that maintains air force aircraft works
for the air force commander, htt: in addition to. the
formal channel through that office, has direct liaison
with the Department of Defense.
2. Strength, composition, and disposition-'
The personnel strength of the air force is about 760.
Included in the total in lute 1972 are 55 pilots, 16
flight engineers, 10 radio operators, aril 81 pilot
trainees. Foreigners are no longer serving in the air
force, although they remain an important part of the
advisory and logistics cadres. Zaire modernized its air
force in 197' and 1972 with the delivery of C -130
transports from the United States, Macchi jets and
SIAI Marchetti conventional trainers from Italy,
Puma helicopters from France, and a British BN -2
Islander.
'For regularly updated information and order of battle data, see
the Military Intelligence Summary and the Free World AirOrderof
Battle, both published by the Defense: Intelligence Agency. The
Zairian airfields system is briefly discussed in this General Survey
under Transportation and Telecomm tin icat ions.
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The types and numbers of organizationally assigned
aircraft, by command and the airfields at which they
are based, are as follows:
In addition to Ndjili International Airfield, Ndola
Airfield, and Kaniina Base Airfield, the air force also
uses at least 16 others that have service facilities for
small, transient aircraft� Kisangani. Lisala, Kalemie,
Kindu, Mbandaka, Kitona, Goma, Lubumbashi,
Bunia, and Isiro.
The air force has no reserve. However, some 210
civil aircraft operated by the government airline, Air
Zaire, afford some mobilization potential. Twenty -six
of these are transports of over 20,000 pounds g ross
weight. The airline employs 85 pilots, 2.3 flight
engineers, and more than 400 maintenance personnel,
a large number of them being Europeans.
3. Training
Bringing Zairians up to the demanding standards
required by aviation is a formidable task, and the air
force continues to have great difficulty in that
endeavor. Even though the air force has existed for
over a decade and has put much effort into training
Zairian airmen, the numLer really qualified as pilots
and technicians remains not much more than token.
In order for the air force to continue to carry on air
operations, it has no alternative but to depend on
foreigners for maintenance, for overseeing the logistics
system, and for piloting some aircraft. There still
appreciably less than one Zairian pilot per aircraft.
Training takes ilace both at home and abroad. The
ai, force training center is at Karnina Base, An 80 man
training mission from the Italian Air Force handles air
force training, assisting in the selection of the men to
be trained as pilots and conducting primary flight
training at Kamina. Those cadets who complete the
primary program are sent to Italy for further training.
It is difficult for these Zairians to meet the high Italian
Air Force standards, so the .1ashout rate is high �onl
abaut 50% of the Zairian cadets %vho begin flight
training finish. In addition to the air force personnel
instructed in Italy, a few others have been trained in
the United States and France. ;Mobutu would like to
have all flight training take place in Zaire, but this
goal will not be reached in the near future.
After the years of training effort that have been
invested in developing Zairian pilots, by late 1972 only
nine are considered proficient enough to fly the
Aermacchi MB-326(;B jet aircraft in combat
operations and two arc: qualified as aircraft
commanders for the Lockheed C -1:30 transports. With
only three or four Zairians serving as imtructors in
1972, it is most likely that the air force will have to
continue to depend on it foreign training staff for some
years to come.
4. Logistics
As in training, the air force is almost totally
dependent upon foreign support in logistics. "rhe
Italian Air Force training mission supervises Zairian
mechanics in maintaining the Aermacchi (Figure 8)
and Siai Marchetti aircraft, and French Sud- Aviation
specialists maintain the Puma SA .430 helicopters. The
rest of the aircraft are maintained by it private
company. the Zaire Maintenance Company (SOI)E-
MAZ). This company was formed in late 1969 because
of the Zairian Governrnent's displeasure over the
operation of the World International Ground
Maintenanc. Organization MGMO)� another
private aircraft maintenance organization. SODE-
MAZ' predecessor. SOI)EMAZ' contract was written
for 30 years, although in official circles it is now re-
ferred to as a "temporary" organization which is to b
disestablished a:, soon as the air force achieves the
necessary proficiency to maintain its aircraft. A
Lockheed Aircraft Company team is training
SOI)EMAZ mechanics to maintain the C -130
transports. About U;$I million worth of C -130 parts
have been ordered frc it the l'nited States. Parts
for some of the older aircraft, especially the C- -It's,
C -54's, and T -28's, are supplied by the United States
under its military sales program
Because of the large number of Europeans who
supervise supply and maintenance procedures, the
logistic~ system for the air force is more efficient than
that of the army. Whenever the air force has to rely on
the army for vehicles, rations, or engineer support, its
capability suffers.
Stock levels for ammunition and parts are usually
adequate. Sometimes a shortage of vehicles causes
13
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NUMBER OF
ORCANIZATION
AIRFIELD
AIRCRAFT
Central Operations Command
Ndjili
11th Pursuit Attack Squad-
do
15 MB- 326CB,
ron
5 T -28
21st Logistical Transporta-
do
2 C -54,
tion Squadron
2 C -118,
3 C130A
22d Tactical Transporta-
do
8C47
tion Squadron
31st Helicopter Squadron
do
1 Alouette II,
3 Alouette III,
5 SA -330
Air Force Schools Command
Kamina
12 SF -260
Base
Technical and Logistics Com-
Ndjili
No assigned
mand
aircraft
In addition to Ndjili International Airfield, Ndola
Airfield, and Kaniina Base Airfield, the air force also
uses at least 16 others that have service facilities for
small, transient aircraft� Kisangani. Lisala, Kalemie,
Kindu, Mbandaka, Kitona, Goma, Lubumbashi,
Bunia, and Isiro.
The air force has no reserve. However, some 210
civil aircraft operated by the government airline, Air
Zaire, afford some mobilization potential. Twenty -six
of these are transports of over 20,000 pounds g ross
weight. The airline employs 85 pilots, 2.3 flight
engineers, and more than 400 maintenance personnel,
a large number of them being Europeans.
3. Training
Bringing Zairians up to the demanding standards
required by aviation is a formidable task, and the air
force continues to have great difficulty in that
endeavor. Even though the air force has existed for
over a decade and has put much effort into training
Zairian airmen, the numLer really qualified as pilots
and technicians remains not much more than token.
In order for the air force to continue to carry on air
operations, it has no alternative but to depend on
foreigners for maintenance, for overseeing the logistics
system, and for piloting some aircraft. There still
appreciably less than one Zairian pilot per aircraft.
Training takes ilace both at home and abroad. The
ai, force training center is at Karnina Base, An 80 man
training mission from the Italian Air Force handles air
force training, assisting in the selection of the men to
be trained as pilots and conducting primary flight
training at Kamina. Those cadets who complete the
primary program are sent to Italy for further training.
It is difficult for these Zairians to meet the high Italian
Air Force standards, so the .1ashout rate is high �onl
abaut 50% of the Zairian cadets %vho begin flight
training finish. In addition to the air force personnel
instructed in Italy, a few others have been trained in
the United States and France. ;Mobutu would like to
have all flight training take place in Zaire, but this
goal will not be reached in the near future.
After the years of training effort that have been
invested in developing Zairian pilots, by late 1972 only
nine are considered proficient enough to fly the
Aermacchi MB-326(;B jet aircraft in combat
operations and two arc: qualified as aircraft
commanders for the Lockheed C -1:30 transports. With
only three or four Zairians serving as imtructors in
1972, it is most likely that the air force will have to
continue to depend on it foreign training staff for some
years to come.
4. Logistics
As in training, the air force is almost totally
dependent upon foreign support in logistics. "rhe
Italian Air Force training mission supervises Zairian
mechanics in maintaining the Aermacchi (Figure 8)
and Siai Marchetti aircraft, and French Sud- Aviation
specialists maintain the Puma SA .430 helicopters. The
rest of the aircraft are maintained by it private
company. the Zaire Maintenance Company (SOI)E-
MAZ). This company was formed in late 1969 because
of the Zairian Governrnent's displeasure over the
operation of the World International Ground
Maintenanc. Organization MGMO)� another
private aircraft maintenance organization. SODE-
MAZ' predecessor. SOI)EMAZ' contract was written
for 30 years, although in official circles it is now re-
ferred to as a "temporary" organization which is to b
disestablished a:, soon as the air force achieves the
necessary proficiency to maintain its aircraft. A
Lockheed Aircraft Company team is training
SOI)EMAZ mechanics to maintain the C -130
transports. About U;$I million worth of C -130 parts
have been ordered frc it the l'nited States. Parts
for some of the older aircraft, especially the C- -It's,
C -54's, and T -28's, are supplied by the United States
under its military sales program
Because of the large number of Europeans who
supervise supply and maintenance procedures, the
logistic~ system for the air force is more efficient than
that of the army. Whenever the air force has to rely on
the army for vehicles, rations, or engineer support, its
capability suffers.
Stock levels for ammunition and parts are usually
adequate. Sometimes a shortage of vehicles causes
13
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FIGURE S. One of the Fighter
Squadron's holian -built Aertnac-
chi MS-326GS light o"ocw
aircraft (L'/OU)
long delays in transporting aircrews to their air -raft
when missions have been ordered. Aviation grade fuel
is purchased from major oil companies in Kinshasa. In
other areas, stocks are controlled by Air Zaire. Foreign
assistance in air force logistics and maintenance will
contintne to be indispensable far into the future.
E. National Gendarmerie; (C)
The National Gendarmerie is a new service, and
many details are not yet known about it. In July 1972
the decision was made to withdraw from the army its
aix gendarmerie battalions and to merge them and the
National Police to form a new armed forces
component. The delicate political situation in the
government, the reorganization of the armed forces,
and the personalities of some of the military leaders
are all among the factors leading to the move. The
personnel strength of the National Gendarmerie is
about 30,000 men, not far short of that of the army
minus its gendarmerie battalions.
Organizationally the new component is subordinate
to the Department of Defense and directly under the
control of the Captain General of the army Figure I
The commander of the National Gendarmerie is a
brigadier general with his headquarters in Kinshasa.
Subordinate to National Gendarmerie Headquarters is
the Republican Guard, which is commanded by a
captain. Included in the Republican Guard is the
Presidential Escort �a Belgian- trained mounted unit
used for ceremonial purposes. For the gendarmerie,
the country is not divided into the army's military
regions but along the lines of the administrative
regions, and the gendarmerie's subordinate twit
headquarters are located in the respective regional
capitals.
"For regularly updated information, see the Military Intelligenre
Summary, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
14
F. Coast guard (C)
Zaire has no navy but does have ,a very small navy
type force that is known as the Coast. River, and Lake
Guard (CRLG). Organizationally it does not came
under the Department of Defense- but is directly
subordinate to the President (Figure I Its
commander is a "fleet captain" (equivalent to the
army rank of colonel), and its headquarters is in
Kinshasa. Most of the vessels are on Lake Tanganyika
and are under the operational control of the Chl.C's
Lake Command, whose headquarters are at Kalemie.
In early 1970 there %gas no table of organization and
equipment and no stated mission for a naval force,
though there were about 25 army officers and 80
enlisted men assigned to coast guard -type duties. The
inventory of watercraft consisted of two 50 -toot Swift
patrol craft, four 21 -foot patrol boats, a converted
fishing trawler, and two Italian patrol boats, each of
the latter armed with a single .50 caliber machinegun
and used for escorting the presidential yacht. The
condition of these craft was poor, and because of a
lack of funds and chronic maintenance difficulties,
only one to four of them were operational at any given
time. To try to rectify this situation, President Mobutu
established the CRLG in November 1971, and Zaire
purchased in the United States six 65 -foot Swift patrol
boats, each armed with an 81 -mrn mortar and two .50
caliber machineguns (Figure 9). Further, to man these
boats, about 200 officers and enlisted meet from the
army were sent for training at the Naval Inshore
Operations Training Center, Mare Island, California.
The CRI.G .became operational in March 1972. Its
mission is to maintain surveillance of territorial waters,
to protect maritime traffic and fishing fleets, to
provide search and rescue services and assisl:tnce for
'For regularly updated information, see the Military Intelligence
Summary, published by the Defense intelligence Agency.
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CoNF rnrNTIAL
a
i
r
E
9
FIGURE 9. A Swift boat of sSe Coat,
River, and lake Guard (U /CU)
ships and aircraft, to assist the National Gendarmerie
and cu:,toms in controlling smuggling and illegal entry
into the country, and to provide assistance in
hydrographic research. With present resources the
CRLG cannot meet many of these responsibilities
except it i token wa
There are plans for exp;.nding the CRLG into a
modest navy, but Neese are contingent on sufficient
grov -th in Zaire's economy to continue supporting a
military buildup. The army s reorganization plan calls
for a navy th,.t will be an arm of the army, as is the air
force:. Plans call for the formation of a "Naval
Command" headquartered at the capital and with
subordinate "Gast Command," River Command,"
"Lake Command," "Training Command" com-
ponents and a "L.ogktical uase." Development in this
direction is proceeding, slowly. The Lake Command is
in operation at Kalemie, the Coast Command has
CONFIDENTIAL
S
4
3
i
1
been �t up at the port of Banana, and a River
Command commander has tv-en appointed. Further
progress now probably depends on naval vppropria-
tions that will permit buying more craft and naval
rnat rial, but pro�,pects appear bleak.
G. Paramilitary (C)
Zaire has no force with a true paramilitary
capability, although members of the Disciplinary
Brigade (BD). a branch o f ;he MPR's youth wing,
have had some security training and could augment
army manpower in the event of mobilization. The
brigade's hard -core strength throughout the country is
estimated at well over 10,000 and increasing. In large
urban areas BD personnel, who are unarmed, have
been given police surveillance roles and the authority_
to make arrest!.
15
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