NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 60A; ZAIRE; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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I_1 �:Z61T A M161 :x a 1Iii
Zair-
CONTENTS
This ceneral Sum ew supersedes the one dated Sep
lemiber 1970, topics of which sha ki be dcstn4wd.
A. Introduction 1
lmpad of Nfebutu s leadcrship; importa�ce of the
finny; foreign arid. e.moomic lxAicirs.
D. Structure and functioning of the governmmA S
Background d pre.Isent governmental systmn, in-
cluding 1867 constitution.
1. National gavcrttment 3
a. Executive 3
Election of the President a formality;
extensive powers vested in President;
ethnic and geognphic balance in cabinet.
Sw3w No FOPEIGN DaMm
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Page
Page
b. Legislature
4
8. Religious organizations
21
Unicameral National Legislative Council;
Political and rAvial importance of Christian
control by President; membership; :ewr:l
churches; Kimbanguism, Mobutu crackdown
since 1970,
on Protestant groups; conflict with Catholic
c. judiciary
6
hierarchy.
Colonial heritage; efforts to reform; court
9. Elections
23
system, 'nciuu;ug Supreme Court and
Suffrage; single list of candidates, chosen by
projected Constitutional Court; judges,
Poltical Bureau; downplay of regional senti.
2. Local government
7
ment; conduct of elections.
Structure; traditional authorities; staffing;
administrative centralization; inefficiency.
D. National policies
24
3. Civil service
8
Past incompetence and corruption; Mobutu's
1. Domestic
24
efforts to streamline and improve quality
Stability under Mobutu; goal of economic in-
of system,
dependence; monetary and fiscal reforms;
belt tightening measures; Mobutu's assertion
C. Political dynamics
8
of authority; defense policies.
Primary political factors.
2. Foreign
26
1. Tribalism, regionalism, and insurgency
Moderate, western- oriented foreign policy.
(1960-65)
9
a. Relations with African states
26
Impact of Belgian pwrnalism and compla-
Avoidance of "neocolonial" image; fear of
cency; independence; rule by Lumumba and
Congolese subversion; recent cordial rela-
Kasavubu; Katanga and Kasai secessions;
tions with Brazzaville; quiet cooperation
Mobutu's assumption of control, followed by
with Portuguese authorities in Angola;
Kasavubu again, then Mobutu once more;
Mobutu's ambition to be International
shift of political power to executive; Adoula
leader,
and the "Binza group'; peasant uprisings;
1i. Relations with Western nations and
Prime Minister Tshombe.
2. Mobutu's consolidation of executive
the U.N.
27
authority (1966-70)
11
History of relations with h Agium, in-
Establishment of single -party MPH; number
cluding seizure of UMHK assets; deep
U.S. and U.N. Involvement.
of provinces reduced from 21 to 12, then to
eight; transfer of governors from their local
c. Relations with Communist countries
28
bases; naticnaliration of regional policy, forces;
Mobutu's wariness; evidence of new cor-
dismantling of pnrliamentary :system; neu-
diality.
tralizdtion of tribalism.
3. Mobutu and his top aides
12
E. Threats to government stability
29
'Attie delegation of authority; cabinet shake-
L Discontent and dissidence
29
UPS; Mobutu's increasing reliance* on individ-
uals outside the cabinet; atmosphere of mis-
Little articulate orposition, yet underlying ma-
trust.
laise; succession question; adverse ernnomic
4. Popular Movement of the Revolution
16
and social conditions; refugees; students.
2. Subversion
31
Supreme national institution; responsibilities
History of insurgency 1960 -67; no outbreaks
and size of Political Bureau; National Exeeu-
sine 1967; Communist aid to insurgents.
Live Committee; youth wing; attempt: to
cultivate grassroots support.
F. Maintenance of internal security
34
S Army
18
Main prop of Mobutu regime; feared by gen-
I. Police
34
eral populace; tribal and regional allegiances;
Recent merger of police and gendarmes into
morale; fending; 1079. sh%Jkeup of high com-
National Gendarmerie strength figures; gures; past
mend.
ineffectiveness of police and brutalit} of
6. Labor
20
gendarmes; Belgium as primary source of aid
Lack of cohesiveness; single union UN77;
and advice; U.S. and U.N. training pro
control by Mobutu; wildcat strikes; now
grams; Mobile Brigade.
UNT7 secretary general.
2. Intelligence
35
7, Students
20
Organization and actvities of the National
Most vocal critics t, oww regime; details
Documentation Center, the Directorate of
of confrontations with government; 'event re-
Information and Military Security, and the
duction in dissidence.
armed forces G -2.
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Page
3. Countersubversive and counterinsur-
gency measures and capabilities .36
Past effectiveness In urban treat but not In
rural areas; use of military units; training.
Page
G. Suggestions for further reading 38
Chronology 39
Glossary 41
FIGURE
Page
Fig. I Structure of government (chart)
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11
Government and Politics
A. Introduction (S)
President Mobutu Scse Seko, the army leader who
assumed )utrol of the governnu�nl in November
1965. has brought 'Zaire greater polilica! stabilit than
the troubled country has known since indelc�1ldence.
hill its governrrleotal institutions remain fragile. The
paternalism of tile� fielgi ;ul colonial regime stifhccl
I"iticarl developttlelti, and Congolese were utipre-
pared for sell -rule when th suddelll% uclifeve(f
iudependenec in June 1960. %wire, oil(- of the largest
autd most helerogeneous otmtries in Africa, had nn
stational political insiitllt)ons, no 11,11ional political
leadership. and very few people with experience ill
ninning either the government or the econortay.
Indelx�nden(1- was followed by ao arim mutiny.
dehilitating political infighting, frigi n�rilalioo of the
country along ethnic lines, three regional secessions.
and everilrially it series of peasant i. Although
the uprisings were largely suppressed by late INiS, the
competition for political primacy hetweeal the for(-(
of Presicent Joseph Kasaytibu a rld Moise 'I'shotube
(whoin Kasa iibu Iuu1 dismissed as 1'remier) broifght
the government to ;1 standstill. On 25 November 1965,
the theli I.I. Gen. Joseph Mobutu seized control,
scimmarily disnlisse(I Kasavubu, ;Ind iuslalled hitllself
as Preside With the support nl' the nt(lilary and
selected civilian polilic�al allies, Mobutu replaced the
disorganized parliament syste h ;a(l existe(I
since independe,,c(', with c�e,,tralized autocratic rule.
Mobutu hits cv(Ived a highly personal st of rifle
virtually devoi(I o f ari institutional f,arti(twork. In June
1967 it new constitution, drafted at Mobutu's w(tuest
and containing provisions which would legitimize the
centralized regime he had developed, was approved
nearly imanituously b% it popular referendun,
Altholigh if majority of the voters probabl woolcl
have approved te h new constitution in a free vote, the
referendum offers little guide to popular acceptance of
the Clew instilli(i0l's hccallse the le was thoroughly
rigged. The provisions of the colistilution for Iraasfer
cif political power have so far been unlesle(I.
Presidential are) Icgisliltive elections were held in late
I but Mobutu was the only candidate for
1'resideol, and all cautdida(es for the National
Ass(�tnbl (,,ow National le�gishitive Council) were
nl+mtbers of his official part%, the hipid ar Moveuuvit
of the fi+�volntion (N1 I'll). When Ilse legislature
convened in December 1970, it passed as c(:nstilutional
aluendinent declaring the MPH to he the supreme
natia)nal ius6(111(11 as well -is the sole legal party lay
mid -1972 the legislature had taken sbap,� as an atilt of
the MI'li, serving to reinforce Mobt1(u's centralised
control of the party's nationw struc�lure ralhertban
representing local inleresYs.
Mobutu has rfeutrdized opposition politic ;d
activity. ;rod there do nut appear to be an) individuals
or groups strong eoougli to cltsrllenge hit,, as long as Ie
relains the support of the army. Guerrilla ac�livity,
puce� troublesome, has been mducf�d. and there remain
only srtlall bun(Is ol' reliefs engaged most in banditry.
Neither Nlohulu nor the MITI ha. getserated
+tdespremi enthusiasm. but popular discoutenls are
The army is Ihv indispensable tnaillst;av of the
Mobutu government, yet Mohutu's c�oulrol of the
;ariti depends on dw conlinual balancilig of divisive
clerlu�nls. It was alit agunis"I Alnong Ihese satilt groups
which fractured Ili,- prein,lependenc�e Force Puhl(qur
into several competing armies shortly ;after inde
pet"I" ce in 1960. Mobutu has managed to restrain
traditional ethnic rivalries among officers by keeping
his old cronies from the Force Puhl(que' ill key
cuuuuand positions, but each year pressures intensify
from the younger, better educated officers for as
change. Mobutu met these pressures head on irl Jul
1072 by retiring nine of the amity's 1(i general officers
;atid proceeding with an extensive shakeup of the high
(If ill's na;lnc!, apparently calculated to tighten his
leverage over the younger men usstiming key
conunands. Military discipline, however, remains
generally lax, ;rod troops reinforcing meager police
units in rural areas 1 0111111011 IV ablise civilians.
Mobutu's foreign policy is motivated I)v a fear of
:onfmunist support to Zairian dissidents, as well as by
economic need. Although professing nonalignment in
accorda nce with his wish to assert leadership over
ilia; r more radical African countries, he depends
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primarily oil the� West for economic and ntilit.ry aid
Mobutu is extremely wary of Coniumnio su11xrt io
Zairian dissideat.. Nevertheless. in early 14173 he was
opt-illy cerltivatinK more cordial relalions witn the
Soviet Union. China, and N :aster, E.t3ropean
(:otnmunist countries, but he apix�ared as determined
as ewer to limit the scolx� af Conontinist mnk%ion, in
!.oleo. At the same time, iielKian- Zairian relation% are
solidly constructive. despite Mobutu'.. occasional
propaganda ploys against Re�igian residents and his
persistent eff:rl, to diversify Zaire's sources of official
aid and private inves(ments. The U nitc�d states
continues to provide important economic and rnilitarN
assistance.
In African affairs Mobnhr has shown a tendency to
meddle in the internal affairs of ne,rby countries,
particularly Congo. While he has condemned
continued white rule in southern Africa, his
government has been realistic in its action., usually
viewing liberatioti movements in light of Zairian %elf
interest. 'Lair(-' relations with Portugal are a good
example of Moheatu's use al pragnrulisrn. For several
years Zaire has given safe haven and training facilities
to Holden Roberto's Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA
whose goal is to free Angola from Portuguese control.
Zaire depends to some extent, Ito sever. on the
Benguela Railroad through Angola for the exlx)rt of
copper frorn Shaba Region. For this reason. Mobutu
has tried to avoid conflict with Ilartugal, and in the
spring of 1970 Zaire restored partial diplomatic
contacts with tho colonial power. allhortgh forma)
diplomatic relation,, severed in 1966, have not been
restnned.
Oil the economic front the Mobutu government has
sought to stimulate econornic development through
fiscal and tnonet:.ry wforn and the enc�ouragetnent of
foreign private iovrament. By 1968 the currenc c!
had
been stabilized, the national hudgel was !,lanced,
and foreign exc�hunge reserves were steadily increasing.
In 1969 the Zaire Government promulgated it
favorable investntr.art cock and also reached in
amicable settle�nu�nt of the hitter dispi le arising from
Mohutu's abrupt nationalization of Belgian-owned
copper nines in early 1967.
Since early 1970, however, Zaire's strong financial
position has been eroded by the decline in world
market prices for copper Zaire's principal expurr
product. The drop in copper earrings caused ,t loss of
..erne $30 million in Z.6re's net foreign assets by the
end of 1970, and u small surplus in the gover inent's
budget in 1969 has given way to a budgetary deficit of
about $1311 million in 1971. Mobutu has responded
with ,a series of belt- tightening measures which show
N
hi, determination to prevent a spiraling budgetary
deficit and monetary inflation. If austerity *treasures
am ftally enfolvvd, however, they inevitably will create
appruviable increases in eanemployment on the part of
urban dweller., among whom political consciousness is
greutml,
Although it apim -ar, that the adverse financial trend
caul he overcome b% 1975, present financial pressures
tnay seriou.l% aggravate Zaire's chronic social and
political problems. 'The government has been unt;ole
significantly to improve living standards for the
majority of the people. 'Tribui anitnosities simmer
beneath the surface. The regime's main prop�the
urrn ---is poorly trained and disciplined and is hated
in the countryside The administrative centralization
of lilt- government, although un improvement over the
previously chaotic situation. has not greatly increased
efficiency. Coordination between the central
govertment and certain provinces is lacking, and
provincial governors often feel neglected, isolated, and
powerless to av( as effective surrogates for the
government. The inade of the trunsimrtution
system have allowed such an extensive loss of contact
sith local atathorities that in some outlying areas, the
people feel lhense�lve, abandoned by the national
officials. Perhaps the most serious flaw is the absence
of any effective sm- cessor to Mobutu. If he is suddenly
removed from the scene, chaos may result until
Another stronginao enwrKcs.
B. Structure and functioning of the
government (C:)
Although the trappings of constitutional representu-
tive government have been preserved in Zaire, the
political r+.�alil% since 1955 has been one- tnut,
authoritarian rule. Although Mobutu commands a
degree of power which fur surpasses that of his
predecessors, his regime has faced an uphill task in
providing an administrative structure approaching the
highly centralized and efficient systern which existed
under (lit Belgians. The ,ize of Zaire (905,000 square
miles, tote� elhnic and social diversity of its people, and
t:rr poor internal communication and transportation
facilities have created harriers to the exercise of central
government authority. 'Zairian leadership still tends to
govern by improvisation rather than set principles and
laws Ad hoc actions and endless political
nnrncuvering remain important methods of operation,
although the overall trend has been toward increased
concentration of power in Mobotu's hands.
Much of the political instability of the first years of
independence sprung frorn disagreement over the
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relatiore.lnip 11411"'een the� evidrel gencrntrien :and the
Pro %ince*. Crider the� R vIgi;ut co;otnia) .sstrm the six
province. "re considered admini subdivisions
of the' colory rather than sc par:cte Political ernti!ie�s. At
iodepold �rice utne Z airimi political leaders uailled to
retain IIIv centralized r. slena, 11,11 others ;advcc�;ctr�d a
federal syslenn with it
high degrev of pra ial
autonomy. This dispute wa% a factor in the sccr�sion in
1W) of Kala nga Pnovinca� (now Slia11a Region! and of
the eastern part of K:, Province (nos, ti;a.ai- (3rienhal
Region), 11 11014 the 1111nn11er of province. had Ic�ru
increased to 21, and ill 1964 the federal sv.tetn Has
codified in a new constitution
After assuming the presidency, Moloa1,1 forcefully
exerted the central governmavnl s ;otthoritv over th;�
local political in.tititlious. 11% thy end of If"i It(- had
successfully consolid all significant ro!itic ;al
control in the central goyernrtu�rat. The number of
provinces sr :as reduced 141 eight. and Ina. iticial
lxrli:ical institutions, such as cabinets ;and asse=nblics,
saen� abolished. altinongh :advisory provincial councils
were lermilled. All provincial governor. ;and high
officials were made ciyil serv;mts of till� central
governmment. 1pliointe(I 1 and directly reslc,nsilte to
the President.
In June� 1967. Zaire prom iflgate'd its third
c�oristitn; ion in just over 7 sears. This c�onstilution
provid for a unitary and republican form of
government. The provincial fragmentation which haul
developed after indepe ndelace� and which Haas codified
in tile 1964 constitution was officiall aIoiisilecl, and
those jmwers previously retained by th uittcnortnons
provinces were centralized ira the presidency. Althoaagh
the constitution t three branches of
government at the nutioti:a! level (Figure I E
executivc, legia,itiye, and judicial �and provides a
.etnblarace of checks and balances among them� in
practice the legislature and jndici:ary have� crercised no
real restraint i the- Presidennt.
The sec�tioti of tilt, constitution dealing
'undanu�ntal rights is taken l;ergely from the 11)(i-I
constitution. The pvw section is much shorter than tut,
previous one. as it tends toward it general defiraitio a of
basic rights imtead of a specific inventory. Articles
protecting religious freedom, farraily structure, the
right of till- individual to fair trial, and humane
treatment after arrest are ineietde�d, along with several
other freedorns prescribed by the U.N. haitnan rights
conventions. The constitution guarantees the right to
farm labor unions ;and to strike as 1011 ;is these rights
are exercised in conformity with the law, tahnic aracl
r. ;vial discrimination in enaplo% nt and (,(Il I( is
forbidde anel for the fiat tune Women are grained
the right to vote.
I� National government
a. h ce�cutire
According ta the I(Xi7 c�onstit,1tiori. the President of
-.it(- Republic� is elected to it pear terra In direct
unive suffrage. with an absolute lmiority of the
b:allols cast retl,1iic�el for elec�tinn. In practice, the
popular election is :i Inert formality. ;a� tI,e
presidential eandidala� must be Imminated by the
Political Bureau of the MPR, the only legal p:u;%.
Although Mobutu seized power and declared himself
President in November I!�1(i5, he was not duly
norninuted and elected until November 11170. The
colistitutiona clots not provide for a vice president. I
the event of the Presidents death, resiglation, or
irnpeachnte' tit� the president of the National
t 'gislativv Coulcil is to ;act its President until :a new
Chief t is clecte�d. The election to fill an
3
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FIGURE Structure -of govemr. 9nt (U /OU)

unexpired term must take place within 90 days after
the office has been vacated.
The constitution vests in the President extensive
executive and legislative powers. By way of
comparison, the Zairian President in effect is delegated
all those powers vested in the U.S. President, all the
prerogatives reserved to the separate states by the U.S.
Constitution, and significant legislative powers which
in the U.S. system are granted to the Congress and to
the legislative bodies of local governments. Under the
Zairian system the President has the power to appoint
and dismiss all high officials of the central and local
governments, all officers of the military and national
police, and all magistrates of the criminal and civil
courts without recourse to legislative or judicial review
or approval. He also has an extensive legislative role.
While the constitution provides for a two thirds vote
in th legislature to override a presidential veto,
Mobutu has the political force e, smother any such
attempt. !n addition the President can bypass the
National Legislative Council by submitting inportai
legislation to a popular referendum. In deter.: ;wing
foreign policy, the President has complete freedom
and does not have to submit treaties or agreements
reached with other nations for review or ratification by
the legislature.
The constitution provides for the impeachment of
the President, but the machinery for doing so has
never been completed. Although he has immunity
from criminal liability for his official acts, this
immunity does not extend to high treason or the
intentional violation of the constitution. If two thirds
of the National Legislative Council vote that
impeachment proceedings be brought, the President
must be tried by a constitutional court, The
constitution provides that a separate law shall define
high treason and willful violation of the constitution
and shall establish the procedure to be followed by the
constitutional court. Neither the court nor the legal
requirements had been created by late 1972.
The President's cabinet, according to the 1967
constitution, consists of an unspecified number of
ministers appointed by and directly responsible to the
President, who defines their areas of responsibility. In
a cabinet reorganization in March 1969, Mobutu
introduced the concept of four "superministers" �the
Ministers of State �each charged with coordinating
certain specific activities of the full cabinet. Mobutu,
however, became increasingly distrustful of the
stronger personalities in the cabinet and was reluctant
to delegate a coordinating roh to anyone. By
December 1970, when the position c f Minister of State
was abolished, the cabinet had lost all pretensions of
4
formulating national policies. and cabinet ministers
were essentially the senior executive of their respective
departments. In successive reshuffles since 1970,
Mobutu has tended to select nee+ ministers from the
higher echelons of the civil service, to rotate the more
competent ministers before they gain firm control of a
particular department, an,l to remove obviously
incompetent executives. Although the net result has
been it distinct trend toward higher technical
competence, Mobutu also has carefully maintained a
geographic and an ethnic balance among cabinet
ministers.
In August 1972 the Political Bureau of the MPR
announced that the cabinet and the party's National
Executive Committee would be combined to form a
National Executive Council.' This reform is intended
to consolidate the supremacy of the MPR over the
national government in accordance with it December
1970 constitutional amendment. The National
fr -.ecutive Council has primary responsibility for
implementing all policy directives of the Political
Bureau concerning the party as well as the executive
components of the government. President Mobutu
presides over both the Political Bureau and the
National Executive Council, and the difference: in
their functions appears to be one of degree, with the
new Council more directly concerned with concrete
administrative matters. According to a presidential
decree issued in October, the former government
ministries were redesignated departments, the heads of
departments became known as state commissioners,
and deputy state commissioners were included in the
National Executive Council. Although the formation
of the new body has not involved it basic
reorganization of the principal executive components,
the former Interior Ministry is now the Department of
Political Affairs and has assumed the additional
function of coordinating MPR activities with
government administrative functions at regio..al and
local levels.
b. Legislature
Under the provisions of the 1967 constitution, the
parliament was converted from a bicameral legislature
to the unicameral National Assembly. In October
1972 the Political Bureau of the MPR announced that
henceforth the National Assembly was to be known as
the National Legislative Council and its members as
People's Commissioners. Presumably only the official
'For a current listing of key government officals, consult Chiefs
of State and Cabinet Members of foreign Gouemments, published
monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency.
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E
title of the legislature and its members have been
changed. and other provisions of the constitution
regarding the former National Assembly now apply to
the National Legislative Council.
All members of the legislature are elected to it 5 -year
term by direct and secret universal suffrage on the
basis of one member for 50,000 citizens. An additional
member can be elected for any remaining fraction of
population of 25,000 citizens or more. The legislature
elected in November 1970 has -120 members, all of
whom belong to the MPR. Although the 1967
constitution originally authorized two political parties,
an amendment passed in December 1970 states that
the MPR is the only legal party. In addition, the
amendment sanctions previous regulations .which in
effect preclude anyone from being elected to the
legislature as an independent candidate. The
constitution also stipulates that a member of the
legislature who leaves his party also forfeits his seat in
the legislature.
According to the constitution, legislative authority
is shared by the National legislative Council and the
President of the Republic, but the Presidents
particular prerogatives enab.e him to virtually control
the whole legislative process. Although the legislature
as well as the President can initiate legislation, the
legislatures initiative is limited to specific areas,
including civil rights, electoral regulations, and
military obligations. In each case actual implementa-
tion of the law is dependent on presidential initiative.
The legislature may also establish "basic principles" in
certain areas, but legislation in these fields can be
effected only by presidential decree. Included in this
group are labor legislation, finances, national defense,
and administration of the local governments. The
legisl iture does have the right to discuss the
government budget, but it must defend to the
satisfaction of the President any changes it proposes.
The initiative for revision of the constitution is
likewise shared by the National Legislative Council
and the President. An affirmative vote by two- thirds of
the legislature is required for a constitutional
amendment, but the President may submit a proposed
amendment to a popular referendum� requiring only
a simple majority for acceptance without approval
of the legislature.
When the National Assembly convened for the first
time in December 1970, it hec.:ne apparent that
Mobutu would contro; the legislative process through
members of the MPR Political Bureau whom he
appointed to key positions in the legislature. Most
important were the president of the National
Assembly and the chairmen of three permanent
committees for political, administrative-, and judicial
functions, economic and financial functions, and
social and cultural affairs. The three permanent
comntittevs are made up of 25 subcommittees, each of
which was alloted an area of responsibility
corresponding to that of a ministry or other major
executive agency. During the first two regular sessions
of the assembly, .which convened in April and October
1971, five constitutional amendments and I 1 ordinary
laws proceeded smoothly from the President through
the Political Bureau and the legislative committees to
the floor of the legis' 'tire, where they were passed
with some debate ov.- ;Ietails and a few dissenting
votes.
By the end of the National Assembly's first year the
legislature, through this process, had become
established as essentially responsive to Mobutu's
directives but distinctly more t1w.a a rubberstarnp.
Although some of the constitutional amendments and
laws --re merely empty proclamations, the national
budget was scrutinized and discussed for 2 months
before passage without significant revisions, and the
various legislative subcommittees diligently worked
out the details of other substantive measures.
Apparently the subcommittees were assuming genuine
monitoring functions over the central government
ministries, and individual members of the legislature,
as they plodded through the mandatory semiannual
tours of their electoral districts, were likewise
monitoring the performance of local administrators.
Mobutu has taken precautions to ensure that the
National Legislative Council is a reliable and
businesslike body. dis decision, made prior to the
legislative election in 1970, that candidates could not
represen! their home districts has tended to prevent a
reemergence of the tribalism and regionalism which
prevailed in the former parliament. At the same time,
Mobutu's directive that each member must visit his
electoral district semiannually and submit a full report
of his activities has made the peoples commissioners
more aware of their representative functions, although
the typical commissioner on tour has slight incentive
for creating genuine rapport with the populace.
Further, Mobutu's emphasis on the commissioner's
watchdog functions encourages the member to snoop
on government and party officials in the field, thereby
initiating a new check on the local levels of the
established hierarchy.
On the whole, the legislature appears to be serving
Mobutu fairly well as it supplementary channel for
dispensing largesse to loval citizens of some local
standing, for disseminating his directives to the
countryside, and for reporting the more flagrant
derelictions of lower echelon bureaucrats.
5
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c. Judiciary
The judiciary is targets a holdover from the colonial
past, although important reforms have begun. A 1967
rdinance called for an general overhaul of the system
within a 10 -year period. Two important reforms, the
creation of a Supreme Court and the establishment of
a third court of appeals (in Kisargani), have already
been implemented. Additional planned reforms are
designed to create a more workable s�stenn by
integrating traditional and modern court structures
and by setting up all organized legal profession.
The Belgian colonial administration grafted the
metropole's legal system onto the various networks of
traditional indigenous jurisprudence. In tle lower
courts the result %vas a dual system of ta%v, one for
Europeans and one for Congolese. At the hottorn of
the dual system tribal courts dispensed customary law
in disputes affecting relations between tribal
members; they also had jurisdiction over minor
criminal offenses. Trial for more seriaus offenses was
reserved to the European system. Cinder ti r- planned
reforms a system of peace tribunals will replace the
myriad of tribal chief courts, sector courts, communal
courts, police courts, and zonal courts which are still
operating. According to the 1968 ordinance which
created the peace tribunals, it minimum of one
tribunal in cacti zone and city will have jurisdiction
over all dispr s falling under traditi( .ial law and in
criminal disputes where the maximum penalties are 2
months imprisonme or a fine of 2 zaires (i z aire
equals US$2).
Above this level the reform calls for a simplified
hierarchy with subregional courts, courts of first
instance, courts of appeal, and it Supreme Court in
Kinshasa. The subregional court is a formal law court,
consisting of three judges and it public prosecutor,
which operates in each subregional capital. Cases
involving a maximum prison terra of up to 5 years or
fines exceeding 2 zaires fall under the jurisdiction of
the subregional courts. The subregional courts also
have jurisdiction over cases normally handled by tilt:
peace tribunals when the disputes or infractions
invoke it police officer, tribal chief, or mayor. 1'he
capitals of the regions maintain courts of first instance
which try cases involving penalties ranging from 3
years servitude to capital punishment. T he courts of
first instance also have appellate jurisdiction over the
subregional court. The courts of first instance are
staffed by a chief judge, two other justices, and a
public prosecutor. Three judges are needed to hear
criminal case!. Capital criminal cases involving
political f igure s, however. are rarely brought before
the courts of first instance. The Mobutu government
6
has preferred to use military courts for such cases, in
violation of the provisions of the 1967 constitution.
Courts of appeal are located in Lubumbashi,
Kinshasa, and Kisangani.
The� Supreme Court of ju%tiee, %%�Inch %vas set up in
November 1968, is the highest appellate tribunal in
Zaire. The Supreme Court's decisions are hinding
upon all the lower courts and tribunaL:. It also judges
cases involving ministers, triemhers of the National
Legislative Council, counselors of the \,et to -he-
created Constitutional Court, and nragistrate of the
Supreme Court. Pending the formation of the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court is the
repository of constitutional review power, making the
court the equivalent of its U.S. counterpart.
The projected Constitutional Court is not it court in
the normal sense but, rather. it commission charged
with interpreting the constitution and upholding its
supremacy as the la%w of the land. The court, when
created. will he composed of nine counselo serving
nonrenewable terms of 9 wars, %with one -third leaving
office each 3 years. One -third of the counselors are to
he chosen by the Preside,t, one -third by the Nationai
Legislative Council, and one -third Im the Supreme
Council of the Magistrates (see below).
Formal criminal investigation procedures in Zaire
are it legacy of the Belgian system. Officers of the court
handle criminal investigation as well as prosecution.
The National Gendarmerie is used primarily to
maintain civil order and has little investigative
authority. Under the Mobutu regime the National
Documentation Center :ND) and its predecessor, the
Surete .Nationale, and the army usurped marry of the
powers of the courts and the local police authorities.
Both the CND and the arm\ engage in arbitrary
measures against suspected opponents of the regime,
and both Z airians and foreigners are subject to
searches, arrests, detainments, and punishments
without recourse to formal judicial procedures. In
several cases involving corruption in government or
having heavy political overtones, such as the trials in
June 1966 of four former ministers accused of plotting
a coup, military tribunals have been substituted for
the regular civilian courts.
The judicial system suffered severely from the
departure of Belgian magistrates in 1960. For over 2
years The Congo was left Without any trained jurists or
magistrates, except for a few in secessionist Katanga
Province (ren amed Shaba Province in 1911 and rto%v
designated Shaba Region). Under a U.N.- sponsored
program in 1962, it number of foreign jurists and legal
advisers were recruited to assist in keeping the court
system going. 'I'll( foreign personnel aiO the few
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qualified Zairian magistrates, however, are not able to
administer the judiciary effective1% over the entire
countr%, and in inan% areas formal judicial procedtires
have been nonexistent for prolonged periods.
There art- Zairian judges at all levels of the
inagist rat tire, but presiding judges. especially in Ile
courts, of first instance, are mostly foreigners. The
Chief ju.itice of tile. Supreme Court is Zairian, but at
least two associate justices are not. Tit(- government
hopes that by the time the reforms are completely
implemented, Zairians will have occupied these
positions.
The judicial reform provides that ne%%. magistrates
will he chosen by the President on the advice of the
Supreme Council of the Magistrates, which has riot
v(,-t been created. It is expected that thi council will
give the President dominant power over the
magistrates and, therefore, over the entire system of
justice, A 1968 ord;riance created a Zairian bar and
regulated its membership. Several terms of tit(
document, however, are not expected to be put into
effect until Zaire has developed its own body of
lawyers.
2. Local government
As President Mobutu has progressively tightened
centralized control, territorial components of tile
government have become mere administrative
subdivision,, rather than autonomous 1)
entities. In order to emphasize tit(- primacy of tile
central government, in juiv 1972 the offici
designations for all territorial components except ti
lowest echelon were changed, although the boundaries
of each component remained tit(- same. Following are
the former and the present designatiois for territorial
components along xvith the number of cxisting units at
each level:
FoRNIER
PRESENT
Nup-tBER
Province
Region
8
District
Subregion
24
Territory
Zone
131
Local collectivity
Local collectivity
446
Zairians gained their first practical experience in
self front the commune system which tile
Belgians established in urban areas in 1957. The cities
were divided into ccinnitines, and each commune
elected its own mayor and coun'JI. Te elected
commune officials, in turn, acted as in advisory group
to the city mayor, who) after independence was
appointed by the President. A 1968 ordinance.
however, eliminated the communal councils and
centralize(] urban decisionmaking in the citN mayor
and his appointive colincil. Since 1968 tile cornintilles
have to exist, but as niere administrative
subdivisions of the ci Their loss of autonom% %kas
fully recognized in July 1972, when coniniones %%ery
redesignated as urban Zones.
Front the zonal administrative level upward, the
government is staffed largel% b% presidential
apl)ointcts in supervisory positions jnd by career civil
servants on the %%orkii ig level. ']'It(-%(- officials are
charged with nuinerotis duties. including the
maintenance of law and order, supervision of
education and the mails, and implementation of tit(-
government's welfare programs.
The administrative centralization of the Mob(itu
,overninent, although an improvement over the
previously (Aiaotic situ d oes lo t a%jpear to li ve
greatly increased administrative efficien cN Ther" is it
lack of coordination bet%%een the ce-itral government
an(] certain regions, leading regional officials to feel
neglected, isolated, an(] 1)o%% to act as an effective
part of the governmental inechanism. Regional
administrations have been deprived of their
independent revenue base and planning awonoiny.
Aithough this has probabl% cut down ()it lo
corruption, matters of regional and local interest imist
be decide, in Kinshasa. there is considerable
bureaticratic redtape and corruption, altbough
corruptioii is not its flagrant as it in the early
1960's. On the stibregional level, central ,Yovernnieri_t
ad nll Itist rat often have trouble getting around in
their areas because of inadequate transportation; this
has led to it breakdown of' central government cont
%%"tit local authorities in some areas. Frequently, an(]
especially at tit(' zonal level. the central governmeW
official is isolated from the inliabit I)e o f hi
ignorance of tit(. loc language or custonis. CmIttiral
gap have widened sin 1966. when Mobutu beg
to assign administrative officials to posts ontside their
home regions in order to make it more difficult for
them to acquire personal influence within their
jurisdictions.
The inability of administrative officials to deal
effectively with local inhabitants has resulted in the
placing of greater reliance on traditional authorities
that was the norm during the colonial era. A 1969
ordinance on local administration reflects Mobkou's
realistic acceptance of existing conditions. As called
for ky the ordinance, the traditional village chi
within each Collectivity comprise a local administra-
tive council, which has primary responsibility for law
enforcement, road Mai 11 te"a lice, and other basic
services. Each local comicil nominates its own leader,
but the latter's appointment nju b confirmed bv
0
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higher authorities, front tit(- zonal commissioner ill) to
the Minister of' Interior (no%% State Commissioner of
Political Affairs). Higher authorities can also appoint
to the local Councils additional members, who arc not
traditional chiefs, arid the council leader need not be a
traditional chief. Sinco- the ranking officials at higher
zonal echelons also hold equivalent positions in the
MPR, their power of appointment enables theni to
pack the local councils with party activists, thereby
exerting firm control over the councils. in more reinote
areas, where local party cadres are still embryonic. a
local party official mav hold the tille of council leader,
but he functions merely its an intermediary between
traditional chief% arid administrative officials at tire
zonal headquartersi.
3. Civil service
As it result of the abrupt departure of the Belgian
administrators ia July 1960, the fop Zairian civil
servants were forced to assume itities far beyond those
for %vhich they were trained. Tire efficiency of the civil
service was decreased further by the introduction
during that sairie year of inexperienced and
incompetent Political appointees into the central arid
provincial government ministries. By late 1966 tit(-
ranks (if the civil service had swellcd from the 12,(XXI
employed in 1960 to some 20,W0 perinanent
employees and an estionated 105,000 persons hired
tinder contract. Many of the new government
employees were political appointees. By an ordinance
promulgated on .30 March 1966, teachers were also
given civil service status. An official anno in
August 1970 tivit there were 45,W0 persons, iticluding
teachers, in the career civil service reflects the
government's effort to ,Ireamfine and improve the
quality of the system.
During 1966 and carly 1.467 the IMobutu regime
institutcd reforms design2d to reduce the number of
political appointees and to attract educated personnel
to government service. A bzisic reform was the rule ',hat
civil administrators in the interior were to be assigned
to areas outside their native regions. This attack oil
tribalism, regionalism, and the regional political
personality hits been effective. 'I'll,- regional
commissioners now look to Kinshasa for support rather
than to local sources. The subordination of the
regional administrations to central authority hits also
limited the opportunities of local leader.% to pad the
local civil service with their political supporters. There
has been some sacrifice i" administrative efficiency it)
the interest of politica! neutrality. Ilegional
cortimissioners have to spend a great dcal of time
gaining a rudimentary knowledge of their regions, and
tire% are subject to frequent transfer. Moreover, oil the
Zonal level, which is usual]% a relatively homogenous
ethnic unit, the civil ad,ninistrallor is often viewed its
air outsider. The effect has been to alienate rather than
encourage local identification %vith tit(- Kinshasa
government.
To increase the number of educated personnel in
tit(- civil service the Mobutu government imposed a 2-
year mandator% service obligation (.)it university
graduates. After the 2-year tour, the graduate call
choose to remain in government and receive seniority
anu 1 )ension rights for the time served, or to leave
government service without having accrued siich
benefits. Mobutu itistructed ministry an(] department
heads to utilize the graduates in responsible positions
rever possible as an incentive for them to remain
after their 2-year tour. Almost 350 graduates had
completed theirservice in 1970, helping to bring about
it noticeable improvement in tipper level administra-
tive services. In addition to its recruitment of
iniversity graduates, the Mobutu government has
sought to strengthen the National School of
Administration, whiAi began in 1961 to provide short,
specialized courses for civil service personnel. By mid-
1971, when the schoo! was incorporated with the
National Universitv, it was providing a 4-yvar
program for prospective administrative offic( rs.
C. Political dynainics (S)
The primary political factors in Zaire are Mobutu's
supreme authority, sanctioned in tit(- national
constitution adopted in 1967, arid the tenacitN of
tribal and regional ties which tend to limit presidential
g
power in practice. Despite Mobutii's unchallenged
political supremacy, the executive agencies lie
conimand- have otily limited effectiveness. Although
Mobuttl employs many strategems for (-losing the gap
between authority and practice, lie Itas come to rely
increasingly oil the MPR. Mobutu formed the MPR in
1967 arid immediately employed it to gain popular
approval for his new constitution. 'Fit,- presidential
and legislative elections of 1970 confirmed his control
of the MPR arid tire party's monopoly of all overt
political activity. Since 1970, Mobwttj hits sought to
consolidate the primacy of the NIPR ovcr the civil
govertintent, the army, organized labor, in(] even the
various religious institutions in Zaire.
Zairians, however, have not forgotten that Mobutu
was able to declare himself President in November
1965 without open resistaitce primarily because lie was
supreme commander of the armed forces. This historic
event is still relevant, despite Mobutu's early removal
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of army offi front high civil positions, bec ti
naticAwide structure of the MPR has not yet
developed the mass popular support that would be
required to maintain its nominal predominance over
tile army without Mobutu's backing. Since Mobutu
has tamed organized labor and suppressed all former
oppositionist groups, it appears that whoever holds
effective command of the arm%- upon Mobutu's
departure front the scene could declare himself
President and encounter no more resistance than (lid
Mobutu in 1965.
Mobutu., however, has maintained his essentially
personal control of the army by counterbalancing rival
senior officers its well as rival factions among younger
officers. This strategy has succeeded so well that it is
seareel% conceivable that any individual could (Itiiekly
acquire the scild army support that Mobutu
developed front 1460 to 196-3. In the absenct- of j
military leader who commands broad respect or
genuinelv professional discipline throughotit tile arm%
Mobutu's demise could trigger a recurrence of tile
army schisms or slicer paralysis which accompanied
the secessionist movements in the early 1960's.
Mobutu's persistent undercutting of potentiai rivals
in the army and in the civilian components of tile
government has tended to gloss over but also
j�rpetuate an intrinsic lack of institutional cohesion.
I iaire has a new generation of tit least teclinicaliv
qualified executives in many pivotal positions, but
almost none has had extensive experience at making
independent decisions. fit the absenc v of all obvious
successor to Mobutu, it is possible that it few strong
personal i ties could collaborate sufficiently to maintain
the minirnum essentials of a central government�as
(lid Mobutu and several kev civilian officials ;11 tile
early 1960's. But the centrifugal forces of tribalism and
regionalism, which produced the tumultuous events of
the. 1960's discussed helo%v, would alp. certainly be
revived to sonic degree.
1. Tribalism, regionalism, and insurgency
(1960-65)
Belgium's sudden grant of independence to its
Congo colony in 1960 precipitated 5 years of turmoil,
with one insurgent movement after another engulfing
large sectors of tile country. Although these
movements adopted the trappings of modern
secessionist governments, the underlying forcc- were
traditional tribal loyalties and various regional
interests which had grown tip during the colonial cra.
For instance, the secessionist regime in Katarga
Province which lasted front July 1960 to January 1963,
drew its strength from an anti-Luba tribal alliance as
well w. tit(- vested interest, of a modern industrial
complex, all held together I)% tit(.- Westernized Moise
Tshombe. By contrast, tit(- "Simba" revolt, wideli
overran easte rn all(] northeastern Congo from tnid-
1964 to inid-1965, was essenti a series of
spontaneous peaslmt uprisings, spearheaded by local
voutlis who had absorbed just enough Western culture
to resent their inal-ility to advance thro modern
vocations. This movement was exploited 1)
Corninunist-oriented politicians who proclaimed a
short-lived "Popidar IlevOhitionary Governinent" in
S(atileyville (nov Kisangani), but the politicians failed
to gain e"k-etive control of the peasant guerrillas.
Consequently thery was far inow bloodshed and chaos
than had occurred during the Katangan secvssion. aud
tile central government's control is still relatively weak
tit tit(- areas devastated hy tit( Simlws.
Hiis epoch of rampant tribalism is no%% seen its the
inevitable restilt of Belgian paternalism, rigorously
maintained undl it was far too late for impatient
Congolese politicians to develop parties of sufficient
breadth to maintain it strong national government.
Following World War 11, while Britain and France
%ecred toward accominodatioi of naseent African
11 ationalism, Belgium ignored political advances for
the Congolest- 'avor of increasing social service. BN
1960 a full 5WY of indigenous children were attending
priniar% school, yet no Congolese had attained officr
%tatus in tit(- Force Publique or in the civil service.
Although tribal cultural a%sociations we re encouraged,
nationalistic organizations were banned until 1959,
when hitherto tight controls oil the press ai)d oil public
meetings were f inally rep, jled. As late as 1958 most
Belgians were convinced that independenc, for their
c(,Ioti% could he deferred at least 30 years after it was
attained in neighboring French British territories.
Belgian coin pl acencv was abrupt1% shattered by tile
January 1959 riots in Kinshasa. and colonial
authorities, who also were reacting to shifting p
pressures in Belgium. reconciled thernselves to a
transitional prcgram which could lead to indepen-
dencc in 5 years. In carl% 1960 roundtable conferences
%%ere held in Brussels %%ith Congolese leaders of 21
embryonic political parties, mostly tribal or regional in
composition. Ignoring Belgian suggestions for interim
measures, the Congolese demanded full independence
on 30 June 1960, and the Belgians yielded. The hastily
organized provincial and national elections in MaV
were contested by nearly M) parties, mostly focused
on local issues.
The on( party which operated oil a national level�
Patrice Lumumba's Congoiese National Movement
(MNC)�won 33 of 1,37 seats in tile Chamber of
9
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Deputies, more than any other part%. Lumuniba
became Premier by including in his cabinct
representatives of almost all the 15 parties that had
seats in parliament. Joseph Kasavubti, leader of
tile Kongo tribal association. was elected President by
parliament following a similar bargaining process. Tile
flimsiness of this facadc of unity soon became evident.
Within 3 months of Independence I)ay, the army
mutinied, tile countrv's two richest areas�Katantra
Province and the eastern half of Kasai Province�
seceded, Kasavubu and Lumuntba dismissed (-,tell
other, and Colonel Mobutu, then tit(- strongest of
competing army commanders, assurned control of the
central government'.
In February 1961 Mobutu bowed out tc. Kasavubij.
who remained President until Mobutu's bloodless
seizure of full power in November 1965. During this
period Kasavubu maintained a semblance of'
consWutional government in Kinshasa while four
secessionist governments %%ere put down through the
cumulative efforts of a Uniied Nations task force, it
partially reformed Congolese ari several white
mercenary units, and military assistance missions front
Belgium, tit( United States, Israel, and ItaIN. 'I lie
Kin government also carne to rely heavily oil
fo�!ign technical and financial assistaiwe to keep its
central ministries functioning arid to restore civil
administration in areas .%'here virtual anarchy h-ld
prevailed. Under these circumstances tile exectitive
ministries. with foreign consultants in key positions,
supplanted parliament its tit(- effecti�_ arm of
goverument. Successive prerniers, however, oc-
casionally felt compelled to elicit votes of confidence
from the legislature for their more significant
measures. Many members still wielded serne influence
in their home areas, and parliament retained it
measure of popular iespect as it syn-,bol of
independence from foreign domination.
The halting, partially disguised Aift of political
power front parliatoentarians to holders of key
executive positions was manifested in tile rise arid fall
of Pritno Minister Adoula, held office from
August 1961 to july 1964, far longer titan any other
prime minister. Adoula, who had received his start as a
labor leader before independence, emerged as the only
individual who could get it nearly unanimous vote of
confidence from a special reconciliation session of
parliament, held at Lovanium University under the
protection of United Nations troops. Adoula was
acceptable to) otherwise bitterly divided factions
because lie was art adroit mediator without a popular
following of his own. Yet even Adoula could not
maintain an effective coalition ill such it fragmented
body. President Kasavubu fivallv dissolved parliament
in September M6. a stalemate developed over
tit(- orojected constitution.
With parliament dissolved. the Adoula government
retained full legislative po%ver�theorefically by
presidential decree. in fact by consensus of fit(- Binza
group discreetly inconspictious group composed
of ariny commander Mobutu and our civilian
officials whose key positions gave them effective
.-ontroi of tile other security services, goveimuent
firiatwes. and fireign affairs, particularIN tit(- %iial flow
of foreign aid. Shortly after Adoula formed his large.
unwieldy cabinct ill August 1961, these five men had
begull ineeting rcioiiarlN in Binza, it stiburb of
Kinshasa, to c(ml !heir activities its Adoula's
closest advisers. Two of the four civilians not only
%%ielded extensivc executive power in A(Iotjla behalf
but contrilmted some political leverage of their 4mil.
Justin Botuboko, Minister of Foreign Affairs front
independence until April 196-3, was also leader of' a
triballN based party ill Equateur Region. Victor
Nendaka riot only took firm command of tit(- former
coloniid Surete, but inoided it into all effeetive
political instrument with nitich broader geographic
range titan anyr regular party.
The Adoula government. with massive foreign
assistance, succeeded in suppresAng three secessionist
reginies by January 1963 and made it good start
toward reconstructing disrupted public services in
some sectors of the country. Adoula failed, however. to
cope with peasant uprisings which started in
Bandundu Region in January 1964 and in eastern
Con,o in April. These new emergencies impelled
President Kasavubu to disiniss him and install Moise
Tshotnhe Lis Prime Minister in July. I)espite
Tshombe's notoriety as leader of the ill-fated
Katangan secession, his impressive capabilities made
him acceptable to many deputies front other
provinces. )'et the changeover took place in tile
absence of parliament, and the decisive factor the
Biriza group's \vithdrawal of support front AAoula.
By the tirne the first parliamentary elections since
independence were held 'Ili April 1965, tit(.- peasant
uprisings had been largel% suppressed, and Tshombe
had assembled a coalition party which won it majo
of seats in the new parliament. By mid-1965, however,
tension had developed between Kasavubu and
Tshombe, primarily because they had become rivals
for the presidential office called for in the new
constitution. Ili October, Kasavubu dismissed
Tshornbe, but Tshombe's coalition in parliament held
firm enough to deny a majority vote for Kasavubti's
choice of a new premier. Mobutu broke the impasse
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On 27) November, wben he declared himself President
for .3 wars and named Colonei Mulainba its Premier
along with a broadly representative civilian cabinet.
On 28 November parliament unanitnously approved
the Mulamba cabinet, and on I 0ecember Mobutu
adjourned parliament and announced that lie would
legislate by decree until the next regular session.
Mobutu's takeover (if supreme atithority without
ativ Open Oppo)sitiou manifested not only tit(- success ot
his lono struggle to harness av unruly ariny but also
the coil-etive failure (%f civi,ian leaders to establish it
workail. political struett. The "Ibject surrender of
parliarnei.t to Mobutu in Nw.ember was surprising
because the constitution promulgated in August 1964
had appeared to bridge the worst gaps between tit(-
European parliamentary system tentatively adopted
in 1960 and the actual political conditions in Zaire.
'rhe nvw constitution legalized tit(.- 21 largely
autonomous provinces wbich had emerged during
1962-63, yet the centrifugal forces appeared to b(
offset bv a strong national presidency with sufficient
executive authority t ride out irre opposition
in parliament. This constitution might I-ive been
inade to work if Kasavubti and Tshotilbe bad
functioiied its true partners, but their eventual
Confrontation revealed each to be standing on liollo%%
legalisins. 1 Kasavubu did not comnitrid it
really disciplined arm% or civil service, and tit( Binza
group did not choose ',o exercise executive power for
Kasavubu as it had done for Adoula.
As for Premier 'I'shombe, his parlianientary coalition
did not hold firm for it full nionth after Kasavubu
dismissed It i m. Mobutu's coup showed that
Tshornbe's supporters represented riterely a caticus
among politicians lacked real popularsupport. In
fact, the rapid spread of the. Siniba rebellion in 1964
had already revealed tit(- extent and depth of poptiLr
alienation against the politicians had %%on
election in 1960 by encouraging naive expectations of
the material rewards of independence. For the bulk of
the populace, indepen(knce had in fact brought
privation which most of tit grassroots leaders had
escaped by going to Kinshasa or the provincial capitals
to sit in ineffectual legislative 6odies or fill newly
available sinecures in the ministries. Consequently b
1964 peasant resentment against high-living
politicians had sharply intensified decp-rooted tribal
and regional antipathies toward the centrid
government. By mid-1965 most of the peasant
guerrillas had been militarily defeated, but Tshombe
and his new allies in Kinshasa had done very little to
counteraO the underlying popular alienation.
2. Mobutu's consolidation of executive authority
1966 J)
Mobutu was able to proclaim himself P.
%%ithout incurring real opposition in November 19K5
because It( held unrivaled eontrol (if the army. and
most politicians realized that tit(-% had tit) other power
structure capable of challenging lie ariny. Yet tit(-
army was ;ntrinsically incapable of maintaining stable
government. Lacking real professional discipline, the
officer corps was still subject to factional splits. The
troops were notorious for brutal -iistreatment of
civilians wlivnevcr the%- "ere deplo% ed on quasi-police
missions. Mobutu, who had aspired before indepen-
detice to be a journalist or a politician, recognized the
limitations of the army as a political ins.runient and
procvedmi to consolidate his authorit,. h% kidding an
-Aternative po%%er strtjc!ojr(-.
By 1970. Mobutu had constric.-ted it Imlitical systent
based on tit(- primacy of a single political 1);MN, which
in sonic ways resembles the pattern in Gorninunist
countries. I lis official part% tit( Popular Mo%vuient of
the Revolution monopolizes political activit
and is predominant the civil government its well
its the labor and youth organizations. The part%
ho%%vver, is essentially .it artificial creation, as it is not
a niass movement shaped through a genuine truggle
for independence. In fact, during his first years tit
power Mobutu focused his print(- efforts on rcbuildi',g
the centralized administrative structure of the fornwr
Belgian ,ongo. Altbough tit( present civil adininistra-
tion is still far less effective than tit(- Belgian model,
Mobutu's authority to appoint. dismiss, and transfer
government employees throughout tit(- coinitry gives
him more real leverage over educated and politically
conscious Zairians than does his control of t1w M111.
Whi-n Mobutu assumed control in Kinshasa, lie had
to deal with 2i provincial governments, each with
elected assemblics and governors were responsible
primarily to these assemblies rather than to tit( -entral
government. As the provincial governments had
bec-onic bastions of tribal and regional interests. an
abrupt cancellation of their autonomous powers
would have precipitated it intich more perilous test of
strength than Mobutu's showdown with parliament.
His alternative was to gradually reduo- tit(- power of
the politicians who had gained some standing in their
own homelands. His most decisive single move, a
decree reducing the number of provinces front 2 to
12, was deferred until April 1966. when army units
were full% deployed to squeich resistance. 'rhe
Consolidated provincial assemblies then elected
governors for the it( provinces in accordance with
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the 1%.4 constitution, but Mobutu soon transferred
most of the newly elected governors to othei provinces.
'rhe transfer of provincial wivernors from their local
hases accompanied by a gradual reanitnatioti of
central government ajencies operating in the
provinces. lit July 1966 Mobutu nationalized the
provincial I-w,)Iice Forces, which had been autonomous
for several years'. By late 1966 the surele, firmly
directed from Kinshasa since independence, lwd
become the major instrument at the local level im
diowing provincial politicians that presidential
decrees could not be ignored with impunity, with
armv units ready to intervene whenever concerte
A
.esistance appeared. lit September, Mobutu finally
ordered local arm% commanders toassume administra-
tive control in Tshombe's foriner stronghold of Sud-
Katanga Province and in traditionaNy unruly Stid-
Kivu. Hence the critical tests of strength had been w-ot
by January 1967, when a presidential decree redticed
the existing 12 provinces to the present eight, replaced
the remaining elected governors with career civil
servants. and reduced the provincial assemblies to
mere consultative status. By late 1968 the process of
regularly rotating all senior administrative officers in
the provinces had largely curtailed their opportunities
for developing significant influci-ce with local
inhabitants.
Compared with Mol)titti*s reassertion of the central
government's authority over the provinces, his
piecemeal dismantling of the parliamentary system in
Kinshasa was a inere theatrical production. lit March
1966, when parliament reconvened "or the first time
since Njobutu's takeover, lie gained confirmation of
his authority to rule by decree for the duration of his
presidency. lit Ociober, Mobutu simply infornied
parliament that he had dismissed Prime Millistel.
Mulaniba and henceforth would serve as Prime
Minister as well as President. In April 1967 lie
announced that a new constitution, confirming a
strong presidential systern, would be submitted to a
popular referendum. In June the refi-rendurn was
conducted with such fanfare that the 92 affirmative
vote became a great psychological victory for Mobutu
over the politicians. Then he dissolved parliament,
and elections for the reformed National Assembly
(now the National Legislative Council) were deferre
until November 1970.
From Mobutu's takeover until his final dissolution
of parliament, lie encounter( only one serious
challenge from the politicians in Kinshasa. In May
1966 a plot to overthrow him was detected which
involved four relatively minor politicians who
apparently thought they had :.,jpi)ort from some
12
elentunts of the army. The officers they cindaelvd,
however, reported them to Moblitti, aud he protnptl%
had them hanged in a public square. There were
rumors thai. public executions might touch off a
popular uprising, as one of tit(- plotters was a fairly
popular member of the Kongo tribe, w
predominated in the area around Kinshasa. But tit(-
Kongo tribesmen remained sullenly quiet, and the net
result was enhanced respect for Mobutu's decisive usi
of power.
The belated convening of tit( National Assembl% in
I)eeember 1970 marked the complete suix)rdination of
tribal and regional interests under Mobutu's new
political systent. The central Political Bureau of the
MPR made the final selection of the part% slate of
candidates. who ran unopposed in the so-called
electious, and no candidate was permitted to rtin in his
home area. Although members of the National
Legislative Council must vi their electoral districts
regularl% and are supposed to heed tit( nee(N of local
inhithitants. the typical legislator i, as culturally
isolated from his constituents its are the government
administrative officers w-ho serve it) the provinces. ]'his
systein does indeed dampen ethnic tensions iri the
legislature, kut such a thormighly insulated bod%
scarcely counteracts the notorious unresponsiveness of
provincial administrative officers to local needs.
Mobutu's comptilsion to neutralize tribalism is still a
heavy impediment to the restoration of effective
public services in the countryside.
Mobutu still feels Compelled to maintain art ethnic
balance in the National Executive Council WIhinet)
and in the higher echelons of each ministry of (lie
central government. This compulsion frekitiently
piecludes placing the best qualified individual .;it an
important post. Yet Mobutu has not succeeded in
eliminating obscure pockets of tribalism within
particular ministries which sometimes generate quietly
obstructive tensions. lit the national capital as -,it the
countryside, Mobutu's conquest of historically divisive
forces is still superficial and inconclusive.
3. -Mobtitu and his top aides
I)uring the first years of Iiis rule, while consolidating
centralized control over th(. provinces and neutralizing
popularly elected politicians, Mobutu also was
building up his supreme authority over winisters and
other individuals holding important executive
positions. To accomplish this, Le began to weed out
persons who had been named to the cabinet because
they already held some element of power or influence
wilen Mobutu declared himself President and replace
them with men who were technically competent but
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devoid of an% indeperif'--itt I)owe base. Moblitil's
assertion of ftill authofiIN- over all cabinet iniiiisters
was a decisive victor'% which completed the
essential foundations for all effective presidential
systern. However, the subordination (if key exectitives
to Mobutu's %%ill has been poshed so far to stifle
initiative within particular ministries and to prevent
any kind of teamwork oil the most difficult national
problems.
Mobtitu's failure to (it-legate stifficieW authority to
his top aides also reflects it defensive attitude toward
otitstanding executive talent. I)espite his control of the
army, his actions betray a tendency to regard anyme
who ields high civil atithority effectively as a rival for
stipreine Ix)wer. While the level of competence ill tile
cabinet hits risen markedly, Mobutu has tended to
assign the more sensit,ve tasks to special aides, to avoid
frank vonmiltations with the cabinet or in% other
regular group, and to make critical decisions in
deepening isolation.
m t) l )tl t tl s com to put down potential rivals
has been Starkly epitomized in his dealings with
former conirades in the Binza grotip---the "kitclien
cabinet" which not only sustained Print(- Minister
Adoula front 1961 to 19(i.4 Nit paved the way for
,..I lillc a ssumption of I)o%%(-r in 1965.
Once in power, Mobutu maintain.-d for a while some
Semblance of his former collaboration With aII
members of the group, but their individual positions
%%ere switched sufficiently to neutraliz. much of their
former 1vveragv. Adoula, the most durable leader of
coalition governments since independence, was kept
overseas 011 umbassidorial osignments until 1969,
whe I became Minister of Forvign Mfairs. Damien
Kandola. who had virttially controlled the Interior
Ministry, was consigned to a lucrative skiectire. Albert
Ndele, the internationally respected Governor of the
Zaire Natiotial Bank, Was retained there a ll d
functioned as Mobutti's chief financial adviser tintil
i) 'rhen lie was abruptly dismissed because
Mobutu suspected him of collusion with Belgian
mining interests,
The two members of tli Sinzit group who initered
M c in November 196,
Nendaka and Justin Bornboko�were reputed to he
indispens..ale bec of their exceptional itifitience
and talent qualities Which eventually triggered
Mobtitu's mistrust and his increasingly extrente efforts
to neutralize them. Nemlaka's outstanding executive
talent IIS Well as his extensive leverage, derived from
his years as Surete chief, qualified him particularly for
the politically vital interior Ministry. Moblitil,
however, assigncd him to Transport and Coninitinica-
tions and %tjb%eqt#vntI% to Filiallce. K)flIIx)ko, on the
other [land. was kept in Foreign Affjirs, where It(- had
alread% ser.ed for over 3 %.(-ar%. His exlwrience ill this
field tis( to Mobtitti, while his past record as
Ivadvr ,'A' it Mongo tribal party madc Mob see birn
as a potential rival in the domestic arena. IIOFIIIK)ko'%
politi a ssets, however, were tiot its formidable as
Nentlaka*s. and this consideration probably inilielled
Mobutit's distim- -1 favoring (if Bomboko over
Nendaka. Nevertheless both Bomboko .III(] Nendaka
were ousted from the cabinet ill t S%%rf.(.I)ilig Aukeilp
of Atigust IWN9: apparentl% Mobtitu wailted to
drainatize his total eclipsing of the former Binza
group.
The cabim-t shaketip of Ugust 1%.*9 was the first
:Md rnost draniatic evidt that Mobutu had ttirtied
from I polic%l of selecting nien primaril% for their
standing in varimis local ermipings to choosing
offich0s havinir technical competence. Subse(Itivilt
cabinet coianges�occtirritig at least once a 'eur�bave
maintained it distinct trend toward thu selection (if
younger men with higher e(hicationi-I cn-dentials and
svverai years of relevant professional experience. This
Significant step to%%ard more effective government has
been possible, despite the compidsioll to Inailitaill
ethnic balance, becatise the recent itiewase iii the
ntimber of Zairians completinv, professional trailling
before entering the civil service has provided Mobtitu
with more candidates wbo nivet both the professional
and the etlinic criteria.
Mobutti has replaced vach inember (if the Binza
group with an individlial who is at least as Well
q ualified to manvge his own ministr\. It is dotibiftil.
ho%vever, thot Mobutti's present cabinet. or III% inner
group of ke\ aides, provides him with stich realistic
counsel or concerted action its the i'liliza vroul)
afforded former Prime Minister Adotila. N has
i)ot delegated to anyone all authority comparable t
that exercised by each member of the Binza grotip
(hiring the near-anarchy (if the varly 1960's.
Since Mobutti has consolidated ftill power, he has
recognized the need for hicreased coordination aniong
ministries, btit his attvnipts so far have foundered oil
his underlying inistrtist of the individiials involved.
10111 March 1969 to Wcember 1970 four cabinet
members were named Ministers; of State, an each was
assigned coordinathig mithority over several
functiom-fly related ministries. Mobutu rvportvdb
intended o meet frequently with these four, thus
reanimating all inner comwil roughly comparable to
III(- Binza group, but the implication of special trust
was shattered onl% 6 months later \vhen two of the four
supvrininisters we re dropped from the cabinet.
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4. Popular Movement of the Revolution
Mobutu announced the formation of the Popular
Movement of the Revolution (MPR) in April 1967,
when he finally dissolved parliament and promised
that a new constitution, establishing a strong
presidential system, would soon be submitted for a
popular referendum. Although the 1967 constitution
authorized two political parties, opposition leaders
soon found that Mobutu intended' tile MPR to
monopolize all political activity. I n December 1970 lie
put through a constitutional amendment which
declared that the MPR was not only the sole legal
party, but the supreme national in This
means, from Mobutu's standpoint, that the MPR*s
role is to supplement the civil administrative structure
as a channel for manipulating the masses and also
pro% sinecures for former politicians and other
localiv influential figures who loyally support
Mobutu. The party's propagand c
embellishes a mystique of nationalism, attempting to
override divisive domestic factors and recounting
Mobutu's largely mythical struggle with siaister
foreign forces. Yet mobutu's dispen of favors
through pa!, v t-hanneis eflects the ame strategy of
accommoeabi -4 and counterbalancing tribal or
regional interestN that lie has employed in the army
and civ;l government. The freedo with which
Mobutu handles party affairs, as compared with his
caution toward institutions which already had some
Substance when he became '-'resident. refle'ets tho clear
reality that the N/iPR is indisputably his creation, to
shape and extend as he pleases.
The nationwide organization of the MPR parallels
the government administrative structure in f ti
same individual ordinarily holds corresponding
positions in each hierarchy. For cxample, the regional
commissioner is also president of the party's executive
committee for the province, and the village chief is
also prff ident-treasurer of the local party iub,Al. Each
village chief is supposed to conduct mo'nthly rneetings
with ordinary party members. who are encouraged to
present resolutions about local problems to higher
authorities. Only certified party officials, however,
attend the periodic party conclaves at local arid
provincial levels and the biennial national party
congresses. All officials are deperident on the party
headquarters at Kinshasa for their appointments, pay,
occasional invitations to Kinshasa, and the assorted
material benefits that they are supposed to distribute
among party militants�the certified active members,
as opposed to all adult citizens, who are nominal
members.
IN
The Political Bureau of the MPA is the supreme
policy formulating bodv for th,� Republic as well as the
part% Mobutu, who is president of the MPR. carefully
selects the. membership of ti '?olitical Bureati and
regularIN presides at its frequent meetings. Thus it is
fully tinder his control and serves to formalize his
directives and convey them to other party organs.
According to the NIPR Constitution, a national party
coi.gress, to be converted at lej-,t every 4 years. has the
power to revise or cancel it directive fronn tile Political
Bureau. In fact, however, the special party congress in
May 1970 and the first regular party congress in May
1 972 merely ratified unanimously the resolutions of
the Political Bureau oil a wide range of national policy
issues.
The size of the Political Bureau has varied, front 17
in 1967 to it maximum of 35 in 1969 and again in late
197L and a minimum of only 15 from February 1972
to date. The only ex officio members of the Political
Bureau tire the President of the Republic and tric
president of the National Executive Council. In early
1969, shortly before the dismissal of Nendaka and
Bornboko from the cabinet. the Political Bureau was
considerably enlarged to include a broad spectrum of
politicians who had gained some prominence before
Mobutu became President. In December 1970,
following the presidential and legislative e le c ti ons
man% of thesc old-line politicians were replaced with
Vounger university graduates. The net result of
Mobutu's deliberately unpredictable .Wlection process
is that Political Bureau membership has been the
ultimate sinecure for senior party militants and also for
other persons who have too intich influence in their
home districts to be safel\ neglected.
Mobutu pruned the PoNtical Bureau from 35 to 15
members in February 1972 arid annoiinced it
reduction in its member's salaries from 2,000 zaires a
month to 500�the satne salary drawn by National
Legislative Council mernbers. Perhaps the slarpness of
the February cuts in both membership and salary was
Mobutu's response to rumors that certain memb of
the Political Bureau had put too many of theircronies
on the final list of candidates�selected personally by
the Political Bureau during a weekend cruise hosted' b)
the President�in the 1.970 legislative elections.
Whatever Mobutu's immediate motives for the
February purge of the Political Bureau, it appears that
he intends to continue using the reduced bureau as it
command post for directing the legislature*s various
committees, which during 1971 diligently worked out
the details of legislation initiated in the Office of the
President.
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The shrewdly phased emergence of the MPR as the
s le A party has been accompanied by Mobutu's
Jorts to bring within its ranks all other significant
special interest groups or professional rankings. A case
in point is offered by the party's youth wing, the
J M PR. When it was formed in 1967, the J M PR was a
clearcut party auxiliary which merely sought to
coordinate other student or In 1969 it was
transformed into the only permissible campus
organization, and all students have been compelled to
join it. By contrast, Mobutti forced several competing
labor federations to merge in 1967 but did not
explicitly subordinate the labor movement to the
party at that time, although key labor leaders became
party officials. to keep
As for the armN and police., Mobutu strove
their leaders isolated from the party until late 197 i. A
directive iss.ued in October of that called for
integration of the army. p the court system, and
the national labor organization with each echelon of
the MPR. The ranking officer for each of these
organizations in each region, subregion, and zone was
assigned a seat oil the party's executive committee for
each geographic entity. At first this arrangement was
regarded as no more than a means for expediting
routine coordination, but in November 1971 the
acting army commander, the police inspector general,
the Supreme Court president. and the Attorney
General were declared to be members of the party s
National Executive C This body wus
responsible for implementing tile directives of the
Political Bureau until August 1972. when it was
merged with tile cabinet to form the National
Executive Council. Hence, the assigning of service
chiefs to the National Executive Committee appeared
to make them directly subordinate to the Political
Btireau, id this move drew enough grumbling to
pit, an indefinite period of heightened tensions
between the MPR hierarchy arid the officers of the
security services, New misgivings that Mobutu may
seriously intend to give the part% s ome security duties
were aroused in March 19772, when he assigned sonic
100 members of the party youth wing's Disciplinary
Brigade to a police training course despite protests
from police authorities.
oil the other hand, Mobutu's handling of the issue
during the NiPR National Congress in May 1972
suggests that he has not really abandoned his
underlying strategy of keeping tile MPR, tile arm%
and ti police as separate power bases, each
responsive primarily to him. The published resolutions
of the party congress stressed the integration of tile
MPR with all national institutions and also declared
that army arid police personnel should be allowed to
vote in national elections. Mobutu, however,
reportedly assured senior army officers shortly before
the congress that no party executive committee would
be formed within arniv units, and army field
commanders were to attend party meetings in their
geographic areas as observers, not directly subordinate
to party officials. Hence the avoidance of direct
ciashes in the provinces presumably depends oil the
continued efficacy of Mobutu's usual counterhalanc-
ing tactics.
The prospect of heightened rivalry arriong field
c omponents (if the MPR, the army. and the police
reemphasizes a perennial enigma: to %%hat extent has
the party taken root in the countryside. The vastness of
tile Zairian interior, the extremes in local geography,
and the spotty nature of local reporting all mitigate
against generalization. Until 1970 it was wideIN
observed that the MPR lacked popular participation-,
relatively few village chiefs really formed subeells, and
the cells in the smaller towns seldom contained
members other than the salaried officials. Cultivating
grassroots support for the party, however. was the
underlying purpose of the presidential and Icgislative
elections of 1970, and the prolonged campaigning
gave extensive public exposure to local officials as well
as touring candidates for the legislature.
The net impact of the election campaign is still
problematical. P typical is the aftermath of the
elections in central Baridundu Region. as reported by a
touring U.S. official in December 1970. Many local
inhabitants expressed disillusionment w ith a n election
that presented no real choices and remarked that most
candidates resembled the old-line politicians who (lid
them no real good during the parliamentary era.
Nevertheless, many inhabitants expressed some faith
i Mobutu's good intentions and a belief that his
single-party concept .%*as more capable of dispensing
material benefits or punishing opponents than would
b possible with many competing parties, Of possiblv
more importance were the indications that the party
was providing tangible linkage between local
inhabitants and government o ffi c i a ls oil rotating
assignment. Continuity w coming particularly from
long-tim(7 local residents oil the party's lower echelon
exec utive committees. Subsequent reports indicate
ay
that the part% v outh wing's Disciplinary Brigade m.
be enforcing government authority fairly effectively in
Some localities where police are absent, despite the
brigade's reputaii1on for rowdyism. Although there is
only slight evidence that local part% units are generally
popular, in many rural areas they may be extending
17
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the reach of tile regular administration in various ways
which significantly strengthen Mobutu's control of the
co
5. Army
The 35,MJ-man Zairian Army is the main p-op of
the Mobutu regime. Mobutu has kept the army out of
government because lie wants to keep it subordinate to
civilian rule, at least nominally. Accordingly, Mobutu
himself has cultivated an image that is disassociated
from his army post. Nevertheless Mobutu has used the
army directly as an instrument of coercion, applied
heavy handedly and at times indiscriminately.
Consequently the army is feared by the general
populace, and any potential challenger is at an
enormous disadvantage as long as the army continues
to back Mo' itu. Although Mobutu has not vet
restored the rigorous discipline of the colonial era, lie
has achieved it master of army politics through
shrewd balancing of rival officer factions and by
providing the troops with a relatively good living,
cornpared with ordinary civilians. As of late 1972 therf
was no evidence of organized plotting against Mobutu
%vithin the army.
The army is crisscrossed by tribal and regimial
allegiances and riddled with tribal prejudices. The
Belgian colonial administration sought to suppress
tribalism in its predecessor, the Force Publique, by a
policy of ethnic mixing which prevented the formation
of ethnically homogenous groups in(] by assigning
units otitsic their home areas. Although these
measures repressed overt manifestations of tribalism,
they did not destroy the personal sense of tribal
identity. Events after independence strengthened
these primordial loyalties, and once the restraints
imposed by the Belgian officer corps were removed,
the army split into tribal and egional factions.
Mobutu ernerged in Sept nher 1960 its senior
officer of the troops who rcmained loyal to the
Kinshasa government, and as the secessionist regirnes
collapsed one by one he consolidated his position as
eommandei in chief of the reinteg.ated natiopal army.
His success was due largely to a combination of
foreign military aid, early support from a cadre of
officers who came from his home region of northern
Zaire, his discreet accommodations with officers from
other regions, and the backing of the Binza group
against competing politicians who sought support
among army officers. Since becoming President,
Mobutu has had to continue an uphill struggle to
rebuild in the army the firm military discipline of the
Force Publique, and he has given highest priority to
isolating the officer corps from civilian politicians,
18
The political neutralization of the officer corps,
however, has been offset by Mobutu's strategy of tacit
accommodation to ineradicable remnants of tribalism
within th(- army. The actual interplay of tribal and
regional loyalties in all phases of army life is still a
basic jeterrent to genuinely impersonal military
disciphric. Because Mobutu and most of tile officers
who rallied to him in 1960 were from northern Zaire,
officers from that area (Equateur and Haut-Zaire
Regions) predominate in the senior grades. Officers
from western Zaire tire less prominent and influential,
but thev remain a cohesive force in the arm% Both
groups discriminate against officers from other regions.
Prejudices base(] on regional origins are deeply
resented bv the southern and eastern officers and
could lead Some da% to it major split in the army.
Until mid-1972 the army high command was still
comprised large1v of the older officers who had rallied
to Mobutu in 1960. These former sergeants of the
colonial Force Publique who had risen to senior
command within n-inths of independence were very
poorly qualified, compared with the middle
generation of officers, who had received some
specialized training in foreign military schools, and
the junior officers, who had graduated front Belgian or
French military academies. iMobtitu kerc the older
officers in key tactical commands or siaff positions
despite their lirnite(l qualifications and waning vigo:
because he relied on their personal loyalty. By 1970 it
had become apparent that the discrepancy between
grade levels and professional training was having a
demoralizing effect on the younger, better qualified
officers�particularly the middle gene who have
become eligible for the more iniportai-A -ommands.
This chronic problem worsened in November 1970,
when General Bobozo, then Commander in Chief of
the army, suffere(I a severe stroke and Mobutu
appointed an acting commander who was second to
Bohozo in seniority but notoriously incompetent.
Bobozo is a member of Mobutu's Ngbandi tribe, yet
lie was widely respected its a strong disciplinarian who
nevertheless spoke up to Mobutu on behalf of the
loyal veterans of all ranks. As Bobozo wits regarded its
kingpin of the old guard, his staving on as nominal
armv commander since his stroke aroused speculation
that Mobutu could not install it ne\ commander
without upsetting the delicate factional balance in the
officer corps.
The lack of a strong army leader since 1970 in turn
stimulated feuding among second-echelon officers
that often surfaced during Mobutu's extended
international junkets. The sharpest clashes occurred
between Brigadier General Buinba, the flamboyant
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paratroop commander, and Brigadier General
Nkulufa, the senior officer at the Defense Department,
who doggediv resisted Bumba's efforts to increase the
autonomy of the elite Airborne Division. The
paratroopers are Mobutu's first line of defense against
mutinies or riots, and Bumba is a member of the
Ngbandi tribe. Mobutu's s p ec i a l reliance on Bumba
despite his abrasive conduct torviAard nonparatroop
officers has h-en widely resented-
In Julv 19 42, Mobutu announced thit nine of the
army's 16 generals would retire soon, thoroughly
reshuffled the remaining senior officers, and also rnadc
significant changes in the command structure of the
armv and other sectirit% services. Bumba was
promoted to Commander in Chief (now Captain
General) of the arm\ while N kulufa was consigned to
a diplomatic post. T he army's six gendarme battalions
and the civil police were merged to form a unified
National Gendarinerie, to be responsible for all local
]aw enforcement throughout Zaire. Then Mobutu
created a special Presidential Special Staff foi the
security services, which includes one senior officer
each from the army's ground and air components,
from the National Gendarmerie, kind from the Co
River, and Lake Guard.
As of late 1972 it was apparent that these inoves
arriounted to the most extensive shakeup of the arniv
high command since Mobutu took power in 1965'.
although their full significance was not vet clear.
While Mobutu had sloughed off his oldest cronies, the
overall pattern appeared carefully calculated to
tighten his leverage over (lie younger, more effective
men assuming key commands. Although Burnba is
expected to generate more friction its ariny
commander than Bobozo had done, it also appears
that Mobutu's other moves would in effect
counterbalance Bumba's promotion. The new
commander of theairborne division. Brigadier General
Danga, also is a member of the Ngbandi tribe and
ieportedly did riot get along with Bumba %%hile
commano]ling a paratroop brigade. The commander of
the newly formed National Gendarmerie is tinder the
control (;f the Defense Department, which Mobutu
has headed since 1965. Furthermore, Mobutu is
expected to rely increasingly on the new Presidential
Special Staff, rather than on Bumba, for tightening his
control of the army's tactical units.
In fact. within a month of Bumba's promotion t
Commander in Chief his title was changed to Captain
General. According to the announcement, the title
11 commander in chief" is to be reserved for the officer
who exercises command of a military theater during
combat operations. Meanwhile, official publicity
stresses that President Mobutti is the Supreme
Commander of the armed forces. Apparently the net
result is to accentitate Mobutu's power to distribute
actual authority arnong senior officers. and he is
continuing his usual tactics of countcrbalancing
several kev military figures. Althougli the retirement
O)f the old guard and the formation of it new
wesidential staff may well foster an overall tightening
of professional discipline, individuals from northern
Equateur Region�Mobutil's home area�still
p. in key positions.
It is ai fairly apparent that most arniv officers
rrsent Mobatu's buildup of the MPR to the point of
nominal supremacy over the armN as well as the civil
government. The doctrine of MPR supremacy baldly
flouts the military legend that Mobutu assurne power
on belialf of the whole officer coros. an(] soldierly
griping has grown audible lit every new embellishmen
of the party's prestige, from the lavish partN1 congress
in May 1970 to the appearance in late 1971 of a new
national flag resembling the part\ emblem.
Nevertheless Mobutu has so effo cloistered the
army front civilian affairs that key officers are not
likely to take scriousl\ inere propaganda Ploys aimed
lit the civilian populace.
On the other hand, the officer corps conceivablN
might close ranks agaiiist Mobutu if such measures a
the strengthening of thcjMPR Disciplinary Brigadeor
the October 1971 directive for local iniegration of'
party, arm\ and civil administrative functions were
actuall\ pushed to the point of clashes between part\
officials an(] tactical commanders. There is no solid
evidence, however, that Mobutu has in fact
abandoned his tacit strategy of favoring the troops
over civilians in the tangible ways that really affect
their morale. Typical of this strategy was tile across-
the-board promotion of most seniorofficers injanuary
1971�within a month of the con
amendment which declare.(] the MPR to be the
supreme national institution.
As early as 1970, however, adverse financial trends
had made it apparent that Mobutu could not
indefinitel v mollify disgruntled arm\ officers by
granting more promotions, fringe benefits, or informal
largesse. 11 fact, by late 19"1 Mobutu had switched
from vague promises of raising overall army strength
-is high as MOM to an oxplicit personnel ceiling of
only 40,M) for 1972. Strict enforcement of this ceiling
could cause serious resentments. Such gaps between
Mobutu's recognition of the financial exigencies and
the limited tolerance of the officer corps for actual
economics appear to be the most sensitive factors in
the overall balance of army morale.
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In late 1972, Mobutu was still temporizing the belt-
tightening measures that might seriously alienate the
officer corps and also was tolei ting lax enforcement
of disciplinary measures governing relations between
troops and ordinary citizens. For instance, in early
197 1 Mobutu recognized that the army's iiitensive
mopping-up operations against rebel remnants in an
isolated sector of eastern Zaire were inflicting far more
hardship on local peasants than on the ever-elusive
guerrilla bands. Hence he auihorized it civic action
program intended to make the troops stop abusing
peaceable inhabitants and start lending a hand with
rehabilitation measures. By late 1972. however, the
civic action program was virtually inoperative because
of a lack of logistical support and of vigorous
enforcement measures.
6. Labor
The labor movement in Zaire has never been a
cohesive political fo;. As long as several labor
federations were operating independentl,, their
leaders were successful in mobiliziug their union
membership on bread-and-butter issues, but they were
never able to translate union loyalty into any long-
term political support for themselves or their policies,
On political questions tile union members' loyalties
had remained with their tribal and regional political
leaders.
In 1967, Mobutu pressured the three existing labor
federations into it single labor organization, no%%
known as the National Union of Workers of Zaire
(UNTZ, formerly UNTC). The LINTZ received
substantial government subsidies and remained
primarily dependent upon them until 1970, when it
compulsory dues checkoff system was extended to
government employees its well as those in private
industrv. Meanwhile Mobutu's virtual control of the
UNTz been reinforced by appointing senior labor
leaders to various offices in the MPR. Labor leaders
have acquiesced in Mobutu's decree makiiig all strikes
illegal unless approved by tl, UNTZ general
secretariat.
The fairly frequent recurrence of small wfideat
strikes since mid-1969�over the government's failure
to pay on time and other grievances�shows that tile
UNTZ officials do not in fact command the full
loyalty of their roughly 900,000 dues-paying members.
Nevertheless the UNTZ ranks second only to the MPR
as a potential mechanisin for mass action. Indeed, the
UNTZ hierarchy may well exert more effective control
over a largvr portion of regular wage carriers than the
MPR hierarchy, as the trade unions that were
amalganiated in the UNTZ had been organized earlier
20
and had generated some sense of voluntary solidarih,
among their members. Although this sense of
solidaritv has been eroded by the complacency of
manv la bor officials despite declining real income for
ordinary workingmen, the UNTZ still retains a real
degree of autonomous strength which makes the
actual working relations between the MPR and the
UNTZ a matter of considerable political significance.
Full collaboration between party and labor officials
would significantly strengthen Mobutu's grip on the
school teachers, other civil service personnel, and
skilled industrial workers m morale largely
determines ti e ff ec tiveness of an government.
Such considerations presuniabiv motivated Mo-
butu's directive in October 1971 which placed UNTZ
officials oil the MipR execu c ommittees for each
ec helon of tile government along with judicial officials
and field commanders in the security senices. Some
senior UNTZ officials have definite misgivings about
the directive. they fear that such visible subordination
to the party hierarch%- w ill even tu a lly compromise
local labor leaders in the eves of ordinary workingmen.
Yet prospects for open resistance to Mobutu's dictates
have been minimal since I)ccember 1970. lie
made Bo-Boliko Lokonga, the former leader of the
UNTZ, president of the National Assembly. Bo-Boliko
has been more widely respected than any other Zairian
labor leader as a stalwart advocate of workingmen's
interests, which may have been it factor in Mobutu's
decision to hire him away frorn direct command of the
UNTZ. The present secretary general of the UNTZ.
Ferdinand Kikorigi, is a protege of Bo-Boliko but lacks
his personal influence. In fact. rivalries aniong senior
labor leaders became more a udible shortly after lie
assumed command, adversely affecting inorale
through the lo%% echelons.
7. Students
The university students have becil tile most vocal
critics of tile Mobutu regime. Their grievaticcs range
front those concerning conditions of academic life to
complaints�from it radical minority.�that tile
Mobutu regime is neocolonialist. ManN students
criu M policies as pro and too
m0de-,itc and resent the government's incompetence
and corruption. By and large, however. student
differences with the regime are not ideological. Tile%
main1v concern such university matters as increased
schola rship stipends and better living conditions.
Sonic 90' of tile students are dependent oil
government scholarships and can look forward
eventually to elite positions in tile civil service. The
majority tend to be vOnservative and prudent in their
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confrontations with the government. Mobutu has used
the carrot-and-stick treatment with the students,
forcibly putting down strikes, imprisoning leaders, arid
later granting amnesty and concessions.
The General Union of Congolese Students (UGEC),
%vitich was the principal student organivation in 1965.
at first gave cautions support to the Mobutu regime.
In November 1967, however, the UGEC organization
at Lovanium University, then the preeminent
institution of higher learning in Zaire, publZed it
manifest.o which attacked the regime as neocolonialist
In January 1968 the Lovanium UGEC, organized a
demonstration against the visit of U.S. Vice President
Humphrey. the president of the UGEC was
subsequently arrested arid the UGEC executive
committee dissolved. In 1968 and early 1969, there
were several student strikes aimed at securing better
food and living conditions.
In June 1969 a campus strike to protest the
government*s failure to produce a promised increase III
student monthly subsidies led to it stud 'i-rit
demonstration in Kinshasa. Police and arm,,- u:uts
forcibly intervened, killing at least a dozen stude I t s'
The deaths arid the temporary closing of Lov i
amurn
University prompted sympathy demonstrations at
Zaire's two smaller universities and several technical
schools. Mobutu responded by bringing to trial arid
giving stiff sentences to 31 students accused of
fomenting the demonstrations and by expelling
hundreds of others. He also banned all existing student
organizations except the Youth of the Popul ar
Movement of the Revolution (JM PR) and insisted that
all university students join the JMPR.
Mobutu later granted it liberal aninesty to allay
student disaffection and reinstated the' expelleil
students. JMPR elections in December 1969 generally
took place quietly, the students reacting witil
resignation and apathy. At the university in
Lubumbashi the elections had to be post ponedwvera I
times because of rivalries among various regional
factions. By early 1970 the student scene .%-its fairlN
quict, although a small group of outlawed UGEC
members was reportedly meeting clandestinely, and
there was considerable discontent simmering boneath
the surface,
Such was the apparent campus stalemate in June
1971, when most students at Lovaniurn Universitv
participated in a demonstration commemorating the
students who had been killed by troops in June 1969.
Although their demonstration was nonviolent. it was
staged independently of the JMPR leaders, and some
speeches, placards, and. leaflets implied disrespect for
Mobutu arid his recently deceased mother. Next day
Mobutu ordered the acting arm% commander and the
university rector to curtail further demonstrations:
students threw stones at the general's car arid held the
rector hostage; and Mobutu announced the induction
of all 1,ovanium students into the arm% for 2 years. fit
August, 10 former students were sentenced to life
imprisonment following a trial uhich scarce]v
substantiated Mobutu's initial charges of a serious plot
to overthrow him. Most student conscripts, however,
were returned to campus as soon as they completed
basic training and assigned to it special Militia which
keeps them tinder lenient military discipline with full
corporal's pay, whch is higher than their former
scholarships.
The net results of this confrontation were a sharp
reduction in student dissidence and renewed popular
respect for Mobutu's overall handling of the affair�a
shrewd [)lending of firmness with restraint. The
avoidance of another fatal clash similar to the tragedy
of 1969 was lurgely attributable to careful planning b"
sectirity authorities, manifested in the generally cool
conduct of police and troops during the crisis. The
subsequent reorganization of higher education, which
its occasioned by the Lovanium demonstrations, has
caused the transfer of social science students, who
have been relatively articulate politically, from the
Lovanitim camptis near Kinshasa to rernote
Lubuml-ashi. In late 1971 Mobutu also ordered JMPR
eao: ers to intensify their indoctrination efforts among
students, do%vn to the primary level. By late 1972,
most university students appeared to be adjusting to
the overall tightening of controls witb ruininial
resistance and some with positive interest in the
j M P R.
8. Religious organizations
Although less than half of the Zairian popidation is
estimated to he Christian, Christian chatches and
affiliated organizations in Zaire have considerable
political importance, largely because they are
providing vital services which the government is not
yet capable of replacing. As of 1970 roughly 80% of all
Zairian primary students and 50% of secondary
students were attending schools that were operated b.-
Catholic or Protestant organizations. Although the
government supports these schools financially, the
foreign-based sponsoring organizations provide
qualified teachers and other essential administrative
support. Lovanium University and the Free University
of the Congo at Kisarigaiii were originally sponsored,
respectively, by Belgian Catholics and American
Protestants, and the incorporation of both institutions
into Zaire National University has not entireiv
21
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eliminated their reliance on the original sponsors.
Christian missions also operate at least two of
all medical clinics in the coiintryside, providing
facilities and medicines that are often lacking at
government clinics.
Roughly 6 million Zairians are Catholic, 2 million
belong to some 70 international Protestant denomiria-
tions, and perhaps as many as 3 million belong to the
predominantiv Zairian Kimbanguist sect. Catholics
are dispersed fairly evenly across the country, but
Protestants are clustered in such a wav that certain
denominations exert a strong influence in particular
localities. Kimbanguism is predominant among
Kongo tribesmen and significantly influential
throughout Bas-Zaire Region and adjacent areas of
Congo (Brazzaville). As a result of the educational
activities of Christian religious bodies, Christian
cultural influences are more pervasive among
educated Zairians following modern professions than
among the general populace. Although the
Kimbariguists lack the foreign support afforded other
Christian bodies in Zaire, they have emulated tlicir
sponsorship of schools and clinics. In fact. the
spreading of Kimbanguism during the colonial era
despite the repressive measures of the Belgian
authorities exemplifies the potentialities of an African
religious movement for resistance to secular authority.
By 1972 the other Christian churches in Zaire were
becoming sufficiently Africanized to eventually evoke
comparable popular loyalty, although the% were still
receiving substantial material support from their
international affiliates.
Until 1971, Miobtitii's dealings with clergymen and
other leaders of churcli-sponsored organizations
reflected a pragmatic recognition that tolerance for
diverse religious groups brought material benefits and
generally stabilizing cultural influences to the Zairian
People which in turn tended to underpin his
government. The declaration of fundamental rights in
the 1967 constitution guarantees religious freedom,
arid Mobutu tisually has sought to depict himself as a
devout Catholic who was nonetheless appreciative of
the constructive role of Protestant missions. in fact,
ever since independence Mobutu has publicly
expressed his respect for Kimbanguism,'as have other
Zairian politicians who wished to ingratiate
themselves with Kongo tribesmen. This tolerant
approach has created a generally favorable attitude
toward the Mobutu government from most religious
leaders�Catholic. Protestant, and Kimbanguist.
In December 1971, however, the legislature�at
Mobutu's behest�passed a law to the effect that no
religious organization could conduct public worship or
22
other activiti-s in Zaire unless it met certain criteria.
Most important %%-ere the stipulations that the officers
of the organization must be Zairian citizens, that the
organization must ha-e at least $200,(X)O on deposit in
Zaire, arid that the founder must not be a "dissident"
priest or pastor. The only religious bodies to (pialify for
legal status b% April 1972 were the Catholic Church.
the Church of Christ of Zaire (ECZA), the
Kimbanguist Church. the Greek Orthodox Church,
the Islamic Communitv, and the Jewish Communitv.
l,cgal status was explicitiv denied to the Protestant
Council of Churches in Zaire (CEPZA), -a-hich
included over 30 internationally affiliated denomina-
tions which had refused to join the ECZA.
This outcome enables Mobutu to employ the ECZA
its an instrunicrit for controlling the activities of the
Protestant oiganizations in Zaire, but it appawntly has
also demoralize(] man% of the foreign missionaries who
opposed affiliation with EC.ZA, As the deadline for
registration under the new law approached, man%-
missionaries who objected to merging their missions
with ECZA prepared to leave Zaire. An exodus was
averted I)v belated assurances that even. denomina-
tion which affiliated .%ith ECZA could retain its own
legal personalit%.� As of late 1972 it remained
unclear whether the denorninations %%hich affiliated
with ECZA under duress could maintain sufficient
autonomv to meet the criteria of their foreign sponsors
for continued support.
Mobutu*s motivation for taking this stand remains
obscure. Official explanations for the new registration
law cite administrative problems w1flch compel the
government to stop the proliferation of schismatic
sects, which has become a serious problem. Hundreds
of new religious bodies have emerged since
independence and gained legal recognition under
previously lenient rules, which in turn has enabled
them to draw government subsidies for their schools.
The leaders of established religious bodies concede the
need for some accreditation standards. at least for
church-sponsored social services. in order to prevent
chaotic competition and abuse of subsidies. Mobutu's
insistence, however, that long-established Protestant
missions join the ECZA or withdraw suggests an
additional, essentially political motive�to depict
himself as champion of the Protestant organization
which has blended an ecumenical appeal with
repudiation of traditional ties with foreign-based
churches, some of which have indeed been slow to
replace foreign clergy or lay executives with Zairians.
Furthermore, Reverend jean Bokeleale, Secretan
General of the ECZA, is not only an ardent Zairian
nationalist, but a highly articulate admirer of
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Mobutu. Ilence Mobutu's eagerness to score an
immediate propaganda ploy and to enhance the
influence of a reliable advocate appears to take
priority over the eventuallyadverse effects of expelling
missienaries who have in fact provided a major
portion )f the schools aud medical services in eastern
Zaire, %%-here loc"l government services are relatively
ineffective.
Shortiv after the rigorous new criteria for official
sanctioning of religious bodies wa issued, Mobutu
became involved in his first serious conflict with the
Catholic hierarchy in Zaire. fit January 1972 Cardinal
Malula, the senior Zairian prelate. published it
pastoral letter denouncing Mobutu's recent call for
Zairians to adopt African persona; names instead of
Christian names of European origin, and also
implying that the glorification of Mobutu in official
publicity verged on idolatry. Mobutu's spokesmen
retorted with threats of prosecuting Malula for
subversion, but a direct clash was avoided by Malula's
acceptance of the Pope's invitation to visit Rome
shortly before Mobuta returned to Zaire from a
European vacation.
In March the Zairian Council of Bishops petitioned
MobutL to rescind various restrictions he had placed
on Catholic institutions during his altercation with
Maluia. This opportunity for quiet negotiation was
rebuffed with a harshly worded announcement from
the MPH Political Bureau that all Catholic seminaries
must accept JMFR units among their students or face
closure. The Catholic hierarchy responded by
accepting J M PH units in minor seminaries but closing
the major seminaries. In April, Mobutu resumed
negotiations with a delegation of four Zairian bishops,
and they finally agreed to a ccept JMPR units in the
major seminaries Nvith assurances that the JMPH
executive committees in each serninary would be
composed exclusively of seminarians and that the
JMPR would have no jurisdiction over religious
instruction. The bishops' acceptance of the Political
Bureau's ultimaturn was then apnotinced ,vith no
mention of Mobutu's concessions. Having won this
basic assertion of his authority, Mobutu announced in
May that lie had pardoned Maltila, w!io returned to
Kinshasa in J une and quietly resurned his f unctions as
archbishop.
The official puhlicity accompanying Mobutu's
confrontations with both Protestant and Catholic
leaders has accentuated nationalistic themes�
Mobutu's opposition to foreign domination of Zairian
Protestants and to the baptism of Zairian Catholic
children with European names. Yet the whole trend of
hisCOTIfrontation with flit Catholic hierarch,, suggvsts
th his strongest incentive for tightening his controls
over Protestant and Catholic institutions may be that
Africanization has proceeded far enough to make each
a genuinely popular organization, and therefore
po threatening, in Mobutu's eyes, to his
supreme authority.
9. Elections
All Zairians IS years of age orolder have the right to
vote. except members of the armed forces, the
National Gendarmerie, mental patients, and citizens
away front their normal voting place on election day.
In Mav 1972 the MPH National Congress passed a
resolution that military and police personnel should
have the right to vote in national elections, and the
National Iegislative Council is expected to pass
legislation to that effect during its next session. Voting
is mandator\ citizens who do not vote are subject to it
fine, The Voter marks his ballot in favor of, or opposed
to, a single list of National Legislative Council
candidates or a single presidential candidate.
Citizens of either sex o\ er 25 years of age are eligible
to he members of the legislature. Excepted categories
established by the April 1970 electoral ordinance are
criminals in jail more than once in the previous 5 years
or three times in the previous 10 ycars. persons who are
not active members of the MPR: persons not endorsed
b% the M PH Political Bureau; and persons who do not
pay the 100 zaire candidature fee. Also, members of
the armed forces, National Gendarnierie. arid civil
service must submit their resignations before standing
for election.
The most important part of the election process is
the selection of the lists of candidates. as only one
approved list for each electoral district is presented to
the electorate. Thi list is the slate of MPR candidates
for the National Legislative Council seats alloted to
the particular electoral district; there is onlv one
candidate for each seat. In preparation for national
legislative elections, local party units submit several
nominees for each seat to the Political Bureau. which
makes the final selection, For the legislative elections
of 1970, the Political Bureau sclected it final list of 420
candidates from some 2,500 nominees submitted by
local party units. Although the 1967 constitution
originally authorized two political parties, an
amendment passed in December 1970 states that the
MPH is the only legal party and gives final sanction to
previotis regulations which in effect preclude anyorst
from running as in independent candidate.
Precautions have been taken to downplay regional
sentiment in the legislature. Deputies do not represent
regions or even die election district in their hotne area.
2.3
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No member of the MPR Political Bureau is permitted
to lie on a list of candidates in his o.va native region.
fit an additional move to lessen regional ties, electoral
districts are not identified with the regional units but
consist of 12 cities and 24 subregions.
There have been only two genuinely contested
national elections in Zaire�in 1960 arid 1%.755.
Although some individuals�notabl Lumumba arid
Tshombe�developed important public foll
popularity at the polls has usually been less impo)rtant
than the ability to organize arid control politi
power at the top. The Zairians did not vote at all until
19,37 %%+.en the commune system established in
tire urban areas. Since most city dwellers tended to live
in areas foined on the basis of tribal affiliation and
voted accordingly, the commune leadership usually
represented the majority tribe it) its sector. When
national election \%ere held in 1960 and 196.5, this
tendency to vote along tribal lines was evident in the
country as a whole. In addition to tit(- tribal factor
elections also have been marked by the administrativC
breakdowns, corruption, and coercion th have
characterized other facets of politi lif
Although balloting fraud arid coercion to get oi t
the vote were the rode rather than the e\ception, there
is good evidence to suggest that the 1967 constitution
would have been approved by a majoritv of the voters
even if these methods had not been use(']. While most
of the voters had little or no understanding of th
provisions of the new constit they recognized
that the referendum was really an expression of
confidence fo,- the Mobutu regitne. On this basis a
majority�but one intich lower than the 92r
registered in tire referendum�probably wotild have
backed Nit )b tit u.
According to the ofik4., wturns for the 1970
presidential elections, Mobutu lw% o f (t vo
cast in all but two of the 24 electoral districts. where
some ballots were declared void. According to reliable
observers, however, officials presiding at th p
commonly issued oply the green cards, which signified
an affirmative vote, or employed various procedures
which prevented genuinely secret balloting. Ap-
parently the coercive tactics were somewhat relaxed at
the elections for National Assemblv candidates 2
weeks later, as it was announced that' the unopposed
siates of MPR candidates were approve(] by o
98.3% of the voteis. Nevertheless either a' verv'
intensive roundup of voters or extensive f ()'f
results intist have been employed to achieve a
nationwide ballot total of 9,K-5-,,517, which is 96.3% o f
the adult Zairian citizens tabulated it! the 1970 censtis.
24
D. National policies (S)
I. Domestic
In 1972, Mobutij was providing a greater measure
of political stability arid internal security than th
country had known since independence. Mobutif has
skillfully, albeit ruthlessly, imposed one-man rule, arid
through local government reforms and appeals to
nationalism lie has tried to replace the tribal an(]
regional loyalties with a sense of allegiance to the
central government arid the President. Although
government institutions at(- still fragile arid there are
persistent popular discontents arid frustrations, the
forceful expression of central authority has apparently
njet \%ith the appro of most Zairians.
In tire financial arid commercial areas. two goals of
tile Mobutu government have been to stabilize the
economy and, at the same time, change the nature of
Zaire's relationship with those foreign financial
interests�notabl\ Belgian�%vilich have dominated
the econorn\ since independence. A major step if) tile
direction of tit(- announced goal of economic
independence was natiomilization in 1967 of the
UMI4K�also known a s Union Miniere�the Belgian
copper arid cobalt mining operation in Shaba Region.
This action was followed b ti establislInjent of a
national insurance company arid by a break between
the operations of Air Zaire arid the Belgian Air Service.
Sabena. fit early 1968 expatriate technicians %%ere
invited back to rim key industries arid titilities. in 1969
air investment code designed to encourage foreign
investivient from a variety of countries was
promulgated. Mobiat, so realized that tio other
country could casily replace Beigitim and that the
ec0n0my and public services were being damage(] by
the absence of key Belgian technicians. At the sam
tinic, Mobutu has sought to offset Belgian influence
bv encouraging persons from other nations to open
businesses or provide professional services. in 1970,
Mobutu awarded a management contract for Air Zaire
to Pan American World Airways, which in effect
replaced the services originally provided by Sabena.
A long-term aim of the Mobutu government is to
further tire economic development of Zaire's potential
wealth. Little overall economic planning has been
done, however. in June 1967 the government
introduced a number of monetary and fiscal reforms
sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
intended to improve the long-range economic outlook.
These reforms. which involved a devaluation of the
currency arid sweeping tax reforms, \%!cre successful in
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slowing
the rate of price increase and generally
strengthening the government's financial position.
In agriculture, the government's aint has been to
raise agricultural production to preindependence
levels. President Mobutu designated 1968 as the year
of agficulture, and at all leve:s government authorities
appealed to farmers to increase output. The
campaign, plus the return of political stability and
peace to Zaire's rural areas. resulted in a comeback in
Some areas for agriculture, although cassava and
plantains, the primary food ca)ps for the rural
population, are estimated to be below the 19.39 levels
despite the substantial increase in the [x
Agricultural recovery, however, has been obstructed
by such a deterioration of local roads as to preverit the
marketing of cash crops throughout much of the
countryside. Moreover, the preindependence transpor-
tation network, which was designed to seve only the
plantation and mineral expvrt. trade, is not adequate
for present interregional marketing needs. Agriculture
is the most extreme instance of a generally uneven
pattern of economic recovery ay A development as a
result of infrastructural deficiencies. Since 1966.
lending agencies and major foreign aid donors have
given priority efforts to improve, modernize, and
extend all forms of transpo)rt. The government,
however, has allocated a disproportionate share of
resources to tiondevelopmental expenditures, such its
military hardware and prestige projects.
Zaire*s chronic economic problenis have become
sharply intensified as a result of the decline since early
1970 in world market prices for copper, Zaire I s
principal export product. The drop in copper (-"rnings
caused a loss in Zaire's net foreign assets from nearly
$250 million in early 1970 to around $218 million III
I)eceniber. In turn, it small surplus in the
government's budget in 1969 gave way to it $24
million deficit in 1970, arid the budgetary deficit for
1971 is estimated to be about $150 million.
Mobutu has responded with a series of belt-
tightening measures which show his determination to
prevent a spiraling budgetary deficit and monetary
inflation. These new stringencies, however, are apt to
place considerable strain on administrative discipline
in both civil arid military services, where the prevalent
practice is to rely on informal largesse to get
subordinates to do anything and to retain their
loyalty. If economizing measures are enforced, they
invvitablv will create morale problems in the arm%*
and appreciable increases in unemployment among
the most politically conscious element of the
population.
Mobutu's adoption since rnid-1971 of se%eral
measures to dramatize his authoritN and. through
intensified propaganda, to promote the cult of his
invincibility probably is evidence of his concern over
deepening economic problems and the related popular
malaise. Fir came a series of repressive measures
agaitv,t sundry known or suspected oppoments: the
drafting of university students in June 1971 for merely
impudent demonstrations; the arbitrar% explusion of
20 Communist diplomats in Jal% the subversion trials
in August of student demonstrators, a former guerrilla
leader, and an obscure pro-Communist group; the
explusion of sorne -30)0 west African **diamond
smugglers" in September; the arrest of two former
cabinet ministers for an alleged coup plot in October;
arid the crackdown on street crime in Kinshasa
throughout late 197 1. Next came Mobut u's campaign
for the adoption of "authentic" Zairian names. from
the sudden switch to Zaire as the official country title
in October to the passage in Januar% 1972 of it
Nationality Law which in effect prohibits Zairian
citizens from retaining foreign surnames. Cardinal
Maltila's &i.unciation of Mobutu's call for Zairian
children to be baptized -witb Zairian rather than
Christian narnes of European origin precipitated
Mobutu's fully publicized confrontation with the
Catholic hierarchy in Zaire, climaxed in April 1972 by
his installing committees of the partx's youth wing in
all Catholic seminaries.
Such propaganda ploys have been typical of
Mobutu's style of public relations since lie became
President. His preindependence experience its it
journalist impressed him with the potentialities of
publicity as it political weapon. and his official acts
usuall% have been calculated %%ith it %ic%% to
propaganda exploitation and inipa.-t on the Zairian
populace. Until 1971, however, Mobutu had rarch
pursued popular courses of action which lie considered
in serious conflict with his material interests. For
instance, his support of Angolan nationalists has never
been extended to the point of provoking damaging
Portuguese reprisals.
Since mid-1971, however, some of Mobutu's tactics
rnav have been counterproductive. His lashing out at
alleged public enemies has stimulated unfounded
rumors of imminent coups, creating it vague but
widespread sense of insecurity despite the limited
capabilities of known subversive elements. As for
Mobutu's confrontation with the Catholic hierarch\
the resulting concordat with the bishops, publicized as
it triumph for Mobutu, inw, discourage Zairians from
challenging Mobutu's supreme authority over any
popular institution. It is also likely to discourage
25
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further foreign support for the exterisive Catholic
social services in Zaire. This result would scarcely
resolve -Mobutu's underlying problem�his inability to
provide the decade of material and social progress
which he pmmised in his inaugural address following
the uncomested elections of 1970.
The maintenance of internal securit%, rather than
defense against foreign attack or invasion. is the
principal aim of Zaire's defense policies. With the
exception of the Portuguese troops in Angola, the
Zairian Army is potentially a good deal stronger than
the armies of Zaire's immediate neighbors.
Even within the country, most of the effective
fighting on behalf of the central government has I-een
done by foreign troops, such as the U.N. force in '960-
63 and the mercenaries recruited in Europe a!-d
southern Africa duriyjg the rebellion of 1964-673. With
the decline of the rebellion, the problem of
maintaining internal security showed signs of
diminishing to the point the armed forces could
cope with it. Mobutu therefore began in early 1967 to
phase (jut the mercenaries, whose presence inside the
counir% was an embarrassment to his regime. By earlv
summer of 1967 there were fewer than 200 mercenaries
left in the country, and it was these troops %vho
muth ocd on 5 J uly for a variety of reasons�a fear that
they would he disbanded without receiving their back
pay, anger over the kidnaping of Tshombe, and,
perhaps for some, a desire to overthrow Mobutu. The
armed forces, with logistical support from Ethiopia,
Ghana, and the United States, (-hipped away at rebel
strength until by November 1967 the rebels eventually
were forced across the border into Rwanda. There
have been no mercenaries in Zaire since November
1967.
2. Foreign
Mobutu's forays into foreigii affairs have been
erratic�particularl% in the area of African politics�
but the thrust of his foreign policy is essentially
moderate and Western oriented. Mobutu's foreign
policy is motivated pritnari by his manifold needs for
financial aid and technical a from
industrialized countries arid his fear of foreign support
for Zairian dissidents. Most of the vital foreign aid for
Zaire has come from Belgium, the United States. and
other Western states. while the Soviet Union, China,
and other Communist states have provided only
intermittent aid to his government arid, in some
instances, encouragement to various dissident groups.
Nevertheless, Mobutu has espoused a policy of
nonalignment and rhetorically played dovn his
reliance on Western states in order to maintain his
stature in African nationali.A.
26
a. Relations uith African states
The overall pattern of Mobutu's relations with other
African leaders reflects his primary concern for Zaire's
exposed location, surrounded by eight independent
states and Portuguese Angola. He has taken a more
active role in the Orr
g anization of African Unity
(OAU) than any of his predece,sors and has made
gestures to dramatize Zaire's so!idarity with southern
Affican nationalist movements. For instance, Zaire
provides sanctuary for Holden Roberto's Angolan
Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) and for
its guerrilla army. (In June 1972, President Mobutu
and Congolese President Ngouabi arranged a
.1 reconciliation in principle" between GRAE arid its
stronger rival, the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola.) By repudiating formcr Prime
Minister T '*neof-vlonialism," Mobutu has
been able to inducc most of the surrounding
independent governmeats to curtail support for
Zairian refugee rehels. When Mobutu declared an
arrinesty for former reLels in December 1970. most of
the neighboring governments cooperated with Zairian
embassies ir, efforts to persuade the remaining refugees
to return home.
The outstanding exception to Mobutu's warily
bland relations with leaders of neighboring states is his
extreme sensitivity�and erratic reaction�to the
threat of subversion from Brazzaville, directly across
the Congo River from Kinshasa. Since the earl% 1%.'O's
leading opponents of the Kinshasa government have
taken refuge in Brazzaville, and Communist envoys to
Congo have not only aided refugee rebels but
cultivated Zairian students and other dissidents. who
can readily visit Kinshasa as long as normal
communications are maintained. ironi Mobutu's
standpoint, this situation has been barcl% tolerable
since September 1968, Major Ngouabi emerged
its the shaky leader of an army-leffist Congo
Government which has been particularly receptive to
Chinese support. Relations between the Zaire and
Congo Governments were severed in October 1968
following the execution of Zairian rebel leader Pierre
Mulele, who had been residing in Congo and had
been returned to Zaire under a guarantee of amnesty.
In June 1970, after two anti-Ngouabi coups having
transparent backing from Kinshasa had failed,
Mobutu arid Ngouabi signed a declaration of
reconciliation and resumed normal communications.
Their respective embassies were reopened in the
following December, but Mobutu expelled Ngouabi's
envoys in August 1971, following Radio Kinshasa's
highly exaggerated accounts of their subversive
activi
ties. In February 1972, Mobutu congratulate(]
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Ngoriabi for crushing a leftist comp, but this return to
cordial relations apparentl% has mere]y lessened
Mobutu's abiding pre(wevpation with the Brazzaville
MeHaCe.
Mobutu has got along relatively well with the
Portuguese authorities in Angola, as significant
material interests have compelled mutual accom-
modations. The ?ortuguese authorities have reacted to
GRAE guerrilla thrusts from Zairian territory by
repeatedly blocking copper shipments ori the rail line
from Shaba Region to the Angolan seaport at
Benguela. Mobutu, in turn. has veered toward
unpublicized collaboratior. with Portuguese air-
thorities, arid Brazzaville's vaunted aid for GRAE
guerrillas has been offset by obstructions of their
border-crossing operations. In March 1970, two
Portuguese representatives were accepted in Kinshasa
with the proviso that they be located in the Spanish
Embassy ard conduct themselves unobtrusively. In
addition to their mutual interest in maintaining the
flow of Zairiai, copper through Benguela, Mobutu
and the Portuguese are anxious to stabilize their
extensive land frontier between Zaire arid Angola. In
fact, Zairian and Portuguese security officials have
been quietly cooperating on various measures since
early 1969 to reduce tensions caused by the presence of
about 370,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire and several
thousand former Katangan (Shaban) gendarmes in
Angola. For instance. the Zaire-Angola horder was
reopened for normal trade at several points a full year
before the reopening of a Portuguese mission if)
kinshasa.
Mingled with Mobutu's primary concern for Zaire's
ecuritN is a personal ambition to achieve recognition
as an interinational leader, and this aspiration has
occasionally distorted his pragmatic regard for
inaterial interests. In early 1968 Mobutu drew Chad
and the Central African Republic into a mini-common
market, apparently to challenge France's economic
predominance in central Africa. His persistent efforts
to forge economic links with Burundi and Rwanda
have been at least partially motivated by a desire to
supplant Belgian influence, although neither venture
has produced solid links. Mobutu withdrew from the
French -sport sored Afro-Malagasy Common Market in
April 1972 am,dst rhetorical assertion% of Zaire's
destiny to bridge the remaining neocoionial barriers
between its French- and English-spea king neighbors.
In May 1972, Mobutu sent a Zairian paratroop unit
arid two jet fighter planes to Burundi in respomse to
President Micombero's plea for help against a Htitu
tribal revolt. Apparently, Mobutu was primarily
concerned with maintaining his personal influence
with jklicombero, arid the Zairian paratroopers merely
performed guard duts.- in the capital, while the aircraft
were used for reconn aissance. Iater, when the extent
of Tutsi aprisals against the Hidu retwl% became
obvious, Mobutu stopped suppli ing M if -ombern with
amm"nition.
b. Relations tath Western nations and the U.N.
Belgium remains the major foreign presenci- in
Zaire, although the relationship has fluctuated greatly
during the years since independcii(-v. The two
countries will probably never again be as close as they
were, and certain issues�such as connpensation for
Belgian losses during the early poistindependence
years�remaii, unresolved. However, both countries
aDpear to realiz that it is in their mutual interest to
stay on good terms. Since Zaire's independence,
Belgium has maintained a higher level of offivial
bilateral aid programs than any other countr%�
roughly &534 million during I %WO-68, compared with
$420 million from the United States and $16 inillioto
from West Germany.
Mobutu's fling at economic independence frorn
Belgium began in mid-19b6 and culminated in the
seizure of UMHK mining assets in January 1%.7.
Mobutu had hoped to destroy UMHK's position�
part real and part fancied�as a political force in Zaire
arid prove his position as an African nationalist. When
lie created a Zairian company, the General Congolese
Ore Co. (GIECOMINES)�now General Quarries and
Mine. Company of Zaire (GECAMINES)�to run tire
mines, the UMHK in retaliation blocked the sale of
Zairian copper by threatening prospective purchasers
with legal action and withheld pa\nients to the
Zairians on the copper then in the pipeline. In
February 196 art agreement was finalb. reached
between the Zaire Government arid the General Ore
Co. (SGM). an associate company of UMHK, twder
which SGM would mine arid market minerals
produced by GECOMINES tinder a contract. The
broader issues in the dispute, such as UMHK's claims
for compensation, were not settled until late 1969 on
terms which a Belgian spokesman called most
generous.
Belgium. for its part, undertook a gradtial
disengagement from its former colony. The trend took
on added momentum following racia I incidents which
accompanied the mercenaries' mutiny of July 1967.
Some 10,000 Belgian% left Zaire at that time, and
Belgian aid programs were reorganized to focus on
program assistance avd purely technical tasks, notably
education. In addition, echnical assistance teanis in
man\ parts of the country were withdrawn, but
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Mobutu's poliey in early 1968 of encouraging
foreigners to stay on sternmed the flow. Foreign
experts were reinstated in the management of mining,
transport, power, and tile public utilities, and Belgian
teachers, who had not been allowed entry (luring the
mercenary crisis, returned to Zaire. Relations improved
steadily. Mobutu's visit as head of statc to Belgium in
November !969 toppod off a series of exchange visits
by high-level officials, and King Baudouin visited
Zaire in mid-1970. There are now some 40,0(X)
Belgians in Zaire, compared to more than 90,000 Lit
independence and as few as I0,(X)0 ill 1967.
As of late 1972, official relations between Brussels
and Kinshasa were still firm and effective despite
Mobutu's continued use of Belgian groups in Zaire as
prime targets for monetary shakedowns or psychologi-
cal coups. For instance, in March 1971 it Zairian
appelate court upheld charges that several Belgian
executives Of SOCOball(ILle, all internationally financed
corporation, had helped some Zairian nationals evade
paying taxes. Prison sentences were imposed on two
Belgian executives, while Socobanque, w1iich include(]
Belgian shareholders, was in effect nationalized by
imposing a ruinotis fine of $4.9 million dolla
Neverthuless, 3 months later Brussels quietly agreed to
provide $1 million a year in pensions to Zairian
veterans of the colonial Force Publique and also to
assume Some $125 million of Zaire's foreign debts.
'rhe debts were owed mostly to Belgian ti.1tioll
which suggests the underlying and usually efficacious
rationale of Mobutu's double-edged approach to tile
Belgian Ili March 1972 the Belgian
Foreign Minister visited Kinshasa to discuss s u c h
matters its it new Zairian property law ostensibly
airned at Belgian absentee landowners. tit*.
involvement of Belgian priests in Mobutu's
confrontation with tile Catholic hierarchy, unfavorab-
le Belgian press coverage of Mobutu's offici actions,
and the failure of Belgian authorities to stop Zairian
students in Brussels from openly criticizing Mobutu.
Tile most tangible results of tit( Belgian Foreign
Minister's visit were sonic $25 million in lie%% tecluji
assistance programs and liberalized credit ternis for
Zairian purchases of Belgian goods. It also agreed
to hold regular consultations tit tile foreign ministers'
level in order to resolve future problems before thvy
became critical.
The Uidted States has been deeply involved in Zaire
through its political arid financial support of the U.N.
military and civilian operations ill tile early 1960'sand
through its bilateral program of technical, militarv,
and economic assistance, The United States hi
extended over $650 million in various forms of aid in(]
support to Zairy sinco 1960. Ill line with the improved
28
political, economic, and security situation, the United
States in FY70 shifted to development loans and to
P. L. 480 programs making U.S. surplus commodities
available oil casy terms. For FY72, the total value of
all U.S. bilateral aid pr(;,;ra.ns for Zaire, including
military, was roughly $5 million in grants or excess
stock and $5 millioa in loans. 'i and
agriculture have the highest priority under tit(-
program emphasizing development.
Zaire's relationship with the United Nations has
been complex and varied. File most drarnatic
development was the U.N. military presence and
operations front Jillv 1960 to June 1964. Less
draniatic. but equally important, was [lie U.N.
vivilian aid program, which %%-,Is still in operation in
1972. Ili the first days of this prograin, personnel
recruited b% the United Nations filled almost ;ill the
crucial positions in the judicial system and in the fields
of medicine, transportation, communications,
education, and government administration. The I 1 N.
personnel were it major factor in staving off total
collapse in the earl cliaotic daNs of indepe As
other countries increased their bilateral assistance and
qualified Zairian replacements were trained, the
munber of U.N. advisers decreased. The United
Nations sponsors it greatly reduced aid pr ,rani
involving about $5 million annually.
'I'll( arnied forces continue to depend oil technic
mid administrative support front Belgium, the United
Kingdom, Ital Israel, and the U it i t es i ll l a t e
1971 there Were about 250 Belgian militar% advisers
stationed iii various parts of the country. There were
also nine Israeli military technicians, who have trained
Illost of tit( Zairian paratroopers, and nine British
military advisers- with the arm%-. Ali Italian military
assistai
ice program conducts pilot trahiing for the air
force, which is it c o f ti arilly Ili july 1972
this program ilIVOINT(I Some 80 Itilli,11) pilots MR1 other
technicians ill Zaire, while 70 Zairians were receiving
advanced flight and other training in Ital 'I'l U.S.
military assistance program has emph training
it'. com In unications, administrati011, alid logistics. The
United States provided materiel aillounting to $29.1
oil it grant basis front 1963 to 197 1. Although the U. S.
grant aid program had been phased o by mid-1972,
military loans wvre continui a t a rate Of roughly $2
likillioll it year.
c. Relations with Communist countries
Zaire's relations with tile Soviet Union are marked
bv it nititual wariness, Soviet representatives were
expelled front Zaire in 1960 and again in 1963 because
Moscow supported elvinen(s which oppo ti
central government. Since 1)vcembvr 1967, when
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Mobutu agreed to resume normal diplomatic
relations, Soviet envoys in Kinshasa have had their lips
and downs. Although a regularly assigned TASS
corresrx)ndent and occasional good-will tours of Soviet
athletes and artists have been welcomed, Mobutu has
never allowed a Soviet cultural center or accepted
Soviet offers of technical assistance which would iesult
in the employment of Soviet personnel in Zaire for
extended periods or would require Zairians to go the
Soviet Union for training. In early 1970 four Soviet
Embassy aides and the TASS correspondent were
expelled amid local press accounts of their
proselytizing activities among Zairian government
employees. Injuly 1971, 20diplomatsfroin Sovietand
other Communist embassies were expelled in
retaliation for their o9eged complicity in the
demonstrations at Lovan'tim UniversitY.
In January 1972, however, evidence of a UeW
cordiality began Nvith ill invitation for I Soviet
parliamentary delegation to visit Zaire and meet with
Zairian legislatois. In March, Mobutu held a %videly
publicized luncheon with the Soviet ambassador. his
warmest gesture towar it Soviet envoy since becoining
President. Anuouncements followed that I Soviet
delegation would attend tile MPH congress in May
and that Foreign Minister Groniyko would visit Zairt
in July. 1 the Groinyko visit has been
continually postponed, and in late 197 there was no
indication that Mobutu seriously intended to accept
substantial aid from the Soviet Union or to relax his
vigilance against potential Soviet subversion in Zaire.
Rather. the whole pattern Suggests that Mobutu is
using his public dealings With tilt' SoVitltF as
propaganda, priniarily to impress others�to
show Zairian dissideuts that they do not havv (lie full
support of their foreign backers or to Show his
international andictive his doteriviination to maintain
a nonaligned Stan(-( despite priniarN &-pendenev oil
tliv West for inaterial support.
In Nov( 1972, Kinshasa atilloullCed that Zaire
and tile People's Republic of Chilla had decided to
exchange ambassadors socu, and h) January 1973
Mobutu visited Peking. During the visit he signed I
tradv pact in(] in agreement for technical and
economic cooperation. Apparently. Mobutu took
these steps to maintain Zaire's m;lIaligned posiHoll
and to enhance his ieputation as a leading A,'rican
tatvsnian. There %%-its Ito hidication that Mobu(ii
intended it) allow Peking to establish in extvitsive
presenev in Zaire.
[it addition to the Soviet Union, five odwr
Communist countries havv diploniatic inissious ill
Kinshasa: Poland, Yiigoslavia, Bulgaria, Hoinania,
and Czechoslovakia. Most of them have modest
commercial and cultural agreements with Zaire, but
their influence is negligible t with th"t of the
non-Communist countries. Mobutu's dealings -vitil
these states have roughly paralleled his tactical Iine
with the Soviet Union. Ile has tended to show some
partiality for Yugoslavia and Romania, and It( visited
their capitais in August 1970. following his first State
visit to the United States. Nevertheless, Yugoslav and
Holliallian diplomats wete include(] ()it the blacklist of
"Communist provocateurs" twelled in Jill%- 1971.
Zaire's relations with Bulgaria were stispentiod ill
August 1969 following student demonstrations ii)
Kinshosa; Mobutu accused the Bulgarian cousul (if
helping students hivolved in the dvinonstration to
escape to Bulgaria. Ill August 1970 the Zaire
Government announced its decision to resunic
diplomatic relations with Bulgaria.
E. Threats to government stability (S)
1. Discontent and dissidence
The foremost impression derived front I review of
tile potentialities for subversion ill Zaire is tiv. contrast
betwvvii the almost complOv absence of' articulate
opposition to the Mobutu govvrninviii and tile
pr(walenev of underlying nialaisv. Mobutti has
a (I roi t Iy twtitralizvd all orga I I i zat ioi is having an
intrinsic capability of ovvrthrowing his one-man rtile.
but he has done rviatively littIv to rvined% advvrsv
economic conditions which appear to N worsening
Zaire's chronic social tensions. III fact, the tactics
which have vfft neutralized resistaiict- to his
supreme authorit\ also havv stunted thv growth of
constructive capabilities throughout tile govvrullivilt
ai)d other institutions that are vital for m-otionfic and
social progress.
Becaust Mobutu has given mory attention io
entrenching his personal influence than building an
effective command structure. the worst threats to the
viability of the Zairt Republic appear too be Mobutu's
incapacitation or death through illness, accident, or
;ISSItsSination. Although it is unlikely that in\
I) resen t I y ide it I i fia b It o I )poi iv it I s wi I I challeng(I
MoDutu as long is Ill remains ill good health, his
persistent undercutting of potential rivals also makes
unlikely that ill\ foreseeable successor could silliply
take over the tangled rvins of his administration and
maintain comparable control.
Although Zzliriaus still vividly recall their long
history of hit(Aribal strife, (be population is divided
into so many tribal groups Gi.0 traditional Mimic
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animosities tend to prevent the emergence of a
cohesive revolutionary movement as much as they
impede the development of a strong national state,
The most important single source of social tensions
since tho ebbing of the peasant uprisings of 1%,4-65 is
the massive influx of peasants into Zaire s principal
urban areas. Ironically tile mingling of people from
diverse tribal backgrounds in government offices,
industrial shops, and urban shantytowns has usually
intensified traditional animosities, but the resulting
tensions in work situations and occasional inter-
neighborhood riots are not likely to produce or sustain
all effective urban revolt. Nevertheless, the continual
rural-urban niigratioi, reflects the government's failure
to stimulate sufficient agricultural expansion to
support the growing rurai population. More important
politically is the fail(ire of tile typical urban newcomer
to fulfill his niaterial desires, because industrialization
has lagged far behind urbunization in creating new
jobs and because housing and social services are
extremely inadequate.
Within most urban areaS, unemployment is the
prime cause of severe privation for a large portion of
tile populace. jot) hunger is potentially exploitable bN
any dernagog who dares raise his vo e, because ti
ic C
local historical context bas conditioned Zairians to
regard the government its the prime source of
ernPlovilic"t and to blunie those in authority for
failing to provide a desired jot). Belgian patvnialism
inculcatcd this attitude during the colonial cra, and it
has been reinforced since independence by ill(.
swehing of tit( government payroll to a point where
almost half of all regular wage e.arners are employed
by govertinterit agencies.
Furthermore, many skilled indirstrial jobs are
unattainable for Zairians and are held by foreigners;
technical iraiiiing is the weakest link in tile Zairian
educational system. Mobutu has exploited this
grievance to the extent of making unrealistic promises
to provide many jobs for Zairians by expelling aliens.
This propaganda Iiiie, cotipled with tile prevalent
i net i na t ion of Zairian officials to favor fellow
tribesmen ill hiring and firing. encourages popular
inferen(ws that anyone who is jobless nust Ile tile
victim of ethnic discrimination and that such
grievances might be redressed through a revolt. Mally
of tile presetit urban inhabitaWs are chronically
unemployed and may be hitired to their plight, hid
currently advvow financial trends confrotit Mobutu
with tile need for severely pruning the government
payroll, thus risking criticism aniong k highly
articulate part of the population.
30
Mobutu's primary claim oil tit(- loyalty of the urban
wage arners�that by 1971 lie had reversed a 10-year
rise in their cost of living�may be canceled if there is
a sharp decline in the real value of wages as a result of
monetary inflation. The subst statutory wage
increases in 1970 and 1971 have only partially offset
all overall decline since independence ill living
conditions for ordinary urban wage earnem. Lower
echelon government employees have repvatedly
suffered long dclays in being paid as a result of chl'0111c
administrative snarls or malfeasance oil tit(- part of
their superior%. Although schools, niedical facilities.
arld other social services are c0ncentr.ited in urban
areas, the% are inadequate for ill(- rapidl%l expanding
urban population, and sanitary housing is particularly
limited. Although urban wage earnem comprise a
fortiniate ininority by comparison with tile urball
unemployed and rural populace. ordinary wagv
earners feel aggrieved by conspicuous gaps between
their lot and that of high-level government officials
who flaunt luxuries derived froin Mobutu's infornial
largesse, Generally poor morale aniong lower echelon
government employees is suggested by the fairl%
common occurrence of wildcat strikes for short periods
in particular offices or shops.
The grcat majority of Zairians are peasants whose
overall material condition is still appreciably worse
than it was during tile laSt decade of tit( colonial era.
In 1959 a large portion of the rural population was
getting some cash invoine front a highly prodtictivv
system of commercial agriculture. Although most
peasants contioued to practice subsistence agriculture
oil their tribal lands, tit( lielgialls ellabletl th a t
grow and sell cash crops through VffVCti%'V 10Cal
administrative support and a transportatiori system
which linked inost of tit( cotnitryside river and
r,-'Iil routes to foreigii markets. Much of t1lis
infrastructure collapsed during the (-,trl% IWW's, and
by 1972 production of cash crops was invrely
.pproaching the level of 1959, although the ritral
population had increased by roughly a third. The net
result for most peasants has J)evii chronic un-
deremployinent and denial of a number of amenities
prvviously gained. Furthermore, previously rudinien-
tary but generally available social services, such its
local niedical clinies, have deteriorated or ceased in
lilost localities.
Material recovery has [)evil vspecialiv slow ill tile
sectors of ewstern Zaire which Nvery overrun by tit(
Sirnba revolt in 1964�sectors that could never be
coulpletely closed to subversive ;nfiltrations front
Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, or Uganda. Although
tile walling of tile Siniba revoll shows diat a peasant
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uprising ill this area cannot congeal into a solid
secessionist regime Without substantial foreign
support. it has also become evident that minimal
foreign suppt)rt call sustain diehard guerrilla remnants
indefinitely. Ill mid-1972, at least 4 years after the
cessation of regular support for the Simba remnants,
nine Zairian army battalions %vere still chasing small
guerrilla hands and disturbing thousands of peasants
in the Mountainous terrain near Lake Tanganyika.
Because local administration is harely adequate to
meet the basic needs even of those settled in their
tribal homelands, any influx of refugees frorn adjacent
wuntries could have a seriously disruptive impact oil
the Zairian inhabitants of frontier zones. Hence ti
ever-present possibilit of large-scale peasant
migrations across Zaire's nine international borders
MaN' constit"te as serious a threat to internal stabilitv
as the possibilit of infiltration by foreign-ba,-d'
opponents of the Zaire Government. As of late 197 2, at
least .5(X),(XX) refugees from adjacent countries were
living in Zaire's frontier zones, including roughly
400,M) Angol 5(),(XX) Sudanese. 25JX)0 Burtuidi-
ans. and 24.(XX) Rwandans. it i s i gn ifi can t tilat fairly
severe tensions b e t %veell these refugees a nd loca I
i nhabi till, ts have occurred front time to ti h
serious disturbances have not ensued. primarily
because of favorable factors that art largely beyolj(
the control of Zairian authorities. For insL the
Angolan refugees 1 j ve g a fairlv well with
local Zairian peaswits because they are fellow Kougo
tribesmen, while Zairian authorities have relied
primaril% oil a U.N. agency to niove some of the
Sudanese rvfug
g ees awav from froutier sectors where
they were most troubles011ie.
On the Whole, prospects appeared poor in late 1972
for alleviating withi th 11ext few years the adverse
vc0nomic and social conditions which had bred unrest
111110 Most elements of the Zairian population s
hidepriulence. Nevertbf-less Mobutu h succee
not 0 AY ill stifling overt opposition b ,I i
reducing known subversive organizations t n
proportions. Presumably, therefore, the presently
muffled tensions aud grievances are more likviv to be
expressed through existing populai organizatiol I is th
Mobutu has sponsored thall to suddenly emerge as
newly formed subversive movements. are no
indications that aHY elements of these organizations�
tl I MIMI, its youth wing, or the national labor uniou
(UNTM�will offer serious resistance to Mol)tlttl as
10lig as he ulaintahis his present vigor, 11lis controls,
however, art- so essen till 11 personal as to niake it
appear dubious that anv o f these organizations c
effectively stifle or restrain urbau or rural dissidellee
following Mobutu's sudden death or incapacitation.
Hence the survival of Zaire as a unitary national state
may hinge oil how each of these popular organiza-
tions, as well as the arm% react to the resurgence of
centrifugal forces that probably will enslie from
Mobutu's demise.
It is significant that university students have been
Mobutu's most articulate critics. The fatal cl
between IA)VaniUlll University students and troops in
)line 1969, and the ensuing sympathy demonstrations
oil other campuse was the most impressive show o f
civilian discontent since Nlobutu assumed power in
1965. The memorial demonstrations at Lovanium ill
June 1971, despite the banning of independent
student unions and mandatory enrollment of a ll
students ill the JIMPR in late 1969, sbow that student
po"'Intia I i ties for spontaneous protests are indeed
rrepressible. Although the i o f 1, ovall i lill
students into t1w arm% in June 1971 had i n
immediately sobering effe ti su
reorganization of l e i list i tut i olls h
-it least temporarily delayed the genuine strengthening
of illadequate facilities resulting from rapid vxpan-on
of higher educatio The net result appear% to be a
quiet dernoralization of soule 10 ,M) postsecondary
s t Udellts. I I Nice sonle possibilities remain tilil
spontaneous student protests inay gain support from
lower echelon UNTC leaders or spark urban riots,
particularly in Ki lls h asa an d l, ti b uill b as i l i, if
economic conditions wors s i gil ifi can tl y
2. Suhversion
1 "or lll of the decade silice independence. Zaire
has been unstable. The authoritN of the central
government over its more than 22 million people and
9050X) square miles of territory has been tellu
and large parts of (lie coui)try have been totallv
outside the government's control for long periods. In
late 1962 and 1963 the central government, with
substantial help from the United Nations, ended the
2-year secessions of Katanga and eastern Kasai
PlOvinces. two of the country's richest areas. only to be
faced ill 1964 %vith it rebellion in eastern Zaire wh at
its peak in the fall (if' 1964 denied the central
government control over about one-third of its
territory. Although this insurgency and a smaller one
in western Zaire were for (lie most part Contained bN
the end of 1465, further instabilitv Nvas generated by I'l
brief mutin in inid-1966 of former Katang all
gendarmes who had been taken into the Zairian Arniv
and bY a lutitinY of some 150 white mercenaries ni
mid- 1967.
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Since late 1967, whert the rebel mercenary hand
withdrew to Rwanda to await evacuation to Europe,
Zaire has suffered no major outhreaks of violence, and
political stability has prevailed. In remote areas
scattered bands of rel and brigands cx)ntinue to
forage, but they avoid contact with ariny units and are
primaril% concerned with simple survival. Aside from
guerrilla remnants. as of late 1972 there were no
known organized groups within Zaire that were openly
opposing the Mobutu government or actively :;eeking
to overthrow it. Presumably there were some covert
oppositionists in Zaire who were still in contact with
sniall groups of anti-Mobutu emigrees or receiving
cautious encouragement front Communist embassies
in Kinshasa or Brazzaville, just across the Congo River.
Since the reduction of orgauized subversive activities
to it negligible level is largely the result of Mobutu's
personal leadership, it might prove to be it inere
interlude in the event of his early demise, before vital
national institutions firm ill) and attain intrinsic
durability.
The greatest internal threat to the government since
the end of the Katanga secession in earl% 1963 the
outbreak of insurgency in late 1963 and early 1964 in
old Kwilu Province (no%%- part (it Bandundu Region)
and in northeastern Zaire. The leader of the K%vilu
revolt, herre Mulelv, %%-its it rtwolutionary who had
received Chinese training and Nvlio was, to sonle
xtent, ideol0giCallN motivated. For most of his
followers, however, tribal discontent, dissatisfaction
Mth the central government, and personal anibitions
were inore important than ideology. The Mulele
forces, compowd mainly of Bapende and Babinida
tribal elentents, %vry initially successful against Ow
government troops,\ but when the traditional tribal
boundaries of th0 Bapvnde and Babunda Nvere
reached, the retwilion lost steam and Mulelt was
forced to retreat,
Mulele x%as exectiWd in October 1968. and by 1970
the rebellion was reduced to scat(ered pockets of
poorly arined rebels. As of latv 1972, the sinall
guerrilla bands rvinaining in central Bandundu
Region appeared to be cut off froin foreign channels of
supply, preoccupied with tit( problems of survival in a
difficult physical environment. and engaged
principally in handitry.
The rebellion ill the north and vas(--the so-called
Simba whellion�differed from tit( Mulele revolt in
that the political leaders of the rebellion did not
actually fonient the revolt but, instead, exploitedlMal
Conflicts and discontent alreadv in existence.
MSSatkfaCtif)n with t he central 1111d pt`00116111
governments, cotipled with ii-alotisy (if apparent
'12
government favoritism for rival tribal groups,
prompted members of several etlinie groups,
particularly the Bakusu, Batetela, Basonge. and
Baftilero, to revolt in early Mit The success of the
rebels attracted the attention of the National
Liberation COMIllittee, a group of Zairian dissidents
formed in late 1963. The ambitious politicians in the
National Liberation Committee soon usurped the
leadership of the rebellion an(] established their own
government" at Kisangani with Christophe Cbenyv
as president, The fanaticism of tit(- rebel troops, who
were indoctrinated by witch doctors to believe in their
()%%'It invincibility. plus the complete collapse of most
army iinits in the area, led to t he rapid advance of the
rebel units.
Realizing the obvious deficiencies of the Zairian
troops, Premier Tshonibe imported whitc niet
to assurne the main burden of coping with tit(- rebels.
By September 1964 the rebellion had reached its
military peak, and the government f0rCCS 1)('g;kll
retaking rebel-held territory. lit November 1964,
confronted by increasing evidence of rebel brutality to
European hostages in the northeast, Belgian
paratroopers transported by U.S. aircraft dropped oil
the rebel capital of Stanleyville (no%% KiSaugani) MId
laier on Patilis (now Isiro). Faced with dvfeat. the
leaders of the Stanleyville rebel regime fled front Zaire.
Nevertheless tit( Sinibas�the pt-asant guerrillas
who had started the rcN'olt kild coinprised its real
drivitig forcv throughout�continued such sttibborn
resistance that a ftill year was required for Zairian
troops and svxeral white inervenary units to (-fear thein
froin the vast sectors of eastern and northeastern Zaire
which thvv held aftvr losing Staulevvillv By the end of
1965 the Jiehard Simba reninants had witfidrawn to it
reiath vly sinall sector facing the northwestern coast of
I iake Tanganyika, where the combination of' rugged
terrain, hadl% deteriorated roads, and the infiltrating
of supplies front Tanzania and Burtindi enabled thein
to hold off government forces. Meanwhile almost
IMOK) Zairian peasants who had been inore or less
responsive to Siniba leaders, or had bevii swept along
between retreating Sinihas and advancing governinvilt
forces, took refuge in Uganda, Burundi. Central
African Republic. Sudan. and Tanzaiiia.
Consequently the I) ri ine subversion threat
Confronting Mobutu whell he assumed power Nvas that
fowign aid to diehard Sin band- aniong Zairian
refugees in neighboring (imatries inight enabit flivin
to return to Zaire in sufficient strength to mount it
counteroffensive. By 1970 this threat had been
reduced to itegligible proportions through Mobutu's
inultifaceted strategy of exerthig perssistent military
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pressure against active guerrillas, making repeated
offers of amnesty to those who tumed themselves in,
and inducing neightmring governments to restrain
Simba activities among Zairian refugees, to interdict
Communist aid to Simbas. and to facilitate voluntary
repatriation of Zairian refugees, The failure of a
"Revolutionary Front" to disrupt Zairian national
elections in late 1970 discredited the few guerrilla
leaders in eastern Zaire who still asserted ideohigic,il
nlo' in contrast with the bulk of Simba
renina-ts who had settled do to subsistence b\
banditry. in late 1972, small guerrilla bands north.%v.4
of Lake Tanganyika were still evading capture and
scoring occasional minor strikes against pursuing
troops despite the discontinuance of substantial
external stipport.
The specter of a significant anti-IMobutil movement
among Zairian emigrees was finally dispelled by
Mobutu's highly publicized amnesty offer in
December 1970. This induced the return within a fc\%
inoriths of two of the three principal leaders of the
short-lived Stanleyville rebel regime�"President"
Christophe Cbenye and "General" Nicholas Olenga�
its well its a dozen or so former politicians of lesser
prominence. Although ii)ade(jitate administrative
M
suptx)rt limited the return of ordinary Zairian reftigees
to no more than several thousatid, the overall
psychological impact of the amnesty offer has
dis(,xmraged further efforts oil the part of Communists
or African radicals to mobilize Zairian refugees agaiiist
the Mobtitu government. fit August 1971, Olenga and
other former rebels were accused of starting a lie%%
revolutionary movement, abetted by Congo President
Ngouabi's envoys, The televised trial. however, was so
lacking ill evidence of concrete subversive actions or
tangible foreign aid as to leave foreign observers
Wondering whether Mobittu had resorted to loose
accusations ill order to discotirage Zairians front
contact with foreign envoys. or to inollifyarmy officers
who res his aninesty for it notorious guerrilla
leader.
Foreign Communist activities have not had
significant results ill Zaire since the Simba revolt
fizzled out. Soviet and other Communist embassies in
Kinshasa have niet Mobutu's vigilance with w 1 ji t
appears to be it long-range strategy�cmitiously
CliltiVUtil Zairian officials. students, atid others who
May eVC`ntkla11%' bVC0111C p0litiCall% CXIA0itablV in the
evelit of Mobutu's dernisv or loss of power. Chinese
embassies in surrounding African cotintries likewise
have teiided to withhold substantial aid for Zairiaii
cliligrees tivitil the\ prove their capabilities for
effective aCti0ll Within Zaire.
There has never been a Communist party in Zaire.
In the period immediately preceding independeiiee,
the Belgian Communist Partv contacted mail%' Zairian
politicians and attempted to organize a Zairian
Communist Party, but the attempt failed. Communist
ideology has had limited appeal to most Zairians,
partly because of its non-African and irreligious
characteristics. Lacking it recognized political organ
through which to channel their doctrine, the
Cornmun, attempted to ti\e existing political
La-tions and to establish front groups.
The U.S.S.R.'s nimcs to establish a strong
Communist prem-nve in Zaire lio-gan ill the I i days ol
independence when the Soviet Union ac(iv(4
supported Premier Patrice Lutnumba ill the internal
i)olitical (-xniflicts which then paralzed the conintry.
In September 1960, Zaire expelled the U.S.S.11
diplomatic mission oil [lie grounds that it %\as
interfering in the eotintry*s intern..1 affairs and
subverting the legitimate government.
Relations were restored in Atigust 1961, and
U.S.S.R. representatives returned, only to he expelled
0lieV More in November 1963 for engaging in
subvers activity. Zairian atithorities had proved
collusion between the inenthers of the Soviet Embassy
al)d the Zairian rebel movement, the National
Liberation Committee. based in Brazzaville. The
U.S.S.R. continued to give substantial support to the
Stanivyville rebellion during 1964. Thv Zairian troops
seized Soviet-made weapons oil several occasions. and
in September 1964 rebel leader Christopher Cbenye
claimed oil Radio Stanleyville that several of his
officers had been trained in Nloscow. Zaire and the
U.S.S.R. decided to restime diplomatic relations ill
IN-evivilwr 196 and by inid-1968 the U.S.S.R., as
well as Poland. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Ronlallia, and
Czeehosiovakia, hit(] diploniatic missions ill Kinshasa.
The Collinitmist missions tread \%arily, placing
emphasis oil building all iniage of frietidl\
cooperation, I ll( U.S.S.R. continlies. hinve%er, to
shelter several Zairian rebel leaders'.
The Chinese have suptiorted rehellion ill the
country through their embassies ill neighboring
African nations. During [lie insurgencies of 19(V
through 1965, the Chinese missions ill Brazzaville and
in Btijunibura (Burundi) wery partictilarly active ill
aiding the reliels, and there were uncomfirnied reports
that Chinese adviser% were aniong the rebel forces is
the\- moved across northeastern Zaire.
Cuban involvement ill Zaire. which began in 1961
with the training of Zairian dissidents outside the
country, in Cuba and Congo (Brazzaville), reached its
Zenith during the 1964-65 rebellimi whell Cuball
33
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advisers served %vith the rebel forces. Although there
were still a fe%% Ctihan advisers in Brazzaville in mid-
1972, there were no indications that they were
engaged in activity directed at the Zairian
Government.
With the collapse of the 1964 rebellion, Communist
aid to Zairian insurgents decreased sharpl%% Earlier
Communist support had depended on the cooperation
of neighboring African states in providing bases front
which to supply the Zairian rebel groups. With the
removal of Tshombe. despised by most African
leaders, aiid I lie success of Mobutti* efforts to improve
Zaire's relations %%ith other African states. African
cooperation in the Communist effort to overthro'.% or
subvert the Zairian Government practically carne to it
lialt. Neighboring countries still coli however, to
give -;afe haven to Zairian rebels. I'll( existenev in
Brazzaville of' a radical, openly pro-Communist
reginte continues to offer the ConinitiniNts it base close
to Zaire, but this base seems to lie tised primarily to
send pro-Maoist and other Conummist propaganda
into Kinshasa. Brazzaville provides haven to Zairian
students all(] trade unionists who h left z jl i rc
becatise of suspected pro-Coninitinist activities. an d it
also gives sanctuary to variotis exile and rebel grot I ps.
fronts orgililized b\ Communist sympathizers
have never had wide appeal in Zaire. The only
significant organization which c otild h J )cen
considered im operating Commimist front was (lit pro-
Communist General Federation of Congolese Workers
(c( it was stipported b% the Soviet Unw,
through the World Fedvratioit of Tradt U 101111
(WFTU) and by Chillil. 'I'lle linlited 1)1'
this organization %%-its further curtailed 1% 111p il l-I j i s l oi l
the CGTC first secretar\ gvnvral,
Niallionga-Allias, in November 1966 and -tie
proscription of CGTC ictiviti I (l M
reginie. Five fornier members of the CGTC wbo lmd
joined die national labor federation, UNTZ, \%ery
dismissed in May 1968 from the UNTZ and
subsequently imprisoned for their financial in(]
ideological dependence oil it foreign trade union,
naniely the WFIT. Although there are midoubtediv
additi
onal ex-CGTC members in the UNIX the\ (10
[lot Pl.k\' a key role.
F. Maintenance of internal security
1. Police (C)
The National Gendarineriv (GN) has primary
responsibility for law enforcement and maintenance of
ptihlic order throtighotit all territorial minpoments of
Zaire. This new %er\ according to a presidential
3.1
decree of 31 jtil%- 1972. incorporates the former
National Police and the former army gendarme
hattalions. 'rhe National Police had been norninalk
responsible [or maintenance of law and order
throughout the nation, and a large powtion of its
pemonnel�roughly 22,600 in mid-1972�had been
thinly distributed across the countryside. The police,
however, had proved so ineffective in rural areas that
local administrative officers IISII.kll\ had to call upon
local detachments front the six arni\ gendarme
battalions to cope with even minor disorders.
The basic organi7ational structure of the GN, as
formulated in the initial presidential decree, clearly is
intended to supplant tit(- fornier rivalrics and
overlapping jurisdictions of tit(- army gendarmes and
civil police with it tinified service, more directly
respomsive to President klobutti's control than r-ither
service had been. The GN is it componvnt of the army,
under the control of the I)epartnivilt of Defellse.
Which has been headed by Mobutu since 19(i.5.
Furthermore, it setdor officer of the GN is included (in
the Presidential Special Staff for Iliv security services.
which was formed in varly August 1972. This St;kff.
chaired by Ihe senior military aid(- in the Office of the
1'resident, provides Mobtitti with all alternate channel
for kpassing Major General Bumba, the ne"
appointed Captain General of the anny.
I'll( GN is expected to have it minierical strength of
I l yfmt 30,M) when the proce of consolidatin, tit(
National Police and dir arim getidarme
mmplHed. As of law 197 Zk detailed
Ubl" ot otwnization for tit( GN reportedly was under
nAl�k tJ tliv provess of integrating personnel front
(lit birr two servicv% \%as still incomplete, causing
%tillit ki 1 lization. esi)vcitl1\ aniong former police
liffik, Tht offico'll announcement of the merger
i r d that .111 the former army getAirnies %%-oil[(] be
n)
while former police pvr-sonnel would be
subjeut to selection. Ill fact. tit( newly appointed
commander of the G.N. Brigadier Genoral Sillga
Boyengv. is a career army officer. as are the senior GN
officers in each administrative region of' the countr\.
By late September 19 2 most of the higher officers ill
the former National Police had bvvit downgraded
within the GN or transferred to other departments. Oil
the other hand. the representative of the GN oil (lie
newly formed special presidential staff for (lit security
services is a highly qualified former police official. and
there were other indiemions that mobtitti intends to
retain the ill ire competent of the former police officers
in responsibiv positions.
As of November 1972 it was still problematical how
intich time wotild he re(lifired for the CN to overmine
the Iemporarily demoralizing effects of such i t
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i-veeping reorganization and to attain its Potential for
becoming much More effective than either of its
predecessors. An important factor uould be the
eventual balance between former gentla-,-Pies and
former Police in key positions. The former army
gendarme battalions had a reputation for brutal
treatment of civilians, dile largely to their being
treated as reserve infantry units and receiving minimal
training in nonviol teeliniques for maintaining
order. On the other hand, the disbanded National
Police had made a good start toward effective mo bil e
patrol units in major urban areas it is unclear whether
this progress will be seriously eroded In the sweepi
personnel changes resultin from the roorganizatio
Belgium has long provio:104 iriticipal techni
aid mission to the police. advisory group
averaged about 40 Owt r'
1, whell it wa-,
sharply reduced ;i,'% "MA ;tied relations
betweell the two Wllkw% In r.. 1) the Belgi
mission compriselmill Ill Ivirr,, i, i I whoin Were
instructors at the shi polict.
FrAt-4t-f 6 6m
schools. The Bel gian wre svrviflg its
consultants or instruct, the Police are
continuing the functiolls"'with the GN.
The United Nations formerly provided techni
assistance. Particularly helpful t the Zairian force %%-Its
a Nigerian police detachment which was sent under
U.N. auspices and served during the period 1960-66.
Ali additimial nine-man U.N. advisory mission its
terminated at the close of 1%.*7.
The United States has had a team of p a
and instructors it) Zaire since 1964. In additi t it
role in helping set 11P filobile brigades and rural mobile
training. the team was instrumental ill organizing Mid
upplying tile efficient police radio network linking
themajor regions. The United St ,l has provided
considerable materiel assistance. The U.S. training
programs t uld other technical assistance activities th
were being conducted with the National Police i
mid-1972 have proceeded with minimal interruptions
"'hile most of 'lie Zairian particip were bei
integrated into the GN.
The most encowaging result of U.S. assistance for
the Natio P(oli 1 beef, the recentl d e% e l ope d
"PlIbilitY of Kinshasa metropolit police for
respondilk-g rapidl% Mid 4ft-etively to serious strevt
crittles. ranging front m ugg i ligs t auto t an d
reckless driving, Until this prograrn was initiated in
1969, Kinshasa P()li" Ilad negligible capabilities for
pursuit of criminals. By mid-19741 a Mobile Brigade,
comprising radio-e motorcycle jeeps, and
sedans, w %%,irillilig occasiollal encoun(er% with
armed thugs if) the course of regular patr More
important, the Mobile Brigade %vas restx)nding
quickly to emergency calls as it result of effective
teamwork with regu traffic control and investiga-
tive units, coordinated through a modernized central
command post for Kinshasa's seven police districts. In
early 1972 a project for establishing a mobile brigade
with similar support facilities i Lubumbashi was well
tinder wa%.
2. Intelligenre (S)
There are three primary intelligen and seciiritv
organi7atiolis in Zaire: the National Documentation
Center (CND. successor to the Surete Nationale); the
Informatiot) and Military Securitv Directorate
(DGRSM) in the Department of Defen and the G-2
section of the arm% To a very limited extent, ti
intelligence section of tile GN also adds to the
government's intelligence effort.
IMobutt has tended to entrust various colintersub-
version tasks to individuals have regular positions
outside the seckirity services. For instance, Jean
-Manzikala, was designated state iuspector in the
Interior IMinistry front 1968 until his indictment of,
murder charges in carly 1972. reportedly functioned as
Mobutu's foremost special investigator. primarily
txmcerned w'th dislovalty oil the part of senior official
in the provinces. S uch informal assignments have
generated loose iietworks of informants whos
activities sometimes overlap the functi o f tl
regular security services.
Ili oroer to wduce tliv rcsiiking cotifusi 1
assigned Lt. Col. Ilayinoild Omba, formerk chief of
the CND Doillestic Opi Directoratc, it iivw
ifitelligence and security position oil the presidential
staff in October 1971. A'Ithough it is lot apparent ill
Omba official title, that of Private Secretary to the
President. he reportedly functions as all inte
coordinator responsible for all security matters. Ife is
ilso coitsidered Mobutu's princil intelligelive
adviser.
a. National Documentation Center
The CND is responsibl directly t th President. Ili
late 1972 tile service reportediv h a total work force
of approximately 550, includi'tig 500 in tile Domestic
Operations Directorate and i f maximuni of 50 i ti
Foreign Operations Directorate. The CND ni.iintains
its headquarters i Kinshasa, with p ill each
regional capital, s1lbIx)sts in other larger towns, and
representativ i few foreign diplomati p suc
is ill neighboring African countries, Brussels, and
Paris.
W-)
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The CND's responsi hil i ties include the collection Of
information on possible subversives and surveillance of
suspected enemies of tile state. In practice, these
functions involve monitoring and countering all%
political activity which in the opinion of the CND
presents a potential threat to the government. Tile
CND has powers of arbitrary arrest and interrogatiun,
as well as de facto power to detain political prisoner.%
without bringing lega! charges against them. Because
military officers. hold key posts in the CND. this power
of detention is widely employed against members of
the armed forces. even though counterintelligence
within the military services is technically tit(-
responsibility of the DGRSM.
The CND has three major directorates: Domestic
Operations, Foreign Operations, and Administration.
Most of the operational activities fall under the
Domestic Operations Directorate. The Foreign
Operations Directorate N%as not formed until 1969
Altb thr 'ND bad beei, assigning operah ('I, to
foreign diplontAic jx)sts for several ears pre%iokislN
I'lic forniatit I this dir( torate represents it scaled-
Jown X of Mobutu's 1111 to estabil4l) a
separate foreign intelligence avk-jic\. As late 1% ljtV
1972 the Foreign Operations Directorate \Ilh still
relativeIN unorganized, and there were no sigix tjwt it
Was functioning with real effect i veness.
The capabilities of the CND have varied gru,jk
since independence its it result of twrsonnel changc
hich in turn have reflected di\ ers political pressures.
Tile service had grown to all tui%vield\ size by 1969,
and a resulting loss ill efficiencV was apparent.
Subsequently inany of the less competent personnel
have been weeded out, and the remaining staff
employees have been better trained. Although there
has been it net vain in effectiveness since 196 lite
CND still is not capable of performing all its assig I
functions. It is subject to the caprices of individud
officer% and to tile Obstructive effects of interservice
rivalries.
b. Directorate of Information and Military
Security
DGHSM is tit agency of the Department of Def eme
but reports directly to President Mobutu. DGRSM has
a charter which gives it it wide range of respoiisibility
and authority, but limited fluids and personnel
preclude the effective CXCCuti011 Of kll\' Of its USSigned
responsibil i ties. In 1969 it was reported to have only
about 20 commissioned officers. in early 1970,
DGRSM started giving more intensive training to its
officer% in ,tit attempt to build ill) its effect i veness and
capabilities.
136 I
DGRSM's basic responsibility is to counter within
the m;1itary establishment anv activity which it deems
harmful to the state. It has a military investigative
(,"s function and has the power of
jow -4 %ithin the arined forces, although normally such
,jw% 4, ire carried out by military police, oil order%
fi,ioiti the DGRSM chief. In carrying out its basic
responsibility, DGRSM call also arrest civilians,
although technically a CND officer is supposed to be
pre.wnt this occurs. DGRSM call detain suspects
tip to 24 hour% without charge, but in practice this
time limit is frequently ignored. lit addition, D(.RSNl
is responsible for information progranis designed to
improve the morale of military personnel. Until tuid-
1972, DGRSM was responsible for the administration
of it small unit which provided bod\ guard% and other
physical protection for President MobutO and the
army commander fit chief. The newl\ formed special
presidential staff for tit( securitv services reportedl\
has assunied direCt re for Mobutu s
personal protcoitm. hile DGHSM []its COHtill tied this
NCr\1C(1 ft the arm Captain Ceneral.
technically coiarols tile budget and
r.tioins ti t i4 afluv G-2 section and theoreticaily
could conlilland authority over it. lit practice.
lbep- \'011slierable overial) and duplication between
I IV- nd -2 units in the field, with no clear
o in of rvsponsibilit\ or authority. Each arm\
-.,I grouping has both a G-2 and it DGRSM
iniollitation officer the major difference being that
DGRSM communications hypass the military chain of
(101111111111(1 and go directly to the Department of
Defense. DCIISNI has its own code systems but not its
own communications e(joipment. G-2 units art-
responsible for collecting tactical cOmbat information
and for reporting oil general political matter in their
respective provinces,
DGRSM is responsible for military intelligemv oil
foreign countries. particularly the countries adjacent
to Zaire. Military attaches are a ssigned to DG.HSN for
the duration of their foreign tours, and DGRSM is
responsible for their administration. Since lost
inilitar\ attaches are senior in rank to the director of
DGRSM, they address their reports to higher echelons,
although all military attache reports pass through
DGRSM.
3. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency
measures and capabilities (S)
Metropolitan police ill Kinshasa and other large
cities have been fairk effective during recent vear% in
controlling peaceful crowds and in dispersing student
denioustrators with it mildinurn number of serious
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injuries. In rural areas, however, the police sho-wed
negligible capabilities for handling minor terrorist
incidents or even sudden gatherings of any sort.
Consequently, local army units frequently were the
first resort in any rural disturbance. Even in urban
situations, troop.i sometimes were deployed against
unruly crowds before police capabilities were fully
exhausted because of the basic predominance of the
armed forces o the police. Although militar% action
in such situations has been effective in the immediate
sense of crushing resistance, the usual brutalit% on the
part of troops has tended to amplify popular
resentments against the government.
President Mohatu s awareness of such potentially
dangerous intideqttacies in the existing sectirity
services apparently motivated his decision to form the
National Gendarmerie (GN i in July 1972. This basic
reorgani7ation. acccrding to qualified observers. clears
the way for the development of a nationwide law-
enforcement service that is of sufficient strength to
cover the countrvside as %%ell as urban areas and is
propefly trained in nonviolent techniques for
maintaining order As of late 1972, however, the GN
was still in a formative phase, and the observed
performances of its predecessors are stil; the only
realistic indications of present counter%uhversiVe
capabilities.
During the colonial era some metropolitan police
units received special training in riot-contiol
techniques, but resulting capabilities were largely
dissipated by 1965. Subsequent training in this field
has been limited, and as of mid-1972 no police units
were. equipped with riot shields or other special
equipment for crowd control except limited supplies of
tear gas. Nevertheless. foreign observers report sonic
recent improvement in crowd-handling performances
on the part of Kinshasa police. possibly because thv%
have had much practice from Moblitu*s frequent
staging of such inass turnouts as MPR rallies and
receptioils for visiting dignitaries. Dming student riots
%Nhicli occurred in June 1%.9 at Kinshasa, Lubuni-
bashi, and Kisangani. regular police units showed fair
capabilities for dispersing unruly crowds through such
nonviolent techniques as selective arrests of
ringleaders and slowly advancing skirmish lines,
Although the new mobile brigades are not designed
primarily for riot control. the% have substantially
enhance(] tile capabilities of metropolitan police for
stopping street brawls before the% explode into riots.
On the whole, however, the capabilities of
metropolitan police are marginal, compared with the
potential for concerted or spontaneous manifestations
of dissidence within the extremely congested, rapidly
growing urban areas. Furthermore, Mobutu's need to
mollify army officers on whom lie has r(.lied for basic
security has disposed him to call upon militan urt;ts
or conspicuous exercises against civilian targets
instead of fully exploiting police capabilities.
Although police units managed to contain student
demonstrator% at IA)Vaniurn University in June 1971
without fatal clashes, only a few months later
Brigadier General (now Major General) Bumba's
paracommandos were deplo%ed on sudden sweeps
through the poorer residential districts of Kinshasa as
part of the highly publicized crackdown on crinic.
Possibly the newly forni-d GN will become so effective
in handling unr"ly crowds as well as ordinary street
crimes that Mobulti %-;ill no longer feel compelled to
deploN arnit combat units against civilians.
Meanwhile. the arm,.'s reputation for brutal
treatment of civilians ma) still have an adverse impact
on popular morale whenever an (ipsurge of dissidence
provokes Mobtitti into intensive countermeasures.
The most notorious instance since 1965 of the
militar%'s mishandling of a popidar gathering in an
urban situation was the fatal clash with Lovaniurn
University students oti 4 )tine 1969. At least it
thousand student-, who had participated in nonviolent
de nionst rat ions on the suburban campus decided to
present petitions to government authorities in
downtou Kinshasa, despite it ban on off-camptis
demonstrations. As their procession approached a
government Imilding, gendarme units who were
ordered to disperse them opened fire. At least at dozen
students were killed in the resulting melee. and man%
other% were %%ounded.
The contrasting perfo rnia i ices of gendarmes and
eivil police involved in the sanic situation highlights
the fact that senior arm%- officers usually have
regarded the army's gendarme hattalions as second-
rate infantry tinits; they have been neglected, rather
than specially trained for coping with disorderl%
civilians through techniques that minimize bloodshed.
When troops have been deployed in rural areas on
counterguerrilla operations, their uneven discipline
and theit traditional contempt for ck-ilians have been
compounded by more concrete factor%. The logistk-al
inadequacies of thv arnied forces ofteit compel troops
in the field to forage for food, to commandeer housing,
and sometimes to press local peasants into service as
portem Mobutu generally has encouraged efforts (in
the part of officir% to make troops adopt constructive
approaches toward peaceable inhabitants of
operational zones. Although sonic protnis;(ig starts
have been made. they tisually have 1) down
under the chronic impediments of lax discipline and
ineffective logistics.
3
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The most recent example of this took place along
the northwest shore of Lake Tanganyika�an
inaccessible but nonethele%s populated area�where
the armed forces had been conducting intensive
search-and-destroy operations against Simi" eiirt"O&
remqants since late 1969. By early 1W I 01114
observers were reporting that the troop." *#Pre J11flictint
far heavier casualtim on the local peas ghan con
the ever-elusive SimbaF. for instance. in-fum 1971
some 100 peasants reportedly 11011' Am 4 11%
paracommandos because they had irWk
pay for porter service before accon1panyu t 1 j
on another operation. In March. Mobutti. having
belatedly learned that thousands of peas�its
starving in the countryside because tile\ hau led froin
troops. ordered the acting commander of the ariny to
initiate a civic action program in the 1,
Tanganyi ka area. According to hastily prepared plai,
teams comprising both military and civilian personnel,
including physicians. veterinarians, and agronomists.
were to undergo a 2-week indoctrination course and he
deploved at eight rehabilitation centers, where
presumably the peasants conild be aided avol thcn
encouraged to return to their villages and resume
farming or fishing tinder military protection. Tile
program was largely a failure because of th
1111wilihigness of (itialified civilians to scive I n a
desolate area, the failure of food, medicine, and othe.-
relief supplies to arrive \%-here needed, and generally
inade(juate support from field commanders. Mistrus't
of the military probably played a major part, as the
troops relx)rte(ll\ had not abated their mistreatment of
the peasants who remained within reach.
G. Suggestions for further reading (U/OU)
Brausch, Georges. Belgian Administration in the
Congo. I.Amolon: Oxford University Press. 1961. A
review of Belgian policy for the fornier colony during
the decade preceding independence by a former
38
Belgian administrator and anthropologist who gives
personal evaluat.ons derived from direct exix-rience.
CAirnevin. Robert. Histoire du Congo 1.eapoldville-
Kinshasa. Paris: Editions Berger- lxvrault. 1966. The
%1,4ndard full-length history of Zai.- from the
I recolonial era, tile finai chapter preso nts a more
v narrative of the jeriod from
to Mobutu*s takeover of he pre%idenc\
Ifism 1% si%aii,ible in any English-la:.guage account.
Matince N. 7 Congo: a Brief History
,IAP Appraisal. New York: Praeger. 1961. Ali
emmently crisp hi.story of tile Belgian colonial
administration and the fimt year of independence,
Kitchen, Helen A. (ed.) Footnotes to the Congo
Story: An Afriva Report Anthology. Ntw Yor
Walker. 1967. Reprints of IS articles from tit(-
magazine Africa Report dealing with the more
important developments front independence to
Mobutu's takeover fif the Presidencv. Crawford
Young's "Significance of the 1964 Rebeilion," v.-hich
analyzes the dynami, of the Mulele and Simba
uprisings, is especially note wort It y.
Merriam. Alan P. Congo, Background of Conflict.
Evanston: Northwestern Univer%itv Press. 1961. The
first three chapters provide a quick intrAticGov to the
cotintrv's ethnic it akeup. art(] the fourth chapter
presents a concise overall description of tile nwii%
political parties which emerged shortl\ hvfmw
independence.
O'Brien, Collor. Cruise to Katariga and Back; A
U.N. GaSC HiStOnl- IAindow Ifutchiiwm. 1962.
Controversial anal\sis of U.N. operations in Congo.
Young, Crawford. Politics in tile Congo: 1)ecoloni-
zation and Independence. Princeton: Princeton
Universitv Press. 1%5. Tile standard scholarlv analvsis
of Political dynamics froin tile origins of tile
independence movement through 1963, with
emphasis oil Political and social institutions rather
than historical narrative,
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Chrumm Wn)
1885
Congo Free State is established as personal domain of
Belgian King L&opokl 11.
1908
Belgian Parbarnent assurnes control of Conv Free State
afta international scandal over conditions.
1959
Jastuary
First African riots in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa).
1980
June
Congo becomes independent under President Joseph
Kasavubu and Premier Patnee Lumumba.
July
Congolese National Army mutinies and Belgians flee.
Katanga Province (now Shaba) under Moise Tshombe
and eastern Kasai under Albert Kalonji both secede. U.N.
troops arrive at request of central government.
September
Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba. Col. Joseph Mobutu and
army take over and remain in control until February
1961.
1961
Lumumba is killed.
August
Cyrille Adoula approved as compromIse Premier by near-
unanimous parliamentary vote.
19"
September
Secession in Kasai ended by Congolese armed forces.
1963
January
Secession in Katan&R ended by U.N. forces.
September
Kasavubu adjourns parliament indefinitely and begins to
rule by decree with support of "Binza group," comprising
army commander Mobutu and four key civilian officials.
December
Peasant uprising led by Pierre Mulele begins in central
sector of present Bandundu Province.
39
%t*" %WPINUAe2wo- ww -.ww I,
19"
April
Simba uprising in eastern Congo begins to spread north-
ward.
July
Moise Tshombe named Premier by Kanvubu with c o n
currence of 'Binza grote and many members of still-
adjourned parliament.
August
President Kasavubu promulgates new constitution ratified
by referendum in June-July.
Simba guerrillas capture Stanleyville (now Kisangard).
September
Refugee politicians join Sisn in Stanleyville, declare
PI)pulu Revo!utionary Govermuent" and pin support
from radical African and Communist states.
November
U.S. planes drop Belgian piLatroopers at Stanle) ville and
Pauhs (now Isiro) to rescue white hostages held byrebels.
1965
Congolese army units with white mercenaries retake
rebel held territory as rebel leaders flee.
Mareh-April
Parliamentary elections am held. Moise Tshombe's
CONACO party gains majority.
October
Kasavubu dismisses Tshombe. New government appointed
by Kasavubu fails to get parliamentary approval.
November
Mobutu seizes control of central government, announces
plans to remain as president for 5 years.
December
Mobutu assumes power to rule by decree.
1966
may-June
Four former cabinet ministers are accused of plotting to
overthrow Mobutu, found guilty by military tribunal, and
publicly hanged.
July
Katangan units in northeastern Congo mutiny, subdued
several months I er by white mercenaries loyal to the
government.
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1900
October
Mobutu dismi"es Premier Leonard Mulamba. popular
army colonel, and declares himself Premi as we ll as
I'mident.
1967
immary
COngolese COvernment seizes UMHK Conso-based assets
and establishes its own comp t run UNIHK copper
Wines. UMHK retaliates by threatening prospective
copper buyers with c &c 4i on
Februitty
COvernment reaches compromise Agreement with UMHK
affiliate, ending for time being dispute over control of
UMIlK operations.
April
Mobutu publishes a new constitution, 10114lizing strong
presidential system, mid forms new party, Popular Move-
ment of the Revolution (MPR).
June
New constitution X 0181 ulgated following popular referen-
dum.
JMF-sponsored monetary reform instituted.
July
White memenaries and Katangan troops mutiny in eastenk
Congo.
November
Mercenary mutiny ends with Mercenaries withdrawing to
Rwanda.
1968
April
Mercvnarics airlifted from Rwanda to L. urope.
Septeutber-October
Mulele flees to 11mr2aville, is returned to Kinshasa under
amnesty spiarantee, and executed. Brazzaville gove
breaks diplomatic relatio with Kinshasa,
1969
June
Lovaniunt University students demonstrating In Kinshasa
are shot by troops, symp demonstrations a t o th er
universities And 'schools UO RrQatcst I'llow of civillan dis.
content since Ntobutu became President,
August
Mobutu bans Independent student unions and requires
all students to join MPR youth wing.
Mobut-i dismisses largo portion of cabinet ministers, III-
cludIng Victor Nendaka and Justin Boinboko, most -n-
fluential members of former Bi grou
40
September
Final settlement of dispute between Congolese Govern-
Mont and U.NIHK.
1970
June
Mobutu and Congo (8) President Ngouabj sign Manifesto
of Rtcondhation, agreeing to Phased resumption of
normal communications, trade. and diplomatic relations;
their respective embassies are reopened in December.
King Baudouin attends 10th anniversary of Co
independence, climaxing gradual return to solidly con-
structive relations between the two countries.
1970
August
Mobutu makes his first st v i s it, t t h e U nite d States,
Romania, and Yugoslavia he negotiates substantial in.
dustrial investments and military pur in the Us.
while reasserting nominal poh of nonalignment.
November
Presidential and National Assembly elections c o m pl e t e
constitutional basis for Mobutu's ru l e
December
Mobutu declares amnesty for all refugee reb a t h ome
or abroad, who turn the mse l ves i t aut two
principal leaders of Stanleyvill rebel regime of 1964
and some less notorious emigres accept Amnes b 31
January deadline.
1971
M,2rch-April
Mobutu makes state visits t France, Jal)an, and Talwan,
gaining fairly allbstAntial Increases in lon economic
aid.
June
1 0 vt"Itun' University students stage unnu demon.
stration commemorati students shot TJY troops In June
1969 Mobutu declares entire student body must serve
in army for 9 years,
August
MObUtu Announces that student dmftcos will re
to c1l '"P us units 'Ifter fUgged basic training, Lov.
aniuni and two other universities at Lubumbashi Itnil
Kkanatud Are W04 1111ated Into the National 11nivenity,
Highly publivixed subversion trials are modticted for
student demonstration lemlem, a (onner robel g e n era l
who ItmophA h1obutu's aninesty, and a mixed bag of
obseum (lissidents.
October
Nendaka and Homboko, who were ousted from cabinet
in August IM, Aro p o f p to
assassinate h1obutu and put under intleffilite detention
without trial.
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October
Mobutu changes official titl o f coun from D emocratic
Republic of the Congo to Republic of Zaire, his *'return
to authenticity" campaign is soon extended to the Congo
River, several provinces, and other place names.
1972
January
"Authenticity" canIPArn is extended to personal names,
the President declares himself Mobutu Sese Seko and
orders subordinates to do likewise.
Cardinal Malula, leading Catholic prelate in Zaire, cri-
ticizes MObutwls nAnle-chAnging campaign; Mobutu
threatens Afalula with prosecution for treason and sus.
Pends A leading Catholic publication.
Glossary (u/ou)
I
Sr,cwT
AssaIMATION
CCTC
CkD
DCRSM
DIA.........
GECAMINES
GRAE
INBEL
jmpr,
MPR
MNC
SCM
UGEC
UMHK
UFA
UN77A
SUMT
March
Belgium Agrees to $25 million in additional technical
assistance and credits for Zaire, one of largest single aid
packages since independence,
April
Mobutu's public confrontation with Catholic Church In
Zaire winds down, with Malula sojourning at Vatican
and church acvoPting MPR youth cadrer I..- its seminaries,
August
Mobuto retires many senior senerAs and tightens the
command structure of the security forces.
1973
January
Mobutu visits Peking and prepares to exc am
dors between China and Zaire.
FoamN
Confederation Generato des rmt*t.
kurs Congolsis
Centre Nationato do Docume"tation
Direction Conerak du Ronaignornent
of do Surcte U11(faire
Aeance do Pocumentation tot crinfor.
ination Aftical"o
La Conerok des CarHeros of des Mines
du Zaire
Gov"no RetWudonarto do Angok no
EX(ho
1111 till't 8 010 trintomistion of do
Documentation
Jou"osso du U014ftmont Populaire do
la newfation
Moumme"t PoPulaire do k fletWuHan
Moumment Natio"ale ConiWafte
Societe Coneratc do Mirutrala
Unto" Conersto des Etudiants Congo.
lob
Union Minkre du Haut Katenga
Untso dos Poin4cove do Amok
Union Nationale des Travailloure do la
Republique du Zaire
E%MUSH
General Confederation of Congolese
Workors
National Documentation Center
Dim of Information and Mili.
tary Security
African Documentation and Informok.
tion Agency
Coneral Quarrivs and Mines Com.
Pany of Zaire
R Government of Angola
In Exile
Belglan Inforniation and Documenta.
tion Agency
Youth of the Popular Movement of
the Revolution
POPI'lor Movement of the Revolution
Conitolose National Movement
Conoral Ores Company
Coneral Union of Congolese Students
Mining Union of Upper Katanga
Union of An$K&n Peoples
National Union of Zatrian W or k ers
NO FOREIGN DISSRAI
41
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SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
Ike
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