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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06116: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can roe updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country r Profile, The Society, Government and POlitiLS, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into 4 one volume. E Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, w ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook c omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Aithough detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of !nese sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing cataloging, and utilization. initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate ch- jpters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through Liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, -Lnd dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorised person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM. GENERAL DECLASSIFI� CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 55 (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECT7R OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. i i i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 J WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernmsnt personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /cnntrol designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 c This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub- stantially completed by January 1973. r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 I_1 �:Z61T A M161 :x a 1Iii Zair- CONTENTS This ceneral Sum ew supersedes the one dated Sep lemiber 1970, topics of which sha ki be dcstn4wd. A. Introduction 1 lmpad of Nfebutu s leadcrship; importa�ce of the finny; foreign arid. e.moomic lxAicirs. D. Structure and functioning of the governmmA S Background d pre.Isent governmental systmn, in- cluding 1867 constitution. 1. National gavcrttment 3 a. Executive 3 Election of the President a formality; extensive powers vested in President; ethnic and geognphic balance in cabinet. Sw3w No FOPEIGN DaMm .n.wm-- .._r., w.-.....�. v.., s� b.... e. TM....+ �.u...- v.a..a.....- APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 ii y 1: APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 Page Page b. Legislature 4 8. Religious organizations 21 Unicameral National Legislative Council; Political and rAvial importance of Christian control by President; membership; :ewr:l churches; Kimbanguism, Mobutu crackdown since 1970, on Protestant groups; conflict with Catholic c. judiciary 6 hierarchy. Colonial heritage; efforts to reform; court 9. Elections 23 system, 'nciuu;ug Supreme Court and Suffrage; single list of candidates, chosen by projected Constitutional Court; judges, Poltical Bureau; downplay of regional senti. 2. Local government 7 ment; conduct of elections. Structure; traditional authorities; staffing; administrative centralization; inefficiency. D. National policies 24 3. Civil service 8 Past incompetence and corruption; Mobutu's 1. Domestic 24 efforts to streamline and improve quality Stability under Mobutu; goal of economic in- of system, dependence; monetary and fiscal reforms; belt tightening measures; Mobutu's assertion C. Political dynamics 8 of authority; defense policies. Primary political factors. 2. Foreign 26 1. Tribalism, regionalism, and insurgency Moderate, western- oriented foreign policy. (1960-65) 9 a. Relations with African states 26 Impact of Belgian pwrnalism and compla- Avoidance of "neocolonial" image; fear of cency; independence; rule by Lumumba and Congolese subversion; recent cordial rela- Kasavubu; Katanga and Kasai secessions; tions with Brazzaville; quiet cooperation Mobutu's assumption of control, followed by with Portuguese authorities in Angola; Kasavubu again, then Mobutu once more; Mobutu's ambition to be International shift of political power to executive; Adoula leader, and the "Binza group'; peasant uprisings; 1i. Relations with Western nations and Prime Minister Tshombe. 2. Mobutu's consolidation of executive the U.N. 27 authority (1966-70) 11 History of relations with h Agium, in- Establishment of single -party MPH; number cluding seizure of UMHK assets; deep U.S. and U.N. Involvement. of provinces reduced from 21 to 12, then to eight; transfer of governors from their local c. Relations with Communist countries 28 bases; naticnaliration of regional policy, forces; Mobutu's wariness; evidence of new cor- dismantling of pnrliamentary :system; neu- diality. tralizdtion of tribalism. 3. Mobutu and his top aides 12 E. Threats to government stability 29 'Attie delegation of authority; cabinet shake- L Discontent and dissidence 29 UPS; Mobutu's increasing reliance* on individ- uals outside the cabinet; atmosphere of mis- Little articulate orposition, yet underlying ma- trust. laise; succession question; adverse ernnomic 4. Popular Movement of the Revolution 16 and social conditions; refugees; students. 2. Subversion 31 Supreme national institution; responsibilities History of insurgency 1960 -67; no outbreaks and size of Political Bureau; National Exeeu- sine 1967; Communist aid to insurgents. Live Committee; youth wing; attempt: to cultivate grassroots support. F. Maintenance of internal security 34 S Army 18 Main prop of Mobutu regime; feared by gen- I. Police 34 eral populace; tribal and regional allegiances; Recent merger of police and gendarmes into morale; fending; 1079. sh%Jkeup of high com- National Gendarmerie strength figures; gures; past mend. ineffectiveness of police and brutalit} of 6. Labor 20 gendarmes; Belgium as primary source of aid Lack of cohesiveness; single union UN77; and advice; U.S. and U.N. training pro control by Mobutu; wildcat strikes; now grams; Mobile Brigade. UNT7 secretary general. 2. Intelligence 35 7, Students 20 Organization and actvities of the National Most vocal critics t, oww regime; details Documentation Center, the Directorate of of confrontations with government; 'event re- Information and Military Security, and the duction in dissidence. armed forces G -2. ii y 1: APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 Page 3. Countersubversive and counterinsur- gency measures and capabilities .36 Past effectiveness In urban treat but not In rural areas; use of military units; training. Page G. Suggestions for further reading 38 Chronology 39 Glossary 41 FIGURE Page Fig. I Structure of government (chart) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01 -00707R000200110002-1 11 Government and Politics A. Introduction (S) President Mobutu Scse Seko, the army leader who assumed )utrol of the governnu�nl in November 1965. has brought 'Zaire greater polilica! stabilit than the troubled country has known since indelc�1ldence. hill its governrrleotal institutions remain fragile. The paternalism of tile� fielgi ;ul colonial regime stifhccl I"iticarl developttlelti, and Congolese were utipre- pared for sell -rule when th suddelll% uclifeve(f iudependenec in June 1960. %wire, oil(- of the largest autd most helerogeneous otmtries in Africa, had nn stational political insiitllt)ons, no 11,11ional political leadership. and very few people with experience ill ninning either the government or the econortay. Indelx�nden(1- was followed by ao arim mutiny. dehilitating political infighting, frigi n�rilalioo of the country along ethnic lines, three regional secessions. and everilrially it series of peasant i. Although the uprisings were largely suppressed by late INiS, the competition for political primacy hetweeal the for(-( of Presicent Joseph Kasaytibu a rld Moise 'I'shotube (whoin Kasa iibu Iuu1 dismissed as 1'remier) broifght the government to ;1 standstill. On 25 November 1965, the theli I.I. Gen. Joseph Mobutu seized control, scimmarily disnlisse(I Kasavubu, ;Ind iuslalled hitllself as Preside With the support nl' the nt(lilary and selected civilian polilic�al allies, Mobutu replaced the disorganized parliament syste h ;a(l existe(I since independe,,c(', with c�e,,tralized autocratic rule. Mobutu hits cv(Ived a highly personal st of rifle virtually devoi(I o f ari institutional f,arti(twork. In June 1967 it new constitution, drafted at Mobutu's w(tuest and containing provisions which would legitimize the centralized regime he had developed, was approved nearly imanituously b% it popular referendun, Altholigh if majority of the voters probabl woolcl have approved te h new constitution in a free vote, the referendum offers little guide to popular acceptance of the Clew instilli(i0l's hccallse the le was thoroughly rigged. The provisions of the colistilution for Iraasfer cif political power have so far been unlesle(I. Presidential are) Icgisliltive elections were held in late I but Mobutu was the only candidate for 1'resideol, and all cautdida(es for the National Ass(�tnbl (,,ow National le�gishitive Council) were nl+mtbers of his official part%, the hipid ar Moveuuvit of the fi+�volntion (N1 I'll). When Ilse legislature convened in December 1970, it passed as c(:nstilutional aluendinent declaring the MPH to he the supreme natia)nal ius6(111(11 as well -is the sole legal party lay mid -1972 the legislature had taken sbap,� as an atilt of the MI'li, serving to reinforce Mobt1(u's centralised control of the party's nationw struc�lure ralhertban representing local inleresYs. Mobutu has rfeutrdized opposition politic ;d activity. ;rod there do nut appear to be an) individuals or groups strong eoougli to cltsrllenge hit,, as long as Ie relains the support of the army. Guerrilla ac�livity, puce� troublesome, has been mducf�d. and there remain only srtlall bun(Is ol' reliefs engaged most in banditry. Neither Nlohulu nor the MITI ha. getserated +tdespremi enthusiasm. but popular discoutenls are The army is Ihv indispensable tnaillst;av of the Mobutu government, yet Mohutu's c�oulrol of the ;ariti depends on dw conlinual balancilig of divisive clerlu�nls. It was alit agunis"I Alnong Ihese satilt groups which fractured Ili,- prein,lependenc�e Force Puhl(qur into several competing armies shortly ;after inde pet"I" ce in 1960. Mobutu has managed to restrain traditional ethnic rivalries among officers by keeping his old cronies from the Force Puhl(que' ill key cuuuuand positions, but each year pressures intensify from the younger, better educated officers for as change. Mobutu met these pressures head on irl Jul 1072 by retiring nine of the amity's 1(i general officers ;atid proceeding with an extensive shakeup of the high (If ill's na;lnc!, apparently calculated to tighten his leverage over the younger men usstiming key conunands. Military discipline, however, remains generally lax, ;rod troops reinforcing meager police units in rural areas 1 0111111011 IV ablise civilians. Mobutu's foreign policy is motivated I)v a fear of :onfmunist support to Zairian dissidents, as well as by economic need. Although professing nonalignment in accorda nce with his wish to assert leadership over ilia; r more radical African countries, he depends APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 primarily oil the� West for economic and ntilit.ry aid Mobutu is extremely wary of Coniumnio su11xrt io Zairian dissideat.. Nevertheless. in early 14173 he was opt-illy cerltivatinK more cordial relalions witn the Soviet Union. China, and N :aster, E.t3ropean (:otnmunist countries, but he apix�ared as determined as ewer to limit the scolx� af Conontinist mnk%ion, in !.oleo. At the same time, iielKian- Zairian relation% are solidly constructive. despite Mobutu'.. occasional propaganda ploys against Re�igian residents and his persistent eff:rl, to diversify Zaire's sources of official aid and private inves(ments. The U nitc�d states continues to provide important economic and rnilitarN assistance. In African affairs Mobnhr has shown a tendency to meddle in the internal affairs of ne,rby countries, particularly Congo. While he has condemned continued white rule in southern Africa, his government has been realistic in its action., usually viewing liberatioti movements in light of Zairian %elf interest. 'Lair(-' relations with Portugal are a good example of Moheatu's use al pragnrulisrn. For several years Zaire has given safe haven and training facilities to Holden Roberto's Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA whose goal is to free Angola from Portuguese control. Zaire depends to some extent, Ito sever. on the Benguela Railroad through Angola for the exlx)rt of copper frorn Shaba Region. For this reason. Mobutu has tried to avoid conflict with Ilartugal, and in the spring of 1970 Zaire restored partial diplomatic contacts with tho colonial power. allhortgh forma) diplomatic relation,, severed in 1966, have not been restnned. Oil the economic front the Mobutu government has sought to stimulate econornic development through fiscal and tnonet:.ry wforn and the enc�ouragetnent of foreign private iovrament. By 1968 the currenc c! had been stabilized, the national hudgel was !,lanced, and foreign exc�hunge reserves were steadily increasing. In 1969 the Zaire Government promulgated it favorable cock and also reached in amicable settle�nu�nt of the hitter dispi le arising from Mohutu's abrupt nationalization of Belgian-owned copper nines in early 1967. Since early 1970, however, Zaire's strong financial position has been eroded by the decline in world market prices for copper Zaire's principal expurr product. The drop in copper earrings caused ,t loss of ..erne $30 million in Z.6re's net foreign assets by the end of 1970, and u small surplus in the gover inent's budget in 1969 has given way to a budgetary deficit of about $1311 million in 1971. Mobutu has responded with ,a series of belt- tightening measures which show N hi, determination to prevent a spiraling budgetary deficit and monetary inflation. If austerity *treasures am ftally enfolvvd, however, they inevitably will create appruviable increases in eanemployment on the part of urban dweller., among whom political consciousness is greutml, Although it apim -ar, that the adverse financial trend caul he overcome b% 1975, present financial pressures tnay seriou.l% aggravate Zaire's chronic social and political problems. 'The government has been unt;ole significantly to improve living standards for the majority of the people. 'Tribui anitnosities simmer beneath the surface. The regime's main prop�the urrn ---is poorly trained and disciplined and is hated in the countryside The administrative centralization of lilt- government, although un improvement over the previously chaotic situation. has not greatly increased efficiency. Coordination between the central govertment and certain provinces is lacking, and provincial governors often feel neglected, isolated, and powerless to av( as effective surrogates for the government. The inade of the trunsimrtution system have allowed such an extensive loss of contact sith local atathorities that in some outlying areas, the people feel lhense�lve, abandoned by the national officials. Perhaps the most serious flaw is the absence of any effective sm- cessor to Mobutu. If he is suddenly removed from the scene, chaos may result until Another stronginao enwrKcs. B. Structure and functioning of the government (C:) Although the trappings of constitutional representu- tive government have been preserved in Zaire, the political r+.�alil% since 1955 has been one- tnut, authoritarian rule. Although Mobutu commands a degree of power which fur surpasses that of his predecessors, his regime has faced an uphill task in providing an administrative structure approaching the highly centralized and efficient systern which existed under (lit Belgians. The ,ize of Zaire (905,000 square miles, tote� elhnic and social diversity of its people, and t:rr poor internal communication and transportation facilities have created harriers to the exercise of central government authority. 'Zairian leadership still tends to govern by improvisation rather than set principles and laws Ad hoc actions and endless political nnrncuvering remain important methods of operation, although the overall trend has been toward increased concentration of power in Mobotu's hands. Much of the political instability of the first years of independence sprung frorn disagreement over the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 relatiore.lnip 11411"'een the� evidrel gencrntrien :and the Pro %ince*. Crider the� R vIgi;ut co;otnia) .sstrm the six province. "re considered admini subdivisions of the' colory rather than sc par:cte Political ernti!ie�s. At iodepold �rice utne Z airimi political leaders uailled to retain IIIv centralized r. slena, 11,11 others ;advcc�;ctr�d a federal syslenn with it high degrev of pra ial autonomy. This dispute wa% a factor in the sccr�sion in 1W) of Kala nga Pnovinca� (now Slia11a Region! and of the eastern part of K:, Province (nos, ti; (3rienhal Region), 11 11014 the 1111nn11er of province. had Ic�ru increased to 21, and ill 1964 the federal sv.tetn Has codified in a new constitution After assuming the presidency, Moloa1,1 forcefully exerted the central governmavnl s ;otthoritv over th;� local political in.tititlious. 11% thy end of If"i It(- had successfully consolid all significant ro!itic ;al control in the central goyernrtu�rat. The number of provinces sr :as reduced 141 eight. and Ina. iticial lxrli:ical institutions, such as cabinets ;and asse=nblics, saen� abolished. altinongh :advisory provincial councils were lermilled. All provincial governor. ;and high officials were made ciyil serv;mts of till� central governmment. 1pliointe(I 1 and directly reslc,nsilte to the President. In June� 1967. Zaire prom iflgate'd its third c�oristitn; ion in just over 7 sears. This c�onstilution provid for a unitary and republican form of government. The provincial fragmentation which haul developed after indepe ndelace� and which Haas codified in tile 1964 constitution was officiall aIoiisilecl, and those jmwers previously retained by th uittcnortnons provinces were centralized ira the presidency. Althoaagh the constitution t three branches of government at the nutioti:a! level (Figure I E executivc, legia,itiye, and judicial �and provides a .etnblarace of checks and balances among them� in practice the legislature and jndici:ary have� crercised no real restraint i the- Presidennt. The sec�tioti of tilt, constitution dealing 'undanu�ntal rights is taken l;ergely from the 11)(i-I constitution. The pvw section is much shorter than tut, previous one. as it tends toward it general defiraitio a of basic rights imtead of a specific inventory. Articles protecting religious freedom, farraily structure, the right of till- individual to fair trial, and humane treatment after arrest are ineietde�d, along with several other freedorns prescribed by the U.N. haitnan rights conventions. The constitution guarantees the right to farm labor unions ;and to strike as 1011 ;is these rights are exercised in conformity with the law, tahnic aracl r. ;vial discrimination in enaplo% nt and (,(Il I( is forbidde anel for the fiat tune Women are grained the right to vote. I� National government a. h ce�cutire According ta the I(Xi7 c�onstit,1tiori. the President of Republic� is elected to it pear terra In direct unive suffrage. with an absolute lmiority of the b:allols cast retl,1iic�el for elec�tinn. In practice, the popular election is :i Inert formality. ;a� tI,e presidential eandidala� must be Imminated by the Political Bureau of the MPR, the only legal p:u;%. Although Mobutu seized power and declared himself President in November I!�1(i5, he was not duly norninuted and elected until November 11170. The colistitutiona clots not provide for a vice president. I the event of the Presidents death, resiglation, or irnpeachnte' tit� the president of the National t 'gislativv Coulcil is to ;act its President until :a new Chief t is clecte�d. The election to fill an 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 FIGURE Structure -of govemr. 9nt (U /OU) unexpired term must take place within 90 days after the office has been vacated. The constitution vests in the President extensive executive and legislative powers. By way of comparison, the Zairian President in effect is delegated all those powers vested in the U.S. President, all the prerogatives reserved to the separate states by the U.S. Constitution, and significant legislative powers which in the U.S. system are granted to the Congress and to the legislative bodies of local governments. Under the Zairian system the President has the power to appoint and dismiss all high officials of the central and local governments, all officers of the military and national police, and all magistrates of the criminal and civil courts without recourse to legislative or judicial review or approval. He also has an extensive legislative role. While the constitution provides for a two thirds vote in th legislature to override a presidential veto, Mobutu has the political force e, smother any such attempt. !n addition the President can bypass the National Legislative Council by submitting inportai legislation to a popular referendum. In deter.: ;wing foreign policy, the President has complete freedom and does not have to submit treaties or agreements reached with other nations for review or ratification by the legislature. The constitution provides for the impeachment of the President, but the machinery for doing so has never been completed. Although he has immunity from criminal liability for his official acts, this immunity does not extend to high treason or the intentional violation of the constitution. If two thirds of the National Legislative Council vote that impeachment proceedings be brought, the President must be tried by a constitutional court, The constitution provides that a separate law shall define high treason and willful violation of the constitution and shall establish the procedure to be followed by the constitutional court. Neither the court nor the legal requirements had been created by late 1972. The President's cabinet, according to the 1967 constitution, consists of an unspecified number of ministers appointed by and directly responsible to the President, who defines their areas of responsibility. In a cabinet reorganization in March 1969, Mobutu introduced the concept of four "superministers" �the Ministers of State �each charged with coordinating certain specific activities of the full cabinet. Mobutu, however, became increasingly distrustful of the stronger personalities in the cabinet and was reluctant to delegate a coordinating roh to anyone. By December 1970, when the position c f Minister of State was abolished, the cabinet had lost all pretensions of 4 formulating national policies. and cabinet ministers were essentially the senior executive of their respective departments. In successive reshuffles since 1970, Mobutu has tended to select nee+ ministers from the higher echelons of the civil service, to rotate the more competent ministers before they gain firm control of a particular department, an,l to remove obviously incompetent executives. Although the net result has been it distinct trend toward higher technical competence, Mobutu also has carefully maintained a geographic and an ethnic balance among cabinet ministers. In August 1972 the Political Bureau of the MPR announced that the cabinet and the party's National Executive Committee would be combined to form a National Executive Council.' This reform is intended to consolidate the supremacy of the MPR over the national government in accordance with it December 1970 constitutional amendment. The National fr -.ecutive Council has primary responsibility for implementing all policy directives of the Political Bureau concerning the party as well as the executive components of the government. President Mobutu presides over both the Political Bureau and the National Executive Council, and the difference: in their functions appears to be one of degree, with the new Council more directly concerned with concrete administrative matters. According to a presidential decree issued in October, the former government ministries were redesignated departments, the heads of departments became known as state commissioners, and deputy state commissioners were included in the National Executive Council. Although the formation of the new body has not involved it basic reorganization of the principal executive components, the former Interior Ministry is now the Department of Political Affairs and has assumed the additional function of coordinating MPR activities with government administrative functions at and local levels. b. Legislature Under the provisions of the 1967 constitution, the parliament was converted from a bicameral legislature to the unicameral National Assembly. In October 1972 the Political Bureau of the MPR announced that henceforth the National Assembly was to be known as the National Legislative Council and its members as People's Commissioners. Presumably only the official 'For a current listing of key government officals, consult Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of foreign Gouemments, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 E title of the legislature and its members have been changed. and other provisions of the constitution regarding the former National Assembly now apply to the National Legislative Council. All members of the legislature are elected to it 5 -year term by direct and secret universal suffrage on the basis of one member for 50,000 citizens. An additional member can be elected for any remaining fraction of population of 25,000 citizens or more. The legislature elected in November 1970 has -120 members, all of whom belong to the MPR. Although the 1967 constitution originally authorized two political parties, an amendment passed in December 1970 states that the MPR is the only legal party. In addition, the amendment sanctions previous regulations .which in effect preclude anyone from being elected to the legislature as an independent candidate. The constitution also stipulates that a member of the legislature who leaves his party also forfeits his seat in the legislature. According to the constitution, legislative authority is shared by the National legislative Council and the President of the Republic, but the Presidents particular prerogatives enab.e him to virtually control the whole legislative process. Although the legislature as well as the President can initiate legislation, the legislatures initiative is limited to specific areas, including civil rights, electoral regulations, and military obligations. In each case actual implementa- tion of the law is dependent on presidential initiative. The legislature may also establish "basic principles" in certain areas, but legislation in these fields can be effected only by presidential decree. Included in this group are labor legislation, finances, national defense, and administration of the local governments. The legisl iture does have the right to discuss the government budget, but it must defend to the satisfaction of the President any changes it proposes. The initiative for revision of the constitution is likewise shared by the National Legislative Council and the President. An affirmative vote by two- thirds of the legislature is required for a constitutional amendment, but the President may submit a proposed amendment to a popular referendum� requiring only a simple majority for acceptance without approval of the legislature. When the National Assembly convened for the first time in December 1970, it hec.:ne apparent that Mobutu would contro; the legislative process through members of the MPR Political Bureau whom he appointed to key positions in the legislature. Most important were the president of the National Assembly and the chairmen of three permanent committees for political, administrative-, and judicial functions, economic and financial functions, and social and cultural affairs. The three permanent comntittevs are made up of 25 subcommittees, each of which was alloted an area of responsibility corresponding to that of a ministry or other major executive agency. During the first two regular sessions of the assembly, .which convened in April and October 1971, five constitutional amendments and I 1 ordinary laws proceeded smoothly from the President through the Political Bureau and the legislative committees to the floor of the legis' 'tire, where they were passed with some debate ov.- ;Ietails and a few dissenting votes. By the end of the National Assembly's first year the legislature, through this process, had become established as essentially responsive to Mobutu's directives but distinctly more t1w.a a rubberstarnp. Although some of the constitutional amendments and laws --re merely empty proclamations, the national budget was scrutinized and discussed for 2 months before passage without significant revisions, and the various legislative subcommittees diligently worked out the details of other substantive measures. Apparently the subcommittees were assuming genuine monitoring functions over the central government ministries, and individual members of the legislature, as they plodded through the mandatory semiannual tours of their electoral districts, were likewise monitoring the performance of local administrators. Mobutu has taken precautions to ensure that the National Legislative Council is a reliable and businesslike body. dis decision, made prior to the legislative election in 1970, that candidates could not represen! their home districts has tended to prevent a reemergence of the tribalism and regionalism which prevailed in the former parliament. At the same time, Mobutu's directive that each member must visit his electoral district semiannually and submit a full report of his activities has made the peoples commissioners more aware of their representative functions, although the typical commissioner on tour has slight incentive for creating genuine rapport with the populace. Further, Mobutu's emphasis on the commissioner's watchdog functions encourages the member to snoop on government and party officials in the field, thereby initiating a new check on the local levels of the established hierarchy. On the whole, the legislature appears to be serving Mobutu fairly well as it supplementary channel for dispensing largesse to loval citizens of some local standing, for disseminating his directives to the countryside, and for reporting the more flagrant derelictions of lower echelon bureaucrats. 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 c. Judiciary The judiciary is targets a holdover from the colonial past, although important reforms have begun. A 1967 rdinance called for an general overhaul of the system within a 10 -year period. Two important reforms, the creation of a Supreme Court and the establishment of a third court of appeals (in Kisargani), have already been implemented. Additional planned reforms are designed to create a more workable s�stenn by integrating traditional and modern court structures and by setting up all organized legal profession. The Belgian colonial administration grafted the metropole's legal system onto the various networks of traditional indigenous jurisprudence. In tle lower courts the result %vas a dual system of ta%v, one for Europeans and one for Congolese. At the hottorn of the dual system tribal courts dispensed customary law in disputes affecting relations between tribal members; they also had jurisdiction over minor criminal offenses. Trial for more seriaus offenses was reserved to the European system. Cinder ti r- planned reforms a system of peace tribunals will replace the myriad of tribal chief courts, sector courts, communal courts, police courts, and zonal courts which are still operating. According to the 1968 ordinance which created the peace tribunals, it minimum of one tribunal in cacti zone and city will have jurisdiction over all dispr s falling under traditi( .ial law and in criminal disputes where the maximum penalties are 2 months imprisonme or a fine of 2 zaires (i z aire equals US$2). Above this level the reform calls for a simplified hierarchy with subregional courts, courts of first instance, courts of appeal, and it Supreme Court in Kinshasa. The subregional court is a formal law court, consisting of three judges and it public prosecutor, which operates in each subregional capital. Cases involving a maximum prison terra of up to 5 years or fines exceeding 2 zaires fall under the jurisdiction of the subregional courts. The subregional courts also have jurisdiction over cases normally handled by tilt: peace tribunals when the disputes or infractions invoke it police officer, tribal chief, or mayor. 1'he capitals of the regions maintain courts of first instance which try cases involving penalties ranging from 3 years servitude to capital punishment. T he courts of first instance also have appellate jurisdiction over the subregional court. The courts of first instance are staffed by a chief judge, two other justices, and a public prosecutor. Three judges are needed to hear criminal case!. Capital criminal cases involving political f igure s, however. are rarely brought before the courts of first instance. The Mobutu government 6 has preferred to use military courts for such cases, in violation of the provisions of the 1967 constitution. Courts of appeal are located in Lubumbashi, Kinshasa, and Kisangani. The� Supreme Court of ju%tiee, %%�Inch %vas set up in November 1968, is the highest appellate tribunal in Zaire. The Supreme Court's decisions are hinding upon all the lower courts and tribunaL:. It also judges cases involving ministers, triemhers of the National Legislative Council, counselors of the \,et to -he- created Constitutional Court, and nragistrate of the Supreme Court. Pending the formation of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court is the repository of constitutional review power, making the court the equivalent of its U.S. counterpart. The projected Constitutional Court is not it court in the normal sense but, rather. it commission charged with interpreting the constitution and upholding its supremacy as the la%w of the land. The court, when created. will he composed of nine counselo serving nonrenewable terms of 9 wars, %with one -third leaving office each 3 years. One -third of the counselors are to he chosen by the Preside,t, one -third by the Nationai Legislative Council, and one -third Im the Supreme Council of the Magistrates (see below). Formal criminal investigation procedures in Zaire are it legacy of the Belgian system. Officers of the court handle criminal investigation as well as prosecution. The National Gendarmerie is used primarily to maintain civil order and has little investigative authority. Under the Mobutu regime the National Documentation Center :ND) and its predecessor, the Surete .Nationale, and the army usurped marry of the powers of the courts and the local police authorities. Both the CND and the arm\ engage in arbitrary measures against suspected opponents of the regime, and both Z airians and foreigners are subject to searches, arrests, detainments, and punishments without recourse to formal judicial procedures. In several cases involving corruption in government or having heavy political overtones, such as the trials in June 1966 of four former ministers accused of plotting a coup, military tribunals have been substituted for the regular civilian courts. The judicial system suffered severely from the departure of Belgian magistrates in 1960. For over 2 years The Congo was left Without any trained jurists or magistrates, except for a few in secessionist Katanga Province (ren amed Shaba Province in 1911 and rto%v designated Shaba Region). Under a U.N.- sponsored program in 1962, it number of foreign jurists and legal advisers were recruited to assist in keeping the court system going. 'I'll( foreign personnel aiO the few APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110002 -1 qualified Zairian magistrates, however, are not able to administer the judiciary effective1% over the entire countr%, and in inan% areas formal judicial procedtires have been nonexistent for prolonged periods. There art- Zairian judges at all levels of the inagist rat tire, but presiding judges. especially in Ile courts, of first instance, are mostly foreigners. The Chief ju.itice of tile. Supreme Court is Zairian, but at least two associate justices are not. Tit(- government hopes that by the time the reforms are completely implemented, Zairians will have occupied these positions. The judicial reform provides that ne%%. magistrates will he chosen by the President on the advice of the Supreme Council of the Magistrates, which has riot v(,-t been created. It is expected that thi council will give the President dominant power over the magistrates and, therefore, over the entire system of justice, A 1968 ord;riance created a Zairian bar and regulated its membership. Several terms of tit( document, however, are not expected to be put into effect until Zaire has developed its own body of lawyers. 2. Local government As President Mobutu has progressively tightened centralized control, territorial components of tile government have become mere administrative subdivision,, rather than autonomous 1) entities. In order to emphasize tit(- primacy of tile central government, in juiv 1972 the offici designations for all territorial components except ti lowest echelon were changed, although the boundaries of each component remained tit(- same. Following are the former and the present designatiois for territorial components along xvith the number of cxisting units at each level: FoRNIER PRESENT Nup-tBER Province Region 8 District Subregion 24 Territory Zone 131 Local collectivity Local collectivity 446 Zairians gained their first practical experience in self front the commune system which tile Belgians established in urban areas in 1957. The cities were divided into ccinnitines, and each commune elected its own mayor and coun'JI. Te elected commune officials, in turn, acted as in advisory group to the city mayor, who) after independence was appointed by the President. A 1968 ordinance. however, eliminated the communal councils and centralize(] urban decisionmaking in the citN mayor and his appointive colincil. Since 1968 tile cornintilles have to exist, but as niere administrative subdivisions of the ci Their loss of autonom% %kas fully recognized in July 1972, when coniniones %%ery redesignated as urban Zones. Front the zonal administrative level upward, the government is staffed largel% b% presidential apl)ointcts in supervisory positions jnd by career civil servants on the %%orkii ig level. ']'It(-%(- officials are charged with nuinerotis duties. including the maintenance of law and order, supervision of education and the mails, and implementation of tit(- government's welfare programs. The administrative centralization of the Mob(itu ,overninent, although an improvement over the previously (Aiaotic situ d oes lo t a%jpear to li ve greatly increased administrative efficien cN Ther" is it lack of coordination bet%%een the ce-itral government an(] certain regions, leading regional officials to feel neglected, isolated, an(] 1)o%% to act as an effective part of the governmental inechanism. Regional administrations have been deprived of their independent revenue base and planning awonoiny. Aithough this has probabl% cut down ()it lo corruption, matters of regional and local interest imist be decide, in Kinshasa. there is considerable bureaticratic redtape and corruption, altbough corruptioii is not its flagrant as it in the early 1960's. On the stibregional level, central ,Yovernnieri_t ad nll Itist rat often have trouble getting around in their areas because of inadequate transportation; this has led to it breakdown of' central government cont %%"tit local authorities in some areas. Frequently, an(] especially at tit(' zonal level. the central governmeW official is isolated from the inliabit I)e o f hi ignorance of tit(. loc language or custonis. CmIttiral gap have widened sin 1966. when Mobutu beg to assign administrative officials to posts ontside their home regions in order to make it more difficult for them to acquire personal influence within their jurisdictions. The inability of administrative officials to deal effectively with local inhabitants has resulted in the placing of greater reliance on traditional authorities that was the norm during the colonial era. A 1969 ordinance on local administration reflects Mobkou's realistic acceptance of existing conditions. As called for ky the ordinance, the traditional village chi within each Collectivity comprise a local administra- tive council, which has primary responsibility for law enforcement, road Mai 11 te"a lice, and other basic services. Each local comicil nominates its own leader, but the latter's appointment nju b confirmed bv 0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 higher authorities, front tit(- zonal commissioner ill) to the Minister of' Interior (no%% State Commissioner of Political Affairs). Higher authorities can also appoint to the local Councils additional members, who arc not traditional chiefs, arid the council leader need not be a traditional chief. Sinco- the ranking officials at higher zonal echelons also hold equivalent positions in the MPR, their power of appointment enables theni to pack the local councils with party activists, thereby exerting firm control over the councils. in more reinote areas, where local party cadres are still embryonic. a local party official mav hold the tille of council leader, but he functions merely its an intermediary between traditional chief% arid administrative officials at tire zonal headquartersi. 3. Civil service As it result of the abrupt departure of the Belgian administrators ia July 1960, the fop Zairian civil servants were forced to assume itities far beyond those for %vhich they were trained. Tire efficiency of the civil service was decreased further by the introduction during that sairie year of inexperienced and incompetent Political appointees into the central arid provincial government ministries. By late 1966 tit(- ranks (if the civil service had swellcd from the 12,(XXI employed in 1960 to some 20,W0 perinanent employees and an estionated 105,000 persons hired tinder contract. Many of the new government employees were political appointees. By an ordinance promulgated on .30 March 1966, teachers were also given civil service status. An official anno in August 1970 tivit there were 45,W0 persons, iticluding teachers, in the career civil service reflects the government's effort to ,Ireamfine and improve the quality of the system. During 1966 and carly 1.467 the IMobutu regime institutcd reforms design2d to reduce the number of political appointees and to attract educated personnel to government service. A bzisic reform was the rule ',hat civil administrators in the interior were to be assigned to areas outside their native regions. This attack oil tribalism, regionalism, and the regional political personality hits been effective. 'I'll,- regional commissioners now look to Kinshasa for support rather than to local sources. The subordination of the regional administrations to central authority hits also limited the opportunities of local leader.% to pad the local civil service with their political supporters. There has been some sacrifice i" administrative efficiency it) the interest of politica! neutrality. Ilegional cortimissioners have to spend a great dcal of time gaining a rudimentary knowledge of their regions, and tire% are subject to frequent transfer. Moreover, oil the Zonal level, which is usual]% a relatively homogenous ethnic unit, the civil ad,ninistrallor is often viewed its air outsider. The effect has been to alienate rather than encourage local identification %vith tit(- Kinshasa government. To increase the number of educated personnel in tit(- civil service the Mobutu government imposed a 2- year mandator% service obligation (.)it university graduates. After the 2-year tour, the graduate call choose to remain in government and receive seniority anu 1 )ension rights for the time served, or to leave government service without having accrued siich benefits. Mobutu itistructed ministry an(] department heads to utilize the graduates in responsible positions rever possible as an incentive for them to remain after their 2-year tour. Almost 350 graduates had completed theirservice in 1970, helping to bring about it noticeable improvement in tipper level administra- tive services. In addition to its recruitment of iniversity graduates, the Mobutu government has sought to strengthen the National School of Administration, whiAi began in 1961 to provide short, specialized courses for civil service personnel. By mid- 1971, when the schoo! was incorporated with the National Universitv, it was providing a 4-yvar program for prospective administrative offic( rs. C. Political dynainics (S) The primary political factors in Zaire are Mobutu's supreme authority, sanctioned in tit(- national constitution adopted in 1967, arid the tenacitN of tribal and regional ties which tend to limit presidential g power in practice. Despite Mobutii's unchallenged political supremacy, the executive agencies lie conimand- have otily limited effectiveness. Although Mobuttl employs many strategems for (-losing the gap between authority and practice, lie Itas come to rely increasingly oil the MPR. Mobutu formed the MPR in 1967 arid immediately employed it to gain popular approval for his new constitution. 'Fit,- presidential and legislative elections of 1970 confirmed his control of the MPR arid tire party's monopoly of all overt political activity. Since 1970, Mobwttj hits sought to consolidate the primacy of the NIPR ovcr the civil govertintent, the army, organized labor, in(] even the various religious institutions in Zaire. Zairians, however, have not forgotten that Mobutu was able to declare himself President in November 1965 without open resistaitce primarily because lie was supreme commander of the armed forces. This historic event is still relevant, despite Mobutu's early removal APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 of army offi front high civil positions, bec ti naticAwide structure of the MPR has not yet developed the mass popular support that would be required to maintain its nominal predominance over tile army without Mobutu's backing. Since Mobutu has tamed organized labor and suppressed all former oppositionist groups, it appears that whoever holds effective command of the arm%- upon Mobutu's departure front the scene could declare himself President and encounter no more resistance than (lid Mobutu in 1965. Mobutu., however, has maintained his essentially personal control of the army by counterbalancing rival senior officers its well as rival factions among younger officers. This strategy has succeeded so well that it is seareel% conceivable that any individual could (Itiiekly acquire the scild army support that Mobutu developed front 1460 to 196-3. In the absenct- of j military leader who commands broad respect or genuinelv professional discipline throughotit tile arm% Mobutu's demise could trigger a recurrence of tile army schisms or slicer paralysis which accompanied the secessionist movements in the early 1960's. Mobutu's persistent undercutting of potentiai rivals in the army and in the civilian components of tile government has tended to gloss over but also j�rpetuate an intrinsic lack of institutional cohesion. I iaire has a new generation of tit least teclinicaliv qualified executives in many pivotal positions, but almost none has had extensive experience at making independent decisions. fit the absenc v of all obvious successor to Mobutu, it is possible that it few strong personal i ties could collaborate sufficiently to maintain the minirnum essentials of a central government�as (lid Mobutu and several kev civilian officials ;11 tile early 1960's. But the centrifugal forces of tribalism and regionalism, which produced the tumultuous events of the. 1960's discussed helo%v, would alp. certainly be revived to sonic degree. 1. Tribalism, regionalism, and insurgency (1960-65) Belgium's sudden grant of independence to its Congo colony in 1960 precipitated 5 years of turmoil, with one insurgent movement after another engulfing large sectors of tile country. Although these movements adopted the trappings of modern secessionist governments, the underlying forcc- were traditional tribal loyalties and various regional interests which had grown tip during the colonial cra. For instance, the secessionist regime in Katarga Province which lasted front July 1960 to January 1963, drew its strength from an anti-Luba tribal alliance as well w. tit(- vested interest, of a modern industrial complex, all held together I)% tit(.- Westernized Moise Tshombe. By contrast, tit(- "Simba" revolt, wideli overran easte rn all(] northeastern Congo from tnid- 1964 to inid-1965, was essenti a series of spontaneous peaslmt uprisings, spearheaded by local voutlis who had absorbed just enough Western culture to resent their inal-ility to advance thro modern vocations. This movement was exploited 1) Corninunist-oriented politicians who proclaimed a short-lived "Popidar IlevOhitionary Governinent" in S(atileyville (nov Kisangani), but the politicians failed to gain e"k-etive control of the peasant guerrillas. Consequently thery was far inow bloodshed and chaos than had occurred during the Katangan secvssion. aud tile central government's control is still relatively weak tit tit(- areas devastated hy tit( Simlws. Hiis epoch of rampant tribalism is no%% seen its the inevitable restilt of Belgian paternalism, rigorously maintained undl it was far too late for impatient Congolese politicians to develop parties of sufficient breadth to maintain it strong national government. Following World War 11, while Britain and France %ecred toward accominodatioi of naseent African 11 ationalism, Belgium ignored political advances for the Congolest- 'avor of increasing social service. BN 1960 a full 5WY of indigenous children were attending priniar% school, yet no Congolese had attained officr %tatus in tit(- Force Publique or in the civil service. Although tribal cultural a%sociations we re encouraged, nationalistic organizations were banned until 1959, when hitherto tight controls oil the press ai)d oil public meetings were f inally rep, jled. As late as 1958 most Belgians were convinced that independenc, for their c(,Ioti% could he deferred at least 30 years after it was attained in neighboring French British territories. Belgian coin pl acencv was abrupt1% shattered by tile January 1959 riots in Kinshasa. and colonial authorities, who also were reacting to shifting p pressures in Belgium. reconciled thernselves to a transitional prcgram which could lead to indepen- dencc in 5 years. In carl% 1960 roundtable conferences %%ere held in Brussels %%ith Congolese leaders of 21 embryonic political parties, mostly tribal or regional in composition. Ignoring Belgian suggestions for interim measures, the Congolese demanded full independence on 30 June 1960, and the Belgians yielded. The hastily organized provincial and national elections in MaV were contested by nearly M) parties, mostly focused on local issues. The on( party which operated oil a national level� Patrice Lumumba's Congoiese National Movement (MNC)�won 33 of 1,37 seats in tile Chamber of 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 Deputies, more than any other part%. Lumuniba became Premier by including in his cabinct representatives of almost all the 15 parties that had seats in parliament. Joseph Kasavubti, leader of tile Kongo tribal association. was elected President by parliament following a similar bargaining process. Tile flimsiness of this facadc of unity soon became evident. Within 3 months of Independence I)ay, the army mutinied, tile countrv's two richest areas�Katantra Province and the eastern half of Kasai Province� seceded, Kasavubu and Lumuntba dismissed (-,tell other, and Colonel Mobutu, then tit(- strongest of competing army commanders, assurned control of the central government'. In February 1961 Mobutu bowed out tc. Kasavubij. who remained President until Mobutu's bloodless seizure of full power in November 1965. During this period Kasavubu maintained a semblance of' consWutional government in Kinshasa while four secessionist governments %%ere put down through the cumulative efforts of a Uniied Nations task force, it partially reformed Congolese ari several white mercenary units, and military assistance missions front Belgium, tit( United States, Israel, and ItaIN. 'I lie Kin government also carne to rely heavily oil fo�!ign technical and financial assistaiwe to keep its central ministries functioning arid to restore civil administration in areas .%'here virtual anarchy h-ld prevailed. Under these circumstances tile exectitive ministries. with foreign consultants in key positions, supplanted parliament its tit(- effecti�_ arm of goverument. Successive prerniers, however, oc- casionally felt compelled to elicit votes of confidence from the legislature for their more significant measures. Many members still wielded serne influence in their home areas, and parliament retained it measure of popular iespect as it syn-,bol of independence from foreign domination. The halting, partially disguised Aift of political power front parliatoentarians to holders of key executive positions was manifested in tile rise arid fall of Pritno Minister Adoula, held office from August 1961 to july 1964, far longer titan any other prime minister. Adoula, who had received his start as a labor leader before independence, emerged as the only individual who could get it nearly unanimous vote of confidence from a special reconciliation session of parliament, held at Lovanium University under the protection of United Nations troops. Adoula was acceptable to) otherwise bitterly divided factions because lie was art adroit mediator without a popular following of his own. Yet even Adoula could not maintain an effective coalition ill such it fragmented body. President Kasavubu fivallv dissolved parliament in September M6. a stalemate developed over tit(- orojected constitution. With parliament dissolved. the Adoula government retained full legislative po%ver�theorefically by presidential decree. in fact by consensus of fit(- Binza group discreetly inconspictious group composed of ariny commander Mobutu and our civilian officials whose key positions gave them effective .-ontroi of tile other security services, goveimuent firiatwes. and fireign affairs, particularIN tit(- %iial flow of foreign aid. Shortly after Adoula formed his large. unwieldy cabinct ill August 1961, these five men had begull ineeting rcioiiarlN in Binza, it stiburb of Kinshasa, to c(ml !heir activities its Adoula's closest advisers. Two of the four civilians not only %%ielded extensivc executive power in A(Iotjla behalf but contrilmted some political leverage of their 4mil. Justin Botuboko, Minister of Foreign Affairs front independence until April 196-3, was also leader of' a triballN based party ill Equateur Region. Victor Nendaka riot only took firm command of tit(- former coloniid Surete, but inoided it into all effeetive political instrument with nitich broader geographic range titan anyr regular party. The Adoula government. with massive foreign assistance, succeeded in suppresAng three secessionist reginies by January 1963 and made it good start toward reconstructing disrupted public services in some sectors of the country. Adoula failed, however. to cope with peasant uprisings which started in Bandundu Region in January 1964 and in eastern Con,o in April. These new emergencies impelled President Kasavubu to disiniss him and install Moise Tshotnhe Lis Prime Minister in July. I)espite Tshombe's notoriety as leader of the ill-fated Katangan secession, his impressive capabilities made him acceptable to many deputies front other provinces. )'et the changeover took place in tile absence of parliament, and the decisive factor the Biriza group's \vithdrawal of support front AAoula. By the tirne the first parliamentary elections since independence were held 'Ili April 1965, tit(.- peasant uprisings had been largel% suppressed, and Tshombe had assembled a coalition party which won it majo of seats in the new parliament. By mid-1965, however, tension had developed between Kasavubu and Tshombe, primarily because they had become rivals for the presidential office called for in the new constitution. Ili October, Kasavubu dismissed Tshornbe, but Tshombe's coalition in parliament held firm enough to deny a majority vote for Kasavubti's choice of a new premier. Mobutu broke the impasse APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 On 27) November, wben he declared himself President for .3 wars and named Colonei Mulainba its Premier along with a broadly representative civilian cabinet. On 28 November parliament unanitnously approved the Mulamba cabinet, and on I 0ecember Mobutu adjourned parliament and announced that lie would legislate by decree until the next regular session. Mobutu's takeover (if supreme atithority without ativ Open Oppo)sitiou manifested not only tit(- success ot his lono struggle to harness av unruly ariny but also the coil-etive failure (%f civi,ian leaders to establish it workail. political struett. The "Ibject surrender of parliarnei.t to Mobutu in Nw.ember was surprising because the constitution promulgated in August 1964 had appeared to bridge the worst gaps between tit(- European parliamentary system tentatively adopted in 1960 and the actual political conditions in Zaire. 'rhe nvw constitution legalized tit(.- 21 largely autonomous provinces wbich had emerged during 1962-63, yet the centrifugal forces appeared to b( offset bv a strong national presidency with sufficient executive authority t ride out irre opposition in parliament. This constitution might I-ive been inade to work if Kasavubti and Tshotilbe bad functioiied its true partners, but their eventual Confrontation revealed each to be standing on liollo%% legalisins. 1 Kasavubu did not comnitrid it really disciplined arm% or civil service, and tit( Binza group did not choose ',o exercise executive power for Kasavubu as it had done for Adoula. As for Premier 'I'shombe, his parlianientary coalition did not hold firm for it full nionth after Kasavubu dismissed It i m. Mobutu's coup showed that Tshornbe's supporters represented riterely a caticus among politicians lacked real popularsupport. In fact, the rapid spread of the. Siniba rebellion in 1964 had already revealed tit(- extent and depth of poptiLr alienation against the politicians had %%on election in 1960 by encouraging naive expectations of the material rewards of independence. For the bulk of the populace, indepen(knce had in fact brought privation which most of tit grassroots leaders had escaped by going to Kinshasa or the provincial capitals to sit in ineffectual legislative 6odies or fill newly available sinecures in the ministries. Consequently b 1964 peasant resentment against high-living politicians had sharply intensified decp-rooted tribal and regional antipathies toward the centrid government. By mid-1965 most of the peasant guerrillas had been militarily defeated, but Tshombe and his new allies in Kinshasa had done very little to counteraO the underlying popular alienation. 2. Mobutu's consolidation of executive authority 1966 J) Mobutu was able to proclaim himself P. %%ithout incurring real opposition in November 19K5 because It( held unrivaled eontrol (if the army. and most politicians realized that tit(-% had tit) other power structure capable of challenging lie ariny. Yet tit(- army was ;ntrinsically incapable of maintaining stable government. Lacking real professional discipline, the officer corps was still subject to factional splits. The troops were notorious for brutal -iistreatment of civilians wlivnevcr the%- "ere deplo% ed on quasi-police missions. Mobutu, who had aspired before indepen- detice to be a journalist or a politician, recognized the limitations of the army as a political ins.runient and procvedmi to consolidate his authorit,. h% kidding an -Aternative po%%er strtjc!ojr(-. By 1970. Mobutu had constric.-ted it Imlitical systent based on tit(- primacy of a single political 1);MN, which in sonic ways resembles the pattern in Gorninunist countries. I lis official part% tit( Popular Mo%vuient of the Revolution monopolizes political activit and is predominant the civil government its well its the labor and youth organizations. The part% ho%%vver, is essentially .it artificial creation, as it is not a niass movement shaped through a genuine truggle for independence. In fact, during his first years tit power Mobutu focused his print(- efforts on rcbuildi',g the centralized administrative structure of the fornwr Belgian ,ongo. Altbough tit( present civil adininistra- tion is still far less effective than tit(- Belgian model, Mobutu's authority to appoint. dismiss, and transfer government employees throughout tit(- coinitry gives him more real leverage over educated and politically conscious Zairians than does his control of t1w M111. Whi-n Mobutu assumed control in Kinshasa, lie had to deal with 2i provincial governments, each with elected assemblics and governors were responsible primarily to these assemblies rather than to tit( -entral government. As the provincial governments had bec-onic bastions of tribal and regional interests. an abrupt cancellation of their autonomous powers would have precipitated it intich more perilous test of strength than Mobutu's showdown with parliament. His alternative was to gradually reduo- tit(- power of the politicians who had gained some standing in their own homelands. His most decisive single move, a decree reducing the number of provinces front 2 to 12, was deferred until April 1966. when army units were full% deployed to squeich resistance. 'rhe Consolidated provincial assemblies then elected governors for the it( provinces in accordance with APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 the 1%.4 constitution, but Mobutu soon transferred most of the newly elected governors to othei provinces. 'rhe transfer of provincial wivernors from their local hases accompanied by a gradual reanitnatioti of central government ajencies operating in the provinces. lit July 1966 Mobutu nationalized the provincial I-w,)Iice Forces, which had been autonomous for several years'. By late 1966 the surele, firmly directed from Kinshasa since independence, lwd become the major instrument at the local level im diowing provincial politicians that presidential decrees could not be ignored with impunity, with armv units ready to intervene whenever concerte A .esistance appeared. lit September, Mobutu finally ordered local arm% commanders toassume administra- tive control in Tshombe's foriner stronghold of Sud- Katanga Province and in traditionaNy unruly Stid- Kivu. Hence the critical tests of strength had been w-ot by January 1967, when a presidential decree redticed the existing 12 provinces to the present eight, replaced the remaining elected governors with career civil servants. and reduced the provincial assemblies to mere consultative status. By late 1968 the process of regularly rotating all senior administrative officers in the provinces had largely curtailed their opportunities for developing significant influci-ce with local inhabitants. Compared with Mol)titti*s reassertion of the central government's authority over the provinces, his piecemeal dismantling of the parliamentary system in Kinshasa was a inere theatrical production. lit March 1966, when parliament reconvened "or the first time since Njobutu's takeover, lie gained confirmation of his authority to rule by decree for the duration of his presidency. lit Ociober, Mobutu simply infornied parliament that he had dismissed Prime Millistel. Mulaniba and henceforth would serve as Prime Minister as well as President. In April 1967 lie announced that a new constitution, confirming a strong presidential systern, would be submitted to a popular referendum. In June the refi-rendurn was conducted with such fanfare that the 92 affirmative vote became a great psychological victory for Mobutu over the politicians. Then he dissolved parliament, and elections for the reformed National Assembly (now the National Legislative Council) were deferre until November 1970. From Mobutu's takeover until his final dissolution of parliament, lie encounter( only one serious challenge from the politicians in Kinshasa. In May 1966 a plot to overthrow him was detected which involved four relatively minor politicians who apparently thought they had :.,jpi)ort from some 12 elentunts of the army. The officers they cindaelvd, however, reported them to Moblitti, aud he protnptl% had them hanged in a public square. There were rumors thai. public executions might touch off a popular uprising, as one of tit(- plotters was a fairly popular member of the Kongo tribe, w predominated in the area around Kinshasa. But tit(- Kongo tribesmen remained sullenly quiet, and the net result was enhanced respect for Mobutu's decisive usi of power. The belated convening of tit( National Assembl% in I)eeember 1970 marked the complete suix)rdination of tribal and regional interests under Mobutu's new political systent. The central Political Bureau of the MPR made the final selection of the part% slate of candidates. who ran unopposed in the so-called electious, and no candidate was permitted to rtin in his home area. Although members of the National Legislative Council must vi their electoral districts regularl% and are supposed to heed tit( nee(N of local inhithitants. the typical legislator i, as culturally isolated from his constituents its are the government administrative officers w-ho serve it) the provinces. ]'his systein does indeed dampen ethnic tensions iri the legislature, kut such a thormighly insulated bod% scarcely counteracts the notorious unresponsiveness of provincial administrative officers to local needs. Mobutu's comptilsion to neutralize tribalism is still a heavy impediment to the restoration of effective public services in the countryside. Mobutu still feels Compelled to maintain art ethnic balance in the National Executive Council WIhinet) and in the higher echelons of each ministry of (lie central government. This compulsion frekitiently piecludes placing the best qualified individual .;it an important post. Yet Mobutu has not succeeded in eliminating obscure pockets of tribalism within particular ministries which sometimes generate quietly obstructive tensions. lit the national capital as -,it the countryside, Mobutu's conquest of historically divisive forces is still superficial and inconclusive. 3. -Mobtitu and his top aides I)uring the first years of Iiis rule, while consolidating centralized control over th(. provinces and neutralizing popularly elected politicians, Mobutu also was building up his supreme authority over winisters and other individuals holding important executive positions. To accomplish this, Le began to weed out persons who had been named to the cabinet because they already held some element of power or influence wilen Mobutu declared himself President and replace them with men who were technically competent but APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 devoid of an% indeperif'--itt I)owe base. Moblitil's assertion of ftill authofiIN- over all cabinet iniiiisters was a decisive victor'% which completed the essential foundations for all effective presidential systern. However, the subordination (if key exectitives to Mobutu's %%ill has been poshed so far to stifle initiative within particular ministries and to prevent any kind of teamwork oil the most difficult national problems. Mobtitu's failure to (it-legate stifficieW authority to his top aides also reflects it defensive attitude toward otitstanding executive talent. I)espite his control of the army, his actions betray a tendency to regard anyme who ields high civil atithority effectively as a rival for stipreine Ix)wer. While the level of competence ill tile cabinet hits risen markedly, Mobutu has tended to assign the more sensit,ve tasks to special aides, to avoid frank vonmiltations with the cabinet or in% other regular group, and to make critical decisions in deepening isolation. m t) l )tl t tl s com to put down potential rivals has been Starkly epitomized in his dealings with former conirades in the Binza grotip---the "kitclien cabinet" which not only sustained Print(- Minister Adoula front 1961 to 19(i.4 Nit paved the way for ,..I lillc a ssumption of I)o%%(-r in 1965. Once in power, Mobutu maintain.-d for a while some Semblance of his former collaboration With aII members of the group, but their individual positions %%ere switched sufficiently to neutraliz. much of their former 1vveragv. Adoula, the most durable leader of coalition governments since independence, was kept overseas 011 umbassidorial osignments until 1969, whe I became Minister of Forvign Mfairs. Damien Kandola. who had virttially controlled the Interior Ministry, was consigned to a lucrative skiectire. Albert Ndele, the internationally respected Governor of the Zaire Natiotial Bank, Was retained there a ll d functioned as Mobutti's chief financial adviser tintil i) 'rhen lie was abruptly dismissed because Mobutu suspected him of collusion with Belgian mining interests, The two members of tli Sinzit group who initered M c in November 196, Nendaka and Justin Bornboko�were reputed to he indispens..ale bec of their exceptional itifitience and talent qualities Which eventually triggered Mobtitu's mistrust and his increasingly extrente efforts to neutralize them. Nemlaka's outstanding executive talent IIS Well as his extensive leverage, derived from his years as Surete chief, qualified him particularly for the politically vital interior Ministry. Moblitil, however, assigncd him to Transport and Coninitinica- tions and %tjb%eqt#vntI% to Filiallce. K)flIIx)ko, on the other [land. was kept in Foreign Affjirs, where It(- had alread% ser.ed for over 3 %.(-ar%. His exlwrience ill this field tis( to Mobtitti, while his past record as Ivadvr ,'A' it Mongo tribal party madc Mob see birn as a potential rival in the domestic arena. IIOFIIIK)ko'% politi a ssets, however, were tiot its formidable as Nentlaka*s. and this consideration probably inilielled Mobutit's distim- -1 favoring (if Bomboko over Nendaka. Nevertheless both Bomboko .III(] Nendaka were ousted from the cabinet ill t S%%rf.(.I)ilig Aukeilp of Atigust IWN9: apparentl% Mobtitu wailted to drainatize his total eclipsing of the former Binza group. The cabim-t shaketip of Ugust 1%.*9 was the first :Md rnost draniatic evidt that Mobutu had ttirtied from I polic%l of selecting nien primaril% for their standing in varimis local ermipings to choosing offich0s havinir technical competence. Subse(Itivilt cabinet coianges�occtirritig at least once a 'eur�bave maintained it distinct trend toward thu selection (if younger men with higher e(hicationi-I cn-dentials and svverai years of relevant professional experience. This Significant step to%%ard more effective government has been possible, despite the compidsioll to Inailitaill ethnic balance, becatise the recent itiewase iii the ntimber of Zairians completinv, professional trailling before entering the civil service has provided Mobtitu with more candidates wbo nivet both the professional and the etlinic criteria. Mobutti has replaced vach inember (if the Binza group with an individlial who is at least as Well q ualified to manvge his own ministr\. It is dotibiftil. ho%vever, thot Mobutti's present cabinet. or III% inner group of ke\ aides, provides him with stich realistic counsel or concerted action its the i'liliza vroul) afforded former Prime Minister Adotila. N has i)ot delegated to anyone all authority comparable t that exercised by each member of the Binza grotip (hiring the near-anarchy (if the varly 1960's. Since Mobutti has consolidated ftill power, he has recognized the need for hicreased coordination aniong ministries, btit his attvnipts so far have foundered oil his underlying inistrtist of the individiials involved. 10111 March 1969 to Wcember 1970 four cabinet members were named Ministers; of State, an each was assigned coordinathig mithority over several functiom-fly related ministries. Mobutu rvportvdb intended o meet frequently with these four, thus reanimating all inner comwil roughly comparable to III(- Binza group, but the implication of special trust was shattered onl% 6 months later \vhen two of the four supvrininisters we re dropped from the cabinet. 1 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 25Xl APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 25Xl 4. Popular Movement of the Revolution Mobutu announced the formation of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) in April 1967, when he finally dissolved parliament and promised that a new constitution, establishing a strong presidential system, would soon be submitted for a popular referendum. Although the 1967 constitution authorized two political parties, opposition leaders soon found that Mobutu intended' tile MPR to monopolize all political activity. I n December 1970 lie put through a constitutional amendment which declared that the MPR was not only the sole legal party, but the supreme national in This means, from Mobutu's standpoint, that the MPR*s role is to supplement the civil administrative structure as a channel for manipulating the masses and also pro% sinecures for former politicians and other localiv influential figures who loyally support Mobutu. The party's propagand c embellishes a mystique of nationalism, attempting to override divisive domestic factors and recounting Mobutu's largely mythical struggle with siaister foreign forces. Yet mobutu's dispen of favors through pa!, v t-hanneis eflects the ame strategy of accommoeabi -4 and counterbalancing tribal or regional interestN that lie has employed in the army and civ;l government. The freedo with which Mobutu handles party affairs, as compared with his caution toward institutions which already had some Substance when he became '-'resident. refle'ets tho clear reality that the N/iPR is indisputably his creation, to shape and extend as he pleases. The nationwide organization of the MPR parallels the government administrative structure in f ti same individual ordinarily holds corresponding positions in each hierarchy. For cxample, the regional commissioner is also president of the party's executive committee for the province, and the village chief is also prff ident-treasurer of the local party iub,Al. Each village chief is supposed to conduct mo'nthly rneetings with ordinary party members. who are encouraged to present resolutions about local problems to higher authorities. Only certified party officials, however, attend the periodic party conclaves at local arid provincial levels and the biennial national party congresses. All officials are deperident on the party headquarters at Kinshasa for their appointments, pay, occasional invitations to Kinshasa, and the assorted material benefits that they are supposed to distribute among party militants�the certified active members, as opposed to all adult citizens, who are nominal members. IN The Political Bureau of the MPA is the supreme policy formulating bodv for th,� Republic as well as the part% Mobutu, who is president of the MPR. carefully selects the. membership of ti '?olitical Bureati and regularIN presides at its frequent meetings. Thus it is fully tinder his control and serves to formalize his directives and convey them to other party organs. According to the NIPR Constitution, a national party coi.gress, to be converted at lej-,t every 4 years. has the power to revise or cancel it directive fronn tile Political Bureau. In fact, however, the special party congress in May 1970 and the first regular party congress in May 1 972 merely ratified unanimously the resolutions of the Political Bureau oil a wide range of national policy issues. The size of the Political Bureau has varied, front 17 in 1967 to it maximum of 35 in 1969 and again in late 197L and a minimum of only 15 from February 1972 to date. The only ex officio members of the Political Bureau tire the President of the Republic and tric president of the National Executive Council. In early 1969, shortly before the dismissal of Nendaka and Bornboko from the cabinet. the Political Bureau was considerably enlarged to include a broad spectrum of politicians who had gained some prominence before Mobutu became President. In December 1970, following the presidential and legislative e le c ti ons man% of thesc old-line politicians were replaced with Vounger university graduates. The net result of Mobutu's deliberately unpredictable .Wlection process is that Political Bureau membership has been the ultimate sinecure for senior party militants and also for other persons who have too intich influence in their home districts to be safel\ neglected. Mobutu pruned the PoNtical Bureau from 35 to 15 members in February 1972 arid annoiinced it reduction in its member's salaries from 2,000 zaires a month to 500�the satne salary drawn by National Legislative Council mernbers. Perhaps the slarpness of the February cuts in both membership and salary was Mobutu's response to rumors that certain memb of the Political Bureau had put too many of theircronies on the final list of candidates�selected personally by the Political Bureau during a weekend cruise hosted' b) the President�in the 1.970 legislative elections. Whatever Mobutu's immediate motives for the February purge of the Political Bureau, it appears that he intends to continue using the reduced bureau as it command post for directing the legislature*s various committees, which during 1971 diligently worked out the details of legislation initiated in the Office of the President. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 The shrewdly phased emergence of the MPR as the s le A party has been accompanied by Mobutu's Jorts to bring within its ranks all other significant special interest groups or professional rankings. A case in point is offered by the party's youth wing, the J M PR. When it was formed in 1967, the J M PR was a clearcut party auxiliary which merely sought to coordinate other student or In 1969 it was transformed into the only permissible campus organization, and all students have been compelled to join it. By contrast, Mobutti forced several competing labor federations to merge in 1967 but did not explicitly subordinate the labor movement to the party at that time, although key labor leaders became party officials. to keep As for the armN and police., Mobutu strove their leaders isolated from the party until late 197 i. A directive iss.ued in October of that called for integration of the army. p the court system, and the national labor organization with each echelon of the MPR. The ranking officer for each of these organizations in each region, subregion, and zone was assigned a seat oil the party's executive committee for each geographic entity. At first this arrangement was regarded as no more than a means for expediting routine coordination, but in November 1971 the acting army commander, the police inspector general, the Supreme Court president. and the Attorney General were declared to be members of the party s National Executive C This body wus responsible for implementing tile directives of the Political Bureau until August 1972. when it was merged with tile cabinet to form the National Executive Council. Hence, the assigning of service chiefs to the National Executive Committee appeared to make them directly subordinate to the Political Btireau, id this move drew enough grumbling to pit, an indefinite period of heightened tensions between the MPR hierarchy arid the officers of the security services, New misgivings that Mobutu may seriously intend to give the part% s ome security duties were aroused in March 19772, when he assigned sonic 100 members of the party youth wing's Disciplinary Brigade to a police training course despite protests from police authorities. oil the other hand, Mobutu's handling of the issue during the NiPR National Congress in May 1972 suggests that he has not really abandoned his underlying strategy of keeping tile MPR, tile arm% and ti police as separate power bases, each responsive primarily to him. The published resolutions of the party congress stressed the integration of tile MPR with all national institutions and also declared that army arid police personnel should be allowed to vote in national elections. Mobutu, however, reportedly assured senior army officers shortly before the congress that no party executive committee would be formed within arniv units, and army field commanders were to attend party meetings in their geographic areas as observers, not directly subordinate to party officials. Hence the avoidance of direct ciashes in the provinces presumably depends oil the continued efficacy of Mobutu's usual counterhalanc- ing tactics. The prospect of heightened rivalry arriong field c omponents (if the MPR, the army. and the police reemphasizes a perennial enigma: to %%hat extent has the party taken root in the countryside. The vastness of tile Zairian interior, the extremes in local geography, and the spotty nature of local reporting all mitigate against generalization. Until 1970 it was wideIN observed that the MPR lacked popular participation-, relatively few village chiefs really formed subeells, and the cells in the smaller towns seldom contained members other than the salaried officials. Cultivating grassroots support for the party, however. was the underlying purpose of the presidential and Icgislative elections of 1970, and the prolonged campaigning gave extensive public exposure to local officials as well as touring candidates for the legislature. The net impact of the election campaign is still problematical. P typical is the aftermath of the elections in central Baridundu Region. as reported by a touring U.S. official in December 1970. Many local inhabitants expressed disillusionment w ith a n election that presented no real choices and remarked that most candidates resembled the old-line politicians who (lid them no real good during the parliamentary era. Nevertheless, many inhabitants expressed some faith i Mobutu's good intentions and a belief that his single-party concept .%*as more capable of dispensing material benefits or punishing opponents than would b possible with many competing parties, Of possiblv more importance were the indications that the party was providing tangible linkage between local inhabitants and government o ffi c i a ls oil rotating assignment. Continuity w coming particularly from long-tim(7 local residents oil the party's lower echelon exec utive committees. Subsequent reports indicate ay that the part% v outh wing's Disciplinary Brigade m. be enforcing government authority fairly effectively in Some localities where police are absent, despite the brigade's reputaii1on for rowdyism. Although there is only slight evidence that local part% units are generally popular, in many rural areas they may be extending 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 the reach of tile regular administration in various ways which significantly strengthen Mobutu's control of the co 5. Army The 35,MJ-man Zairian Army is the main p-op of the Mobutu regime. Mobutu has kept the army out of government because lie wants to keep it subordinate to civilian rule, at least nominally. Accordingly, Mobutu himself has cultivated an image that is disassociated from his army post. Nevertheless Mobutu has used the army directly as an instrument of coercion, applied heavy handedly and at times indiscriminately. Consequently the army is feared by the general populace, and any potential challenger is at an enormous disadvantage as long as the army continues to back Mo' itu. Although Mobutu has not vet restored the rigorous discipline of the colonial era, lie has achieved it master of army politics through shrewd balancing of rival officer factions and by providing the troops with a relatively good living, cornpared with ordinary civilians. As of late 1972 therf was no evidence of organized plotting against Mobutu %vithin the army. The army is crisscrossed by tribal and regimial allegiances and riddled with tribal prejudices. The Belgian colonial administration sought to suppress tribalism in its predecessor, the Force Publique, by a policy of ethnic mixing which prevented the formation of ethnically homogenous groups in(] by assigning units otitsic their home areas. Although these measures repressed overt manifestations of tribalism, they did not destroy the personal sense of tribal identity. Events after independence strengthened these primordial loyalties, and once the restraints imposed by the Belgian officer corps were removed, the army split into tribal and egional factions. Mobutu ernerged in Sept nher 1960 its senior officer of the troops who rcmained loyal to the Kinshasa government, and as the secessionist regirnes collapsed one by one he consolidated his position as eommandei in chief of the reinteg.ated natiopal army. His success was due largely to a combination of foreign military aid, early support from a cadre of officers who came from his home region of northern Zaire, his discreet accommodations with officers from other regions, and the backing of the Binza group against competing politicians who sought support among army officers. Since becoming President, Mobutu has had to continue an uphill struggle to rebuild in the army the firm military discipline of the Force Publique, and he has given highest priority to isolating the officer corps from civilian politicians, 18 The political neutralization of the officer corps, however, has been offset by Mobutu's strategy of tacit accommodation to ineradicable remnants of tribalism within th(- army. The actual interplay of tribal and regional loyalties in all phases of army life is still a basic jeterrent to genuinely impersonal military disciphric. Because Mobutu and most of tile officers who rallied to him in 1960 were from northern Zaire, officers from that area (Equateur and Haut-Zaire Regions) predominate in the senior grades. Officers from western Zaire tire less prominent and influential, but thev remain a cohesive force in the arm% Both groups discriminate against officers from other regions. Prejudices base(] on regional origins are deeply resented bv the southern and eastern officers and could lead Some da% to it major split in the army. Until mid-1972 the army high command was still comprised large1v of the older officers who had rallied to Mobutu in 1960. These former sergeants of the colonial Force Publique who had risen to senior command within n-inths of independence were very poorly qualified, compared with the middle generation of officers, who had received some specialized training in foreign military schools, and the junior officers, who had graduated front Belgian or French military academies. iMobtitu kerc the older officers in key tactical commands or siaff positions despite their lirnite(l qualifications and waning vigo: because he relied on their personal loyalty. By 1970 it had become apparent that the discrepancy between grade levels and professional training was having a demoralizing effect on the younger, better qualified officers�particularly the middle gene who have become eligible for the more iniportai-A -ommands. This chronic problem worsened in November 1970, when General Bobozo, then Commander in Chief of the army, suffere(I a severe stroke and Mobutu appointed an acting commander who was second to Bohozo in seniority but notoriously incompetent. Bobozo is a member of Mobutu's Ngbandi tribe, yet lie was widely respected its a strong disciplinarian who nevertheless spoke up to Mobutu on behalf of the loyal veterans of all ranks. As Bobozo wits regarded its kingpin of the old guard, his staving on as nominal armv commander since his stroke aroused speculation that Mobutu could not install it ne\ commander without upsetting the delicate factional balance in the officer corps. The lack of a strong army leader since 1970 in turn stimulated feuding among second-echelon officers that often surfaced during Mobutu's extended international junkets. The sharpest clashes occurred between Brigadier General Buinba, the flamboyant APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 paratroop commander, and Brigadier General Nkulufa, the senior officer at the Defense Department, who doggediv resisted Bumba's efforts to increase the autonomy of the elite Airborne Division. The paratroopers are Mobutu's first line of defense against mutinies or riots, and Bumba is a member of the Ngbandi tribe. Mobutu's s p ec i a l reliance on Bumba despite his abrasive conduct torviAard nonparatroop officers has h-en widely resented- In Julv 19 42, Mobutu announced thit nine of the army's 16 generals would retire soon, thoroughly reshuffled the remaining senior officers, and also rnadc significant changes in the command structure of the armv and other sectirit% services. Bumba was promoted to Commander in Chief (now Captain General) of the arm\ while N kulufa was consigned to a diplomatic post. T he army's six gendarme battalions and the civil police were merged to form a unified National Gendarinerie, to be responsible for all local ]aw enforcement throughout Zaire. Then Mobutu created a special Presidential Special Staff foi the security services, which includes one senior officer each from the army's ground and air components, from the National Gendarmerie, kind from the Co River, and Lake Guard. As of late 1972 it was apparent that these inoves arriounted to the most extensive shakeup of the arniv high command since Mobutu took power in 1965'. although their full significance was not vet clear. While Mobutu had sloughed off his oldest cronies, the overall pattern appeared carefully calculated to tighten his leverage over (lie younger, more effective men assuming key commands. Although Burnba is expected to generate more friction its ariny commander than Bobozo had done, it also appears that Mobutu's other moves would in effect counterbalance Bumba's promotion. The new commander of theairborne division. Brigadier General Danga, also is a member of the Ngbandi tribe and ieportedly did riot get along with Bumba %%hile commano]ling a paratroop brigade. The commander of the newly formed National Gendarmerie is tinder the control (;f the Defense Department, which Mobutu has headed since 1965. Furthermore, Mobutu is expected to rely increasingly on the new Presidential Special Staff, rather than on Bumba, for tightening his control of the army's tactical units. In fact. within a month of Bumba's promotion t Commander in Chief his title was changed to Captain General. According to the announcement, the title 11 commander in chief" is to be reserved for the officer who exercises command of a military theater during combat operations. Meanwhile, official publicity stresses that President Mobutti is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Apparently the net result is to accentitate Mobutu's power to distribute actual authority arnong senior officers. and he is continuing his usual tactics of countcrbalancing several kev military figures. Althougli the retirement O)f the old guard and the formation of it new wesidential staff may well foster an overall tightening of professional discipline, individuals from northern Equateur Region�Mobutil's home area�still p. in key positions. It is ai fairly apparent that most arniv officers rrsent Mobatu's buildup of the MPR to the point of nominal supremacy over the armN as well as the civil government. The doctrine of MPR supremacy baldly flouts the military legend that Mobutu assurne power on belialf of the whole officer coros. an(] soldierly griping has grown audible lit every new embellishmen of the party's prestige, from the lavish partN1 congress in May 1970 to the appearance in late 1971 of a new national flag resembling the part\ emblem. Nevertheless Mobutu has so effo cloistered the army front civilian affairs that key officers are not likely to take scriousl\ inere propaganda Ploys aimed lit the civilian populace. On the other hand, the officer corps conceivablN might close ranks agaiiist Mobutu if such measures a the strengthening of thcjMPR Disciplinary Brigadeor the October 1971 directive for local iniegration of' party, arm\ and civil administrative functions were actuall\ pushed to the point of clashes between part\ officials an(] tactical commanders. There is no solid evidence, however, that Mobutu has in fact abandoned his tacit strategy of favoring the troops over civilians in the tangible ways that really affect their morale. Typical of this strategy was tile across- the-board promotion of most seniorofficers injanuary 1971�within a month of the con amendment which declare.(] the MPR to be the supreme national institution. As early as 1970, however, adverse financial trends had made it apparent that Mobutu could not indefinitel v mollify disgruntled arm\ officers by granting more promotions, fringe benefits, or informal largesse. 11 fact, by late 19"1 Mobutu had switched from vague promises of raising overall army strength -is high as MOM to an oxplicit personnel ceiling of only 40,M) for 1972. Strict enforcement of this ceiling could cause serious resentments. Such gaps between Mobutu's recognition of the financial exigencies and the limited tolerance of the officer corps for actual economics appear to be the most sensitive factors in the overall balance of army morale. 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 In late 1972, Mobutu was still temporizing the belt- tightening measures that might seriously alienate the officer corps and also was tolei ting lax enforcement of disciplinary measures governing relations between troops and ordinary citizens. For instance, in early 197 1 Mobutu recognized that the army's iiitensive mopping-up operations against rebel remnants in an isolated sector of eastern Zaire were inflicting far more hardship on local peasants than on the ever-elusive guerrilla bands. Hence he auihorized it civic action program intended to make the troops stop abusing peaceable inhabitants and start lending a hand with rehabilitation measures. By late 1972. however, the civic action program was virtually inoperative because of a lack of logistical support and of vigorous enforcement measures. 6. Labor The labor movement in Zaire has never been a cohesive political fo;. As long as several labor federations were operating independentl,, their leaders were successful in mobiliziug their union membership on bread-and-butter issues, but they were never able to translate union loyalty into any long- term political support for themselves or their policies, On political questions tile union members' loyalties had remained with their tribal and regional political leaders. In 1967, Mobutu pressured the three existing labor federations into it single labor organization, no%% known as the National Union of Workers of Zaire (UNTZ, formerly UNTC). The LINTZ received substantial government subsidies and remained primarily dependent upon them until 1970, when it compulsory dues checkoff system was extended to government employees its well as those in private industrv. Meanwhile Mobutu's virtual control of the UNTz been reinforced by appointing senior labor leaders to various offices in the MPR. Labor leaders have acquiesced in Mobutu's decree makiiig all strikes illegal unless approved by tl, UNTZ general secretariat. The fairly frequent recurrence of small wfideat strikes since mid-1969�over the government's failure to pay on time and other grievances�shows that tile UNTZ officials do not in fact command the full loyalty of their roughly 900,000 dues-paying members. Nevertheless the UNTZ ranks second only to the MPR as a potential mechanisin for mass action. Indeed, the UNTZ hierarchy may well exert more effective control over a largvr portion of regular wage carriers than the MPR hierarchy, as the trade unions that were amalganiated in the UNTZ had been organized earlier 20 and had generated some sense of voluntary solidarih, among their members. Although this sense of solidaritv has been eroded by the complacency of manv la bor officials despite declining real income for ordinary workingmen, the UNTZ still retains a real degree of autonomous strength which makes the actual working relations between the MPR and the UNTZ a matter of considerable political significance. Full collaboration between party and labor officials would significantly strengthen Mobutu's grip on the school teachers, other civil service personnel, and skilled industrial workers m morale largely determines ti e ff ec tiveness of an government. Such considerations presuniabiv motivated Mo- butu's directive in October 1971 which placed UNTZ officials oil the MipR execu c ommittees for each ec helon of tile government along with judicial officials and field commanders in the security senices. Some senior UNTZ officials have definite misgivings about the directive. they fear that such visible subordination to the party hierarch%- w ill even tu a lly compromise local labor leaders in the eves of ordinary workingmen. Yet prospects for open resistance to Mobutu's dictates have been minimal since I)ccember 1970. lie made Bo-Boliko Lokonga, the former leader of the UNTZ, president of the National Assembly. Bo-Boliko has been more widely respected than any other Zairian labor leader as a stalwart advocate of workingmen's interests, which may have been it factor in Mobutu's decision to hire him away frorn direct command of the UNTZ. The present secretary general of the UNTZ. Ferdinand Kikorigi, is a protege of Bo-Boliko but lacks his personal influence. In fact. rivalries aniong senior labor leaders became more a udible shortly after lie assumed command, adversely affecting inorale through the lo%% echelons. 7. Students The university students have becil tile most vocal critics of tile Mobutu regime. Their grievaticcs range front those concerning conditions of academic life to complaints�from it radical minority.�that tile Mobutu regime is neocolonialist. ManN students criu M policies as pro and too m0de-,itc and resent the government's incompetence and corruption. By and large, however. student differences with the regime are not ideological. Tile% main1v concern such university matters as increased schola rship stipends and better living conditions. Sonic 90' of tile students are dependent oil government scholarships and can look forward eventually to elite positions in tile civil service. The majority tend to be vOnservative and prudent in their APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 confrontations with the government. Mobutu has used the carrot-and-stick treatment with the students, forcibly putting down strikes, imprisoning leaders, arid later granting amnesty and concessions. The General Union of Congolese Students (UGEC), %vitich was the principal student organivation in 1965. at first gave cautions support to the Mobutu regime. In November 1967, however, the UGEC organization at Lovanium University, then the preeminent institution of higher learning in Zaire, publZed it manifest.o which attacked the regime as neocolonialist In January 1968 the Lovanium UGEC, organized a demonstration against the visit of U.S. Vice President Humphrey. the president of the UGEC was subsequently arrested arid the UGEC executive committee dissolved. In 1968 and early 1969, there were several student strikes aimed at securing better food and living conditions. In June 1969 a campus strike to protest the government*s failure to produce a promised increase III student monthly subsidies led to it stud 'i-rit demonstration in Kinshasa. Police and arm,,- u:uts forcibly intervened, killing at least a dozen stude I t s' The deaths arid the temporary closing of Lov i amurn University prompted sympathy demonstrations at Zaire's two smaller universities and several technical schools. Mobutu responded by bringing to trial arid giving stiff sentences to 31 students accused of fomenting the demonstrations and by expelling hundreds of others. He also banned all existing student organizations except the Youth of the Popul ar Movement of the Revolution (JM PR) and insisted that all university students join the JMPR. Mobutu later granted it liberal aninesty to allay student disaffection and reinstated the' expelleil students. JMPR elections in December 1969 generally took place quietly, the students reacting witil resignation and apathy. At the university in Lubumbashi the elections had to be post ponedwvera I times because of rivalries among various regional factions. By early 1970 the student scene .%-its fairlN quict, although a small group of outlawed UGEC members was reportedly meeting clandestinely, and there was considerable discontent simmering boneath the surface, Such was the apparent campus stalemate in June 1971, when most students at Lovaniurn Universitv participated in a demonstration commemorating the students who had been killed by troops in June 1969. Although their demonstration was nonviolent. it was staged independently of the JMPR leaders, and some speeches, placards, and. leaflets implied disrespect for Mobutu arid his recently deceased mother. Next day Mobutu ordered the acting arm% commander and the university rector to curtail further demonstrations: students threw stones at the general's car arid held the rector hostage; and Mobutu announced the induction of all 1,ovanium students into the arm% for 2 years. fit August, 10 former students were sentenced to life imprisonment following a trial uhich scarce]v substantiated Mobutu's initial charges of a serious plot to overthrow him. Most student conscripts, however, were returned to campus as soon as they completed basic training and assigned to it special Militia which keeps them tinder lenient military discipline with full corporal's pay, whch is higher than their former scholarships. The net results of this confrontation were a sharp reduction in student dissidence and renewed popular respect for Mobutu's overall handling of the affair�a shrewd [)lending of firmness with restraint. The avoidance of another fatal clash similar to the tragedy of 1969 was lurgely attributable to careful planning b" sectirity authorities, manifested in the generally cool conduct of police and troops during the crisis. The subsequent reorganization of higher education, which its occasioned by the Lovanium demonstrations, has caused the transfer of social science students, who have been relatively articulate politically, from the Lovanitim camptis near Kinshasa to rernote Lubuml-ashi. In late 1971 Mobutu also ordered JMPR eao: ers to intensify their indoctrination efforts among students, do%vn to the primary level. By late 1972, most university students appeared to be adjusting to the overall tightening of controls witb ruininial resistance and some with positive interest in the j M P R. 8. Religious organizations Although less than half of the Zairian popidation is estimated to he Christian, Christian chatches and affiliated organizations in Zaire have considerable political importance, largely because they are providing vital services which the government is not yet capable of replacing. As of 1970 roughly 80% of all Zairian primary students and 50% of secondary students were attending schools that were operated b.- Catholic or Protestant organizations. Although the government supports these schools financially, the foreign-based sponsoring organizations provide qualified teachers and other essential administrative support. Lovanium University and the Free University of the Congo at Kisarigaiii were originally sponsored, respectively, by Belgian Catholics and American Protestants, and the incorporation of both institutions into Zaire National University has not entireiv 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 eliminated their reliance on the original sponsors. Christian missions also operate at least two of all medical clinics in the coiintryside, providing facilities and medicines that are often lacking at government clinics. Roughly 6 million Zairians are Catholic, 2 million belong to some 70 international Protestant denomiria- tions, and perhaps as many as 3 million belong to the predominantiv Zairian Kimbanguist sect. Catholics are dispersed fairly evenly across the country, but Protestants are clustered in such a wav that certain denominations exert a strong influence in particular localities. Kimbanguism is predominant among Kongo tribesmen and significantly influential throughout Bas-Zaire Region and adjacent areas of Congo (Brazzaville). As a result of the educational activities of Christian religious bodies, Christian cultural influences are more pervasive among educated Zairians following modern professions than among the general populace. Although the Kimbariguists lack the foreign support afforded other Christian bodies in Zaire, they have emulated tlicir sponsorship of schools and clinics. In fact. the spreading of Kimbanguism during the colonial era despite the repressive measures of the Belgian authorities exemplifies the potentialities of an African religious movement for resistance to secular authority. By 1972 the other Christian churches in Zaire were becoming sufficiently Africanized to eventually evoke comparable popular loyalty, although the% were still receiving substantial material support from their international affiliates. Until 1971, Miobtitii's dealings with clergymen and other leaders of churcli-sponsored organizations reflected a pragmatic recognition that tolerance for diverse religious groups brought material benefits and generally stabilizing cultural influences to the Zairian People which in turn tended to underpin his government. The declaration of fundamental rights in the 1967 constitution guarantees religious freedom, arid Mobutu tisually has sought to depict himself as a devout Catholic who was nonetheless appreciative of the constructive role of Protestant missions. in fact, ever since independence Mobutu has publicly expressed his respect for Kimbanguism,'as have other Zairian politicians who wished to ingratiate themselves with Kongo tribesmen. This tolerant approach has created a generally favorable attitude toward the Mobutu government from most religious leaders�Catholic. Protestant, and Kimbanguist. In December 1971, however, the legislature�at Mobutu's behest�passed a law to the effect that no religious organization could conduct public worship or 22 other activiti-s in Zaire unless it met certain criteria. Most important %%-ere the stipulations that the officers of the organization must be Zairian citizens, that the organization must ha-e at least $200,(X)O on deposit in Zaire, arid that the founder must not be a "dissident" priest or pastor. The only religious bodies to (pialify for legal status b% April 1972 were the Catholic Church. the Church of Christ of Zaire (ECZA), the Kimbanguist Church. the Greek Orthodox Church, the Islamic Communitv, and the Jewish Communitv. l,cgal status was explicitiv denied to the Protestant Council of Churches in Zaire (CEPZA), -a-hich included over 30 internationally affiliated denomina- tions which had refused to join the ECZA. This outcome enables Mobutu to employ the ECZA its an instrunicrit for controlling the activities of the Protestant oiganizations in Zaire, but it appawntly has also demoralize(] man% of the foreign missionaries who opposed affiliation with EC.ZA, As the deadline for registration under the new law approached, man%- missionaries who objected to merging their missions with ECZA prepared to leave Zaire. An exodus was averted I)v belated assurances that even. denomina- tion which affiliated .%ith ECZA could retain its own legal personalit%.� As of late 1972 it remained unclear whether the denorninations %%hich affiliated with ECZA under duress could maintain sufficient autonomv to meet the criteria of their foreign sponsors for continued support. Mobutu*s motivation for taking this stand remains obscure. Official explanations for the new registration law cite administrative problems w1flch compel the government to stop the proliferation of schismatic sects, which has become a serious problem. Hundreds of new religious bodies have emerged since independence and gained legal recognition under previously lenient rules, which in turn has enabled them to draw government subsidies for their schools. The leaders of established religious bodies concede the need for some accreditation standards. at least for church-sponsored social services. in order to prevent chaotic competition and abuse of subsidies. Mobutu's insistence, however, that long-established Protestant missions join the ECZA or withdraw suggests an additional, essentially political motive�to depict himself as champion of the Protestant organization which has blended an ecumenical appeal with repudiation of traditional ties with foreign-based churches, some of which have indeed been slow to replace foreign clergy or lay executives with Zairians. Furthermore, Reverend jean Bokeleale, Secretan General of the ECZA, is not only an ardent Zairian nationalist, but a highly articulate admirer of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 Mobutu. Ilence Mobutu's eagerness to score an immediate propaganda ploy and to enhance the influence of a reliable advocate appears to take priority over the eventuallyadverse effects of expelling missienaries who have in fact provided a major portion )f the schools aud medical services in eastern Zaire, %%-here loc"l government services are relatively ineffective. Shortiv after the rigorous new criteria for official sanctioning of religious bodies wa issued, Mobutu became involved in his first serious conflict with the Catholic hierarchy in Zaire. fit January 1972 Cardinal Malula, the senior Zairian prelate. published it pastoral letter denouncing Mobutu's recent call for Zairians to adopt African persona; names instead of Christian names of European origin, and also implying that the glorification of Mobutu in official publicity verged on idolatry. Mobutu's spokesmen retorted with threats of prosecuting Malula for subversion, but a direct clash was avoided by Malula's acceptance of the Pope's invitation to visit Rome shortly before Mobuta returned to Zaire from a European vacation. In March the Zairian Council of Bishops petitioned MobutL to rescind various restrictions he had placed on Catholic institutions during his altercation with Maluia. This opportunity for quiet negotiation was rebuffed with a harshly worded announcement from the MPH Political Bureau that all Catholic seminaries must accept JMFR units among their students or face closure. The Catholic hierarchy responded by accepting J M PH units in minor seminaries but closing the major seminaries. In April, Mobutu resumed negotiations with a delegation of four Zairian bishops, and they finally agreed to a ccept JMPR units in the major seminaries Nvith assurances that the JMPH executive committees in each serninary would be composed exclusively of seminarians and that the JMPR would have no jurisdiction over religious instruction. The bishops' acceptance of the Political Bureau's ultimaturn was then apnotinced ,vith no mention of Mobutu's concessions. Having won this basic assertion of his authority, Mobutu announced in May that lie had pardoned Maltila, w!io returned to Kinshasa in J une and quietly resurned his f unctions as archbishop. The official puhlicity accompanying Mobutu's confrontations with both Protestant and Catholic leaders has accentuated nationalistic themes� Mobutu's opposition to foreign domination of Zairian Protestants and to the baptism of Zairian Catholic children with European names. Yet the whole trend of hisCOTIfrontation with flit Catholic hierarch,, suggvsts th his strongest incentive for tightening his controls over Protestant and Catholic institutions may be that Africanization has proceeded far enough to make each a genuinely popular organization, and therefore po threatening, in Mobutu's eyes, to his supreme authority. 9. Elections All Zairians IS years of age orolder have the right to vote. except members of the armed forces, the National Gendarmerie, mental patients, and citizens away front their normal voting place on election day. In Mav 1972 the MPH National Congress passed a resolution that military and police personnel should have the right to vote in national elections, and the National Iegislative Council is expected to pass legislation to that effect during its next session. Voting is mandator\ citizens who do not vote are subject to it fine, The Voter marks his ballot in favor of, or opposed to, a single list of National Legislative Council candidates or a single presidential candidate. Citizens of either sex o\ er 25 years of age are eligible to he members of the legislature. Excepted categories established by the April 1970 electoral ordinance are criminals in jail more than once in the previous 5 years or three times in the previous 10 ycars. persons who are not active members of the MPR: persons not endorsed b% the M PH Political Bureau; and persons who do not pay the 100 zaire candidature fee. Also, members of the armed forces, National Gendarnierie. arid civil service must submit their resignations before standing for election. The most important part of the election process is the selection of the lists of candidates. as only one approved list for each electoral district is presented to the electorate. Thi list is the slate of MPR candidates for the National Legislative Council seats alloted to the particular electoral district; there is onlv one candidate for each seat. In preparation for national legislative elections, local party units submit several nominees for each seat to the Political Bureau. which makes the final selection, For the legislative elections of 1970, the Political Bureau sclected it final list of 420 candidates from some 2,500 nominees submitted by local party units. Although the 1967 constitution originally authorized two political parties, an amendment passed in December 1970 states that the MPH is the only legal party and gives final sanction to previotis regulations which in effect preclude anyorst from running as in independent candidate. Precautions have been taken to downplay regional sentiment in the legislature. Deputies do not represent regions or even die election district in their hotne area. 2.3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 No member of the MPR Political Bureau is permitted to lie on a list of candidates in his native region. fit an additional move to lessen regional ties, electoral districts are not identified with the regional units but consist of 12 cities and 24 subregions. There have been only two genuinely contested national elections in Zaire�in 1960 arid 1%.755. Although some individuals�notabl Lumumba arid Tshombe�developed important public foll popularity at the polls has usually been less impo)rtant than the ability to organize arid control politi power at the top. The Zairians did not vote at all until 19,37 %%+.en the commune system established in tire urban areas. Since most city dwellers tended to live in areas foined on the basis of tribal affiliation and voted accordingly, the commune leadership usually represented the majority tribe it) its sector. When national election \%ere held in 1960 and 196.5, this tendency to vote along tribal lines was evident in the country as a whole. In addition to tit(- tribal factor elections also have been marked by the administrativC breakdowns, corruption, and coercion th have characterized other facets of politi lif Although balloting fraud arid coercion to get oi t the vote were the rode rather than the e\ception, there is good evidence to suggest that the 1967 constitution would have been approved by a majoritv of the voters even if these methods had not been use(']. While most of the voters had little or no understanding of th provisions of the new constit they recognized that the referendum was really an expression of confidence fo,- the Mobutu regitne. On this basis a majority�but one intich lower than the 92r registered in tire referendum�probably wotild have backed Nit )b tit u. According to the ofik4., wturns for the 1970 presidential elections, Mobutu lw% o f (t vo cast in all but two of the 24 electoral districts. where some ballots were declared void. According to reliable observers, however, officials presiding at th p commonly issued oply the green cards, which signified an affirmative vote, or employed various procedures which prevented genuinely secret balloting. Ap- parently the coercive tactics were somewhat relaxed at the elections for National Assemblv candidates 2 weeks later, as it was announced that' the unopposed siates of MPR candidates were approve(] by o 98.3% of the voteis. Nevertheless either a' verv' intensive roundup of voters or extensive f ()'f results intist have been employed to achieve a nationwide ballot total of 9,K-5-,,517, which is 96.3% o f the adult Zairian citizens tabulated it! the 1970 censtis. 24 D. National policies (S) I. Domestic In 1972, Mobutij was providing a greater measure of political stability arid internal security than th country had known since independence. Mobutif has skillfully, albeit ruthlessly, imposed one-man rule, arid through local government reforms and appeals to nationalism lie has tried to replace the tribal an(] regional loyalties with a sense of allegiance to the central government arid the President. Although government institutions at(- still fragile arid there are persistent popular discontents arid frustrations, the forceful expression of central authority has apparently njet \%ith the appro of most Zairians. In tire financial arid commercial areas. two goals of tile Mobutu government have been to stabilize the economy and, at the same time, change the nature of Zaire's relationship with those foreign financial interests�notabl\ Belgian�%vilich have dominated the econorn\ since independence. A major step if) tile direction of tit(- announced goal of economic independence was natiomilization in 1967 of the UMI4K�also known a s Union Miniere�the Belgian copper arid cobalt mining operation in Shaba Region. This action was followed b ti establislInjent of a national insurance company arid by a break between the operations of Air Zaire arid the Belgian Air Service. Sabena. fit early 1968 expatriate technicians %%ere invited back to rim key industries arid titilities. in 1969 air investment code designed to encourage foreign investivient from a variety of countries was promulgated. Mobiat, so realized that tio other country could casily replace Beigitim and that the ec0n0my and public services were being damage(] by the absence of key Belgian technicians. At the sam tinic, Mobutu has sought to offset Belgian influence bv encouraging persons from other nations to open businesses or provide professional services. in 1970, Mobutu awarded a management contract for Air Zaire to Pan American World Airways, which in effect replaced the services originally provided by Sabena. A long-term aim of the Mobutu government is to further tire economic development of Zaire's potential wealth. Little overall economic planning has been done, however. in June 1967 the government introduced a number of monetary and fiscal reforms sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) intended to improve the long-range economic outlook. These reforms. which involved a devaluation of the currency arid sweeping tax reforms, \%!cre successful in APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 slowing the rate of price increase and generally strengthening the government's financial position. In agriculture, the government's aint has been to raise agricultural production to preindependence levels. President Mobutu designated 1968 as the year of agficulture, and at all leve:s government authorities appealed to farmers to increase output. The campaign, plus the return of political stability and peace to Zaire's rural areas. resulted in a comeback in Some areas for agriculture, although cassava and plantains, the primary food ca)ps for the rural population, are estimated to be below the 19.39 levels despite the substantial increase in the [x Agricultural recovery, however, has been obstructed by such a deterioration of local roads as to preverit the marketing of cash crops throughout much of the countryside. Moreover, the preindependence transpor- tation network, which was designed to seve only the plantation and mineral expvrt. trade, is not adequate for present interregional marketing needs. Agriculture is the most extreme instance of a generally uneven pattern of economic recovery ay A development as a result of infrastructural deficiencies. Since 1966. lending agencies and major foreign aid donors have given priority efforts to improve, modernize, and extend all forms of transpo)rt. The government, however, has allocated a disproportionate share of resources to tiondevelopmental expenditures, such its military hardware and prestige projects. Zaire*s chronic economic problenis have become sharply intensified as a result of the decline since early 1970 in world market prices for copper, Zaire I s principal export product. The drop in copper (-"rnings caused a loss in Zaire's net foreign assets from nearly $250 million in early 1970 to around $218 million III I)eceniber. In turn, it small surplus in the government's budget in 1969 gave way to it $24 million deficit in 1970, arid the budgetary deficit for 1971 is estimated to be about $150 million. Mobutu has responded with a series of belt- tightening measures which show his determination to prevent a spiraling budgetary deficit and monetary inflation. These new stringencies, however, are apt to place considerable strain on administrative discipline in both civil arid military services, where the prevalent practice is to rely on informal largesse to get subordinates to do anything and to retain their loyalty. If economizing measures are enforced, they invvitablv will create morale problems in the arm%* and appreciable increases in unemployment among the most politically conscious element of the population. Mobutu's adoption since rnid-1971 of se%eral measures to dramatize his authoritN and. through intensified propaganda, to promote the cult of his invincibility probably is evidence of his concern over deepening economic problems and the related popular malaise. Fir came a series of repressive measures agaitv,t sundry known or suspected oppoments: the drafting of university students in June 1971 for merely impudent demonstrations; the arbitrar% explusion of 20 Communist diplomats in Jal% the subversion trials in August of student demonstrators, a former guerrilla leader, and an obscure pro-Communist group; the explusion of sorne -30)0 west African **diamond smugglers" in September; the arrest of two former cabinet ministers for an alleged coup plot in October; arid the crackdown on street crime in Kinshasa throughout late 197 1. Next came Mobut u's campaign for the adoption of "authentic" Zairian names. from the sudden switch to Zaire as the official country title in October to the passage in Januar% 1972 of it Nationality Law which in effect prohibits Zairian citizens from retaining foreign surnames. Cardinal Maltila's &i.unciation of Mobutu's call for Zairian children to be baptized -witb Zairian rather than Christian narnes of European origin precipitated Mobutu's fully publicized confrontation with the Catholic hierarchy in Zaire, climaxed in April 1972 by his installing committees of the partx's youth wing in all Catholic seminaries. Such propaganda ploys have been typical of Mobutu's style of public relations since lie became President. His preindependence experience its it journalist impressed him with the potentialities of publicity as it political weapon. and his official acts usuall% have been calculated %%ith it %ic%% to propaganda exploitation and inipa.-t on the Zairian populace. Until 1971, however, Mobutu had rarch pursued popular courses of action which lie considered in serious conflict with his material interests. For instance, his support of Angolan nationalists has never been extended to the point of provoking damaging Portuguese reprisals. Since mid-1971, however, some of Mobutu's tactics rnav have been counterproductive. His lashing out at alleged public enemies has stimulated unfounded rumors of imminent coups, creating it vague but widespread sense of insecurity despite the limited capabilities of known subversive elements. As for Mobutu's confrontation with the Catholic hierarch\ the resulting concordat with the bishops, publicized as it triumph for Mobutu, inw, discourage Zairians from challenging Mobutu's supreme authority over any popular institution. It is also likely to discourage 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 further foreign support for the exterisive Catholic social services in Zaire. This result would scarcely resolve -Mobutu's underlying problem�his inability to provide the decade of material and social progress which he pmmised in his inaugural address following the uncomested elections of 1970. The maintenance of internal securit%, rather than defense against foreign attack or invasion. is the principal aim of Zaire's defense policies. With the exception of the Portuguese troops in Angola, the Zairian Army is potentially a good deal stronger than the armies of Zaire's immediate neighbors. Even within the country, most of the effective fighting on behalf of the central government has I-een done by foreign troops, such as the U.N. force in '960- 63 and the mercenaries recruited in Europe a!-d southern Africa duriyjg the rebellion of 1964-673. With the decline of the rebellion, the problem of maintaining internal security showed signs of diminishing to the point the armed forces could cope with it. Mobutu therefore began in early 1967 to phase (jut the mercenaries, whose presence inside the counir% was an embarrassment to his regime. By earlv summer of 1967 there were fewer than 200 mercenaries left in the country, and it was these troops %vho muth ocd on 5 J uly for a variety of reasons�a fear that they would he disbanded without receiving their back pay, anger over the kidnaping of Tshombe, and, perhaps for some, a desire to overthrow Mobutu. The armed forces, with logistical support from Ethiopia, Ghana, and the United States, (-hipped away at rebel strength until by November 1967 the rebels eventually were forced across the border into Rwanda. There have been no mercenaries in Zaire since November 1967. 2. Foreign Mobutu's forays into foreigii affairs have been erratic�particularl% in the area of African politics� but the thrust of his foreign policy is essentially moderate and Western oriented. Mobutu's foreign policy is motivated pritnari by his manifold needs for financial aid and technical a from industrialized countries arid his fear of foreign support for Zairian dissidents. Most of the vital foreign aid for Zaire has come from Belgium, the United States. and other Western states. while the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist states have provided only intermittent aid to his government arid, in some instances, encouragement to various dissident groups. Nevertheless, Mobutu has espoused a policy of nonalignment and rhetorically played dovn his reliance on Western states in order to maintain his stature in African nationali.A. 26 a. Relations uith African states The overall pattern of Mobutu's relations with other African leaders reflects his primary concern for Zaire's exposed location, surrounded by eight independent states and Portuguese Angola. He has taken a more active role in the Orr g anization of African Unity (OAU) than any of his predece,sors and has made gestures to dramatize Zaire's so!idarity with southern Affican nationalist movements. For instance, Zaire provides sanctuary for Holden Roberto's Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) and for its guerrilla army. (In June 1972, President Mobutu and Congolese President Ngouabi arranged a .1 reconciliation in principle" between GRAE arid its stronger rival, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.) By repudiating formcr Prime Minister T '*neof-vlonialism," Mobutu has been able to inducc most of the surrounding independent governmeats to curtail support for Zairian refugee rehels. When Mobutu declared an arrinesty for former reLels in December 1970. most of the neighboring governments cooperated with Zairian embassies ir, efforts to persuade the remaining refugees to return home. The outstanding exception to Mobutu's warily bland relations with leaders of neighboring states is his extreme sensitivity�and erratic reaction�to the threat of subversion from Brazzaville, directly across the Congo River from Kinshasa. Since the earl% 1%.'O's leading opponents of the Kinshasa government have taken refuge in Brazzaville, and Communist envoys to Congo have not only aided refugee rebels but cultivated Zairian students and other dissidents. who can readily visit Kinshasa as long as normal communications are maintained. ironi Mobutu's standpoint, this situation has been barcl% tolerable since September 1968, Major Ngouabi emerged its the shaky leader of an army-leffist Congo Government which has been particularly receptive to Chinese support. Relations between the Zaire and Congo Governments were severed in October 1968 following the execution of Zairian rebel leader Pierre Mulele, who had been residing in Congo and had been returned to Zaire under a guarantee of amnesty. In June 1970, after two anti-Ngouabi coups having transparent backing from Kinshasa had failed, Mobutu arid Ngouabi signed a declaration of reconciliation and resumed normal communications. Their respective embassies were reopened in the following December, but Mobutu expelled Ngouabi's envoys in August 1971, following Radio Kinshasa's highly exaggerated accounts of their subversive activi ties. In February 1972, Mobutu congratulate(] APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 Ngoriabi for crushing a leftist comp, but this return to cordial relations apparentl% has mere]y lessened Mobutu's abiding pre(wevpation with the Brazzaville MeHaCe. Mobutu has got along relatively well with the Portuguese authorities in Angola, as significant material interests have compelled mutual accom- modations. The ?ortuguese authorities have reacted to GRAE guerrilla thrusts from Zairian territory by repeatedly blocking copper shipments ori the rail line from Shaba Region to the Angolan seaport at Benguela. Mobutu, in turn. has veered toward unpublicized collaboratior. with Portuguese air- thorities, arid Brazzaville's vaunted aid for GRAE guerrillas has been offset by obstructions of their border-crossing operations. In March 1970, two Portuguese representatives were accepted in Kinshasa with the proviso that they be located in the Spanish Embassy ard conduct themselves unobtrusively. In addition to their mutual interest in maintaining the flow of Zairiai, copper through Benguela, Mobutu and the Portuguese are anxious to stabilize their extensive land frontier between Zaire arid Angola. In fact, Zairian and Portuguese security officials have been quietly cooperating on various measures since early 1969 to reduce tensions caused by the presence of about 370,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire and several thousand former Katangan (Shaban) gendarmes in Angola. For instance. the Zaire-Angola horder was reopened for normal trade at several points a full year before the reopening of a Portuguese mission if) kinshasa. Mingled with Mobutu's primary concern for Zaire's ecuritN is a personal ambition to achieve recognition as an interinational leader, and this aspiration has occasionally distorted his pragmatic regard for inaterial interests. In early 1968 Mobutu drew Chad and the Central African Republic into a mini-common market, apparently to challenge France's economic predominance in central Africa. His persistent efforts to forge economic links with Burundi and Rwanda have been at least partially motivated by a desire to supplant Belgian influence, although neither venture has produced solid links. Mobutu withdrew from the French -sport sored Afro-Malagasy Common Market in April 1972 am,dst rhetorical assertion% of Zaire's destiny to bridge the remaining neocoionial barriers between its French- and English-spea king neighbors. In May 1972, Mobutu sent a Zairian paratroop unit arid two jet fighter planes to Burundi in respomse to President Micombero's plea for help against a Htitu tribal revolt. Apparently, Mobutu was primarily concerned with maintaining his personal influence with jklicombero, arid the Zairian paratroopers merely performed guard duts.- in the capital, while the aircraft were used for reconn aissance. Iater, when the extent of Tutsi aprisals against the Hidu retwl% became obvious, Mobutu stopped suppli ing M if -ombern with amm"nition. b. Relations tath Western nations and the U.N. Belgium remains the major foreign presenci- in Zaire, although the relationship has fluctuated greatly during the years since independcii(-v. The two countries will probably never again be as close as they were, and certain issues�such as connpensation for Belgian losses during the early poistindependence years�remaii, unresolved. However, both countries aDpear to realiz that it is in their mutual interest to stay on good terms. Since Zaire's independence, Belgium has maintained a higher level of offivial bilateral aid programs than any other countr%� roughly &534 million during I %WO-68, compared with $420 million from the United States and $16 inillioto from West Germany. Mobutu's fling at economic independence frorn Belgium began in mid-19b6 and culminated in the seizure of UMHK mining assets in January 1%.7. Mobutu had hoped to destroy UMHK's position� part real and part fancied�as a political force in Zaire arid prove his position as an African nationalist. When lie created a Zairian company, the General Congolese Ore Co. (GIECOMINES)�now General Quarries and Mine. Company of Zaire (GECAMINES)�to run tire mines, the UMHK in retaliation blocked the sale of Zairian copper by threatening prospective purchasers with legal action and withheld pa\nients to the Zairians on the copper then in the pipeline. In February 196 art agreement was finalb. reached between the Zaire Government arid the General Ore Co. (SGM). an associate company of UMHK, twder which SGM would mine arid market minerals produced by GECOMINES tinder a contract. The broader issues in the dispute, such as UMHK's claims for compensation, were not settled until late 1969 on terms which a Belgian spokesman called most generous. Belgium. for its part, undertook a gradtial disengagement from its former colony. The trend took on added momentum following racia I incidents which accompanied the mercenaries' mutiny of July 1967. Some 10,000 Belgian% left Zaire at that time, and Belgian aid programs were reorganized to focus on program assistance avd purely technical tasks, notably education. In addition, echnical assistance teanis in man\ parts of the country were withdrawn, but 27 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 Mobutu's poliey in early 1968 of encouraging foreigners to stay on sternmed the flow. Foreign experts were reinstated in the management of mining, transport, power, and tile public utilities, and Belgian teachers, who had not been allowed entry (luring the mercenary crisis, returned to Zaire. Relations improved steadily. Mobutu's visit as head of statc to Belgium in November !969 toppod off a series of exchange visits by high-level officials, and King Baudouin visited Zaire in mid-1970. There are now some 40,0(X) Belgians in Zaire, compared to more than 90,000 Lit independence and as few as I0,(X)0 ill 1967. As of late 1972, official relations between Brussels and Kinshasa were still firm and effective despite Mobutu's continued use of Belgian groups in Zaire as prime targets for monetary shakedowns or psychologi- cal coups. For instance, in March 1971 it Zairian appelate court upheld charges that several Belgian executives Of SOCOball(ILle, all internationally financed corporation, had helped some Zairian nationals evade paying taxes. Prison sentences were imposed on two Belgian executives, while Socobanque, w1iich include(] Belgian shareholders, was in effect nationalized by imposing a ruinotis fine of $4.9 million dolla Neverthuless, 3 months later Brussels quietly agreed to provide $1 million a year in pensions to Zairian veterans of the colonial Force Publique and also to assume Some $125 million of Zaire's foreign debts. 'rhe debts were owed mostly to Belgian ti.1tioll which suggests the underlying and usually efficacious rationale of Mobutu's double-edged approach to tile Belgian Ili March 1972 the Belgian Foreign Minister visited Kinshasa to discuss s u c h matters its it new Zairian property law ostensibly airned at Belgian absentee landowners. tit*. involvement of Belgian priests in Mobutu's confrontation with tile Catholic hierarchy, unfavorab- le Belgian press coverage of Mobutu's offici actions, and the failure of Belgian authorities to stop Zairian students in Brussels from openly criticizing Mobutu. Tile most tangible results of tit( Belgian Foreign Minister's visit were sonic $25 million in lie%% tecluji assistance programs and liberalized credit ternis for Zairian purchases of Belgian goods. It also agreed to hold regular consultations tit tile foreign ministers' level in order to resolve future problems before thvy became critical. The Uidted States has been deeply involved in Zaire through its political arid financial support of the U.N. military and civilian operations ill tile early 1960'sand through its bilateral program of technical, militarv, and economic assistance, The United States hi extended over $650 million in various forms of aid in(] support to Zairy sinco 1960. Ill line with the improved 28 political, economic, and security situation, the United States in FY70 shifted to development loans and to P. L. 480 programs making U.S. surplus commodities available oil casy terms. For FY72, the total value of all U.S. bilateral aid pr(;,;ra.ns for Zaire, including military, was roughly $5 million in grants or excess stock and $5 millioa in loans. 'i and agriculture have the highest priority under tit(- program emphasizing development. Zaire's relationship with the United Nations has been complex and varied. File most drarnatic development was the U.N. military presence and operations front Jillv 1960 to June 1964. Less draniatic. but equally important, was [lie U.N. vivilian aid program, which %%-,Is still in operation in 1972. Ili the first days of this prograin, personnel recruited b% the United Nations filled almost ;ill the crucial positions in the judicial system and in the fields of medicine, transportation, communications, education, and government administration. The I 1 N. personnel were it major factor in staving off total collapse in the earl cliaotic daNs of indepe As other countries increased their bilateral assistance and qualified Zairian replacements were trained, the munber of U.N. advisers decreased. The United Nations sponsors it greatly reduced aid pr ,rani involving about $5 million annually. 'I'll( arnied forces continue to depend oil technic mid administrative support front Belgium, the United Kingdom, Ital Israel, and the U it i t es i ll l a t e 1971 there Were about 250 Belgian militar% advisers stationed iii various parts of the country. There were also nine Israeli military technicians, who have trained Illost of tit( Zairian paratroopers, and nine British military advisers- with the arm%-. Ali Italian military assistai ice program conducts pilot trahiing for the air force, which is it c o f ti arilly Ili july 1972 this program ilIVOINT(I Some 80 Itilli,11) pilots MR1 other technicians ill Zaire, while 70 Zairians were receiving advanced flight and other training in Ital 'I'l U.S. military assistance program has emph training it'. com In unications, administrati011, alid logistics. The United States provided materiel aillounting to $29.1 oil it grant basis front 1963 to 197 1. Although the U. S. grant aid program had been phased o by mid-1972, military loans wvre continui a t a rate Of roughly $2 likillioll it year. c. Relations with Communist countries Zaire's relations with tile Soviet Union are marked bv it nititual wariness, Soviet representatives were expelled front Zaire in 1960 and again in 1963 because Moscow supported elvinen(s which oppo ti central government. Since 1)vcembvr 1967, when APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 Mobutu agreed to resume normal diplomatic relations, Soviet envoys in Kinshasa have had their lips and downs. Although a regularly assigned TASS corresrx)ndent and occasional good-will tours of Soviet athletes and artists have been welcomed, Mobutu has never allowed a Soviet cultural center or accepted Soviet offers of technical assistance which would iesult in the employment of Soviet personnel in Zaire for extended periods or would require Zairians to go the Soviet Union for training. In early 1970 four Soviet Embassy aides and the TASS correspondent were expelled amid local press accounts of their proselytizing activities among Zairian government employees. Injuly 1971, 20diplomatsfroin Sovietand other Communist embassies were expelled in retaliation for their o9eged complicity in the demonstrations at Lovan'tim UniversitY. In January 1972, however, evidence of a UeW cordiality began Nvith ill invitation for I Soviet parliamentary delegation to visit Zaire and meet with Zairian legislatois. In March, Mobutu held a %videly publicized luncheon with the Soviet ambassador. his warmest gesture towar it Soviet envoy since becoining President. Anuouncements followed that I Soviet delegation would attend tile MPH congress in May and that Foreign Minister Groniyko would visit Zairt in July. 1 the Groinyko visit has been continually postponed, and in late 197 there was no indication that Mobutu seriously intended to accept substantial aid from the Soviet Union or to relax his vigilance against potential Soviet subversion in Zaire. Rather. the whole pattern Suggests that Mobutu is using his public dealings With tilt' SoVitltF as propaganda, priniarily to impress others�to show Zairian dissideuts that they do not havv (lie full support of their foreign backers or to Show his international andictive his doteriviination to maintain a nonaligned Stan(-( despite priniarN &-pendenev oil tliv West for inaterial support. In Nov( 1972, Kinshasa atilloullCed that Zaire and tile People's Republic of Chilla had decided to exchange ambassadors socu, and h) January 1973 Mobutu visited Peking. During the visit he signed I tradv pact in(] in agreement for technical and economic cooperation. Apparently. Mobutu took these steps to maintain Zaire's m;lIaligned posiHoll and to enhance his ieputation as a leading A,'rican tatvsnian. There %%-its Ito hidication that Mobu(ii intended it) allow Peking to establish in extvitsive presenev in Zaire. [it addition to the Soviet Union, five odwr Communist countries havv diploniatic inissious ill Kinshasa: Poland, Yiigoslavia, Bulgaria, Hoinania, and Czechoslovakia. Most of them have modest commercial and cultural agreements with Zaire, but their influence is negligible t with th"t of the non-Communist countries. Mobutu's dealings -vitil these states have roughly paralleled his tactical Iine with the Soviet Union. Ile has tended to show some partiality for Yugoslavia and Romania, and It( visited their capitais in August 1970. following his first State visit to the United States. Nevertheless, Yugoslav and Holliallian diplomats wete include(] ()it the blacklist of "Communist provocateurs" twelled in Jill%- 1971. Zaire's relations with Bulgaria were stispentiod ill August 1969 following student demonstrations ii) Kinshosa; Mobutu accused the Bulgarian cousul (if helping students hivolved in the dvinonstration to escape to Bulgaria. Ill August 1970 the Zaire Government announced its decision to resunic diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. E. Threats to government stability (S) 1. Discontent and dissidence The foremost impression derived front I review of tile potentialities for subversion ill Zaire is tiv. contrast betwvvii the almost complOv absence of' articulate opposition to the Mobutu govvrninviii and tile pr(walenev of underlying nialaisv. Mobutti has a (I roi t Iy twtitralizvd all orga I I i zat ioi is having an intrinsic capability of ovvrthrowing his one-man rtile. but he has done rviatively littIv to rvined% advvrsv economic conditions which appear to N worsening Zaire's chronic social tensions. III fact, the tactics which have vfft neutralized resistaiict- to his supreme authorit\ also havv stunted thv growth of constructive capabilities throughout tile govvrullivilt ai)d other institutions that are vital for m-otionfic and social progress. Becaust Mobutu has given mory attention io entrenching his personal influence than building an effective command structure. the worst threats to the viability of the Zairt Republic appear too be Mobutu's incapacitation or death through illness, accident, or ;ISSItsSination. Although it is unlikely that in\ I) resen t I y ide it I i fia b It o I )poi iv it I s wi I I challeng(I MoDutu as long is Ill remains ill good health, his persistent undercutting of potential rivals also makes unlikely that ill\ foreseeable successor could silliply take over the tangled rvins of his administration and maintain comparable control. Although Zzliriaus still vividly recall their long history of hit(Aribal strife, (be population is divided into so many tribal groups Gi.0 traditional Mimic 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 animosities tend to prevent the emergence of a cohesive revolutionary movement as much as they impede the development of a strong national state, The most important single source of social tensions since tho ebbing of the peasant uprisings of 1%,4-65 is the massive influx of peasants into Zaire s principal urban areas. Ironically tile mingling of people from diverse tribal backgrounds in government offices, industrial shops, and urban shantytowns has usually intensified traditional animosities, but the resulting tensions in work situations and occasional inter- neighborhood riots are not likely to produce or sustain all effective urban revolt. Nevertheless, the continual rural-urban niigratioi, reflects the government's failure to stimulate sufficient agricultural expansion to support the growing rurai population. More important politically is the fail(ire of tile typical urban newcomer to fulfill his niaterial desires, because industrialization has lagged far behind urbunization in creating new jobs and because housing and social services are extremely inadequate. Within most urban areaS, unemployment is the prime cause of severe privation for a large portion of tile populace. jot) hunger is potentially exploitable bN any dernagog who dares raise his vo e, because ti ic C local historical context bas conditioned Zairians to regard the government its the prime source of ernPlovilic"t and to blunie those in authority for failing to provide a desired jot). Belgian patvnialism inculcatcd this attitude during the colonial cra, and it has been reinforced since independence by ill(. swehing of tit( government payroll to a point where almost half of all regular wage e.arners are employed by govertinterit agencies. Furthermore, many skilled indirstrial jobs are unattainable for Zairians and are held by foreigners; technical iraiiiing is the weakest link in tile Zairian educational system. Mobutu has exploited this grievance to the extent of making unrealistic promises to provide many jobs for Zairians by expelling aliens. This propaganda Iiiie, cotipled with tile prevalent i net i na t ion of Zairian officials to favor fellow tribesmen ill hiring and firing. encourages popular inferen(ws that anyone who is jobless nust Ile tile victim of ethnic discrimination and that such grievances might be redressed through a revolt. Mally of tile presetit urban inhabitaWs are chronically unemployed and may be hitired to their plight, hid currently advvow financial trends confrotit Mobutu with tile need for severely pruning the government payroll, thus risking criticism aniong k highly articulate part of the population. 30 Mobutu's primary claim oil tit(- loyalty of the urban wage arners�that by 1971 lie had reversed a 10-year rise in their cost of living�may be canceled if there is a sharp decline in the real value of wages as a result of monetary inflation. The subst statutory wage increases in 1970 and 1971 have only partially offset all overall decline since independence ill living conditions for ordinary urban wage earnem. Lower echelon government employees have repvatedly suffered long dclays in being paid as a result of chl'0111c administrative snarls or malfeasance oil tit(- part of their superior%. Although schools, niedical facilities. arld other social services are c0ncentr.ited in urban areas, the% are inadequate for ill(- rapidl%l expanding urban population, and sanitary housing is particularly limited. Although urban wage earnem comprise a fortiniate ininority by comparison with tile urball unemployed and rural populace. ordinary wagv earners feel aggrieved by conspicuous gaps between their lot and that of high-level government officials who flaunt luxuries derived froin Mobutu's infornial largesse, Generally poor morale aniong lower echelon government employees is suggested by the fairl% common occurrence of wildcat strikes for short periods in particular offices or shops. The grcat majority of Zairians are peasants whose overall material condition is still appreciably worse than it was during tile laSt decade of tit( colonial era. In 1959 a large portion of the rural population was getting some cash invoine front a highly prodtictivv system of commercial agriculture. Although most peasants contioued to practice subsistence agriculture oil their tribal lands, tit( lielgialls ellabletl th a t grow and sell cash crops through VffVCti%'V 10Cal administrative support and a transportatiori system which linked inost of tit( cotnitryside river and r,-'Iil routes to foreigii markets. Much of t1lis infrastructure collapsed during the (-,trl% IWW's, and by 1972 production of cash crops was invrely .pproaching the level of 1959, although the ritral population had increased by roughly a third. The net result for most peasants has J)evii chronic un- deremployinent and denial of a number of amenities prvviously gained. Furthermore, previously rudinien- tary but generally available social services, such its local niedical clinies, have deteriorated or ceased in lilost localities. Material recovery has [)evil vspecialiv slow ill tile sectors of ewstern Zaire which Nvery overrun by tit( Sirnba revolt in 1964�sectors that could never be coulpletely closed to subversive ;nfiltrations front Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, or Uganda. Although tile walling of tile Siniba revoll shows diat a peasant APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 uprising ill this area cannot congeal into a solid secessionist regime Without substantial foreign support. it has also become evident that minimal foreign suppt)rt call sustain diehard guerrilla remnants indefinitely. Ill mid-1972, at least 4 years after the cessation of regular support for the Simba remnants, nine Zairian army battalions %vere still chasing small guerrilla hands and disturbing thousands of peasants in the Mountainous terrain near Lake Tanganyika. Because local administration is harely adequate to meet the basic needs even of those settled in their tribal homelands, any influx of refugees frorn adjacent wuntries could have a seriously disruptive impact oil the Zairian inhabitants of frontier zones. Hence ti ever-present possibilit of large-scale peasant migrations across Zaire's nine international borders MaN' constit"te as serious a threat to internal stabilitv as the possibilit of infiltration by foreign-ba,-d' opponents of the Zaire Government. As of late 197 2, at least .5(X),(XX) refugees from adjacent countries were living in Zaire's frontier zones, including roughly 400,M) Angol 5(),(XX) Sudanese. 25JX)0 Burtuidi- ans. and 24.(XX) Rwandans. it i s i gn ifi can t tilat fairly severe tensions b e t %veell these refugees a nd loca I i nhabi till, ts have occurred front time to ti h serious disturbances have not ensued. primarily because of favorable factors that art largely beyolj( the control of Zairian authorities. For insL the Angolan refugees 1 j ve g a fairlv well with local Zairian peaswits because they are fellow Kougo tribesmen, while Zairian authorities have relied primaril% oil a U.N. agency to niove some of the Sudanese rvfug g ees awav from froutier sectors where they were most troubles011ie. On the Whole, prospects appeared poor in late 1972 for alleviating withi th 11ext few years the adverse vc0nomic and social conditions which had bred unrest 111110 Most elements of the Zairian population s hidepriulence. Nevertbf-less Mobutu h succee not 0 AY ill stifling overt opposition b ,I i reducing known subversive organizations t n proportions. Presumably, therefore, the presently muffled tensions aud grievances are more likviv to be expressed through existing populai organizatiol I is th Mobutu has sponsored thall to suddenly emerge as newly formed subversive movements. are no indications that aHY elements of these organizations� tl I MIMI, its youth wing, or the national labor uniou (UNTM�will offer serious resistance to Mol)tlttl as 10lig as he ulaintahis his present vigor, 11lis controls, however, art- so essen till 11 personal as to niake it appear dubious that anv o f these organizations c effectively stifle or restrain urbau or rural dissidellee following Mobutu's sudden death or incapacitation. Hence the survival of Zaire as a unitary national state may hinge oil how each of these popular organiza- tions, as well as the arm% react to the resurgence of centrifugal forces that probably will enslie from Mobutu's demise. It is significant that university students have been Mobutu's most articulate critics. The fatal cl between IA)VaniUlll University students and troops in )line 1969, and the ensuing sympathy demonstrations oil other campuse was the most impressive show o f civilian discontent since Nlobutu assumed power in 1965. The memorial demonstrations at Lovanium ill June 1971, despite the banning of independent student unions and mandatory enrollment of a ll students ill the JIMPR in late 1969, sbow that student po"'Intia I i ties for spontaneous protests are indeed rrepressible. Although the i o f 1, ovall i lill students into t1w arm% in June 1971 had i n immediately sobering effe ti su reorganization of l e i list i tut i olls h -it least temporarily delayed the genuine strengthening of illadequate facilities resulting from rapid vxpan-on of higher educatio The net result appear% to be a quiet dernoralization of soule 10 ,M) postsecondary s t Udellts. I I Nice sonle possibilities remain tilil spontaneous student protests inay gain support from lower echelon UNTC leaders or spark urban riots, particularly in Ki lls h asa an d l, ti b uill b as i l i, if economic conditions wors s i gil ifi can tl y 2. Suhversion 1 "or lll of the decade silice independence. Zaire has been unstable. The authoritN of the central government over its more than 22 million people and 9050X) square miles of territory has been tellu and large parts of (lie coui)try have been totallv outside the government's control for long periods. In late 1962 and 1963 the central government, with substantial help from the United Nations, ended the 2-year secessions of Katanga and eastern Kasai PlOvinces. two of the country's richest areas. only to be faced ill 1964 %vith it rebellion in eastern Zaire wh at its peak in the fall (if' 1964 denied the central government control over about one-third of its territory. Although this insurgency and a smaller one in western Zaire were for (lie most part Contained bN the end of 1465, further instabilitv Nvas generated by I'l brief mutin in inid-1966 of former Katang all gendarmes who had been taken into the Zairian Arniv and bY a lutitinY of some 150 white mercenaries ni mid- 1967. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 Since late 1967, whert the rebel mercenary hand withdrew to Rwanda to await evacuation to Europe, Zaire has suffered no major outhreaks of violence, and political stability has prevailed. In remote areas scattered bands of rel and brigands cx)ntinue to forage, but they avoid contact with ariny units and are primaril% concerned with simple survival. Aside from guerrilla remnants. as of late 1972 there were no known organized groups within Zaire that were openly opposing the Mobutu government or actively :;eeking to overthrow it. Presumably there were some covert oppositionists in Zaire who were still in contact with sniall groups of anti-Mobutu emigrees or receiving cautious encouragement front Communist embassies in Kinshasa or Brazzaville, just across the Congo River. Since the reduction of orgauized subversive activities to it negligible level is largely the result of Mobutu's personal leadership, it might prove to be it inere interlude in the event of his early demise, before vital national institutions firm ill) and attain intrinsic durability. The greatest internal threat to the government since the end of the Katanga secession in earl% 1963 the outbreak of insurgency in late 1963 and early 1964 in old Kwilu Province (no%%- part (it Bandundu Region) and in northeastern Zaire. The leader of the K%vilu revolt, herre Mulelv, %%-its it rtwolutionary who had received Chinese training and Nvlio was, to sonle xtent, ideol0giCallN motivated. For most of his followers, however, tribal discontent, dissatisfaction Mth the central government, and personal anibitions were inore important than ideology. The Mulele forces, compowd mainly of Bapende and Babinida tribal elentents, %vry initially successful against Ow government troops,\ but when the traditional tribal boundaries of th0 Bapvnde and Babunda Nvere reached, the retwilion lost steam and Mulelt was forced to retreat, Mulele x%as exectiWd in October 1968. and by 1970 the rebellion was reduced to scat(ered pockets of poorly arined rebels. As of latv 1972, the sinall guerrilla bands rvinaining in central Bandundu Region appeared to be cut off froin foreign channels of supply, preoccupied with tit( problems of survival in a difficult physical environment. and engaged principally in handitry. The rebellion ill the north and vas(--the so-called Simba whellion�differed from tit( Mulele revolt in that the political leaders of the rebellion did not actually fonient the revolt but, instead, exploitedlMal Conflicts and discontent alreadv in existence. MSSatkfaCtif)n with t he central 1111d pt`00116111 governments, cotipled with ii-alotisy (if apparent '12 government favoritism for rival tribal groups, prompted members of several etlinie groups, particularly the Bakusu, Batetela, Basonge. and Baftilero, to revolt in early Mit The success of the rebels attracted the attention of the National Liberation COMIllittee, a group of Zairian dissidents formed in late 1963. The ambitious politicians in the National Liberation Committee soon usurped the leadership of the rebellion an(] established their own government" at Kisangani with Christophe Cbenyv as president, The fanaticism of tit(- rebel troops, who were indoctrinated by witch doctors to believe in their ()%%'It invincibility. plus the complete collapse of most army iinits in the area, led to t he rapid advance of the rebel units. Realizing the obvious deficiencies of the Zairian troops, Premier Tshonibe imported whitc niet to assurne the main burden of coping with tit(- rebels. By September 1964 the rebellion had reached its military peak, and the government f0rCCS 1)('g;kll retaking rebel-held territory. lit November 1964, confronted by increasing evidence of rebel brutality to European hostages in the northeast, Belgian paratroopers transported by U.S. aircraft dropped oil the rebel capital of Stanleyville (no%% KiSaugani) MId laier on Patilis (now Isiro). Faced with dvfeat. the leaders of the Stanleyville rebel regime fled front Zaire. Nevertheless tit( Sinibas�the pt-asant guerrillas who had started the rcN'olt kild coinprised its real drivitig forcv throughout�continued such sttibborn resistance that a ftill year was required for Zairian troops and svxeral white inervenary units to (-fear thein froin the vast sectors of eastern and northeastern Zaire which thvv held aftvr losing Staulevvillv By the end of 1965 the Jiehard Simba reninants had witfidrawn to it reiath vly sinall sector facing the northwestern coast of I iake Tanganyika, where the combination of' rugged terrain, hadl% deteriorated roads, and the infiltrating of supplies front Tanzania and Burtindi enabled thein to hold off government forces. Meanwhile almost IMOK) Zairian peasants who had been inore or less responsive to Siniba leaders, or had bevii swept along between retreating Sinihas and advancing governinvilt forces, took refuge in Uganda, Burundi. Central African Republic. Sudan. and Tanzaiiia. Consequently the I) ri ine subversion threat Confronting Mobutu whell he assumed power Nvas that fowign aid to diehard Sin band- aniong Zairian refugees in neighboring (imatries inight enabit flivin to return to Zaire in sufficient strength to mount it counteroffensive. By 1970 this threat had been reduced to itegligible proportions through Mobutu's inultifaceted strategy of exerthig perssistent military APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 pressure against active guerrillas, making repeated offers of amnesty to those who tumed themselves in, and inducing neightmring governments to restrain Simba activities among Zairian refugees, to interdict Communist aid to Simbas. and to facilitate voluntary repatriation of Zairian refugees, The failure of a "Revolutionary Front" to disrupt Zairian national elections in late 1970 discredited the few guerrilla leaders in eastern Zaire who still asserted ideohigic,il nlo' in contrast with the bulk of Simba renina-ts who had settled do to subsistence b\ banditry. in late 1972, small guerrilla bands north.%v.4 of Lake Tanganyika were still evading capture and scoring occasional minor strikes against pursuing troops despite the discontinuance of substantial external stipport. The specter of a significant anti-IMobutil movement among Zairian emigrees was finally dispelled by Mobutu's highly publicized amnesty offer in December 1970. This induced the return within a fc\% inoriths of two of the three principal leaders of the short-lived Stanleyville rebel regime�"President" Christophe Cbenye and "General" Nicholas Olenga� its well its a dozen or so former politicians of lesser prominence. Although ii)ade(jitate administrative M suptx)rt limited the return of ordinary Zairian reftigees to no more than several thousatid, the overall psychological impact of the amnesty offer has dis(,xmraged further efforts oil the part of Communists or African radicals to mobilize Zairian refugees agaiiist the Mobtitu government. fit August 1971, Olenga and other former rebels were accused of starting a lie%% revolutionary movement, abetted by Congo President Ngouabi's envoys, The televised trial. however, was so lacking ill evidence of concrete subversive actions or tangible foreign aid as to leave foreign observers Wondering whether Mobittu had resorted to loose accusations ill order to discotirage Zairians front contact with foreign envoys. or to inollifyarmy officers who res his aninesty for it notorious guerrilla leader. Foreign Communist activities have not had significant results ill Zaire since the Simba revolt fizzled out. Soviet and other Communist embassies in Kinshasa have niet Mobutu's vigilance with w 1 ji t appears to be it long-range strategy�cmitiously CliltiVUtil Zairian officials. students, atid others who May eVC`ntkla11%' bVC0111C p0litiCall% CXIA0itablV in the evelit of Mobutu's dernisv or loss of power. Chinese embassies in surrounding African cotintries likewise have teiided to withhold substantial aid for Zairiaii cliligrees tivitil the\ prove their capabilities for effective aCti0ll Within Zaire. There has never been a Communist party in Zaire. In the period immediately preceding independeiiee, the Belgian Communist Partv contacted mail%' Zairian politicians and attempted to organize a Zairian Communist Party, but the attempt failed. Communist ideology has had limited appeal to most Zairians, partly because of its non-African and irreligious characteristics. Lacking it recognized political organ through which to channel their doctrine, the Cornmun, attempted to ti\e existing political La-tions and to establish front groups. The U.S.S.R.'s nimcs to establish a strong Communist prem-nve in Zaire lio-gan ill the I i days ol independence when the Soviet Union ac(iv(4 supported Premier Patrice Lutnumba ill the internal i)olitical (-xniflicts which then paralzed the conintry. In September 1960, Zaire expelled the U.S.S.11 diplomatic mission oil [lie grounds that it %\as interfering in the eotintry*s intern..1 affairs and subverting the legitimate government. Relations were restored in Atigust 1961, and U.S.S.R. representatives returned, only to he expelled 0lieV More in November 1963 for engaging in subvers activity. Zairian atithorities had proved collusion between the inenthers of the Soviet Embassy al)d the Zairian rebel movement, the National Liberation Committee. based in Brazzaville. The U.S.S.R. continued to give substantial support to the Stanivyville rebellion during 1964. Thv Zairian troops seized Soviet-made weapons oil several occasions. and in September 1964 rebel leader Christopher Cbenye claimed oil Radio Stanleyville that several of his officers had been trained in Nloscow. Zaire and the U.S.S.R. decided to restime diplomatic relations ill IN-evivilwr 196 and by inid-1968 the U.S.S.R., as well as Poland. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Ronlallia, and Czeehosiovakia, hit(] diploniatic missions ill Kinshasa. The Collinitmist missions tread \%arily, placing emphasis oil building all iniage of frietidl\ cooperation, I ll( U.S.S.R. continlies. hinve%er, to shelter several Zairian rebel leaders'. The Chinese have suptiorted rehellion ill the country through their embassies ill neighboring African nations. During [lie insurgencies of 19(V through 1965, the Chinese missions ill Brazzaville and in Btijunibura (Burundi) wery partictilarly active ill aiding the reliels, and there were uncomfirnied reports that Chinese adviser% were aniong the rebel forces is the\- moved across northeastern Zaire. Cuban involvement ill Zaire. which began in 1961 with the training of Zairian dissidents outside the country, in Cuba and Congo (Brazzaville), reached its Zenith during the 1964-65 rebellimi whell Cuball 33 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 advisers served %vith the rebel forces. Although there were still a fe%% Ctihan advisers in Brazzaville in mid- 1972, there were no indications that they were engaged in activity directed at the Zairian Government. With the collapse of the 1964 rebellion, Communist aid to Zairian insurgents decreased sharpl%% Earlier Communist support had depended on the cooperation of neighboring African states in providing bases front which to supply the Zairian rebel groups. With the removal of Tshombe. despised by most African leaders, aiid I lie success of Mobutti* efforts to improve Zaire's relations %%ith other African states. African cooperation in the Communist effort to overthro'.% or subvert the Zairian Government practically carne to it lialt. Neighboring countries still coli however, to give -;afe haven to Zairian rebels. I'll( existenev in Brazzaville of' a radical, openly pro-Communist reginte continues to offer the ConinitiniNts it base close to Zaire, but this base seems to lie tised primarily to send pro-Maoist and other Conummist propaganda into Kinshasa. Brazzaville provides haven to Zairian students all(] trade unionists who h left z jl i rc becatise of suspected pro-Coninitinist activities. an d it also gives sanctuary to variotis exile and rebel grot I ps. fronts orgililized b\ Communist sympathizers have never had wide appeal in Zaire. The only significant organization which c otild h J )cen considered im operating Commimist front was (lit pro- Communist General Federation of Congolese Workers (c( it was stipported b% the Soviet Unw, through the World Fedvratioit of Tradt U 101111 (WFTU) and by Chillil. 'I'lle linlited 1)1' this organization %%-its further curtailed 1% 111p il l-I j i s l oi l the CGTC first secretar\ gvnvral, Niallionga-Allias, in November 1966 and -tie proscription of CGTC ictiviti I (l M reginie. Five fornier members of the CGTC wbo lmd joined die national labor federation, UNTZ, \%ery dismissed in May 1968 from the UNTZ and subsequently imprisoned for their financial in(] ideological dependence oil it foreign trade union, naniely the WFIT. Although there are midoubtediv additi onal ex-CGTC members in the UNIX the\ (10 [lot Pl.k\' a key role. F. Maintenance of internal security 1. Police (C) The National Gendarineriv (GN) has primary responsibility for law enforcement and maintenance of ptihlic order throtighotit all territorial minpoments of Zaire. This new %er\ according to a presidential 3.1 decree of 31 jtil%- 1972. incorporates the former National Police and the former army gendarme hattalions. 'rhe National Police had been norninalk responsible [or maintenance of law and order throughout the nation, and a large powtion of its pemonnel�roughly 22,600 in mid-1972�had been thinly distributed across the countryside. The police, however, had proved so ineffective in rural areas that local administrative officers IISII.kll\ had to call upon local detachments front the six arni\ gendarme battalions to cope with even minor disorders. The basic organi7ational structure of the GN, as formulated in the initial presidential decree, clearly is intended to supplant tit(- fornier rivalrics and overlapping jurisdictions of tit(- army gendarmes and civil police with it tinified service, more directly respomsive to President klobutti's control than r-ither service had been. The GN is it componvnt of the army, under the control of the I)epartnivilt of Defellse. Which has been headed by Mobutu since 19(i.5. Furthermore, it setdor officer of the GN is included (in the Presidential Special Staff for Iliv security services. which was formed in varly August 1972. This St;kff. chaired by Ihe senior military aid(- in the Office of the 1'resident, provides Mobtitti with all alternate channel for kpassing Major General Bumba, the ne" appointed Captain General of the anny. I'll( GN is expected to have it minierical strength of I l yfmt 30,M) when the proce of consolidatin, tit( National Police and dir arim getidarme mmplHed. As of law 197 Zk detailed Ubl" ot otwnization for tit( GN reportedly was under nAl�k tJ tliv provess of integrating personnel front (lit birr two servicv% \%as still incomplete, causing %tillit ki 1 lization. esi)vcitl1\ aniong former police liffik, Tht offico'll announcement of the merger i r d that .111 the former army getAirnies %%-oil[(] be n) while former police pvr-sonnel would be subjeut to selection. Ill fact. tit( newly appointed commander of the G.N. Brigadier Genoral Sillga Boyengv. is a career army officer. as are the senior GN officers in each administrative region of' the countr\. By late September 19 2 most of the higher officers ill the former National Police had bvvit downgraded within the GN or transferred to other departments. Oil the other hand. the representative of the GN oil (lie newly formed special presidential staff for (lit security services is a highly qualified former police official. and there were other indiemions that mobtitti intends to retain the ill ire competent of the former police officers in responsibiv positions. As of November 1972 it was still problematical how intich time wotild he re(lifired for the CN to overmine the Iemporarily demoralizing effects of such i t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 i-veeping reorganization and to attain its Potential for becoming much More effective than either of its predecessors. An important factor uould be the eventual balance between former gentla-,-Pies and former Police in key positions. The former army gendarme battalions had a reputation for brutal treatment of civilians, dile largely to their being treated as reserve infantry units and receiving minimal training in nonviol teeliniques for maintaining order. On the other hand, the disbanded National Police had made a good start toward effective mo bil e patrol units in major urban areas it is unclear whether this progress will be seriously eroded In the sweepi personnel changes resultin from the roorganizatio Belgium has long provio:104 iriticipal techni aid mission to the police. advisory group averaged about 40 Owt r' 1, whell it wa-, sharply reduced ;i,'% "MA ;tied relations betweell the two Wllkw% In r.. 1) the Belgi mission compriselmill Ill Ivirr,, i, i I whoin Were instructors at the shi polict. FrAt-4t-f 6 6m schools. The Bel gian wre svrviflg its consultants or instruct, the Police are continuing the functiolls"'with the GN. The United Nations formerly provided techni assistance. Particularly helpful t the Zairian force %%-Its a Nigerian police detachment which was sent under U.N. auspices and served during the period 1960-66. Ali additimial nine-man U.N. advisory mission its terminated at the close of 1%.*7. The United States has had a team of p a and instructors it) Zaire since 1964. In additi t it role in helping set 11P filobile brigades and rural mobile training. the team was instrumental ill organizing Mid upplying tile efficient police radio network linking themajor regions. The United St ,l has provided considerable materiel assistance. The U.S. training programs t uld other technical assistance activities th were being conducted with the National Police i mid-1972 have proceeded with minimal interruptions "'hile most of 'lie Zairian particip were bei integrated into the GN. The most encowaging result of U.S. assistance for the Natio P(oli 1 beef, the recentl d e% e l ope d "PlIbilitY of Kinshasa metropolit police for respondilk-g rapidl% Mid 4ft-etively to serious strevt crittles. ranging front m ugg i ligs t auto t an d reckless driving, Until this prograrn was initiated in 1969, Kinshasa P()li" Ilad negligible capabilities for pursuit of criminals. By mid-19741 a Mobile Brigade, comprising radio-e motorcycle jeeps, and sedans, w %%,irillilig occasiollal encoun(er% with armed thugs if) the course of regular patr More important, the Mobile Brigade %vas restx)nding quickly to emergency calls as it result of effective teamwork with regu traffic control and investiga- tive units, coordinated through a modernized central command post for Kinshasa's seven police districts. In early 1972 a project for establishing a mobile brigade with similar support facilities i Lubumbashi was well tinder wa%. 2. Intelligenre (S) There are three primary intelligen and seciiritv organi7atiolis in Zaire: the National Documentation Center (CND. successor to the Surete Nationale); the Informatiot) and Military Securitv Directorate (DGRSM) in the Department of Defen and the G-2 section of the arm% To a very limited extent, ti intelligence section of tile GN also adds to the government's intelligence effort. IMobutt has tended to entrust various colintersub- version tasks to individuals have regular positions outside the seckirity services. For instance, Jean -Manzikala, was designated state iuspector in the Interior IMinistry front 1968 until his indictment of, murder charges in carly 1972. reportedly functioned as Mobutu's foremost special investigator. primarily txmcerned w'th dislovalty oil the part of senior official in the provinces. S uch informal assignments have generated loose iietworks of informants whos activities sometimes overlap the functi o f tl regular security services. Ili oroer to wduce tliv rcsiiking cotifusi 1 assigned Lt. Col. Ilayinoild Omba, formerk chief of the CND Doillestic Opi Directoratc, it iivw ifitelligence and security position oil the presidential staff in October 1971. A'Ithough it is lot apparent ill Omba official title, that of Private Secretary to the President. he reportedly functions as all inte coordinator responsible for all security matters. Ife is ilso coitsidered Mobutu's princil intelligelive adviser. a. National Documentation Center The CND is responsibl directly t th President. Ili late 1972 tile service reportediv h a total work force of approximately 550, includi'tig 500 in tile Domestic Operations Directorate and i f maximuni of 50 i ti Foreign Operations Directorate. The CND ni.iintains its headquarters i Kinshasa, with p ill each regional capital, s1lbIx)sts in other larger towns, and representativ i few foreign diplomati p suc is ill neighboring African countries, Brussels, and Paris. W-) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 The CND's responsi hil i ties include the collection Of information on possible subversives and surveillance of suspected enemies of tile state. In practice, these functions involve monitoring and countering all% political activity which in the opinion of the CND presents a potential threat to the government. Tile CND has powers of arbitrary arrest and interrogatiun, as well as de facto power to detain political prisoner.% without bringing lega! charges against them. Because military officers. hold key posts in the CND. this power of detention is widely employed against members of the armed forces. even though counterintelligence within the military services is technically tit(- responsibility of the DGRSM. The CND has three major directorates: Domestic Operations, Foreign Operations, and Administration. Most of the operational activities fall under the Domestic Operations Directorate. The Foreign Operations Directorate N%as not formed until 1969 Altb thr 'ND bad beei, assigning operah ('I, to foreign diplontAic jx)sts for several ears pre%iokislN I'lic forniatit I this dir( torate represents it scaled- Jown X of Mobutu's 1111 to estabil4l) a separate foreign intelligence avk-jic\. As late 1% ljtV 1972 the Foreign Operations Directorate \Ilh still relativeIN unorganized, and there were no sigix tjwt it Was functioning with real effect i veness. The capabilities of the CND have varied gru,jk since independence its it result of twrsonnel changc hich in turn have reflected di\ ers political pressures. Tile service had grown to all tui%vield\ size by 1969, and a resulting loss ill efficiencV was apparent. Subsequently inany of the less competent personnel have been weeded out, and the remaining staff employees have been better trained. Although there has been it net vain in effectiveness since 196 lite CND still is not capable of performing all its assig I functions. It is subject to the caprices of individud officer% and to tile Obstructive effects of interservice rivalries. b. Directorate of Information and Military Security DGHSM is tit agency of the Department of Def eme but reports directly to President Mobutu. DGRSM has a charter which gives it it wide range of respoiisibility and authority, but limited fluids and personnel preclude the effective CXCCuti011 Of kll\' Of its USSigned responsibil i ties. In 1969 it was reported to have only about 20 commissioned officers. in early 1970, DGRSM started giving more intensive training to its officer% in ,tit attempt to build ill) its effect i veness and capabilities. 136 I DGRSM's basic responsibility is to counter within the m;1itary establishment anv activity which it deems harmful to the state. It has a military investigative (,"s function and has the power of jow -4 %ithin the arined forces, although normally such ,jw% 4, ire carried out by military police, oil order% fi,ioiti the DGRSM chief. In carrying out its basic responsibility, DGRSM call also arrest civilians, although technically a CND officer is supposed to be pre.wnt this occurs. DGRSM call detain suspects tip to 24 hour% without charge, but in practice this time limit is frequently ignored. lit addition, D(.RSNl is responsible for information progranis designed to improve the morale of military personnel. Until tuid- 1972, DGRSM was responsible for the administration of it small unit which provided bod\ guard% and other physical protection for President MobutO and the army commander fit chief. The newl\ formed special presidential staff for tit( securitv services reportedl\ has assunied direCt re for Mobutu s personal protcoitm. hile DGHSM []its COHtill tied this NCr\1C(1 ft the arm Captain Ceneral. technically coiarols tile budget and r.tioins ti t i4 afluv G-2 section and theoreticaily could conlilland authority over it. lit practice. lbep- \'011slierable overial) and duplication between I IV- nd -2 units in the field, with no clear o in of rvsponsibilit\ or authority. Each arm\ -.,I grouping has both a G-2 and it DGRSM iniollitation officer the major difference being that DGRSM communications hypass the military chain of (101111111111(1 and go directly to the Department of Defense. DCIISNI has its own code systems but not its own communications e(joipment. G-2 units art- responsible for collecting tactical cOmbat information and for reporting oil general political matter in their respective provinces, DGRSM is responsible for military intelligemv oil foreign countries. particularly the countries adjacent to Zaire. Military attaches are a ssigned to DG.HSN for the duration of their foreign tours, and DGRSM is responsible for their administration. Since lost inilitar\ attaches are senior in rank to the director of DGRSM, they address their reports to higher echelons, although all military attache reports pass through DGRSM. 3. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities (S) Metropolitan police ill Kinshasa and other large cities have been fairk effective during recent vear% in controlling peaceful crowds and in dispersing student denioustrators with it mildinurn number of serious APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 injuries. In rural areas, however, the police sho-wed negligible capabilities for handling minor terrorist incidents or even sudden gatherings of any sort. Consequently, local army units frequently were the first resort in any rural disturbance. Even in urban situations, troop.i sometimes were deployed against unruly crowds before police capabilities were fully exhausted because of the basic predominance of the armed forces o the police. Although militar% action in such situations has been effective in the immediate sense of crushing resistance, the usual brutalit% on the part of troops has tended to amplify popular resentments against the government. President Mohatu s awareness of such potentially dangerous intideqttacies in the existing sectirity services apparently motivated his decision to form the National Gendarmerie (GN i in July 1972. This basic reorgani7ation. acccrding to qualified observers. clears the way for the development of a nationwide law- enforcement service that is of sufficient strength to cover the countrvside as %%ell as urban areas and is propefly trained in nonviolent techniques for maintaining order As of late 1972, however, the GN was still in a formative phase, and the observed performances of its predecessors are stil; the only realistic indications of present counter%uhversiVe capabilities. During the colonial era some metropolitan police units received special training in riot-contiol techniques, but resulting capabilities were largely dissipated by 1965. Subsequent training in this field has been limited, and as of mid-1972 no police units were. equipped with riot shields or other special equipment for crowd control except limited supplies of tear gas. Nevertheless. foreign observers report sonic recent improvement in crowd-handling performances on the part of Kinshasa police. possibly because thv% have had much practice from Moblitu*s frequent staging of such inass turnouts as MPR rallies and receptioils for visiting dignitaries. Dming student riots %Nhicli occurred in June 1%.9 at Kinshasa, Lubuni- bashi, and Kisangani. regular police units showed fair capabilities for dispersing unruly crowds through such nonviolent techniques as selective arrests of ringleaders and slowly advancing skirmish lines, Although the new mobile brigades are not designed primarily for riot control. the% have substantially enhance(] tile capabilities of metropolitan police for stopping street brawls before the% explode into riots. On the whole, however, the capabilities of metropolitan police are marginal, compared with the potential for concerted or spontaneous manifestations of dissidence within the extremely congested, rapidly growing urban areas. Furthermore, Mobutu's need to mollify army officers on whom lie has r(.lied for basic security has disposed him to call upon militan urt;ts or conspicuous exercises against civilian targets instead of fully exploiting police capabilities. Although police units managed to contain student demonstrator% at IA)Vaniurn University in June 1971 without fatal clashes, only a few months later Brigadier General (now Major General) Bumba's paracommandos were deplo%ed on sudden sweeps through the poorer residential districts of Kinshasa as part of the highly publicized crackdown on crinic. Possibly the newly forni-d GN will become so effective in handling unr"ly crowds as well as ordinary street crimes that Mobulti %-;ill no longer feel compelled to deploN arnit combat units against civilians. Meanwhile. the arm,.'s reputation for brutal treatment of civilians ma) still have an adverse impact on popular morale whenever an (ipsurge of dissidence provokes Mobtitti into intensive countermeasures. The most notorious instance since 1965 of the militar%'s mishandling of a popidar gathering in an urban situation was the fatal clash with Lovaniurn University students oti 4 )tine 1969. At least it thousand student-, who had participated in nonviolent de nionst rat ions on the suburban campus decided to present petitions to government authorities in downtou Kinshasa, despite it ban on off-camptis demonstrations. As their procession approached a government Imilding, gendarme units who were ordered to disperse them opened fire. At least at dozen students were killed in the resulting melee. and man% other% were %%ounded. The contrasting perfo rnia i ices of gendarmes and eivil police involved in the sanic situation highlights the fact that senior arm%- officers usually have regarded the army's gendarme hattalions as second- rate infantry tinits; they have been neglected, rather than specially trained for coping with disorderl% civilians through techniques that minimize bloodshed. When troops have been deployed in rural areas on counterguerrilla operations, their uneven discipline and theit traditional contempt for ck-ilians have been compounded by more concrete factor%. The logistk-al inadequacies of thv arnied forces ofteit compel troops in the field to forage for food, to commandeer housing, and sometimes to press local peasants into service as portem Mobutu generally has encouraged efforts (in the part of officir% to make troops adopt constructive approaches toward peaceable inhabitants of operational zones. Although sonic protnis;(ig starts have been made. they tisually have 1) down under the chronic impediments of lax discipline and ineffective logistics. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 The most recent example of this took place along the northwest shore of Lake Tanganyika�an inaccessible but nonethele%s populated area�where the armed forces had been conducting intensive search-and-destroy operations against Simi" eiirt"O& remqants since late 1969. By early 1W I 01114 observers were reporting that the troop." *#Pre J11flictint far heavier casualtim on the local peas ghan con the ever-elusive SimbaF. for instance. in-fum 1971 some 100 peasants reportedly 11011' Am 4 11% paracommandos because they had irWk pay for porter service before accon1panyu t 1 j on another operation. In March. Mobutti. having belatedly learned that thousands of peas�its starving in the countryside because tile\ hau led froin troops. ordered the acting commander of the ariny to initiate a civic action program in the 1, Tanganyi ka area. According to hastily prepared plai, teams comprising both military and civilian personnel, including physicians. veterinarians, and agronomists. were to undergo a 2-week indoctrination course and he deploved at eight rehabilitation centers, where presumably the peasants conild be aided avol thcn encouraged to return to their villages and resume farming or fishing tinder military protection. Tile program was largely a failure because of th 1111wilihigness of (itialified civilians to scive I n a desolate area, the failure of food, medicine, and othe.- relief supplies to arrive \%-here needed, and generally inade(juate support from field commanders. Mistrus't of the military probably played a major part, as the troops relx)rte(ll\ had not abated their mistreatment of the peasants who remained within reach. G. Suggestions for further reading (U/OU) Brausch, Georges. Belgian Administration in the Congo. I.Amolon: Oxford University Press. 1961. A review of Belgian policy for the fornier colony during the decade preceding independence by a former 38 Belgian administrator and anthropologist who gives personal evaluat.ons derived from direct exix-rience. CAirnevin. Robert. Histoire du Congo 1.eapoldville- Kinshasa. Paris: Editions Berger- lxvrault. 1966. The %1,4ndard full-length history of Zai.- from the I recolonial era, tile finai chapter preso nts a more v narrative of the jeriod from to Mobutu*s takeover of he pre%idenc\ Ifism 1% si%aii,ible in any English-la:.guage account. Matince N. 7 Congo: a Brief History ,IAP Appraisal. New York: Praeger. 1961. Ali emmently crisp hi.story of tile Belgian colonial administration and the fimt year of independence, Kitchen, Helen A. (ed.) Footnotes to the Congo Story: An Afriva Report Anthology. Ntw Yor Walker. 1967. Reprints of IS articles from tit(- magazine Africa Report dealing with the more important developments front independence to Mobutu's takeover fif the Presidencv. Crawford Young's "Significance of the 1964 Rebeilion," v.-hich analyzes the dynami, of the Mulele and Simba uprisings, is especially note wort It y. Merriam. Alan P. Congo, Background of Conflict. Evanston: Northwestern Univer%itv Press. 1961. The first three chapters provide a quick intrAticGov to the cotintrv's ethnic it akeup. art(] the fourth chapter presents a concise overall description of tile nwii% political parties which emerged shortl\ hvfmw independence. O'Brien, Collor. Cruise to Katariga and Back; A U.N. GaSC HiStOnl- IAindow Ifutchiiwm. 1962. Controversial anal\sis of U.N. operations in Congo. Young, Crawford. Politics in tile Congo: 1)ecoloni- zation and Independence. Princeton: Princeton Universitv Press. 1%5. Tile standard scholarlv analvsis of Political dynamics froin tile origins of tile independence movement through 1963, with emphasis oil Political and social institutions rather than historical narrative, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 Chrumm Wn) 1885 Congo Free State is established as personal domain of Belgian King L&opokl 11. 1908 Belgian Parbarnent assurnes control of Conv Free State afta international scandal over conditions. 1959 Jastuary First African riots in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). 1980 June Congo becomes independent under President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Patnee Lumumba. July Congolese National Army mutinies and Belgians flee. Katanga Province (now Shaba) under Moise Tshombe and eastern Kasai under Albert Kalonji both secede. U.N. troops arrive at request of central government. September Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba. Col. Joseph Mobutu and army take over and remain in control until February 1961. 1961 Lumumba is killed. August Cyrille Adoula approved as compromIse Premier by near- unanimous parliamentary vote. 19" September Secession in Kasai ended by Congolese armed forces. 1963 January Secession in Katan&R ended by U.N. forces. September Kasavubu adjourns parliament indefinitely and begins to rule by decree with support of "Binza group," comprising army commander Mobutu and four key civilian officials. December Peasant uprising led by Pierre Mulele begins in central sector of present Bandundu Province. 39 %t*" %WPINUAe2wo- ww -.ww I, 19" April Simba uprising in eastern Congo begins to spread north- ward. July Moise Tshombe named Premier by Kanvubu with c o n currence of 'Binza grote and many members of still- adjourned parliament. August President Kasavubu promulgates new constitution ratified by referendum in June-July. Simba guerrillas capture Stanleyville (now Kisangard). September Refugee politicians join Sisn in Stanleyville, declare PI)pulu Revo!utionary Govermuent" and pin support from radical African and Communist states. November U.S. planes drop Belgian piLatroopers at Stanle) ville and Pauhs (now Isiro) to rescue white hostages held byrebels. 1965 Congolese army units with white mercenaries retake rebel held territory as rebel leaders flee. Mareh-April Parliamentary elections am held. Moise Tshombe's CONACO party gains majority. October Kasavubu dismisses Tshombe. New government appointed by Kasavubu fails to get parliamentary approval. November Mobutu seizes control of central government, announces plans to remain as president for 5 years. December Mobutu assumes power to rule by decree. 1966 may-June Four former cabinet ministers are accused of plotting to overthrow Mobutu, found guilty by military tribunal, and publicly hanged. July Katangan units in northeastern Congo mutiny, subdued several months I er by white mercenaries loyal to the government. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 1900 October Mobutu dismi"es Premier Leonard Mulamba. popular army colonel, and declares himself Premi as we ll as I'mident. 1967 immary COngolese COvernment seizes UMHK Conso-based assets and establishes its own comp t run UNIHK copper Wines. UMHK retaliates by threatening prospective copper buyers with c &c 4i on Februitty COvernment reaches compromise Agreement with UMHK affiliate, ending for time being dispute over control of UMIlK operations. April Mobutu publishes a new constitution, 10114lizing strong presidential system, mid forms new party, Popular Move- ment of the Revolution (MPR). June New constitution X 0181 ulgated following popular referen- dum. JMF-sponsored monetary reform instituted. July White memenaries and Katangan troops mutiny in eastenk Congo. November Mercenary mutiny ends with Mercenaries withdrawing to Rwanda. 1968 April Mercvnarics airlifted from Rwanda to L. urope. Septeutber-October Mulele flees to 11mr2aville, is returned to Kinshasa under amnesty spiarantee, and executed. Brazzaville gove breaks diplomatic relatio with Kinshasa, 1969 June Lovaniunt University students demonstrating In Kinshasa are shot by troops, symp demonstrations a t o th er universities And 'schools UO RrQatcst I'llow of civillan dis. content since Ntobutu became President, August Mobutu bans Independent student unions and requires all students to join MPR youth wing. Mobut-i dismisses largo portion of cabinet ministers, III- cludIng Victor Nendaka and Justin Boinboko, most -n- fluential members of former Bi grou 40 September Final settlement of dispute between Congolese Govern- Mont and U.NIHK. 1970 June Mobutu and Congo (8) President Ngouabj sign Manifesto of Rtcondhation, agreeing to Phased resumption of normal communications, trade. and diplomatic relations; their respective embassies are reopened in December. King Baudouin attends 10th anniversary of Co independence, climaxing gradual return to solidly con- structive relations between the two countries. 1970 August Mobutu makes his first st v i s it, t t h e U nite d States, Romania, and Yugoslavia he negotiates substantial in. dustrial investments and military pur in the Us. while reasserting nominal poh of nonalignment. November Presidential and National Assembly elections c o m pl e t e constitutional basis for Mobutu's ru l e December Mobutu declares amnesty for all refugee reb a t h ome or abroad, who turn the mse l ves i t aut two principal leaders of Stanleyvill rebel regime of 1964 and some less notorious emigres accept Amnes b 31 January deadline. 1971 M,2rch-April Mobutu makes state visits t France, Jal)an, and Talwan, gaining fairly allbstAntial Increases in lon economic aid. June 1 0 vt"Itun' University students stage unnu demon. stration commemorati students shot TJY troops In June 1969 Mobutu declares entire student body must serve in army for 9 years, August MObUtu Announces that student dmftcos will re to c1l '"P us units 'Ifter fUgged basic training, Lov. aniuni and two other universities at Lubumbashi Itnil Kkanatud Are W04 1111ated Into the National 11nivenity, Highly publivixed subversion trials are modticted for student demonstration lemlem, a (onner robel g e n era l who ItmophA h1obutu's aninesty, and a mixed bag of obseum (lissidents. October Nendaka and Homboko, who were ousted from cabinet in August IM, Aro p o f p to assassinate h1obutu and put under intleffilite detention without trial. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 October Mobutu changes official titl o f coun from D emocratic Republic of the Congo to Republic of Zaire, his *'return to authenticity" campaign is soon extended to the Congo River, several provinces, and other place names. 1972 January "Authenticity" canIPArn is extended to personal names, the President declares himself Mobutu Sese Seko and orders subordinates to do likewise. Cardinal Malula, leading Catholic prelate in Zaire, cri- ticizes MObutwls nAnle-chAnging campaign; Mobutu threatens Afalula with prosecution for treason and sus. Pends A leading Catholic publication. Glossary (u/ou) I Sr,cwT AssaIMATION CCTC CkD DCRSM DIA......... GECAMINES GRAE INBEL jmpr, MPR MNC SCM UGEC UMHK UFA UN77A SUMT March Belgium Agrees to $25 million in additional technical assistance and credits for Zaire, one of largest single aid packages since independence, April Mobutu's public confrontation with Catholic Church In Zaire winds down, with Malula sojourning at Vatican and church acvoPting MPR youth cadrer I..- its seminaries, August Mobuto retires many senior senerAs and tightens the command structure of the security forces. 1973 January Mobutu visits Peking and prepares to exc am dors between China and Zaire. FoamN Confederation Generato des rmt*t. kurs Congolsis Centre Nationato do Docume"tation Direction Conerak du Ronaignornent of do Surcte U11(faire Aeance do Pocumentation tot crinfor. ination Aftical"o La Conerok des CarHeros of des Mines du Zaire Gov"no RetWudonarto do Angok no EX(ho 1111 till't 8 010 trintomistion of do Documentation Jou"osso du U014ftmont Populaire do la newfation Moumme"t PoPulaire do k fletWuHan Moumment Natio"ale ConiWafte Societe Coneratc do Mirutrala Unto" Conersto des Etudiants Congo. lob Union Minkre du Haut Katenga Untso dos Poin4cove do Amok Union Nationale des Travailloure do la Republique du Zaire E%MUSH General Confederation of Congolese Workors National Documentation Center Dim of Information and Mili. tary Security African Documentation and Informok. tion Agency Coneral Quarrivs and Mines Com. Pany of Zaire R Government of Angola In Exile Belglan Inforniation and Documenta. tion Agency Youth of the Popular Movement of the Revolution POPI'lor Movement of the Revolution Conitolose National Movement Conoral Ores Company Coneral Union of Congolese Students Mining Union of Upper Katanga Union of An$K&n Peoples National Union of Zatrian W or k ers NO FOREIGN DISSRAI 41 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET Ike APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDPOl-00707R000200110002-1