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SECRET 6DA /GS /CP Zaire April 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 rw _�'JL�x-1AL.WJM trri ,,....n. woelersg4lCdkwrGasrs �.mrw,srssek NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS ,Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional conies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the U -Med States, within the meantnq of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 3B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased 5r shown to representatives of any foreign govern ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Seca ;rity Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are hidividually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009106/16: CIA-RDP01-007078000200110007-6 n e A a hrieUw Ch nt mv Am (A)VT"KNARNT AND 1 TI.ItfT IX. Aletirtival ,if `the ecqlrlllflly !I l 1114 Millmols, ugficolltem., iisliceb( lion '17rrnN St c` tra(le: e'vallfololic 1XIIIcy mod'A"O oppoill MaIllw1wer o latemallotoll ramoollit'. TO fitlem 410irmlory 'i'mN's'emmvriox o c.00 v CATION', Apt,mimil of systerns a SoratcOu dwobil.1 Railroads highways a fedae14 vnd�fcriq,s il* I Merchant madne 0 Civil uie Airfield,, '11 MILITAM GEOGIUNIV To1mgmplay and d6u Military K4,4)gfapl0P TKi'llIs "If-licitit! il"'- Q'I W lcrnal'nekit6i W"if 1) ["(MC ES I lie joint activities 4p 0661141 INCTS flk* *I;V dakrineric 0 CA)u%umilactilo I This Gencral Siorvejr sWroks iht September 1,970, copies of'4ich.shouldbe APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110007-6 The Blessings and Perils of One-Man Rule.............................. I The National Heritage Paternalism and Prem,,ture Birth *Decline and "all of the First Republic Pax Mobutu *Growing Pains Nonalignment� Pragmatism With a Flair Chronology 17 Area brief 20 Summary map follows 20 This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substan- tially completed by January 1973. I is APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110007-6 f r During this Administration, the� entire w'utttnry has de- voted itself' singlembidedl v to building the Republic a d industrializing it. Our future is ever brighter. Our goal: t(s -make sivift r progress than- any� ether developing country. Zaire's endrtnous material resources; plus the energies oj' a proud, dedi- rated people, guaranmee that We shall achieve shut goal. June 1971 Lt. GW J. 1). MORUTCl Pre� .ude w A w R a Y s The Blessings and Perils of One -Man Rule In mid -1965, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (as 'Zaire was then known) was an example of prac. tically everything that could go wrong for a newly independent country. Five years of postindependence rebellion and violence had left the political, economic, and social life of the country in ruins. The appoint- ment in 1964 of the controversial Moise Tshombe as Prime Minister and his subsequent use of white mercenary troops to help quell widespread insurgency had alienated most of the so- called Third World. Economic activity (except for copper mining) had come to a virtual standstill. Many of the foreign experts whose skills were vital to the modern commer- cial, economic, and administrative sectors had fled. The treasury was bankrupt, the currency debased, and the population terrorized, divided, and demoralized. (U /OU) Moreover, the country's existing political structure virtually precluded firm corrective action. Under the provisions of the 1964 constitution, political authority was none too clear! divided rimong u "strong" President, the Prime Minister, an unruly bicameral national legislature, and the governments of 21 largely autonomous provinces. Behind the scenes, a kitchen cabinet (the "Binza Group and the military es- tablishment wielded considerable power. All depended on close teamwork �and of that there was precious little. When President Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe in October 1965, he was unable to persuade parlia- ment to confirm his choice for the new Prime Minister. For nearly 6 weeks, the central government all but ceased to function. (U /OU) As he had done under similar circumstances some 5 years earlier, the Commander in Chief of the Congolese arnied forces, Lt. Gen. Joseph Mobutu, stepped in to break the impasse. Backed by the army and by fellow members of the Binza Group, he summarily dismissed Kasavubu on 25 Noveml�,er 1965, proclaimed himself President, and installed a military colleague as Prime Minister at the head of a broadly representative civilian cabinet. And his initial lipser- vice to the 1964 constitution notwithstanding, he proml tly set about replacing the Congo's federal structure and disorganized parliamentary system with centralized ac.tocratic rule. (U /OU Mobutu began by canceling the presidential elec- tions scheduled for 1966 and by claiming a 5 -year mandate to rule by decree. Once parliament had dutifully endorsed these moves, he adjourned that body "until its next regular session" (an event which never materialized). In the months that followed, Mobutu reduced the number of provinves to eight �plus the national capital dirtrict of Kinshasa. fie made the provincial assemblies purely consultative bodies, then abolished them altogether. He gave the provinces essentially the same status as before in- dependence: apolitical administrative units run by appointed officials, He merged the provincial police forces into a new r.itional police organization under the Interior Ministry. He then suspended the activity of all political parties and subsumed the office of Prime Minist.rr into the Presidency. In June of 1967, he incorporated most of his structural revisions Into a new constitution. declared the suspended parliament of- ficially ended, and postponed the election of the envisaged new unicameral National Assembly until 1970. (U/ OU) Reversion to what amounted to a slightly modified version of the former Belgian colonial administration left the Congo without a political system even theoretically responsive to the electorate. Mobutu moved to fill !his void and at the same time to forge a tool for mobilizing the masses and for further con- solidating his personal position. He set up the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) in May 1 "d67 as his country's only sanctioned political party. (Official encouragement for the formation of a second party as originally authorized under the 1967 constitution quickly evaporated.) The MPR was designated the nation's supreme political institution technically superior to the Presidency, army, parliament, and civil administration --in a constitutional amendment adopted in December 1970 A creature of its founder and president, the highly centralized MPR parallels the governmental hierarchy and is interchangeable with it. (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 Mobutu's political organization has been slow to develop grassr("s suppc)rt. Nevertheless he has been able to use it effectively to stage -mans� the referen- dum -ityle presidential and ;parliamentary elections in 1970, to centralize control of political patronage, and to manipulate the National Assembly. In addition, Mobutu has used his "movement" to bring the country's religious and labor organizations in line, to counterbalance the power of the military, and to .supplant with its youth wing (tile) M PR) all the former vouth and student organizations. (C) Thus, despite the trappings of democracy which 'Laird has displayed since late 1970 �when the citizenry was galvanized into giving an overwhelming vote of confidence to Mobutu as sole candidate for the 7 -year post of esident and to the MPR's hand- picked National Assembly slate �the government (now termed the Second Republic) remains very touch a one -than show. In fact, with a presidential slush funs] which amounted to about $100 million In 1971 (i,e., around 15% of the entire government budget), Mobutu ru!es more as a paramount tribal chief than as a head of state in the Western sense, Secretive, ruthles,, and politically astute, he has a talent for catching rivals off balance and for exploiting tribal jealousies. And while gene�ully car -ful to avoid offending key military leaders, he dispenses largesse and punishment, funds pet projects, and indulges in such luxuries as a yacht and a second presidential palace without being directly accountable to any authority. (S) With an eye to broadening suplxrt for his regime both at home and throughout Africa. Mobutu recently proclaimed national "authenticity" as a primary political goal. Similar in spirit to his earlier moves in rehabilitating Patrice l_umumba as a national hero and in posing as a champion of African liberation movements, Mobutu's call to his countrymen to reject foreign models and to draw on their own heritage in shaping their nation's future was designed to appeal to local xenophobia and to generate a unifying Congolese nationalism. In terms of developments elsewhere in Africa, Mobutu was at least a decade behind the times In attempting to develop and harness nationalistic fervor. But he approached the idea with characteristic zest. Backed by the full resources of the MPR, he began a controversial campaign to Africanize the symbols of national identity starting with the name of the country and of its principal river �in the fall of 1971. Thus Zaire was born. The national flag and anthem were changed. Preindependence monuments were removed to museums. Street and placenames with colonial connotations were scrapped, and a law was passed requiring all 'Zairians to take African names. Mobutu himself adopted the names of Sese N Seko, which can be �ughly translated�depending upcm one's persc- -al feeling% atmut the 'Zairian tresident�as either "Great (thief of the Earth and Unconquerable Warrior or "Rcxster Who Leaves No Hen Intact." (C:) Behind all the ruffles and flourishes, Mobutu's highly personalized style of rule has brought Zaire same very tangible benefits With the assistance he has been able to secure from friendly powers� chiefly the United States and Belgium �he has moved his country well down the road toward economic recovery, lie has reduced factional links between segments of the military establishment and ambitious politicians and has restored a measure of discipline and cohension to the army. He has reestablished centralized political and administrative authori(y, placed competent men in key positions, and given his countrymen some peace and political order for the first time since in- dependence. And he has vastly improved 'Zaire's stature in Africa. W) Nevertheless, 'Zaire remains a fragile state, vulnerable to abrupt political change. There are serious flaws in the system which Mobutu has es- tablished. Some of these are inherent in one -man rule, but others are attributable to Mobutu's persona) weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. In general, the political institutions It(- has created still have shallow roots and often appear to operate as little more than palace appendages. Mobutu's advisers, including the cabinet, are politicalIv unimportant technocrats who owe their position to the President and who are not inclined to snake waves. While all this accords with Mobutu's style and insures a sole source of authority, the risk is high that the president will become inc, easingly isolated and ill informed. And there is no question but that his sur]&n departure from the national scene would leave a serious political void. (S) These problems are compounded by Mobutu's temperament. f)espite his many talents, he seems to be able to focus on only one problem at a time. He tends to immerge himself in minutiae, to avoid following through on complicated decisions, and to wear himself out periodically. Further, his vanity and suspicion prevent him from delegating authority or grooming a successor. Potential rivals are reassigned, demoted, imprisoned, or sent into diplomatic exile.. In the past few years, Mobutu has purged practically all persons with whom he once shared a measure of power, Including such able and powerful figures as Justin Bomboko (long -time Foreign Minister) and Victor Nendaka (former Minister of Finvnce and of Interior). The atmosphere created by this !cort of behavior has tended to stifle initiative, impede interdepartmental APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 coml>.�raliom, and reinforce flit- President s relative isolation. (S) Moreover, Mobutu'-- sssl: m of rub� delt -nds (o a degme� fill his ability to dislrense soilsidies and n�wards, itu�luding untffieiad payme fits to key arm%. loolice, party, and Kovemment officials. Yet not only dot�, spending on the scale which Mobutu semis (o (et -I necessary contribute to infla!ionaty pressures, boil the ,%stern could backfire if for uuv reasmi the mmney were to rum low. (n an% event, the practice of buyint; it measun� of unity and loyalty through v ash gifts cfinflicts with cvrncurmnl attempts Ili inform govem- metit olierations and to root out corniption, (S) Finally, Mohutoi's efforts to prom otv the Milli as Zaire's milm- ie institution have not le -en well received by the arms. 'Ihw situation is particularly delicate bec�alise it comes at a tithe w beoi M obutu fins beery force- to curtail rnihtary v%pertcfitures and when the Imng illness of the bumbling but loyal former army The Hational Heritage knjnnl "Zaire is a country of great promise --and great problems. Its outstanding characteristics are its im- mense size and diversity. Hut, despste the fabled wealth of 'Zairian natural resources, the historic, geographic, and sociological heritage which Mobuht now so elocpimitly evokes has done more to impede than to facilitate the nation building process. The third largest nation in Africa, Zaire covers approximatel two- thirds of central Africa alz:f Is uhout equal in area to the United States east of the Mississippi River. The country is roughly rectangular in shape; maxiumin dimensions �both north -south and east west --are about 1,200 miles. Lying astride the equator, it is essentially an inland state with access to the sea being limited to a 23 -mile strip of land along the Atlantic Ocean on the north hank of the Congo Zaire) River estuary between Angola and the Angolan exclave of Cabinda, In addition to Angolan territory, eight independeat states border on 'Zaire's more than 6,(Xx) -mile perimeter. Unlike many. of these other former colonies, however, Zaire aloes constitute something of a natural geographic entity. Not only do most of its houndaries follow clearly defined topographic features, but they generally conform to the outline of the watershed of the Congo River, which, !ogether with its most distant major tributary, the Imalaba, winds for 2,8W miles through the chiel. (:ertt -rill Hobozo. has Illcf.%miatt -d ntakiug ss ceeling chaisKes iii flit- militar% commati f %Iruulun� I)c- %trite Mnloitu's efforts Ill Lcep tit(' affm 41111 o) lnlilie- and too devef.p idWrnatc mmirevs of suplurrt. 1be 110)(J-111an ntihlars e 0.11)I shnlelt u�npains 1,011 his principal loouvr bass and flit mt,,t .rnfiu% pfit�nth11 thn�at Io his n.16111c� The %ettsilise )runic� oil iofra- arrm factiomal rivalries which hr has w, manaevd io tnaiut:lio eoltld be easili, upset In sump. the strength of Lure tmtin% pk Avl its weakness. The countr% is virlu.dls deprndrnl fin one neaert' Iresidrnf Mofmtn Facelt for isolaled and so far vivdy containecf---- pockeh (if old Simba rebels in southeastern Kivu Regifili. fir faces no over) :pposi limn. Hut lbe prolr)rtns with which hr toast rope an cc mplr. indeed. c�oridilimwd as the, ;iry bs %aim� s histor% and geography. by the,-ontinuing and unc-rn impact 4 mmleniii.11ion and bs his fiwn 0%Ic of ride Ills prospects, and those of tilt' Second livpltltlic. remain mwertain. (S) 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 eastern, central, and northwestern sections of the country. Because of Zaire's location on the Equator, seasons are reversed in the northern and southern sections of the country, Temperature, rainfall, and humidity vary markedly with the topography, and the country's boundaries include widely differing geographic areas. The Congo Basin, a relatively low -lying plain in central 'Zaire, is covered by a dense equatorial rain forest and makes up about one -third of the country. This area Is characterized by Hgh temperatures, excessive humidity, torrential rains. and the prevalence of disrase- hearing insects. The Congo Basin Is rimmed by plateaus and hills, with extensive areas above 5,000 feet in elevation, The upland country beyond the humid central core of the basin gradually becomes cooler as elevation increases and has definite wet and dry seasons, in the northeast there are savanna lands, covered with long grasses and stunted tree,; in the northwest, swamps and marshes; and in the south, scattered woodlands along the plateaus. The rest of the country Is characterized by grassy hills, plains, and scrub forests. In the east, the border passes through several larger lakes in the Creat Rift Valley of east Africa, including lake. Tanganyika, and through a mountain chain with some of the higheft peaks in Africa. Because of its diversity of climate, terrain, and resources, Zaire perhaps has the greatest potential for economic development In sub Saharan Africa. The ruil exteci of the country's natural wealth has yet to be chartered, much less tapped. The Congo River has one of the greatest hydroelectric Potentials in the world. Major mineral resources include copper, cobalt, in- dustrial diamonds, zinc, tin, iron, bauxite, manganese, uranium, and gold. Offshore oilfields have recently been discovered. Despite generally poor soils, the country's differing climatic zones make possible the raising of a broad range of tropical, subtropical, and tempe. -atz crops. Its rivers and lakes abound with many species of fish. And extensive tropical forests provide an almost Inexhaustible� though difficult to exploit source of valuable timber. But Zaire's physical size and diverse topography have severely complicated efforts to unify the nation and to promote its economic development. Despite the country's extensive river systems, great distances and natural obstacles (e.g., swamps, forest barriers, rapids, and falls) have always made travel and communica- tion difficult. The roads and railroads built by the Belgians to complement the uatural waterways were primarily oriented toward improving lateral com- munication. And now even these inadequate transpor- tation facilities have deteriorated as the result of Zaire's postindependenre strife. N Thus while Loire has a limited capacity to s!irlift ergo and lr. to most parts of the country, it still has no complete nrrth -south or east -west transport system. Considerable effort has been made to repair and maintain existing railroad trackage, but rood and river transportation have been barfly neglected. It takes goods offloaded at the Congo River port of Matadi nearly a month to reach the capital of copper -rich Shaba Region because of costly and time consuming tramfers from rail to water transporta- tion and back again. In the heavily populated eastern region of Kivu, travelers need 2 months to negotiate the sporadically maintained road between the capital city of Bukavu and the town of Mwen,ga some 100 miles to the south. And there is no usable road connection at all between Bukavu and the two faiTly large Kivu cities of Kindu and Kasongo on the Lualaba river. In fact, the road system which provides the only means of access its some parts of the country--has deteriorated so much that the un- reliability and high cost of truck transport have become thou principal limiting factors in the develop- ment of 'Zaire's rich interior. FAlually important, continued difficulty of movement and communication has hinderM efforts to overcome traditional regional and tribal loyalties and to unite Zaire's diverse peoples under an effective national government. As a whole, Zaire Is thinly populated in comparison with most other African countries. But even before contact with the West hastened the process of ur- banization, adverse climatic and soil conditions throughout much of the area had resulted in marked variations in density of population, with the, bulb of the people living In the fertile northeastern plain and along the lower reaches of the Congo River. And although about 80% of Zaire's 24 million inhabitants are of Bantu stock, history and geography have combined to create wide differences among them. There are more than 200 tribes in Zaire, and many of these are made up of significant subtribal groupings. Bantu tribes Inan drifting Into the area at least 1600 years ago, pushing the pygmies they found there back deep lnta the forests and +ettling in the vicinity of their present homelands by the beginning of the I5tij century. There was little: Intertribal contact and no common Iangilage. Sharply differing forest and savan- na cultures developed. And while several kingdoms emerged between the 14th and 17th centuries which united one or another of the larger tribal groupings for a century or more, none included more than a small sector of present -day Zaire, Over the past 500 years, the impact of successive tureign interventions �most importantly, Portuguese, l J r 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 I Arab, and Belgian �has widened tribal and regional differences. The Portuguese arrived on the scene in 1482. They built forts along the lower reaches of the Congo River, made contact with and Christianized the then flourishing Kingdom of the Kongo, established a profitable trade in ivory and slaves, and dominated the extreme western sector of the Congo until well into the 19th century. While the span of effective Portuguese control began to decline toward the end of the 17th century, the activities of Lisbon's slave merchants (as well as of their rivals from other European countries) continued to expand. In contrast to the limited influence of early missionary efforts, the impact of the slave trade �which reached its peak during the first half of the 19th century�was felt throughout the land. Some tribes were enriched, others decimated. The constant warfare which the growing demand for slaves promoted caused great suffering and generated tribal hatreds and a distrust of foreigners that still affect the Zairian scene. Tier Arabs contributed their share to this unfor- tunate aspect of Zaire's heritage. Long entrenched in settlements along the east African coast, they extended their operations inland in the mid -19th century. After establishing a caravan route from "Zanzibar to Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika, they penetrated the Congo in search of ivory and slaves. Like the Portuguese, their policy was to get both by winning the cooperation of �and arming� selected tribes rather than by the direct use of force. They were so successful that by 1885 the controlled a large part of eastern Congo through an elaborate administrative system based on local chiefs. And although the Arabs made no effort to force their culture on their new African collaborators, their influence affected dress and manners, brought about conversions to Islam, and altered agricultural practices throughout their area of control. Even today, the so- cai'.,-J Arabises of Kisangani and other eastern i! 'a'"t- '''k.'aS'x.ti �:,a. 4 :.r ',r. ;:t.' rut+ ;urrvsr< wawa..: s :...o.�.,_........,..... towns remain more Arab than African in their way of life, and hundreds of thousands of their fellow easterners speak Swahili �the lingua franca in- troduced by their former Arab masters. It was also in 1888 thai Belgium's King Leopold II capped a decade of devious maneuvz;;ng by founding the Corgo Free State aad getting tNe Berlin Congress to recognize it as his personal possession. Thus, the general outline of present -day Zaire was established. Within 9 years, Belgian -led contingents had ousted most of the Arab slavers, adding a new facet to 'Zaire's complex tribal rivalries in the process. Tribes like the Batetela which fought on the Arab side generally remained extremely hostile to Belgium rule and toward Belgium's tribal allies. Like the suspicions and animosities born of the slave trade, these old resentments still have so ne relevance. They account in part for separatist tendencies throughout ea::e-n Zaire and particularly it; Kisangani. And they were reriected in the inability of such postindependence leaders as Lumumba (a Batetela) and Kalonji (a Luba) to work together. Today, as in the past, no single tribe holds sway over all of Zaire. Indeed, the largest group, the Hamitic Mangbetu- Azande cluster in the northeast, accounts for less than 15% of the total population. But Zaire's eight largest tribes dominate home areas which together cover something more than half of the country. Some of these groups �e.g., the Kongo, Luba, and Lunda �are still moved by memories of past empires. The process of modernization has further exacerbated old tribal tensions and created new ores. Despite continuing government efforts to broaden their horizons, most Zairians remain loyal to their tribal communities. In fact, many rural inhabitants are either totally unaware o.' existing provincial and national institutions or see them as so i emote that they seem almost unreal. 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 Patergaiism and Premature Birth (u /0u) The difficulties which Zaire's postindependence leaders have faced in trying to establish a cokes; e and viable nation are hardly unique on the African scene. But in Zaire's case, many of these problems were deeper because of Brussels' approach to colonial rule. The beginnings were particularly inauspicious. King Leopold's interest in the Congo Basin was purely commercial. A man of expensive hab.itr, he was perpetually short of funds. Tile ruthless manner in which he exploited Congolese labor in order to increase his profits from rubber and ivory in time resulted in international opprobrium. After vacillating for a n;amber of years, the Belgian Government finally annexed what had become Leopold's 900,000- square- mile private African estate and in October 1908 created a Ministry of the Colones to oversee it. On the map, the Congo .Free State was replaced by the Bcigian Congo. Brussels moved swiftly to mitigate the harsher features of Leopold's former practices, to establish tighter accountability for revenues produced, and to provide greater opportunity for foi eign participation in the development and exploitation of the Congolese economy. Beyond this, however, the shift in the Congo's international status brought little change. Leopold's system of highly centralized rule was maiaa- tained. So were the alliances he had forged with the Catholic Church and with influential business circles. And the Belgians cont=inued to regard their African subjects as children, incapable of managing their own affairs in an environment marked by modernization and rapid change. Under these circumstances, Belgian colonial policy gradually evolved toward paternalism. The primary duty of the metropole, as the Belgians saw it, was to provide for the economic, social, and moral well -being of the native population. And, in fact, Belgium's record in this regard was impressive. With Brussels' encouragement and support" the Catholic Church established an extenAve primary schoo; system. Ad- ditional schools were provided by various Protestant denominations. Over time, iperea. by substantial sums of money were poured into the construction of housing projects, hospitals, village wells, and other facilities of direct benefit to the population. Social services were expanded, snd following World War II the Belgians provided the Corgo with tropical Africa's first comprehensive t ocial se,:arity program. On the other hard, Belgium's approach to the problem of training Congolese for responsible positions 6 0 and to expansion of self government was one of gradualism bordering on immobilism. While they paid lipservi to the role of chiefdoms as basic units of administration, in rural areas, Belgian officials did not hesitate to intervene vigorously in.local affairs. Until about 1950, educational opportunities for the Congolese beyond the primary level� indeed, beyond the second grade �were extremely limited. The native population was kept in check and protected against temptation by a host of discriminatory regulations, including a curfew and restrictions go,erning weapons, al ^oholic beverages, and land ownership. And prior to 1958, when the first municipal elections were held, the Congolese were not able to form political parties or to exercise a meaningful voice in governmental affairs above the chiefdom level. By 1958, there were at least some leaders in Brussels who were seriously considering the possibility of granting the Congo independence in perhaps another 25 or 30 years. But the times were no longer suited to a leisurely approach to In August 1958, President de Gaulle visited Brazzaville and offered independence to the French Longo. Scarcely 4 months later, Patrice Lumumba, head of the newly formed APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 National Congolese Movement (MNC), returned from talks he had held with various African nationalist leaders at the first Pan African Congress in Accra and issued a public call for indepene.. -rice for the Belgian Congo. And the efforts of the colonial administration to block what it feared might be a similar speech by Joseph Kasavubu, eader of the Alliance of the Bakongo People (ABAKO), in Leoy 1ville (renamed Kinshasa), in January 1959 touched off rioting which lasted for several days. Shaken by this development, Brussels changed its course and for the first time offered the Congolese a program for political change explicitly directed at achievement of independence within a few years. But Belgium's retreat only fanned the nationalist fervor of the Congo's fledgling politicians. In the chaotic months that followed, political parties proliferated and vied with one another in calling for early in- dependence. Tribal and regional tensions mounted over the issue of whether the future Congolese state should be federal or unitary in structure. Vague secessionist threats were voiced by prominent regional leaders, and bloody tribal conflicts broke out in Albertville (Kalemie), Bakwanga (Mbuji- Mayi), Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) and Tshikapa. Faded with a rapidly eteriorating situation, Brussels capitulated in January 1960 and set 30 June of that year as the date for Congolese independence. Brussels drafted an interim constitution based on the Belgian model which, among other things, transformed the Congo's six provinces from d ministrative jurisdictions into political entities �PAch with an assembly elected by universal suffrage, a president elected by the assembly, and a full comple- ment of ministers. Nationai and vincial elections, contested by over 100 parties, w Ad in May. No single party emerged in a com._ ,.ping position. A reasonable factional balance seemed to have been struck at the !ast minute, however, by the election of ABAKO's federally oriented leader, Kasavubu, as President and the installation of the centralist Lumumba as Prime MiniAer at the head of a cwalition government. But ti. Congolese were grossly iil prepared to take over tL administration of their new state. The Belgians had bequeathed them the most advanced evonomy �and the highest literacy rate �in sub Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, when independence day arrived, the country's three recently established universities 1,ad yet to produce a single graduate. There were, in fact, less than 25,000 citizens in the whole country who had received any kind of secondary education. While some individuals had pursued higher education abroad, there were few doctors, fewer engineers, and no lawyers at all. No Congolese had attained officer status in either the security forces or the civil service. Although there was no dearth of aspiring and vocal politicians, none had practical governmental experience above the local level And there were no political parties of sufficient breadti, to support a strong national government. Moreover, the Republic of the Congo inherited a public debt of about $900 million, the sen-icing cf which promised to drain away nearly one quarter of its annual budget. It also inherited a number of generous social welfare programs which the new regime could neither afford nor easily reduce. Finally, Belgian policies, the uneven impact of modernization, and the charged atmosphere of the immediate preindependence period had all served to strengthen regional and tribal particularism. All told, the new Leopoldville regime's position was clearly precarious. Its prospects depended heavily on external economic and technical assistance, including the continued service of large numbers of foreign primarily Belgian specialists. 7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 Decline and Fall of the First Republic Unfortunately for the Republic of the Congo, there were a number of additional factors which com- pounded its troubles during the first few years of its existence. For example, the interim 1960 con- stitution� failing, as it did, to define clearly either the powers of the President and Prime Minister or the division of authority between the provincial and central echelons of government�.was poorly attuned to local political realities. In addition, irresponsible electioneering rhetoric had raised false hopes about rich and immediate benefits which would more or less automatically flow from independence. Throughout the period of Kasavubu's Presidency the impact of successive foreign interventions� including some of the well- intentioned actions of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force� tended to exacerbate factional and tribal sirife. 0 The new Congolese state was only 5 days old when its soldiers, disappointed in their belief that in- dependence would bring immediate Africanization of the military leadership, mutinied against their Belgian officers and thereby set in motion the chain of events that eventually led to the downfall of the First Republic. Despite the relative calm which prevails in the country today, the lessons and legacies of those crisis years still bear heavily on Mobutu's attitudes, options, and problems. Lumumba's initial efforts to cope with the mu- tiny proved futile, and on 10 July, Belgian paratroopers acting without Congolese au- thorization� landed at Lul-labourg (Kananga) and Elisabethville to restore order. The following day, Moise Tshombe led Katanga Province (now Shaba Region) into secession. Lumumba and Kasavubu then APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 Patrice Lumumba Antoine Gizenga i g 1 s z appealed to the United Nations for protection against foreign (i.e., Belgian) aggression. But while the first hastily assembled United Nations units arrived in the country on 15 July the situation continued to deteriorate. In early August, Albert Kalonji proclaimed the independence of the Mining State of South Kasai (now part of Kasai Oriental Region). Unable to per- suade the United Nations to help him reintegrate his country's two secessionist provinces by force of arms, Lumumba called on Moscow for direct support. By then, however, his increasingly freewheeling behavior had placed him on a collision course with President Kasavubu. In September 1960, the world watched as Kasavubu and Lumumba attempted to dismiss each other. The Congolese parliament refused to confirm the dismissal of either man s.nd sought to effect a recon- ciliation between them. A deadlock ensued, and in mid September, the commander of the army (or of what was left of it), Joseph Mobutu, announced that he was temporarily assuming power. A clerk in the security forces from 1950 to 1956 and subsequently a journalist, Mobutu had been appointed Chief of Staff of the army following the July mutiny and had served in that capacity until his promotion to the top military post in early September. He had joined the MNC in 1958 and, while not a Batetela but a non -Bantu Ngbandi tribesman fron. the north, was a close friend of Lumumba. Thus it was ironic �but indicative of the intricate twists and turns of Congolese politics �that he turned out to be the man most responsible for Lumumba's political, if not physical, demise. Mobutu'S objectives were apparently limited, at that time, to ending the factional strife which had paralyzed the central government. He undercut Lumumba's position by ousting the Communist mis- sions which had been giving the MNC moral and material support. He replaced the cabinet with a t College of Commissioners composed of recent university graduates, students, and a f %w carefully selected former ministers. In addition, he .1 neutraii;.ed" parliament, thereby initiating a practice of imposing the primacy of the executive over the legislative branches of the government which, with brief lapses, has endured. But the brief period of Mobutu's caretaker rule was also highlighted by the establishment of a rival regime in Stanleyville (Kisangani) under Lumumba's lieuten- ant and former Deputy Prime Minister, Antoine Gizenga. There was also the arrest and imprisonment of Lumumba after his escape from United Nations protective custody in an effort to join Gizenga. Thus when Mobutu stepped down on 9 February 1961 to resuine his military duties, the Congo had four governments �h: -)wn at Leopoldville, and the rival establishments I led by Gizenga, Tshombe, and Kalonji. The world standing of the Leopoldville regime was at a low ebb and would soon sink further with the announcement that Lumumba and two of his associates had perished during their mysterious transfer to Katariga. Only two provinces plus a portion of a third remained under the effective control of the new Kasavubu -ileo provisional government. Nevertheless, the secessionist phase of the Congo's postindepen&nce cris?s soon came to an end. Pressured by the United Nations, Kasavubu and No opened a series of bilateral and multilateral discussions with Tshombe, Kalonji, and Gizenga during which it was finally established that the Congo would become a federal, rather than a confederal or unitary, state. Parliament was reopened on 25 July 1961 (under i iited Nations protection) with all areas except 'i shombe's Katanga represented. After several days of spirited debate, the legislators gave nearly unanimous approval to a broad coalition government headed by Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister. Gizenga, offertd the post of First Deputy Prime Minister, chose to remain in Stanlewii1e. But his camp was divided, and he was deposed and arrested by some of his own colleagues� acting on Adoula's instructions and backed by United Nations units �in January i962. In response to the continued growth of tribal and regional particularism and to agitation for the overhaul of ineffective or inequitable institutional arrangements, the Adoula government tentatively reorganized the country into 21 provinces. Together with United Nations experts, it accelerated efforts to prepare a new constitution. The internal situation further improved in September 1962 when Kalonji's arrest fatally weakened the still recalcitrant govern- ment in South Kasai. And while Tshombe continued to hold out for a confederal solution, both inter- national and internal support for his position was dwindling. After a third round or fighting with United Nations forces, he capitulated in Jaruary 1963 and departed for self imposed exile in Spain a few months later. The Congo was whole once again �but not for long. With less than a year of relative peace in which to catch its breath, the Congo moved from a period of regional secessions to one of near general rebellion. Nearly 3 years of strife, complicated and prolonged by foreign intervention, had resulted in much suffering and in a marked decl;ne in the material well -being of the populace in mr'.st areas of the country. Moreover, such rewards as had actually flowed from in- dependence had been unevenly distributed. Economic 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 deprivation tended to be most severe in the areas farthest removed from two poles of relative prosperity, southern Katanga and the Leopoldville -Lower Congo area. Tribal jealousies had deepened arid, equally important, the expectations of virtually all segments of the general population particularly of the widely but inadequately educated postwar generation �had been bitterly disappointed. Although Leopoldville con- tinued to benefit from generous :.reign assistance, its efforts to overcome warborn social and economic ills were hampered by administrative breakdowns, clashes between radical nationalists and the military- bureaucratic oligarchy, and labor unrest. The inability of the Kasavubu Adoula regime to cope with rising popular discontent was reflected in its decision to suspend parliament in September 1963. Thereafter, Kasavubu backed by his powerful Binza Group advisers �ruled by presidential decree. Deprived of their parliamentary immunity, a number of radical Congolese political leaders fled to Brazzaville, where, under the friendly protection of the newly installed Massamba -Debat government, they formed a group called the National Liberation Com- mittee (CNL), established guerrilla training camps, and launched a number of terrorist operations against the Leopoldville establishment. The activities of the CNL were backed by a number of African countries and received some covert support and encouragement from both Moscow and Peking. The CNL sought to wrap itself in Lumumba's fallen mantle, but it was never a cohesive, disciplined group. Tensions rapidly developed over tactics, leadership, goals, and sources of external support. In fact, until January 1964, when Pierre Mulele apparently acting on his own� successfully raised the flag of rebellion in Kwilu Province (now part of Bandundu Region) and thereby attracted the attention of other members of the CNL to the fertile target of rural discontent, the Brazzaville conspirators constituted little more than a nuisance factor for the Kasavubu Adoula regime. The insurgen- cy which spread through much of eastern and northeastern Congo in the ensuing months came to be known as the Simba rebellion, after the name given troops of the Batetela- Bakusu officered eeople's Liberation Army (APL) raised by "General" Nicholas Olenga in the spring of 1964. But it was in fact a series of revolts, strongly influenced by local contingencies and bound together only by a shifting coalition of leaders, certain common grievances, and common external support. Stanieyville fell to the APL on 4 August, and the rebellion reached its high -water mark during the 6 10 weeks that followed, By early September, Leopoldville had lost control over almost all that part of the Congo �about two- thirds of the country�which had once been under Arab rule. A rival govr:�rnment, Christophe Gbenye's so- called People's Rerniblic of the Congo, had been established in Stanleyville and was courting the rr,dical African states, the Soviet bloc, and Peking. But the summer months had witnessed major and more encouraging developments in Leopoldville as well: Adoula's inability to stem the tide of revolt bA cost him the confidence of the Binza Group, In late June, faced with the imminent departure of the last United Nations peacekeeping units and the ad- ditional problem of introducing a new constitution in the midst of civil strife, Kasavubu and his ad -isers had invited Tshombe to return home from Spain. The following month, Tshombe had been installed as Prime Minister at cne head of a transitional govern- ment and had begun to organize an auxiliary inilitary force composed of veterans of his former Katangan gendarmerie and mercenary personnel. Thus strengthened, the Congolese Army began to administer telling defeats to the rebels in mid September. In late November, a joint Belgian -U.S. paratroop operation to rescue civilian hostages in Stanleyville facilitated the recapture of that city. By the end of 1964, the rebels had been reduced to small pockets of guerrillas who, while still receiving liwited quantitie- of arms from Corimunist sources via Sudan, Uganda, and Tan zartia, no longer constituted a serious threat to Leopoldville. The suppression of the rebels did not, however, spell the end of the Congo's internal crisis. Tshombe entertained political ambitions extending far beyond the temporary fireman's role for which he had been recalled from Spain. Following the promulgation of the new constitution in August 1964, he established a power base by forming an alliance of political parties, the National Confederation of Congolese Associations CONACO). And when CONACO won a majority in the parliamentary elections of March 1965, he emerged as the leading potential challenger to Kasavubu in the presirential race scheduled for the following year. In the fall of 1965, howevt Kasavubu moved to cut Tshombe back to size. Exercising his new constitutional prerogatives, he dismissed Tshombe from office and named Evariste Kimba of the bitterly anti Tshombe Katangan Balubakat party to take his place. But the CONACO- controlled parliament refused to confirm the Kimba government, and the impasse which triggered Mobutu's second seizure of power ensued. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 mobutu's distrust of freewheeling democratic prac- tices, his sensitivity to the risks involved i'l letting anN local or national leader develop too :uhtitantial it territorial or organizational po.ver base, and his reluc- tance to delegate authority are firmly grounded in his appreciation of the disnlptive role that divided loyalties and opportunism have played in his countrN s brief post indepe n d e n c �t. histor%. Considering the potentially destabilizing imPac�t of the radical charges I, has effected in 'Zaire's political and administrative systc�Tns, he has been remai ably .ticcessful in restoring and maintaining a reasonable degree of domestic peace and order. ;Vey �rtheless, his efforts to establish highly :e'ntralized one -man rule and to suppress all signs of overt opposition have not gone unchallenged. Mobutu has had to cope with thvo military mutinies in eastern "Zaire. one involving Rat.otgan units in 19 the other Hoene serious-- imolving both '-bite nwri :�nary and hatargan troops in 1967. Student ioonstratio os eru deed in 1969 and again in >>eginlling with ti,�� trial and execution of four former cabinet ministers in mid -1966, a seemingl} endless series of real or alleged plots against Mobutu has been exposed to public view. 'kncl the opening months of 192 were marked b confrontation between Mobutu and the (i it illion-member Zairian (:alt Church when Cardinal Malula, Archbishop of himhasa and long -time Mobutu critic. took it public stand against the Africanization of ChrisLan uan}es and attacked certain impious ac�tiyitie� of the \1111. "I'he Archbishop. fearing arrest for "treason," fled to ijoine in Fel..oarx 1972. He was permitted to return, howewr, afv�r the remaining Zai,i!o; church hierarchN capitulated and acceded to de- .1 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 mand that MPR youth organizations be established in the seminaries.) Although few citizens would welcome a re::::.. to the chaos of piecoup Zairian politics, Pax Mubutt. is still little� more than a truce enforced through presiden- tial monopoly of the instruments of military and political coercion. Beneath the surface, tribal and regional tensions persist, and the social problems generated by urbanization and modernization are becoming more acute. Moreover, Mobutu is con- fronted with a number of problems of his own making. For example, his practice of assigning administrators to areas where they have no Tribal ties and of frequently rotating these officials has had its intended effect in that it has kept these officials from developing a regional base of power. But it has also contributed to bureaucratic inefficiency and to widespread resent- ment of being governed by "foreigners." Similarly, Mobutu's efforts to suppress criticism of his ,regime have partially alienated the student and intellectual communities v support he badly needs. And white Mobutu's drive to Zairianize the economy has im- proved his stature at home and throughout the Third World, it has resulted in less efficient operations, periodic strains in Zaire's relations with Belgium, and the flight (albeit, generally temporary) of some badly needed foreign capital and technicians. Zaire's domestic problems 'lave been compounded by Mobutu's tendency to accord higher priority to suppressing centrifugal currents and dissent and to propagandizing the public than to attacking the root causes of social discontent. Until recently, relatively little money has been allocated for expanding urban housing and services or for providing the technical assistance and improved transport facilities needed to restore farm output and living conditions to preindependence levels. In a period marked by high urban unemployment and spiraling living costs, Mobutu has sought to tame the trade union movement rather than allow it to develop into an independent champion of workers' irterests. Student protests have been met with punishment iaiher than dialog. The twin problems of tribalism and ,-vionalism provide another case in point. Viewed by i "obutu as the source of many of Zaire's ills, overt tribalism is outlawed and routinely condemned in political dis- course. But the logic of Mobutu's one-man rule has limited the scope and pace of bureaucratic reform, and tribalism remains an important factor in competition for government, party, military, and business positions as well as in popular attitudes toward the central government. Despite Mobutu's efforts to exhibit an even hand, ethnic rivalries have been exacerbated I, 12 such widely held �and largely valid beliefs that the Luba of Kasai Oriental dominate the educational field, that soldiers from Mobutu's home region of Equateur have increased their proportional strength within the army, and that the Kongo and Luba dominate commerce in the key Kinshasa and mining belt areas. Moreover, since the presence of the central govern- ment is stilt virtually unfelt throughout vast sections of Zaire �being manifested primariiv through scattered and none too welcome army units doubts flourish about the intentions of the remote elite in Kinshasa. Shaba's residents, fo: example, feel strongly that the central government is bleeding their copper -rich province while returning almost nothing to it. In Kivu and Haut Zaire regions, the populace fears that Mobutu will never build up those areas that supported the Simba rebellion. A similar fear exists in Bandundu Region because of the Kwilu insurrection. Nevertheless, the significance and depth of popular dissatisfaction with Mobutu's regime are difficult to gauge. Continued high levels of unemployment or a renewal of student agitation could result in urban disorders. But most of the rural population remains apathetic. There is at present no political nucleus around which active opposition to the regime could crystallize. And despite the clash with Cardinal Malula, there are signs that Mobutu's "authenticity" program may be having a greater stabilizing effect than most outside observers originally anticipated. All told, while Mobutu's survival depends on successfully handling a variety of interrelated problems, his most pressing difficulties are in the economic field. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 Growing Palos f c Zaire's current economic difficulties stem from many sources, including the lingering effects of postindependence chaos (particularly the deterioration of the country's road, rail, and water transportation facilities), a continued shortage of modern technical and managerial skills, the persistence of c and inconsistencies or flaws in Mobutu's own policies. In fact, the Kinshasa regime's approach to economic progress has been somewhat haphazard. It has com- piled a list of projects which are to receive priority attention during the next 5 years, but it has yet to begin work on a formal development pla i. Moreover, it has consistently tended to favor quick profit or showcase ventures over badly needed but less glamorous or rapidly maturing projects in the fields of agriculture, transportation, and education. As the result of 'these and other problems, economic recovery has I �en markedly uneven. On the positive side of the ledger, a combination of domestic calm, economic reform, substantial infusions of foreign aid, and rising copper prices yielded an average annual increase in gross domestic product 1( ;DI of nearly 8'(' from 1968 through 1970�with the most dramatic gains being registered in the industrial field. Put this period of relatively_ rapid growth was not accompanied by a comparable improvement in the distribution of cash income. The percentage of the work force receiving steady wages is still well belo%y its prcindependencc level. There arc, in fact, nearly as many unemployed workers in Zaire today as there are regular wage earners. And even those workers who hold steady jobs hove suffered a marked decline in real wages over the past fey yea, as the result of inflation. Moreoye structural changes in 'Zaire's econmv have eroded the fairly high degree of diversification which had been achieved under Belgian management. For example, prior to independence, agriculture con- stituted the backbone of the economy, and agri- cultural commodities� primarily rubber, coffee, palm oil, cotton, and timber� consistently accounted for between one -third and one -half :f the country's foreign exchange receipts. This is no longer the case. 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 The production of most of Zaire's cash crops is still below preindependence levels, and the prices which the country's agricultural exports have commanded on the world market have tended to decline in recent years. Thus, while about 70% of the Zairian popula- tion is still engaged in agricultural pursuits, agriculture's share in both GDP and export earnings has sharply declined. And whereas the country was once comfortably self- sufficient in most food products, postindependence agricultural output for domestic consumption has not kept pace with population growth. At the same time, the modern sector of the economy has become more and more dependent on minerals, especially copper. While production of some minerals has stagnated or declined, the mining industry as a whole now accounts for almost one- fourth of GDP, about one -half of government revenues, and well over three fourths of export earnings. Zaire is currently the non Communist world's largest producer of industrial diamonds and cobalt and its fifth largest source of copper. More important, however, is the fact that in 1969, when the world price of clipper was nearing its peak, that metal alone accounted for nearly 80% of the more than $575 million received through the sale of Zairian minerals abroad. Overdependence on a single expc,rt commodity is a hazardous state of affairs for any developing country, particularly for one plagued with economic and social problems of the scale fac,vd by Zaire. Zaire's net foreign trade accounts for abort 25% of GDP. Despite con- tinuing inflows of foreign aid and investment, Kinshasa needs to maintain a relatively high level of export earnings in order to pay for the import of the machinery, raw materials, equiiprnent, and consumer goods essential to economic recovery and development as well as to cover balance -of- payment deficits in services and private transfers. Moreover, since a sub- stantial portion of export earnings are regularly reinvested in the Zairian economy or spent on locally produced goods or services, any contraction or expan- sion of these receipts is certain to have acorresponding secondary effect on national income, governmental revenues, and employment. With a per capita GDP of about $90, Zaire ranks among the poorest nations of the world, By late 1970, however, when Mobutu was elected to a new 7-year presidential term, 3 years of near economic boom had generated high expectations for the future. Even Mobutu did not foresee the consequences of the downturn in world copper prices that had begun some 6 months earlier. During his inaugural address, he sketched out ambitious developmental plans under the 14 ruUtir "Objective 80." He pledged that henceforth the economy would be at th:! service of the citizenry and that the coming decade would be a period of evenly distributed social and economic progress. Within months, however, the emphasis in Kinshasa had shifted from growth to retrenchment. M GbUtu had little choice. Since mid- 1970, government revenues have barely risen, while foreign exchange reserves have fallen. Imports have mounted. Inflation has reappeared. And despite Mobutu's quiet postpone- ment of a number of prestige projects, government expenditures have increased. A prolonged economic stagnation could seriously weaken Mobutu's position, generating social unrest and jeopardizing his ability to sustain the loyalty of his subordinates through liberal material rewards. In fact, the short -term economic outlook is not particularly encouraging. Much depends on the price of copper which, while it has recovered somewhat from 1971's low, seems unlikely to regain the lucrative heights of the late 1960's very soon. Major investments now being made to expand Zaire's mining and refining capacity will not bear much fruit before the mid- 1970's and will not become important sources of tax revenues until still later in the decade. Agricultural exports cannot be expected to take up much of the slack because they depend on major improvements in internal transportation and port facilities which are years away. There is no doubt but that Mobutu is counting heavily on foreign technical and financial assistance to he'p him weather what promise to be 2 or 3 rather lean years a;: Pad. To some degree, at least, his recent increase in emphasis on cultural and economic nationalism is likely to be an impediment in this regard. But so far, Mobutu has appeared willing to draw back from Zairianization, nationalization, or other popular measures when vital economic activity seemed to be threatened. Thus periodic campaigns to expel alien residents have fallen more heavily on west African and Asian traders than on Zaire's European population. Thousands of highly qualified foreign executives, educators, military officers, and technicians still hold responsible positions throughout the country. In fact, Mobutu has not only extended the use of foreign experts in various government components but has also engaged foreign firms to operate a number of public utilities and nationalized industrial plants. And while financial aid from foreign governments and international agencies has dropped off to about one -third its crisis years peak of over $200 million annually, Kinshasa has waged a rather successful campaign over the past year or two to attract ne v foreign private investment. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 Nonalignment Pragmatism With a Flair (s) As is the case with his domestic policies, Mobutu's approach io foreign affairs has been colored by a unique mix of pragmatism and egotism. He has sought to stimulate Zairian nationalism, to loosen his dependence on Belgium, and to improve his regime's standing in African circles by portraying Zaire as a nonaligned nation firmly committed to the elimina- tion of the political and economic vestiges of colonialism and dedicated to promoting inter African cooperation. But his overriding concerns in the inter- national field have been his need for financial and technical assistance from industrial countries and his fear of Communist- sponsored intervention in Zaire's internal affairs. Thus, behind his militant rhetoric and demonstrative acts, the thrust of his policy has been essentially moderate and pro Western. In fact, Mobutu privately calls the United States an "ally" and expects key security and economic backstopping from Washington. His hopes in this regard are understandable, for not only has the United States poured over $650 million into Zaire since 1960 in various forms of aid and support, but U.S. advice, encouragement, and assistance proved to be of crucial importance to Mobutu during his difficulties with rebellious mercenaries and a faltering economy in 1967. And while the amount of U.S. bilateral aid has been decl;ning, Mobutu's recent breakthrough in attracting American investors has given Washington a growing direct stake in the Zairian economy. Periodic strains in Zaire's relations with Belgium notwithstanding, Mobutu has furnished ample evidence o the flexibility and pro Western orientation of his foreign policy posture. He has openly entrusted the training of elite military and police units to Israeli, Italian, and U.S. advisers. Although he tolerates the existence of modest Soviet bloc missions in Kinshasa �bo ti as "proof' of his nonalignment and as potential sources of economic aid �he monitors the activities of Communist diplomats closely and does not hesitate to expell them if his suspicions are aroused. And while he gives lipservice and some modest material support to liberation movements nithp Africa, he has prudently sou&h to limit the practical consequences of such action. For example, he righteously broke relations with the colonialist govern- ment in Lisbon in 1966. But, mindful that the shortest exporc route for Shahan .opper passes through Angola, he has restricted the activities of Holden Roberto 's Kinshasa -based Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAS). Indeed. in March 1970 he allowed two Portuguese representatives to establish an office in the Spanish Embassy in Kinsham. Similarly, he has condemned the Rhodesian regime and rejected proposals for opening a diplomatic dialog with South Africa but has kept open us- trade links with both countries. Despite his ambivalence toward nearby non African governments and his ill concealed ties to the West, Mobutu has managed to win a position of leadership and respect in Africa. Seeking a measure of insurance against repetition of the type of intervention which at one time or another during Zaire's postindepimclence troubles has been mounted across the borders of almost all nine of his country's immediate neighbors, he has consistently taken a more active role in the Organiza- tion of African Unity (OAU) than any of his predecessors. Whenever possible. he has tailored his more dramatic moves �such as his posthumous rehabilitation of Lumumba �to appeal to both OAU and domestic audiences. His early success in easing strained relations with such states as Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, and Sudan made possible his triumphant hosting of the 1967 OAU summit. Thereafter, Mobutu's regional stature bolstered by his domestic record as well as by skilful diplomacy �grew rapid:-. Nevertheless, Mobutu's action in spending over $20 million on preparations for the OAU summit meeting in Kinshasa was illustrative of the egocentric and less 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 rational aspect of his foreign policy behavior. Mobutu firmly believes that it is 'Zaire's destiny �and his own �to play a leading role in African affairs, and his ambitions in this regard sometimes distort his un- derlying pragmatic appreciation of his country's basic material interests. In 1968, for example, he drew Chad and the Central African Republic into a mini common market in an apparent challenge to France's economic pr -dominance in central Africa. And despite his pressing economic difficulties at home, he has pater- nalistically provided aid to his poorer neighbors �e.g., military training for the Chadian Army and budgetary supplements for Burundi. Zaire's economic union with Chad and the Central African Republic was stillborn. And Mobutu's quest for glory suff ,-red other setbacks as well �such as in June 1970 when Kinshasa's involvement in two abor- tive efforts to overthrow the leftist Ngouabi regime in neighboring Brazzaville was revealed. But by the end of 1971, Mobutu apparently felt sure enough of his international position to assume an even more assertive foreign policy posture. In the course of the next 6 months alone he moved to improve relations with the 16 Soviet Union, effected an at least temporary rec.- onciliation with Ngouabi, withdrew from the French sponsored Afro Malagasy Common Market, and stepped up agitation for dismantling "neocolonial" barriers between French- and Eliglish- speaking African states. He also took the initiative is attempting to 'impose an end to the feud between two rival Angolan liberation organizations, launched a concerted drive to improve Zaire's rele #ions with Guinea and Algeria still further, and dominated the Rabat OAU summit conference of June 1972. While Mobutu n.-) doubt derived a considerable degree of personal satisfaction from this flurry of activity, and while he may have at least temporarily succeeded in diverting poprlar attention away from Zaire's domestic problems, his is a risky course of action. For example, his campaign to reduce French influence in Africa could jeopardize the approximately $5 million a year in bilateral assistance which Kinshasa has beer receiving from Paris. Further steps to improve relations with Moscow or Peking could generate discontent in the military establishment. Mobutu's penchant for summit diplomacy could result in his absence from the country at some critical juncture. But more important, his emphasis on foreign affairs cuts down on the time and energy he is able to devote to meeting his country's pressing internal problems. Arid without his constant attention and encouragement, progress could be slow indeed. Mobutu has, of course, taken many calculated risks in the past, and some of the more assertive interludes in Zah an foreign policy have ;Melded very tangible accomplishments. Not the least of these has been Kinshasa's success in reducing Belgian domination of the Zairian economy without sacrificing continued financial and technical support from Brussels. But the gains �apart from enhancing his domestic and regional stature �which Mobutu now hopes to achieve are not clear. Unless he is able to translate his new activism on the international scene into concrete economic benefits (e.g., modest new credits from the Soviet bloc), he may find that its net effect has been to worsen his internal problems. Despite the strength of Mobutu's current position, there is always the danger that at some point a combination of economic and political malaise will lead Zairian military leaders to decide that he is more useful as a scapegoat than e- a strongman. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 KLrshaw's ostm&Wkw OA I I Chronology (u/ou) 1885 Congo Free State is established as personal domain of Belgian King Leopold II. 1908 Belgian Parliament assi:aies control of Congo Free State after international scandal over conditions. 1959 January First African riots in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). 1960 June Congo becomes independent under President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier Patrice Lumumba. July Congolese National Army mutinies and Belgians flee. Katanga Province (now Shaba) under Moise Tshombe and eastern Kasai under Albert K_alonji both secede. U.N. troops arrive at request of central government. September Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba. Col. Joseph Mobutu and army take over and remain in control until February 1961. 1961 January Lumumba is killed. August Cyrille Adoula approved as compromise Premier by near- unanimous parliamentary vote. 1962 September Secession in Kasai ended by Congolese armed forces. 1963 January Secession in Katanga ended by U.N. forces. September Kasavubu adjourns parliament indefinitely and begins to rule by decree with support of "Binza group," comprising army commander Mobutu and four key civilian officials. December Peasant uprising led by Pierre Nlulele begins in central sector of present Bandundu Province. 1964 April Simba uprising in eastern Congo beginr to spread north- ward. July Moise Tshombe named Premier by Kasavubu with con- currence of "Bins group" and many members of still adjourned parliament. August President Kasavubu promulgates new constitution ratified by referendum in June -July. Simba guerrillas capture Stanleyville (now Kisangari). September Refugee politicians join Simbas in Stanleyville, declare "Popular Revolutionary Covemment" and gain support from radical African and Communist states. November U.S. planes drop Belgian paratroopers at Stanleyville and Paulis (now Isiro) to rescue white hostages held by rebels. 1965 Congolese army units with white mercenaries retake rebel -hell territory as rebel leaders flee. March -April Parliamentary elections are hell. Moise Tshombe's CONACO party gains majority. October Kasavubu dismisses Tshombe. New government appointed by Kasavubu fails to get parliamentary approval. November Mobutu seizes control of central government, anncunces plans to remain its president for a years. December Mobutu assumes power to rule by decree. 1966 May -June Four former cabinet ministers are accused of plotting to overthrow Mobutu, found guilty by military tribunal, and publicly hanged. July Katangan units in northeastern Congo mutiny, subdued several months later by white mercenaries loyal to the government. 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 i! 1966 October Mobutu dismisses Premier Leonard Mulamba, popular army colonel, and declares hims- =!f Pnnnier as well as President. 1967 January Congolese Government seizes UMHK Congo -based assets and establishes its own company to run UMHK copper mines. UMHK retalia`es by threatening prospective copper buyers with court action. February Government reaches compromise agreement with UMHK affiliate, ending for time being dispute over control of UMHK operations. April Mobutu publishes a new constitution, legalizing strong presidential system, gad forms new party, Popular Move- ment of the Revolution (MPR). June New constitution promulgated following popular referen- dum. IMF sponsored monetary reform instituted. July White mercenaries and Katangan troops mutiny in eastern Congo. November Mercenary mutiny ends with mercenaries withdrawing to Rwanda. 1968 April Mercenaries airlifted from Rwanda to Europe. September- October Mulele flees to Brazzaville, is returned to Kinshasa under amnesty guarantee, and executed. Brazzaville government wreaks diplomatic relations with Kinshasa. 1969 June Lovanium University students demonstrating in Kinshasa are shot by troops; sympathy demonstrations at other universities and schools are greatest show of civilian dis- content since Mobutu became President. August Mobutu bans independent student unions and requires all students to loin MPR youth wing. Mobutu dismisses large portion of cabinet ministers, in- cluding Victor Nendaka and Justin Bomboko, most in- fluential members of former &iza group. 18 September Final settlement of dispute between Congolese Govern- ment and UMHK. 1970 June Mobutu and Congo (B) President Ngouabi sign Manifesto of Reconciliation, agreeing to phased resumption of normal commi cations, trade, and diplomatic relations; their respective embassies are reopened in December. King Baudouin attends 10th anniversary of Congolese independence, climaxing gradual return to solidly con- t;' ructive relations between the two countries. 1970 August Mobutu makes his first state visits to the United States, Romania, and Yugoslavia; he negotiates substantial in- dustrial investments and military purchases in the U.S. while reasserting nominal policy of nonalignment. November Presidential and National Assembly elections complete constitutional basis for Mobutu's rule. December Mobutu declares amnesty for all refugee rebels, at home or abroad, who turn themselves in to authorities; two principal leaders of Stanleyville rebel regime of 1964 and some less notorious emigres accept amnesty by 31 January deadline. 1971 March -April Mobutu makes state visits to France, Japan, and Taiwan, gaining fairly substantial increases in long -term economic aid. June Lovanium University students stage unauthor, -ed demon- stration commemorating students shot by troops in June 1969; Mobutu declares entire student body must serve in army for 2 years. August Mobutu announces that student draftees will return to campus militia units after rugged basic training; Lov- anium and two other universities at Lubumbashi and Kisangani are amalgamated into the National University. Highly ublicized subversion trials are conducted for student demonstration leaders, a former rebel "general" who accepted Mobutu's amnesty, and a mixed bag of obscure dissidents. October Nendaka and Bomboko, who were ousted from cabinet in August 1969, are publicly accused of plotting to assassinate Mobutu and put under indefinite detention without trial. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 r a o�r October Mobutu changes official title of country from Democratic Republic of the Congo to Republic of Zaire; his "return to authenticity" campaign is soon extended to the Congo River, several provinces, and other place names. 1972 January "Authenticity" campaign is extended to personal names; the President declares himself Mobutu Sese Seko and orders subordinates to do likewise. Cardinal Malula, leading Catholic prelate in Zaire, cri- ticizes Mobutu's name changing campaign; Mob to threatens Malula with prosecution for treason and sus- pends a leading Catholic publication. Glossary (u/ou) Much Belgium agrees to $23 million in additional technical assistance and credits for Zaire, one of largest single aid packages since independence. April Mobutu's public confrontation Catholic Church in Zaire winds down, with Malula sojourning at Vatican and church accepting MPR youth cadres in its seminaries. August Mobuto retires many senior generals and tightens the command structure of the security forces. 1973 January Mobutu visits Peking and prepares to exchange ambassa- dors between China and Zaire. AwwEv ATioN F OREIG N E NGLISH CGTC Confederation Generale des Travail- General Confederation of Congolese leurs Congolass Workers CND Centre Nationale de Documentation National Documentation Center DGRSM Direction Generale du Renseignement Directorate of Information and Mili- et de Surete Militaire tary Security DIA Agence de Documentation et d'Infor- African Documentation and Inferma- mation Africaine tion Agency CECAMINES La Generale des Carrieres et des Mines General Quarries and Mines Com- du Zaire pany of Zaire GRAE Govern Revolucionario de Angola no Revolutionary Government of Angola F.xilio in Exile INREL Institut Belge d'Information et de Belgian Information and Documenta- Documentation tion Agency JMPR Jeunesse du Mouvement Populaire de Youth of the Popular 'Movement of la Revolution the Revolution MPR Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution Popular Movement of the Revolution MNC Mou�ement Nationale Congolaise Congolese National Movement SCM Societe Generale de Minerais General Ores Company UGEC Union Generate des Etudiants Congo General Union of Congolese Students lzis UMHK Union Minier.�e du Haut Katanga Mining Union of Upper Katanga UPA Uniao das Populacoes de Angola Union of Angolan Peoples UNTZA Union Nationale des Travailleurs de la National Union of Zairian Workers Republique du Zaire i 19 v......... a. w.... o.,.-............�.. :xvw awe+. wraaaawrw. arcura: k: ti^. Y+. b: :xaraa.Yxu ::a47WSG7:,rtiafkt4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110007 -6 t SECRET Area Brief (u/ou) LAND Size: 905,000 sq. mi. Use: 22% agricultural land (2% cultivated), 45% forested, 33% other Land boundaries: 6,153 mi. WATER Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 n. mi. Coastline: 23 mi. PEOPLE Population: 23,918,000, average annual growth rate 4.2% (FY71) Ethnic divisions: Over 200 African ethnic groups, the majority are Bantu; four largest tribes� Mongo, Luba, Kongo (all Bantu), and the Mangbetu Azande make up about 45% of the population Religion: 51% Christian, 45% animist, 4% other Language: French, English, Lingala, Swahili, Kikongo, and Tshiluba are all classified as official languages Literacy: 5% fluent in French, about 35% have an acquaintance with French Labor force: About 8 million, but only about 12% in wage structure GOVERNMENT Legal name: Republic of Zaire (until October 1971 known as Democratic Republic of the Congo) Type: Republic; constitution establishes strong presidential system Capital: Kinshasa Political subdivisions: 8 regions and federal district of Kinshasa Legai system: Based on Belgian civil law system and tribal law; new constitution promulgated 1967; legal edu- cation at National University of 'Zaire; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction Branches: President elected 1970 for seven -year term; National Legislative Council of 420 members elected for five -year term; the official party is the supreme political institution Government leaders: Lt. Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko, Presi- dent Elections: Presidential and legislative elections in Octo- ber and November 1970 Political parties and leaders: Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR), only legal party, organized from above with actual grassroots popularity not clearly definable Communists: No Communist Party Member of: EAMA, FAO, IAEA, ICAO, IHB, ILO, ITU, OAU, UDEAC, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO 20 ECONOMY GDP: $2.1 billion (1971 est.), under 3100 per capita; real growth rate 7.9% p.a. 1968 -71 Agriculture: Main cash crops� coffee, palm oil, rubber; main food cramps� cassava (manioc), bananas, root props, corn; some regions self- sufficient Major industries: Mining, mineral processing, light indus- tries Electric power: 751,380 kw. capacity (1971); 3.23 billion kw. -hr. produced (1971), 148 kw. -hr. per capita Exports: $669 million (f.o.b., 1971); copper, cobalt, diamonds, other minerals, coffee, palm oil Imports: $693 million (c.i.f., 1971); consumer goods, food- stuffs, mining and other machinery, transport equipment, fuels Major trade partners: Belgium, U.S., West Germany, Italy, and France Aid: Economic �U.S. (FY61 -70) $449 million; (1970 esti- mated disbursements) Belgium, $27.4 million; France, $6.9 million; other bilateral aid $3 million; U.N., $7.1 million; EC, $14.1 million military�U.S., $39.2 million (FY62 -71) Monetary conversion rate: 1 zaire US$2 Fiscal year: Calendar year COMMUNICATIONS Railroads: 3,218 miles, all single track; 2,419 miles 3'6 gage, 78 miles 3'3%" -gage, 85 miles 2' 3 /4" -gage, 636 miles 1'11%"-gage. 532 miles of 3'6" -gage electrified. Highways: 86,930 miles; 1,095 bituminous, 10,427 laterite, gravel, cr crushed stone, 75,408 improved or unimproved earth Inland waterways: 9,320 navigable; 8,390 in Congo River system, 930 miles on lakes Ports: 2 major (Matadi and Boma), 1 minor (Banana) Merchant Marine: 4 ships of 1,000 g.r.t. and over, totaling 35,901 g.r.t. or 45,8P, d.w.t. Civil Air: 26 major transports Airfields: 320 usable; 1 has a runway over 12,000 feet, 2 have runways 8,000 to 11,999 feet, and 56 have run- ways 4,000 to 7,999 feet; 19 have permanent- surfaced runways. 166 airfield sites and 5 seaplane stations Telecommunications: Average African system composed of radio -relay links, open -wire lines, multiconductor cables, and radio and TV stations; principal center, Kin- shasa; 22,500 telephones; 800,000 radio receivers and 20,000 TV receivers; 7 AM, 1 FM, and 2 TV stations DEFENSE FORCES Military manpower: Males, 15 -49: 5,715,000, of whom it is estimated that about 2,745,000 (or 48% are fit for military service. About 240,000 will be coming of military age (16) each year through the period 1972 -76 SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 Places and features referred to in this General Survey (U/01J) 0; COORDINATES F 0 IS. 0 'E I 1 0 0 'E. Aketi 2 44N. 23 46 Lake Albert, (lake) I 40N. 31 00 Akula 2 22N. 20 11 Lake Edward 1 21 29 35 Ango Ango 5 51 13 26 Lake Mwci-u lake) 9 Gu 28 45 Bafwasende I 05N. 27 16 Lake Tanganyika (take) 6 00 29 30 Banana 6 01 12 24 Libenge 3 39N. 18 38 Bandundu 3 19 17 22 Lienart 3 04N. 25 31 Bangui, Central African Republic 4 22N. IS 35 Likasi 10 59 26 44 Beni 0 30N. 29 28 Lisala 2 09N. 21 31 Binsa 1 03 28 54 Lobito, Angola 12 20 13 34 BNck River (strm) 3 57 15 54 Lomami (sirm) 0 46N. 24 I Bomide 0 13 20 52 Lualaba (sirm) 0 26 N. 25 20 Boma 5 51 13 03 Luapula (sirm) 9 26 28 33 Bomu (sirm) 4 08N. 22 27 Lubudi 9 57 25 58 Bondo 3 49N. 23 40 Lubudi sta) 9 57 25 57 Brazzaville, Congo 4 16 15 17 Lubumbashi 11 40 27 28 Budjala 2 39N. 19 42 Luena 9 27 25 47 Bujumbura, Burundi 3 23 29 22 Lukala 5 31 14 32 Bukama 9 12 25 51 Luilu (mine) 10 38 25 21 Bukavu 2 30 28 52 Lulimba 4 42 28 38 Bumba 2 IIN. 22 28 Madula 0 28N. 25 23 Bunia I 34N. 30 15 Mambasa 1 21N. 29 03 Busanga JO 12 25 23 Maniema 1 11 28 37 Businga Buta 3 20N. 2 48N. 20 53 24 44 Manono Masina 7 18 5 52 27 25 17 03 Chililabombwe, Zambia 12 22 27 50 Matadi 5 49 13 27 Congo River (strm) 6 04 12 24 Mayamba 4 46 16 46 Crique dr Banana (tidal creek) 6 01 12 25 Mayunbe (massif) 4 30 12 30 Dilolo 10 42 22 20 1 Mbandaka 0 04N. 18 16 Djelo-Binza 4 23 15 15 Mbanza-Ngungu 5 15 14 52 Douala, Cameroon 4 03N. 9 42 Mbengo-Mbengo (whirlpool) 5 50 13 26 Fimi (81rm) 3 01 16 58 Mbuji-Mayi 6 09 23 36 Fungurume 10 37 26 18 Mongala (siren.) I 53N. 19 40 Gemena 3 15N. 19 46 M'Pala. .'.ngola 6 08 13 44 (Iolua 1 41 29 14 Muanda 5 56 12 21 Guba, 10 40 26 26 Mulungwishi 10 47 26 37 Idiofa 5 02 19 36 Mungbere 2 38N. 28 30 Ilebo 4 19 20 35 Mushengc 4 32 21 21 Inga 5 39 13 39 Musoshi 12 15 27 38 Isiro 2 46N. 27 37 Mutshatsha 10 39 24 27 Itimbiri (sirm) 2 02N. 22 44 Mwenga 3 02 28 26 Ituri (strm) I 40N. 27 01 Ndjili 4 28 15 21 Kahalo 6 03 26 55 Ndolo 3 36 23 03 Kabongo 7 24 25 38 Ndolo (sec popl) 4 19 15 19 Kalemie 5 56 29 12 Pool Malebo (pool) 4 15 15 25 Kamina 8 44 25 00 Port de Kindu 2 57 25 57 Kananga 5 54 22 25 Punia 1 28 26 27 Kasai (strm) 3 02 16 57 Ruzizi (strin) 3 16 29 14 Kasese, Uganda 0 ION. 30 05 Sakania 12 45 28 34 Kasongo 4 27 26 40 Sake 1 34 29 03 Katanti (mission) 2 18 27 08 Sankuru (sirri) 4 17 20 25 Katonto (hill) 10 38 25 21 Shituru (mine) It 01 26 46 Kenge 4 52 16 59 Sona-Bata 4 54 15 09 Kiambi 7 20 28 01 Songololo 5 42 14 02 Ki,;ali, Rwanda 1 57 30 04 I Tenke 10 35 26 07 Kigoma, Tanzania 4 52 29 38 Titule 3 17N. 25 32 Kikwit 5 02 18 49 Tshela 4 59 12 56 Kimpoko-Nsele 4 14 15 33 Tshikapa 6 25 20 48 Kinkuzu 4 58 14 28 Tshinsenda 12 18 27 58 Kinshasa 4 18 15 18 Ubangi (airm) 3 30 17 42 Kipushi 11 46 27 14 Ubundi 0 21 25 29 Kisangani 0 30N. 25 12 Uvira 3 24 29 08 Kisenge 10 41 23 10 Vila Teixeira de Sousa, Angola 10 42 22 12 Kitona 5 28 17 42 Yei, Sudan 4 05N. 30 40 Kolwezi 10 43 25 28 Zonzo 5 44 14 39 Komba 2 53N. 23 59 Kongolo 5 23 27 00 Selected Airfields Kota Koli It 40 27 28 Kwa (8irm) 3 10 16 11 Kamina Base 8 38 25 15 Kwango (siren) 3 14 17 22 Kitona Base 5 -M 12 27 Kwilu (strm) 5 40 12 52 Lubumbashi 11 35 27 32 Lac Kivu (lake) 2 00 20 10 Ndjili 4 23 15 27 NOTE-All latitudes are south unless otherwise indicated. I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110007-6 Oil 12 Batouri 4 L C a m e r o o n 0 rquator G a b o n 20 Cen African Republic Mobaye _Pan y ville -4 Berbe ti F Francovole 0 KIMM MW C o n g 0 Bra; D C, ;ii e ob Busing G e r, n N Mon zr- -7 >L LOPO" 00 N t '2 t u r 7 -:7 7 I bandska 8 sira Boo ",7 4 "C k1a Ndombe.) I- N x Band -Naela Ileho kshasa B \u n u 0 �ayirnba Lu Madirriba Kenge Tshela Kikwjj))� i biloia I J AtIlantic Oicean lua Mtianz t Ngun Kasai-Oc CI tal J B a i r e rigololu -A*'. Popokabaka Kana 7 Maquela ti do Zornbo M 'Pala I S lv ao Saador I shikapa do Chador Zaire Kahnrnba, Dundo1 '-armo 8 ct Caungula., ique APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110007-6 African Republic zs I S u d a n Mobaye I I "t,T B\zyvillh i Yep Uele J go Aba :Z1 'Faradle Busing& Tdule to I Watsa[, Gdi, An Zxco Aru Aketi A't�, Buta 1a5! Isiro Mortgala `.J' 1 Mungbere j Pi J Bum rJ i M H a 1 Z aire '131? I N LoPorl 1 00 Banana Bum 203 7! r La Koman -Mambasa A'be q e u r Bafwasendo T r ,i lz Kisan a F� Madula Portal 98 Lubero fl Lake o George .y Ubundi 1 A a ?992 Lubutu I r Mbarara ,1467 I Ka a doe f Punia e o Si Wali4le k 7 e/e i j a a Gisan Om L fi f r' K l Kigali Lomela I' K i 1" u i i l' m 1 t Kahma L 7' j Buka Cyangug ft _'Y Port de Kindu i i Mwenga Bu mbQ>ha Q' Uv Da DeDeke Lodla t. s -srr "r tGdej I Burundi Kasai- Oiriental i Ilebo i 'U Laba bare to lass o Uiil' Kongo ra }}Y Kasa Occl tal Y T Dimbelenge' i I i a n a n i a K 9a Kabal 'Lake i M i May i Tangaoyika b r C t Tshikapa Moandai I ibaya i i I� 1 G daiika r Mwene Ditu ung` V I god Manono K Oundo r P to X `MitwabyyF% Kamin f 8C r ip -Upemb .o1a MPulungu mi APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 u d a n r. n Y Yew Ab, r Itru U A Lake Uca PEAK George Kigali Y- e Burundi I T a ft a n i a Lake Tanganyika n MpandaP Population Persons per square mile 0 15 35 75 0 6 14 29 Persons per square kilometer Based on 1970 Census mpulunqu Mbela APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110007-6 Imhof L ,Likasi I jj Rice Oil palm Ii Tea OK Fish Coffee W Cocoa Kanargs 'Obuil-111120 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110007-6 %FF v v I vIX IX`L_%prJ%XI6.. wvvr w Iv. vu-wnvr-uwryrr v_wr v n t e u 1 1 t Zia s+ Ilk a 0 1 (y a c r�. T Rve G a b o n Fort Rousso I f Franceville lac i 1. `f i o j C i o. i f Ban dund �r' -l\ Dekese j mow t d o Brazzaville u Kimpok' Nsele I Ilebo (o s48.Sa B, Il dlU n d f; r F as 31 Y Lu zi i l' i t i oire Madimba Kenge r Id+ofa j Tshela Fv,\ Kiktrvit lua 1 z la Mbabz A 9 IVgttn t a Bas i r e l4asai- tcct J i Popokabaka Gungu }r 1 ngololo Ma uela do Zombo i Sao Salvador Tshikapa r do Congo j I Kasongo�Lunda I l A t l an t c Kahemba Dundo O c ea n Carmona 1 Ambriz Caungula- Cif I o ej I Zai enrigae d lh Carvao Melanie International boundary n Region boundary i f (Port.) 1 National capital Mat Region capital Railroad I Vila u s e I 1 de ousa Surfaced road i Unsurfaced road j Rio Airfield Major port I Luso Populated places Oa Over 100,000 0 10,000 to 100.000 Under 10,000 Spot otevations m fee! Silva Porto l Scale 1:5,000,000 0 50 100 150 20 t= swlt :a Mdes 0 50 100 150 20 I Kilometers l Names and boundary representation .X.� r iL 16 are not necessarily authordetire 500 2.73 Y Central Intelligence Agency For Official Use Only b APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110007 -6 y "9",ammc..rwv rvv r v v v v vv v pvvrvv vvv se o u r i r I y 1 Madula t A Go Ubunth ,r- I 1 mss, /'tea t i �!r f A' Ka f Lubutu (Jkeia 1 1. K C J s4as.s!\ wat le F7