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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06116: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be undated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be av ^_:!able as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area none and lumber and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial disseminc;ion, aaditona) copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 58 (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified/ For Officlial Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 GENERAL SURVEY CHAPTERS COUNTRY PROFIIX Integrated perspective of the subject country Chronology Area Brief Sum- mary Map THE SOCIETY Social structure a Popu }ation a Labor a Health a Living conditions a Social problems a Religion a Education a Public infor- mation Artistic expression GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolu- tion of the state a Governmental strength and sta- bility a Structure and function a Political dynamics a National policies a Threats to stability a The police a Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabilities THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy a Its structure agriculture, fisheries, forestry, Fuels and Power. metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction a Domestic trade a Economic policy and development a International economic rela- tions TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems a Strategic mobility Railroads *Highways e Inland waterways a Pipelines a Ports a Merchant marine a Civil air a Airfields a The telecom system MILITAR; GEOGRAPHY Topography and climate a Military geographic regions a Strategic areas a Internal routes a Approaches: land, air ARMED FORCES The defense establishment a join: activities a Ground forces a Naval forces a Air forces a Paramilitary SCIENCE Level of scientific advancement a Or- ganization, planning, and financing of research a Scientific education, manpower, and facilities a Major research fields APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 I.1 �:tl 17 7::_F9II:1bI:fti[: 311< a: 1] IZQIf Lf /:iIIYIZfibIII:1� WW r f W K A i The Past- Duhcek Era: Buck to P- udence and Pragmatism I Land of Forests and Factories A Star Crossed People The Stalinist Interlude and the Dubeek Revival Husak's Headaches "We Have Bern, and We Will Be Again" Chrawl ogy Zb Area Brief I 25 Swnmary Map follows 25 This Country Profile prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub- stantially completed by January 1974. Confidential APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 I.1 �:tl 177: F9II: 1bI: l 31t a: 1] IZQIf Lf /:iIIYIZfibIII:1� APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 The Post-Duhcek Era: Back to Prudence and Pragmatism In sharp contrast to the turbulence and tensions which marked the period immediately following the Warsaw Pact invasion of August 1968, the domestic scene in Czechoslovakia in early 1974 was quiet and outwardly stable. The idealism of the fleeting preintervention Prague Spring had given way to a strongly :materialistic pragmatism. In many ways, the population was enjoying a mea! ire of prosperity un- known since just prior to World' Jar II. Consumer lux- uries, botf: of foreign and local manufacture, were available in unprecedented variety and quantity. Both real wages and savings were at alltime highs. After years of privation, the Czechoslovak people were hastening to reap the benefits of what one Western observer has aptly termed "dumpling communism." Preoccupied with their quest for material pleasures� including TV sets, cars, and, most recently, summer cottages �they seemed to have lost ill interest in politics. (U/ 0U) True enough, a few intellectuals still held high the banner of dissent. But they were becoming increasing- ly isolated. Most of their countrymen appeared to be resigned, however reluctantly, both to the loss of many of their individual rights and liberties and to the con- tinued presence of about 60,000 Soviet occupation troops on Czechoslovak soil. A consensus had gradual- ly emerged that further overt resistance to clearly overwhelming power could only delay any loosening of internal controls and might even imperil coveted improvements in living standards. Not only did the average man on the street seem almost anxious to forget what the Czechoslovaks now refer to euphemistically as the "August events," but there also appeared to be growing feelings of resentment toward the fallen heroes of the Prague Spring �and toward erudite roman. Gists in general �for having gotten Czechoslovakia into such a mess in the first place. (U /OU) Indeed, the agonizing process of "nor- malization"� psychological, political, and economic seemed near completion. Czechoslovakia was once again a trusted memLer of the Soviet bloc. From the Kremlin's point of view, Prague's conserv- ative domestic policies were ideologically sound, and none of Moscow's other Warsaw Pact allies could boast of a better record of loyal cooperation in the foreign policy field. (U /Oi_J) For better or for worse, a large part of the credit for bringing all this about belongs to Gustav Husak, the shrewd and authoritarian Slovak intellectual who APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 replaced Alexander Dubcek at the helm of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in April 1969. Operating under the twin banners of realism and moderation, Husak played upon fears of much more unpleasant alternatives to win grudging acceptance of a policy of broad compliance with Moscow's demands. His task was made easier by his reputation for stub- born independence and personal integrity born of long years sp -nt as a political prisoner of the Novotny regime on the charge of "bourgeois Slovak nationalism." Moreover, despite his insistence on dis- cipline, he demonstrated a genuine determination to avoid returning to the harsh administrative and police methods of the 1950's. Like his well publicized efforts to improve the economic well -being of his coun- trymen, this aspect of Husak's style of rule did much to case the pain of capitulation. (U /OU Not that the "normalization" process didn't take its human toll. The party was subjected to a purge which cost it� through resignation or involuntary separation nearly one -third of the 1.7 million members carried on its rolls when Husak came to power. In addition, those individuals who stood in the forefront of the 1968 reform movement have been os- tracized and denied responsible or well paying employment. But, thanks to Husak's continuing resistance to the demands of party ultraconservatives for more severe reprisals, only a handful� primarily people who could be charged with inflammatory or subversive behavior in the postinvasion period �have been brought to trial. Even Dubcek has been spared. And although the question of how to deal with the leading figures of the reform era remains a major point of contention within the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Husak has made it clear that he personally favors a policy of selective rehabilitation. (U/ 0U) All told, however, Husak has asked his countrymen to swallow a great deal, not the least of which has been his own gradual conversion from an open critic of the '968 invasion into one of its dutiful apologists. Although he initially promised to preserve the "positive features" of the Prague Spring, he has methodically dismantled or vitiated virtually all of the reforms, including those with which he himself was once closely identified. Censorship has been reinstituted. The party's control over all segments of the government and society has been restored �a process involving, among other things, both recen- tralization of the economy and abandonment of many of the established or projected features of the country's new binational federal system. Sharp curtailment of freedom of travel to the West has provided yet another cause for popular dismay. But perhaps the cruelest blow of all was the signing in May 1970 of a nety bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., which not only vindicated the Warsaw Pact invasion but established a legal basis for possible Soviet intervention in the future. (U/ 0U) Thus, Husak's bargain was at best a hard one, and it might seem a bit surprising that a people who had made such a show of defiant unity during the initial stages of their confrontation with their Warsaw Pact allies did not hold out for somewhat better terms. After all, the Kremlin's willingness to countenance some rather innovative reforms elsewhere in Eastern Europe and its apparent reluctance to risk taking any action %%hich might adversely affect the new trend toward East -West detente must have suggested to the Czechoslovaks that such a goal was not beyond reach. But a capacity for prolonged heroics is not a characteristic Czechoslovak national trait. (U; OU) Czechoslovakia was carved from the Austro- Hungarian Empire in 1918. It is not an ethnically homogeneous state like Poland or Sweden and thus has lacked their cultural unity to help it withstand the unusual pressures occasioned by its APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Brezhnev and Husak shake hands following the signing of the 1970 bilateral treaty APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 strategic location. Although the Czec4,s and Slovaks share a Slavic background and were -mired `n their desire for independence from the Peal Monarchy, they differ markedly in cultural ano institutional heritage. Indeed, their mutual antagonisms have been exploited successfully by Czechoslovakia's enemies at several critical points in the country's history. Moreover, a legacy of centuries of foreign domination has left a lasting imprint on Czechoslovak society and has played an important role in the political life of the country. (U/ 0U) Thei: long experience with powerful foreign overlords lias endowed both the Czechs and albeit, to a lesser extent �the Slovaks with a down -to -earth realism, a -leep- seated respect for the worth of the in- dividual, nd a strong dose of caution. With little hope of freein themselves by force of arms, they learned to preserve their intellectual and national integrity through a mixture of resignation and passive resistance, or simply put �to bend with the wind. Even among the Slovaks, who tend to be somewhat more hot blooded than the Czechs, rebellious impulses were generally kept in check by considerations of numerical weakness. Today, when confronted with what he judges to be a superior power, the average Czechoslovak citizen is still inclined to fall back on devious maneuvering under a pretense of submission rather than mount outright frontal opposition. Although he is as ready as anyone to rise and fight for his convictions, he is unlikely to do so unless he sees a realistic chance of success. He would rather y'eld and preserve his strength than risk breaking it in a mere gesture of bold defiance. (U /OU) These enduring national traits have been immor- talized in the figure of "Good Soldier Schweik," the Czech folk hero �now more popular than ever� created by novelist jaroslav Hasek in 1923. A reluctant conscript in the Austro- Hungarian army dur- ing World War I, Schweik managed to frustrate the will of his superiors by feigning obedience, indolence, and stupidity. He did not, for example, risk expressing his pacifist views; he simply got lost repeatedly �on his way to the front. (U /OU) The persistence and significance of Czechoslovakia's earthy Schweikist tradition is well illustrated by the parallels between the population's response to the Warsaw Pact invasion and its behavior when the coun- try fell to Hitlerite Germany 30 years earlier. In both instances, the majority of the Czechoslovak people rallied to the defense of their government and their country's sovereignty in the face of a clear external threat �only to break ranks and gradually lapse into seemingly subservient apathy when that threat developed into actual military intervention. Although there were scattered acts of heroism, in neither case were the entering occupation forces met with organ- ized armed resistance. And both times the sacrifice of popular beliefs and ideals on the altar of cautious realism generated a compensatory �in fact, virtually escapist interest in material comforts. (U /OU) But even though Husak has been able to exploit his countrymen's traditional instincts and attitudes to achieve his initial domestic objectives, the long -term viability of his conservative program is by no means assured. The doctrinaire formulas of orthodox Marx- ism- Leninism simply have little appeal for most Czechoslovak citizens. After all, Husaic is dealing with a people who, alone in Eastern Europe, experienced a working and fairly liberal democracy throughout the interwar period. Hence, while successful in winning a degree of popular acceptance based on purely pragmatic considerations, he has been unable to develop the broadly based domestic support he needs to revitalize the country politically and economically and to reduce his dependence on Moscow. This absence of rapport and meaningful communication between the regime and the people has been reflected in alarmingly poor job discipline and widespread eva- sion of minor regulations. Husak is understandably troubled by this situation, and is making a determined effort to correct it. Given the atmosphere of rising ex- pectations generated by the current trend toward East -West detente, however, it seems like'y that he will find this task quite difficult. (C) 11E RUM OF SOIOER SHEIK A J Y Y r j APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Land of Forests and Factories Wou) Comprising the historic provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, modern Czechoslovakia is a long and narrow landlocked nation about equal in area to New York State. By almost any measure �loca- tion, climate, drainage, or vegetation �it can be characterized as constituting the very heart of Europe. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that geography has played a key role in shaping the political and economic evolution of the country'; inhabitants, both before and after they achieved independence. The strategic location of their homeland athwart some of the oldest and most significant trade routes in Europe has traditionally invited intervention by powerful neighbors. And together with the area's long division between Austrian and Maryar overlords, marked variations in weather and terrain have contributed to the growth of the economic disparities and cultural differences which still cause friction between the Czechs and Slovaks today. For its size, Czechoslovakia exhibits an unusual variety of physical and climatic features. In the west, the Bohemian basin �the core of the so- called Czech Lands consists primarily of a rolling fertile plateau with broad river valleys and intervening forested divides. Its hilly to mountahious rimlands are exten- sions of mountain systems further to the west, and the natural transportation routes through them have traditionally oriented the region and its inhabitants toward the western part of Europe. Bohemia's climate, influenced by the maritime weather systems that predominate over western Europe, tends to be somewhat milder than that of most of the rest of the country. Another distinctive feature of Bohemia is the radial convergence of its streams toward Prague in the center. All are tributaries of the Elbe, which drains the region northward and provides a water route to the North Sea. As a whole, the Bohemian region is extensively cultivated, and its northern and western reaches �where there are long exploited coal and iron deposits and more recently discovered uranium fields �are heavily industrialized. The Moravian lowlands, also traditional Czech do- main, form a distinct transitional zone between the Bohemian basin and Slovakia. A considerable portion of Moravia is hilly, but its valleys �most of which trend toward the Moravian Gate (a strategic gap between the Sudeten Mountains and the Carpathian Alps) provide the best avenues for north -south com- munication in central Europe. North of the low divide which separates the headwaters of the Baltic -bound Oder and the southward flowing Morava, the region exhibits some of the physical and climatic characteristics of the Bohemian rimlands. Four- fifths of Moravia lies south of that divide, however, and the weather conditions and terrain features there resemble those of the neighboring lowland areas of southern Slovakia. Moreover, the soils in central and southern Moravia are generally very fertile, and, unlike the forested and marginally productive northern uplands, the area is extensively cultivated. Despite these physical variations, however, most of Moravia is densely populated. In part this reflects the area's historic importance as a hub of commercial activity, but its coal deposits and favorable location favored its early industrialization as well. The first major facilities for manufacturing and metallurgy in what is now Czechoslovakia were built in northernr st Moravia. And while, with active Austrian encoui- ement, fac- tories and furnaces soon spread westward, Moravia's impressive array of urban industrial centers still nearly matches that of Bohemia. Slovakia, which makes up the eastern two- fifths of the country, has a few rather sizable pockets of fertile lowland in the south, but unlike Bohemia and APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 P3. Overlooking the forested Moravian Beskydies are the Slovak Carpathians. The wealth of forest land in Slovakia has given rise to large wood processing works. Moravia, it is predominantly mountainous. Its rugged highlands extend in a thick are from the Danube in the southwest to the Soviet frontier in the east, attaining their highest elevations and greatest beauty in the craggy High Tatras mountain chain which forms part of Czechoslovakia's border with Poland. Much of this rough terrain is also heavily forested, and although it poses no insurmountable obstacle to communication, it has reinforced the effects of a thousand years of un- enlightened Magyar rule in isolating the Slovaks from western European influence and in retarding their economic development Drainage is to the Black Sea via the Danube, and since S!ovakia's principal com- munication routes follow the river valleys that penetrate deeply into its mountainous backbone from the Danubian Plain in the south, its natural orienta- tion is toward Hungary and the Balkans. This, in turn, together with the difficulties involved in tapping the re gions timber and mineral resources, has contributed to the area's slow rate of industrialization and thus to the economic and cultural differences which set the relatively provincial and tradition -bound Slovaks apart from their more urbanized and sophisticated Czech cousins. Even in today's age of modern technology, the stub- born facts of geography have hampered Prague's ef- forts to hasten Slovakia's economic and social develop- ment. True, Bratislava and the Vah valley have become the core of a small but highly diversified in- dustrial belt which, with its new petrochemical, machine tool, and steel plants, now complements the traditionally important agricultural economy of the in- tensively cultivated lowland regions. But despite the local impact of large forestry and mining operations, Slovakia's mountainous hinterland is still a predominantly backward and sparsely populated area, and the people there still live in comparative isolation. Viewed as a whole, however, Czechoslovakia has at- tained a rather advanced level of economic develop- ment and over the years, the process of growth has placed increasingly heavy demands on the nation's natural and human reso While a variety of other important industrial minerals including tungsten, lead, copper, gold, silver, zinc, and low grade iron ore� continue to be mined, only magnesite and uranium ore (the latter almost totally earmarked for export to the Soviet Union) are being produced in suf- ficient quantities at present to meet the country's re- quirements. In some respects, at least, the energy pic- ture is considerably brighter. Both hard and soft coal are still in relatively abundant supply, and hydroelec- tric power sources are being developed. On the other hand, there is little oil or natural gas anywhere in Czechoslovakia. In fact, locally produced petroleum products account for less than 5% of domest; con- sumption. With a population estimated in 1973 at only a little over 14 5 million �less than half that of Poland and well under that of the German Democratic Republic, East ,rn Europe's geographically compact industrial giant Czechoslovakia has also felt a manpower pinch. This problem is not attributable to the modest number of its inhabitants alone, however. Government sponsored urban migration has seriously depleted the country's agricultural work force, a development which has contributed in no small way to the continuing inability of the modern and extensive agricultural sector to produce enough food to meet domestic needs. At the same time, Czechoslovakia's low rate of population growth �also at least partly a byproduct of the modernization process �has helped to depress the nation's overall manpower pool by bringing about a rise in the median age of the popula- tion. 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 A Star Crossed People (ulou) Czechoslovakia's population may be aging, but at least is is less ethr' complex than it was only a generation ago. In an effort to provide the country with some natural protection against potentially hostile neighbors, the elder statesmen of Versailles gave their creation borders �for the most part historic �that generally follow mountain ridges and major rivers. By so doing, however, they also endowed the Czechoslovak state with large groups of people who were neither Czech nor Slovak and whose existence was subsequently used to justify irredentist territorial claims. Individuals of German extraction, for example, accounted for slightly more than 22% of the popula- tion, far outnumbering the Slovaks. Another 11 was composed of Hungarians, Ruthenians, and various lesser minority groups. But as a result of the territorial and population adjustments which followed World War II �the most significant of which were the mass expulsion of Germans, the resettlement of large numbers of Hungariaas, and the loss of the country's easternmost province (Ruthenia) to the IJ.S.S.R.�Czechoslovakia is now almost solidly Slavic. The dominant Czechs now make up about 65% of the population, and the Slovaks about 30 A half million or so Hungariar for the most part concen- trated in Slovakia near the border of their ethnic homeland, constitute the largest remaining minority group. he Czechs and the Slovaks are descendants of a western Slav group that migrated into the general area of their present Homeland from beyond the Car- pathian mountains before the sixth century A.D. Mach of the region had been occupied earlier by Celtic tribes, from one of which, the Boii, Bohemia and the adjacent German state of Bavaria derive their names. The Celts were gradually supplanted by Ger- manic groups, and in the seventh century, the Slavic tribes banded together for the first time under a single leader �a merchant named Samo �in order to fend off both the Franks and raiding Avar tribesmen from Asia. For a while, they were successful. But Samo's kingdom, which embraced Bohemia, Moravia, and part of present -day Austria, died with him in 685 A.D. For the next 100 years, the history of the Czech and Slovak peoples was scarred by Avar domination and periodic Frankish incursions. In the early ninth century, however, following the defeat of the Avars by the Franks under Charlemagne, the Czechs and the Slovaks once again emerged from the shadows. Czech princes established what soon became known as the Great Moravian Empire and, in 863, invited Byzantine missionaries Cyril and Methodius to visit their domain and convert their sub- jects to Christianity. By then, the empire was one of the largest states in Europe. Centered on Moravia and Slo, akia and covering a very respectable share of the central and eastern portions of the continent, it showed promise of becoming a permanent fixture of the political scene. Internal discord over succession gradually weakened it, however, and over time, the locus of political power began shifting westward to Bohemia, where the Prague -based Premyslid princely house was gaining strength. Finally, in 906, defeat by Magyar forces that had invaded Slovakia brought the Moravian Empire down altogether. The Czech Lands survived this catastrophe relative- ly unscathed. The Premyslid princes succeeded in es- tablishing the independent duchy �later kingdom �of Bohemia and quickly incorporated Moravia into their domain. The Slovaks, on the ether hand, had no such luck. Their homeland was annexed by Hungary in 973, an event that ushered them into nearly 10 cen- turies of uninterrupted isolrtion and repression. The Bohemian state is generally regarded as the direct nredecessor of modern Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the s!atue and name of -)ne of its earliest rulers, Prince Vaclav (later sainted and still widely celebrated as ttie "Good King Wenceslas" whose exploits are recorded in a traditional English Christmas carol) eomewhat in- congruously continue to grace the main square in Communis! Prague today. Although few of Vaclav's successors won greater fame, their influence in shaping the distinctive character and outlook of the Czech peo- ple was no less profound. Under the Premyslids, who ruled until 1306, the Kingdom of Bohemia entered into a loose relationship with the Holy Roman Empire, thus beginning an association with Germanic lands to the west that has affected Czech political and cultural life ever since. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Karlstein, perched in the mountains near Prague Although frequently torn by dynastic rivalries, the em- bryonic to not only survived but eventually expand- ed its t;�-: .'oriel into parts of Austria and Poland. A brief interregnum followed the death of the last Premyslid king, during which several European royal houses contested for the vacant throne. The victor, John of Luxembourg, rarely visited his new domain., preferring to leave the business of government to his nobles while he sought his fame on the battlefield and his amusement at the French court. But the reign of his son, Charles 1 (1346 -78), is generally considered to be the most brilliant in the history of the Kingdom of Bohemia. Charles was elected Holy Roman Emperor (as Charles IV) in 1355, and Prague for a time became the chief city of the empire. Charles quickly elevated Bohemia to a position that rivaled those of the greatest states of Europe. Among other things, he established the Prague Archbishopric and founded the first university in central Europe. In 13.56, acting in his capacity as Holy Roman Emperor, be issued the Golden Bull, which gave the King of Bohemia first rank among the electors of the empire. In addition, he promoted the use of the Czech language, promulgated a code of laws, and en- couraged the growth of cities and commerce. He also imported foreign architects and artisans and initiated a program of public construction that contributed to Prague's later renown as one of Europe's most beautiful cities. After Charles' death, however, Bohemia entered a prolonged and ultimately fatal period of decline. The line of succession became uncertain, and, together with flagrant church corruption, frequent struggles between successive kings and the entrenched nobility generated considerable popular unrest. Finally, emly in the 15th century, the bold rhetoric and martyr's death of Jan Hus �the Prague pastor and university rector who became central Europe's first champion of religious reform� brought matters to a head. His followers, the Hussites, established fortified towns in southern Bohemia and, in 1419, rose in open rebellion against their country's establishment which was con- APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 trolled by German Catholics. Interestingly, the inci- dent that touched off the fighting was the defenestra- tion of a number of Prague town counselors by their angry Hussite compatriots, a unique form of violence (the victim is literally thrown through a window) which has twice since played a prominent role in Czech history. The Hussite Wars, which lasted about 20 years, ravaged Bohemia and left a legacy of bitterness and distrust. Basic issues were left unresolved, and the Hussite movement remained. active. With the land thus divided, powerful nobles extended their estates at the exp rise of both the church and the crown. In time, the succession to the Bohemian throne again became confused, passing briefly into Hungarian and Polish hands before being successfully c!aimed for the House of H,;psburg by Ferdinand I of Austria in 1526. Although a precursor of later traumatic developments, the advent of Hapsburg rule had little immediate impact on the political, social, and ec:)nomic structure of the Czech Lands. As legal masters of a complex domain embracing Austria and Hungary as well, Ferdinand and his successors were content to share their royal power with the local chinch and lay nobility. Thus it was that in an era when tiie Hapsburgs were becoming more and rnore involved with the Counter- Reformation, Czech Protestantism drew fresh strength from Luther's teachings and placed Prague on a collision course with Vienna. Frictions between the House of Hapsburg and native Bohemian nobles finally erupted into open war- fare in 1618, setting off a series of conflicts that raged over much of central Europe for 30 years. Once again, hostilities were precipitated by the defenestration of Catholic officials �in this instance, the appointed representatives of Ferdinand 11�by assembled Protes- tant dignitaries in Prague. This time, however, retribu- tion was swift in coming. After jcining forces with Maximilian of Bavaria (the head of the Catholic League) and the Elector of Saxony, Ferdinand dealt a decisive defeat to the Czech armies at the Battle of White Mountain, near Prague, on 8 November 1620. From that day forward �and for the next 300 years traditional Czech independence and civil liber- ties were forfeit to the Austrian crown. The leaders of the rebellion were promptly behead- ed. Catholicism was proclaimed the area's only religion. The German language was elevated to a higher status than Czech. Religious and political persecution forced most :)f the surviving nobility to flee, and their estates were handed over to a new gen- try composed primarily of Catholics fron southern 8 Germany who had supported the Hapsburg cause. All high administrative offices were taken over by crown appointees, and the powers of town and village of- ficials were sharply curtailed. Deprived of both political and intellectual leaders, the Czech nation was reduced to a mass o f serfs. Although the Czech Lands became mere provinces of the Hapsburg monarchy, their resilient inhabitants die: not lose their sense of national identity. Regional patriotism surfaced once again in the more relaxed at- mosphere of 18th century "enlightened despotism" and subsequently gathered strength under the con- ditions of comparative prosperity and intellectual freedom that prevailed during much of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Moreover, despite the Hungarians' continuing treatment of the local pop ulace as subhuman, Slovakia experienced a parallel national revival. Thus, when World War I offered an opportunity to win independence from the Austro Hungarian monarchy, there was no dearth of capable Czech and Slovak leaders �men like Thomas G. Masaryk, Eduard Benes, and Milan Stefanik �will- ing and able to join forces to launch what turned out to be a finely orchestrated and highly successful cam- paign to attract widespread international support for their cause. The establishment of Czechoslovakia as an indepen- dent democratic republic was proclaimed on 28 Oc- tober 1918, and its self- appointed National Assembly elected Thomas Masaryk to be the country's first Presi- dent a few days later. Masaryk was returned to office in the general election which followed final determina- tion of the new state's boundaries and remained there until old age and ill health forced him to retire in 1935. Under his leadership, Czechoslovakia developed into a relatively liberal, prosperous, and democratic nation dependent for its security on treaties linking it with Romania, Yugoslavia, France, and, ultimately, the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, Eduard Benes, Masaryk's friend and foreign minister who succeeded him as President, was confronted with some formidable problems. Economic difficulties born of the worldwide depres- sion were aggravating old minority -based internal ten- sions. Moreover, Hitler had already exploited this situation to foster the organization of a large �and growing� Nazi- oriented Sudeten German Party which was calling for autonomy for all Germans in the republic and being generally disruptive politically. Then, in 1938, when Hitler openly espoused the cause of self- deterrnination for the Sudeten Germans and began levying political and territorial demands on Prague, Czechoslovakia's allies deserted her. The Soviets made a point of announcing their readiness to APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 join in a rescue effort if, as required under their mutual assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia, France would in- tervene first. But Paris, like London, was determined to avoid war at all costs. Conclusion of ti.e four -power Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938, which directed unrepresented Czechoslovakia to cede all dis- puted Sudeten territory to Germany within i I days, prompter! Benes tc resign and leave the country. Although his successor, Emil Hacha, was more accept- able to the Axis powers, he was in no position to halt the breakup of his homeland. Poland and Hungary joined Germany in seeking additional bits and pieces of the hapless Czechoslovak state. Finally, in March 1939, Hacha bowed to a new ultimatum from Berlin and surrendered control of all remaining Czech territory to Germany. What was left of Bohemia and Moravia was promptly incorporated en bloc into the Third Reich as a protectorate. To the east, Slovakia was established as an autonomous republic under an almost equally onerous degree of German control. After existing for only 21 years, Czechoslovakia dis- appeared from the map. The outbreak of World War lI enabled Benes to form an exile government in London and, in time, to secure full recognition for his group from all the major Allied powers both as the leg successor to Czechoslovakia's pre- Munich regime and as a cobelligerent in the war against the Axis. As the war progressed, Benes became convinced of the wisdom of a policy of close cooperation with the Soviet Union as well as with the West. In December 1943, he flew to Moscow to conclude a new 20 -year treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the Kremlin. While there, he also agreed to several political compromises that favored his country's Communists in order to secure their cooperation in a postwar government. In early 1945, when it became evident that responsibility for liberating Prague would fall to the Soviets, Benes returned to Moscow in order to work out the details of establishing a provisional government on Czechoslovak soil as soon as circumstances would per- mit. In April, Benes and his newly reorganized cabinet arrived in Kosice, a town in eastern Slovakia that had been designated as "he temporary national capital a few weeks earlier. Their first official act was to publish a detailed governmental plan, the so- called Kosice Program, which revealed the extent of the concessions Benes had made to insure Soviet support. Indeed, the chanties made in Czechoslovakia's traditional political and economic systems under the Kosice Pr:.4ram were nearly as dramatic as the popula- tion and territorial adjustments cited earlier. A National Front coalition government was established in which the Communists initially held more than one -third of the portfolios, including the important ministries of defense, interior, agriculture, and infor- mation. The conservative Agrarian Party �the largest political party in prewar Czechoslovakia �was barred from participation in the coalition on the grounds that its representatives had collaborated with the Germans during the occupation. Under these circumstances, the Communists were soon able to push through a number if measures that further strengthened their position. Land redistribution, under a thinly disguised system of party patronage, was begun by 'fie Communist minister of agriculture. Nationalization of industry, banking, and commerce was introduced. A reorgan za- tion of the military and police establishments aimed at bringing them more fully under Communist control was initiated. These moves, together with the general popularity enjoyed by the Communists as a result :heir prewar and wartime activities, contributed to the party's strong showing in the parliamentary elections of 1946. Receiving 38% of the votes cast, Communists won 14 of the 300 seats at stake �far more than any of the other five coalition parties. Their chief, Klement Gottwald, became prime minister. With little in- terference from his relatively complacent intended vic- tims, he promptly began laying the groundwork for a total Communist takeover. His opportunity came in February 1948 when, noting that Communist pop- ularity was declining and hoping to hasten new elec- tions, all the non Communist cabinet ministers re- signed in protest of Communist manipulation of the police. The Communists quickly brought massive pressures to bear on President Benes to force him to form a new government which would exclude their opponents. Communist controlled action committees in almost every town, factory, school, and government office were armed and sent out to join the police in an overwhelming display of strength in Prague and other key points throughout the country. The radio and press were commandeered and used to saturate the popula- tion with pro Communist propaganda. Tired, sick, and above all anxious to avoid civil war, President Benes capitulated. On February 25, he accepted a new National Front cabinet headed by Gottwald and composed largely of Communists and Communist sympathizers. And, while otherwise relatively bloodless, the coup took a final tragic twist in what may have been yet another defenestration incident. Whether he jumped or fell, as the Communists main- tain, or whether he was pushed, as most Czechoslovaks still believe, the body of Jan Masaryk Benes' postwar foreign minister and son of Czechoslovakia's first President �was found beneath the window of his quarters in Prague Castle on 10 March 1948. 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 The Stalinist Interlude and the Dubeek Revival (c) The advent of Communist rule brought a whole new series of traumatic experiences for the Czechoslovak people. Early hopes that local Communist leaders would prove to be less exacting overseers than their Soviet counterparts and that Moscow would allow them to chart their own domestic course were quickly dashed. Gottwald's forces embarked on a determined campaign to secure their victory and force the nation into an ideologica!ly orthodox authoritarian mold. Ef- forts to liquidate non Communist elements were stepped up, and in May 1948 the National Assembly, by then Communist- dominated, approved a new con- stitution redesignating Czechoslovakia a "people's republic" in consonance with the pattern the Soviets had established elsewhere in Eastern Europe. A problem developed when President Benes resigned rather than sign the new charter int-, law, but Gottwald, Benes' successor as President, made haste to remedy this s-tuation. By mid -June, Czechoslovakia's initial postwar political system had been officially dis- carded. With this event, the country entered a grim and lengthy Stalinist phase in its development. Fearful of lingering democratic values, the Gottwald regime employed all the techniques at the disposal of a modern totalitarian state� including intimidation, propaganda, and strict regulation of the political, economic, and cultural life of the people �to con- solidate its position. Intensive programs of nation- alization of remaining small private firms and of agricultural collectivization were launched. A highly centralized command economy was established in which, just as in its Soviet prototype, investment priority was accorded to h -avy industry. Those non Communist parties which were not disbanded out- right were either merged with or made puppets of the Communist Party. Much to the dismay of the 10 nominally autonomous regional Communist Party organization in Slovakia, effective political power was concentrated in the hands of a few top national party leaders in Prague. Ever tighter controls were imposed on educational institutions, the church, and the infor- mation media. The population was herded into a web of interlocking Communist- dominated mass organiza- tions embracing almost every aspect of social activity and was subjected to a broad campaign of coercion and terror which reached its zenith during the ruthless Stalinist trials of the late 1940's and early 1950's. In contra: to what happened in most of the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe, neither Stalin's death in 1953 nor Khrushchev's famous denttnciatioA of his former master 3 years later resulted in any internal liberalization in Czechoslovakia. Gottwald quickly followed Stalin to the grave, but the heirs to his power� Antonin Zapotocky, who stepped up to the Presidency from his former post as prime minister, and Antonin Novotny, who took over leader- ship of the party �were risen of the Stalinist mold. Despite their general unpopularity, however, they were spared the sort of internal unrest that erupted in neighboring Communist suates by the tight grip that they maintr fined on all aspects of Czechoslovak life, the traditional caution of the population, and the steady increase in living standards generated by forced -draft industrial grnwth. Zapotocky's death in 1957 brought no change in the ultraconservative orautation of the regime, for Novotny simply donned the hat of President in addi- tion to that of party chief. Three years later, a new constitution was promulgated proclaiming Czechoslovakia to be a mature socialist state, one� indeed, the only one aside from the U.S.S.R.� nearly ready to begin the vaguely defined APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 J x i ,4r if Klement Gottwald process of transition to communism. The charter changed the name of the country to Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and provided for far reaching ad- ministrative changes designed to support the principle of strong centralized rule. In addition to its more mun- dane objectives, the document was clearly intended to serve as an eloquent testimonial to the success and wisdom of Novotny's domestic policies. But such self congratulation was a bit premature. In fact, Novotny's outmoded Stalinist system was already beginning to break down. Over the years, Novotny's policies had alienated most of his countrymen and had even created divisions albeit for the most part well con- cealed� within the party itself. The Slovaks, chafing under their total subordination to a Czech dominated regime in Prague, were particularly unhappy. Moreover, popular discontent, while rarely openly ex- pressed, had quickly found reflection in various forms of passive resistance which not only exacerbated the shortcomings inherent in Czechoslovakia's strait- jacketed economy, but undermined the effectiveness of Novotny's political programs as well. In late 1962, mounting economic troubles and Khrushchev's renewed assault on Stalinism brought matters to a head. Reformist forces inside and outside the party began to agitate openly for the sort of liberalization that had been undertaken throughout most of the rest of Communist Eastern Europe many years earlier. raced with new economic reverses in 1963, Novotny was forced to modify his policies and sanction a gradual relaxation of controls. Once begun, however, liberalization developed a momentum of its own. Longstanding differences between party liberals and conservatives broke out into the open, frequently impeding the formulation or implementation of policies needed to deal with pressing economic and social problems. Novotny's efforts to establish and maintain a delicate balance between these factions only increased the levels of party discord and official inertia. By late 1967, Novotny was clearly losing con- trol of the situation, and a full -blown party crisis en- sued. Sensing Novotny's vulnerability, a group of Slovak leaders headed by Alexarder Dubcek precipitated the crisis during an October meeting of the Party Central Committee by boldly criticizing him and his inef- ficient Czech dominated administration and by suggesting that the time had come for collective leadership. Although a number of Czech leaders who also favored a change at the helm soon joined in these personal attacks on the previously sacrosanct Novotny, he managed to postpone discussion of the leadership question for a number of weeks in hopes of improving 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Antonin Novotny APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 his position. It was a bad gamble; Novotny continued to lose support at all levels of the party. The final blow came in early Decernt er when Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev arrived in Prague for an on- the -spot assessment of the situation and decided not to in- tervene in Novot, 's behalf. Desperate, Novotny and his principal supporters ther, toyed with the idea of mounting a military coup, but they proved unable to bring one off. In early January 1968 the Central Com- mittee ousted Novotny as Party First Secretary and elected Alexander Dubcek to take his place. Novotny was, however, allowed to retain both the Presidency and his seats on the Party Presidium and Central Com- mittee until March when, partly because of the damaging revelations of a close associate who had defected to the West, his political career came to an abrupt end. The news of Novotny's fall was received with ap- proval at home and abroad. A brighter era seemed to be in store for the Czechoslovak people, but no one, least of all the Soviets, really expected momentous changes. Dubcek, a compromise choice for the top par- ty post, had been trained in Moscow and had seemed to occupy a middle -of -the -road position on political and economic reform during his rise to leadership of me Slovak Party organization under Novotny. Once in national office, however, he surrounded himself with an impressive team o% liberal intellectuals and youthful technocrats whose unorthodox views and im- patient energy soon won popular approbation. Czechoslovakia's brief and exhilarating Prague Spring blossomed in April when the Dubcek regime adopted, and swiftly moved to implement, a com- prehensive program for reform �the so- called Action Program. The sweeping changes embodied therein were intended both to rationalize the country's un- wieldy socialist system and to humanize it by making it responsive to democratic processes. Thus, personal rights and liberties were guaranteed, including the freedoms of speech anJ assembly and the right to travel, work, and, in some cases, reside permanently abroad. Censorship was lifted. The role of the party in the process of government was reduced, and the National Assembiv was directed to assume its con- stitutional role as the "supreme organ of state power." Plans were made to establish a decentralized and market- oriented economy, akin in spirit if not in detail to the Yugoslav model. Gustav Husak was called out of political obscurity to lead a drive to federalize the state. And while the Dubcek regime repeatedly reaf- firmed its basic loyalty to Moscow, it delighted its prideful domestic constituency by simultaneously serving notice that Czechoslovakia would thence forth maintain a less subservient stance. 12 The tasks Dubcek set for himself in the Action Program were not easy. From the outset, the reform process was impeded by quarrels over tactics and priorities and by the maneuvers of formidable op- ponents both at home and abroad. For their part, Czechoslovak conservatives, both inside and outside the party, opposed Dubcek's programs for ideological reasons and out of fear that they would lose their jots. Beyond the country's borders, the Soviet Union and its more conservative Warsaw Pact allies, most notably East Germany and Poland, became concerned that Dubeek's reforms not only might lead Czechoslovakia to withdraw from the socialist camp but also might prove to be disastrously contagious. In consequence, the pressures brought to bear on Dubcek from the east to get him to alter his course mounted steadily throughout the spring and summer of 1968, culminating in a summit -level confrontation between the Soviet Politburo and the Czechoslovak Presidium at the Slovak border town of Cierna nad Tisou in late July. The Soviet- orchestrated campaign of intimidation was, however, a dismal failure. Far from cowing the Czechoslovak people and their leaders, it forged a strong bond of anti Soviet nationalism between them. Increasing domestic popularity, in turn, encouraged Dubcek, and his lieutenants to deal with their Warsaw Pact critics in the best and most devious Schweikist tradition. Finally, when it appeared that the pledges the Soviets thought they had extracted from Dubcek at Cierna nad Tisou would not be fulfilled, the Kremlin's patience ran out. On the night of 20 -21 August, Moscow moved to crush the Dubcek experi- ment by force. About 300,000 troops, predominantly from the Soviet Union but including contingents from East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary, poured into Czechoslovakia. The invasion was swift and well coordinated. There was no organized milif.a-y resistance and, despite sporadic gunfire and atterripts by some Czechoslovak citizens to sabotage the movements of the invading forces, casualties were ex- tremely light. Prague and other major urban enters were quickly occupied. Key Czechoslovak leaders, in- cluding Dubcek, were arrested and spirited away to prison cells in the U.S.S.P1. At this point, however, the Soviet Union's carefully laid plans went awry. Failing to foresee the surge of national unity and lok. Ity to Dubcek that its heavyhanded actions would provoke, the Kremlin had assumed that it could install a collaborationist regime within hours after the intervention. The Soviets quick- ly learned how wrong they were. Ge... Ludvik Svoboda, the normally mild mannered old national hero who had succeeded Novotny as President 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 A ti `i Angry crowd confronts a Soviet tank in Prague months earlier, refused to name a new government. Leading Czechoslovak conservatives tripped over each other in denying complicity in or sympathy with the invasion. The National Assembly issued a ringing resolution of protest. Angry throngs, defiant radio and television broadcasts, and an irrepressible flood of hastily lettered slogans and posters ridiculed Moscow's lame justification for intervention. An extraordinary congress of the Czechoslovak Party -by name and composition an expditiov.s substitute for the party conclave previously scheduled for September �was convened in secret under the very noses of the occLpa- tion troops in Prague on 22 August. By nightfall, the assembled delegates had elected a new and overwhelmingly liberal Central Committee, recon- firmed Dubcek in his post as First Secretary, con- demned the invasion, and adopted a resolution threat- ening unspecified "measures" it the Czechoslovak leL.ders being held in the Soviet Union were not freed. The following day, President Svoboda, accom- panied by Husak and an ideologically mixed group of other Czechoslovak leaders, flew to Moscow to de- mand the release of his colleagues and to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution to the situation created by the invasion. Fearing the outbreak of an uprising similar to the one in Hungary in 1956 and under sharp attack from both Communist and non- Communist critics abroad, the Soviets backed down. Dubcek and his associates were freed and brought to the negotiating table in Moscow. A compromise agree- ment, one which fell far short of meeting the Kremlin's original objectives, was hammered out, and on the morning of 27 August Czechoslovakia's preinvasion leadership team returned home �tired and discour- aged, but intact. Undaunted, the Soviets launched a determined campaign to undermine the Dubcek group's domestic position by forcing it to implement a number of un- popular measures. In this, the Kremlin was successful. Prague's actions in nullifying the work of the extraor- dinary party congress, signing a status -of- forces agree- ment authorizing the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak soil, and creating a new and appropriately "balanced" eight- member body at the apex of the party hierarchy reopened old divisions within the leadership and disappointed the popula- tion. Althou as Dubcek had promised, a law federalizing the country into separate Czech and Slovak republics was duly enacted and implemented, bitter factional infighting made it increasingly dif- ficult for him to preserve any other feature of his preinvasion reform program. Finally, in April 1969, he bowed to the inevitable and agreed to step aside in favor of Husak, Slovakia's postintervention party boss and by then the leading advocate of "realism" and "normalization" of relations with the Soviet Union. Subsequently stripped of his remaining party posts and recalled from honorable exile as Ambassador to Turkey, Dubcek was eventually expelled from the par- ty altogether and relegated to a modest and obscure existence as a motor pool supervisor in the Slovak forestry administration, a job he still held in late 1973. 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Hu:ak': Headache: (c) 14 The situation that Husak faced when he took over as Party First Secretary was far from reassuring. The country was suffering from inflation, shortages, and generai economic chaos resulting from the beleaguered Dubcek's inability to develop a workable new economic system to replace the discarded centralized controls of the Novotny era. Moreo%er, the leadership was still bitterly divided, the Czechoslovak people were still indulging in occasional anti Soviet demon- strations, and the Kremlin had recently renewed threats of direct intervention. It was evident that, at the very minimum, political normalization would re- quire reunification of the party and restoration of its "leading role establishment and maintenance of an effective system of control over the country's popula- tion and mass social organizations; removal of the dis- ruptive influence of surviving liberal and, in some cases, fundamentally antisocialist elements; and restoration of the confidence of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members in the policies of the Czechoslovak Government. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Dubcek with his successor, lusak, the night he resigned as party leader APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Despite the apparent urgency of the need to correct the "distortions" of the Dubeek era, Husak sought to establish a relatively moderate regime, one which would gradually win both popular acceptance and support by turning back the clock as gently and selec- tively as possible. In this, he was hampered to some degree by his own authoritarian bent, a trait which was reflected in his willingness to employ firm and oc- casionally brutal methods in suppressing the open manifestations of dissent which marred his early months in office. More important, however, his room for maneuver �never very great� shrank markedly as the forced exodus of liberals from public life gradually denied him the traditional centrist option of playing both ends of the political spectrum against each othe:. Husak's problems o_� this score were compounded by the Soviets who, suspicious about his reformist past and t. ue intentions with respect to the future, not only withheld the support he needed to consolidate his domestic position but also actively sought to prevent him from becoming too powerful by giving measured encouragement to his hardline critics. In keeping with this strategy, flattering attention was paid to promi- nent ^onservatives, especially to those like Alois Indra and Vasil Bilak who were potential contenders for par- ty leadership, and their willing cooperation was enlis.ed bosh in keeping a close watch on Husak and in prodding him to further rapid compliance with Soviet wishes. Because of these pressures, Husak was forced into a series of damaging political retreats. He yielded to his opponents on some key cadre appointments. Bit by bit, he backed away from his early positions on a number of vital issues, including his initial and highly popular contention that the 1968 intervention had been both uninvited and unneeded, his promise that there would be no massive purge of the party membership, and his advocacy of a policy of "reconciliation" with the deposed liberal community. indeed, as he shifted toward a more orthodox and conservative posture, his policies at times became indistinguishable from those of his hardline rivals. But liusak's retreat never became a rout. A tough anti brittle- scarred master of the art of political sur- viva. he yielded just enough to steal his conservative opponents' thunder and to bolster his standing with Moscow. By so doing, he w, is able to prevent his rivals from converting the part:/ purge of 1970 into a witchhunt that would have Deprived the organization of its mass character and reduced it to an elite core of hardliners. He also managed to stave off demands for Stalinist -style political vials and for a wholesale purge of technicians, managers, and other members of the "technical intelligentsia." In late 1970, he even succeeded in getting Moscow to agree to the removal of two of his more troublesome domestic enemies: Czech lnturios Minister Groesser and General Rytir, Prague's representative in the Czechoslovak Soviet Military Liaison Office. Shortly thereafter, following new concessions designed to satisfy Moscow's remain- ing minimum requirements foi political normalization (most notably, the publication of two major party documents sanctifying a Soviet- approved explanation of the origins and nature of the country's recent inter- nal crisis), political infighting in Prague began to taper off. By late May 1971, when the long postponed official 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Party was convened to proclaim the defeat of "izvisionism" and the ad- ve it of a hopeful new era of solid "socialist construc- tion," the continuation of Husak's tenure as party chief was no longer in doubt. The thoroughness with which he had dismantled the liberal movement and his firmness in quieting public dissent had left his con- servative opponents no lever with which to challenge his position. Moreover, the dedication with which he had aligned Czechoslovak policy with Soviet interests and his personal allegiance to Brezhnev had earned him the all- important backing of Moscow. The issue on which he had appeared most vulnerable �his failure to sanction the Warsaw Pact's military intervention in 1968 �had been largely diluted by his public accession at the Soviet Party Congress a month before to the thesis that th� invasion had been mounted in response to "appeals" by true Czechoslovak Communists. For the most part, the 14th Congress was a pro for- ma affair, nota5le primarily for its display of unity within the top leadership. Husak was duly reconfirmed in office and subjected to some warm words of praise from Brezhnev. The changes made in the party leadership and organization were minor, designed either to tie up loose ends remaining from the reform era or, like according Husak the Soviet -style title of general ecretary, to underscore Prague's loyalty to the U.S.S.R. Perhaps the most significant of these moves was the decision to recentralize the power structure by abolisYng the Czech Bureau �a stopgap body created after the invasion by reformists attempting to federalize the party around equal Czech and Slovak organizations �and by returning the Slovak Party to its traditional subordinate, albeit separate, status. Despite his emergence as undisputed primus inter pares, however, the congress was not an unqualified personal success for Husak. For all th. pomp and cir- cumstance, the proceedings had done nothing to im- prove his domestic popularity or to decrease his dependence on Moscow. Quite the contrary. Not only 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Husok dWivarkv closip sWemwit at 11th Porte Conprem had he heen forced to repeat his endorsement of the in- vited invasion thesis but, by strming the collective nature of party authority, the congress had un- derscored the fact that he had paid for his preeminence by making fundamental concessions to his conserv- ative colleagues. Moreover, the one change made in the membership of the Party Presidium �the replace ment of Dubeek -era holdover Evzen Erban by hardliner Karel Hoffman served notice to all con- cerned that the c tinservative wing of the party would continue to exercise a strnag voice in the policymaking process. Flusak was subsequently able to redress the leadership balance to his advantage by easing Alois 1n- dra out of his post as Party Secretary and into the less powerhrl lob of Chainnan of the National Assembly. Hilt although Husuk's position in late 1973 appeared stronger, with regard to both the Soviets and his inter nal opposition, than at any time since he assumed power, his room for maneuver was still very limited. The short- and long -term problems that Husak has encountered in the economic field have been inex- tricably intertwined with his political woes. He was painfully aware that the inherent weaknesses of a coin mand economy had played a major role in Novotny's downfall, yet in moving to overcome the chaos generated by Dubeek's embryonic reforms, he had no choice other than to reimpose a highly centralized system patterned on the Soviet model. From the out- set, however, he wisely avoided one major error of the Novotny era by preserving the J)ubcek regime's emphasis on building new housing, producing more consumer goods, end upgsadirg the Czechoslovak diet. Hawk's first order of business was to strengthen his regime's control over the planning and direction of the economy, As in the political field, he moved slowly at first in artier to avoid unduly alarming the populace. In mid -IIQ09, however, continued inflationary pressure ft+iced his hand, and Czechoslovakia entered a prolonged period of economic retrenchment and reorganization. Retail prices were increased and then frozen. New investment projects were curtailed. Plan- ned walte increases were halted. A wide range of con- trols, including obligatory goals for output and trade, 16 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 were imposed on the business community. The trade unions were gradually deprived of the meaningful voice in both local and top -level economic decisions that they had acquired during the I>bcek era and eventually were relegated to their traditional role as an instrument of control under the unenlightened leadership of hardliner Karel Hoffman. Husak succeeded in containing inflation by the end of 1970. He then unveiled a new Five Year Plan (1971 -1975) which turned out to be the most cautious of any in Eastern Europe �and the most closely attuned to Moscow's desires. The plan's growth goals were, in fact, clearly understated in order to insure that the economy would enjoy the appearance of healthy progress. In broad terms, the document called for a renewed stress on heavy industry, closer cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries, and increased attention to the immediate needs of the Czechoslovak consumer. One thing which was eon:.pieuousty missing front the plan was any hint of new economic reforms. Indeed, while possible changes affecting prices, wages, and managerial techniques have subsequently become the subject of lively debate within the closed confines of top b lvernmental and party organs, little movement toward -)verhauling the country's resurrected com- mand economy had been recorded by late 1973. In Husak's defense, it must be said that neither the political balance in Czechoslovakia nor Moscow's renewed emphasis or,, conformity have favored innova- tion. Furthermore, there is no denying that Husak's ef- forts to improve consumer welfare have met with con- siderable suc.. ass. At the same time, however, his dutifully orthodox approach to ec -nomic and political affairs and his marked reluctance to remove loyal par- ty hacks from important jobs have aggravated old economic problems and created some new difficulties of their own. In fact, while the economy continues to plod along (both national income and industrial production have been growing at about 6% a year), it is creaking audibly. The manpower squeeze has grown worse. Ex- hortation and threats have failed to yield planned gains in productivity. Thanks largely to poor worker discipline and unsound management, construction and production costs have increased much faster than anticipated. In part due to the same factors, major in- vestment projects have been taking an average of 8 years from planning to completion� nearly twice the comparable period in other developed nations. Many industrial facilities are antiquated and lag !ar behind their Nestern counterparts. Alarmingly, in view of Husak's efforts to bind his country more closely to the Soviet bloc, even the comparative advantage which Czechoslovak products have traditionally enjoyed within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) has evaporated. Husak's principal problems in the field of foreign af- fairs� Soviet tutelage and troubling isolation �were a logical outgrowth of his normalization campaign. Dur- ing his first 3 years in office, when he was largely preoccupied with internal matters, his foreign policy was characterized by total subservience to Moscow. Predictably, his regime's overall responsiveness to Soviet desires and, in particular, its action in officially endorsing Brezhnev's views on both the practical and ideological justification for the 1968 invasion, le-1 to a marked deterioration of its relations with free spirited Yugoslavia and Romania. Similarly, Prague's relations with the leading nations of the non Communist world became strained as Husak moved to cut off the free travel of Czechoslovak citizens to the West and as his rigid domestic policies came under growing Western criticism. Toward the end of 1972, increasing self- confidence and the opportunities created by Moscow's unfolding policy of detente prompted Husak to turn his hand to repai-ing some of this damage. With the Kremlin's blessing, he launched a broad diplomatic offensive designed to restore Czechoslovakia to its preinvasion standing in the international community. There were some setbacks, both of his own making and because of problems in the Middle East, but by early 1974 he could claim an impressive list of accomplishments. Among other things, he had buried the hatchet with Romania and Yugoslavia. At the cost of retreating from its original demand that Bonn declare the 1938 Munich Agreement invalid ab initio, Czechoslovakia had concluded a pair of bilateral treaties with West Germany which had paved the way for restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the two coun- tries. Soma progress had been made toward resolving longstanding differences with Austria and the Vatican. The U.S. Secretary of State had paid a much publi- cized visit to Prague, and workin -level talks aimed at reaching a satisfactory settlement of opposing U.S. and Czechoslovak financial claims had been initiated. Despite its more assertive posture, however, Prague's freedom of action in the foreign policy field in early 1974 was still clearly circumscribed by its loyalty to the Soviet Union. Indeed, Czechoslovakia remained the loudest proponent of a "coordinated socialist foreign policy" in Eastern Europe. And under those cir- cumstances, Husak was still finding it hard t,1 develop either domestic support or international respect. 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 This old Czech motto reflects the combination of resignation and basic optimism that still characterizes the outlook of Husak's countrymen. Despite past dis- appointments, hopes persist that Husak will someday reveal himself to be the ultimate practitioner of Schweik ism �that, having lulled L )th the Kremlin and his hardline domestic opponents into dropping 18 their guard, he will shrewdly exploit the logic and im- peratives of detente to launch a new round of liberaliz- ing political and economic reforms. But although such a happy eventuality is iot beyond the realm of possibility, the prospects for any significant improve- ment in Czechoslovakia's internal climate in the near future are not bright. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 "We Have Been, and We Will Be Again" (c) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Whatever his ultimate intentions. Husak is in a dif- ficult position. He cannot chart an e-en modestly in- dependent course unless he can develop a firm base of popular support similar to that enjoyed by Poland's Gierek or Hungary's Kadar. ironically, the trend toward East -West detente has made it more difficult for Husak to court this support. For one thing, Moscow has been pressing for increased discipline and conform. it) in Eastern Europe in order to counter the poten- tially corrosive impact of detente. As might be ex- pected, the Kremlin's call for an intensification of the struggle against all forms of ideological heresy has been enthusiastically echoed by Czechoslovakia's hardliners. Moreover, although Husak still favors a policy of moderation, even he recognizes that Czechoslovakia is particularly vulnerable to destabiliz- ing Western influences. Not only do most of the pop- ular grievances that combined to topple the Novotny regime still lie close to the surface, but the 1968 inva- sion created a str )ng �and for the Czechoslovaks, un- precedented� undercurrent of anti Sovietism as well. All told, Husak must find the arguments against casing internal controls to be very strong. In any event, the general trend of developments in Czechoslovakia suggests that Husak's course will con- tinue to swing between suppressing the vestiges of resistance with a stick and luring the masses out of their apathy with a carrot. Unfortunately for the Czechoslovak populace, the stick seerred most in evidence as 1973 drew to a close. For example, about a0 former students and faculty merrtbc-rs of the Com- ruunist Party's higher school were suddenly and belatedly stripped of their academic titles and degrees. The 'ply of )an Palach, a young student who im- molated himself in January 1969 to protest the War- saw Pact in -asion and its consequences, was mysteriously removed from a cemetery in Prague, and his grave was replaced with that of a virtually un- known woman. In addition, there were reports that a new trial of prominent dissidents was being prepared. In sum. it would appear that no general thaw is in the immediate offing. Without one, however, it seems almost certain that the economy �and Husak per sonuliy- --will have to continue to bear the twin burdens of popular apathy and passive resistance. Indeed, even if Husak should introduce some modest economic reforms in the near future, he could find it increasingly difficult just to satisfy the newly whetted economic expectations of his countrymen- 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Mom than 50,000 mourners offend funeroi serriees of !on Moch, whose self- immolotion was in protest of the Soviet -led invasion. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Chronology (u/ou) 863 Greek missionaries Cyril and Methodius arrive in Moravia, establishing early Christian unity among Czech peoples; draw up first Slavic alphabet. 906 Moravian Empire is dissolved after defeat by Magyars. 921 -29 Bohemia and Moravia are united under crown of Wenceslas, Bohemiz's patron saint. 973 Slovakia is annexed by Hungary. 13th century Germans begin mass migration into Bohemia, setting stage for rapid social and ronomic development. 1346 -78 Bohemia enjoys "Golden Age" under aarleg I of Bohemia (Charles IV of Holy Roman Empire). 1348 University of Prague (Charles University), first university in central Furope, is founded. 1415 Martyrdom of Jan Hus precipitates Hussite revolt against domination by Germans and Catholic Church; Czech national consciousness gestates. 1526 Ferdinand assumes Bohemian throne, beginning Hapsburg domination and renewing Catholic domination. 1592 -1670 Jan Comcnius reforms education and leads latter phase of Czech reformation. 1618 Bohemian Protestants revolt against Catholic Church, initiating Thirty Years War; two Catholic governors are victims of "defenestration of Prague." 1620 Czechs are defeated at Battle of White Mountain, reestab- lishing Hapsburg rule; daring "Time of the Night" Bohemia endures severe political, religious, and cultural persecution; war losses and heavy migration lead to renewed Germaniza- b n of Bohemia. 19th century Czech "renaissance" emphasizes literary works of national history and folklore; Czech language revives. 1867 Austro- Hungarian Empire incorporates Slovakia, Bohemia, and Moravia; economic and cultural growth are facilitated by relatively mild Austrian hegemony. 1918 First Czechoslovak Republic is founded under President Tomas G. Masaryk. 1921 Czechoslovak Commun:st Party is founded. 1935 Eduard Benes succeeds Masaryk as President of the Republic. 1938 September Munich Conference cedes Sudetenland to Germany. 1939 March German troops occupy Czechoslovakia; Bohemia and Mo- ravia become German protectorate and Slovakia becomes "independent" state. 1940 J aly United Kingdom recognizes Czechoslovak Government in London under Eduard Benes. 1943 December Benes signs 20 -year friendship and mutual assistance pact with U.S.S.R. 1944 August Slovak national uprising takes place against Nazis. 1945 April Kosice program of close relations with U.S.S.R. and nationali- zation of industry is announced. May Last German resistance ends with liberation of Prague. June Expulsion of most ^thnic Germans is ordered. Ruthenia ceded to U.S.S.R. December By mutual agreement, U.S. and Soviet troops withdraw from Czechoslovakia. 20 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 1946 May Communists receive 38 National Socialists 18 Social Democrats 13 and Slovak Democrats 14% of votes in first postwar general election. Three other parties share remaining 17% of votes. June Eduard Benes is unanimously elected President. July Klement Gottwald (Communist) forms government. 1947 July Under Soviet pressure Czechoslovak cabinet reverses its de- cision to participate in Marshal: Plan. 1948 February Communists seize power in bloodless coup and formally establish "people's democracy." June Benes resigns presidency. Gottwald becomes President and Antonin Zapotocky Prime Minister. 1949 January First Five Year (Economic) Plan (1949 -53) begins. 1951 March Roman Catholic Archbishop Beran is banished from Prague. November Rudolph Slansky is arrested and charged with conspiracy against state. 1952 November Slansky and 10 other former officials are sentenced to death for treason. 1953 March Gottwald dies; Zapotocky becomes President and Viliam Siroky Prime Minister. September Antonia Novotny becomes party First Secretary. 1955 May Warsaw Pact is established. 1956 January Second Five Year Plan (1956 -60) begins. 1957 November President Zapotocky dies; Novotny becomes President, retaining post of party First Secretary. 1960 July Newly elected National Assembly proclaims achievement of socialism in Czechoslovakia, ratifies new "socialist" con- stitution, and changes country's name to "Czechoslovak Socialist Republic." 1961 January Third Five Year Plan (1961 -65) begins. June Judicial law tightens party control over simplified court system. 1962 August Third Five Year Plan is scrapped as economic situation deteriorates. December 12th Party Congress agrees to review 1949 -54 purges and to begin de- Stalinization in earnest. 1963 May Intellectual :crment reaches point of public criticism of party and state leaders. June Regime announces liberalization of cultural policies at writers and journalists unions' congress. Novotny moves to reassert his control as de- Stalinization gains momentum. Verdicts of 1949 -54 purge trial are revised and victims partially rehabilitated. Septembe: Premier Siroky is fired and cabinet shuffled; Jozef Lenart becomes Premier; party commissions for ideology, economy, standard of living, and agriculture are established. Americans still in Czechoslovak prisons are released and returned to United States in gesture to improve relations. 1964 March Experiments in economic decentralization and "market socialism" begin. October Youth demonstrations occur in Prague. November Novotny is reelected President for 5 -year term. 91 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 1965 February Radical reform of economy is adopted. Archbishop Beran it named Cardinal; leaves permanently for Rome. 1966 January Economic Reform Program (ERP) is introduced. May �June 13th Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress elects more liberal Central Committee. 1967 Jane Liberal intellectuals attack conservative Novotny regime at fourth congress of Czechoslovak Writers Union. July Novotny visits Moscow to reaffirm his policy position and to gain Soviet support. October Slovak leaders, including Dubcek, launch strong person -1 attack at Central Committee meeting against Novotny for his poor handling of Czech Slovak problems. Prague students demonstrate in streets in protest over poor living conditions, but are intercepted and brutally man- handled by police. December Brezhnev arrives in Prague to assess political situatior and to encourage Czechoslovak party leaders to maintain stable regime. Novotny is attacked by bosh Czech and Slovak leaders at Central Committee plenum, and continues to lose support on all levels of Communist Party. 1968 January Central Committee plenum ousts Novotny as Party First Secretary bnd replaces him with Slovak leader Alexander Dubcek. Four additional Dubcek supporters also elected to Presidium, thus providing moderate Dubcek group with a majority. Dubcek visits Moscow alone for first time as party chief. 1968 February Dubcek meets separately with Hungary's Kadar and Poland's Gomulka. Czechoslovak army Maj, r General Sejna, who is implicated in attempted military coup in support of Novotny, defects to United States. First issue of Lilerarni Lisly, new journal of Liberal intel- lectuals, appears in Prague. 22 March Novotny resigns from presidency, e.11egedly for reasons of health; wave of resignations among high- ranking regime conservatives follows. Dubcek attends meeting with Soviet, Polish, East German, Bulgarian, and Hungarian leaders in Dresden in abortive attempt by Prague's bloc allies to influence internal Czecho- slovak developments. Novotny resigns from Party Presidium. April New Party Presidium and government caLinet are an- nounced; Oldrich Cernik replaces Lenart as Premier; party announces its Action Program designed to fuse socialism with basic elements of democracy. May Dubcek and other leaders visit Soviet Union to discuss Czechoslovak situation. Soviets and Poles conduct military maneuvers along Czecho- slovak border. Soviet, Polish, East German, Bulgarian, and Hungarian leaders meet in Moscow to present united front against Czechoslovak "democratization." Soviet Premier Kosygin and Defense Minister Grechko visit Czechoslovakia to confer with Prague leaders. Novotny is ousted from Central Committee and suspended fro.n party membership. June �July Warsaw Pact "command staff exercises" in Czechoslovakia and Poland result in protracted presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia after maneuvers are over. June National Assembly passes law abolishing prior censorship. Three Prague newspapers publish "2,000 Words" manifesto written by liberal writer Ludvik Vaculik and signed by other liberals demanding acceleration of "democratization" and callh.g for dismissal of party leaders who have abused their power. Party Presidium denounces manifesto on same day. July Czech National Council established as provisional counter- part to Slovak National Council, as first step in proposed federative arrangement. Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian leaders meet in Warsaw and draft letter censuring Dubcek regime and Action Program. Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense recommends re- form of Warsaw Pact command. Czechoslovak Party Presidium issues reply to "Warsaw Letter" refuting allegations. Soviet Pravda claims that Czechoslovak security forces found secret cache of U.S. arms near West German border. Soviet Warsaw Pact military exercises along Czecho- slovakia's borders greatly expand. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 1968 July- August Czechoslovak Presidium and Soviet Politburo meet at Cierna nad Tisou, on Czechoslovak- U.S.S.R. border. August Soviet bloc leaders ratify Cierna nad Tisou agreement at special summit sessior in Bratislava. Yugoslav President Tito given rousing welcome during 3 -day visit to Prague. East German party boss L'Ibright receives chilly reception during brief trip to consult with Dubcek at Karlovy Vary. manian party chief Ceausescu arrives in Prague to confer with liberal Czechoslovak leadership and to sign 20 -year mutual friendship treaty with Czechoslovakia. Soviet pres-., after 3 -week silence, resumes heavy propaganda barrage oplosing Czechoslovak reforms. Soviet troop accompanied by East German, Polish, Hun- garian, and Bulgarian forces, invade Czechoslovakia on night of 20-21 August; by morning of 21 August, Soviet military in complete control of Prague and other major population centers. Dubcek and other leaders arrested. Extraordinary "14th" Party Congress convenes clandestinely in Prague factory. President Svoboda journeys to Moscow to negotiate releases of all arrested leaders and agreement on future of Czecho- slovakia under occupation. Dubcek is allowed to resume post as Party First Secretary. Party plenum hears Dubcek report on Moscow talks; Pre- sidium enlarged to 22 members; Central Committee also expanded. October Czechoslovak leaders Dubcek, Premier Cernik, and Siovak party chief Husak� negotiate with Soviet Po)'!buro in Mosco.+; communique outlines Soviet demands for "nor- malization." Czechoslovaks and Soviets sign status -of- forces agreement in Prague; pact gives semblance of legality to occupation and calls for removal from Czechoslovak soil of bulk of Soviet bloc invasion forces by mid- December. Czechoslovaks demonstrate in restrained manner on 50th anniversary of founding of Czechoslovak Republic; federali- zation law transforms Czechoslovakia into two nations Czech and Slovak �with equal rights. November Anti Soviet demonstrations mark 51st anniversary of Russian October Revolution. Party plenum announces new middle -of- the -road policies. Czech and Slovak students stage sit -in strikes to protest further compromise of liberal reform program and to support Dubcek leadership. December Czechoswvak and Soviet leaders hold summit conference in Kiyev; Soviets review Czechoslovak progress in fulfilling commitments and im ,)ose new demands on Czechoslovak regime. 1968 December Over one million workers threaten nationwide demonstrations and strikes if any leading political figures especially National Assembly President Smrkovsky �are ousted. 1969 January Czechoslovakia is declared a Federal Republic. Czech student Jan Palach protests occupation by setting himself on fire in Wenceslas Square; widespread demonstra- tions occur in Czech Lands; Prague police disrupt crowds with tear gas. March Victory of Czechoslovak ice hockey team over Soviets sparks popular riots in Prague; mob sacks Aeroflot office rendering position of Dubcek regime virtually untenable. April Leading Communists accused by Dubcek regime of collab- orating witF Soviets in 1968 are rehabilitated. Central Committee plenum replaces Dubcek with Husak as First Secretary. Dubcek replaces Petr Colotka as Chairman of Federal Assembly. May Central Committee plenum promulgates "Implementation Directive," spelling out Husak's basic policies of establishing tight party discipline and reconciliation with ex- liberals willing to accept party authority. Ota Sik and Frantisek Kriegel, two of Dubeek's closest supporters, are expelled from party. August Large -scale pro- Dubcek demonstrations in Prague on inva- sion anniversary are brutally dispersed by security forces; regime promulgates Emergency Law temporarily suspending and rule of law. September Party Presidium rescinds its August 1968 condemnation of Soviet invasion. Central Committee plenum removes Dubcek from Presidium; Dubcek refuses to recant; leading Dubcek supporters ousted from Central Committee; Husak eschews punitive measures against liberals. December Dubcek named ambassador to Turkey. 1970 January Central Committee plenum revises Presidium; Strougal named federal Premier; Dubcek "resigns" from Central Committee. February Central Committee implements party card exchange program. 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 March Dubcek suspended from Communist Pa! ty. May Czechoslovak- U.S.S.R. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in Prague, includes principle of "socialist internationalism" justifying Warsaw Pact in- vasion, provides for close economic cooperation, implicitly commits Czechoslovakia to side with Soviet Union in case of military confrontation between latter and Communist China. Dubcek returns to Prague and semi- isolation. 1970 June Dubcek and ex- Premier Oldrich Cernik are stripped of remaining government positions. Party conservatives heighten criticism of Husak's moderaO domestic policies and call for more thorough party purge. July Regime publishes counterattacks on conservative critics, highlighting intraparty feud. Regime publishes official interpretation of Dubc '-.'s role in 1968 reform movement, describing his r ; tc power as aberration in otherwise necessary reform effort. August Quiet passing of second anniversary of invasion strengthens Ht yak's political position. September Party organ Rude Fravo declares party purge over and be- ginning of effort to restore party discipline� second stage of post Dubcek "consolidation" campaign. October Husak fires Czech Minister of Interior and Army liaison officer with Soviet forces to reduce influence of hardliners. Czechoslovak and West German officials make preliminary plans to open political talks. November Regime stresses "reconciliation" with intelligentsia by an- nouncing plans to foster cultural activity, including amnesty for signatories of 1968 political manifestoes. December Central Committee plenum issues Party's definitive "Les- sons" of Czechoslovak history since 13th Party Congress of 1967; Husak announces postpurge Party membership to be 1,200,000; proceedings indicate stand -off between pro -Husak moderates and conservative faction. Federal Assembly amends federalization law reducing Slovak economic and administrative autonomy. 1971 May 14th Party Congress convenes; pronounces "end of the crisis period." Minor leadership changer reflect regime's emphasis 24 on party u:.ity. Central Committee undergoes large turnover in party's search for reliable and motivated members. Fifth Five Year Plan (1971 -75) approved. November Elections held to federal, republic, and local governmer.t bodies, first such balloting since 1964 (scheduled 1968 elec- tions indefimi;ly postponed after invasion). Regime claims 99.8% of 10.3 million eligib!c voters supported official single slate. December As result of election "mandate," Ifusak revamps leadership of Federal Assembly, Czech and Slovak National Councils, and reshuffles respective cabinets. Shifts symbolize final phase of Husak's consolidation of power over government apparatus. 1972 July- August Some 50 former second- string party officials and intellectuals associated with Dubcek tried for subversive and other illegal acts committed during 1970 -71 period. December Foreign Minister Chnoupek visits Romania in effort to heal rift caused by Bucharest's vehement denunciation of the invasion in 1968. 1973 February Soviet party leader Brezhnev visits Prague on 25th anni- versary of Communist takeover. Brezhnev warmly endorses Husak, presents him with Order of Lenin, and declares Czechoslovakia's "normalization" completed. March Aging General Ludvik Svoboda reelected President by Federal Assembly. June Czechoslovak -West German treaty initialed in Bonn after Prague dropped persistent demand that Bonn declare 1938 Munich Agreement "void from the beginning." U.S. Secretary of State Rogers visits Prague in first such visit since World War II. Eve: t_ paves way for improving bilateral relations within framework of detente, and symbolizes Czechoslovakia's success in gradually breaking out of post invasion diplomatic isolation. October Husak's visit to Yugoslavia ends cool relations that followed Belgrade's 1968 denunciation of Warsaw Pact invasion. December Husak pays official visit to India, in first trip to non -Com- munist country since assuming power. West German Chancellor Brandt visits Prague for formal signing of bilateral good will treaty, opening way to establishment of riplomatic relations. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Area Brief Neu) LAND: Size: 49,400 s mi. Use: 42% arable, 14% other agricultural, 35% forested, 9% other Land boundaries: 2,200 mi. Other political group: Puppet parties Czechoslovak Socialist Pasty, Czechoslovak People's Party, Slovak Freedom Party, Slovak Revivrl Party Member of: CEMA, GATT, IAEA, ICAO, Seabeds Com- mittee, U.N. Warsaw Pact PEOPLE: Population: 14,608,000, average annual growth rate 0.6% (current) Ethnic divisions: 65.0% Czechs, 29.2% Slovaks, 4.0% Magyars, 0.6% Germans, 0.5% Poles, 0.4% Ukrainians, 0.3% others (Jews, Gypsies) Religion: 77% Roman Catholic, 20% Protestant, 2% Orthodox, 1 other Language: Czech, Slovak, Hungarian Literacy: Almost complete Labor force: 7.1 million; 18% agriculture, 37% industry, 11 services, 34% construction, communications and others GOVERNMENT: Legal same: Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Type: Communist state Capital: Prague Political subdivisions: 2 separate autonomous republics (Czech Socialist Republic and Slovak Socialist Republic); 7 regions (kraj) in Czech lands, three regions in Slovakia; national capitals of Prague and Bratislava have regional status Legal system: Civil law system based on German codes, modified by Communist legal theory; revised constitution adopted 1960, amended in 1968 and 1970; no judicial review of legislative acts. legal education at Universita Komenskeho School of Law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction Branehep: Executive President (elected by Federal As- sembly), cabinet (appointed by President); legislative Federal Assembly (elected directly), Czech and Slovak Na- tional Councils (also elected directly) legislate on limited area of Czech ari Slovak affairs; judiciary Supreme Court (elected by I� rderal Assembly); entire governmental structure dominated by Communist Party Government leaders: President Ludvik Svoboda (reelected March 1973), Premier Lubomir Strougal Suffrage: Universal over age 18 Elections: Governmental bodies every 5 years; President every 5 years (last election, November 1971) Dominant political party and leader: Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC), Gustav Husak, General Secretary; Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) has status of "provincial KSC organization" Voting strength (1971 election): 99.81% Communist sponsored single slate Communists: 1.2 million party members NOTE �This Area Brief is compiled from data appearing in the January 1974 issue of the NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook. ECONOMY: GNP: $36.8 billion in 1972 (at 1971 prices), $2,540 per capita; 1972 real growth rate 3.6% Agriculture: Diversified agriculture; maie craps� wheat, rye, potatoes, sugar beets; net food importer �moat, wheat, vegetable oils, fresh fruits and vegetables; caloric intake, 3,100 calories per day per capita (1967) Major industries: Machinery, food processing, metallurgy, textiles, chemicals 81sortages: Ores, crude oil, grain Crude steel: 12.7 million metric tons produced (1972), 880 kg. per capita Exports: $5,123 million (f.o.b., 1972); 50% machinery, equipment; 28% fuels, raw materials; 4% foods, foou prod- ucts, and live animals; 18% cr,,.sumer goods, excluding foods (1971) Imports: $4,662 million (f.o.b., 1972); 33% machinery, equipment; 44% fuels, raw materials: 15% foods, food prod- ucts, and live animals; 8% consumer gc ^ds, excluding foods (1971) Major trade partners: $9,785 million (1972); 70 �h Com- munist countries, 30% with West Monetary conversion rate: Commercial 5.2 crowns =US$1; noncommercial 10.7 crowns =US$1, tourist rate 13.3 crowns US$1; old commercial rates: 6.63 crowns L'S$1 in 1972; prior to 1972, 7.2 crowns= L'SSI Fiscal year: Calendar year Note: Foreign trade figures were converted at the 1972 rate COMMUNICATIONS: Railroads: 8,260 mi.; 8,080 mi. standard gage, 70 mi. broad gage, 110 mi. narripw gage; 1,014 mi. double track; 1,560 mi. electrified; government owned (1972) Highways: 45,5W mi.; 800 mi. concrete; 28,651 mi. bitumi- nous; 2,400 mi. cobblestone, brick sc.,t, stc ne block; 13,650 mi. crushed stone, gravel, improved earth (1972) Inland waterways: 517 mi. (1973) Pipelines: Crude oil, 900 mi.; refined products, 535 mi.; natural gas, 2,800 mi. Freight carried: Rail -248.9 million short tons, 41.2 billion short ton/mi. (1972); highway -901.4 million short tons, 8A billion short ton/mi. (1972); waterway -9.5 million short tons, 2.5 billion short ton/mi. (incl. int'l. transit traffic) (1972) Porli: No maritime ports; outlets are Gdynia, Gdansk, Stet in in Poland; Rijeka, Yugoslavia; Hamburg, West Germany; Rostock, East Germany; principal river ports are Prague, Melnik, Usti nad Labem, Decin, Kom� rno, Bratislava (1973) 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 i e! PLACES AND FEATURES REFERRED TO IN TEXT (U /OU) COORDINATCB COORDINATES COORDINATES Banskti Byetrica 'N 'E. 'N o 'E 'N. 'E. Banskh tiavnica 48 44 19 09 Kra13v 7 Dv,6r 49 58 14 03 Senec.. 48 12 17 24 Beroun 48 27 18 54 PLACES AND FEATURES REFERRED TO IN TEXT (U /OU) Land Utilizal Fors.+ Mgor. i.q,. GENERAL AGRICULTURAL REGIONS Corn, wheat, barley Wheat. barley, sugar bests Oats. Potatoes, rye Mountain farming Pi Font /ai1,,:1 =1 1 11;1 6 1 :a N =1 I =Fait ='4 Iwo] Fai IIZ Qillyflyl:ZIIIIIN `bIII11 -s COORDINATCB COORDINATES COORDINATES Banskti Byetrica 'N 'E. 'N o 'E 'N. 'E. Banskh tiavnica 48 44 19 09 Kra13v 7 Dv,6r 49 58 14 03 Senec.. 48 12 17 24 Beroun 48 27 18 54 Krnov 50 08 17 43 Sered 48 17 17 44 49 57 14 05 KromD Land Utilizal Fors.+ Mgor. i.q,. GENERAL AGRICULTURAL REGIONS Corn, wheat, barley Wheat. barley, sugar bests Oats. Potatoes, rye Mountain farming Pi Font /ai1,,:1 =1 1 11;1 6 1 :a N =1 I =Fait ='4 Iwo] Fai IIZ Qillyflyl:ZIIIIIN `bIII11 -s Land Utiliza.l Forest Malor GENERAL AGRICULTURAL F Corn, wheat barle Wheat, barley, su1 oats, potatoes, ry Mountain farming Populal Persons Per spore 00 71 111 21111 20 0 x 10 ltl Persons per peers kl 14 E a s t on,aR APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 Limit or Polish AdmlMseration 18 W roctow Ottl nod oksnr r Ckfwtnowmost M Karkry Gary Sokdn Klel 1 Pkei Stro coke� 18 Basic Resourci and Processin RESOURCES Hard coal Brown coal Iron ore M Magnetite U Uranium PROCESSING Iron and .feel p oil refining PIPELINES Crude oil (CEMA) Refined produefa Natural gas Ikjr HrMlke WON 7 Joke� TfakA ealiprka APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA �RDP09 00707R0002009 9 0008 -5 URB" OFUUrION 00..1. Basic Resources and Processing RESOURCE! Hrd c.O B� cad Lon M M.W�* U U� PROCESSING Lp, .rtl Ca W�v NFELINES C.A.odICEMA) R.6,W pdl Na-i q.. Industries i "H. qv. ..M,._ .moo. kld�W p� ph Food p�,.." Sw W crcrs sne sspn.�o MQq ,.wn.wp.rnnee APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 78e11f. ct:'::S 48 28 `QilevFe 49 46 Bn.d)a bad Labem (4ee aJ Brand0 wd L.6cw- Slari Bakal .a) 50 II BRAWL .va 48 09 Bhelav 48 46 or... 49 12 B udapest, Hungary 47 30 Budto v 49 04 Budkovice 48 38 Budubv.... 48 35 nad Per BOON= oitejoere 49 31 Cad 49 26 Cw.. 49 SS Cehjovee 48 35 C-14 v P. lumavi. 48 44 C.luk Up. 50 41 Ceaki Thb. va 49 54 Ceaki Bud4jo"M'� 48 59 Ceahi Veleniee 48 40 C. Krumlav 411 49 Corky Tflln 49 45 Cheb 50 04 Chomuw I 50 27 Chop, U.H.S.R 48 26 Ch^. de Hce 50 34 Clerna nod Tiwu 48 26 Cleasyn, Pel and 49 40 Citer 48 19 Coltovo 48 30 C...Mrta, Remaeta 44 It Danube(arm) 45 20 D561n............. 50 47 D. 1.[ 2k6 50 5o Dreaden, Ewt Germ anY 4......., 51 03 13 ukta Paw (Pawl 49 25 Dukovany.. I.......... I 49 05 Elbe arm) 53 50 Frabtodt, .I- tri, 48 30 Frydek -Newt (coma...) 49 40 Kurth Im Wald, Wear Germany 48 IS Cdynfa, Pa l a9d 54 30 (I6ny9, Ilungwy 47 44 G.tte,ald.e 49 13 Habty... 49 4S Hamburg, Weat Germany 53 33 Hanbta 49 37 11- Illk0v Brad 49 37 Illohovec 48 4: Hnivlm SO 27 Horns 31.65. 48 49 flnrn5 Srale 48 49 Hndco Krifove 50 13 Hradiltaki M.Yv 49 36 Wank. ...1-1 49 33 Hurbenavo 47 52 11"" Wrm) 47 49 latebnf C', 13 Ja6leniea 48 36 Jfchymov 50 22 J ar.mdf 50 22 is 38 Z liay......... iovee. 48 24 JIM. van 49 24 Karlovy Vary 50 13 Karvinf....... 49 52 Kawwi.. Po (and 30 l0 K) adn o 4 SO 00 Klawvy 49 24 Klobaukr 18 39 Kl.dako, Poland 50 26 Kalin._. 5002 K.m6rao 47 49 Kopffv.ix... 49 36 Kullce 48 42 nad Vlnvou 50 14 17 39 Kdty 48 40 13 22 Lamrilol K�il ( 50 19 SI y. 1�fire. 48 13 14 40 Llblicc 50 05 17 07 I.Ipnik na4 Bd.. 49 32 1853 L.mnlckg Stit( a.) r"I'll 4012 16 38 Leuny 50 2t t9 05 Lovinoha6. 48 26 14 00 Luben(k 48 40 21 56 Lutenec 48 20 21 00 5lalacky 49 28 16 18 Mall. ..49 68 18 47 hhly Duna! (arm) 47 45 IS 24 MarktredniLt, West Germany. 50 00 21 04 Martin 49 04 14 07 SSedved'ov 47 48 14 33 hl5lnik SO 21 16 27 Mich. lout 48 45 H 28 Mirkolr, Hungary 48 OB 14 .58 htladf Meet v 50 2S it 19 Wilek pod Rimy 49 52 I8 37 Moldova cad H.dvou 48 37 12 22 Morava (arm) 10 13 26 Manvla (ogin.) 49 30 22 12 Manvln Gate (Pura) 49 33 13 47 Motoemagyatdvir, IluntarY 47 52 22 06 Wit .50 32 18 36 Matdtlet 50 O9 17 30 N.Wlf tar, 48 l6 20 23 New9ee 49 03 28 39 Nlln 48 10 29 40 Nev6 Metro nad Vih.m 45 14 13 N �v Zi mky 47 59 14 13 N.vy J161. 49 36 13 45 Nymburk 50 11 21 42 Odcr( rlrm 53 32 16 12 Ohfe 41 50 32 0 00 Olomouc 49 35 14 30 Ondfejuv 49 54 18 20 Op. 6f.e k 50 02 12 51 Oanva 49 50 i8 33 Oalravako-Karvinski Pi� (119ml) 49 50 17 50 Pamki Yea 50 32 17 40 Par dubice 50 02 15 29 Pet6(n (iilD $0 OS 30 DO Plest'any 48 36 21 15 Plavwky SLvrtok 48 22 15 25 PIw6 49 45 16 46 Podbrtwvi 48 49 N 22 Podibody SO 09 18 53 Podu.ajsk6 Blakuplre 48 08 IS 05 Pepr ad 49 03 IS 50 PavaLki Byetrica 49 07 21 4o Povrly L- 50 40 17 44 Pndad (m[1 50 05 IS 12 Prague 50 05 IS 51 Pfeov 49 27 19 13 Prelov 4o 00 17 25 Pllb.r 49 39 125.5 PHhnm..., 4942 15:.5 PdcM.�.... 4946 20 t4 Prmtfjov 49 28 IB 04 Pr6h.wc 50 00 IS 35 Nlhav 49 09 12 34 flea 50 l0 1833 Rijeka, YUgwlavia..... 4521 10 fit R)may.kf Sebota...._ 48 23 14 (16 Roatock, Et Germa.y 54 OS 13 18 Roudnln nad Labem.... So 25 16 52 RudhanY 48 53 16 39 Rwki. 48 32 IS 12 Safic(kevo 48 25 18 08 Sahy 48 04 18 09 'Salsa 48 O9 21 15 sttallee.._ 50 07 14 19 Satan fal) 49 10 17 01 14 22 18 36 14 53 17 36 20 13 13 48 19 30 20 12 10 40 17 01 1.5 18 I8 09 12 05 I8 50 17 40 34 20 21 56 20 17 14 54 14 16 21 00 Ig 39 17 00 17 5o 17 17 13 39 14 42 18 28 14 12 Is 05 17 50 )8 10 18 01 13 03 14 38 14 OH 17 IS 14 48 I5 30 18 17 is 30 14 33 13 47 14 24 17 50 17 00 13 22 to 32 IS 08 i7 13 20 18 IN 27 14 10 17 15 14 28 17 27 21 15 IS 0o 14 01 18 38 17 07 14 34 Is 20 14 21 14 24 20 02 12 08 14 IS 20 41 22 Drs 20 20 18 58 I7 53 14 35 20 D3 Sku hwv................................... 49 41 SHdkovl6uvo 48 12 Stan 49 38 SI y. 50 14 49 49 81 6.._ 48 37 81a 1, Rudehone (muc) 48 45 Sokol�".. 50 11 Starojkki Lhota 49 34 Staty' B.humf 49 55 Swain, Poland 53 25 Strbak5 Mean. 49 07 StOcovo 47 48 Sumperk 40 56 Tibor 40 25 Tarry............. 48 45 Teh.v 49 58 Tepliea 50 38 Tifywhant, Went Germany 49 35 Thant, AIL..). 41 20 Tfia (arm) 45 15 Tlma6e 48 17 TomiinvA.... 48 22 TOpo1'6.ny 48 34 TIe 615 49 13 Tre b% 48 38 Tren61 n 54 T'lnec 49 44 Tr.ava 48 22 Tupf 48 07 Tgn nad Vft.. 49 14 Oelf mad Labe. 50 40 Usbgowd. U .S.S.R 46 47 Vih (arw)....... I 47 55 48 49 Wkl Bitei 49 16 VOW K. Pe aany 48 33 Vel'ki Zllevm 48 12 Vienna,,i 48 12 Vitkovlee (sec of oarosa) 49 49 Vltava (al�).. 4 50 20 Vochov 49 46 Vrchlabi 50 3a Vrdtky....... 49 07 Vyaokf prl Mcra� 48 20 VywkS Tatty (,aw 49 t0 Vyaok6 Tntry 41 4D 08 Waldkous, West Oermany 41 39 Z6141f 50 34 Moo (arc I Pmgasi 50 01 Zbraalty 50 02 21. mad It� 48 35 2ldluchoviee 49 02 211i.a 49 13 M.ntvice 48 23 Znojmo X18 51 Z.h.r 48 I9 Zvolen 48 35 SELECTED AIRFIELDS 17 39 21 29 14 08 14 24 19 11 20 20 12 38 17 SS 18 20 14 35 2D 03 I8 44 19 58 14 40 14 12 14 42 13 50 12 35 19 50 20 17 18 32 20 01 I8 11 IS 53 21 43 18 02 18 39 17 36 IS 54 14 25 14 02 22 is 18 O1 19 31 16 13 22 05 19 27 16 22 18 16 14 ^9 13 17 15 38 18 35 16 55 20 00 20 13 12 30 13 36 14 26 13 09 Is 52 16 37 18 44 18 24 )6 03 10 50 19 OB Bmhy.e._ __..........__._.....,..4916 1430 Bntialay.ilvanke..._._, I 4810 1713 Cwt- lChetosfce 49 56 15 23 Ceske Budejovice 48 57 14 26 Dobrany 49 40 13 16 Hndee Kralme.,.._..... 50 15 15 51 KleueylV.dochody 5013 14 24 Milovlce 50 14 14 55 Ml�nco 50 37 14 55 Mormov. 49 42 18 07 Nameat nad Oaavou 49 10 16 07 Pardubice. 50 01 IS 44 Png.011 -yne 50 06 14 16 Prm:v 40 26 17 24 84be. 4838 1908 Zater 50 22 13 35 M me, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 o r, o 4 7,iA A" SIOL-�TAS I yr Jj all MANIFN MIMWIASWIA m mollsill o wr +w JG r`� d, fie NI'll L '+1 �O" "B .f ::ti 4 P 4r4 it 'Cx 1 .A' S ir :1 a t w k'r 41 yo -to .,c Iff NNW. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110008 -5