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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 007078000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates :y Stu tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the facibook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those Prk viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classif'cation and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title le, sections 793 and 794 of the US code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of i% contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 1102 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES sR (2), (2). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE I IRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- restive No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made tau National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 CONTENTS This chapter supersedes the political coverage in the Central Sauey dated December I97I. A. Introduction 1 U. Structure and functioning of the govertunent 5 1. Constitutional developments 5 2 Legislative an executive functions 8 3. Central government 8 (1) Legislature 9 (2) Presidency 11 (3) Cabinet 12 b. r:zech and Slovak national governmen* 12 c. Local government 13 I judicial system 13 ,T� I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 Page C. Political dynamics 15 1. Assessment of the reform era 15 2. The Communist regime 17 a. Background 17 b. The Dubcek era 18 c. Husak and the return to normalcy 21 3. Communist Party organization and federalization law photo) membership 24 a. Central organs 24 b. Regional and local levels 26 c. Membership 26 4. Mass organizations and other parties 27 5. Exile groups 28 6. Electoral procedures 29 D. National policies 30 1. Domestic 31 2. Foreign 34 a. Relations with the Communist world 35 b. Relations with developed non- Communist states 36 c. Relations with developing count ries 38 Page E. Threats to government stability 38 1. Discontent and dissidence 39 2. Subversion 40 F. Maintenance of internal security 41 1. Police 41 2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities 43 G. Selected bibliography 43 1. General works 44 2. The pre -1948 period 44 3. The Stalinist era and after 44 4. The Dubcek era and the 1968 crisis 44 Chronology 46 Glossary 51 FIGURES Page Fig. 1 Territorial changes map) 2 Fig. 2 National Assembly voting on federalization law photo) 7 Fig. 3 President Svoboda signing federalization law photo) 7 Fig. 4 Organization of government (chart). 10 Fig. 5 President Ludvik Svoboda photo) 11 Fig. 6 Premier Lubomir Strougai (photo). 12 Fig. 7 General Secretary Gustav Husak 26 Fig. 12 (Photo) 16 ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 Page Fig. 8 Former First Secretary Alexander Dubcek photo) 19 Fig. 9 Invasion by the Warsaw Pact countries photo) 20 Fig. 10 Organization of the Czechoslovak Communist Party chart) 2.5 Fig. 11 Leadership of Communist Party (chart) 26 Fig. 12 Minister of Foreign Affairs Bohuslav Chnoupek photo) 35 Fig. 13 River patrol photo) 43 ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 Government and Politics A. Introduction (C) When on the night of 20 August i9b S the Soviet -led militar invasion of Czechoslovakia terminated Prague's R -month experiment with "socialism with u human face." it did more than forcibly reinstate Soviet dominance in the formulation of Cmeheslovak national policies. It also once again turned the Czechoslovak people away from their sporadic flirtation with r oliticad idealism, and forced them to retreat into that putrid of political apathy, passive resistance, awd pragmatic materialism which historically has been the more common national characteristic As a result, the forced return to orthodo%% that hits been dubbed "nornialization" by the C.errnmunist regime of Gustav Husak has brought about a degree of political stability and renewed Soviet trust in the lovalty of its Czxchoslovak ally. Nevertheless. the lcgacv of the 1%. 8 experiment and its strangulation by Moscom continues to Plague the countn whose current rulers have had to concentrate attvittion on the material well -being of the people to elicit a degree of acceptance from them. Since 1968. therefore, the political, social, cultural, and economic development of the country has reverted to it mold that has been historically more common than the brief periods of true self determination. Indeed, the central theme of the histories of the Czech and Slovak peoples has been the stniggle to maintain their cultural and national identities in the face of Successive periods of domination by their neighbors. Victimized by geography and their relatively small numbers, the t mchs and Slovaks have repeatedly found themseive s the pawns of European expansionist powers ---in modern times the Austro- Hungarian Empire, Nan Germany. arid, most recently, the U.S.S.R. The geographic proximity that led to their political domination by other Europeans kept the Czechs, and to a lesser degree the Slovaks, within the sphere of an essentially Western cultural and social development. an evolution consistent with the Greco -Roman rots of Ixth societies. Prior to 1918, however, the (:zechs and the Slovaks pursued their respective national identities largely ind.:pcndently of each other. This historic individuality inevitably troubled the unity of Czechoslovakia. While the C:zech% were developing their cultural and social traditions during 3W years of Germanic rule, the neighboring Slovaks were being molded by feudal Hungarian overlordship and customs. By the 20th century the Czechs and Slovaks had developr:d disparate cultural attributes and political modalities that were to prove as influential as the shared ethnic and linguistic characteristics in shaping the Czechoslovak polity. The independent First Republic of Czechoslovukia lasted onl) from 19113 to 1938, its existence being assured only as long as British and t Bench support appeared certain. The country's fate was sealed, hOWCVCr, when the Western powers, unprepared to risk war, chose a polic) of appeasement at the Munich Conference in September 1938 and agreed to the cession of the Czechoslovak Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. In March 1939 German troops occupied the remaining areas of Bohemia and Moravia, which became a protectorate of the Reich; Slovakia was established as a Gennan- sponsored autonomous state. Extensive border areas in southern Slovakia were seized by Hungary, which also acquired the easternmost province of Czechoslovakia, Sub- Carpathian Ruthenia (Carpatho- Ukraine). Poland annexed the city and surrounding area of Tesin (Cieszyn). The restoration of an independent Czechoslovakia was an avowed objective of the World War 11 allied victors. The country, however, emerged from the war with four- fifths of its territory occupied by forces of the Soviet Union, the dominant military power in a Furope that was still without a security system. Despite the 1943 Soviet- Czechoslovak treaty of mutuul assistance which recognized the pre- Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia. the U.S.S.R. annexed Ruthenia in 1945. The territorial changes that have occurred in Czechoslovakia since 1938 arc shown in Figure 1. The lack of opposition to the ceding of Ruthenia. a section inhabited almost entirely b ethnic Ukrainians, perhaps reflects the failure of C:zecho- APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 -Annexed M Germany Under German ion Annexed by Hungary �Annexed by U.S.S.R administration Miles 0 100 200 300 0 100 200 300 Kilometers NOTEf This chart does net show minor le"Nonal changes such as the numerous smoll odiostments that have occid along the northern limits of the 1937 Czechoslovak boundary. FIGURE 1. Territorial changes in Czechoslovakia, 1937 -1973 (U/OU) slovakia, a model of Western democracy during the interwar years, to repair a strong sense of national purpose after World War II. It is perhaps representative, too, of the atmosphere in which the country succumbed in 1948 to a bloodless Communist coup and, over the following decade, developed into a model Soviet satellite, docile and unquestioning in its loyalty to Moscow. The country's high degree of economic develop- ment, its proximity and strategic importance to the U.S.S.R., and its vulnerable liberal political system were am the factors which made Czechoslovakia an attractive target for postwar Soviet expansionism. From 1945 to the coup in 1948, the leaders of major non Communist political factions pursued con- ciliatory tactics toward the Communists, with whom they formed a coalition government. This first postwar government, its confidence in the Western powers impaired by the memory of Munich, committed itself to internal policies favored by the Communists and to a fo!eign policy line sympathetic to Soviet interests. The Soviet Union at this time was still greatly admired by most Czechoslovaks because of its role in the war and the fact that in 1938 it had been the only power to declare its support of Czechoslovakia. In addition, many Czechoslovak leaders had a utopian vision of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 Czechoslovakia's serving as a "bridge between East and West." They lulled the nation into a false sense of security and tolerated the activities of domestic Communists and Soviet agents who were already preparing for an eventual takeover. The Czechoslovak experiment with the popular front government formed in 1946 was viewed with considerable optimism by some Western leaders, who were prepared to believe that the Communists were sincere in their professed desire to cooperate with the democratic parties in a multiparty government. The subsequent Communist coup came as a harsh awakening to the West and dashed hopes for constructive cooperation with Communists in the international political arena. The Czechoslovak Communists had carefully prepared the groundwork for their seizure of power. In particular, they were able legaiiy to place party members in key government positions. Other postwar developments also had contributed to setting the stage for this event. The Soviet occupation authorities not only actively supported the Communists in efforts to extend their political influence a.d organization but also sought to obstruct in numerous ways the rebuilding of the nwi- Communist political organiza- tions shattered by the war. Thus, Soviet influence, the pliant attitudes of Czechoslovakia's first post uar government, the party's legal status during the interwar pe od, and its role in the anti -Nazi underground all contributed to Communist strength. In the last free national elections held in May 1946, the Communists gained 38% of the vote. By 1948 the party's popularity had diminished considerably, but by then it was well entrenched in the government, the trade unions, and other public organizations. Moreover, many non Communist political leaders naively supposed they could combat the Communist threat by democratic means. In February 1948, 12 non Communist cabinet ministers attempted to hasten new national elections by resigning from the cabinet in protest against Communist manipulation of the police. The Communists, however, seized the initiative by activating "action committees" which effectively took over every governmental office, nationalized enterprise, and public organization. President Benes, who vacillated in the governmental crisis, accepted the government's resignation and a new, virtually all- Communist cabinet was formed. After 1948, organized opposition to the Czecho- slovak Communist Party �from either the non Communist political parties or underground �letivity �was eliminated. The party quickly consolidated its position as the "leading force" in shaping national life, and concentrated all pinver in the hands of a few top party leaders. The Czechoslovak regimes of Gottwald, Zapotocky, and Novotny remained in power by employing all the techniques at the disposal of a modern totalitarian state intimidation and terror, propaganda, and regulation of the political, economic, and cultural life of the people. In contrast to most of the Communist ruled countries of Eastern Europe, the death of Stalin in 19x`3 did not lead to a relaxation of the tight grip the Czechoslovak regime held on almost every aspect of national life. The defeatism of the people, the relatively high standard of living, and the economic concessions granted by the regime all contributed to delaying pressures for liberalization. In July 1960 the Communist regime proclaimed Czechoslovakia a "socialist state," the second in the world after the U.S.S.R., and renamed the country the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. At the same time the Communists wrote a new "socialist" constitution and made far reaching administrative changes. These changes called, inter alia, for the country to complete the "construction of a mature socialist society" by 1965, at which time it was supposed to begin the transition into a "Communist societv." To the sophisticated, urban Czechs, memories of democracy, and even of the relatively benign Austrian hegemony, made the Communist dictatorship increasingly difficult to endure. The ill feeling which the Slovaks had towar,] the Czechs and toward Czech domination of the central government created further problems on the domestic scene. By late 1962, economic failure exacerbated by political discord encouraged liberal forces inside and outside the Communist Party to demand the liberalization or de- Stalinization which had begun many years earlier in the U.S.S.R. and some other Eastern European Communist countries. After considerable pressure, the regime of Antonin Novotny was forced to modify its policies and permit a gradual "thaw. But even limited liberalization had adverse effects on the party. It permitted, for example, the feud between party liberals and conservatives to be brouy,ht into the open. Meanwhile, deep- seated differences within the Communist leadership, long just below the surface, were being aired publicly, often impeding the formulation or implementation of effective policies needed to deal with a number of urgent economic and social problems. Inertia seemed to grip the leadership, and this it; turn led to crippling confusion and the interparty crisis of the final months of 1967. 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 Aware of Novotny's vulnerabilit, Slovak officials led by Alexander Dubcek criticized iii the Central Committee the park boss and his ineffective, Czech dominated administration. Other party leaders, including Czechs who sought a change in leadership, soon joined in these personal attacks on the previocv.l� sacrosanct Novotny. He was replaced as First Secretary by Dubcek in January 1968. Dubcek and his colleagues won popular approval after they announced a comprehensive reform program �the so- called Action Program published in April 1968. Dubeek's proposed "clemocratization" called for ending the Communist Party's fight control of society. The program guaranteed personal righis and liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and the right to travel, work, and �in some cases reside abroad permanently. Lifting the part's heavy hand from the process of government, the program directed the National Assembly to assume its rightful rule as the "supreme organ of state power." In sum, the Czechoslovak Communist Part was given the task of "humanizing" socialism by making it responsive to basic democratic processes. From the beginning, however, the new leaders in Prague and their "political experiment" were confronted with significant opposition, both foreign and domestic. The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries saw in the reform program the seeds of a disintegration of the Czechoslovak Communist system which could have (lire effects on the political, economic, and even military integrity of the bloc. At the same time, conservative Czechoslovak Com- munists were concerned over both the ideological "deviation" of Dubeek's programs and their own political positions should he succeed. As foreign pressures on Dubce!. to modify his program mounted, most of the competing interest groups within Czechoslovak society closed ranks to foige a strong bond of anti- Soviet nationalism between. the liberal party leaders and the ordinary people. Domestic solidarity, however, could not deter the fateful Soviet decision. On the night of 20 -21 August 1968, approximately 3(N).O(X) troops, predominantly ;nom the Soviet Union but including forces from Fast Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary, occupied Prague and the other major urban areas. 'There was no organized military resistance, and casualties were extremely light, despite sporadic gunfire and &tt,,mpts by some Czechoslovak citizens to sabotage the movements of the invading troops. Key Czechoslovak leaders, including Dubcek, were taken to Moscow, where they were held captive during "negotiations" between 23 and 26 August. 4 During and immediately following the invasion. Czechoslovak national unit and loyalty to the Dubcek leadership reached unparalleled heights. The Soviets had mistakenly assumed that they could install a collaborationist regime within hours after the intervention, but these plans had to be changed when the Soviets realized that an abrupt ouster of the Dubcek leadership could result in an uprising similar to that in Hungary in 1936. Dubcek and the other top officials returned to Prague, and the Czechoslovak leadership remained intact. Nevertheless, the Soviets launched a campaign to deprive Dubcek of support within Czechoslovakia. Their primary tactic was to undermine the Dubcek leadership by forcing it to comply with Soviet demands. Meanwhile, a "shadow' leadership dominated by "realists," including Slovak Party boss Gustav Husak, gradually emerged. The newly ascendant group called for accommodation with Moscow as the only possible course, while attempting to curry popular favor by implementing those remnants of Dubcek's reform program that did not conflict with Soviet objectives. As the leading spokesman for "realism" and "normalization" of relations with Soviet Union, Husak won the party's nomination as Dubeek's successor and in April 1969 was named First Secretary (now called General Secretary). When Husak assumed power, he faced a faltering economy and a thoroughly disordered society. Although most Czechoslovaks looked with distaste on what they viewed as Husak's opportunistic willingness to do Moscow's bidding, they reluctantly agreed that he was the least odious of the available alternatives. Although Husak managed to inject a degree of restraint into the "normalization" process, as time went on the bulk of Dubeek's reforms were dismantled: censorship was reinstituted, the party's control over all segments of the government and society was restored, freedom of travel to the West was sharply curtailed, and the various special interest groups that had sprung up under Dubcek were either disbanded or reoriented to serve the purposes of the party. Moreover, the party was subjected to a massive purge. Of the 1.7 million party members when Husak came in, some 300,000 were stricken from the rolls and another 200,000 resigned in disgust. In the end, the individuals who were in the forefront of the Dubcek reform movement were removed from positions of power and ostracized. Dubcek, for example, was assigned to run a motor pool for the Slovak Forestry Administration. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 Nevertheless, Husak's "normalization" program has not included the administrative and police practices prevalent during the early days of the Novotny regime. Husak, himself a victim of a purge of so- called Slovak "bourgeois nationalists" in the early 1950's, successfully opposed putting the reformers on trial, at least not for their activities prior to the invasion. His success in deflecting the more severe reprisals advocated by the party's ultraconservatives. however, has led to squabbling among the leadership. The question of how to deal with the leading figures of the reform era remains it major point of contention S years after the events of 1968. While one faction apparently feels that the time has come to use selectively the talents of the Dubcek reformers in economic affairs and cultural efforts, the ultraconservatives voice paranoid concern over the continued danger posed by these "rightist opportimists." Husak seems to favor it policy of "differentiation.." He would separate the ex- reformers into an irredeemable "hard t� responsible f o r t he events of 1968, and "honest Communists" who were merely duped and who can return to the mainstream of Czechoslovak life by recanting. Although most of the country's technical experts appear to have reached a nuidus oiuendi with true regime, most creative artists and other intellectuals have resisted all the regime's blandishments and have boycotted the party controlled cultural organizations. As a result, the country has become it cultural wasteland. Within the part. Itusak has repeatedly counseled patience in dealing with the intellectuals, and in 1973 there were some signs that a less oppressive cultural policy might eventually be instituted. Husak has taken a wmll- publicized interest in popular welfare. More and better consumer goods are ayailablc, and for the most part, the populace has responded by grudgingly grcutting qualified accept- ance to t.I Itusak regime. Even more important, Husak has been accepted b% the So%iets. So iet party chief Brezhney made it clear during his visit to Prague in February !97:3 that Husak had passed the performance test, ending speculation that his stewardship over the party would be temporary and that he would be replaced by it more reliable conservative. In spite of all this, the Czechoslovak regime's claims to domestic "normalization" �i.e., that the "Prague Spring" has been obliterated �are it sharn. Internal repression, though hidden behind an aura of material prosperity, is harsher than it was in 1967, and leaders of the reform are in exile, in jail, or at least out of the way. Neither their erstwhile supporters nor their opponents who are now in power can forget the impact of the reformers. Indeed, current policies are what they are in large part because the reformers once held sway and because they continue to influence, eve if negatively, the thinking of the leadership. Although Prague has become more active in the field of foreign relations since late 1972, its activities in the field clearly remain circumscribed by the necessity to conform to the wishes of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Czechoslovakia is the loudest proponent of the "coordinated socialist foreign policy" that Moses%%' has called for from its allies. The Husak regime, however, will do what it can to utilize the openings created by the Soviet policy of detente to seek further recognition of its legitimacy. On the other hand, the potentially corrosive impact of detente will perhaps be f -it more in Prague than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. it should be noted that Moscow's rationale for the 1968 invasion was in large part to counter the danger stemming from Dubeek's inability to resist the alleged subversive influence of Western ideas. Husak inherited this rationale, but it now appears as if he may have to contend with much the same Western influence as a matter of policy, treading a tightrope between the impact the West will haiye on popular expectations and the demands of Soviet- imposed discipline. His success in this, as in all his other goals, is by no means a foregone conclusion. B. Structure and functioning of the government (C) 1. Constitutional developments The present "socialist" constitution of Czecho- slovakia was promulgated on I1 July 1960, replacing the one adopted in 1918. A new constitution, which w�ouid have codified the reforms of the Dubcek regime's "democratization program, was in the process of formulation in 1968. It became it casualty of the August invasion, however, and is now a dead letter. By early 1974 the Communist leadership had given no indication that it new constitution was being considered. The 1960 constitution changed the natne of the country fn,nr Czechoslovak Republic to Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and accorded the nation the distinction of being the second to achieve the status of a 'socialist st att after the U.S.S.R. The constitution is important not only as it legal document but also as a reflection of political and social changes imposed since the Communist accession to power in 1948. Like constitutions of all countries ruled by Communist 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 regimes, it is primarily an outline guide for the transition of the nation to "mature socialism." Only secondarily is it a charter setting forth the structure and operations of the government apparatus and the rights and duties of citizens. The programmatic character of the docurent suggests that the Communist Party, then under First Secretary Antonin Xovotny, planned to issue a new constitution when the leadership decided that the nation was prepared for the final transition to a Communist socie This temporary aspect of the MWO constitution further distinguishes it �in common with other Soviet bloc cunslit tit ions �frout most Western democratic hasic la%%s with their seeming assurances of perpetuity. F.tnphasis on the "socialist" character of the state is the salient characteristic of the 1960 constitution. It proclaims the affiliation of the nation to the bloc of socialist and Communist nations, a first for it Soviet bloc constitution. Hie Communist Party's monopoly of power is explicitly confirmed, as is the doctrine of "democratic centralisn." The Czechoslovak Com- munist Part, which had shaped the lives of the population and tFrc development of the countrx without arty for ad constitutional sanction since 1948, received cousti' utional status as the "vanguard if the %corking class" and the "leading force in the community and the state. The 1960constitution, like that of 1948, makes no mention of the fear existing puppet political parties, bu! it clearly spells out the influential role of the Communist controlled mass organizations, particularly the trade unions. Although the constitution of 1960 is patterned after the constitution of the U.S.S.R., especially with reg ard to the socioeconomic rights of citizens, the regime retained almost all aspects of the governmental structure of the 1948 constitution, xhich in turn had emhodied certain features 4 the democratic ('Z echoslovak constitution of 1920. Both postwar constitutions retained a seemingly powerful office of President of the Republic, creating an impression of I uridical confornity %it,', the� form of the popular First Republic. TIiv rete,rtion of a nominally powerful president as the chief executive officer of tiie government as well as head of state distinguishes the C -ch rslovak constitution from those of most other ?astern European Communist countries where the chairman of a multimember state council has the generally ceremonial role of head of state but virtually no executive functions. The Czechoslovak Com- munists thus sought to benefit from tLe strung attachment of the population to the democratic forms of the former republic by observing them in name, if not in substance. 6 The reincorporation of certain administrative mechanisms outlined in the earlier constitutions notvithstatAing, the present document gives legality to an unabashedly totalitarian system. There are, indeed, clauses reaffirming the principles of popular sovereignty, democratic government, and civil liberties, b,it they have littli significance because of the absence of meaningful implementing laws or decrees, and, most significantly, of adequate provisions for checks and balances. Unlike Western democratic constitutions, the Czechoslovak document places no limits on the arbitrary powers of the government. The classical concept of individual liberty was replaced by a nesy rubric of "collective freedom." Greater emphasis throughout is placed on he "equality" rather than on the "freedoms' of the individual. Furthermore, economic rights and duties arc stressed more than those of a political nature. Under the 1960 constitution, the concept of private property was eliminated and replaced by a more restrictive concept of "personal property, essentially limited to articles of private and domestic consumption, family houses, and savings acquired by "honest work." (It should be noted, however, that this provision has not inhibited the material acquisitive- ness of the Czechoslovak people; the present Husak regime has in fact encouraged this tendency as a means of diverting popular energies from political to mat!ria! goals.) The earlier constitutio r had allowed for small business enterprises mid _agricultural holdings but, because such prerogatives conflicted with part aims, they were progressively ignarod. The extension of state contol over virtually all businesses and the collectivization of farms were among the main features of the development toward "socialism" after 1948. Like its predecessor, the 19('0 charter proclaimed a "unitary stale of two fraternal (Slavic) nations possessing equal rights, the Czechs and the Slovaks." Both documents provided for local administration to he under the authority of national committees "accountable to the people," although the 1960 constitution alone specifically provided for popular elections. 'Pouching on the basic relationship of the Czech and Slovak people, one important reform envisaged in the stillborn 1968 constitutional draft, the federalization of the country into two separate Czech and Slovak republics, did survive the invasion and was enacted into law on 28 October 1968, the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic. This law of federalization went into effect on 1 January 1969 (Figures-2 and 3). APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 FIGURE 2. Czechoslovak National Assembly voting on the federal;za- tion low, 27 October 1968 (U /OU) La FIGURE 3. President Ludvik Svoboda signing the wastRu Tonal low declaring Czechoslovakia a federal republic, 30 October 1963 (U /OU) Federalization was the culmination of a Slovak drive, begun in 1968, to attain constitutional equality with the numerically superior Czechs. Slovak dissatisfaction over traditional Czech domination of the national administration dates from the founding of the republic in 1918. Various letislative concessions were made by both democratic and Communist regimes to grant the Slovaks a semiautonomous status, but none provided the Slovaks with meaningful control of their domestic affairs. During the belated de- Stalinization movement of the early 1960'x, the Slovaks focused their energies on gaining a greater share in the central government, but remained discontented with the concessions wrung from Prague. By 1967 Slovak officials were able to take advantage of Novotny's rapidly deteriorating political position and launched a renewed campaign for national autonorvy. Slovak nationalism played a key role in the collapse of the Novotny regime and was an important platforn of the successor Dubcek government, which committed itself to a new Czech Slovak federation. As Slot ak party boss under the Dubcek regime, Gustav Husak in 1968 was named deputy premier in chz ge of the "great Slovak dream federalization of a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 the country. He .njoyed a measure of popular support in Slovakia, and worked diligently against Czech opposition to engineer a meaningful federal program. The effort seemed doomed to defeat, but, ironically, was revived by the invasion, which gave Husak considerable leverage in asserting Slovak claims because it was widely believed the Soviets were opposed to them. Even after the federalization law was passed and partly implemented, howover, the uncertain vacillation between strong central authority and federalism continued. When Husak became First Secretary, in April 1969, he felt obliged to dismantle some of the federal alterations in the government structure already put into effect. A multitude of problems had been encountered in transferring legislative and executive powers from the central government to the separate republics. The diminished authority of Prague threatened to disrupt the social and political administration of the (country; Husak's efforts to assert absolute control were commensurately compromised. As a result, federalization became a serious liability to a government whose first obligation was to reesh political stability throughout the country. The regime, gradually transferred much of the regional authority back to national government institutions, and in December 1970 the Federal Assembly amended the federalization law to once again permit essential direction from Prague. This trend toward recentralization in ;practice while retaining the outward institutional forms of federalization has continued through 1973, and includes the effective reimposition of central controls over mass organizations, such as the trade unions, by means of newly created coordinating executive organs on the federal level. The public's assessment of the constitution is realistic; given the fact of the Communist Party's monopoly of p)wer, the Czechoslovak Government is one of peen, not laws. In this context, no written document, even if it contained legal constraints on governmental power �which the Czechoslovak constitution does not �can be viewed as providing a genuine recourse to the citizenry against an abuse of powr r by their rulers. 2. Legislative and executive functions a. Central government Although separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government are delineated in the constitution, no act ial separation of powers has existed under the Communists. Until for the period of Dubcek's incumbency, there were constant efforts to 13 concentrate as much power as possible in the hands of ,a few Communist leaden. The legislative body, the National Assembly, was in practice a tool of the executive branch. In turn, many leaders of the executive branch often simultaneously held leadership positiors in the Communist Party. This interrelation- ship between party and government leadership was personified by Antonin Novotny, who functioned as both First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Pariy and as President of the Republic between 1957 and January 1968. The numerous interlocking party and government positions enabled the party hierarchy easily to dominate the state apparatus. In 1968 the Dubcek leadership initiated an extensive reorganization of the government, which eventually would have been spelled out in a new constitution. The new plan separated and defined executive, legislative, and judicial responsibilities, and provided for the effective delegation of powers by the party, which would then withdraw from its ubiquitous tole in the governmental process. In particular, no longer would leadiii party officials have been permitted to assume top positions in the governmental hierarchy. The only major constitutional reform to survive the downfall of the Dubcek regime was the federalization of the country. Approved by the U.S.S.R., the federal law invested in the Czech and Slovak republics much of the executive power previously held by the central government, and provided for equal representation between the two nations in all remaining central government bodies. The premiers of the Czech and Slovak national governments automatically became deputy premiers of the federal government. Enforcement powers for laws enacted by individual republics as well as many federal laws were given to the separate republics. Areas limited solely to federal jurisdiction were foreign policy, national defense, and "materiel reserves" (strategic resources). Executive functions under joint jurisdiction of the federa! and two national governments included finance, prices, agriculture, transportation, communications, labor, internal security, and the mass media. In addition to the federal budget, each of the national governments was empowered to draw tip its own budget. Legislative powers, on the other hand, were left largely in the hands of the federal government, but both national administrations were given veto power in the federal legislature in such important matters as the federal budget, the distribution of revenues between the federation and national states, taxation, police affairs, and informati :)n media. Regional legislation was envisaged concerning civil and penal law, education, and conservation. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 The federalization law was a hastily drafted document and when promulgated was fur from complete, causing considerable administrative confusion and leading to disputes between Czechs and Slovaks, each fearful that the other was getting undo advantage. The composition and responsibilities of the bicameral Federal Assembly featuring a coequal Chamber of Nations, alongside the traditional Chamber of the People �.vas an early issue, as was the yet untested division of powers between federal and national governments. The abolition of 16 federal ministries and their replacement by federal "committees" posed serious staffing problems, particularly among the Slovaks who had fewer qualified officials. There .were inadequate national organizations in both the Czech lands and Slovakia. Moreover, the Czechs and Slovaks were to implement federalization at different speeds, when tandem cooperation was vital to the program's success. When Gustav Husak took over as party First Secretary in April 1969, it was his purpose quickly to reinstate strict centralized control of the country as the only possible course in the face of military occupation and the threat of a serious confrontation between the populace and Soviet troops. Federalization �in terms of the political and administrative separateness initially envisaged proved incompatible with Ilusak's new policy of "realism," and he has subsequently .whittled away most regional authority, placing the federal government and both national administrations under tight party control. In June 1970 a special party commission was set tip to review and propose changes in the federalization law. The commission's recommendations resulted in the enactment of Mditional legislation in December 1970 .which further reduced the regional autonomy of Czech and Slovak authorities in economic and administrative matters. Figure 4 depicts the federal arrangement, as amended. i Legislature- -The bicameral legislature, known as the Federal Assembly, consists of a Chamber of the People (the former National Assembly), and a Chamber of Nations. The Chamber of the People consists of 200 deputies elected on a proportional basis. The Chamber of Nations consists of 73 Czech and 73 Slovak representatives elected by the respective national legislatures, the popularly elected Czech and Slovak National Councils. Legislation must be approved by both chambers to become laws of the land. The Federal Assembly is governed by a Chairman, a First Vice Chairman, and a 40- member Presidium which consists of 20 deputies from the Chamber of the People. and 10 Czechs and 10 Slovaks from the Chamber of Nations. The Chairman and First ,'ice Chairman are elected in joint session of the assembly, and must alternate between Czech and Slovak. Dalibor Hanes, a Slovak and pro -Husak moderate, replaced Alexander Dubcek as Chairman of the Federal Assembly on 1.3 October 1969- -the latter's last significant post. In December 1971, Hanes himself was replaced Gy Alois Indra, a Czech and one of the most conservative, pro- Soviet members of the Communist Party's policymaking Presidium. Hanes remained a member of the Federal Assembly's Presidium, however, receiving the additional post of Chairman of the Chamber of Nations. Vaclav David, who served as Foreign Minister from 1933 to :8 and is a sycophant of the Soviets, was named Chairman of the Chamber of the People. The Federal Assembly Presidium carries out the duties of the Federal Assembly when the latter is not in session. It cannot, however, elect a President of the Republic, make a decision on peace for war, adopt the federal budget, or pass on a vote of confidence asked by the government. The Presidium issues decrees which become invalid unless approved by the next session of the Federal Assembly. This reshuffling of the legislative leadership followed the first national elections since the 1968 invasion, held on 26 -27 November 1971. The elections scheduled for November 1968 clearly had to be scrubbed in vi;w of the unsettled political and constitutionai conditions. The 1971 elections were held in a traditional, closely controlled manner in an atmosphere of intimidation and some antiregime pamphlefeering by dissident intellectuals. During the Novotny era, regular sessions of the National Assembly were largely devoted to approving legislative measures submitted by the President's cabinet. Parliamentary committees met outside the regular sessions to discuss legislation, to hear reports, and to draft recommendations. To expedite the implementation of measures, it parliamentary presidium consisting of 30 deputies selected by the party and elected by the assembly �sat year round and approved measures on a "temporary" basis. In this manner, the government could proceed in its course without waiting for the formal approval of the whole assembly in regular session. Beginning in 1963, the Novotny regime responded to demands for more rational, democratic government by granting the National Assembly greater respon- sibilities in policy and legislative matters as well as greater control over governmental ministries. The 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 regime largely offset these reforms, however, by increasing the role of the party in initiating and guiding legislation. The Party Central Committee established commissions to direct policy implement_ tion in the realms of ideology, the economy, standard of living, law, and agriculture. These commissions, chaired by members of the party hierarchy, were responsible only to the Party Central Committee and the Party Presidium; they had the power to dictate to the governmental minist.ies concerned as well as to the National Assen Iv and its committees. In addition, there was a patty organization parallel to, if not actually in, almost every government component to insure continuous party control. Dubcek's Action Program directed the National Assembly to assume its constitutional role as the "supreme organ of Mate power" and to" really decide on laws and important political questions." Party organs were no longer to do the work of state bodies, thus removing the party's omnipresence in govern- mental affairs. These reforms were abandoned in the wake of the invasion. Under the Husak regime, the Federal Assembly has again been subjugated to the pre- Dubcek system of party controls. Senior members of the Communist Party, including Husak himself, now sit on the Federal Assembly Presidium. Legislative initiative again rests with Party Central Committee commissions and departments. (2) Presidency �In contrast to the constitutions of most .)ther Communist countries, the Czechoslovak document provides for the position of a President of the Republic exercising real executive functions. This holdover from the 1920 constitution is in large part explained by the prestige originally attached to the office by the popularity of the first "President Liberator," Tomas G. Masaryk. Under the 1960 constitution, which was tailored to fit pasty boss Novotm the President is asysgned executive functions as Chief of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and representative of the state in all international dealings. He also exercises powers such as the appointment and recall of the Premier, cabinet members, all ranking government officials, and diplomatic representatives. While Novotny exercised these theoretical constitutional powers, his real authority as President flowed from his paramount role as Communist Party First Secretary. The President is elected by a three fifths majority of the Federal Assembly sitting in joint session. His term of office is 5 yea rs. It was the intention of the Dubeek government to divest the Presidency of the nearly limitless powers formerly associated with the offi -e, while retaining its ceremonial eminence. Ludvik Svoboda, who replaced Novotny as Chief of State in May 1968, was elected with the tacit understanding that he would be an interim, rubberstamp President (Figure 5). His widespread popularity based on his wartime exploits, along with his courage in standing up to the Soviets before and after the invasion, also served the interests of the Husak regime, which had no other figure with which the public could identify. Svoboda's image has subsequently been tarnished, however, because of his close association with the Husak egime and almost total acquiescence to So�.,et demands. Some dissidents, in fact, have blamed the aged (78 in 1973) general for having begun the postinvasion "dialog" with the Soviets, and thus allegedly compromising if not negating the possibility of active resistance to the occupation. As the expiration of Svoboda's 5 -year term (on 30 March 1973) came closer, a great deal of speculation emerged concerning his successor, and the impact this would have on the political configuration of the party leadership itself. Though in failing health mainly senility �and anxinw, to step aside, Svoboda was reelected to the Presidency. Indeed, as a consistent supporter of party chief Husak's political line, Svoboda reportedly was persuaded by Husak himself to accept the post to prevent a reshuffling of the hierarchy in favor of the hardline elements over Husak's moderate /conservative supporters. Given Svoboda's ill- health and advanced age, the regime realizes the problem of presidential succession and its impact has been only postponed. One consideration bearing on the selection of the next President will be his nationality; no Slovak has ever held that post and many may think that after Svoboda 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 FIGURE b. President of the Republic Ludvik Svoboda (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 the time will be right. Unless the regime decides in due course to combine the top party position and the Presidency �a proposition that is widely considered as unlikely in view of Novotny's adverse record under his arrangement prior to 1968 �the next President is likely to be a Czech assuming that Husak retains the top party slot. Some Czechoslovaks, however, foresee a time when Husak will be dispensable enough to be "kicked upstairs" into the Presidency. Although filling the office of a chief of state in a Communist country is normally a matter of small significance, both the unusual prerogatives of the Czechoslovak Presidency and Svoboda's ill- health will give this question continuing political and constitu- tional significance. With this in mind, some reports have suggested that the regime will seek a constitutional amendment abolishing the Presidency and establishing a collective executive on the model of the U.S.S.R. and some other East European regimes. It is unlikely, however, that the Czechoslovaks would lightly aba,.don the traditional office of President of the Republic unless a major political impasse developed in the selection of Svoboda's successor. (3) Cabinet �Under the federal system the powers of the cabinet (Council of Ministers) were to be sharply curtailed. Sole federal jurisdiction was to be limited to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense. All others were supposed to be reorganized to serve as coordinating agencies between federal and national governments. Each such changed ministry would then be assigned a state secretary as a Czech or Slovak counterpart to the minister. The existing 21 ministries were to be reduced to seven, with the abolished ministries being replaced by seven federal committees, each with equal Czech and Slovak representatiou. Like the five reorganized ministries, the committees were to be responsive to their rc7,pective cot� terparts in the Czech and Slovak governments. These changes were short lived, however. As part of Husak's program to recentralize economic planning, the cabinet system was again overhauled in December 1970. All federal committees were restructured into federal ministries, which now total 12. The old Ministry of Planning was replaced by a State Planning Commission, which is responsible for overall national planning. The office of state secretary, designed to give the Slovaks equal representation in the federal ministries, was also abolished. The names and the role of the federal ministries in early 1974 are given in Figure 4. All cabinet members, including the Premier are appointed by the President of the Republic; their tenure is subject to resignation or presidential recall. 12 I FIGURE 6. Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal (C) The present Premier, Lubomir Strougal (Figure 6), succeeded Oldrich Cernik in January 1970. The appointment of Strougal, then head of the powerful Czech Party Bureau and a potential rival to Husak, was engineered by Husak to strengthen his own position. The federal cabinet at the beginning of 1974 consisted of a tota! of 24 members. In addition to the Premier, there were 8 deputy premiers, 12 heads of ministries, and 3 ministers heading cabinet -level central agencies (the People's Control Committee, the State Planning Commission, and the State Price Bureau).' All 24 members belonged to the Communist Party. b. Czech and Slovak national government Under federalization, the governments of the individual Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics were organized parallel to the federal structure. Each of the two republics thus has its own Premier heading a cabinet which, in turn, directs the activities of local government organs, i.e., the national committees existing at the regional, district, and community levels within the respective republics. The Czech and Slovak National Councils are the legislative organs representing the "national sovereignty and individuality" of the respective republics. While their legislative powers are limited to regional mat`.ers, the National Councils provide the individual republics with considerably more autonomy than they previously had. The councils are empowered to implement, at the national republic level, laws passed by the Federal Assembly and to 'F'or a current listing of cabinet posts and key governmental officials, consult Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 "approve" international treaties whose implementa- tion requires regional legislation. The councils are also invested with the nominal power of appointment over regional judiciaries. Subordinate to the councils are a number of commissions which coordinate legislative activity in such fields as health, education, and transportation. Although the Czech National Council was an innovation of the fed( rulization plan, the Slovak National Council had been established as early as 1960, in deference to Slovak pressure for "autonomy." Before 1969, its legislative powers were limited to minor administrative matters, and all initiatives were subject to veto by the National Assembly. As implemented by the 1969 federalization scheme, the National Councils are bodies whose members are popularly elected for 4 -year terms. The Czech National Council has 200 representatives, the Slovak, 150. Deputies may not be prosecuted for criminal or political activity without the consent of their council. Each council elects its own presidium, which performs the functions of the main holy when it is not in session. fhe presidiums are empowered to appoint and remove national republic government officials, including the national premiers. c. Local government local administration in Czechoslovakia is conducted by a system of national committees which exist on the regional (kraj), district (okres) and community levels. The r mmittees are constitution- ally responsible, under the jurisdiction of the respective national governments, for the regulation of economic, cultural, educational, security, and civic services. Corresponding to the country's adnuaistra- tive breakdown, there are I I national committees with regional status, 118 with district status, and about 1 1,001) local committees. Members of the national committees, are popularly elected for 4 -year terms in the same manner and at the carne tirne as members of both of the National Councils and of the Federal Assembly. Each committee is run by an executive council, which varies in size depending on the area of jurisdiction. The function of the committee system is to closely supervise the activities of the individual citizen and to act as an administrative transmission belt from the national ministerial level to the local level. The committees are ci.arged with implementing govern- mental directives in virtually all social and economic spheres, including local transportation, sanitation, public order, community services, cultural activities, and the administration of local judicial organizations. Autonomous administration of economic enterprises of local importance is an important function of the committees. The national committees to a degree serve as ombudsmen for citizens' complaints, although this role varies widely among the localities and depends on the character of the officials invrlved. The Communists have claimed that the committees have contributed to Czechoslovakia's "democratic" system by directly involving the population in executive functions on the local level. dtl,ough the committees are constitutionally "accountable to the people," their elections and programs are closely managed and supervised by the central government. Moreover, it is the party organization at each level of local government that is the real locus of power. Prior to federalization, the national committees were directly subordinate to the central government. Whey are now ;csponsible to the respective national governments As part of its economic decentralization program, the Dubeek regime declared the regional nation� 1 committees "superfluous" and in June 1968 abolished the Slovak regional committees. Abolition of the Czech regional committees was preluded by the invasion. Reversing this process, the Husak regime in December 1970 reverted to the "three- tier" (kraj, okres, communal) national committee system throughout the country by reinstituting the three Slovak regional committees. I judicial system The constitution of 1960 amply demonstrates the. Communists' basic philosophy with respect to the role of the judiciary by charging it first with the protection of the "socialist state' �its social order �and then with the rights and "true interests" of the citizen. Lovalty to the political system is thus given priority over the protection of basic human rights. In addition, the constitution restricts the independence of the lower courts which had existed in the prewardernocracy and were theoretically preserved in the 1948 constitution. The traditional three systems of courts criminal, civil, and military �were through the early 1950's integrated into a single system. The Supreme Court, itself ur der firm central party control, came to supervise closely the work of the four lower courts: regional, district, local people's courts, and military. The local people's courts, which in 196. succeeded the once ubiquitous "comrade" courts, and whose function was to relieve higher courts of cases involving work discipline and minor breaches of "socialist order," were abolished in 1970. The structure and subordination of the court system is shown in Figure 4. 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 The reform mowinent of 1968 set in motion a full scale review of the judicial system with the intent of once more separating the judiciary from political control. Uccause of a combination of influences�the continuing pressures for reforms from the judiciary itself, the need of the Husak regime to align the judicial system along federa; lines, and the need to conic to grips %%ith the numerous It-gal problems following the invasion� suhstantial changes were enacted in December 1969. The powers and duties of the courts were specified in much greater detail, emphasizing the administrative separation of the judiciary from the government. The new laws explicitly confirmed the independence of judges, binding them only to the "legal order of the state. Many of the reforms were administrative, designed to increase the effic'ency of the court system. Under federalization, the Supreme Cot! t of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is the Highest judicial organ in the country. It has the lxwer of judicial review over the Supreme Courts (established in 1970) of the� Czech and Slovak Republics. %%hick in turn exercise review authority over the kraj and okre. courts. Judges of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia are elected to 10 -ar terms by the Federal Assembl on the nomination of the National Front (an "umbrella" political mass organization encompassing all political parties but firmly controlled by the Communists). Members of the national supreme courts are elected, also for 10 -year terms, by their respective National Councils. The regional court systems employ both professional and lay judges who theoretically have equal status. The constant turnover of the lay judges and their ignorance of legal procedures have decreased the courts' effectiveness, and the use of laymen is declining. Professional judges are now elected by National Councils of the Czech and Slovak Republics oil the nomination of the National Front for 10 yrar terms, a regime compromise with jurists who demanded permanent appointments. Lay judges are elected for 4 years I -y kraj or okres national committees. Judges can he recalled or prosecuted only by the action, or with the consent, of the organ electing them. The Czech and Slovak ministers of justice supervise the administrative aspects of the regional judicial systems, Including financing and assig Trent of clerical personnel. They also supervise the legal training and professional examinations of judges and determine their saki es. The military judicial system is under federal jurisdiction, with no direct participation by regional Czech and Slovak judicial authorities. The 14 administration of military justice corws under the jurisdiction of the federal Minister of National Defense, who acts through the ministry_ 's Militar\ Courts Administration. The authorih of the regional Czech and Slovak ministers of justice in criminal law affecting military personnel is limited to initiating judicial complaints. Judicial review of the military courts is exercised by the federal Supreme Court. "There are two levels of military courts military district courts and "higher" military courts which exercise jurisdiction in all criminal matters involving members of the armed forces. "These courts consist of both professional and lay judges who serve only while they themselves are members of the military. The military district and higher' courts are constituted and dissoled by the President of the Republic. Commanding officers exercise judicial authority in criminal cases involving 500 korunas or less, in accordance with the military Manual of Discipline. The federal Prosecutor General, and under him the two national prosecutors general, are responsible for the "observance of the la\%, and other legal regulations by ministries and other organs of state administration national committees, courts, economic and other organizations, and individual citizens." The federal Prosecutor General is appointed and recalled by the Federal Assembly, while the national prosecutors general are appointed and recalled by the presidiums of their respective National Councils. The prosecutors general operate through subordinate regional and district public prosecutors. From 19417 to 19178 the application of public, civil, and criminal law generally failed to respect the legal rights enumerated in the 11948 and 1960 constitutions. Criminal administrative law, in man\ cases, was enforced directly by the secret police %%ithout even it facade of court proceedings. Criminal cases requiring court action also were largely determined by state prosecutors, who gave judges orders on the basis of police evidence. De- Stalinization� parti, ularl with its emphasis on rectification of past "miscarriages of justice brought some liberalization to the court system after 1962. Party chief Novotny ordered periodic token amnesties of political prisoners but the judiciary remained tightly controlled by the Communist Party until his fall in January 1968. The liberal judiciary that briefly emerged under Dubcck soon came under severe attack by the Husak regime for its "inadequate protection' of the socialist state. Because of the difficult\ of finding "qualified" judges, the conservative retransforrnation of the judiciary began slowly, but by mid -1970 it had commenced in earnest. Most of the judges on the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 federal Supreme Court were removed mud politically conservative judges were appointed to succeed them. Under a hardline minister of justice, numerous judges within thi Czech judiciary were replaced. Efforts have since been made to fill hundreds of vacant judgeships, and to speed up prosecutions, which fell behind in 1968 -69. Husak had long publicly pledged that there would be no return to the harsh repressive judicial practices of the Stalinist era, and that punitive political trials would not be held. His determination on this score, however, was slowly whittled away by pressure from party extremists as well as by the sometimes audacious Political dissent by some of the ousted reformers of 1968. In 1972 a number of trials were held with many former reformers in the clock, although they were technically charged only with antistate political activity since the 19(78 invasion. The pressim-s that led to the trials also contributed to significant and harsh amendments to the legal codes enacted by the Federal Assembly in April 1973. The changes affected the codes of 1961, as amended in 196-5, and put on the books some provisions which %%ere even harsher than those of the Novotny era. For example, military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians in a wide range of generally ill- defined crimes involving "state secrets." The amended codes also virtually eliminated the hard -won rights of the defense with respect to its participation in the investigative pro ass and access to evidence. Moreover, the search and- seizure powers of the police (though long exercised in practice) were expanded and written into law. Finally, mast criminal sentences were increased, and provisions were made for export facto increase in sentences already being served if the inmate refused to cooperate. Refusal to undertake overtime work (which may total as much as 280 hours a year) or refusal to eat, i.e., engaging in a hunger strike, is now punishable by as much as I year added to the inmate's original sentence. C. Political dynamics Political fife in Czechoslovakia is, by virtue of popular alienation from the regime, even more insulated from domestic issues than is the case in neighboring East European countries; it consists essentially of factional party infighting, with virtually all serious candidates for positions of authority angling for support from the ultimate arbiter, the Soviet Union. A leadership capable of instilling a sense of national purpose has been conspicuously lacking since the Soviet -led invasion in 1968 and the ouster of the Dubcek government. Governmental instabili :v has been aggravated by the economic problems facing the nation. The events of the past several years have demoralized the Czechoslovaks who, for the most part, appear to have "given up." The popular esteem enjoyed by the political leaders is in inverse proportion to the degree of their commitment to Moscow, the sine qua non for an assured future for an aspiring politician. (U /OU) Knowing that little can change without the approval of Moscow, the Czechoslovak people ignore the maneuverings of the party except inasmuch as this results in policies that could affect the national welfare of the population. By 1973, the Husak regime appeared fairly secure and stable in having obtained Soviet endorsement of its "normalization" policies, and having gained a modicum of popular acceptance if not support. (U /OU) The regime, however, continues to be faced with a paradox. While the leaders wish to engage popular energies in support of the party's program particularly in the economic area �thev realize that government stability depends on the continued political apathy of the masses. Ins'ill;ng the lost sense of nationa! purpose thus conflicts with the regime's sense of self preservation, a conflict that is unlikely to be soon resolved. Meanwhile, most Czechoslovaks now pursue material well -being as a substitute for their repressed political impulses. (U /OU) 1. Assessment of the reform era (C) The reform movement which brought Alexander Dubcek to power in 1968 convulsed the Czechoslovak Communist P� rty by reevaluating the theory and the practice of unitary party control of the state. Beginning in 1967 as a reaction to the inadequacies ,i the Novotny leadership, the movement rapidly evolved into a revolt against the traditional Soviet model of party government citizen relations. It was essentially a palace revolution led by senior, dedicated Communists, and supported in differing degrees by a wide range of party members. The thrust toward reform then, not unexpectedly, elicited the enthusiastic support of the citizenry as a whAe. As the first effort by any ruling European Communist party to question its monopoly on power, the initiative set a precedent that, from the Soviet point of view, threatened to trigger the dissolution of Communist hegemony in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the reform era was accompanied by a maximum of fanfare and publicity, which, with its anti-Sovi -t thrust, further aroused the hostility of Moscow and other conservative Communist regimes. 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 After the experiment was abruptly checked in August 1566 by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations, it became Gustav Husak's task to reestablish the party's control over the entire government and social structure and thus to reassure the U.S.S.R. that r zechoslovakia no longer constituted a threat to its domain. This Husak has done. The Husak "counterreformation" has not, however, been a reversion to the authoritarian style of Novotny which held scant regard for popular needs or desires. Husak has emerged as a "moderate" with a new and distinct understanding of the structure and the governing authority of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. He has committed himself, insofar as possible, to base party rule ultimately on popular cooperation, despite the odds against this inherent in the popular mood. By 1973, there were increasing indications that the regime was ready, as political conditions allow, to look anew at some of the reforms of the 1968 era particularly in the economic sphere �with a view to implementing them in modified form. Yet each such hopeful sign appears balanced by countervailing repressive moves. Moreover, the advent of detente in Europe has intensified this conflict between the need for economic reinvigoration, if not reform, and the need for political ce ;ntrol in order to counter the potentially corrosive effect of Western influence. To a large extent the course of the Husak regime since 1969 has been influenced by the interplay of pro Soviet party extremists on one end of the spectrum and the disruptive though relatively benign political activity of liberal dissidents on the other. Husak's desire for political peace as a precondition for some degree of relaxation, cautious reform arid, ultimately, popular support has thus been inh;hited by the need to counter both liberal dissidence mid ultraconservative pressure for even more draconic measures. By alternately moving against both extremes, he may have wished to strengthen his fundamental position as a moderate /conservative. Yet to many Czechoslovaks he has only succeeded in appearing to yield to conflicting pressures arid, on balance, to be compromising his principles to Soviet desires. It is difficut to determine how many of Husak's "counterreforms" have been the result of Soviet pressures and how many have resu.ted from his own initiative. Once his "normalization" campaign had succeeded basically the n!establishmerit of party control domestically and reaffirmation of Czecho- slovak allegiance to the Soviet Union �Husak u to have been free to chart his own course so Ions as it was consistent with Moscow's foreign ,)olio% 16 objectives. Close Soviet supervision continues, and all important issues, such as economic planning, have stayed closely in step wit'. ;,oviet purposes. By early 1973, however, Moscow was clearly content to let Husak deal with his own domestic problems and endorsed his assertion that the p ocess of "normal- ization" had omen completed. Gustav Husak (Figure 7) has unquestionably put his personal stamp on Czechoslovakia. He is highly intelligent and dynamic, and effectively holds the reins of power. He is the first intellectual since Lenin to head a ruling European Communist party. His reputation as a competent political tactician stems larger from his role in establishing the Slovak state. An ardent Slovak nationalist, he was prominent in the anti -Nazi Slovak uprising in 1944, and emerged from the war a major Slovak political figure. Husak became embroiled in the power struggle following the Communist coup in 1948 that ushered in Czecho- slovakia's Stalinist era. Accused of "bourgeois nationalism," he was expelled from the party; in 1954 he was tried on trumped -up charges of treason, sabotage, and espionage, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was released in 1960, but avoided becoming politically active in the Novotny regime, for which he held no sympathy. Although he apparently played a minor role in the 1967 drive to unseat Novotny, he was picked up by Dubcek in early 1968 to mastermind the Slovak drive for federalization. During the first two decades of Communist rule, Husak refined a sense of political "realism" which, by his own evaluation, governs his formulation of current policies. His dealings with both the Germans and the Soviets during the war years, his political caution APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 FIGURE 7. General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Gustav Husak (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 during the waning years of th^ Novotny regime and during the reform era, his reversal on the issue of federalization, and his cooperative attitude toward the Soviet Union all indicate an ability to weigh carefully the pros and cons of a given course of action. Influenced no doubt by his own long incarceration, Husak also seems to have little stomach for oppression and terror despite a willingness to use harsh measures in order to avoid being exposed to political pressure by the ultraconservative elements in the party. His interest in fedcrali7ation also indicated a willingness to treat with moderation traditionally trouFlesome problems such as Czech Slovak rivalries and the church, as long as neither threatened to undermine Comp..unist control. Husak's success in his attempt !o pursue course somewhat akin to the reformist but politically correct program of Hungarian party leader Kadar is by no means assured. Husak is caught in the crossfhe between those who still fear and wish to suppress everything reminiscent of the 1968 reform era, and those advocates of reform who will accept )nh� a wholesale reviv; of the Dubeek program. In between are those elements which, like Husak himself, see that nothing can come of such continual snipinj, proclaim 1968 to be "history." and ardently wish that moderate forward movement would replace the stagnant hostility which has to a large extent sapped the energy of the regime and maintained the wide gulf between it and the people. There were signs in 19 that this might, be accomplished, but these signs were still inconclusive. 2. The Communist regime (C) a. Background The introduction of Communist rule in Czecho- slovakia in February 1948 effectively terminated the popular democratic parliamentary form of govern- ment which had first been introduced in 1918. Non Communist political parties were either disbanded, or merged with or reduced to mere puppets of the ruling Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC). The Communist Party, four puppet parties, and various mass organizations were molded into a unified mass organiza! ion, the National Front, dominated by the Communists, which presented a single list -,f approved candidates at election time. While givia.,g some attention to the maintenance of a democratic facade, the Communist Party influenced all facets of national and social life, much on the pattern of its prototype in the U.S.S.R. Gradually the party became the dominant force through coercion and terror, which reached its zenith during the bloody anti- Titoist trials in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The regime at the same time moved quietly to tighten its grip on the educational institutions, the church, and the information media. Virtually all outlets of cultural and political expression eventually came under Communist control. Trade unions became a mere transmission belt for the imposition of labor discipline and the party's economic directives. In order to facilitate indoctrina- tion and control of the population, the Communists created such mass organizations as the Communist Youth Union and various athletic, and friendship societies. Although choice was permitted theoretically, membership in these organizations was, for the most part, compulsory. From 1953, when Antonin Novotny become Party First Secretary, until 1960, the Czechoslovak regime was one of the most stable in Eastern Europe. After Stalin's death in 1953, the regime successfully suppressed pressures toward liberalization. Unlike its Polish and Hungarian counterparts, the Novotny regime maintained a tight grip on the country and was able to prevent the serious unrest which broke out in neighboring Communist states. Although there were forces in Czechoslovak society that retained some vitality during the years of repression, they were devoid of the massive popular support which elsewhere in the Soviet orbit was successfully pressing indigenous regimes toward varying degrees of de- Stalinb: ation. It was not until the 12th Partv Congress in December 1962 that reform ele,nent,. in the Party Central Committee, possibly with veiled Soviet support, gained enough influence to push through a resolution favoring, at least some tents ive steps toward liberalization. The iegime began this campaign by calling for a review of the purge trials and executions of Communists between 1949 and 1954. At about the same time that the party began to loosen its grip somewhat, the once prosperous Czechoslovak economy, damaged by misdirected Communist management in the 1950's, began to decline precipitously. In !963 shortages and industrial stagnation triggered widespread popular discontent. Criticism of the economy led to a wider call for reform. Debates on virtually --very aspect of the party's political and social policy became commonplace, avd an overall deterioration in party discipline ensued. Growing dissatisfaction among other sectors of the society contributed to the malaise. The intellectuals emulating their counterparts in Poland apd Hungary in the mid- 1950's �were particularly active in pushing 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 for an easing of restrictions on creativity in many aspects of the intellectual and cu!tural life of the Ration. The Slovaks commenced a hold drive to regain some degree of autonomy and to rectify past injustices perpetrated b% the central government. Stimulated to greater efforts. the liberal faction among the Communist began to exercise genuine influence in part% affairs. In manv instances, the demands of the Czech and Slovak party liberals initial!% coincided. In time, however. traditional Czech- S!ovak animosities reemerged as a crucial problem, and combined with a growing popular awareness and involvement to add to the instability. By late 196:3, Novotnv himself appeared in danger of being toppled. By carp� 1964, however, Novotny seemed to have decided on tactics that would enable him to restore oiler and reconsolidate his power. One significant comp. was his decision in 1966 to bring into the part% it aurnber of younger, more liberal members to offset the influence of the dogmatists who were hindering economic reforms. The newcomers, who comprised half of the Central Committee, quickly became discouraged with Novotny's dilatory approach toward reform and consid-vred him an impediment to meaningful liberalization. The intensification of differences between the liberals and conservatives in the p- ity became so acute that by mid- 1967 a stalemate in Icaders!1j) resulted. A number of serious problems, notably the continuing decline in the economic growth rate, could no longer he conceded or rationalized. The regime's problems were significantly height- ened by its inability to cmmtrol or to achieve rapport with the intellectual community. Czechoslovak youth also contributed to the pressures for change and became it force which the regime could not ignore. During demonstrations in October and November 1967 protesting poor living coi ditions in their Prague dormitories, students were badly mishandled by the police. "Phis, and a number of other political misadventures in which the regime was culpable, served to magnify intraparty confusion. When the Central Committee met in it plenary session in October 1967, Novotny 's position was in serious jeopardy. Encouraged by his apparent vulnerability, Slovak leaders launched it Iwid and personal attack against him, suggesting that it was time for collective leadership and that the next President ought to be it Slovak. Novotnv w ;s able to postpone discussion of the leadership question until December, but throughout the period he continued to lose support at all levels of the party. IK Soviet apprehensions a6ont events in Czecho- slovakia became apparent in the final weeks of 1967. Sw.eral delegations from the U.S.S.R. visited Prague in late November and earl% December to sign bilateral agreements and to assess the state of the economy and the extent of unrest among intellectuals and youth Soviet park chief Brezhncv, at the urging of Novotny and the Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, made a sudden visit to Prague on 8-9 December it, discuss the situation in the party leadership, but reportedly refused to he drawn into the quarrel on the ground that it was an internal matter. Although the Soviets had preyiousl sought in various ways to holster Novotny's position, it was obvious that Brezhncv, at this point, was more interested in stability than in Novotny "s personal fortunes. Regardless of the circumspect role played by Brezhncv, many Czechoslovaks resented his presence and regarded it as unwarranted interference in Czechoslovak affairs. The Central Committee met in it healed but inconclusive session between 19 and 21 December, during which Novotny attempted to intimidate his adversaries by threatening to use the army against them. Some of Novotny's close associates attempted a military coup %%hich was foiled by an alert general. When the Central Committee sessions were resumed in January, Novotny was ousted as the Party First Secretary and was replaced by Dubcek. Novotny still retained the Presidency, however, as well as his seat on the Party Central Committee and its Presidium. After it succession of political setbacks, the fate of the Novotny regime was scaled in February 1968, when Czechoslovak Army General Jan Sejna defected to the United States. Because of Sejna's close relations with Novotny, the defection caused a sensation and led to allegations of Scjna's corruption and participation in military coup plotting on Novotn%'s behalf. 'There were widespread demands from wit: ;in the party for Novotny retirement from political life. Novotny refused to step down despite Dubeck's urging, but in March was forced from the Presidency and the Part% Presidium. h. The Duheek era Alexander Dubcek (Figure S) and his colleagues rapidly attained popularity once they had launched their comprehensive reform program in April 1968. "r'his Action Program clearly designed to synthesize communism with basic democratic principles and promised profound changes in virtually every sector of Czechoslovak society. To many Czechoslovak Communists whose naive idealism was dashed by the gars of Stalinist oppression, Dubcek APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 symbolized that synthesis of socialism and humanism which many of them erroneously believed would ensue after the 1948 coup. In one sense, therefore, 1968 seemed to wipe clean the Stalinist slate and begin anew. This factor contributed to the tremendous release of political energy that characterized the Dubcek era. Despite inadequate time for thorough preparation and a bitter hchind- the scenes struggle waged by the conservatives, the Action Program was well underway by early summer of 1968. In quickly freeing the mass media and making substantial personnel changes in government and party organs, the program strengthened Dubeek's popular and party position. His appointments were designed to appeal to the idest possible range of the party membership and impeilalion. He concentrated on replacing the old guard conservative ideologists with younger technical experts anxious to implement sweeping economic and political reforms. Dubcek also sought to strengthen the representation of particular interest groups such as farmers, intellectuals, and national minorities. Inevitably, frictiow, between interest groups emerged. Conservatives, both inside and outside the party, opposed Dubeek's changes for ideological reasons and for fear of losing their positions. Progressives began to urge immediate and more sweeping reform measures. Czechs and Slovaks engaged in a debate over the steps required to federalize the government structure and the varying interpretations of the idea of "equality." But once the Soviet Union in the summer of 1968 intensified its pressure on Dubcek to modify his reform program. competing interest groups began to unify around the leadership on the basis of patriotism. As the pressures increased, popular attitudes became inereasingh hostile toward the Soviet Union and forged a strung lxwnd between the liberal party leaders and the people. Dubcek, President Svoboda, and other leaders became national heroes after standing up to the Soviets during the confrontation between the Czechoslovak Part Presidium and the Soviet Party Politburo in July 1968 at Cierna nad Tisou" near the Soviet border. A subsequent meeting between Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders in Bratislava seemed publicly amiable, but in fact may have represented Dubeck's last chance to moderate his course. Dubcek either failed to recognize or ignored the warnings. In response, the Soviet leadership, already distrustful of Dubxek's reforms and fearful that they would eventually lead to Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the socialist camp, disrupt the political and economic unity of the Warsaw Pact nations. and infect the other Fast European countries and the U.S.S.R. itself, ordered Soviet troops and Warsay. Pact forces from Hungary, Poland, East Cennany, and Bulgaria into Czechoslovakia on the night 20 -21 August 1968 (Figure 9). The ability of the Dubcek leadership to remain in power for some 8 months after the entry of Soviet troops can be attributed to the unprecedented wave of national unity that the invasion precipitated. It even prupell-d a number of prominent conservatives, who opposed the reform program, into the Dubcek camp. The immediate aim of the Soviet Union was political stability and, after failing to install a pupp ^t regime, the Soviets realized that if the Czechoslovak leadership were deposed by force, the csult might be open rebellion. The Soviet leaders decided to let the Dubcek regime remain in power but at the expense of the reform programs which were to be drastically curtailed. Moscow reasoned that Dubcek could eventually be reduced to a puppet or his popular support could be eroded to the point where he could be removed without creating a stir. The ground swell of public support for the government eng0ed the Dubcek leadership initially to weather enormous Soviet pressures, including the infamous "inquisition" of Dubcek, Premier Cernik, and others in Moscow from 23 to 26 August, which included physical maltreatmert, as well as threats of 'For the diacritics on place names, see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map and the map itself in the Countr% Profile chapter. 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 FIGURE 8. Alexander Dubcek --the happy face of socialism, 1968 May Day parade IU /0111 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 FtiURE 9. Soviet -led invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 1968 (C) dismemberment of the republic and the establishmer:t of an occupation government. The Soviets in the ensuing months, not totally insensitive to world criticism and reluctant to engage in full -scale repression, were vulnerable to political blackmail on the part of the Czechoslovak population itself. Anti Soviet demonstrations in October and November 0ireatened to bur.:t into full -scale rictiny, and in late December over i million workers threatened nationwide demonstrations and strikes if any of the tots reformist leaders were ousted from their posts. With such critical political issues at stake, however, the Czechoslovak leadership inevitably divided again over what courses of action to t -ke. Dubeek came under fire from many of his liberal supporters who claimed he was going too far in satisfying Soviet den ands, which were spelled out in the "Moscow protocol" of October 1968. Moderates joined the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 liberals who attacked him for bowing to Soviet desires. Both telt that he was permitting the conservatives to enhance their politics positions. Thy.� conservatives, for their part, pressed Dubcek to move faster to satisfy Soviet demands. Rivalry between Czech and Slovak leaders sharpened over the it uninent implementation of the federalization program, with the Czechs fearful of losing their traditional prerogatives and the Slovaks complaining that they would still be dominat( d by the more numerous Czechs on the basis of "majority rule." Czechoslovak leaders also disagreed over the status of- forc-,s agreement which they felt constrained to sign with the Soviets in October in Prague. Although the pact called for the removal of the busk of the Soviet occupation troops by mid- December 1968 �an actual reduction to about 60,000 �it also gav� a semblance of legality to the "tempori ry" stationing of Soviet troops in the country. In sum, the Soviet hope to erode Dubeek's popular support seemed to be working. By late December, the Dubcek leadership had begun to lose some of its drive as a result of indecision and the competing demands of the various factions. The liberals were attempting to save the remnants of the reform program while the "realists" or the centrists were trying to reconcile the demands of the population With those of the Soviet Union. The pro Soviet conservatives, meanwhile, were seeking to develop an opposition bloc in the Central Committee as a springboard to power. At the same time, Soviet officials were making a concerted effort to expand their contacts with Czechoslovaks at all levels of the party and government, hoping to persuade middle and lower level officials to support the conservative cause. Dubeek's political position had rapidly deteriorated by early 1%9, enabling the Soviets to seek out a more amenable successor. In April of that year Dubcek was forced to step aside in favor of Gustav Husak. c. Husak and the return to normalcy Gustav Husak's rise to power began with his assignment, in April 1968, to lead the Slovak fight for federalization. Th, campaign led to heated (Imputes with the Czech leaders and, although the Slovaks seemed headed for defeat on the issue, Husak reemerged as an influential national political figure. Husak made his mark with the Soviets immediately following the invasion. Fir was a member of President Svoboda's delegation to Nloscow to negotiate the release of Dubcek and the other leaders who had been taken prisoner. During the talks, Husak argued cogently and forcefully; he apparently impressed his Soviet counterparts who began a dialog with him that has continued to the present. Husak had also established a record acceptable to the Soviets and most of his party colleagues on the reform programs. While he championed federalization and many of the "democratic" reforms that went with it, he had been critical of several "incorrect views" incorporated in the Action Program. Husak's increasing influence at home won him election to the Presidium and Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party during the "illegal" 14th Party Congress conducted secretly in the shadow of Soviet guns on 22 August. Following his return to Czechoslovakia from Moscow, Husak dominated the "extraordinary" Slovak Party Congress 26 -29 August and was elected First Secretary_ of the Slovak Communist Party. Shortly thereafter Husak delineated his policy of "realism" and became the foremost spokesman for "normalization" �broad compliance with Moscow's demands �as the only possible course in the face of military occupation and the threat of violent repression. Husak's apparent transformation from a nationalist to an uncompromising supporter of "normalization" appears to have been entirely pragmatic. His stress on the bilateral character of the Moscow Agreement suggests that he believed the Soviets would make no significant concessions to Prague until their demands had been met. The strong leadership exercised by Husak in the aftermath of the invasion Dubcek appears to have relied heavily on him �and his dialog with numerous Russian visitors led to widespread speculation as early As September 1968 that he was being groomed as Dubeek's successor. Gradually, Husak achieved greater prominence while Dubcek fad into the background. The anti- Soviet rioting triggered by Czechoslovakia's ice hockey victory over the Soviet Union in March 1969 embroiled the Czechoslovak leadership in its most serious crisis !after the invasion. The Russians apparently demanded Dubcek's ouster and the installation of new leaders who could exercise effective control over the population. Husak was instrumental in organizing a new regime whose members were more acceptable to the Soviets. Husak was subsequently nominated for the post of party chief by Dubcek, and he received the overwhelming support �often for conflicting reasons �of the members of the Central Committee on 17 April 1969. Moscow's role in Husak's ascendancy is not entirelv clear, but the Soviet leaders appear to have accepted him on the basis of his strength in Prague and their 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 belief that his Slovak "nationalism" and his authoritarianism would work to their advantage. The Russians may also have believed that, if necessary, it would he it relatively simple matter to replace the cautious and pragmatic Ilusak who did not command the intense loyalty and support of most Czechoslovaks. Husak wits immediately prPoecupiedi with establishing his own authority in the party, it delicate task in view of the hitter conflict between the liberal, centrist, and conservative factions. A struggle soon began between Husak and part conservatives for control. There were substantial numbers of conservatives in the part hierarch v, including Luhomir Strougal, Vasil Bilak, and Alois Indra who, although opposed to the course the M'S reform program had taken and to a large degree victimized by it, were able to retain a precarious hold on their positions until the invasion. Subsequently supported by the Soviets, who were anxiously seeking it nd�w Czechoslovak leadership, the conservatives gained a new lease on life. Immediately following Husak's ascendancy, conservative leaders began voicing opposition to Husak's relatively restrained policies. It was clear from Ilusak's speeches that he held little sympathy for many of the conservatives' demands, such as it wholesale purge of the party and political trials. Ilis tenuous domestic position, however, and his need to convince the Soviets that he was the proper nian to head the country's "normalization" program depended on it ntodicurn of conservative support. To hold conservative criticism to it minimum he was forced to grant them numerous concessions. Many of Dubcek's reforms were slowed or reversed. Increasing numbers of conservative and dogmatic hardliners began finding their way into important part and government positions. The press emerged as it battleground between Husak supporters and the dogmatists over key issues, such as how energetically to purge the Duhcek reformers. As the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion approached, however, it became clear that a major lest of Husak's ability to maintain domestic stability was approaching. Antiregime and anti- Soviet incidents increased, generating a volatile atmosphere in the country. Moscow manifested considerable uneasiness over the situation, and made thinly veiled threats of military intervention if Czechoslovak security forces were unable to maintain order. 'rhe Soviets' failure openly to support Husak heightened popular fears that they were seeking a more repressi%v regime. Continuing economic difficulties, highlighted by worsening morale in the factories, contributed to the general nalaise. .1 a Large -scale demonstrations occurred following the first atumve.sary of the invasion. The regime prevented extensity, violence, however, b- tight security measures .which included emergency security legislation, massive preventive arrests, and, occasionally, brutal police tactics. H usak's willingness to use force earned him much needed Soviet approval, conveyed through an appreciative Soviet press and a belated Order of Lenin award for his wartime efforts in Slovakia. Nevertheless, the demonstrations were embarrassing to the regime and it left Husak little choice but to launch it nationwide purge of liberals, which he had previously eschewed. During it Central Committee plenum in September, Husak announced that the purge would affect the party, government, and social organizations with emphasis on local party organizations. He stopped short of justifying the invasion despite the urgings of the conservatives, but his remarks pleased Moscow, because they were it quantum leap from his previous ambivalence. It was at tl,e September plenum that Dubeek lost his remaining official positions in the Party Presidium and his chairmanship of the Federal Assembly. The Czechoslovak Central Committee plenum scheduled for January 190 was expected to he a major test for Husak in the leadership struggle. After it was over, however, in terms of personnel appointments and party policies, it was clear that neither Husak nor the cons rvatives could achieve more than it standoff. Within the top party organs, Husak clearly held his own. The three remaining liberals in the Presidium, Oldrich Cernik, Karel Polacek, and Stefan Sadiovsky, were removed. as was expected. Whatever ground Husak may have been compelled to yield as a result of these appointments was more than regained by the transfer of Luhomir Strougal from Czech party boss to federal Premier, thus removing Strougal from his political base in the part. In addition, Husak named moderates to head the Czech and Slovak party organizations, respectively. Perhaps the most threatening development at the January plenum was the appointment of a predominantly hardline commission to implement the part membership card exchange program. This progran was designed to purge the party membership of liberals hut, if carried to the extremes the hardliners were demanding, threatened to erode Htsak's support. The dogmatists, motivated in part by the Soviets, sought a drastically reduced membership, leaving it small, highly centralized and disciplined elite to rule without the encumbrances of an unwieldy party structure and membership. Some of 'hem demanded APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 the ouster of all who had any com.,,etion with the Dubcek regime or who had objected to the Soviet invasion. Willingness to approve of the invasion became the touchstone of a member's "reliability." As the purge progressed, it became clear that the dogmatists would be unable to prevail. Most of the local party commissions conducting the reliability interviews refused to utilize the heavily slant.d criteria presented by the hardline commissioners in Prague. In some instances, the interviews turned into fiascos, with more aggressive party members either refusing to cooperate or launching counterattacks on the commission member.. Many members simply resigned in disgust, while othea., cajoled their interviewers into renewing party cards. The result of the purge was a decided victory for Husak. Some 300.000 party members were ousted which, in addition to the 200,000 believed to have resigned prior to the purge, left a membership of about 1,200,000. The bulk of those removed were liberals who had supported the Dubcek reform program and who had refused to recant their sins and follow the new party line. The intellectual group was the hardest hit by the purge, followed by officials of the central government, especially those in positions that called for dealing with foreigners, because such posts were now judged to be "sensitive." By the summer of 1970 Husak evidenced a growing confidence in his ability to head off conservative pressures and to guide the part% as he saw fit. The party simultaneously published !t preliminary interpretation of Dubcek's role in the reform movement, describing him not as the principal villain behind the liberalization process but ay the dupe of "antisocialist forces." Dubcek's tenure was depicted as an aberration, brought on by Lzq overemphasis in late 1967 on party unity when the ;:e exercise of Leninist criteria would have resulted in the selection of a more qualified and foreciul man. Party spokesmen, nevertheless, have consistently defended Novotnv's removal as a legitimate move toward correcting the numerous problems that faced the country. This theme was developed further in December 1970 when the Central Committee approved the regime's official definition of the "lessons to be learned from the Dubcek and late Novotny periods. The document, published in early 1971, is intended to serve as a model and warning to other Communist regimes faced with potential reformist pressures. "Full title Lessons Drawn from the Crisis Development in the Party and Society after the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The u:.ev.mtful second anniversary of the invasion in August 1970 was touted by the regime as proof that "normalization" had been a success, and Husak seemed to be confident enough of his own position to call for convocation in May 1971 of the long delayed Party C-ngress. The 14th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, held in Prague on 25-29 May, formally marked the end of one phase of Czechoslovak history and the beginning of another. The congress outwardly held out little hope for early relaxation, moderation, and national reconciliation. There was in fact little solace to be gleaned from congress proceedings for purged Communist reformers and the non Communist popt�' :lion. Several changes i the amended party statutes (such as the abolition of the Czech Party Bureau) had the effect of eroding still further what little remained of federalization and of tying the Czechoslovak party closer to its Soviet model. The overall effect of the amendments, moreover, strengthened central party control and discipiine over the membership. The Soviet rationale for the invasion �an act of "selfless international assistance" intended to save socialism in Czechoslovakia and carried out in response to the "appeals" of leading Czechoslovak party -state officials �was enshrined as party dogma. Husak, who is on record as initially opposing the invasion, expressed his gratitude and thanked Brezhnev for his role in it. Husak's reversal, dictated apparently by politicvl expediency, merely contrib- uted to the atmosphere at the congress, which glorified all thiags Soviet. The few personnel changes that took place in the party hierarchy seemingly strengthened the pro Soviet, hardline cast of the Presidium �at the expense of the more moderate position generally associated with Husak. On balance, the congress stressed the collective character of party authority and underscored the fact that Husak would continue to pay for his preeminence with fundamental compromises wish his conservative colleagues. Although a show of cohesiveness and unity was apparent factionalism was in fact formally proscribed by fiat �Husak was not permitted by the Soviets to have a leadership constellation of his own choosing even if he were otherwise able to do so. Since the congress Husak has secured his position both with the Soviets and his internal critics. He obtained wholesale endorsement of his course �and the Order of Lenin- -from Brezhnev when the latter visited Prague in February 1973, the 25th anniversary of the :.ommunist coup. internally, his position as first among equals is unchallenged, although it apparently 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 serves Soviet purposes to maintain a potential for criticism by prexy. In short, while Husak seems secure from attack by the hardliners, he has not been allowed to remove them from the leadership. Vasil Bilak, who was accused of collaboration in August 1968, has long been regarded as a Soviet favorite and a man posing the most easily discernible threat to Husak. Bila!, is a member of the Presidium and is the Party Secretary in charge of international -lations, although there have been reports that he has, perhaps coincident to the transfer of India to the largely ceremonial position of head of parliament, assumed a greater role in the formulation of domestic policies In late February 1972 rumors circulated in Prague that Husak had mrde a secret trip to Moscow to complain about Bilak's domestic activities and that Bilak, in turn, was summoned by Brezhnev for disciplining. On 19 April Bilak publicly disclaimed any differences between himself and Husak and gave high praise to the party leader, lending credibility to the rumors. In view of Husak's reputation as a master tactician and of the acrimony which has existed between the two men for years, Husak can be expected to keep a particularly close watch over Bilak's activities. It is generally conceded, even by Husak's bitter critics, that in intellect and ability Lc f_-. exceeds other members of the Czechoslovak leadership. He appears thus far to have prevented anv single Czechoslovak leader from seriously challenging his position. While there have been rumors of ultraconservative plots to unseat him, the Soviets �who retain the final say on who Should rule in Czechoslovakia �would hardly permit his ouster at this time, if only because they would not want a leadership struggle in Prague which could affect Soviet policies of detente. Husak has given Brezhnev a stable, if sullen, Czechoslovakia, which has in many respects resumed its role of "model satellite." Should Husak falter or become a liabilitv, however, Moscow would undoubtedly replace him. 3. Communist Party organization and member- ship (S) As part of its goal of democratization, the Dubeek regime in 1968 launched a comprehensive review of the organization, structure, and delegation of responsibilities among the organs of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC). The most important of the pending changes was the division of the party into two separate but equal components: the Czech Com- munist Partv and the Slovak Communist Party. This division was to have paralleled the federalization of the government. Few of the proposed party reforms 24 survived the invasion, however, and today federaliza- tion of the party is a dead letter. The basic rules governing the organization of the party in 1913, together with its functions and membership requirements, are contained in the party statutes adopted at the 14th Party Congress in May 1971. Among the statutory changes introduced at the 14th Congress was the change in name for the top party position from First Secretary to Secretary General, and the lengthened interval between congresses from 4 to i years. In both instances the KSC clearly followed the Soviet model. Like other Communist parties, the KSC is theoretically guided by the principle of democratic centralism. The main theoretical elements of democratic centralism include election of all party leaders, strict party discipline, the accountability of higher party bodies to lower bodies, the indisputable and compulsory nature of decisions once made, and the subjer�tion of the minority to the majority. Husak has clearly concentrated political power in the KSC top leadership. Nevertheless, the repeated turnover of personnel and changes in policy since 1968 have left unclear important aspects of its day -to -day management and working relationships among the top leaders and party organs. Husak clearly dominates policymaking, but it is difficult to assess the degree of support he enjoys among the hierarchy or the extent to which he has delegated administrative responsibilities to his colleagues in the Secretariat and Presidium. The public image of party unity that KSC leaders evinced during the 14th Party Congress does not hide the fact that now dormant ideological and personal differences could have a significant effect on party administra- tion Subordinate to the national party is the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) which serves as a transmission belt for promulgating directives of the KSC throughout the respective regional, district, and' local party organs in Slovakia. The Central Committee Bureau for the conduct of party work in the Czech Lands (Czech party bureau), established in November 1968 as a stopgap measure pending the outcome of party federalization plans, was dropped at the 14th Party Congress. The organizationa; hierarchy of the Communist party system in Czechoslovakia is shown in Figure 10. a. Central organs The KSC Party Congress, which now convenes every .5 years, is in theory the supreme organ of the party. In practice, however, t!ie congress has merely served to ratify the policies fixed by the top leadership. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 hold plenary sessions at least once every 4 months and to report on its work to the lower party organs. In exercising party supervision of government programs the Central Committee operates through It departments: Agriculture Economy Education, Science, and Culture Elected State Organizations Ideology Industry, Transportation, and Communir--ions Internal Affairs Organization and Politics Pan, Radio, and Television Social Organizations State Administration As a collective body, the congress elects the Central Committee, hears the reports from the various party committees, and reaffirms general party policy. An extraordinary congress may be called by a vote of one third of the members of 'he Central Committee. The Central Committee has the assigned task of directing the work of the party between congresses and of organizing aid supervisi:ig the executive agencies of the KSC, including its own 11 administrative departments. It promulgates directives on the implementation of party policies. It also appoints chief editors of the party's central press and maintains central funds. The Central Committee is comprised primarily of technicians and "apparatchiki" (plant managers, party functionaries, and bureaucrats). The size of the Central Committee varies, often reflecting the needs and policies of the party leadership. The 14th Party Congress elected 115 members and 45 candidate members. Candidate members normally attend plenary sessions but do not have the right to vote. Party statutes require the Central Committee to The ruling body of the KSC is the Presidium, a group of 11 members and 2 nonvoting candidate members who determine the policies and tactics of the party. The Presidium exercises authority over the Central Committee, which formally eiects" it. In actuality, the composition of the Presidium is determined by the Party General Secretary, or, as in more recent years, by the Presidium itself. The Presidium is not enjoined to report its activities to any other party or slate body, including the Cenral Committee. Moreover, there is no direct electoral relationship, even t'ieoretically, between the rank and -file and the Presidium. The Secretariat is the administrative arm of the Presidium and the only other party body with considerable authority. Its activity, however, is restricted to the implementation of policies and is subject to review by the Presidium. Nevertheless, its powers, which embrace the direction of day -to -day party work in all spheres, are very extensive. The leadership of the KSC as of IM is shown in Figure 11. The Secretariat is headed by the Party Genc(LI Secretary, who presides over and directs th, woik of the six additional secretaries and two other members of the Secretariat. Collectively, they supervise the work of the secretaries on the lower party levels. Separately, they keep a careful check on the activities and attitudes of government and public agencies operating in their assigned fields of interest. Under Novotny, the predominant force in the party leadership was a handful of doctrinaire party politicians, who were primarily specialists interested in gaining and wielding power rather than in developing expertise it functiewil areas such as government, international relations, or economics. This model was abruptly abolished by Dubcek who installed leaders with technical qualifications to cope with the country's major economic and social problems. The 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 FIGURE 10. Organization of the Czedaslovak Corn munist Party apparatus (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 leadership thit has developed under Husak is basically a combination of politically influential conservatives and more moderate men that agree with most of Ilusak's policies. A majority of the members of the Secretariat and Presidium may still be considered technical experts and administrators, however, suggesting that Husak continues to stress technical competence and part expertise over pure power Politics. b. Regional and local levels In 1968 the party organization in the Czech lands secs divided into five Bohemian regions, two Moravian regions, and a Prague city region. To the existing three Slovak regions wits added tnc Bratislava city region. 26 The evolution of party administration on the intermediate level has paralleled that of the national level. Thus, just as the Party Congress is the representative body of the national party, conferences of the regional, district, and basic party organs serve their respective levels. Similarly, regional and local committees and secretariats serve as counterparts to the national Central Committee and Secretariat. All organizations are responsible to the party's central apparatus, in consonance with the princip !c of democratic centralism. The lowest level of tF.e party is referred to as the basic party organization, ,which has a minimum of five inembers but otherwise varies widely in size. In 1973 there were over 30,000 such basic p:,rt organizations. The basic part. organization, which is found in schools, industry, agriculture, the armed forces, and the government apparatus, has a number of functions. It disseminates propaganda and promotes organiza- tional work with the people and the local press for fulfillment of part resolutions, and mobilizes workers and employees in factories and offices to prevent waste, fulfill economic plans, and strengthen state and local discipline. c. Membership The Czechoslovak Communist Part, unlike most other Eastern European parties, has traditionally been it "mass" party, designed to incorporate repre- sentatives of all age groups and major segments of Czechoslovak society. Having been legal prior to World War 11, the part had it core of several hundred thousand upon which to build following the end of Nazi rule in the country. Because of the KSC's traditional legitimacy and its anti -Nazi record, the membership rose sharply following the war. When the Communists came to power in 1948, the membership soared to 2.3 million, 19%% of the total population of the country. Party membership has since fluctuated clue to periodic purges ant; membership drives, but it has remained the largest in proportion to the population of all ruling Communist parties, including that of the U.S.S.R. In 1962 the leadership decided to hold party rolls to about 1.3 million, or approximately one out of every six adults. By 1968, when liberalization of the party was well along, the membership had swelled to nearly 1.7 million, where it remained until the fall of Dubeek. Following the 1968 invasion, some 200,000 members mostly disaffected intellectuals and youth resigned from the part; added to this loss are some 300,000 who were dropped in the 1970 purge. The membership in 1971 was approximately 1.2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 FIGURE 11. leadership of the Comnwnist Party (C) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 tnillian, the lowest figure since 1918. In %lay 1973 this figure grew to only 1.2:5 million, despite the fact that more than 920X) new candidates were admitted. ['his indicates that the net gain in part nu (hiring the 1971 -',3 period was almost matched b% the nunnber of purged, resigned, or otherwise dropped members. Metnberhip is technically open to all citizens over IS years of age. Under Novotny, membership was dependent upon numernus qualitative rcyuirements regarding each applicants social background and political vie%ys. As it result, the rank and file have normally been conservative in outlook and, until the late 1960'x, disinclined to regard the party as it vehicle for social or political innovation. The average age is high, clue to the large numbers who join(-([ inunediate1% after 11'orld War 11. Many members have joined (it(- party for oppo,rhmistic reasons personal or professional ambition, desire for political protection, travel abroad, or even professional survival. In 1971 candidate membership, in effect it 2 -year probationary period, was established to enable the regime to screen its members more carefully. Belo%% the top levels, the hSC membership has never displayed marked ideological fervor. Except for the period of Nazi occupation, the party has been a legal political movement; it enjoyed a measure of success in free electoral competition with other parties, having at time during the interwar period polled as much as Wr of the. total �.ote. Most of the party members who survived the purge hay(- not proved to be the militant "vanguard' of soci(-t that the regine sought. %%hatever loyalt to the nesv regine the hulk of the rank and file has developed has been diluted by the post -1968 organizational disnnptions that seriously affected the party local effectiyene-,. In view of these disruptions, data on the social composition of the part are sparse. In 1971 workers constituted only ?:iii of the rembership, and another 20'1 consisted of retired people. The average age of the membership in 1971 was -19 years, it slight increase over the previous year. In mi(I-197 the regime claimed that Wi of party netnbers "wee working in factories ;uul on farms." it figure undoubtedly inflated to include administraliye staffs. Other (IC fires to give the illusion of it rising percentage of %corkers in the party include the use of statistical categories stuck as workers and former workers,.. who tot,cther were said to constitute 68 r of the part in 1973. The parts efforts to reestablish its "proletarian" basis b% increasing the proportion of industrial workers Oil the party rolls h the had limited.srtccess. 'I'll(- Ilusak reginu�, both for ideological and practical reasons, largely spared the workers during its purge of the membership rolls, in spite of the large number that had rallied to the Dubcek banner. Many workers. however, disgruntled over the reversal of liberalization policies, resigned from the party. The regime is also paying particular attention to recruiting young people and the technical intel- ligentsia. The skills and assistance of this latter group. consisting mostly of professionals such as scientists and economists, are ind;spensahle if the regime is to decd effectively with the counts_ 's numerous economic troubles. The regime has acknovIedged haying considerable difficult in recruitment, however, and this is not likely to change unless the part relax,�: its restraints on initiative and constructive criticism. Nor Goes the regime appear to be improving the balance between Slovak and Czech membership. Prior to 1968, Slovaks comprised only about 12Si of the total membership of the part', although they iarmed 2854 of the population of the cotuttry. No reliable data on the ratio of Czechs and Sitwaks within the party as it whole have been avail :cble since the invasion. Within the party leadership, however, the Slovaks enjoy representation more than consistent with their proportion of the total population, with four of 1I members in the Pro siditun and three of seven in the Secretariat, including General Secretary Husak. Little is known about party finances. According to part statutes, income is derived from membership dues, revenues of part enterprises, and "other" sources. The party purports to he financed by monthly membership dues %%hich are roughly I ci to 4c' of each members net nnonthly wages, depending on the income bracket. 4. Mass organizations and other parties (C) As in other Eastern European countries, the Czechoslovak Communist Party has from the beginning of its rule employed it number of political and sociopolitical mass organizations to extend its control and influence over the population. The purpose of the mass organizations has he(-n to reach all segments of sotci(-ly and .,.tivitics and organizations. particularly those which were carr,overs from the democratic era and cotuld not be disbanded or neutralized in any other way. "cider the total domination of the Conttnunist Part, these mass organizations are designed to channel the political and social energies of the population into pursuits which either further park goals or which at least are politically harmless. Virtually every Czechoslovak 27 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 citizen is involved in some wav in the elaborate network of political, economic, and cultural mass organizations. The most important of these organizations have been the Czechoslovak National Front (NF), the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH), and the Czechoslovak Youth Union (succeeded in 1970 by the Socialist Youth Union �SSM The National Front is political) the most influential organization in Czechoslovakia aside from the Communist Party, on whose behalf the Front is charged with mobilizing the er: of both the Communist and the non Communist members of society through control of all other political and social organizations. In short, it is an umbrella organization, encompassing all political parties and most major specialized mass organizations, dominated by the Communist Party, and designed to assure the Communist monopoly of power. The National Front supervises national and local elections and serves as the party's vehicle for appointing or nominating candidates to the Federal Assembly and other government organs. In 1969 the Front took on a liaison role with the military for coordinating civil defense and paramilitary training. Dubcek sought to reorganize the National Front, enabling it to supervise the activities of its constituent organs free of interference by the Communist Party. Husak has reaffinaed the tr�iditional role of the National Front and, by having himself elected chairman, has restored part supervision of its activities. There are four theoretic.-lly non Communist political parties in Czechoslovakia �the Czechoslovak Socialist Part, the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Slovak Revival Party, and the Slovak Freedom Party. The regime has permitted these parties to survive 22 years of Communist rule primarily to enhance the facade of a multiparty democracy, as well as to provide Czechoslovaks who in conscience cannot become Communist Party members with a vehicle for permissible political activity. These parties are totally subservient to the Communist Party, however, and offer no challenge to its authority. It is testimony to the democratic political impulses of the Czechoslovaks that the minor parties energetically sought to increase their influence in 1968 prior to the invasion. Encouraged by the concessions granted by the Dubcek regime, such as lifting restrictions on recruiting and publishing, the smaller parties openly stressed the importance of non Communist political organizations and even challenged the "leading role" of the Communist Party. Membership in the parties swelled, with the Czechoslovak People's Party and the Czechoslovak Socialist Party reporting an increase of more than i0% 28 to 40,000 and 16,000, respectively. Since the advent of the Husak regime, however, the non- Communist parties have taken their cue from the purge conducted by the Communist Party, expelling the liberals from their own ranks and proclaiming loyalty to the program of th^ National Front, that is, to the Communists' program. As a result, these parties have resumed their marginal existence on the periphery of national political life. 5. Exile groups (C) Prior to 1968 Czech and Slo-ak exile groups domiciled in the West consisted almost entirely of anti Communist intellectuals or former politicians who either chose a life of intellectual freedom or were forced by threat of reprisals to remain outside the country. Loosely organized, such groups have limited their activities to antiregime propaganda and have posed no significant challenge to the Communist regime in Prague, although their condemnations occasi y have been troublesome for the leadership. The Dubcek regime had sought to woo some of the emigrees back to Czechoslovakia by promising full rehabilitation and remuneration for losses suffered when they left the country. This process was abruptly halted by the Soviet -led invasion of 1968, however. The invasion resulted in a new exodus of refugees, many of whom were fearful of retribution for having supported the reform movement. The large majority have remained in Western Europe and for the most part have avoided involvement in political activity. Some of the leading intellectuals behind, the liberalization movement, such as former TV director Jiri Pelikan, economist Ota Sik, and literary critic Antonin Lie.'.m, have expressed interest in trying to bring together the exiles for the purpose of continuing the struggle for reform in Czechoslovakia. Pelikan, from his residence in Rome, has spearheaded an exile periodical, Listy (Papers). Unlike earlier emigree groups, the post -1968 refugees consider themselves dedicated Communists who wish to reform the party's leadership rather than to end Communist rule. As a result, the regime has been much more sensitive to their activities, especially inasmuch as they have contributed to keeping alive the resentment within many major Western European Communist parties toward the Soviet crushing of the Dubcek experiment. Gustav Husak has made a considerable ef:ort to persuade the postinvasion emigrees to return by reducing their fear of punitive measures. Immediately after coming to power, the Husak regime declared an amnesty which expired in October 1969. Few of those who returned appear to have been arrested or APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 otherwise penalized. llowever, those who chose to remain in the Nest �over 5009), by the government's count �had their apartments and private property confiscated. In late 1970 the authorities in Prague sought to blackmail the exiles living abroad by advising them that tile% woidd be prosecuted in absentia for illegally leavinx the country and that the "defense costs" incurred as a result of these proceedings %vonld be collected from relatives living in Czechoslovakia if payment was not forthcoming from abroad. Following worldwide� criticism, Husak personally terminated the practice as "impractical." 'I'll(- regime's "differenti- ating" attitude toward Czechoslo%ak citizens living abroad was underlined in Decemi,er 1970 by President Svoboda's cordial New Years greeting to emigrees who maintained their "warm attitude" toward socialist Czechoslovakia. Another amnesty, commemorating the 25th unnive�car% of Communist rule, was proclaimed by S".)boda in Fehruar% 1973. Under this edict, emigrees "'ho have not engaged in "sedition, ?eopardzirg state were�ts. or causing darnege to Czerhoslo ak interests abroad" could return home forgiven for their "illegal emigration" pro%iding they (lid so by the end of 197 That the amnesty excluded the regime's most prominent gadflies abroad was made clear by an official press comment stating that "it ma% he inferred that the amnesty does not apple to several score inte'leetuals and former officials of the Czechoslovak Cormminist Party because of whom the Czechoslovak leadership has encountered fresh difficulties in its relations with some Western Communist parties." 6. Electoral procedures (C) Czechoslovakia has had extensive experience with free elections dating hack to the relativel% liberal s%stenn under the Austrian Empire and the scrupulous practice of democratic governments during the interwar period. Despite a generation of Communist rule, these democratic traditions are still cherished by the large majorit of Czechoslovaks. In line with t1w practice in other Eastern European countries where the Communists had gained power. the Czechoslovak party rmised the electoral procedures to assure vic�twn at the polls. There may have been non Communist leaders in Czechoslovakia who hoped that the part' �which had won it .3Vi plurality in the last free national election in 1946 nlight have been influenced by Czechoslovakia's dernoc�ratic� traditions and that it would be restrained in its exercise of power, but the restrictions the party i unposed in 1948 were as rigid as any in the Communist world. The new procedures severely restricted political activity and made it virtually impossible for an individual to stand freely for office, nominate opposition candidates, or campaign on his ow-1 initiative. According to the electoral laws implementing constitutional provisions, the nomination of all political officials was the province onl of the political parties and organizations represented in the Communist dominated National Front. In practice, tile National Front put forward only one name for each pent to be filled. Thus, the periodic election campaigns were meaningless, reflecting on:y the extent of Communist Party control over the electoral process. Devices such as semicomptihory "manifest voting" (voting without the secrecy of the booth) and the appointment of part' members as election officers gave the Communists control of both the balloting and the counting of votes. These practices, coupled with propaganda and various methods of coercion, insured the success of the specially selected candidates. "Negative" votes generally consist of blank ballots heing cast as a symbol of disapproval. Under the Dubeek regim far- reaching changes were proposed in the electoral law, mainly in the direction of liberalizing anti restricting the role of the Communist Parh� in the nominating process, in ensuring the secrecy of the ballot, and guaranteeing an honest count. These proposals, as well as the national election. that were scheduled by Dubcek for November 1968 were scuttled by the invasion. "Three years !titer, the incumbent Ilusak regime felt sufficiently secure to hold general elections, the first such balloting in Czechoslovakia since June 1964. Husak and other regime spokesmen viewed the elections of 26 -27 November 1971 as the culmination of the political consolidation process: the elections, in fact, served to legitimize the Husak regime's hold over the legislature and government executive organs in the same manner that the 14th Party Congress held the preceding May had clone for Husak's hold over the Comnnunist hierarchy. The elections were carried out in match the same manner as those of 964. 'I'll(- "c�ampaign' was broken clown into four phases. First, candidates were nominated by the communist Part', sovial organizations, or individual citizens who presented the names to the National Front. 'I'll(- National Front then selected the candidates according to their political and social yualific�ations as determined by the part, and registered the names on official election lists. Election "programs politic�al platforms that the candidates were required to follow �were then drawn up at the 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110010 -2 respective electoral levels under party supervision. This phase also included public hearing:: at which each candidate committed himself to the program au.d answered c,tizens' questions. Finally, the voter "approved" the official slate at the poll'. Although the elections were patently rigged, the regime went all out to cloak them with an aura of democratic respectability. According to the tortured official philosophy, it is the voters participation in the preelection process and his willingness to convince himself of the candidate's proper political caliber that gi�.�es the elections their "democratic" character. Indeed, it is the duty of the citirea. not merely his right, to countersign the slate, thus transforming what otherwise would he an official appointment into an "election." The regime hailed the results of the 1971 elections as it measure of popular support for its policies. It claimed that 99.h