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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 SECRET i3A /GS /CP East Germany August 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY C SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 NX WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified/ For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret MUUZT61Tl :II1761ZAZ01 1I1I:7bI:l[: wo]F_ l 1S1iftll rl :itI1I1Y41I11I11111KISI {:LAI� RA1. SL ifs EA CHAPTERS O t I III I'M )1 i I I Integrated perspective of the subject country F Chronology Area Brief Summary Map I i 11. %O C I I 'I 1 Social structure Population Labor Health hiving conditions Social problems Religion Education Public in- formation Artistic expression (,O I�ii\N.F I A \1) POI.1T1Us Political evo lution of the state Governmental strength and stability 0 Structure and function Political dynamics National policies Threats to sta- bility The police intelligence and security Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capa- bilities I'11I� 1�.( ()\()111 Appraisal of the economy Its structure� agriculture, fisheries forestry fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction Domestic trade heonomic policy and development International economic re-'a- tions 0 I R 1 \ti1'OIt1 1I(}\ 1 \1) TE.I.FC ONI\It'\IC A'lION Appraisal of syst ^ms Strategic mobility Railroads Highways Inland waterways Pipelines Ports Merchant mas:ne Civil air Airfields The telecom system \I1I.IT -1111 C YOC RA1'1I1' Topography and cli- mate Military geographic regions Strategic areas Internal routes Approaches: land, sea, air 114 \I ED F ORCE S The defense establishment Joint activities Cround forces Naval forces Air forces Paramilitary SCIENCE Level of scientific advancement Organization, planning, and financing of re- search Scientific education, manpower, and facilities Major research fields APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELE 7 200 9/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 East G W-1 I&A EJUMAN A Place in the San t Linking the Old with the New Institution of the New Society Lifestyle: Politicul and Economic The Regime and the People Big Brother and Orhvrs Two Germanies or Oise? Chronology I8 Area Brief 2 Summary Map follows 23 This Country Profile uws prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by May 1973. SecnF-r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 1 .4 ti .k f1 g I Fri l... 1 j N �.san' rrJ 4 y I i; t x t r -s x d 1 r Una r� s .''rh r r fy 1/ r i -^�ff 111 6 F Now 1 t.r ,'l+ta? ,.r Y? I IF rd rte' r j f If r i t _lr f or k i I J, y f i. r 1 1 r 1 3 i Alwk I A Place in the Sun (c) For years the Leipzig Industrial Fair has symbolized East Germany's striving for international stature. some fumbling by Bonn in the Middle East broke the ice. Iraq established formal ties with East Germany, and then a number of other Afro -Asian states followed suit. When West Germany's Government, led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, concluded the reconciliation treaty with East Germany in late 1972, broad inter- national diplomatic acknowledgement of East Ger- many began to follow in due course. (U /OU) In its campaign for international acceptance, East Germany has held one major trump card: it is an in- tegral part of the German Problem, a major source of cols' war tensions which stood as a massive stumbling block to the realization of an enduring peace in Europe. It would be exceedingly difficult, if not im- possible, to resolve the problem without Western acceptance of East Germany. Over the years East Ger- many and its Soviet sponsor have reinforced that point by various means, including the instigation of periodic crises over control of the movement of goods and per- sons across the autobahn between West Germany and West Berlin. The aura of East -West confrontation there was finally cleared away by the laboriously negotiated Berlin Agreement of 1971, which guaranteed access to isolated West Berlin. In subse- quent accords West Germany formally conceded the existence of an East German state, albeit as a part of one German nation. East German political theorists make no such proviso; they claim a completely sovereign existence for their country, a claim which has been unwavering under the late Walter Ulbricht and his successor Erich Honecker. (U /OU) Well before the East German regime gained non Communist acceptance abroad it began to win the grudging respect, if not the support, of the native pop- ulation Along the way, the regime was favored by an assortment of traditions that allowed for a measure of popular approval. By and large, the populace found nothing strange in a prideful nationalism, a strong socialist movement, a highly developed social welfare system, a Prussianized view of state dominance and citizen conformity, and a certain scorn for those Ger- mans living to the west or south. The authorities need- ed only to exploit this endowment. (C) t' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 With the conclusion in late 1972 of the General Relations Treaty between the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany gave its blessing to hav- ing its friends and allies proceed at their own pace to establish relations with the German Democratic Republic. The dam burst, and a literal wave of new diplomatic relationships engulfed the East Germans. This, coupled with its simultaneous entry into the world of international organizations, has brought the CDR the acceptance which it vainly sought since its founding. (U /OU) The demise of Nazi Germany left the Third Reich dismembered. Some of its eastern area was transferred to Polish or Soviet rule. The old capital city of Berlin was separated into Sectors under Four -Power ad- ministration. The remaining German territory was divided into zones of occupation �later merged, in the West, to create the Federal Republic of Germany. The 4` Soviets countered by declaring East Germany a separate state. To Bonn and its allies the move was a hypocritical attempt to provide a facade for continued manipulation of East Germany by Moscow. (U /OU) At that time, in the wake of World War II, East Ger- man assertions of separate statehood and sovereign status clearly lacked credibility. The Germany of re- cent memory had been a large, independent. prosperous, and powerful nation. The new East Ger- many, by contrast, was a mere fragment of that territory, economically deprived and dependent on Moscow's mailed fist for its political muscle. After more than two decades, the expenditure of mountainous ef- fort, and continued Soviet backing, East Germany still stands �and now stands much stronger. (U /OU) The international acceptance East Germany has gained has not come easily. For 20 years West Ger- many, with the aid of the Western Allies and by weight of its own political dynamics and surging economic strength, kept its eastern neighbor isolated r� from the non Communist world. East Germany tried with dogged determination to win favors where it could �by exchanging trade missions with emerging African states, for example �but its successes were few. Finally, in April 1969, East Berlin's persistence and For years the Leipzig Industrial Fair has symbolized East Germany's striving for international stature. some fumbling by Bonn in the Middle East broke the ice. Iraq established formal ties with East Germany, and then a number of other Afro -Asian states followed suit. When West Germany's Government, led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, concluded the reconciliation treaty with East Germany in late 1972, broad inter- national diplomatic acknowledgement of East Ger- many began to follow in due course. (U /OU) In its campaign for international acceptance, East Germany has held one major trump card: it is an in- tegral part of the German Problem, a major source of cols' war tensions which stood as a massive stumbling block to the realization of an enduring peace in Europe. It would be exceedingly difficult, if not im- possible, to resolve the problem without Western acceptance of East Germany. Over the years East Ger- many and its Soviet sponsor have reinforced that point by various means, including the instigation of periodic crises over control of the movement of goods and per- sons across the autobahn between West Germany and West Berlin. The aura of East -West confrontation there was finally cleared away by the laboriously negotiated Berlin Agreement of 1971, which guaranteed access to isolated West Berlin. In subse- quent accords West Germany formally conceded the existence of an East German state, albeit as a part of one German nation. East German political theorists make no such proviso; they claim a completely sovereign existence for their country, a claim which has been unwavering under the late Walter Ulbricht and his successor Erich Honecker. (U /OU) Well before the East German regime gained non Communist acceptance abroad it began to win the grudging respect, if not the support, of the native pop- ulation Along the way, the regime was favored by an assortment of traditions that allowed for a measure of popular approval. By and large, the populace found nothing strange in a prideful nationalism, a strong socialist movement, a highly developed social welfare system, a Prussianized view of state dominance and citizen conformity, and a certain scorn for those Ger- mans living to the west or south. The authorities need- ed only to exploit this endowment. (C) t' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 P The regime has also attempted to create its own tradition. The new rulers first argued their claim to govern on the basis of historical determinism. Accord- ing to Marxist Leninist doctrine, a socialist worker's state was destined to replace the capitalist system on German soil. It was asserted that this progression had already been sanctified by Soviet success, which Walter Ulbricht, a one time "associate" of Lenin, was best able to interpret. (U /OU) While this may have satisfied true believers in the Communist faith, it failed to generate mass loyalty. Therefore a more pragmatic line was introduced and emphasized: the contention that the East German system works, purportedly in ways even superior to those of rival West Germany. (U /OU) The government in East Berlin boasts in particular of high standards in such fields as education, welfare, health care, and in the dramatic arts. It impresses on the young that East Germany is a "land of oppor- tunity" where aptitude and drive �not to mention political conformity �are likely to bring rapid ad- vancement. It asks the general public to take pride in an "economic miracle" that has made East Germany the ninth ranked world industrial power and provided it with the highest standard of living in the Soviet camp. It sports the trappings of a full fledged nation, including an army to patrol its borders and a civil air- line and merchant fleet to show its flag abroad. The regime also has working in its favor, of course, the fact that it has endured �far longer, in fact, than did either the Weimar Republic or the Third Reich. (U /OU) The overall extent to which the rulers of the new "worker- peasant state" have won popular support is difficult to estimate. The regime has its warm adherents (doubtless a minority) and its outright op- ponents (probably an even smaller minority). There remains the bulk of the citizenry, among whom an un- emotional conformity seems to be the rule. Life evidently goes forward in a familiar pattern for most East Germans, who are concerned with things other than politics. Privately they may find the regime doc- trinaire, niggling, and clumsy; publicly they may drop a critical remark. Yet, resistance appears futile. The regime's capacity for coercion and willingness to use it, the Soviets' determination to maintain a firm grip on Eastern Europe (as exemplified in East Germany itself in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968), and the West's caution about intervening directly in the East are factors that would stifle the hopes of any would -be resistance leader. (C) i 1 Linking the Old with the New (c) On the whole, the history of East Germany has been short and inglorious. Deriving from that sector of Ger- many assigned Soviet occupation forces by World War II agreements, East Germany grew up in the Russian image as a well regimented state in which human beings conformed to the wishes of the Communist par- ty. Incorporated formally in 1949 as the German Democratic Republic, East Germany under the much -hated Walter Ulbricht remained an inter- national pariah for much of the cold war era. Unilateral grants of sovereignty by Moscow were effec- tively countered by Bonn's efforts to isolate the regime. Internally, there was a short -lived popular uprising in 1953, and in succeeding years many East Germans "voted with their feet �as President John F. Kennedy put it �until the construction of the Berlin wall in August 1961 closed the last escape route. In the decade following the erection of the infamous wall, East Germany inched forward in economic and political stature, winning a grudging respect from the populace and a modicum of international acceptance. In May 1971, Ulbricht �who had come to place his wisdom above that of the Soviet masters retired" as party leader and long -time party stalwart Erich Honecker was installed in his stead. During the early months of Honecker's efficient but colorless rule, he endorsed the Four -Power negotiations then in progress on the status of Berlin, thus paving the way for the in- ter- German General Relations Treaty establishing the GDR as a member of the international community. Despite humble beginnings and a deprived up- i,ringing, East Germany had reached maturity. East Germany's rulers, as if fearful that their hold is more tenuous than it appears to be, have been expert at invoking past spirits and building new illusions in their own behalf. A regime specialty is to push the East i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 r Berlin's ancient Maiden's Bridge; SED Central Committee offices are at left and apartments on the right, with the State Council and Foreign Ministry buildings in the rear. German story back in time so as to make current GDR is validated. happenings seem the natural outcome of prior events. In tangible ways East Germany also links itself with History is reinterpreted; in East German texts the older times. It uses the black, red, and gold flag of "class struggle" is rampant, and "heroes of the Weimar, but with the hammer and compass state sym- people" are many. Ultimately the "triumph of the bol affixerl. Its rail system is still called the Deutsche proletariat" is assured, and thus the legitimacy of the Reichsbahn. Statues of the Prussian generals 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 f Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bluecher, and Yorck are again in place on broad, tree -lined Unter den Linden, the Fifth Avenue of prewar Berlin. Goethe, despite his aristocratic tendencies, is made to seem a democratic progressive and thus a progenitor of the East German ethos. The greatest prize of all is Berlin, long promoted as "the capital of the German Democratic Republic. For years, East German autborities intimated that it was only a matter of time before they took over the en- tire city, but with the General Relations Treaty they finally admitted the right of West Germany to repre- sent West Berlin. Nevertheless, they seek whatever ad- vantage they can derive from the fact that their capita! is the city �part of it, at least �that throughout Ger- many's history as a nation -state was its political and cultural heart and soul. Germany, centrally located as it is, has served as the crossroads of Europe. Historically it has been a battleground and an arena of conflicting cultures. Primarily Western- oriented, it also has displayed a fascination with the East. It has preyed upon its neighbors and in turn has been a prey. That Germany should now exist in two parts is not extraordinary. More often than not it has existed in a state of dis- unity. The territory which became East Germany is situated principally on the central North European Plain and is dominated by Berlin, a focus of land and inland waterway transportation routes. Generally scenic though not spectacularly so, the country ranges in nortb -south perspective from flat to gently rolling terrain. Only in the south and southwest is there high S ground with elevations up to 3,300 feet. A rail i network, so extensive as to be likened to a national trolley, constitutes the backbone of the transportation system. Good highways, lengthy canals, and midern oil and gas pipelines help speed traffic. The two great navigable rivers, the Elbe and the Oder, lead respec- tively to the ports of Hamburg, West Germany and Szczecin, Poland. Cool to cold winters, mild summers, prevalent cloudiness, and frequent precipitation con- stitute the weather pattern. Generally variable within i fairly narrow limits, the weather at times turns suf- ficiently capricious to disrupt crop growing, an endeavor k.lready beset by soils low in fertility. The subsurface endowment primarily brown coal, potash, sulfur, fluorspar, natural gas, and uranium �is insufficient to maintain an advanced industrial socie- ty, and East Germany must look largely to Soviet suppliers to meet its energy and raw material re- quirements. Looking outward, East Germany finds its setting to be equally bleak. To the west stands a powerful Ger- man rival. To the south lies a potentially unstable Czechoslovakia, and to the east a proud, nationalistic Poland comes between East Germany and its patron, the U.S.S.R. As the westernmost of the European Communist states, East Germany has developed a "front line" mentality. Party functionaries have visualized themselves as members of an outpost holding back the tide of "Western imperialism." On a broader front, regime leaders have at times displayed suspicions of all their neighbors and performed as if East Germany were virtually beleaguered. In a sense it is. East Germany is smaller in area than any adjoining state and surpasses only Czechoslovakia in population. In these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that East German authorities suffer some sense of inse- curity. Within a compact area of almost 42,000 square miles there exists a population of slightly over 17 million, a figure that has remained virtually static since the building of the Berlin wall. The people are a Nordic- Slavic blend, and thus exhibit the tall, blond, blue -eyed and short, brunet, brown -eyed characteristics of both groups. East German society is homogeneous, however, being sc 99% Germanic in makeup and outlook. Only a tiny Slavic minority, the Sorbs, form an exception. Even they are highly in- tegrated into the Germanic lifestyle, despite the government's attempts to portray them as a treasured minority. The regime has largely destratified the old Germanic society, eliminating the former ruling class and bring- ing the middle class under control by economic stric- tures. The working class in theory dominates the system, but in practice Communist authorities somewhat distrustful of worker loyalties �speak for it. Thus, a party managerial elite constitutes the true dominant class. The old Teutonic family portrait of the iron willed father, domestic servant mother, and submissive children has also been drastically altered. Women have been granted equal rights with men, and are no longer kitchen bound. Nurseries, schools, and youth groups are heavily responsible for child- rearing by "approved methods." Originally unpopular, such policies have been increasingly accepted by a populace which with the passage of years has perceived that it had little choice but to come to terms with the regime. 6 -X. t APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 8?. The regime, during its two -plus decades of existence, has busied itself domestically with reshaping old Ger- man institutions into a new socialist establishment. It has been fortunate in that some of its reforms have proven popular and thereby established a rapport between ruler and ruled. It has also dispensed medicine bitter enough to antagonize its citizenry. a r. k Throughout, the guiding principle has continued to be R Institution of t h e Ne d Soci the exaltation of the interest of the state. The populace has had to adjust accordingly. The determination of the government to have its way was most strikingly demonstrated in the spring of 1960 when it unleased a massive campaign to com- y y 5 F APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 plete the collectivization of agriculture, Many farmers resisted as best they could, only to be overwhelmed in a matter of weeks by party organizers fanatically devoted to the dictates of political doctrine and socialist agricultural science. Defeat bred apathy among the peasantry, which in turn contributed to a downturn in agricultural production. Typically, the regime persevered and through the application of threats and incentives inspired East German farmers to outproduce their counterparts in neighboring East European countries. In human terms, the happy, smil- ing peasantry portrayed by the regime is doubtless a great distortion, but still the original bitterness seems to have dissipated and the collectivized farmer ap- parently finds life tolerable. By contrast with the equivocal result in the agricultural sector, educational reform has definitely bolstered the regime. By and large, the changes under- taken have proven acceptable, and the credit goes to the government. The old European class system, which permits the advancement of only a small elite, has largely been scrapped, and a mass schooling system has been substituted. The formerly submerged levels of society may now achieve according to their ability, and their political reliability. Principal emphasis is placed on vocational training and on socialist indoc- trination, which is pervasive. Practical work programs in the factory or on the farm are emphasized as an educational adjunct even for those hoping to enter the professions. This factor of socialist learning is equaled in unpopularity by one other: as in other areas, also in education and science there persists the strong odor of Soviet dominance and exploitation. Russian is given first prior;ty in the study of foreign languages. Research projects are frequently oriented toward Soviet needs. Soviet dogma, as it extends into the physical and natural sciences, is stressed. In the classroom, life in the West is presented in an extremely restricted and highly colored format, thus reinforcing the mental isolation of the student. He may opt not to believe what the teacher imparts, but still he will be able to acquire precious little ground on which to build a counterbelief. In the instance of at least one institution, the military, the regime has sought popular acceptance by retaining rather than abandoning "the best of the old tradition." The Volksarmee presents with its goose- stepping troopers, neat formations, rumbling tanks, and heavy Germanic marches a remarkable resemblance to the forces of former times. Aspects of 6 socialist modernity also creep in, however, including: the shaping of an officer corps representative of the party and the proletariat, the lowering of caste barriers between officers and men, and the reordering of Ger- man military history to highlight "revolutionary episodes." East Germany nurtures its army as a prominent sym- bol of the integrity of the state. Totaling almost 120,- 000 men, the East German armed force exceeds in numbers only those of Hungary and Albania in Eastern Europe. However, relative to population it has almost as many men in uniform as West Germany. The army is clearly subordinate to the civilian officials c.f the state and is virtually incapable of exercising political influence. In. addition, there is doubt about its combat reliability. Ultimately the question that has hung over the Volksarmee is the same as that which has haunted its West German counterpart: "Would German fight German The proposition may seem highly theoretical, but still it exists. And, in the East German case, any answer other than a strong af- firmative bespeaks doubt about the endurance of the state. Alert to this frailty, the regime continually seeks �with some success �to bolster the morale of the army. Plaudits are showered on it by the government, and extensive favorable coverage is g in the media. Military parades are held with considerable frequency in East Berlin even though they violate tl: a terms of Four -Power Agreements on the status of the city. In addition the armed forces increasingly have been per- mitted to play a more prominent role in Warsaw Pact exercises, though hardly one that challenges the reality of Soviet dominance in Pact affairs. The Volksarmee itself is molded along the lines of the Soviet forces, is supplied chiefly with Soviet equipment, and, quite naturally, is subject to considerable Soviet influence in its day -to -day operations. The approximately 333,000 -man Soviet component euphemistically known as "the friends maintains a low public profile in East Germany, but by its presence helps in- sure the life of the regime. From 1945 onward, the Protestant Evangelical Church has represented the longest lived holdout against the dominance of the state. The church initial- ly sought to operate on the basis of one Germany, in principle a denial of East Germany's right to exist. The church was also identified with the old society, whereas to many pastors the new secular authorities were the representatives of "godless Marxism." In A APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 i:. 1} i t r r f F i 10 1 I 0 former times the church had had a say in the running of the state. Now the state encroached on the church. In the name of "socialist morality" (i.e., whatever fosters socialism is moral), Walter Ulbricht proclaimed the "Ten Commandments of Socialism." The state pressed its own forms for baptism, confirmation, and marriage, and discouraged religious education. Recalcitrant clergymen were browbeaten, or even jailed. Presently, after years of feuding, church and state have learned to coexist, although not always comfort- ably. The regime continues to grant small subsidies as in pre -1945 days, tolerates religious training, and per- mits pastors to speak out against state sponsored atheism but not against the socialist state itself. For its part, the church has forsworn open political opposition and, under extreme pressure, broken ties with the church in West Germany. Viewing these developments, some observers have seen the regime trying for a genuine modus vivendi, but the situation appears to be more a case of the state, by cat -and- mouse tactics, turning the church into a cooperative subject. Overall, the regime has been more watchful of its in- tellectuals than its churchmen. Religious expression inay be dismissed as anachronistic and irrelevant; cultural expression is officially regarded as a modern day tool for upholding and exemplifying the state. From time to time, as in the early Honecker days, the regime deems it wise to relax its hold, but normally in- tellectual dissent is rooted out far more quickly in in- secure East Germany than in other, better established East European states. The regime has failed rather woefully in enlisting the full cooperation of its most innovative people. It has permitted them to travel abroad, provided them with social clubs, showered them with honors, and made them financially secure. Yet, it has not seen fit to supply the degree of freedom that even avowed Marx- ists demand. Some of the most able of German Marx- ists� Bertolt Brecht and Arnold Zweig, for ex- ample �chose to reside in East Germany following World War II, and by their presence lent prestige to the regime. The situation soured, however, as many of the great talents rebelled or dried up, and few replacements were found in the younger generation. To some extent the collective excellence of orchestral and theatrical ensembles has filled the void, but in- dividual genius remains a dear commodity in a land of group conformity. Lifestyle: Political and Economic (c) As a political entity, East Germany is the product of interlocking wills: that of German Communists to fulfill their destiny as set down by the patron saints Marx and Engels and that of the Soviet Union to build for itself the broadest possible buffer zone in central Europe. The event that historically was supposed to bring forth a German Communist state �a violent class revolution �never materialized. This omission constitutes a serious departure from orthodoxy for a highly doctrinaire regime. A successful revolution, however, was never an immediate prospect for strug- gling members of the radical left, who ultimately found in Russian expansionisia their instrument for victory. The Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the direct antecedent of the East German ruling party, was founded at the end of World War I following a split of the Socialist Party. True to Lenin's vision, it sought by all available means to promote an upheaval on Ger- man soil as the precondition for revolution everywhere. At the time of Hitler's accession to power in 1933, the KPD had 300,000 members, a total second only to the Soviet party in the Comintern. Over the next 12 years Nazi persecution and party factional strife thinned the ranks and hardened the survivors in their determina- tion to build a new German state following World War II. Communist rule in the Soviet Zone of Germanv commenced on 30 April 1945 when the "Ulbricht group" arrived from Moscow. Operating under Soviet aegis, it offered the semblance of a democratic system. As the cold war came on and the time for mollifying the Wcst passed, a new reality appeared: an authoritarian state patterned on the Soviet model and subservient to it. All power was lodged in the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the party formed by the forced merger in April 1946 of the Social Democratic Party 7 Yfwit'e",3v,ie ,v -a�c.. ...e_..?t;. ,.L,t ...L vA,, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 i x t into the KPI). From the beginning, the SED was largely the tool of Waiter Ulbricht, and he endowed the party with his principies: rigid organization, strict discipline, doc- trinal orthodoxy, and loyuity to Moscow. Any devia- tion from these norms was a privilege reserved for Ulbricht himself. Having faced many perils since his youthful days as a KPD functionary� including the menace of Stalin's displeasure during his Moscow years (193 845)--he had become practiced at political survival. He set Lle public example as the well in. funned, painstaking, and puritanical leader who work- ed almost ceaselessly for the new state. In private- he manipulated the party machinery ruthlessly to his own advantage. Overall, he lilted to be considered the father of his country, but his inability to rise above the image of a petty tyrant more often made him an object of ridicule. Under Ulbricht, the party, by its own accounts, guided the state from one triumph to another in a quest fur excellence. At its founding in 1949 the self styled German Democratic Republic was declared to be a peoples denrocmcy at an intermediate stage, aim- ing to become a genuine socialist state. By 1952 the groundwork was being laid for a socialist order, and as of 1958 the groundwork had been completed. In 1968 a new constitution hailed the achievement of the socialist state and assumed its continuing perfectiun. Thoughout, important anniversaries were --as they continue to be� celebrated by the party with overflowing self praise for its achievements in building "the first German peace state." Su outpourings over the years doubtless have con stitutiJ an attempt on the part of regime leaders to in- spire confidence in the durability of the party and the system that it has wrought. The doctrinaire dullness of the exaggerated claims and constant sloganeering, however, has served more as a reminder of the nature of the leadership itself. it fia:< been the burden of the party to have produced few tan men of the type who inspire popular trust. What has been produced has been a coterie of grey -faced bureaucrats, solemn of mien, and joyless of mood, who operate in the old :;er- man paternalistic tradition of "papa knows best." As the chosen keepers and interpreters of Marxist truth, they exhibit an elitist mentality and a consegttent dis trust for popular feeling. On occasion they pose as true democrats and friend: 4 the people, but conformity is what they demand and expect to receive from those below. The success of political regimentation as practiced by tier SED has rested to a considerable .1egree on a commonalty of view and a uniformity of purpose among the top members of the party. Ulbricht was for years the personification of the unity of the Socialist Unity Pary. Fealty to the mast( was the price of political success. There were thuse who plotted his demise as party leader, but so firm was his grip and so favorable the fates that even the workers' uprising of 17 June 1933 failed to dislodge him. Eventually he was eased out, but even then the changeover to Erich Honecker in 1971 .vas carried through smoothly. Like Ulbricht, Honecker is experienced and artful, the sort of man not likely to be taken by suprise by his foes. As is usually the ease with Communist governments, the East German regime has outfitted itself with Western -style democratic finery. One of its showier items is a multiparty system which allows four ad- ditional parties representing Christian, Liberal, agrarian, and reformed Nazi elements membership in parliament. These parties ptirport to be counterparts of similar groups in West Germany, but in reality they are largely paper organizations. Each, of course, is regime controlled and lacks any stature of its own. In similar fashion, so- called mass organizations such as the Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB) and the Free German Youth (.I:DJ) operate under direct SED guidance and serve both as listening posts for popular opin and as conduits for regime edicts. Finally, the regime groups together the political parties and the more important mass organizations into a semisaered body known as the National Front, which claims to represent the views of the populatic.. as a whole. In East Cennany the indbipensable political element is solidarity. An election iq a referendum for or against the system. Candidates are hand chosen, and their speeches are carefully tailored. Subsequent discussion is so arranged as virt.tally to be scripted. The campaign audience is well aware that only its approval is desired. Social and psychological pressure is applied to guarantee a massive turnout since a nonvoter is con- sidered a dissenter. Regularly, 98% to 99% of titre elec- torate do their duty and overwhelmingly "confirm" the regime. The shorn forms of democratic practice in East Ger- many are complemented by err,; ty vessels of parliamentarism. The republican institutions Wpulated in the Constitution serve largely as stage props around which the SED directs the human APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 scenario. Unreal in the Wvstt-rn c�oniext. thi% w1krine nevertheless represents socialist reality A readieIg of the East German Constitution gives tilt- impression that the };nveriirr+.t�rtt constitutes a funs- tioning parliaincritary s�stent. relrlcte irtt shred powers and responsiitilities. Twin nndtinientber vx- ecuti�c heiciies exist: the {..until of St11te, 'kill] Iwven approximating those� of a cercrncttial president; will. the Council of N- finistcrs, largely an administrative force. Both purlxirte dly operate ail the collegial psin i- ple. In Fact. both carry out orders presented In the SE'D I'Mitharo, tie tightly krtit body of st�lect part% authorities vho decide Policy in tie name of the vurkinx class." Parliament is midoved with nuiltitudinous dirties. inilist of which have 1wen dclegattil to the executive, 1110 i1 prttct M has been relegated to the role of a rolthe�rstarnp. In :uw cast�, the� (ask of the elceted It-gidator is not to repre-wnt the Itt�a- Ple to tilt� state� hilt tit( state to tht- people. pnshittt; the reginiv's nie�ssage and soothing those� trotthled In it East Gerrttart's eCanoltic� Iz'lartnerc hate ;aced. ;ill([ its a c�onsiderahli� tlet;ree inct a treater challengf. than 111.0 Paced tin tilt- political leader~ We�ighti-d down b% the ravages rif car and the dic-ta0t�% of soei:iiisnt, Ihc Ila�e nonethele�+ hitilt a qeu rtatioti:ilizcd et�onom%. Fed Soviet aplx�titec. etcl provided a floe of roods to the local cmi 'I hew accoinplishrueuts �h and large superior to thww of the other Eust Eurnpe:itt e i�nked a weasure of :iclutir�.ition ill the ll'est and its nttn�h :tc ut".111ing elst� have provided In those leaning toward Ilu� Gt-rown cause a rati01.11le for .tecept:utce In the itoint -lute poshar \cars, East t ;crania io Iwwt by severe handicaps irnncated traitsportatitm DI APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 The "People's Chamber' is the Communist parrs rubber stamp parliament. ti systems, a paucity of raw materials, a lack of heavy in- dustry, and an inadequate agricultural base. Heavy reparations, including the dismantling and shipping of entire industrial enterprises to the U.S.S.R., completed the gloomy picture. While the West German economy, given the impetus of the Marshall Plan, took off and soared, the East German economy for years remained grounded. The factors were many, and certainly not the least of them was the dire labor shortage caused by the flight of 2.3 million persons prior to the building of the Berlin wall. Whereas in the West the wall signified the division of Germany, for the GDR it meant the start of a new economic life. With escape no longer a possibility, the people had no choice but to serve East Germany. The result was what the East Germans choose to call their very own Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). It clearly is a source of pride, even to those East Germans unsympathetic to the regime. The manner in which the regime directed the 10 buildup of the economy was indicative or its ambition to give East Cermany a claim to a sovereign existence. Prior to 1945 this sector of Germany had been somewhat sparsely industrialized �its chief production being in light industry: chemicals, optics, and preci- sion instruments. The regime proceeded with a vengeance to build a broad industrial base in the in- terest of virtual self sufficiency. Unfortunately for the East Germans, their economic aspirations frequently remained just that, as Soviet needs took priority over their own. By Moscow's lights, East Germany's role was to be that of a servant of the Soviet economy. It would be a machineshop turning out high quality products for the U.S.S.R. and would provide a ready market, at inflated prices, for Soviet raw materials. The East Germans over the years have swallowed hard and accepted Soviet demands, but not without acts of protest, the most sDectacular of which was the suicide in December 1965 of Erich Apel, head 0 t i 5 a i y e i 0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 of the State Planning Commission. Apel's death illustrated a basic fact of East German life, i.e., that politics dominates economics and that party chiefs are ascendant over technocrats. Those who would push the economy ahead in a rational fashion, even resorting to capitalistic devices, have won a modicum of freedom, particularly under Honecker, but the dead hand of party doctrine still lies heavily on their plans. It is as if the authorities would rather per- mit economic lag than commit political heresy. Thus East Germany, advanced though it is by East Euro- pean standards, has proceeded under severe hand- icaps. Its industry for years was cut off from impor- tant scientific and technological advances, and its markets were restricted by reason of its isolation from the West. It continues to exist in the straitjacket of a centralized command economy. Finally, it seems fre- quently to be stretched to the limit of its resources and thus susceptible to grievous damage from the errors of man or the wHms of nature. Acts of God are imper- missible in socialist planning, but nonetheless wet summers have ruined crop harvests, and harsh winters have produced power shortages dire eneugh to disrupt industry and douse city lights. Breakdowns are embarrassing, especially in that they serve as a reminder of grimmer days for the average man. The late 1940's and much of the 19M's were times of deprivation. In the 1960's the populace experienced a steadily increasing standard of liv- ing, and now, by Communist criteria, a consumer- oriented society has arrived. Television sets and to a lesser degree refrigerators and washers are generally available, though frequently not at a price the average family can easily afford. Private cars are still luxury, and housing remains in meager supply despite the best efforts of the regime. Food shortages are largely a thing of the past, with the quality and variety of the offerings both unproved. Some advances also have been made in supplying high quality clothing, shoes. and furniture. As consumers, the Fast Germans are _.ot unlike their cousins in the West. They yearn increasingly for luxury items� exotic food, stylish apparel, or even a car, and work long hours and stint themselves in various ways to gain their goals. They inwardly rage at authority if the pmdiict is not available, or, if obtained, it proves unsatisfactory. The regime is well aware that its reputation is on the line in the nationalized market place, and under Honecker in particular it hai made adjustments to fill the wants of the people. The Regime and the People (c) In an era of increasing detente, the regime continues to prefer that its people live in semi isolation behind heavily barricaded borders. With few exceptions, only those certified as politically reliable or economically expendable are allowed to travel to the West. Those rash enough to attempt flight across a boundary or over the Berlin wall are still deemed guilty of a crime against the state and may be shot by border guards. Within its political compound, the state constantly ex- tracts pledges of loyalty from the populace and dis- penses a rigorous brand of justice. To a large extent, Western influences are still shut out. Intellectuals are exhorted to be good servants of the state, mirroring East German society in their works and combating ,lien ideologies. The People's Army, the state security forces, and the considerable encampment of Soviet troops are frequently lauded a a bulwark against the enemy to the west. Trends towards liberalization elsewhere in Eastern Europe frequently have elicited public condemnation from a regime intent on warding off any infection iii its body politic. Even the Soviet Union has been open to criticism, at least during the !alter years of Ulbricht, though seldom under the g enerall loyal Honecker, who has also seen fit to relax domestic strictures ever so %lightly. As compared with earlier yeah, Fast German society in the 1970's is caught in some -thing less than an iron vise. On ncrasion. the authorities even relent suf- ficiently to allow a modicum of free expression. Such leniency selves to alleviate a buildup of tension.. However, the %ituation is rarely permitted to get out of hand, and, if signs of di%%Pnt appear, the clamp-t are likely to be reapplied. Since most potential tmublemaken apparently either have had their spirits crushed or have long since fled the country, public of- ficiate� encouraged by the lead of Honecker �have APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 assumed more of an air of trust of the populace. Most inhabitants of East' Germany on a day -to -day basis have faced the reality of their existence and have learned to give the cooperation required of them. ,Many slip into rationalizations to the'effect that life in East Germany is mare secure, less hectic, and therefore "nicei than in West Germany. Those who are a part of the regime or who owe their success to it doubtless constitute a growing band of state loyalists. 12 There remains, however, an air of negativism among East Germans, which frequently is more pronounced than that found elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Fven allowing for the traditional German tendency to face life grimly, many observers have commented on the absence of enthusiasm and spontaneity. There appears to be a "we versus them' mental set among the pop- ulace vis -a -vis the authorities. At times individuals are surprisingly outspoken on such matters as the inability APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R00 0200110020 -1 to visit West Germany or the unavailability of certain items at the neighborhood store. Sallies against "the system" at this level are genera!!, tolerated, but out- right attacks on the political leadership are taboo and invite stern retribution. Other evidences that "a correct socialist attitude" has not been fully implanted are readily available. Rock music and long hair, for example, frequently have been portrayed as tools of capitalistic subversion, although as of 1973 these "youthful aberrations" were tolerated. High party officials continue to inveigh against juvenile delinquency, or "hooliganism" as they call it. in addition, the regime has acknowledged alcoholism as a considerable problem. The high in- cidence of divorce and eRtramarital relations also suggests that a systematized existence does not necessarily bring the high standards of morality preached by the regime. By and large, however, antiregime and antisocial behavior is a relatively minor concern in a state in which regimentation bas become a way of life. Per- sonal documentation is constantly required, and police checks are common. Job mobility is severely restricted, and variant behavior is viewed with suspicion. What regular authorities fail to detect, police informers may ferret out. Political offenses, though considerably less frequent than in earl 't er days, usually result in harsher punishment than standard crimes, and, one accused, the individual's chances for acquittal are slim. Then too, a personal such is sharply dimini_shvA by reason of the fact that an individual is merged into a series of collectives --for work, play, and political and s(: ial activity. Within that context, he is expected to conform in realization of the socialist dictum that cooperation with one's "comrades" and obedience to the rules of the team are the highest goals. Centralized direction by the regime of the nation's intellectual and cultural life provides another means for the perpetuation of mass subservience to the state. Radio, television, and the press bear witness to the gre�tness of the nation -and the wisdom of the party with a constancy, volume, and uniformity seemingly guaranteed to promote boredom. Motion pictures and theatrical productions frequently supply only a slightly less rigorous political indoctrination. Unhappily for the regime, Western influences such as radio and TV brondeasts are available in sufficient quantity to provide a standard of comparison for those Fast Ger- mans who care to take advantage of them, On balance, however, the regime's domestic propaganda is the major factor. Pervasive and thus largely un- avoidable, it must eventually seep into the individual's being. Doubtless the most powerful instrument of control is the ruling Socialist Unity Party itself. About 1.9 million East Germans are Communist party members, but some only nominally so. In addition, the party directs a 35.000 -man Workers Militia, a paramilitary force, adw ittedly of unknown effectiveness, charged with putting down civil unrest. Basic party organizations are established in factories, collective farms, production cooperatives, police units, state and economi_- administrations, scientific and educational institutions, residential areas, and any other place a small group may congregate. At this level, trained functionaries propagate the regime's message to the ex- tent that their sometimes limited skill and their auditors' frequently limited Interest allow. When propaganda and political agitation fail, the government may still enforce its will on the populace by resort to the police, the courts, and the prisons. De- Stalinization and liberalization as practiced elsewhere in Eastern Europe, however, have also taken root in East Germany, albeit somewhat tentatively, and in the process the government's use of terror tHdics has abated. Memories of state oppsessioa persist, however, and they serve to discourage overt dissidence. Even then it is important to note that bloodlust was more a Soviet than an -East German aberration and that Ulbricht disposed of opponents in less brutal fashion than Stalin. Generaily, the regime in recent years has preferred to cow rather than crush its op- ponents. A domesticated critic is living proof of the regime's ability to triumph. Purges would only invite comparisons to events of the Hitler era. The maintenance of public order an a day to-day basis Peoples Police and the.State Service (SSD), both responsible 'to national and not local authority. The SSD, operating .covertly, has been the feared instrument of political control, although to- day to a considerably lmwr extent than formerly. Sum- mary punishment is n-a longer a feature of the East German system. Arrests, indictments, and trials are conducted according to established procedures. Ac- quittals; reversals of sentences, and pardons are now conceivable. By constitutional writ the Fast GermamIs entitled to many of the same rights and privileges as the citizen of a Western democracy. In practice the in- dividual is, Judged according to the degm.- that his behavior detracts, from the well -being of the state. 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA -RDP01 -00707 R000200110020 -1 Big Brother and Others (c) in the successful quest foe status, East Germany has had the decisive backing of the Soviet Union. For Moscow, East Germany represents the Soviets forward most military political position in Europe. It is an im- portant industrial partner, and above all else its con- tinued existence obviates "the German threat." Soviet troops stationed in East Germany provide a guarantee of the endurance of the regime. The U.S.S.R. takes about 40% of East German exports and is the chief supplier of essential raw materials. Ry its ac- complishments, e.g., space flights, it radiates an aura of socialist success in which East Germany may bask. For its part, East Germany has a record of compliance that compares favorably with that of any other East European state. The evident harmony of the Moscow -East Berlin relationship has been punctuated by some discordant notes over the years. In the postwar era, the Soviets plundered their sector of Germany, hesitated before approving the creation of the GDR, domineered over it for years. failed to deliver Berlin to it or to sign a separate peace treaty with it despite frequent promises. In the early days, the proud Nordics had little choice but to accept humiliation by their Slavic mentors. As East Germany became stronger and hence less dependent, the leadership undertook a new course. It frntueptly finessed Moscow's demands, openly pledg- ing loyalty to the Soviets and then quietly proceeding the German way. In the post- Khnuhchev era. the Ulbricht regime, perhaps exaggerating its importance to th- bloc. went a step further. It ceased giving the Sovi4 full credit for all socialist advances and with evident delight pronounced some of its own accom- plishments superior. As the elder statesman of blom leaden. Ulbricht increasingly advised Moscow on proper courses of action, particularly on Berlin where 14 East German interests were involved. Finally a more pliable leader was found in the person of Erich Honecker. From this episode it became clear that on crucial issues Moscow's desires still prevailed over Pankow's, to the detriment of the image of full East German sovereignty. In domestic affairs the regime clearly enjoys the dominant role, but overall it remains only a junior partner in Soviet sponsored ventures. Friendship among peoples" is one of East Ger- many's most heavily stressed precepts. Yet even in Eastern Europe East Germans often are resented, since they are viewed more as Germans than as socialist brethren. Alluding to past Teutonic depredations, many East Europeans are inclined to believe that Ger- mans, East or West, simply "cannot overcome their national character." As inheritors of a Western cast of mind and a Protestant morality, East Germans are also considered to be "different." For their part, many in East Germany would agree that they themselves are "different," and also "better." The regime has lived in mortal fear that incipient liberalism in the established East European nations may spread into East Germany and pro.iuce infec- tions, perhaps even convulsions among the populace. Broadly, it was for this reason that East Germany was a prime mover in the bloc's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Once again the world was treated to the spectacle of Germans marching into Czechoslovakia. Despite underlying tensions and occasional flash- points, the Fast Germans remain generally cc} operative allies in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. Within this context, Pankow looked to the other allied capitals to back its claims to sovereignty and boost its campaign for recognition. Their frequent failure to do so vigorously increased the regime's sense of insecurity, and at times induced among East German leaders con- cern that their Eastern neighbors would succumb to the wiles of West Germany, strike a deal with Bonn. and thus leave Fast Germany in an isolated and weakrne d condition. A new confidence born of acceptance has partially displaced such oncerns. and has imbued the regime with a sense of belonging. Still, old fears die hard among the East German faithful, and they remain vigilant against any infidelity on the part of Fast Europeans. On the basis of experience, the Fast Germans have never been quite able to trust the Soviets. In 1952 Stalin proposed a draft treaty offering reunification of f APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 a. 9 r: y i� i i 4. Germany conditional un it� neutralization and disar- at thi..tage -were only a remote� Ixp..ibilit% Equally nlament. and Khrmlic�hev .portly Ix�fore his. downfall remote i% the chalice that the Sin iet. would .00n allow in 1964 %%as dropping hints. to Bolin of a Exn +ible dial. Ea.t Germany. should it %%kh� to make ttS own drrl. In For the time being. however� the Soviet commitment the final view. the lot of F'a.t G-nnan% depends to 1�:1. German. aplx ar. firm A revcr%ion by Mo.cnw 011 hoe %.ell it. V ith Slroiet backing, call nn�ct the to a strategy of a united, n: utralized Germam world challenge of German" 15 d APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 l E Two Germanies or One? (c) It has not been easy for East Germany to live next door tco the dramatic prosperity which burst forth in West Germany's capitalistic pluralistic society. Pankow on the one hand belittles Bonn's economic slsmess and on the other promises to outstrip it by way of Marxian socialism. Extending its effort to the break- ing point has brought some results, but has not dis- pelled the sense of frustration and inferior.ty of com- ing off second best in almost any observable com- parison with West Germany, which to 'iegin with has two and a half times the territory and nearly four times the population of East Germany. In marching to its own dremmet, the GDR has written off the idea of German reunification �a notion it had occasionally extolled for propaganda purposes and which is still held up in West Germany as an arti- cle of faith. In one of his more accurate descriptions of the German situation, Walter Ulbricht told his Com- munist Party Congress in April 1967: "Two separate German states 1-ave been created, and they have pur- sued completely different paths of development. To unify them would be tantamount to combining fire and water. I: is unrealistic to talk about unification now." On balance, it appears that the former East German ruler c as a point. Time and circumstance have lossened tanohar and fraternal ties. Regionalism has taken hold, rind each state has been welded into military and economic pacts inimical one to the other. Each is prideful in its accomplishments and separate identity. Each sees itself as the true fatherland, reserv- ing for itself the best of the Germanic past, and places the onus of unrighteousness on the other. Neither appears disposed in the near future to modify its style sufficiently to accommodate the other. Present -day relations between the two Germanies are heavily influenced by a residue of distrust. For 16 years West Germany treated East Germany as a political and social outcast, an "untouchable" on the international scene. Bonn claimed the right to sole representation for Germany as a whole. Bonn spokesmen dismissed East Germany as "the Soviet oc- cupied zone," "Middle Germany," and "the so- called German Democratic Republic." Only in the fall of 1969 did newly inaugurated Chancellor Brandt acknowledge the existence of "two German states," albeit in "one German nation �a formula unaccept- able to a Pankow regime intent on winning accept- ance of a sovereign East Germany. By contrast with Bonn's attitude of disdain, East German spokemen over the years verbally assaulted the Federal Republic with very special rage, some of it bordering on the obscene. More recently, the Brandt policy of recon- ciliation with the East has undercut Pankow's propaganda effort and the war of words abated in the early 197G's. A sign of the mood of insecurity that still grips East Germany is the uncertainty with which relations with West Germany are conducted. On the one hand, the GDR in recent years has pressed a policy of separateness (Abgrenzurig) in order to show in every small way the existence of two entirely different Ger- manies. It continues to regard West Germany as a menace to its existence, the governing SPD as a betrayer of socialism, and popular Chanceller Willy Brandt as a seducer of its people. On the other hand, East German leaders realize they must deal with West Germany in good faith, in order to solidify their political ga,..s and to open new avenues to Western markets and technology. Seeking a solution to its dilemma, the CDR has agreed, somewhat grudgingly and with specific limitations, to permit those East -West German personal contacts spelled out in the General Relations Treaty. Simultaneously, the GDR has continued to bargain toughly on the official level with Bonn in behalf of East German interests. In mall ways, such as the release of political prisoners, East Germany has made concessions to domestic and West German public opinion, bu c it remains doubtful that Pankow is ready to risk a full normalizaticip of relations with the powerful magnet that is West Germany. Looking ahead, observers of East Germany have mused for years as to what comes next. Many predicted that Ulbricht's passing from power would be a major turning point. As it turned out, observable changes have thus far been minimal. Erich Honecker has slightly relaxed domestic controls and allowed his r1 0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 t r F 3x pi 4 s n ail people a slightly larger measure of "the good lift," both in terms of consumer gomis and social welfare benefits. At the same time, lie has opted for a somem-hat greater degree of ceotralLmd control of the economy. In external affairs, lie differs again by degree: conforming more fully to Soviet wishes, acting friencifier ,oward other Warsaw fact states, and generally avoiding throwing his weight around in East European affairs. In party matters, he procceds cautiously, in the process slowly replacing incumbents with his own risen. As a lifelong bureaucrat and longtime heir apparent, he seems to Have learned his lessons well. Unlike Honecker and the bureaucrats now in office, there Is no certainty that the younger generation, which will inherit the system, will conform to es- tablished practice. Self- confident and pragmatic, the new risen seers willing to accept the concept of socialism nominally, but then operate according to the dictates of reason. An infusion of more youthful, less rigid personnel into positions of Iwwer conceivably could eventually tip the balance in favor of a society miff ieientiv h1wralized and an econoniv sufficientiv Westerniml to permit an accommodation with West Germany. Stic a result is hardiv foreordained. however. The firobability remains that the liberals of today will be the conservatives of tomorrow; and. by the time they assume power. they will be prepared to march in lock step along the Ulbricht- Honecker course. On balance, the bast German regime has reason to believe that developments in the ricar term may be favorable to its interests. In effect, it has built its own house. To u considerable degree, it has gained aecep- lance at home and ubroud. Overall, it feels t hat time is on its side, 1larticularly as expectations of a return to 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 d German national unitv diminish further among East and West Germans and separation becomes more a i reality. Nonetheless, East Germany still has problems. At home, the regime must deal with the spiral of rising ex- pectations, and it is problematical whether it can fulfill the demands of the populace both for a better life and increased contact with the outside world. I Abroad, East Germany must be careful in several respects �to maintain the proper attitude of loyalty to the Soviet Union; to avoid the weighty embrace of West Germany; to exploit Western economies without falling prey to their ideologies; to keep the friendship t of third world countries without paying an exorbitant price in terms of aid; and above all, to do these var'.ous things with slender diplomatic resources and little ac- crued experience in tb international arena. In the long run, Pankow also will not be able to rest worryfree. Hopes for reunification, as opposed o ex ,iectations, are unlikely to die out completely. Building on hope, Chancellor Brandt and his suc- cessors may be expected to pursue practical inter German ties as the br for some form of political union. In an era of detente, circumstances con- ceivably may arise which would break down the carefully erected barriers and make union the more possible. On c, larger scale, West and East Europe may over time interact in a movement toward one Europe in which logic decrees that there will be ono Getmany. Thus, there is no guarantee in per- petuity that there will he an East Germany. At present, Pankow can only insist that such must be the case. No matter what path the regime itself would take, it must in plotting its course accept two conditions as facts of life. The GDR will continue to be subordinate to the Soviet Union whose own national interests will define the broader aspects of Fast Germany's relationships abroad. Also, the West German Govern- ment has not abandoned the concept of reuni .cation. Rather, it has switched to playing a Fong -term game on this ;paramount issue. Bonn has challenged East Ger- many to a competitive coexistence in the confident belief ,'hat ultimately its Western lifestyle and the spirit of German nationhood will win out. At present, it has acceded to East Germany's international recogni- tion in an effort to lure the Communist regime into the arena. East Germany has accepted the challenge and novv is fated to emerge from isolation into a world of change, with con.setluenem as vet unknown. Is Chronology (u/ou) 1945 April First group of German Communist emigrees, headed by Walter Ulbricht, returns from Moscow to take charge of civil affairs under Soviet auspices. May German Iligh Command signs unconditional surrender. Jane Allied Control Council composed of United Kingdom, France, Urited States, and U.S.S.R. takes over government of Germany. Jaly� Aagoat Tripartite (United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.) Potsdam Conference confirms division of Germany into four zones of occupation, while Berlin is divided into sectors occupied by four Allied powers. Germany not to be parti- tioned but to be treated as single economic unit with certain central administrative departmeuta following a common policy to be determined by Allied Control Council. 1946 April Socialist Unity Party (SED) founded in Soviet Zone through forced merger of German Communist Party and Social Democratic Party. October Elections held for parliaments in fiv Laender created in Soviet Zone, and coalition governmews (SED, CDU, LDPD) formed. Number of central admit.istrative departments created, directly respt,nsible tc Sevtet occupation authorities. 1947 January U.S. and British zones fused into the Bizone to cope with economic problems worsened by Soviet lack of cooperation. (French zone joined in October 1948.) 4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 i 1 1 X December SED convenes People's Congress in East Berlin; by appor- tionment of seats SED and front parties dominate. 1948 January Power and composition of Economic Council of Bizone changed to create nucleus of a future German government. March Soviet representative walks out of Allied Control Council, thus ending last vestige of joint control. April Soviet authorities gradually extend restrictions on read and rail traffic to Berlin. June Soviet representative leaves Allied Kommandatura, executive body for Berlin. Total blockade imposed on 2.5 million inhabitants of West Berlin by Soviet and East German authorities, requiring airlift by U.S. and British to supply city. Summer U S.S.R. begins to build up militarized police force in East Germany, in violation of Potsdam Agreement. 1949 May Blockade of West Berlin ends. People's Congress adopts East German Constitution. Federal Republic comes into existence in West Germany with publication of its constitution. September East German regime joins Soviet sponsored Council for Economic Mutual Assistance. October German Democratic Republic proclaimed and its government recognized by Soviet Union and Soviet dominated govern- ments; Soviet Military Administration dissolved and admin- istrative functions transferred to East German regime; East German representation at quadripartite functions retained by Soviet Control Commission. 1950 July East Germany and Poland sign treaty at Goerlitz recognizing Oder -Neime line as their frontier. October General elections held in East Germany establishes primacy of SED. To enhance illusion of East Germ.:. autonomy, Soviet Control Commission replaced by a Soviet High Commissioner with rank of ambassador. 1952 May Poliee guarded no man's land 3 miles wide created along entire western frontier excluding only Berlin. July East Germany administrative divisions reorganized; tradi- tional Laender abolished; 14 districts (Bezirko), similar to Soviet oblast, established. Collectivization of agriculture j begins. October Judicial system revised in accordance with Soviet system. 1953 June Uprising in East Berlin over harsh labor policies spreads throughout East Germany; repressed by Soviet forces. 1954 January Reparations to Soviet Union cease; ownership of joint East German Soviet companies, except for uranium complex in the Erzgebirge, returned to East Germans. 1955 January Soviet Union ends state of war with Germany. May East Germany joins Warsaw Pact ae provisional member; receives full membership following year. September Soviet Union declares East German regime sovereign; East Germany given control over border security and communica- tions between West harlin and West Germany, with U.S.S.R. reser �ing jurisdiction only over movement of Allied personnel and freight. December West Germany formally implements policy of isolating East German; diplomatically by proclaiming Hall -,tein Doctrine, i.e., West Germany will end diplomatic relations with any country except the U.S.S.R. establishing diplomatic ties with East Germany. 1556 January East Germany formally establishes armed forces. 1957 March U.S.S.-L. and East Germany sign agreement on stationing of Soviet troops in East Germany. 19 01 i I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 i October Yugoslavia recognizes East Germany; first nonbloc state to do so. 1958 February Purge begins of leading Communist functionaries who oppose pace of Ulbricht's economic policies; party and government reorganized. November East and West Germany formalize commercial relations by signing Interzonal Trade Agreement, which for years serves as principal official link between them. 1959 May� August Big Four foreign ministers meet at Geneva in futile attempt to work out formula for German unification; East and West represented as "advisers." 1960 April Government undertakes drive to complet^ gricultural collectivization. September Upon death of Wilhelm Pieck, office of president abolished; Council of State created as replacement with SED chief Ulbricht elected chairman. 1961 July� August East German refugees to West Berlin and West Germany reach highest number since 1953: 33,415 in July and 47,433 in August. August Escapes virtually stopped by erection of Berlin wall and by strengthening of defenses on East -West German demarcation line. 1962 January Universal military training law passed. August Would -be defector Peter Fechter shot and allowed to bleed to death at the Berlin wall in h.dhly publicized instance of East German brutality. 1963 June Ulbricht proposes and later (February 1964) spells out New Economic System which places emphasis on such factors as profitability, realistic price -cost relationships, greater outlays for remarck, material incentives for workers, and increased managerial responsibility. 20 August Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by East Germany. December West Berlin and East German authorities conclude first Berlin Pass Agreement whereby West Berlin citizens visit relatives in East Berlin. 1964 June Soviet -East German Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed. September Premier Otto Grotewohl dies and is succeeded by Willi Stoph. 1965 April Soviet and East German military forces harass West German civilian and Allied military traffic to West Berlin in retalia- tion for West German Bundestag meeting in West Berlin. September Ulbricht leads high -level delegation to Moscow to receive support for GDR claims to international recognition of its sovereign status; marks beginning of more intensive Soviet GDR bilaterial relations. October Youth n'ctc occur in Leipzig and other East German cities. December SED leaders criticize youth and cultural policies at 11th plenum of the SED Central Committee; subsequent return to hardline cultural policy produces many incidents between regime and intellectuals during 1966. Erich Ape], head of the State Planning Commission, commits suicide in spectacular act of protest against Soviet economic demands on East Germany. 1966 March In bw for international recognition, East Germany applies for U.N. membership through Polisn offices. 1967 February Nationality Law enacted by People's Chamber establishes for first time concept of "citizens of GDR" as distinct from "German nationality." Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers discuss bilateral relations with Wpst Germany; East Germans, Poles against; Czechs, Bulgariais, Hungarians favor. March� September GDR seeks to shore up opposition to Bonn; signs 20 -year bilateral treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia (March), Hungary (May), and Bulgaria (September). 41 i i i I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 0 ,o V June East Germany publicly sides with Arabs in Arab Israeli war. September West German efforts to broaden and improve contact founders on East German precondition of recognition for GDR. 1168 April New constitution replacing outmoded 1949 document adopted in East Germany's first popular referendum. March �Jane East Germany bans travel to and from West Berlin by mem- bers of NPD, West Germany's ultrarightist party. In April, ban broadened to include senior officials of West German Government. In June, People's Chamber announces passport and visa requirements for all West Germans and West Berliners. August Occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, in- cluding East German troops, followed by crackdown at home on liberals sympathetic to Dubeek government. 1969 March West German presidential election held in West Berlin; arouses ire of East German and Soviet Governments but no incidents result. April Recognition of East Germany by Iraq, first non Communist country to do so, opens door to recognition by number of other Afro -Asian states. September Advent of West German Government led by Social Demo- cratic Party's Willy Brandt renews efforts to normalize relations with Soviet Union, GDR, and other Communist neighbors. Soviets reply positively to notes from Allied partners seeking cooperation in reducing Berlin tensions. October Delegations from 84 countries attend 20th anniversary celebrations in East Germany; divergences between East Germany and its allies over policy toward West Germany dominate speeches by most Eastern European leaders. December U.S.S.R. begins talks with West Germany on renunciation of threat or use of force in any conflict. 1970 March and May Prime Minister Stoph and West German Chancellor Brandt meet in Erfurt and Kassel but fail to agree on basis for improving relations. March First Four -Power talks in 11 years discuss Berlin problems. August Soviet Union and West Germany sign trerAy renouncing use of force and accepting all postwar European boundaries. Four -Power rights in Berlin and Germany not affected. (West Germany signs same agreement with Poland in December.) December Ulbricht criticized for economic planning failures at 14th Central Committee plenum. 1971 May Erich Honecker replaces Ulbricht as SED First Secretary. June Honecker's opening speech at Eighth Party Congress ratifying his accession indicates he would settle for less than full diplomatic recognition by West Germany; wishes success to Four -Power negotiations on Berlin. September Four -Power Agreement on Berlin initialed (signed in June 1972). Berlin remains under quadripartite authority with reduced political ties to West Germany, Soviet Union guarantees unimpeded access to West Berlin through East Germany. East -West German negotiations begin on supple- mentary agreements. October Major ideological speech to social scientists explicitly rejects Ulbricht's favorite themes. 1972 April General Traffic Agreement reached with Bonn in April (signed in May); covers transport of goods, travel of West Germans to East Germany virtually unrestricted, only emergency travel allowed to East Germans. Fifth Central Committee plenum adopts package of social legislation, granting additional benefits in pensions, rent and family assistance allotments. June Four -Power Agreement on Berlin is signed; discussions begin Fth Federal Republic on general treaty. October Government reorganization places greater power in hands of ministers at expense of advisory commissions, according to Honecker's dictates. 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 -nno mcrc. Agreement reached on general German treaty designed to end 25 years of cold war hostility; states pledge to refrain from use of force, respect common border, recognize sovereignty of each state in internal and external affairs; left open question of reunification. East Germany becomes member of UNESCO and is granted observer status at U.N. victory. 1973 January East and West Germany accorded equal representation at Helsinki preparatory talks for Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Regime hails reelection of Brandt coalition in West German Area Brief LAND (UIOU) Size: 41,800 sq. mi. Use: 43% arable, 15,E meadows and pasture, 27% forests, 15% other Land boundaries: 1,433 mi. PEOPLE (UIOU) Population: 17,050,000 (including East Berlin), average annual growth rate 0% (current) Ethnic divisions: 99.7% German, 0.3% Slavic and other Religion: 59% Protestant, 8% Roman Catholic, 33% un- affiliated or other; less than 5% of Protestants and about 25% of Roman Catholics actively participate 22 By end of January, 67 states had established diplomatic relations with East Germany, 34 since 7 December 1972. Language: German, small Sorb (West Slavic) minority Literacy: 99% Labor force: 8.2 million; 36.9% industry; 5.2% handicrafts; 8% construction; 12.5% agriculture; 7.2% transport and communications; 10.9% commerce; 19.3% services and others Organized labor: 88% of total labor force GOVERNMENT (UIOU) Legal name: German Democratic Republic Type: Communist state Capital: East Berlin (not officially recognized by U.S., U.K., and France, which together with the U.S.S.R. have special rights and responsibilities in Berlin) Political subdivisions: (Excluding East Berlin) 14 districts (Bezirke), 218 counties (Kreise), 8,845 communities (Gemeinden) Legal system: Civil law system modified by Communist legal theory; new constitution adopted 1968 by approx. 95 of the voters in national "referendum court system parallels administrative divisions; no judicial review of legislative acts; legal education at Universities of Berlin, Leipzig, Halle and Jena; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction; more stringent penal code adopted 1968 Branches: Legislative Volkskammer (elected directly); executive Chairman of Council of State, Chairman of Council of Ministers, Cabinet (elected by Volkskammer); judiciary� Supreme Court; entire structure dominated by Socialist Unity (Communist) Party Government leaders: Chairman, Council of State, Walter Ulbricht (Head of State); Chairman, Council of Ministers, Willi Stoph (Head of Government) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 E C. I I X X Suffrage: All citizens age 18 and over Elections: National and local alternating every 2 years; pre- pared by an electoral commission of the National Front; ballot supposed to be secret and voters permitted to strike names off ballot; more candidates than offices available; parliamentary elections held 14 November 1971; local elections, 22 March 1970 Political parties and leaders: Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (BED), headed by First Secretary Erich Honeeker, dominates the regime; 4 token parties (Christian Democratic Union, National Democratic Party, Liberal Democratic Party, and Democratic Peasants Party) and an amalgam of special interest organizations participate with the BED in National Front Voting strength: 1971 parliamentary elections: 98.33% voted the regime slate; 1970 local elections: 99.85% voted the regime slate Communists: 1.9 million party members Other special interest group9: Free German Youth, Free German Trade Union Federation, Democratic Women's Federation of Germany, German Cultural Federation (all Communist dominated) Member of: CEMA, IPU, Warsaw Pact, UNESCO ECONOMY (UIOU) GNP: $45.1 billion (1972, at 1971 prices); per capita $2,650 Agriculture: Food deficit area; main crops potatoes, rye, wheat, barley, oats, and industrial crops Major industries: Metal fabrication, chemicals, light indus- try, brown coal, uranium, and shipbuilding Electric power: Installed capacity 14.3 million kw.; produc- tion 72.8 billion kw.-hr. (1972), 4,270 kw.-hr. per capita Exports: $7,635 million (1972) at 1972 monetary conversion rate; metal products, basic materials, light industrial and agricultural products Imports: $7,248 million (1972) at 1972 monetary conversion rate; metal products, basic materials, light industrial, agri- cultural and forestry producta Major trading partners: 75% of export trade zsnd 70% of import trade with Communist areas (1971), U.S.S.R. 38% of total trade, West Germany 10.2% Fiscal year: Same as calendar year Monetary conversion rate: DME2.8 =US$1 (early 1973); DME3.15 US$1 (1972) COMMUNICATIONS (S) Railroads: 9,109 route miles; 8,762 miles standard gage, 347 miles meter and narrow gages; 7,379 miles single track, 1,730 miles double- and multiple- track; 843 miles electrified; government owned Highways: 28,500 miles classified routes, mostly paved: 7,750 miles classified state or national highways including 950 miles of limited- access autobahns, 20,750 miles classified district roads. Additionally, 25,600 ?Hiles unclassified, natural surface minor roads SECRET d Inland waterways: 1,640 miles navigable, 1,040 miles of which are principal Pipelines: About 650 .piles, mostly for crude products; estimated 116 miles of ne.v lines under construction Ports: 5 major (Rostock, Wismar, Stralsund, Sassnitz, Peenemuende), 12 minor Merchant marine: 138 ships (1,000 g.r.t. and over) totaling 1,043,247 g.r.t. and 1,392,260 d.w.t.; major part of fleet consists of 91 dry cargo, 12 bulk cargo, and 10 tankers Civil air: 28-30 major transport aircraft Airfields: 146 total; 54 with permanent- surface runways; 49 with runways 8,000 11,999 ft.; 42 with runways 4,000- 7,999 ft. Telecommunications: Domestic and international facilities modern and adequate; good coverage provided by radio broadcast stations (AM and FM), 6 million receivers; 12 regional and 7 local TV stations, 4.5 million TV receivers; 2,165,000 telephones (fully automatic) DEFENSE FORCES (S) Military manpower: Males 15 -49, 3,876,000; 3,110,000 fit for military service; about 132,000 reach military age (18) annually Personnel: (Estimated) ground forces 90,000, naval forces 17,500, air force 12,000, groups 49,500, alert police 11,000, security guard 3,500 Personnel in reserve (not on active duty): (Estimated) ground forces 700,000, naval forces 22,800, air force 4,400 Major ground units: 6 divisions (4 motorized rifle, 2 tank), 1 SCUD (88-1) tactical missile brigade, 4 regiments (2 artillery, 2 antiaircraft artillery), 1 airborne battalion, 2 antitank battalions Ships: 2 destroyer escorts, 141 coastal patrol types R9 river/ roadstead patrol types, 57 minesweepers, 28 amphibious types, 54 auxiliaries, 91 service craft Aircraft (operational): 399 including 329 jet (320 jet fighters and 9 turbofan transports), 3 turboprop transports, 11 prop transports, 14 turbine helicopters, 35 piston helicopters Missiles: 20 SA -2 SAM sites (120 launchers)* Supply: Dependent on Communist countries mainly tee U.S.S.R. except for light infantry weapons, small arms am- munition, explosives, chemical warfare, defensive materiel, signal equipment, transport vehicles, some CW /BW warfs e agents, and most naval ships Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1973, 8.3 billion DME; about 9.2% of total budget *National SA -2 force capability is increased by presence of 27 operational SA -2 sites and 23 operational SA -3 sites which are subordinate to Soviet Group of Forces (stationed in) East Germany; deployment of SA-4 (23 BA-4 battalions) continues in defense of Soviet forces. Deployment of SA-6 has commenced, and elements of a:, least 2 regiments are believed to be present. 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 Places and features referred to In this General Survey (u/ou) Adlershof (see. of East Berlin) Altenburg Aue.................................... Babelliberg Bad Elster Bad dersfeld, West Germany Bad Schandau Bansin................................. Barh6ft................................ Barth.................................. Bautzen................................ Bergen................................. Berlin.................................. Biesenthal.............................. Bitterfeld Blankenheiin B6hlen................................. Boizenburg............................. Bonn, West Germany Boxberg................................ Brandenburg Brandenburg (region) Braunschweig, West Germany............ Breege................................. Briesen................................. Bracken (peak) Buch (see. of East Berlin) Bug................................... Calvdrde............................... Gilpin................................. Cottbus............ Crossen................................ Diinholm (island) Danube (stream) Darsser Ort (cape) Dequede............................... Dessau Dresden................................ EastBerlin Eberswalde Eggersdorf Eilenburg Eisenach EisenhUttenstacit Eialeben Elbe (stream) El be- Havel- Kanal (canal) Erfurt................................. Erzgebirge (mts) Espenhain Fichtel-Berg (mt) Forst.................................. Frankfurt Freiberg Fulda, West Germany Gedser, Denmark Gehl&dorf Gera................................... Gerstungen............................. Glowe.................................. Gdrlitz...... Greifswald Gross In8elsberg (mi) Gfildendorf Halle.................................. Halle-Neustadt (sec. of Halle) Hamburg, West Germany Harz( is) Havel (stream) Havel-Kanal (canal) Heinersdorf COORDINAT9A 11 1 COORD04ATEM #N. 'E. 0 'V. 01:. 52 27 13 32 Naumburg 1 51 09 11 49 60 59 12 27 Neisse (stream) 52 04 14 46 50 35 12 42 Neubrandenburg 53 34 13 16 52 24 13 06 Neustrelitz 53 22 13 05 50 17 12 11 Niederfinow 52 50 13 56 50 52 Q 41 Niemegk 52 05 12 42 50 55 14 09 Oberhof 50 43 10 44 53 58 14 08 Oder (stream) 53 32 14 34 54 26 13 02 Oder- Havel- Kanal (canal) 52 52 14 02 54 22 12 44 Oder-Spree-Kanal (canal) 52 23 13 41 51 11 14 'A Oranienburg 52 45 13 14 54 25 13 26 Osnabrijck, West Germany 52 16 9 03 52 31 13 24 Opthafen (part) 52 27 13 2f, 52 46 13 38 Ostseebad Wustrow 54 21 12 24 51 37 12 19 Paderborn, West Germany. 51 43 N 46 51 31 11 25 Pankow (sec. of East Berlin) 52 34 13 24 51 12 12 23 Parow 54 21 13 05 53 23 10 43 Patz 52 14 13 39 50 44 7 06 Peenemijnde 54 08 13 '7 51 24 14 34 Petkun 51 59 13 21 52 25 12 33 Piesteritz 51 52 12 36 53 00 14 00 Plauen 50 30 12 ON 52 16 10 32 Pomerania (region) 53 40 15 00 54 37 13 21 Potsdam 52 24 13 04 52 03 13 43 Prague, Czechoslovakia. 50 05 14 28 51 48 10 37 Radeberg 51 07 13 55 52 39 13 30 Rheinsb4,-rg 53 06 12 53 54 37 13 13 Riems island 54 11 13 22 52 24 11 18 Riesa 51 IN 13 19 53 31 13 26 Rossendorf 51 03 13 M 51 46 14 20 Rosslau $1 53 12 15 50 46 12 29 Rostock 54 05 12 09 54 19 13 07 Rothenser 52 11 11 40 45 20 29 40 Ruderitz 50 25 12 01 54 29 12 31 Rfigen (island) 1 54 25 13 24 52 50 11 41 Rummelsburg 52 30 13 31 51 50 12 15 Saale (stream) 51 57 11 55 51 03 13 45 Saalfeld 50 39 11 22 52 30 13 33 SRAII)w 52 12 13 23 52 50 13 50 Savir. West Germany r(gior 49 15 7 00 52 32 13 49 Sangerhausen I 51 28 11 IN 51 28 12 37 Sassnitz 54 31 13 39 50 59 10 19 Kiihlungsborn........................... 54 09 11 43 52 09 14 39 Saxony (region) if 00 IZ 00 51 32 11 33 Schkopau 51 24 11 59 53 So 9 00 Schimebeck 52 01 11 .15 52 24 12 23 Schwarzeripfont.... 44 If 12 Is 00 59 11 02 8 c h warse p 51 32 14 21 50 30 13 10 Echwedenschante (site) 54 33 13 09 51 11 12 28 Schwedt 53 04 14 IN 50 26 12 57 Schwerin 52 *2 13 53 51 44 14 38 Seefeld 52 37 13 �41 52 21 14 33 Seelingstadf, 50 47 12 15 50 55 13 22 Seiffen 50 39 13 27 50 33 9 40 8enftenberg 51 31 14 01 54 15 11 57 Silesia, Poland and Czechoslovakia (region) 51 00 is 00 54 06 1. 06 Sonneberg 50 21 11 10 50 52 12 03 Stendal 32 36 11 51 50 58 10 04 Stralsund 54 18 13 06 54 34 13 29 Strausberg 52 35 13 53 51 10 15 00 Stubbenkammer 54 35 13 40 54 06 13 23 Sfidluffen (port) 52 31 13 12 50 52 10 28 Suhl 50 38 10 42 52 19 14 32 Szczecin (Stettin). Poland 53 25 14 35 51 30 12 00 Tarnewitz 53 58 11 14 51 29 11 56 Tautenburg 51 00 11 43 53 33 10 00 Teplice, Czechoslovakia 50 38 13 SO 51 45 10 30 Thfiringer Wald (mia) 50 40 10 so 52 53 11 58 Thuringia (region) 1 51 00 11 00 52 36 13 12 Torgau 51 34 13 00 53 06 14 12 Trattendorf 51 32 14 23 51 33 11 30 Trelleborg, Sweden 55 22 13 10 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1 1 a 14 11117't6" East Berlin 52 30 to 33 Eberswalde 52 80 13 80 Eggersdorf 82 32 13 49 Eilenburg 81 28 12 37 Eisenach 50 59 10 19 Eisen hOttenstadt 52 09 14 39 Eisleben at a2 11 33 Elbe (sirea m) 53 50 9 Do Elbe Havel Kanal (canal) 52 24 12 23 Erfurt so 59 11 02 Erzgebirge (min) 50 30 13 10 F. speahain 51 11 12 28 Fichtel -Berg (ml) 50 26 12 57 Forst 51 44 14 38 Frankfurt 52 21 14 33 Freiberg 50 55 13 22 Fulda, Went Germany 50 33 9 40 Gedser, De.-mark 54 35 11 57 Gehlsdorf 1,4 06 12 P6 Gera 50 52 12 05 Gerstungen 50 58 10 04 Glowe 54 34 13 29 Gorlitt 51 10 15 00 Greifswald 54 06 13 23 Gross inselsberg (ml) 50 52 10 28 Guldendor t 52 19 14 32 Halle 51 30 12 00 Iialle- Neustadt (sec. of Halle) 51 29 11 56 liambcrg, West Germany 53 33 10 00 Harz mix 51 45 10 30 Havel stream 52 53 11 58 Havel -Kenal (canal) 52 36 13 12 Heinersdorf 53 06 1: 12 Helbra 51 33 11 30 Helmstedt, West Germany 52 14 11 Ob Hennigsdorf 52 38 13 12 Hettatedt 51 39 11 30 Hildesheim, West Germany 52 (19 9 58 Hof, West Germany 50 19 11 55 Hohenwarte IYJ 36 11 29 Hoyerswerds 31 26 14 15 Ilmenau 50 41 10 54 Jens 50 56 11 ;tS Juliusruh 54 37 13 22 Kamenz 51 16 14 06 Karl Marx- Stadt So 5(1 12 85 Kassel, West Germany at 19 9 30 Kolkwitz 51 45 14 15 Konigttein SO 58 14 M Konigs Wusterhsusen 52 17 13 37 Kdpeniek (see. of Bast Berlin) 32 27 13 34 Kostrtyn, Poland 52 35 14 39 K uhlungsborn 54 09 11 43 Lauta at 28 14 04 Leipzig 51 18 12 20 Leuns 51 19 12 01 Lichtenberg (see. of Gera;. 30 Ii0 12 09 Lindenberg 52 12 14 08 Linow 53 23 13 57 Lippendorf 51 11 12 23 Lohme 54 35 13 37 Lubbenau al 52 13 S8 Lubmin 34 07 13 36 Lud wigslust 53 19 11 30 Lutzkendorf 81 18 it SI Magdeburg 52 10 11 40 Marienborn 82 12 11 07 Marienehe (sec. of Rostock) 84 07 12 05 Markenbath 50 32 12 52 Markgrsfenheide 54 it 12 10 Marlow 51 09 12 35 Marquardt 32 27 12 58 Mecklenburg (region) 53 30 12 W Meiningen 30 33 10 25 Meissen at 09 13 29 Meneburg al 22 12 00 Mittellsod Kanal (canal) 32 16 11 41 Moxa 30 39 It 38 Muldenstein 31 40 12 20 Nauen 52 36 12 33 Saslow, 80 39 11 22 Saar, m Wept Uerany (repinn) 82 12 13 23 Saniterhausen 49 18 7 00 8assnitz 81 28 11 18 K tihlungsborn 84 31 13 39 Saxony 84 09 11 43 region 81 00 13 00 8chkopau 81 24 It 89 Schiineb eck 52 01 11 45 Schwarteupfost 54 11 12 to Schwarte Pumpe 51 32 14 21 Schwedenschanse (Rife) 54 33 13 09 f;chwedt 53 04 14 IN Schwerin 52 12 13 53 Seefeld 52 37 13 41 SeelingstAdt 60 47 12 15 Seiffen 50 39 13 27 Senftenberg 51 31 14 01 Silesia, Poland and Czechoslovakia (region) 51 00 18 00 3onneberg 50 21 11 10 S tendal 52 36 11 51 Stralsund 54 IA 13 06 Strausberg 52 35 13 53 Stubbenka mmer 54 35 13 40 Siidhafen (port) 52 31 13 12 Suhl 50 36 10 42 Szczecin (Stettin), Paiand 53 25 14 35 Tarnewitz 53 58 it 14 Tautenburg 51 oo it 43 Teplice, Czechoslovakia !i0 38 13 50 Thuringer Wald (mix) 50 40 10 50 Thuringia (region' 51 (o 11 00 Torgau 51 34 13 00 Tmttendorf 51 32 14 23 Trelleborg, Sweden 55 22 13 10 Tremsdorf .',2 16 13 07 Unstrut stream) 51 10 11 48 U nterwellenborn 50 39 11 26 Vetschau 51 47 14 04 Vitte 54 34 13 06 Vockerode 51 51 12 21 Wahnsdorf 51 07 13 t0 Waldheim 52 35 13 03 Warnemiinde 54 10 12 05 Weimar 50 59 H 19 Werra sirerm 51 26 9 39 West Berlin 52 30 13 20 Westhafek .(port) 52 32 13 20 Westatsaken 52 30 13 08 Wieck....... 54 06 13 27 Wilhelm- Pieck-Stadt G uben 51 57 14 43 Wismar 53 54 11 28 Wittenberg 51 52 12 39 Wilte nlr rxr 53 00 11 45 Wolit "t 54 03 13 46 Wroclaw (Breslau). Poland 51 06 17 02 Wunxdorf 52 10 13 28 Wurzburg, Went Germany 49 48 9 56 Zehlendorf 52 47 13 23 Zebrensdorf 52 10 13 30 Zeitz 51 63 12 09 Zeft- Mehlis 50 35 M 39 Zeuthen 52 22 13 37 Z 52 17 11 41 Zoeeen 52 13 13 27 Zschornewitz 51 43 12 24 Zwickau .W 44 12 30 Selected airfields Alt Lonnewitz 51 33 13 13 Brieaen 52 02 13 45 Dresden 51 08 13 46 Drewilz 51 53 14 32 Gross Dollo 53 02 13 32 Kothen SI 43 11 58 Oranienburg S2 44 13 13 Peenem a nde 54 10 13 47 Prsxhen 51 40 14 38 Schonefeld 32 23 13 31 We lzow 51 35 14 08 W eraeuchen 52 38 13 46 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110020-1 East Germany International boundary k' Ur t Bazlik center t Airfield Soviet Zone boundai Railroad 4 Major port Bezirk boundary Autobahn National capital Other road A Soviet control Point for Allied traffic A East German Intomnol border crossing point Populotod prates 1.000.0" IQ 7,200A00 0 20.000 1) 100.000 100,000 to 1.000.000 Und., 20,000 Spot ol&rflonz in (�r SC614 �1.430A00 0 1 so ty Statue uue 0 1s 5 T8 Naumanetn .11 1.0 1.0nebutil- F e die r a b I ir, 14 7,7 FTIMMe" 21 =1% WITIPT11 Vith i 1 1 1 aItIC 1 1 East Berlin Land Use and Industi LAND USE S Urban Forest or park Open area (primarily field or meadow) INDUSTRY Cncse ar�d seg-unts mdcale relatire rmporlanC M Q Basic materiels Metallurgy, power, chemicals and Iert rubber. bulldmg .001,6.001,61t Metal working Neary machinery, transparlat� sgu,l menl, ehipbudd'% elscarrul egrupmei Pierian and optical equipment Light industry O Tertles, clolhrnq, wood, paper, glass Food mduatry Stadtbezuk boundary See 54 Pomeranian Bay Od w poll and 57 Basic Resources and Process RESOURCES lC.f Natural gas i Brown cod llm Bituminous c Potash Copper MAJOR PIPELINE Oil f Natural gas PROCESSING Iron and wee Copper A Od, gas, coal APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 oirn I@Iv a 1111 tea& ten id Indussr ark (primarily sallow) r Is indicate M clie -Cate :nd fart falling mSte, ials franapi 1141,0- eguil 1. alaelrical equlpmei lea) puipmant wood, paper, glass isources Coss[ MCES oral gas wn coal tninous cc Nh iper MVEUNE Ural gets ISSING and steel leer ves. coal Land Use Industrial Cen Grclu and segments md� 'slat.: unttartanee Q Basic Most intensive agricult (primarily wheat, sugt and corn) Mimed intensive and e11 0 agriculture (including and potatoes) LJ Mixed e11lerimver agricui pasture, and forest Permanent pastt -re Forest Industrial Cen Grclu and segments md� 'slat.: unttartanee Q Basic materials Mmmq, mNfllurgy. D0' tAem Calf and fer:duvs, rubber, build mg inaterols 0 Metal working Heavy maohmry, transporttwn equip. men). sh,pbuddng, electrical equipment. predawn smi cDUCall equromenl O Light industry Toxides. clothing, wood. paper. glass, C:rs�s Food industry APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 53 p ol a n d m Basic Resources and Processing RESOURCES Natural gas J Brown pe1 JUDI num na a Ca i pa ;ash Ca PPar "OR PIPELINE Od Naiur al gaa PROCESSING iron and ale. 4a Copp"( !Y' Od San caa+ Populati ienu; w I%tktg so lop m I Prraws pt sown WR chosIova6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1 rces d Industrial Centers C>�L1.a .nq 1.qlfni. +IC+cli. Iiblln. I+poriln[. BI.iC RIOT @rillq 14iry, aftli6u ql, pp.,er, c+.s++ Klla .nd Ilrsavua, rblw a+ra- MQ mJ4n111. M@!ql worAmp k.l r7 Ir.n.rpgr(pfWn fqu.p nlenL MPt-UMs. Ckcl-al .gvipmfnl cd 4_1.1 11@ j O Llyht mdo" T.difa, cbtpry. >.aqa, p.p.r. ql..a. Nr.wK. Food mduttry APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110020 -1