NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 23; BULGARIA; GENERAL SURVEY

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• Collection: NIS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110035-5
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Bulgaria
GENERAL SURVEY
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MAY 1972
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated
May 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.
Page
Glossary xv
Chronology xvi
Bulgaria: The Most Compliant of Moscow's East European Allies 1
Land and People g
A. Historical background 3
Origin of Bulgarian tribes, development of the state, Byzantine domination, the
Bulgarian church, independence under Russian protection and influence, friend-
ship between the two countries, ethnic divisions, industrial revolution, migration
to urban areas, remaining rural character, oppressive aspects of the regime.
B Geography 5
Location in northeastern part of Balkan Peninsula, historical zone of contact
between cultures of Bast and West; settlement patterns; variety of geographical
features and consequent relative agricultural self- sufficiency; limited natural
resource base.
C Population 10
1. Size, composition, and distribution 10
Growth to 8.6 million, major and minor groups, comparison of densities, areas
of density, migration to cities, urban growth.
2. Vital statistics 12
Low growth and marriage rates, birth rate and factors influencing it, declining
death rate, increase in life expectancy, infant mortality, median age, age -sex
distribution, sex ratios.
3. Population policies and projections 13
Abortion laws; payments for children, benefits for families; increase in popu-
lation to 9 million by 1985.
D. Structure and characteristics of the society 14
1. Ethnic composition and languages 14
Bulgarians, Turks, Gypsies, and Macedonians; ancestors of Bulgarians, physical
appearance; origin of the Turks, their survival and international status;
Gypsies, their habits; Macedonians, their international role, and government
attitude toward them; less significant groups; attitude toward Jews; the
Bulgarian language �its history and dialects; Russian and other foreign
languages.
2. Social organization 18
A rural society at the end of Turkish dominption; growth of towns and cities
in early 1900's; the communal multiple fa.nily; change under Communist
regime; classes; mobility and education.
3. National attitudes 19
Influences, especially of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church; selective opposition
to communism; nationalism; attitudes toward the U.S.S.R., Gern,any, the
United States, and Greece.
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E. Manpower and labor 20
1. Size and characteristics of the labor force 20
Some 50% of the population; increase in industrialization but agriculture
remains important; rapid gains of employment in heavy industry; distribution
of the labor force; the self employed; labor reserve; military services; pro-
portion .xonomically active males and females; unemployment; policies on
movement and migration of labor; demand for skilled labor; professional,
vocational, and technical training.
2. Productivity and working conditions 23
Shortfalls; growth in productivity; length of the workweek; safety; wage
scales.
3. Labor relations, conditions, and attitudes 24
Functions of trade unions; Central Trade Union Council and its unions; the
congress; later policies of the regime; rights of labor; collective agreements.
F. Health 25
1. Health conditions and principal diseases 25
Evaluation, diseases prevalent among humans and animals, programs to
control disease; death rate, infant mortality, life expectancy; distribution and
ratio of physicians, paramedical personnel, competence of physicians, dis-
tribution of hospitals and personnel, government control of facilities, private
practice; departments of the Ministry of Public Health, funds, medical re-
search, psychiatric services, pharmacies, facilities for emergencies.
2. Food, water, and sanitation facilities 28
Caloric consumption, food supply; sanitary regulations, storage facilities, role
of the State Health Inspectorate; water consumption, supply, sources, in-
spection; disposal of wastes in cities and rural areas.
G. Welfare and social problems 29
1. Level of living 29
Rise during 1960's, comparison of levels; sources of income, increased pur-
chasing power, expenditure of income; amenities available in Bulgaria and
other countries; housing shortage, occupancy, funds for construction and
ownership.
2. Social programs 3,?
History of social insurance, provisions, administration, qualifications for and
amounts of pensions, facilities for health care, disbursements and funding.
3. Social problems 34
Tensions from conflicting values, crowded living quarters, juvenile delin-
quency, breakdown of family solidarity, state control of daily life, increase
in consumption of alcohol and remedial practices, control over employment
and leisure time.
H. Religion 35
1. Role and importance of religion 35
Major force in ethnic identity and center for Eastern rite Slays, influence of
the Turks, Rilski Monastery, other religious faiths, state control of religious
activities, extremities of religious strength.
2. Bulgarian Orthodox Church 37
Organization, church -state relations, stagnation.
3. Religious minority groups 39
Muslims, Roman Catholics, Jews, Protestants.
I Education 40
1. General 40
Expansion under communism; progress after the Turkish rule, traditional
education, foreign and specialized schools, facilities in 1939; changes follow-
ing Communist takeover, increased vocational technical training, restructuring
in accord with economic goals, standardization of secondary schools, the
10 -year school; number of schools and students, quality of education and in-
fluence of Communist concepts, ed ication of minority groups, restrictions on
free education, administration and funds.
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2. Educational system 43
Preschool education, 8 -year general education, secondary system, higher
education, quota system for university attendance, the University of .;ofiya,
narrow programs and lack of flexibility, scholarships, language training, adult
education.
3. Foreign students 45
Origin and number, problems they present.
4. Extracurricular student activities 45
Komsomol, junior organizations, activities governed by the party.
J. Artistic and cultural expression 46
Stimulation to maintain identity under the Turks, nationalist writing, "socialist
realism" and other controls.
1. Literature 46
Inspiration from oral literary tradition, epic poetry, love songs, religious litera-
ture, patriotic themes; inspiration from Russians, especially the Ukrainians,
Ivan V .zov, Pencho Slaveiko; restrictions under communism and demands of
the regime, satire, Radoy Ralin, Andrey Culyashki, the Dimitrov prizes.
2. Performing arts 47
Origins of the theater, number of theaters, popular U.S. plays, opera, Nikolay
Cyaurov.
3. Art and music 48
Origin in medieval times, Ivan Mrkvicka, Konstantin Shtarkelov, Tsanko
Lavrenov, and exhibits, folk heritage in music, Western influence, national
traditions encouraged but undermined by foreign tourists.
K. Public information
49
Agitprop control of news media; radio and television supersede the press, other
media; isolation frmm non Communist sources.
1. Radio and television
50
Facilities, origin of radio transmissions, programs, jamming, television broad-
casts, sets, international links.
2. Newspapers, periodicals, and wire services
50
Party and governmental mouthpiece, numbers of papers and their circulation,
coverage by papers, skepticism of the press, BTA, major news services, wide
circulation of periodicals and their purpose.
3. Other public information media
51
Book publishing� extent and restraints; "Sofiya Press" publishing agency;
control of foreign publications; museums, libraries, theaters, films.
L. Suggestions for further reading
54
Government and Politics
55
A. Summary and background
55
Pawn of Great Power interplay in the Balkans; predominance of ethnic Bul-
garians, Turkish minority, Bulgarian claims to Macedonia; historical territorial
ambitions; traditional authoritarian government and political violence; over-
whelming rural and agricultural character of society i nd economy prior to Com-
munist era; rise of Communists during Russian occupation after World War II;
two decades of factional strife within party leading to model Communist or-
thodoxy and accommodation to communism by people.
B. Structure and functioning of government
58
Subordin? _ion of government to Communist Party monopoly of power.
1. Constitution
58
1947 Constitution on Soviet model, formalization of subsequent practice in
1971 Constitution; legal basis for Communist Party's "leading force" in society;
outline of provisions for government structure and circumscription of people's
rights by primacy of government organs.
2. Structure of govermnent
60
a. National Assembl}�
60
Popularly elected .;elegates, 5 -year terms of office, composition pre
dominently BCP members; rubberstamp role in approving State Council
decrees and appointments.
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b. State Council
60
Subservience to Communist Party despite extensive theoretical powers;
organ of state rule at apex of administrative hierarchy down through
district and community people's councils.
c. Council of Ministers
60
Principal executive and administrative organ.
d. Local government
61
District and community people's councils; executive committees.
e Judiciary
61
System to protect "socialist legality"; Supreme Court, 12 regional or
71
district courts, communal courts, people's courts, special military, trans-
portation, and comradely courts; Chief Prosecutor and public prosecutors.
3. Legal codes and penal system
62
a. Criminal codes
62
1968 Penal Code patterned after Soviet jurisprudence; objectives of code;
classifications of crimes and penalties; criminal proceedings.
b. Penal system
63
Central, local, and special prisons; continued existence of forced labor
camps.
C. Political dynamics 63
1. The political system
One -party dictatorship in a totalitarian state since World War II; ascendence
of BCP and its infiltration of Agrarian Union; continued dominance of Todor
Zhivkov.
2. Party organization 64
Democratic centralism: accountability and obedience to higher party bodies;
territorial organization with each level having similar structurc.
a. National level 64
The Party Congress as supreme party organ; functions; Central Committee,
Politburo, and Secretariat.
b. District and communal levels 67
District and communal conferences and committees responsible to party's
central apparatus; functions; basic party organizations (cells),
c. Membership 67
Qualifications; growl. and decreasing average age.
3. Mass organizations 68
Devices for comprehensive indoctrination and control of population; Father-
land Front, Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, Central Council of Trade
Unions.
4. Electoral procedures 69
Party control of elections through single list ballot; voting qualifications
and mechanism.
D. National policies
69
BCP's principal objectives of consolidating and maintaining paliticai powrr,
creating mass social and political homogeneity, and communism; suppression
of opposition domestically, subservience to Soviet Union in foreign affairs.
1 Domestic
70
Vacillating economic policy remaining essentially conservative and orthodox
communism; socialization of industry, collectivization of agriculture; economic
planning; rigid control over cultural influences; propagation of atheism while
attempting to harness Orthodox traditions to Communist goals.
2 Foreign
71
Policymaking as the prerogative of the BCP Politburo and Secretariat; role
of State Council; coincidence of Bulgarian and Soviet policy since World
War II, evolution from pawn to ally; increasing contact with Western nations,
relations with the United States, problems with Turkey and Greece; relations
with Communist neighbors, Albania, Yugoslavia; participation in international
organizations.
3 Defense
75
Coordination of military policy with Soviet defense and Warsaw Pact policies;
BCP Politburo control; civil defense.
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E. Propaganda programs 76
Propaganda media as regime mechanism to control and influence populace; press,
radio, films as primary channels, growing importance of television; party control
and counterproductivity.
1. Domestic propaganda 76
Principal theme of extolling communism and aims of Communists, secondary
theme of promoting homogeneous society; attempts to improve sophistication
to overcome ineffectiveness.
2. Propaganda directed abroad 76
Primary objective of contributing to overall Soviet oriented proselytization
of Communist system; radio as major medium.
3. Propaganda from Western countries 77
Importance of rad` despite jamming, because of restrictions on other means;
Western efforts to counter Soviet propaganda.
F. Threats to government stability 78
Absence of active genuine political resistance; sporadic expressions of discontent,
apathy; intraparty factionalism; controls and informant network in the military;
relatively mild restlessness of youth, peasantry, industrial workers; unassimilated
Turkish community.
G. Maintenance of internal security 79
State Security and People's Militia under the Ministry of Internal Affairs; In-
telligence Division of the Ministry of National Defense.
1. Police and public order 80
Functiops and organization of the People's Militia and Interior Troops;
auxiliary police.
2. Security and intelligence 81
Missions and organization of intelligence units; targets and effectiveness.
H. Suggestions for further reading 81
Brief list and assessment of publications treating political and historical affairs.
The Economy
83
A. The basic setting
83
Rapid industrialization, dependence upon U.S.S.R.; comparison of GNP with
other Eastern European countries.
1. Structure of the economy
83
Changes in characteristics of the economy; increased contribution of industry
to GNP, data on growth and distribution of output in industry; technological
problems, efforts to modernize; role of agricultural sector in facilitating in-
dustrialization, reorganization of agricultural units, role of private plots; ex-
pansior of energy base.
2. Economic policy
85
Application of traditional Communist techniques of economic management,
stability of domestic priorities; economic growth as most important criten )n,
plans to bring about growth; increases in efficiency as second priority, eco-
nomic reform as means to achieve rationalization of economic activity; pro-
vision for more responsive pricing system.
3. Foreign trade
85
Rapid growth of trade, predominance of CEMA countries in trading patterns;
aggressive foreign trade policies; composition of exports and imports; integra-
tion efforts within CEMA.
B. Sectors of the economy 86
1. Agriculture, fisheries, and forestry 86
a. Agriculture 86
Place of agriculture in the economy, growth of the sector, continuing
inefficiency.
(1) Land use and climate 86
Small amount of arable land, wide range of climate.
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(2) Organization and policies
86
Collective farms, their organization and operation; declining status of
state farms; creation of agroindustrial complexes, which are intended
to become dominant form of organization, slow implementation of
program.
(3) Crops
87
Importance of crop production, changes ..i distribution of cultivated
area among crops; production and exports of grains and iruits and
vegetables, increases in output of industrial crops.
(4) Livestock
88
Growth in the industry in 1960's; decline in the private sector's
contribution, program to increase output, expanded role for public
sector.
(5) Manpower and investment
88
Decline in agricultural employment, problems of maintaining skilled
labor force on farms; bulk of agricultural investment used for infra-
structure, failure of machine tractor stations; use of fertilizers.
b Fisheries
89
Rapid growth of the industry, data on fishing fleet, size of catch; expan-
sion of processing facilities, imports of fish products.
c. Forestry
89
Decline in the industry arising from past mismanagement and neglect, ar-
rangement with U.S.S.R. for timber supplies.
2. Fuels and power
89
Rapid expansion of energy base in 1960's, shift away from predominance of
coal; increased dependence upon imports for supply.
a. Coal
90
Rise in coal production accounted for mostly by lignite; deziu,in," reserves
of coal, efforts to upgrade coal quality and to increase production.
b. Petroleum and natural gas
90
Fluctuations in crude oil production, location of oil fields; expansion of
processing facilities, increases in imports of refined products; natural gas
output, plans for expansion.
c. Flectric power
91
Ranking of capacity with other Eastern European countries, expansion
during 1960's, present inadequacy of production, difficulties in operation;
concentration of consumption; predominance of thermal installatic :s;
well developed transmission network, international exchanges of electricity;
plans for expansion.
3. Metals and minerals
92
Adequacy of deposits, particularly of nonferrous metals.
a. Ferrous metals
92
Ranking among Eastern European countries, dependence upon imports;
description of iron and steel mills, plans for expansion; plans for building
additional facilities; problems of processing manganese and chromium ores.
b. Nonferrous metals
92
Self- sufficiency in lead, zinc, and copper, leading position in Eastern
Europe; slow growth in nonferrous metallurgy despite excellent potential;
processing of uranium ore.
c. Nonmetallic minerals
93
Export of most of production; adequacy of construction materials.
4. Manufacturing and construction
93
Importance of manufacturing in industrial production.
a. Machinery and equipment
93
Efforts to expand and diversify the industry, growth in output and exports
in the 1960's, concentration of plants near Sofiya; profitable operation of
shipbuilding industry; lag in developing automotive industry, interrelation-
ship with other CEMA countries in production and sales.
b. Chemicals and rubber 95
Rapid expansion of the industry, growing exports of products; description
of chemical complexes, growth of petrochemical industry, plans for in-
creasing output of synthetic rubber.
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c. Light industry 96
Minor role thrust upon light industry by policy orientation, low rate of
growth and declining share of industrial output; importance of textiles;
attempts to promote exports of light industry products; lack of emphasis
in future plans.
d. Agricultural processing
96
Importance in the economy, in terms of output and exports; output of
various kinds of products.
e. Construction
98
High, sustained rate of growth, backwardness of management and opera-
tions, programs to upgrade the industry; lack of improvement in housing,
description of dwelling stock, plans for expansion.
5. Domestic trade
98
Development of domestic trading system, control by the state; organization
of trade; policy and movement of prices, pricing mechanism; inadequacy of
trade network, plans for improvement.
C. Economic policy, planning, and the financial system
100
1. Economic policy
100
Influence of U.S.S.R. on overall policy orientation.
a Domestic
100
Push for industrialization, analysis of investment activities through mid
1960's, by sector and within industry; problems leading to reform; two
stages of reform; the first with emphasis upon improving the basic eco-
nomic unit, the enterprise, through a system of incentives and admir.:stra-
tive changes; the second stage with emphasis upon computerized control
through scientific planning, minimum effect upon investment pattern;
plans for 1970's in the spirit of the second stage, with integration of eco-
nomic functions as the norm.
b. Foreign
102
Efforts to upgrade domestic economy by importing from the West, re-
newed interest in CEMA when these efforts failed; general alignment
with Soviet interests within CEMA, differences with other CEIVL_
members.
2. Implementation of economic plans
103
Economic plans as basic instruments for carrying out policies, types of plans;
resporsibility for enacting and carrying out plans; description of plan periods'
provisions and fulfillment of plans.
3. The financial system
104
a. Financial planning
104
Responsibility for financial plans; importance of the cash elan in directing
currency flr,ws within the economy; functions of the credit plan, volume
and uses o:� short- and long -term credit.
b. The budget
104
Functions of the budget; allocation for various types of expenditures;
sources of revenue, description of taxes.
c. Financial institutions
105
Responsibilities of Ministry of Finance; predominance of Bulgarian Na-
tional Bank in conduct of the financial system, types of services rendered
by the banking system; provision of various kinds of insurance.
D. International economic relations
105
1. Foreign trade
105
Dependence of the econorry on foreign trade, growth during the 19Ws,
plans for expansion in the 1970's.
a. Geographic distribution
106
Heavy reliance upon the U.S.S.R., trade with other CEMA countries;
role of non Communist areas, disastrous spending sprees in the West;
expected increase in jependence upon U.S.S.R.; efforts to trade with
United States.
b. Commodity composition
107
Continued predominance of agricultural products and processed foods in
exports, increases in exports of manufactured goods; lack of change in
composition of imports, predominance of machinery and equipment.
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2. Balance of payments 138
a. Current account 108
Move from surplus in 1950's to chronic deficits; major role of tourism
in earning foreign exchange; inability to cover deficits.
b. Foreign aid 109
Heavy reliance on credit from other Communist countries; transactions
with non Communist countries; aid granted by Bulgaria.
Science ............................111
A. General 111
Assessment of progress; problems, including lack of contact with the West,
inexperience, political discrimination, and dependence of foreign aid.
B. Organization, planning, and financing of research 112
Control by the party and government; role of the DRNTP and BAN; scientific
and technical research; creation of TsNIRD's funding.
C. Scientific education, manpower, and facilities 114
Wide variation in quality of manpower; the University of Sofiya and higher
institutes; quality of training and equipment; graduate programs; exchange pro-
grams; training in data processing and automated systems of management;
adequacy of facilities.
D. Major research fields 115
1. Air, ground, and naval weapons
115
Absence of research and development program for weapons systems.
2. Biological and chemical warfare
116
Apparent lack of an offensive BW research and development program; de-
fensive BW and CW programs.
3 Atomic energy
116
Problems and accomplishments of the very modest nuclear energy program;
Soviet supplied research reactor; uranium ore processing; proposed nuclear
power station.
4. Electronics
116
Limited capabilities; some expansion and modernization; computer develop-
ment, semiconducting materials, electromagnetic wave propagation, lasers.
5. Medical sciences, including veterinary medicine
117
Shortcomings and attempts to overcome them; emphasis on applied medical
sciences, especially clinical medicine; microbiology, pharmaceuticals, bio-
chemistry, physiology, underwater research, radiation hazards, public health,
military medical research, veterinary research.
6. Other sciences
118
a. Chemistry and metallurgy
118
Assessment and description of chemical research effort and capabilities;
small research and development effort in metallurgy.
b. Physics and mathematics
119
Sizable research program in physics, primarily in solid -state and nuclear
sciences; review of research effort; Soviet assistance; very poor mathemati-
cal research.
c. Astrogeophysical sciences
121
Main research effort on development of natural resources; lack of fa-
cilities, equipment, and w--II-trained manpower; review of efforts in
geodesy and geology, including oil prospecting; astronomy, space, meteor-
ology, hydrology and hydraulics, and oceanography.
Transportation and telecommunications 123
A. Summary 123
Minimal adequacy of transportation and telecom systems, improvements; Sofiya
and Plovdiv as network centers; predominantly west to east direction of routes.
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B. Railroads
124
Mileage figures and characteristics of the railroads; traffic statistics and equip-
ment inventory; planned improvements.
C. Highways
126
Extent and salient features of the highway system and administration; moderniza-
tion program; vehicle inventory.
D. Inland waterways
127
Adequacy of the Danube, the only waterway of commercial significance; extent
and salient features of Danube operations.
E Pipelines
129
Inextensive 73 miles in operation, 690 miles under construction; selected pipelines.
F. Ports
130
Adequacy of two m:.jor and 10 minor ports; characteristics of the major ports.
G. Merchant marine
131
Fleet of 107 ships carrying about 85c /L 4 seaborne foreign trade, physical aspects
and administration of the fleet; training provisions for merchant mariners;
expansion plans.
H. Civil air
133
Government ownership and control; adequacy for domestic and international
requirements; fleet inventory, number of employees, and training operations;
membership in international organizations.
I. Airfields
135
Air facilities and maintenance; characteristics of selected airfields.
J. Telecommunications
136
General adequacy for only basic needs of the public and government; extent
and salient features of the various systems; plans for improvement.
Military factors
139
A. Military geography
139
1. Location and description
139
a. Topography
139
Brief overview of landscape, vegetation, drainage network, and settlement
and transportation patterns.
b. Climate
139
Summary of seasonal variations, frontal systems, temperature, precipitation,
visibility, and winds.
2. Military geographic regions
141
Effect of terrain on operations by conventional ground forces, airmobile and
airborne forces, and irregular forces for Hach of the following regions:
a. Danube Plains
141
b. Central Lowlands and Hills
141
c. Bulgarian Highlands
143
3. Strategic areas
144
Analysis of the site, population, prinsary activities, key transportation ele-
ments, nationally significant industries and petroleum storage for each of
the following areas:
a. Sofiya
144
b. Plovdiv
145
c. Varna
145
d. Burgas
145
e. Other significant areas
145
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4. Internal routes 145
Description of terrain, road, and railroad characteristics and offroad dispersal
and cross country movement potentials along land routes to and between
strategic areas.
5 Approaches 145
Data on lengths, legal status, and terrain of Bulgaria's land and water
boundaries.
a Land 145
Approach conditions by road and railroad and the effect of terrain on
offroad dispersal and cross country movement.
b Sea 145
Conditions for amphibious approach to the coast, and pertinent data
for those amphibious landing areas that provide the best access to the
strategic areas.
c Air 147
Air approach routes and likely weather conditions en route.
B. Strategic mobility 150
Capability of the transportation systems to support major military operations.
C. Armed forces 150
1 General
150
Bulgarian People's Army as a unified force controlled by Ministry of National
Defense; personnel strength; offensive and defensive missions in consonance
with Warsaw Pact objectives; organization, training, and equipment on Soviet
pattern.
a. Historical
153
Strategic position and ambitions of Balkans as factors in long military
tradition; reconstitution of armed rces under Soviet supervision.
b. Defense organization
154
Soviet Control through interrelation 'e:lip of Bulgarian Government and
Soviet dominated Bulgarian Commun .t Party; full administrative and op-
erational control by Minister of Nati- gal Defense; General Staff and its
chain of command to army, navy, and a.r and air defense forces.
c. Military manpower and morale
154
(1) Manpower
154
Breakdown of male population by age group and fitness; terms of
compulsory service; comparatively favorable quality with increasing
technical skills.
(2) Morale
155
Capable officers and noncommissioned officers loyal to Communist
cause.
d. Strength trends
155
Examination of decreases in service strengths to 1950 and subsequent
increases and fluctuations.
e Training 155
Guidance by Soviet Military Mission and coordination with Warsaw Pact
plans; types and locations of schools; patterns of exercises.
f. Economic support and military budget 156
(1) Economic support 156
Dependence of U.S.S.R. for imports of most military equipment.
(2) Military budget 156
Announced defense budgets for 1967 -70.
g Logistics 156
Administration of procurement, distribution, and issue of supp:ies and
equipment; sites of storage and maintenance facilities.
b. Uniforms and insignia 157
(1) Uniforms 157
Descriptions and sketches of uniforms for officers and enlisted
personnel.
(2) Insignia 157
Descriptions and sketches of insignia worn by officers and enlisted
personnel; explanation of where displayed on uniforms.
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Page
2. Ground forces 157
Strength and types of units; general assessment of state of readiness.
a. Organization 157
Regional administration and composition of combat division and tank
brigade.
b. Strength, composition, and disposition 157
Estimate of total strength; numbers and composition of combat units;
general deployment.
c. Training 158
Training cycle with peak in early fall; school system; refresher training
for reservists.
d. Logistics 158
General description of supply and maintenance program.
3 Navy 158
Adequacy for mission of defending home waters and coastal communications;
emphasis on ASW.
a. Organization 158
Lines of operationr.l and administrative command.
b. Strength, composition, and disposition 163
Estimates of number of officers and enlisted men and their general assign-
ments; numbers of principal combatants; general assessment of service-
ability of ships.
c. Training 163
General adequacy; schools and type of training for officers; enlisted men.
d. Logistics 165
Location and types of support facilities; limited naval construction; repair
facilities.
4. Air and air defense forces 165
Air force as part of integrated Air and Air Defense Forces Command; general
assessment of capability of fulfilling primary mission of air defense and in-
creasing responsibility for ground support.
a. Organization 166
Lines of command to subordinate aircraft and defense commands; divi-
sional and regimental organization; operational control and communications
networks.
b. Strength, composition, and disposition 166
Estimates of total strength and numbers of pilots; numbers of units by
type; general description of deployment.
c. Training 166
(1) Premilitary 166
Indoctrination and training in schools and aeroclubs; formal training
in Komsomol.
(2) Preoperational 166
Details of 5 -year course at air academy; general training at other
schools.
(3) Operational training 167
Grading of pilots; types of exercises for air defense personnel.
d. Logistics 167
Dependence on U.S.S.R. for aircraft and support equipment, including
spare parts; description of supply and maintenance organization; de-
pendence on U.S.S.R. for all missiles and associated equipment.
5. Militarized security forces 167
Mission and strength of Frontier Troops; Maritime Frontier Guard.
AreaBrief 170
Summary Map follows 170
General map showing boundaries, terrain, selected railroads, highways, and airfields;
insets on population and administrative divisions, economic activity, land utilization,
and location orientation.
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FIGURES
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Page
Fig.
1
Typical village (photo)
6
Fig.
2
Farmer herding cattle (photo)
7
Fig.
3
Hothouses on lowlands photo)
7
Fig.
4
Coastal settlement (photo)
7
Fig.
5
Golden Sands resort (photo)
8
Fig.
6
Mining settlement in mountain valley photo)
9
Fig.
7
Planting tobacco (photo)
9
Fig.
8
Population density (chart)
10
Fig.
9
Population distribution table)
11
Fig.
10
Population of eight largest cities map)
12
Fig.
11
Births, deaths, and marriages (chart)
14
Fig.
12
Vital rates (chart)
14
Fig.
13
Infant mortality (chart)
15
Fig.
14
Age -sex distribution chart)
15
Fig.
15
Distribution of estimated and projected population. table)
16
Fig.
16
Geographic distribution of minorities map)
16
Fig.
17
Typical farmer and city dweller photos)
17
Fig.
18
Distribution of labor force (chart)
20
Fig.
19
Employment in socialized nonagricultural sectors table)
21
Fig.
20
Employment in socialist sectors (chart)
22
Fig.
21
Educational level of employees table)
23
Fig.
22
Hospital facilities photo)
27
Fig.
23
Water pipeline (photo)
29
Fig.
24
Levels of living (chart)
31
Fig.
25
Sources of income (table)
31
Fi,
26
Housing occupancy and size of accomodations table)
32
Fig.
27
Residential areas, Sofiya and Veliko Turnovo photos)
32
Fig.
28
Rilski Monastery (photos)
36
Fig.
29
Investiture of Patriarch Maxim photo)
38
Fig.
30
Organization of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (chart)
38
Fig.
31
Alexander Nevsky Cathedral photo)
39
Fig.
32
Educational system (chart)
43
Fig.
33
University of Sofiya (photo)
44
Fig.
34
Students at the University of Sofiya table)
44
Fig.
35
National Theater (photo)
48
Fig.
36
Bulgarian musical instruments photos)
48
Fig.
37
Principal newspapers (table)
52
Fig.
38
Principal periodicals (table)
53
Fig.
39
National Library (photo)
54
Fig.
40
Major changes in Bulgaria's borders (maps)
56
Fig.
41
Todor Zhivkov (photo)
58
Fig.
42
Boris Velchev photo)
64
Fig.
43
Stanko Todorov (photo)
64
Fig.
44
Party control of the government chart)
65
Fig.
45
Tenth Party Congress (photo)
65
Fig.
46
Members of the Politburo and Secretariat (chart)
66
Fig.
47
Communist Party headquarters photo)
67
Fig.
48
Growth of the Bulgarian Communist party table)
68
Fig.
49
Distribution of BCP membership table)
68
Fig.
50
Election results (table)
69
Fig.
51
Soviet leaders greeting Zbivkov photo)
70
Fig.
52
Approximate division of Macedonia map)
74
Fig.
53
Radiobroadcasts to and from Bulgaria (chart)
77
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Fig. 54
Fig. 55
Fig. 56
Fig. 57
Fig. 58
Fig. 59
Fig. 60
Fig. 61
Fig. 62
Fig. 63
Fig. 64
Fia.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
87
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
Page
Organization of Ministry of Internal Affairs (chart)
80
Growth of GNP and industrial and agricultural production
(chart)
83..
CNP, employment, and output per worker chart)
84
Distribution of industrial production table)
84
Growth of gross industrial production table)
85
Land use (chart)
86
Production and yields of principal crops (table)
87
Numbers of livestock and output of livestock products (table)
88
Consumption of primary energy table)
89
Principal sources of energy table)
90
Production of minerals, metals, and construction materials
(table)
92
The Wilhelm Pieck cement plant photo)
93
Production of machinery and equipment (table)
94
Lovech automobile assembly plant photo)
95
Production of major chemical products table)
95
The petrochemical complex at Burgas photo)
97
Light industry production (table)
97
Production of agr: cultural processing industry table)
98
Level and composition of fixed capital investment chart)
100
Fixed capital investment by economic sector chart)
100
Distribution of capital investment, by economic sector table)
101
Distribution of capital investment in industry table)
101
Growth of exports and imports table)
106
Geographic distribution of foreign trade chart)
106
Value of foreign trade table)
107
Commodity composition of exports and imports chart)
108
Trade balance (table)
108
Academy of Sciences (photo) ............................111
Organization of scientific and technical research (chart)
113
Railroad bridge in Iskur gorge photo)
125
Ruse Giurgiu rail- highway bridge across the Danube photo)
125
Class 41 electric locomotive photo)
126
Unlined tunnel (photo)
127
Steep bluffs backed by low hills photo)
128
Selected pipelines (table)
129
Major ports (table)
130
Varna port (photo)
132
Soviet -built Cxusrx photo)
134
Selected airfields table)
136
Military geographic regions and terrain map)
140
Georgi Dimitrov Boulevard, Sofiya photo)
141
Climatic characteristics (chart)
142
Collective farm near Plovdiv photo)
143
Rugged mountains in southwest photo)
144
Strategic areas, internal routes, and approaches map)
146
Sofiya strategic area map)
146
Plovdiv strategic area map)
146
Varna strategic area map)
147
Burgas strategic area map)
147
Other significant areas (table)
147
Internal routes (table)
148
Boundaries (table)
150
Yugoslavia Bulgaria border near Kalotina, Bulgaria photo)
151
Gorge on route from Pirot, Yugoslavia, to Sofiya photo)
151
Land approaches (table)
152
Organization of armed forces (chart)
154
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Page
Fig.
110
Armed forces personnel strengths (table)
156
Fig.
111
Defense budgets (table)
156
Fig.
112
Officers' uniforms and insignia chart)
159
Fig.
113
Enlisted men's un'forms and insignia chart)
161
Fig.
114
T -55 tanks (photo)
163
Fig.
115
Scup -A missiles (photo)
163
Fig.
116
Reconnaissance troops photo)
163
Fig.
117
Riga class destroyer escort (photo)
164
Fig.
118
Vanya class coastal minesweeper photo)
164
Fig.
119
Shershen class fast patrol boat photo)
164
Fig.
120
Vydra class utility landing craft (photo)
164
Fig.
121
FisxBEn H aircraft(photo)
165
Fig.
122
Summary Map follows
170
This General Survey was prepared for the NIS under the general
direction of the NIS Committee. The military geography, trans-
portation and telecommunications, and armed forces coverage was
prepared under the general supervision of the Defense Intelligence
Agency; the introductory material and the sociological, political,
economic, and scientific coverage were prepared under the general
supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-
stantially completed by January 1972.
The NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook provides semiannual up-
dating of basic data of the type appearing in the Area Brief of this
General Survey. A listing of all NIS units dealing with this and
other areas is in the CIA prepared Inventory of Available NIS
Publications, issued quarterly and also bound into the concurrent
Factbook.
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GLOSSARY (U /OU
ABBREVIATION
FOREIGN
ENGLISH
BAN
Bulgarska Akademiya na Naukite
Bulganan Academy of Sciences
BCP
Bulgarska Komunisticheska Partijaya
Bulgarian Communist Party
BDZ
Bulgarskite Drzavni Zeleznici
Bulgarian State Railroads
BTA
Bulgarska Telegrafna Agentsiya
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency
BWU
Slsyuz na Bulgarskite Pi+ateli
Bulgarian Writers Union
BZNS
Bulgarski Zemedelski Narodni Suyuz
Bulgarian National Agrarian Union
Agrarian Union)
CAC
Komitet na Izkustvo i KulAsra
Committee on Art and Culture
CCTU
Tsentralen Suzet na Profsuyuzite
Central Council of Trade Unions
DKMS
Dimitrovski Komunistichski Mladezhki
Dimitrov Communist Youth Union
Suyuz
(Komsomol)
EKNTP
Durzh �--en Komitet za Nanki 1 Tekni-
State Committee for Scie .ce and
cheski Progres
Technical Progress
DOSO
Dobrovina Organizatsiva za Sudeystvie
Volunteer Organizatiol. for Coopera-
na Otbrana
tion in Defense
DS
Durzhavna Sigurnost
State Security
GSNM
Grupi za Sudeysvie na Narodnata
Groups for Assistance to the People's
Militsiya
Militia
GSO
Gotov za Sanitarna Otbrana
Ready for Medical Defense Red
Cross
JINR
Obedinennyy Institut Yadernykh Issle-
Joint Institute of Nuclear Research
dovaniy (Russian)
KDS
Komitet na Durzhavna Sigurnost
Committee of State Security
MVR
Ministerstvo na Vutreshnite Raboti
Ministry of Internal Affairs
NM
Naroda Militsiya
People's Militia
OF
Otechestven Front
Fatherland Front
TsNIRD
Tsentrove za nauchnoizsledovatelska,
Center for scientific and development
razvoyna i proektantska deynost
activity
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Chronology (U /00
c. 680
Bulgarian tribes under the leadership of Asperuch defeat a
Byzantine army and occupy the territory between the
Danube and the Balkan Mountains. Amalgamation with the
native Slays proceeds gradually, with the military classes
long remaining strictly Bulgarian.
c. 852 -927
The First Bulgarian Empire is created, including the territory
of modern Albania, parts of Serbia, Macedonia, Thrace,
and most of contemporary Bulgaria.
865
Boris I overrides the objections of his nobility and orders
the baptism of the entire population in Christianity and,
after some indecision, accepts the spiritual leadership of
the Eastern Church in Constantinople.
893 -927
Rule of Symeon, a son of Boris and the first Bulgarian ruler
to assume the title Tsar. His tenure is marked by a continual
warring effort against the Byzantine Empire and the in-
fusion of Greek culture into the magnificent capital at
Great Preslay.
1018
After a century of internal troubles and increasing centrifugal
tendencies the Byzantine leaders achieve in 1018 a complete
victory over Bulgaria. For almost the next two centuries,
Bulgaria remains a generally peaceful Byzantine province,
and the national church is subjected to intense Helleniza-
tion pressures.
c. 1218 -41
A brief period of Bulgarian resurgence is capped by the
establishment of the Second Bulgarian E --ire, covering
approximately the same territory as the fii mpire.
1389
Military reverses and internal splintering of the Bulgarian
lands make the country susceptible to Serbian conquest
(1330) and ultimately to Turkish control. At the Battle
of Kossovo on June 20, 1389, the Ottoman armies defeat
a coalition of Serbs, Bulgarians, Bosnians, Wallachians,
and Albanians. Five centuries of Ottoman rule �known
popularly as "the dark era" �end with Bulgaria's inde-
pendence only in the late 19th century.
1762
Father Paisii writes an idealized history of Bulgaria, his
famous Slaveno Bulgarian History, which is generally taken
to mark the beginning of the Bulgarian national renaissance.
1824
First published works begin to appear in the modern
Bulgarian language
1870
Bulgarian Orthodox Church gains greater autonomy when,
largely at Russian insistence, the Ottomans allow the estab-
lishment of a Bulgarian Exarchate with jurisdiction over
large parts of Macedonia and Thrace.
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1878 March 3 Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey provides
for an autonomous Bulgaria with enlarged borders to
include most of Macedonia.
July 13 Treaty of Berlin reduces Bulgaria to one -third the size
projected in March and leaves Macedonia under Turkish
rule.
1879
The independent Bulgarian state is granted a constitution,
drawn from the forefront of constitutional theory of the
day.
1893
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO
is formed to work for an autonomous Macedonia.
1895
External Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (EMRO
is formed, with headquarters in Sofiya. Vying with IMRO
for leadership of the Macedonian independence movement
for many years, this organization is a potent, radical
force in contemporaneous Bulgarian political life.
1902 -03
Insurrections in Macedonia, accompanied by raids into the
area from Bulgaria, temporarily exacerbate relations be-
tween Bulgaria and Turkey.
1912
First Balkan War: After concluding treaties of alliance with
Serbia (in March) and Greece (May), Bulgaria declares
war on Turkey. The Turks suffer military reverses at the
hands of the three allies and the Treaty of London in May
1913 forces Turkish concessions.
1913
Squabbling over the spoils of the First Balkan War leads to
Bulgaria's defeat in a short-lived Second Balkan War
against its former allies. Bulgaria loses all the gains from
the previous war.
1915 -19
Bulgaria joins the Central Powers in World War I, largely
with the hope of reclaiming lost territories in the Balkans.
Defeat is especially embarrassing, as the Treaty of Neuilly
(1919) reduces the country to an area smaller than before
the First Balkan War.
1923
The assassination of Prime Minister Stambolisky encourages
the small Communist Party to attempt a coup which is
nonetheless quickly suppressed.
1941
After several years of gradually moving toward alliance with
Germany, in the belief that this was the best way to regain
the territories promised at San Stefano, Bulgaria finally
signs formal Tripartite Pact and German troops enter
the country. After Pearl Harbor, Bulgaria declares war
on the United States.
1944 September 9
U.S.S.R. declares war on Bulgaria. Fatherland Front coali-
tion� composed of Communists, Agrarians, Socialists, and
Radicals� seizes power after Red Army enters Bulgaria.
October
Bulgaria concludes armistice agreement with the Soviet
Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
1945 February Communist "people's courts" convict three former regents,
38 former ministers, and 130 members of the National
A -mbly for "collaborations" with Nazi Germany.
November Parliamentary elections, boycotted by opposition parties
headed by Agrarian leader Nikola Petkov, result in victory
for Communist dominated Fatherland Front (88% of
votes).
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1946 March New government is formed without representation of opposi-
1955 May Warsaw Pact is ratified by National Assembly.
December Bulgaria becomes member of United Nations.
1956 April Party First Secretary Todor Zhivkov exonerates the late
Traycho Kostov and others from charges of Titoism and
treason.
October Relations between Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist
Farties officially resume.
1958 November Party First Secretary Todor Zbivkov announces economic
"leap forward" program.
1959 January Party Central Committee approves drastic reorganization
of state economic apparatus.
March Bulgaria and the United States resume diplomatic relations
at the legation level.
May Compulsory deliveries of farm produce to the state are
abolished.
Sept -tuber Bulgaria completes collectivization of agriculture.
1961 November Vulko Chervenkov, former Party First Secretary, is expelled
from Central Committee.
1962 January Currency reform is announced; 1 new lev is equal to 10 old
ones.
;May Khrushchev heads a Soviet party- government delegation
visiting Bulgaria.
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tion parties.
April
The United States and the United Kingdom refuse to recog-
nize new government.
September
Monarchy is abolished. King Sir leaves country, and
Bulgaria is declared a "People's Republic."
November
Bulgarian Communist Party leader Georgi Dimitrov returns
from Moscow, assumes premiership, and forms new Father-
land Front government.
1947 February
Bulgaria signs peace treaty in Paris with th U.S.S.R., the
United States, and the United Kingdom.
September
Opposition leader Nikola Petkov is executed for treason.
December
National Assembly approves Dimitrov Constitution.
1948 March
Law is enacted giving state control over all organized
religions.
July
Premier Dimitrov dies in Moscow.
December
Traycho Kostov, leading "nativist" Commufflst, is sentenced
to death on charges of Titoism and treason; party initiates
extensive purges of alleged Titoist elements.
1950 February
The United States suspends diplomatic relations with Bul-
garia and subsequently freezes Bulgarian assets in the
United States.
Party First Secretary Vulko Cbervenkov becomes Pr:!mier.
1951 December
All pre Communist legislation is repealed.
1954 March
Todor Zhivkov replaces Vulko Chervenkov as Party First
Secretary.
May
Bulgaria and Greece resume diplomatic relations.
1955 May Warsaw Pact is ratified by National Assembly.
December Bulgaria becomes member of United Nations.
1956 April Party First Secretary Todor Zhivkov exonerates the late
Traycho Kostov and others from charges of Titoism and
treason.
October Relations between Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist
Farties officially resume.
1958 November Party First Secretary Todor Zbivkov announces economic
"leap forward" program.
1959 January Party Central Committee approves drastic reorganization
of state economic apparatus.
March Bulgaria and the United States resume diplomatic relations
at the legation level.
May Compulsory deliveries of farm produce to the state are
abolished.
Sept -tuber Bulgaria completes collectivization of agriculture.
1961 November Vulko Chervenkov, former Party First Secretary, is expelled
from Central Committee.
1962 January Currency reform is announced; 1 new lev is equal to 10 old
ones.
;May Khrushchev heads a Soviet party- government delegation
visiting Bulgaria.
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1962 November Anton Yugov is dismissed as Premier and succeeded by
Todor Zhivkov, Party First Secretary.
1963 February African students riot in Sofiya.
July The United States and Bulgaria sign claims agreement.
December AssPn Georgiev, Bulgarian diplomat and alleged Western
spy, is tried and sentenced to death for treason.
Anti-U.S. demonstration is held before the U.S. Legation
in Sofiya.
1964 July Greece and Bulgaria sign claims agreement.
1965 February Demonstrations again are held before U.S. Legation, de-
nouncing U.S. bombing raids in North Vietnam.
1966 October Premier Todor Zhivkov visits France in first official visit to
a Western European capital.
November United States and Bulgaria raise diplomatic missions to the
ambassadorial level.
Ninth Party Congress convenes in Sofiya.
1967 During the year, Bulgaria renews the 20 -year Treaties of
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with
Poland (April), U.S.S.R. (May), and East Germany (Sep-
tember).
May First Bulgarian Congress of Culture convenes in Sofiya.
June Bulgaria breaks relations with Israel.
October Turkey and Bulgaria agree to gradual repatriation of between
5,000 and 30,000 ethnic Turks to their homeland.
November Bulgarian Ambassador to Communist China is recalled; suc-
cessor does not take post in Peking.
1968 January Macedonian issue flares up as irritant in Bulgarian- Yugoslav
relations.
July Party session maps out long -range plan for more effective
centralization of the economy.
August Bulgaria participates iii Soviet -led Warsaw Pact invasion
of Czechoslovakia. Action causes cooling of relations with
its independent minded Balkan neighbors as well as with
the United States.
1969 July Friendship treaty with Hungary is renewed.
Party session formulates long -term reorganization of the
educational system.
November Foreign trade scandals result in several arrests and trials
and eventually lead to a centralized reorganization of the
foreign trade mechanism.
December Foreign minister Bashev makes ill- conceived goodwill trip
to Yugoslavia which further sours relations between the
two countries.
1970 April Todor Zhivkov unveils scheme for nationwide reorganization
or agriculture along industrial lines. Plan envisages forma-
tion of huge agricultural industrial complexes (AIC)
September For the first time in 3 years, Ceausescu meets with Todor.
Zhivkov, thereby starting to overcome the strained rela-
tions growing out of the Czechoslovak events of 1968.
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1970 November Bulgaria and Romania renew their 20 -year Treaty of Friend
ship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.
Bulgaria returns its Ambassador to China, an act which is
reciprocated by the PRC 4 months later.
1971 January
Formation of State Economic Trusts DSO) in the nonagri-
cultural sectors serves as a major step in centralization of
the economy.
March
Bulgaria proposes a far-rea -ping program of economic co-
operation to Greece.
April
Bulgarian Communist Party holds Tenth Congress.
May
A new state constitution, replacing the Dimitrov Constihntion
of 1947, is promulgated following a national referendum.
July
Patriarch Maxim is installed as new head of the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church, replacing the deceased Kiril.
September
Soviet party leader Brezhnev stops in Sofiya after his much
heralded talks with Tito.
October
Bulgaria opens its second university in the city of Veliko
Turnovo.
November
Bulgaria modifies long- standing refusal to recognize the
existence of a Macedonian language and signs a low -level
agreement with Yugoslavia in Macedonian.
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Bulgaria: The Most Compliant of Moscow's East European
Allies (U/ O U)
The Bulgarian state, it creation :und pawn of Great
Power politics in the Balkans, has traditionally depended
on one or another of the major European powers for
guarantees of its national existence. As it result, the goal
of full national independence has been elusive a
illusory, yielding invariably to the more attainable airn
it greater or lesser degree of autonomy within the Balkan
power balance. Although Bulgaria's history as it state has
been punctuated by imaginative and opportunistic shifts
of allegiance and by sporadic bouts of aggressive
chauvinism, the price of national existence has more
consistently been unswerving fealty to whatever power
has been paramount in the Balkans at the time. 'Thus,
Bulgaria's shift from an alliance with Nazi Germany
during World War II to Communist rule since then is but
the latest example of what, in Bulgarian eyes, is it
lamentable but necessary compromise of national
principle for the sake of national existence.
For more than a quarter of it century of Communist
rule Bulgaria's international image was obliterated by the
shadow of the U.S. S.R., and its diplomatic interests were
c onfined to the near proximity of its state borders. Since
the mid- 1960's Bulgaria's rulers have embarked on a
c:nttious search for new contacts with the West, especially
with the developing countries of the 'Third World. 'this
expansion of activity from parochial Balkan concerns to
the larger world scene is, however, less an indication of
self- assertive independence than a measure of Soviet
confidence that Bulgaria's leaders will not transgress
Moscow's ideological and policy guidelines in the pursuit
of their own national interests. In 1971 Bulgaria
continued to be the most willingly loyal, pro- Soviet, and
the least politically and socially restive of the U.S.S.R.'s
Eastern European allies.
The Communist regime was carried to power on the
shoulders of the Soviet Red Army that swept into
Bulgaria in 19.1.1. The postwar consolidation of
Communist rule was led by veteran Bulgarian
revolutionary Georgi Dirnitrov, who returned from
Moscow with years of experience in the Soviet controlled
Communist Iniernational (Comintern) movement. The
succession of Bulgarian strongmen after Dimitrov's death
was determined chiefly by the intrigues of Stalin's court
and the ferocity of Stalin's dispute with Yugoslavia's
Tito. In the process, Bulgaria's aspirations i.nd tangible
needs were once again ignored.
Under Stalin, Soviet control of Eastern Europe was
complete, and Bulgaria's vassalage was not unique. But
amidst the diversity and controversy that ha,
characterized Eastern Europe since the death of Stalin,
Bulgaria alone has remained loyal and seemingly hereft
of dangerous nationalist aspirations. The country h ,ts
been untouched either by major internal upheavals, with
their often anti Sovict overtones, or by the visions of
independence which have at one time or another affected
all the other countries of Eastern Europe. In large
measure, this unique path taken by Bulgaria is noted in
its historical, cultural, and religious affinities with Russia,
which after World War II were strengthened by
ideological and political imperatives. Bulgaria thus serves
as t1w prime instrument of Soviet policy with regard to
the Balkans, a key element of which is the historic
Russian desire for it firm foothold there.
The ascendancy of Todor Zhivkov in 1954 to the post
of Party first Secretary, a position to which he has
tenaciously clung, was itself it part of Moscow's need to
buttress its position in the Balkans. 'The consolidation of
Zhivkov's personal control, conducted in it context of
endemic party factionalism, was heavily dependent on
Soviet support. Zhivkov's position did not become
reasonably secure until 1962, and even then his tenure
was shaky enough to be endangered by the ouster of his
Soviet patron, Nikita Khrushchev, in 1964 and by an
anti- Zhivkov plot discovered in 1965. Once again,
however, by convincing the new Soviet leaders of his
unqualified loyalty, Zhivkov obtained the support he
needed to weather these crises.
The encouragement of Bulgarian nationalism �an
official policy designed to garner greater support for the
regime �has been watched approvingly by Zhivkov's
Soviet mentors, but always with an eye to its potential
excesses. Such controlled nationalism, even though
predicated on loyalty to Moscow, can easily exceed
official limits, especially if it focuses on such volatile
issues as Bulgaria's historic irredentist claims to
Macedonia.
Bulgaria's veteran Communists had seized a fairly
viable government structure in 1944 despite the
disruptions of World War IL Long before that conflict,
authoritarian tendencies had overtaken any incipient
democratic impulses, and the political process was
confined to the urban, educated Bulgarian. Although
local government was strong, local politics were seldom
related to national issues, and, in a country of Eastern
Orthodox believers, the village clergy often exercised
decisive influence. Political parties existed but had little
impact on the 80% of the populace laboring on the land.
Nonetheless, the Agrarian Union, claiming to -epresent
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the interests of the peasantry, was the dominant prewar
party. Organized transportation and communications
were rudimentary and in some arc:ks virtually
nonexistent. Education, however, was available in almost
every village, and a relatively large number of young
people finished higher education courses, albeit such
training beir:g largely irrelevant in an agricultural
society. Industry was only of limited significance, and the
major portion of national income was produced by small,
independent farmers.
Under Communist rule, the roots of local government
have been torn up and supplanted by centralized
political organization on the Soviet model. The power of
the local priest has been broken and the importance of
the family -clan in the fabric of society has declined.
Religious beliefs and observances, while not formally
banned, have been assaulted by regime sponsored
programs of atheist "education." Attacks on religion as
an institution have been moderated, however, by the
regime's wish to retain the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as
a symbol of national identity. Impressive strides in
education have stressed the applied polytechnical and
technological side of formal learning as the regime has
tried with moderate success to overcome the endemic
shortage of scientific and skilled workers. Improvements
in the nation's health have included a reduction in the
incidence of disease, accompanied by a decline in the
death rate and a significant 'se in life expectancy.
Bulgaria's postwar industrialization has been undertaken
with heavy Soviet aid, and in fu" conformity with Soviet
economic policies within the Council for Economic
Mutual Assistance (CEMA); as a result, industrialization
has increased rather than lessened Bulgaria's economic
dependence on the U.S.S.R. Although the regime
proclaimed early in 1971 that industry had become the
major source of national income, the majority of the
populace still resided in rural areas and was occupied
with agricultural pursuits. "Socialization" of production
was completed in the early 1950's, and agricultural land
was fully collectivized by 1959. Nevertheless, some
private economic activity is permitted, and artisan
production and the cultivation of small agricultural plots
allotted to farmers continue to thrive. Economic
planning and development are rigidly controlled by the
regime, with mammoth organizational units wielding
control over large sectors of production in both industry
and agriculture. Transportation and communications
networks have been developed.
Bulgaria's Communist leaders, generally ill- educated
and aging, are nevertheless so solidly entrenched that it
would probably require a major internal upheaval and
loss of Soviet support to dislodge them. They have
brought the country a long way into the modern world,
but only by the expedient of using terror and coercion as
instruments of national policy, even in the context of
1971. The Bulgarian Armed Forces, adequately armed
and staffed with the aid of the U.S.S.R., are probably
capable of a creditable defense of the country and, in
conjunction with Bulgaria's allies, could njount offensive
actions against its NATO neighbors. The country hcs
abandoned an extreme bellicose stance, however, and
recently has sought more normal relations with its
neighbors. Such new sources of foreign exchange as
tourism promote this pacific attitude and, in turn, help
diversify an economy which still must make great strides
to be fully abreast of the 20th century.
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Land and People
A. Historical background (U /OU)
Bulgarian tribes first settled in the eastern Balkan area
as early as the seventh century, when the pressures of war
forced their migration frcm the southern Russian steppes
into the region immediately south of the Danube River. A
fierce warrior people who defeated a Byzantine army,
these ewriv Bulgarians only slowly assimilated with the
native Slavic inhabitants and easily assumed a dominant
upper class (boyar) position. The ethnic Bulgar
aristocracy that wielded authority over the inhabitants of
an area roughly coinciding with present -day Bulgaria
were slow to acknowledge the prolonged primacy of one
of their number. But they more often than not cooperated
with each other, particularly when leading the local
inhabitants in successful military campaigns against
neighboring peoples.
An identifiable Bulgarian state gradually developed
through the course of the ninth century, as "Bulgarized"
native strongmen eroded the powers of the original boyar
class and sped the melding of the Bulgarian and Slav
populations. Major gains were registered during the short
reign of Krum (808 -814), who was first able to exercise
central authority over most of the principal boyars, and
during the tenure of Boris (852 -889), who overrode the
objections of his nobility to have the entire populace
baptized in the eastern Christian faith. A central power of
sufficient vigor had emerged by the late ninth century to
enable Simeon (893 -927) to assume the title of Tsar and,
after important military victories over Byzantium, to
have himself proclaimed (925) Emperor of the Romans
and the Bulgars. The splendor of Simeon's capital at
Preslav and the cultural achievements of his court, much
influenced by Simeon's personal fascination with Greek
culture, were renowned through the eastern Mediterra-
nean.
The glories of the first Bulgarian Empire �at its
pinnacle during Simeon's rule �were superseded within a
century by a Byzantine domination. Presaged by a period
of weak leadership, military reverses, and political
splintering �the realities of subjugation to Byzantium
became apparent by the first quarter of the 11th century,
after which there was little further development of a
peculiarly Bulgarian national life. The Bulgarian
Orthodox Church, an early pillar of national identity,
was submitted to Greek direction, and native Bulgarian
churchmen of ability often dissipated their energies
trying to escape Byzantium's control. Sporadic
convulsions of Bulgarian assertiveness culminated in the
brief flowering of a Second Bulgarian Empire in the 13th
century and the reemergence of the Bulgarian Church for
some three decades, but the eclipse of national life then
became total with the ensuing reabsorption into
Byzantium.
The westward advance of the Ottoman Turks in the
14th century brought to the Balkans half a millennium of
oriental dominatio-i and imposed on Bulgaria a political,
cultural, and economic stagnation that endured into the
20th century. The great majority of the native feudal
landowners were displaced by Ottoman bureaucrats and
knights, the few remaining ones� called Pomaks�
embracing Islam and serving as the tatters' agents. "These
overlords extracted from the peasantry a significant share
of the agricultural produce needed to sustain the farflung
empire. The few Bulgarians who engaged in nonagricul-
tural pursuits and Pomaks undertaking independent
farming often served as intermediaries between the
Turkish rulers and the peasantry, but in general the
absence of a native leadership above the village level
developed a certain sense of social egalitarianism.
The Bulgarian church was the only institution to keep
alive national identity, providing :i storehouse of the
Bulgarian past, despite its being placid under the Greek
patriarch of Constantinople. 'Ale few cultural
developments took place largely under church tutelage,
arid, in the face of intense Hellenizing pressures, the
Bulgarian clergy often resorted to guile in retaining intact
the records of past cultural achievements. When
Bulgarian national consciousness started to surface in the
18th century, it sprang from among the clergy and was
closely related to its desire for an independent church,
free of Greek pressures.
A benchmark of national renaissance was the
publication under church auspices in 1762 of A History of
the Bulgarian People, written in the Bulgarian language
by the Orthodox monk Paisi. A subsequent translation of
the Bible into the modern Bulgarian vernacular by
Orthodox monks �aided by U.S. Protestant missionaries
helped confirm the church as the center of the national
revival. The establishment in 1870 of the Bulgarian
Exarchatc, as a distinctly national branch of the Greek
Orthodox Church, was quickly followed by two abortive
national insurrections against Turkish rule, and finally, in
1878, by national independence under Russian
protection. Since that time, much of Bulgaria's national
development has been influenced by the Russians,
notwithstanding the costly anomaly of hostility in two
world wars. Russian influence has stemmed not only from
political power and popular recognition of the deciding
role played by the "big Slav brother" in freeing Bulgaria
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of Turkish rule, but from linguistic, religious, and general
cultural similarities as well. Bulgaria's friendship has
meant for the U.S.S.R. an ,ally and useful salient in the
often troubled Balkan Peninsula; for Bulgaria's part,
many of its social institutions and programs, especially
under the Communist regime, have been drawn from
Soviet experience, especially in such matters as
education, health, culture, and economic planning.
A touchstone of Russian- Bulgarian friendship long was
the common, majority Orthodox faith, which influenced
importantly the attitudes of each society and solidified at
the village level a link often expressed at the diplomatic
level. Eastern Orthodoxy carne to Bulgaria in 865, more
than a century before it reached Kiyevan Russia, and
paved the way for Bulgarian linguistic and cultural
achievements that contributed greatly to Orthodoxy's
common fund. Old Bulgarian (more commonly known as
Church Slavonic) became the language of Eastern
Orthodoxy in Slavic lands, and the Bulgarians are proud
:hat they had a written language nearly a century before
the Russians. Orthodoxy in turn weighed greatly in
shaping a distinct Bulgarian ethnic identity, and in
maintaining it fundamentally intact during the centuries
of Turkish rule. As in Russia, the church was long a center
of social and political life and espoused a peasant piety
that, with its strong sense of devotion, contributed to a
tightly knit social fabric.
Ethnic divisions within the overwhelmingly rural,
Orthodox society are few, but have in modern times
affected relations with Bulgaria's neighbors. A Turkish
minority (about 8.5%) is descended from colonies of
settlers placed in eastern Bulgaria by the ruling Ottomans
and retains its Muslim religion and attendant culture. A
spirit of isolation is still evident among the 'Turks in
Bulgaria and has hindered the Communist attempts at
assimilation. Discriminatory practices and popular
persecution of Turks have been fairly common in
Bulgaria's modern history and undoubtedly continued
into the Communist era.
The much smaller Macedonian minority in the
southwestern corner of the country was closely related to
the Bulgarian majority and had only minor language
differences, arid, indeed, the feeling of being
Macedonian seems to be a fairly recent development.
Consequently, this minority has never been the divisive
clement the Turks have been; rather, its importance has
centered on the conflicting claims to the territory known
as Macedonia registered by Bulgaria, Greece, and
Yugoslavia. Both Greeks and Slays live in the often
disputed, ill- defined region, with the national identity of
the Slav Macedonians the most violently contested aspect
of the dispute. From the Bulgarian side, the most galling
points are the San Stefano Treaty of 1878, by which
Russia gave Bulgaria nearly all Slavic Macedonia, and
the Congress of Berlin, the same year, at which the great
powers took Macedonia away from Bulgaria and gave it
to the Kingdom of Serbia. The temporarily inflated
frontiers of 1878 have haunted Bulgarian nationalist
dreams ever since �even, perhaps, the dreams of
Bulgarian Communists as well.
4
The industrial revolution came late to Bulgaria �at the
beginning of the 20th century �and then only on a small
scale. Despite government sponsored industrialization
programs in the pre -World War I years, and again in the
interwar period, manufacturing enterprises were slow to
take hold, and towns and cities remained rehatively small.
The country continued to be au overwhelmingly rural,
agriculturally based society right into the Communist
era. Only since mid -20th century has industrial
development been a significant factor, notably in the
exploitation of hydroelectric power, the extraction and
refining of fuels, extraction of nonferrous rr textiles,
and machine building. Indeed, some think that the
traditional Communist methods of economic manage-
ment have been applied more successfully in Bulgaria
than in any other East European Communist country
partly because of relatively liberal Soviet credits and
Moscow's willingness to provide a guaranteed market in
the U.S.S.R. for goods whose quality would not permit
them to compete in the markets of Western Europe.
Industrialization has brought a massive and rapid
migration, mainly of younger people, to the urban areas.
Rapid urban development has meant shortages of
housing and sanitation facilities, as well as other
amenities. Pollution has become a worsening problem in
the few major industrial areas� especially Sofiya
leading to the creation of a ministerial -level environmen-
tal protection agency in 1971. Social problems that
accompany the urbanization of an essentially pi :"ant
society �such as juvenile delinquency, alcoholism, and
increased divorce �have been evident, and, although not
,vet nearly an acute proportion, have spurred strong
efforts by the regime to deal with them.
Bulgaria still maintains much of its rural character,
however, and agriculture continues to be the major factor
in the economy. Migration to the cities has left the older
generation in the villages, where health facilities and
educational opportunities still need to be improved. The
rural levels of living are slowly advancing, but so are
urban amenities, leaving a still considerable gap between
town and country. The advent of huge "agricultural
industrial" complexes, proclaimed official nationwide
policy in 1970, is intended partly to bring food processing
industries and urban amenities to the countryside as part
of a major effort to further mechanize and specialize
large -scale farming.
Notwithstanding the relative success of economic
management in the attainment of planned goals, the
oppressive aspects of the regime, if not relieved, could
begin to threaten even the modest material growth,
Traditional values that have given the people purpose
and direction still count for something. In suppressing the
church, for example, the Communists have deprived the
people of a historic mainstay that Marxist ritual simply
has not replaced. The litany of communism has not filled
the void left by the dismantling of the church's role in
village life, and a resultant spiritual rootlessness is evident
among sizable sections of the population.
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B. Geography (U /OU)
Bulgaria occupies the northeastern part of the
turbulent Balkan Peninsula, a historical zone of contact
where the cultures of tit(- east and west have met. For
centuries people and commerce have moved around arid
through this part of the Balkans, and in the process they
profoundly influenced the area's culture, history, and
politics. Even the physical landscape seems to reflect "in
between" characteristics, for the arrangement of
lowlands, hills, and mountains tends to channelize
interregional movements whether along the co.-:1 or
within the nation's interior.
With Imperial Russia's backing, Bulgaria emerged
from the dominance of the Ottoman 'Turkish Empire in
the late 19th century. The country's proximity to the
strategic Bosporus enhanced its international significance
and fostered alliances that led to confrontations between
various foreign powers. As an Independent nation,
Bulgaria has sought to expand its territory to reach
"historic frontiers," and, in particular, to extend its
southern boundary to formerly held Aegean coastal
lands. The desire to attain these lands, in fact, led
Bulgaria to ally itself with Germany during World Wars I
and II and to oppose Russia, allegedly its patron.
Generally following natural geographic features, the
borders of Bulgaria are currently stabilized, although
occasional references to lands formerly in the Bulgarian
Empire heighten tensions in the unstable Balkans. The
border with Yugoslavian Macedonia cuts through the
larger historic homeland of the Macedonians and thus is
involved in the broader, volatile Macedonian question.
The border with Greece transects north -south corridors
whose natural transportation outlets are the Aegean Sea.
During World War II the northeastern land boundary
with Romania was shifted northward across the drv, hilly
southern Dobruja, thereby incorporating areas settled
predominantly by Bulgarians. This boundary is one of
the few wartime boundary adjustments that was riot
reversed in the postwar period.
Forested mountains and high hills dominate the
landscape of approximately 55% of the country (Figure
1). Mountains in the western arid southern border zones,
some alpine in character, funnel international land
communication routes into and through a few valleys
and basins. The Balkan Mountains extend ;�eross the
central part of the country to separate the two major
lowlands and form the water divide between streams
flowing into the Black and Aegean Seas. Many low passes
cut through these mountains, however, thereby
facilitating a considerable, if difficult, north -south
movement of goods aril people. The mountains are the
major source of Bulgaria's timber and mineral resources,
and they act as a rain catchment basin, from which
emanate the perennial streams that water the adjacent
lowlands. Valleys and basins in the mountains provide
pastureland (Figure 2) and small tracts that are suitable
for cultivation.
Lowlands. primarily treeless plains broken by local
hills, cover approximately 459 of Bulgaria's 42,800
square miles. On the broad, loess- covered, and more
extensive northern plains that border the Danube 13iver,
streams have cut deep valleys, thus making irrigation of
the adjacent fiat drainage divides difficult. In the eastern
sector of these plains, the few streams are intermittent.
The fertile lowlands are extensively cultivated and
agricultural production usually exceeds domestic needs.
The lowlands support it relatively dense rural population
and have many medium -sized cities, located along major
transportation routes a. d supported by agriculture
related industries (Figure 3).
The Black Sea coast has a variety of features; wooded
hills, some terminating as cliffs overlooking the sea,
contrast sharply with small arid low embayments Jigure
4). Two embaytnents provide harbors for the major
industrial port cities that connect Bulgaria with other
maritime nations. Capitalizing on excellent sandy
beaches and a favorable climate, the Bulgarians are
developing this coast into a "riviera" for Eastern
Europeans (Figure 5).
A continental climate with cold winters and hot
summers, in which rainfall usually occurs in the form of
summer thundershowers, is characteristic of a large part
of the country. The mountains generally protect the
central lowlands from the coldest northern winds, but
they and the coastal hills also cut off the warm
ameliorating influences of the Mediterranean and Black
Seas. Only the south- opening valleys aril south- facing
slopes of the southern mountains experience the warm,
dry summers and cool, moist winters that are
characteristic of areas adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea.
Except in the uplands, which intercept the moisture
laden winds, precipitation is only marginally adequate
for agriculture, and droughts can occur at any time.
As a result of boundary adjustments, exchanges of
population, and immigration, Bulgaria today is more
homogeneous in character than when it gained
independence, but evidence of 'Turkish culture still
abounds. Despite exchanges through governmental
agreements, Turks remain the largest minority group
(8.5% of the total population). Their number belies the
impact Turkish culture had on the Bulgarian people,
which is evident in Turkish words in the language, dishes
in the cuisine, oriental tone in the folk music, and the
ubiquitous mosques aril minarets of the Muslim religion.
Concentrations of Turks occur in the northeast and
southeast, areas densely settled by early Turkish
colonizers; neither area is adjacent to the existing
boundary with Turkey. Macedonians pose a potential
threat to internal tranquillity, although their numbers are
few. They are concentrated in the southwestern part of
the country, which is part of the ephemeral Macedonian
region over which Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders have
recently exchanged invectives.
The population until after World War 11 was primarily
rural in character. Over 50% of the total lived in
communities, mostly in large nucleated settlements
5
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FIGURE 2. Cattle raising is impor-
tant on the grasslands that cover
some of the valleys and gentler
slopes of the Balkan Mountains of
north central Bulgaria (U /OU)
FIGURE 4. Coastal settlements
favor the pocket lowlands that lie
between the cliffed stretches. The
lack of port facilities limits fishing
to local enterprises. (U /OU)
FIGURE 3. Hothouses are a fre-
quent part of the landscape on the
lowlands. These are utilizing heat
from the Maritza 3 powerplant at
Dimitrovgrad (left background).
Some of the fertilizer used un-
doubtedly comes from the Stalin
Chemical Works, seen here border-
ing the hothouses. (U /OU)
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formed historically to use the land to its fullest and to
provide protection against marauders. To a ground
observer, the Danubian lowlands may appear sparsely
settled, as many settlements are located in the incised
valleys where water is available and where protection
from cold winter winds can be found. The mountains
tend to be sparsely populated, except for concentrations
in mining areas (Figure 6). Villages are small and
generally widely separated. Since World War 11 there has
been a notable movement of people, especially the
young, from the farming areas to the cities, which are
generally located along the principal transportation
avenues, such as the Maritsa River, and offer
opportunities for employment in industry. The influx of
such individuals has created problems, especially in
housing. Today, over one -half of the population is urban,
with Sofiya, the capital and industrial center of the
nation, the largest city (approximately 825,000).
Fertile soils, tillable terrain, and a favorable climate
have encouraged farming and stock raising in the area
since its early occupation by the Slays. Substantial
regional differences permit agricultural diversity, which
in turn enables Bulgaria to be agriculturally self
sufficient. Extensive croplands characterize the
practically treeless but fertile Danubian lowland. The
region is Bulgaria's major producer of winter wheat, the
preferred bread crop, and corn., which provides fodder for
the growing livestock industry. The principal industrial
crops are sunflowers, a co!orfnl field crop grown in the
FIGURE S. The Golden Sands, north of Varna, is one of
several rapidly developing resort areas on the Black
Sea (U /OU)
drier eastern areas for oil, and sugar beets, cultivated
primarily in the wet stream valleys. Agricultural practices
on the central lowland are similar to those of the northern
plains; however, irrigation is more widespread, and crops
include rice and cotton. Despite the competition of
synthetics in the perfume industry, attar of roses remains
in demand, and roses continue to be a specialty and cash
crop in the Tundzha valley, the famous "Valley of Roses"
that lies between the Balkan Mountains and the Sredna
Gora. Orchards generally cover the slopes of hills
throughout the cot :,try, and fruit is exported fresh,
canned, in juice, or in distillate form (such as
"Slivovitsa," a clear plum brandy). Vineyards are
common to water divides, with the grapes being used for
the table and winemaking Market gardening occurs
around major cities. Fresh vegetables, fruit, grain, and
flowers are grown in sufficient quantities to permit their
export, and have gained for the Bulgarian peasant the
appellation "gardener of Europe." The hills and
mountains are generally devoted to animal husbandry.
Flocks of sheep are herded to alpine pastures in the spring
and returned to the lowlands in the fall. Tobacco, a
major cash crop, is cultivated in the valleys of the
southern mountains (Figure 7). Opium poppies, probably
introduced by early Turkish settlers, are grown primarily
in the lower Struma and Mesta valleys in the southwest; a
poppy of poorer quality is also grown in the northwest.
Industrial development, a relatively recent phenome-
non in Bulgaria, is to a large degree dependent on a
1 %46,"
r -�'h.` fin.
A
7% f 1yt
.y
:1':., {elf
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8
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FIGURE 6. Multiple- dwelling hous-
ing units compact the workers'
families in this mining area at
Borinovo in the Rhodope Moun-
tains in southern Bulgaria (U /OU)
sr
4.1
!lI'
�M
aJf r +y
t t 1 i1
FIGURE 7. Planting tobacco on a
collective farm in the extreme
southwest. Irrigation enhances the
productivity of this mountain valley
in Blagoevgrad. (U /OU)
9
fi Y
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limited natural resource base concentrated primarily in
the western and southern mountains. Reserves of low
quality iron ore and of other mineral resources are
basically inadequate to support a large metallurgical
industry. Deposits of nonferrous metals �lead, zinc, and
copper �in the central and southern mountains,
however, are mined in quantities sufficient to meet
domestic needs and permit some export. Bulgaria lacks
adequate fuel resources. Extensive brown coal and lignite
deposits in the central and western areas are utilized for
homes and powerplants, and also as a raw material base
for a young chemical industry. Oil and gas deposits are
small. and imports are necessary to meet domestic
requirements. The presence of fuels, minerals, and
manpower in the Sofiya basin, along with the location of
the city on a major transportation route, contribute to the
leading role of Sofiya as the industrial center of the
country. Air pollution is becoming serious in the vicinity
of Sofiya because of the increased use of soft coal by
industrial and private consumers in the basin. Industrial
pollution of streams here and elsewhere in the country is
also a growing threat associated with industrial
development. Varna, Burgas, and Ruse, all important
ports, are centers of shipbuilding and of chemical and
petrochemiril industries. Ruse and Burgas have oil
refineries based on imported Soviet and Middle Eastern
crude oils. Small factories processing agricultural
materials or producing specialty items are scattered
throughout the country. Coniferous forests, primarily in
the southern and western mountains, and deciduous
forests on the central and western mountains provide a
base for a wood products industry. Recognizing the
continued dependence of Bulgarian industry on
agricultural raw materials, the Bulgarian Government
recently initiated the organization of agro- industrial
complexes. The government's intention is to bring all
phases of production into one place by attaching food
connected industries to large groups of farms. By
providing employment to the peasant and bringing
workers into a few modernized villages offering social
services, the program may slow the exodus of the
population from the countryside to the cities.
C. Population (U /QU)
1. Size, composition, and distribution
Bulgaria's last official census, taken in December 1965,
recorded the population at 8,227,869, an increase of
614,070 persons or about 8% since the 1956 census,
averaging slightly less than 1% per year. According to
U.S. Census estimates the Bulgarian population
numbered 8,601,000 as of 1 July 1971.
The ethnic composition of the population in 1967 was
approximately 85.3% Bulgarian, 8.5% Turkish, 2.6%
Gypsy, 2.54 Macedonian,' 0.3% Armenian, 0.2%
'Any estimate of the Macedonian population is very tenuous and is
complicated by official Bulgarian claims, espoused since 1958, that
Macedonians are not a separate national group brit instead are a
subgroup of the Bulgarian nation. The official Bulgarian census of
1956, the last one to list separately the Macedonian population,
asserted that 187,789 persons (2.5% of the total population) were
Macedonian.
10
Russian, 0.1% Greeks, with the remaining 0.5% divided
among at least eight other ethnic groups. The number of
Turks is being reduced as a result of an agreement signed
in October 1967 between Bulgaria and Turkey which will
allow the eventual emigration of perhaps 20,000 to
50,000 of Bulgaria's approximately 700,000 ethnic Turks
to Turkey.
Encompassing an area of 42,800 square miles, slightly
less than th, state of Pennsylvania, Bulgaria as of July
1971 had a population density of 200 persons per square
mile, about average for the rugged Balkan area.
Approximately half of this area is suitable for agricultural
purposes; the remainder consists mainly of forests, hills
and mountains, and built -on areas. Bulgaria has fewer
people than most of its European neighbors. Of the four
Balkan countries which border directly on Bulgaria,
Greece has approximately half a million more
inhabitants, Romania and YuF .,lavia each have more
than twice as many people, and Turkey is four times as
populous. The population and population density of
Bulgaria are compared with selected countries in
Figure 8.
The are-is of highest population density are generally
found on the more fertile plains or plateaus, where most
of the urban centers are also located (i.e., in the
Danubian tableland, the Trakiyska Nizina, and the
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FIGURE 8. Population and population density, Bulgaria
and selected countries, 1970 (U /OU)

Sofiya basin). The major fxlpulation concentrations are
around the two largest cities, Sofiya and Plovdiv.
Estimates as of January 1968 indicate that Sofiya District
and the city of Sofiya combined had nearly 15% of the
population; Plovdiv District (which includes the city of
Plovdiv) had nearly 87v of the total population. These
two districts, along with Varna District (which includes
the city of Varna) showed the highest rate of population
increase between 1956 and 1965. Conversely, the areas of
lowest population density are in mountainous central and
southern Bulgaria -the western Rhodope and Balkan
Mountains, ranging longitudinally across the center of
the country, and in the Strandzha Mountains in the
southeastern corner. The population distribution by
administrative divisions is shown in Figure 9 and on the
inset on the Summary Map, Figure 122.
Heavy rural to urban migration, partly a consequence
of industrialization. has greatly increased the size of
urban centers, reflecting the eagerness of the people
especially the younger generation -to leave rural areas in
favor of the amenities of urban life. In 1956 the urban
population comprised slightly less than 34% of the total
population, and in 1965 the urban population
constituted 43.9 with an additional 2.5% living in
"settlements of an urban type." This new category,
created in 1964 and including at that time 40 villages,
reflected the employment of the bulk of the population in
the extractive or relocated manufacturing industries.' By
early 1970 about 51 of the population lived in urban
areas, with an additional 1% dwelling in the recently
defined urban settlements. The migration to urban
centers has increased the urban population about 107,000
annually (1944 -70), which is a rate more than 1.5 times
that of the population increase for the country as a whole.
The eight largest cities totaled almost 1.8 million persons
in 1968 or 21.2% of the total population (Figure 10).
Moreover, these eight cities, which increased 41.7% in
population between 1956 and 1968, accounted for 42.8%
of the total urban population in the latter year. In
2 Bulgarian sources classify 10% of Sofiva's population as rural
because the city, classified as a separate district (okrug), contains rural
areas.
FIGURE 9. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION, 1 JANZTARY 1970 j7/0U)
II
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PERSONS
PERCENT
PERCENT
PER
PERCENT
OF TOTAL
OF TOTAL
LAND
TOTAL
SQUARE
OF TOTAL
URBAN
URBAN
RURAL
RURAL
OKRUGS
AREA
POPULATION
MILE
POPULATION
POPULATION
POPULATION
POPULATION
POPULATION
Square
miles
Thousands
Thousands
Thousands
Blagoevgrad
2,504
310.6
124.0
3.7
125.8
2.9
184.8
4.5
Burgas
2,916
404.2
138.6
4.8
223.4
5.1
180.8
4.4
Gabrovo
794
188.4
237.3
2.2
118.8
2.7
69.6
1.7
K haskovo..........
1,568
289.5
185.0
3.4
155.4
3.5
134.1
3.3
K urazhali
1,560
296.4
190.0
3.5
62.0
1.4
234.3
5.7
K yustendil
1,174
197.5
168.2
2.8
94..9
2.2
102.6
2.5
Lovech
1,597
221.3
138.6
2.6
99.5
2.3
121.8
3.0
hlikhaylovgrad
1,387
236.9
170.8
2.8
93.3
2.1
143.6
3.5
Pazaydzhik
1,678
306.2
182.5
3.6
157.1
3.6
149.1
3.7
Pernik
921
181.4
197.0
2.1
97.4
2.2
84.0
2.1
Pleven
1,595
349.8
219.3
4.1
151.8
3.5
198.0
4.8
Plovdiv
2,139
658.3
307.8
7.8
401.1
9.2
257.2
6.3
Razgrad
1,015
200.6
197.6
2.4
57.6
1.3
143.0
3.5
Ruse
1,026
285.9
278.7
3.4
164.9
3.8
121.0
3.0
Shu men
1,285
249.2
193.9
2.9
103.3
2.4
1115.9
3.6
Silistra
1,109
131.8
154.9
2.0
58.9
1.3
112.9
2.8
Sliven
1,389
233.3
168.0
2.8
116.9
2.7
116.4
2.8
Smolyan
1,372
178.0
129.0
2.1
59.2
1.3
117.8
2.9
Sofiya District
2,814
317.5
112.8
3.8
111.8
2.6
205.7
5.0
Sofiya city
434
973.5
2,243.1
11.5
873.6
20.0
99.8
2.4
Stara Zagora
1.893
373.6
197.4
4.4
208.0
4.8
165.4
4.0
Tolbukhin
1,816
239.3
131.8
2.8
100.8
2.3
138.5
3.4
Turgo ishte
1,050
175.4
167.0
2.1
58.0
1.3
117.3
2.9
Varna
1,504
397.8
264.5
4.7
257.8
5.9
140.0
3.4
Veliko Turnovo............
1,808
333.2
184.3
3.9
133.2
3.0
200.1
4.9
Vidin
1,197
175.6
146.7
2.1
70.9
1.6
104.7
2.6
Vratsa
1,602
302.8
189.0
3.6
121.5
2.8
181.4
,.4
Yam bol
1,682
217.2
129.1
2.6
96.9
2.2
120.3
2.9
Total
42,829
8,464.2
197.6
100.0
4,374.0
100.9
4,090.0
100.0
NOTE- Figures may not add
to totals
because of rounding.
Source: Slalislicheski Godishnik na Narodna Repuhlika
Rulgariga, 1970, p. 423.
II
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2956 19" d
Sotiya
72.5
Burgas
Pernik 73.3%
56.1
161.8 Stara Zagora
Plovdiv
FIGURE 10. Population and population growth of the
eight largest cities, 1956 -68 (U /OU)
January 1970 Sofiya' alone contained almost 20% of the
urban population or 11.5% of the total inhabitants.
Much of Varna's increase in population can be attributed
to the recent development of the tourist industry (Figure
5).
Urban growth has been so rapid that regime officials
have attempted to ease congestion by dispersing industry
in an effort to redistribute the national labor force. Many
efforts have centered on curbing the heavy migration to
Sofiya, and on accelerating the growth of small and
average -size cities (under 20,000 population). In 1955 the
Council of Ministers passed a decree for the "Temporary
Limitation on Admitting New Residents to the Capital."
Decrees in 1961 and 1962 provided for the dispersal of
industrial plants, as did the more receltt decree of the
Council of Ministers in 1967. This measure dictated that
10 industrial enterprises as well as parts of other
production units be moved from Sofiya. The measures
have had a limited effect on the growth of the larger
cities. Between 1965 and 1968 the percentage of the total
urban population found in the eight largest cities
declined 3.7 Further industrial dispersion, already
reflected statistically in the appearance of the new
"settlements of an urban type" created in 1964, was
placed on a continuing long -term basis by a 1 -day party
plenum in March 1970.
2. Vital statistics
Bulgaria's modest average population growth rate of
0.9% annually since 1956 is slightly above the Eastern
European average of 0.7 however, an overall decline in
'Inhabited places in Bulgaria are classified as rural or urban on the
basis of administrative status rather than by size. The major criterion for
this distinction is the occupation of the majority of the economically
active population. However, according to the census of 1965, 97% of
the rural population dwelled in towns of less than 5,000 population; no
town over 10,000 population was classified as "rural."
12
these rates seems portended for the 1970's. The country
historically has shown a relatively low rate of natural
increase. Except for the immediate post -World War II
years, the rate of natural increase has fluctuated around
10 per 1,000. The rate of natural increase in 1967
registered a low point of 6.0 per 1,000 (for the 50 years in
which statistics have been compiled), and by 1969 had
only slightly increased to 7.5 per 1,000, despite measures
by the government to encourage a higher birth rate.
A low marriage rate has been a constant factor for over
two decades in keeping population growth down. The
marriage rate of 8.7 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1969
equaled the average low rate among the Eastern
European countries as a whole and showed remarkable
stability when compared with the average rate of 8.6
registered in Bulgaria over the last two decades. It is well
below the U.S. average of 10.6. At the same time, the
divorce rate has increased somewhat, from 1.01 per 1,000
inhabitants in 1962 to 1.16 in 1969.
A rapid decline in the birth rate after World War II.
slowed population growth. Unlike many other Eastern
European countries, Bulgaria's birth rate was not greatly
affected by the war. After reaching a postwar high of 25.6
per 1,000 population in 1946 �up from 22.8 in 1938 �the
birth rate declined almost steadily until 1966, when it
reached an all -time low of 14.9 per 1,000 population. A
modest upturn has been evident since then. Statistical
data released by the regime reveal a birth rate of 17.0 per
1,000 population in 1969 (Figure 11).
Like other Eastern European countries, Bulgaria's
fertility rate �the number of births in relation to the
number of women of childbearing age �is quite low. The
large number of women active in the labor force,
increased urbanization, and, until recently, the ease with
which abortions could be obtained tended to discourage
childbearing. Only in the past few years has the
government begun to provide meaningful incentives to
natural population growth.
Substantial decreases in the death rates particularly
in infant mortal ity� pariially balanced the declining
birth rate. Improved medical facilities and techniques,
accompanied by easier access to medicine and by
improved sanitation, are the principal factors in the
declining death rate. A comparison of vital rates in
Bulgaria and other selected countries is shown in Figure
12.
Life expectancy has increased. According to official
Bulgarian estimates, a male child born in the middle
1960's will live about 69 years, while a female will live
almost 73 years. By comparison, the life expectancy of a
child born in the early 1920's was about 44 years for a
male and 45 years for a female. The general increase in
life expectancy stems in good measure from the marked
decline in infant mortality. Nevertheless, the infant
mortality rate of 30.5 deaths per 1,000 is still relatively
high, although it is exceeded by the infant mortality rates
of Hungary, Poland, and Portugal. The rate has been
stable since the early 1960's and shows a marked decline
from the 138.9 deaths per 1,000 registered births in 1939,
then one of the highest rates in Europe. A comparison of
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the infant mortality rate in Bulgaria with rates in other
Eastern European countries is shown in Figure 13.
Disparities between urban and rural health and
sanitation facilities are vividly reflected in the difference
between the urban infant mortality rate of 26.5 and the
rural rate of 35.6.
As in neighboring European countries, the population
of Bulgaria, which had been relatively young, is now
aging. Thus, the median age has risen from 26.6 in 1947
to 29.3 in 1956, to 33 years in 1969. The working -age
group, ages 15 through 64, increased from 4,789,000 in
1950 to an estimated 5,720,00 as of 1 July 1969. This
growth of about 19% represents an increase of almost 2%
in the proportion of the total population found in the
working -age group. U.S. Census projections indicate that
the number of persons in the working -age group will
continue to grow proportionately, but at a reduced rate.
The age -sex distribution of the Bulgarian population
shows greater regularity than do distributions of other
Eastern European countries, in which war casualties and
emigration have had more of an impact. In comparison
with the United States, however, such influences on the
Bulgarian pyramid, as well as the recent rapid declines in
the birth rate, become more apparent (Figure 14). The
smaller proportion of Bulgarians in the 25 through 34 age
group reflects low birth rates during and just prior i ;,o
World War II. Additionally, Bulgaria's present
population structure reflects a long -range deg dine in the
death rate.
The sex ratio has remained relatively unchanged since
at least 1939 �about 100 males o 10C females �and
Bulgarian estimates for 1969 listed 99.9 males for every
100 females. Male slightly exceed females in number
between ages 25 -1:j, and have a greater, albeit still
modest, advantage in the under -25 age groups.
3. Population policies and projections
eversing the decline in the birth rate has become a
matter of official concern. Toward this end, the regime
has tightened abortion laws and has encouraged larger
families. The liberal abortion laws of 1956 were
superseded by an amendment of the "Instructions for
Procedures for Artificial Termination of Pregnancy" in
1963. Under these new provisions abortions were to be
granted only to women who claimed difficult "social"
problems and received approval of their claim by a
special commission in the Ministry of Public Health and
Social Welfare.
Even so, the policy evidently remained one of
relatively easy abortions, and they continued at a high
rate. The number of abortions between 1958 and 1963
increased from approximately 55,000 to about 104,000,
according to an article published in Ikonomicheski
Zhivot (Economic Life) in January 1967. Moreover, on
the basis of a questionnaire distributed by the regime in
1963, officials estimated that an additional 60,000
abortions went unrecorded annually. On the basis of
these statistics, the number of abortions by the mid
1960's had become significantly greater than the number
of births. New abortion regulations announced in
December 1967 are much more restrictive than those of
1963. Under the 1967 ruins abortions of a firs. pregnancy
are allowable only in cases of proved n:pe or other
"especially serious cases." They must be approved by a
three -man medical committee, one of whom is an
obstetrician.
In an effort to increase the birth rate, the regime has
instituted a system of financial rewards paid at the time
of birth of each child to married couples. A decree issued
in December 1967 set a Aiding scale of one -time
payments to parents for the }girth of !ive childreni m the
following amounts: first child, 20 Iowa (1.17 leya�
USS1.00 at the commercial rate): second child. 200 leva,
third child, 500 leva: fourth and subsequvat children, 20
leva. Monthly payments, previously based on incunie
levels, have been increased in two stages. Beginning Jan-
uary 19(18 all families with three children received I0 Icva
per month (which is more than they had received before),
regardless of family income. Families with one or two
children coitinued to receive the previous payments.
Since January 1969 families have icceived 5 leva for the
first child, 15 for the second, 35 for the third, and 5 leva
for each additional child. These payments are made
regardless of income and exceed the payments under the
old schedule.
Oth er measures taken in 1967, and still in effect,
included the liberalization of maternity leave benefits
and greater use of non!nonetary rewards. Longer
maternity leaves are now the rule �up to 6 months of
paid leave and 12 months of unpaid time off for a mother
bearing her third child -as are liberal absentee policies
for mothers either tending sick children or nursing. Since
1967 large families have been given greater empolynient
opportunities and priority in obtaining housing or
housing construction loans. Plans for the 5 years 1971 -75
call for further unspecified gains in state support
allowances for the second child and increases in the
capacity of state -run creches and kindergartens. The
government also awards "Maternity Glory" orders to
mothers of large families and imposes a special tax of 5%
to 10% on the pay of single persons and childless couples.
The U.S. Census Bureau expects Bulgaria's population
to reach at least 8.8 million by 1975 and 9.4 millicn in
1985. According to the projection, the number of persons
in each broad age group will increase over the period
1965 -85, but the increase will be proportionately greater
in older ages (Figure 15). Because the low fertility rate is
expected to continue, the number of persons underage 15
is expected to increase by only about 5.2 from slightly
over 2 million in 1965 to about 2.1 million in 1985. The
projection forecasts an increase in the working -age
population (15 through 64 years) from approximately 5.5
million n 1965 to over 6.2 million by 1985, with the
greatest gain concentrated in the older working ages. The
increase during this period in the group aged 15 through
34 is estimated !o be 5.5 while the population aged 35
through 64 will, according to the projection, increase
approximately 20.3 The number of persons 65 and
over will increase approximately 38.4 from 663,000 in
1965 to over 1 million in 1985.
13
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FIGURE 11� Births, dealhs, marriages per 1,000
population, 1920 -69 (U /OU)
FIGURE 12. Vital rates, Bulgaria and
selected countries (U /OU)
Rate per 1,000 persons
D. Structure and characteristics of the society
(U /OU)
1. Ethnic composition and languages
Bulgaria's population is overwhelmingly ethnic
Bulgarian, with Turks, Gypsies, and Macedonians, the
last named concentrated in the southwest corners of the
country, the only significant minorities (Figure 16). On
the whole, the minority groups are outwardly quiet and
submissive to the regime. Longstanding prejudices still
exist, however, especially against the Turkish minority,
and create a divisive element in Bulgarian society.
Modern Bulgarians are a south- Slavic people with a
strain of Asiatic assimilated long ago. They are descended
from unknown Central European Slavic tribes that
settled the eastern Balkan Peninsula over a 300 -year
period extending from the fourth to the seventh centuries.
Turko Tartar nomads known as Bulgars invaded the
region in the seventh century and, although relatively
few in number, soon dominated the area. By the ninth
century, however, the majority Slavic population had
completely assimilated the Bulgars, who left only their
name as a token of their rule over the population.
Modern Bulgarians speak a common language, and
many facets of their cultural development are associated
historically with the Eastern Orthodox Church.
Bulgarians vary widely in physical characteristics. As
elsewhere in the Mediterranean area, tallness is rare. The
pigmentation of Bulgarians, while lighter than that of the
Greeks, is predominantly dark, and light colored hair is
rare. Figure 17 depicts a typical Bulgarian farmer and
urban dweller. Turks living in Bulgaria are similar in
14
Romania*
11fi#flfil lf#1i#illl fill 23.3
liiilliiii iliiiiif if f ifl
10.1 13.2
Yugoslavia*
flililifl# ##11##111 18.8
1111110ii iffifiiif
9.2 9.6
#lllliilf#
United States* #1111##1 17.7
ffififfifl IM M11
9.5 8.2
BULGARIA ##i#lfiflf 111111116.
9.5 7.4
ilii#lifif
United Kingdom* 11111#1 16.6
lifiiiiiil 11111
11.9 4.7
ililfiffll
Poland' M1111 16.3
fiifiififf iff M
8.1 8.2
Czechoslovakia* 111111 15.5
11.2 4.3
Hungary'
11111 15.0
lifliiiiii Mil
1 1 .3 3.7
Sweden* #fllllilfl fill 13.5
fillii M #fff
10.4 3.1
it Births if Deaths ii Natural increase
Provisional 1969 United Notions figures.
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Infant deaths in first year
of. tire per 1.000 live births
126
100
80.
60
40
20
0
1950 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
FIGURE 13. Infant mortality, Bulgaria and
selected countries, 1950 -69 (U /OU)
FIGURE 14. Age -sex distribution, Bulgaria and
the United States, 1970 (U /OU)
BULGARIA
N
Age
70 and
over
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
UNITED STATES
k
6 4 2 0 0 2 4 6
Percent
physical characteristics to the hulk of the population, but
Armenians and Gypsies tend to be distinguishable.
Gypsies are usually darker and shorter, while Armenians
may be markedly round headed and are usually heavier
than most other Bulgarians.
The Turks, the largest of the minority groups, are the
descendants of settlers who migrated from Asia Minor
during the 500 years of Ottoman supremacy in the
Balkans. The Ottoman Empire for reasons of military
security colonized the eastern portion of Bulgaria with
Turks, a practice that ceased only after Bulgaria's
liberation in 1878. Most of the 'Turks now live as farmers
in the northeastern section of Bulgaria, although there are
sizable numbers in the south and in the Rhodope
Mountains (Figure 16). The town of Kolarovgrad
(formerly Shumen) is the traditional 'Turkish religious
(Muslim) and cultural center; several other large towns in
eastern Bulgaria have 'Turkish quarters. The 'Turks have
never been fully assimilated into Bulgarian society, and
efforts by the current regime to encourage assimilation
have not met with success. The c.' fficulty experienced by
the 'Turkish minority in identifying with the majority
population or with the regime has been exacerbated by
discriminatory practices, such as inducting 'Turkish
couths into labor troop units. \chcm thc\ rccvivv little or
no military training and fulfill their military obligation
IN
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FIGURE
15. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTIMATED AND
PROJECTED
POPULATION,
BY BROAD AGE GROUPS
AND
SEX (UrOU)
(Population
in thousands)
NUMBER
PERCENT
DISTRIBUTION
AGE /SEX 1965
1975
1985
1965
1975
1985
Both sexes:
0- 14
2,003
2,020
2,108
22,.5
22.8
22.3
15- 34
2,510
2,608
2,649
30.7
29.4
28.1
35- 64
3,000
3,288
3,608
36.7
37.1
38.2
65 and over
663
952
1,077
8.1
10.7
11.4
All ages
8,177
8,869
9,442
100.0
100.0
100.0
:Yale:
0- 14
1,024
1,037
1,083
25.1
23.4
22.9
15- 34
1,265
1,325
1,352
31.0
29.9
28.6
35- 64
1,501
1,637
1,792
36.7
36.9
38.0
65 and over
295
438
494
7.2
9.8
10.5
All ages
4,085
4,435
4,722
100.0
100.0
100.0
Female:
0- 14
981
983
1,025
24.0
22.2
21.7
15- 34
1,244
1,284
1,297
30.4
29.0
27.5
35- 64
1,501
1,654
1,815
36.7
37.3
38.4
65 and over
369
514
583
8.9
11.5
12.4
All ages
4,093
4,434
4,720
100.0
100.0
100.0
NOTE- Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
Macedargan 50-100
FIGURE 16. Geographic distribution of Turkish and
Macedonian minorities, 1965 (C)
by working. Furthermore, popular persecution of Turks
including terror and beatings partly negates the few
positive steps in education and medical services taken by
the regime toward this minority.
Lack of concern over the Turkish minority by the pre
Communist government allowed a great number of
native Turkish customs and practices to survive. A
substantially self contained community within the larger
community thus continued to exist well into the
Communist era. Currently the few ethnic Turks who
collaborate with Sofiya have little actual contact with or
16
influence over the other Bulgarian Turks, since the former
have been ostracized from the Muslim church, and the
church is one of the most influential institutions in the
Turkish community.
This Turkish minority has been a source of irritation
between the two countries since Bulgaria attained
independence from Turkey in 1878. This irritation was
lessened somewhat in March 1968, when the two nations,
pursuant to a 1967 agreement, arranged for the eventual
emigration of perhaps 20,000 to 50,000 Turks, the first
such large -scale transfer since 1950 -51, when Bulgaria
permitted several thousand ethnic Turks to return to their
homeland. The two governments appear content with the
gradual repatriation, because Bulgaria does not want to
lose a significant portion of its agricultural labor force,
and Turkey does not want the problem of resettling a
large number of impoverished immigrants.
The second largest minority group, the Gypsies, came
to the Balkan Peninsula during the 15th century and are
now scattered throughout Bulgaria. Prior to World War
II they could be divided into two groups -the settled and
the nomadic. The first group lived mainly in the cities,
often in the slum areas, especially in Pleven. Since the
Communists took power, the government has made an
effort to reduce nomadism and to integrate all Gypsies
more fully into national life. These attempts, however,
have met with stubborn resistance, as the Gypsies balk at
assimilation into the modern industrial, urban society.
Reportedly given equal rights with ethnic Bulgarians,
Gypsies, because of their clannish nature, are still
generally reluctant to broaden contacts with the
Bulgarians. While nearly all are able to make themselves
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FIGURE 17. A typical farmer in fast disappearing traditional dress
and a city dweller from Plovdiv (U /OU)
understood in Bulgarian, they communicate among
themselves in their ancient Romany language (of Indo-
European origin). During the 1950 -51 exodus of Turks,
the Turkish Government complained that the Bulgarian
regime was trying to get rid of Gypsies by passing them
off as Turks. Currently the government's policy seems
aimed merely at persuading the Gypsies to settle down
and take up regular work in the socialized economy. The
majority of Gypsies are Muslims.
Macedonians (or, as the Bulgarian regime would have
it, Bulgarians from Macedonia) are about as numerous a
minority as the Gypsies, but there all analogy ends.
Concentrated in the Rhodope Mountains in southwestern
Bulgaria, the Macedonians adhere to the beliefs of
Eastern Orthodoxy and speak a language closely related
to Bulgarian. Significantly larger numbers of Macedoni-
ans live in contiguous areas of neighboring Yugoslavia
and Greece, and some Macedonians still hope for a
united Macedonia composed of territory from all three
states. Yugoslav contentions that the Macedonians are a
separate nationality have been answered by Bulgarian
claims that the Macedonians are a political and
geographic subgroup of the Bulgarian nation and
therefore not a separate nationality. Both sides interpret
the other's position as a threat to its territorial integrity
because of the sizable Macedonian population on both
sides of the border. Vituperative exchanges between
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over the Macedonian issue flare
up periodically, often for little apparent immediate
cause. The issue, although real, on occasion has become
something of a red herring, exploitable from time to time
by both sides for a variety of internal and external
political reasons.
The Bulgarian regime forbids all political activity
associated with Macedonian nationalism and suppresses
cultural activity which is uniquely Macedonian, i.e.,
songs and folklore. Moreover, unlike the Turkish
minority, the Macedonians are not permitted to have
schools in their native language. The regime considers
Macedonian a dialect of Bulgarian rather than a separate
language. Signifying the hardening attitude against the
Yugoslav position, the 1965 Bulgarian census fur
fewer Macedonians than had been reported in 1956.
Of the numerically less significant ethnic groups in
Bulgaria, the Armenians, Russians, Greeks, Jews, Tartars,
and Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarian Muslims) are the most
important. The Armenians consist mostly of refugees and
the descendants of refugees who fled Turkey after the
massacres in the first quarter of this century, most having
entered Bulgaria in 1922 -25. Some, however, are
descendants of Armenian colonies which were established
iu the Maritsa valley over a thousand years ago. Most
Armenians are urban dwellers. The Russians in Bulgaria
also are primarily refugees, survivors of General
Wrangel's army who fled Russia after the Bolshevik
revolution, and their descendants. The few thousand
Greeks are the remnants of a much larger minority,
estimated at some 67,000 in 1905. Many Greeks left
Bulgaria after riots in 1905, but most emigrated to their
homeland during population exchanges aft,, World War
1. There was a slight influx of Greek Communist
guerrillas who sought refuge in Bulgaria in the late
1940's. These latter -day Greek immigrants live in the
urban areas as foreign refugees and receive assistance
from the Communist authorities. The few thousand
Tartars in Bulgaria are the descendants of a group which
colonized the northeastern part of the country after
having emigrated from the Crimea in 1861.
The Jews are the remnants of a much larger minority of
between 50,000 and 60,000 who lived in Bulgaria prior to
World War II. They are mostly Sephardim, descendants
of the Jews-who left Spain and Portugal, and have lived
in Bulgaria for several centuries. Unlike other Eastern
European countries, Bulgaria has not had a tradition of
anti Semitism, and during World War II Bulgaria was
the only German ally which did not allow deportation of
Jews. After 1945 Bulgaria was the only Eastern European
Communist nation to permit a liberal policy on Jewish
emigration, allowing the hulk of its Jews to emigrate to
Israel.
Many of the remaining Jews, about 7,000, hold
influential government posts associated with cultural
17
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activities, mass communications, and economics. In early
1966 the Cultural and Educational Organization of
Bulgarian Jews organized a permanent exhibition of
Jewish martyrdom throughout Europe during the days of
Nazi German hegemony. During the June 1967 Arab
Israel war Bulgaria officially supported the Arabs, but
popular sentiment, if not pro- Israeli, certainly lagged
behind the official pro -Arab stance.
Bulgarian, one of the Slavonic languages of the Indo-
European family, is the first language of some 85 of the
population and is the official and literary language. The
next most numerically significant language is Turkish,
used as a first language by the Turkish minority. Other
languages of distinctly secondary importance used by
small segments of the population include Romany
(Gypsy), Armenian, Romanian, and Sephardic (Judeo-
Spanish). The Macedonian language is officially
prohibited by the regime.
Bulgarian is written in the Cyrillic alphabet, invented
about A.D. 900 for the first writings of the Eastern
Orthodox Church. The Bulgarian language as spoken in
the ninth century was soon cast in literary form and is
known today as Old Church Slavonic, the first literary
language of the Slavic world. The orthography of
Bulgarian was reformed in 1945, when historic spelling
was abandoned in favor of a more phonetic one.
The Bulgarian language has numerous dialects, which
are usually subdivided into three main groups, based on
the pronunciation of the vowel e. In most of western
Bulgaria a is pronounced as the a in the English word
"met in the northeast a becomes "ya" as in the English
word "yard" when stressed and followed by a hard
consonant or syllable; in the southwest the same vowel is
pronouns� d "ya" in both stressed and unstressed
positions. The dialects of the northeast form the basis of
the literary language. Differences are minor, and speakers
of the various dialects have nr iil"t ulty in
understanding one another.
Russian is probably understood 1, a large numho of
Bulgarians because of s si1Nlilil N 1*hveen the wo
languages and the protmi"Ird Imrlod of Russian infliioce
in Bulgarian affairs. RI shill 11'lls Compulsory in (1 )re-
Communist educational ;~,stein stud its study ha -oven
considerably expanded by tlu Communist rgime.
Knowledge of French, German, English jJimited
but increasing. It is difficult to estiitikjtc, the }'amber of
Bulgarians having a knowledge of these languages,
although a number of secondary schools are devoted to
intensive study of them. Such schools are presumably
attended principally by young people preparing for a
career in the government services.
2. Social organization
The autonomous principality of Bulgaria that emerged
from Turkish domination in 1878 was an overwhelmingly
rural and agrarian society. The peasantry, many of whom
were small independent landowners, constituted over
90% of the population. Urban development was
extremely limited, and occupations in the few provincial
18
towns were confined to local commerce and trade,
provincial administration, and a few extractive and small
artisan industries. The industrial revolution had not yet
arrived, so an urban working class was negligible, if
identifiable at all. At the other end of the social scale was
an equally light and insignificant landed gentry. Five
hundred years of Turkish occupation had eliminated the
old boyar class; both the renegade nobles and the Greek
phanariots, who replaced the boyars, the former,
embracing Islam, owed their existence to the Turkish
suzerain they served, and, lacking all rapport with the
native population, either emigrated or faded into relative
insignificance following the removal of Turkish power.
The long restricted cultural life was marked by rural
habits and outlook. The most influential national
institution was the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which
indeed over the preceding century had provided much of
the thrust toward a Bulgarian national identity and
concept of nationhood. But the strong emotional religious
ties that helped bind the backward people together had
their darker aspects, particularly since Bulgarian
Orthodoxy and nationalism were so intertwined. If class
warfare as such was still negligible, there were the ethnic
minorities, particularly the Turks and Greeks former
oppressors �to serve as lightning rods for the frustrations
attending the painful emergence into nationhood. To a
population still over 90% illiterate, pogroms against
certain minorities provided an emotional catharsis, and,
for so late a period in Europe's history, occasionally took
on especially barbarous manifestations.
The gradual growth of the towns and cities did not
start until the early 1900's under the impetus of a
government sponsored industrialization program. A
measurable urban working class was in evidence by the
1930's, albeit one still lacking an organized sense of
purpose. At this time the growing middle class included
those in the liberal professions, industrial and commercial
entrepreneurs, army officers, and middle -level civil
servants. The small upper class embraced the royal family
and its immediate entourage, the most influential
industrialists and bankers, and a new landed gentry. The
peasantry on the eve of World War II still accounted for
some 80% of the population.
The dominant social institution of the country at the
turn of the 20th century, intimately associated with its
rural character, was the zadruga or communal multiple
family. Characteristic of all rural south Slavic societies,
the zadruga was a household composed of two or more
nuclear families, which owned, worked, and regulated
their economic livelihood communally. Such households
often included as many as 60 members. The zadruga
began to disappear with the growth of cities, the
adoption of written national codes of law, and the
development of an exchange economy; by the time of
World War II it had virtually ceased to exist.
After 1944 the Communists dispossessed the few
industrialists, financiers, large landowners, and small
businessmen; absorbed peasant landholdings into
collective farms; compelled religious and intellectual
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groups to submit to state control; outlawed political
opposition; and generally restricted social and economic
advancement to those who could be useful to the party or
who could meet Communist political requirements.
Industrial workers as it group, who with their families
now comprise about one fourth of the population, have
been highly favored by the regime, and their incomes are
almost on a par with the incomes of professionals. For a
short time in the mid- 1960's the regime allo private
artisans to operate under fewer limitations in order to
improve consumer services and the supply of consumer
goods.
As in neighboring Communist countries, the top
echelon of the social pyramid is made up of it new ruling
group of senior administrators and policymakers, nearly
all of whom are party members. A middle level,
somewhat analagous to the former middle class, is
composed of highly trained technicians and persons with
special managerial skills, middle level civil servants, and
army officers. A few former middle and upper class
entrepreneurs aril practitioners of the liberal professions,
who It Bade their peace with the regime, may today
comrr -comes and other amenities that admit them
j i0 level. Manv, however, have been displaced
the working class. The working class is
embers of the pre -World War 11 urban
f ivily augmented by new recruits trained
III tht c'riirrll1ttf schools, including large numbers of
lornlc�r In .t\mil and the displaced members of the
tcl Illc r ;j .ind elite classes. The urban working class
the object of glorification by the regime's
propagaocla. Increased material rewards, however, have
been largely reserved for outstanding workers, chiefly in
ruining and heavy industry. Such workers, in addition to
commanding relatively high wages, receive premiums
and decorations for fulfilling high production norms.
Most Bulgarian workers have, however, only it modest
level of living, and their real income has only recently
begun to show significant improvement. They have an
even more modest influence in political affairs. The
collectivized peasants, with their families, still
accounting for close to one -half of the population, are
regarded ideologically as agricultural "workers." They
are somewhat less favored by the regime, which,
nonetheless, has felt obliged to make concessions to their
traditional peasant attaclurient to private property and
the profit motivation.
Bulgarian society is more mobile than it was prior to
the Communist takeover, principally because of the
industrialization program and the attendant increased
educational opportunities. Party affiliation or active
participation in a front organization has been at times
necessary for success. But proper technical (and
ideological) training in the state schools remains
fundamental. Although ability and success on the
examination are necessary to gain access to the state's
higher educational institutions, it certain number of
students are still admitted largely on the hasis of political
attitudes or the status and connections of parents. The
children of World War 11 partisan fighters are assured
preferential treatment by hew, such as waiving certain
examinations to enter educational institutions.
Occupations requiring intellectual skills and talents
continue to be symbols of high social status.
3. National attitudes
Bulgarian attitudes have been shaped by the influence
of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, by the traditionally
peasant character of the country, by it long struggle for
national independence, and by many years of rivalry
with neighboring Balkan countries over conflicting
territorial claims.
'''6e Bulgarian Orthodox Church, to which the
majority of the people still belong, has been it traditional
symbol of independence and nationalism as well as an
important factor in shaping the peasant's morals and
conservative character. The historic alliance of religion
and nationalism presented the regime with the dilemma
of propagating atheism without creating a major popular
irritant. The Orthodox Church's role in shaping the
peasant's mentality is shown by his strong but formal
piety, tinged with superstition, and his traditional respect
for the village priest. A strong belief in the importance of
land and land ownership and a marked feeling for the
family as an institution, also characteristic of this
outlook, have proved impediments to popular acceptance
of collectivization and other initiatives by the regime.
Acquiescence in the extensive retention of private plots
and the selling of their produce in the free market have
been necessary economic concessions to these sentime
It follows that many Bulgarians are either hostile or
ambivalent toward the Communist regime. Large
numbers of defector reports attest to such attitudes,
indicating selective opposition. Most defectors approve
certain accomplishments, such as the extension of
medical and health services and the improvements in
education. The populace, however, generally resents the
many impingements on individual freedom, the attacks
on traditionally honored institutions, such as the church,
and, basic to nearly all other grievances, the rule by
arbitrary force.
The roots of nationalism are found in the achievements
of the first and Second Bulgarian Empires in early
medieval times. In modern times nationalism was further
stimulated by the Treatv of San Stefano in 1878, which
provided for the reestablishment of a large Bulgarian
state. Although this settlement was blocked by the
United Kingdom and Austria Hungary, the brief
existence of "San Stefano Bulgaria" remains for many
Bulgarians it glorious moment in history.
Attitudes toward foreign countries are largely
conditioned by the role these countries have played in
events that affected Bulg arian national aspirations. A
great deal of the good will gained by the U.S.S.R. as a
result of the Russian role in the liberation of Bulgaria
from the Turks was dissipated when postwar Soviet
control in Bulgaria became increasingly onerous. While
Sofiva's tics to Moscow remain the strongest in Eastern
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Europe, Bulgaria has recently embarked on a modest
campaign to expand ties, both economic and political,
outside the Communist world. Bulgaria sided with
Germany in both world wars in the hope of territorial
aggrandizement, and Bulgarians, especially the former
upper classes and intellectuals, have al%vays admired
German technical proficiency and cultural achievements.
Since 1965 Bulgaria has again increased its economic ties
with West Germany; political relations between the two
countries have improved, but Bulgaria, clearly under
pressure from the U.S.S.R. and East Germany. L== not yet
been prepared formally to recognize 111, i -deral
Republic.
The United States is generally admired and respected
because of its power and democratic ideals, its long
record of friendly feelings toward Bulgaria, and the
continuing favorable influence of Bulgarian emigrants to
the United States on friends and relatives in Bulgaria.
The official attitude of the Communist regime toward
the United States has fluctuated from hostile to cool. In
the relatively cordial year of 1966 Bulgaria and the
United States raised their diplomatic relations to the
ambassadorial level. Currently, U.S. relations with
Bulgaria are more limited than with most of the other
countries of Eastern Europe, but they registered a modest
improvement in 1969 and 1970.
Traditional antagonisms are among the most
important influences on polndar attitudes toward
Bulgaria's neighbors. The Turkish occupation engen-
dered animosities which have been presery d to 01'1: rlgv,
despite the political cunt iI In. vyt l7rke
and Bulgaria. tic role of th' Greeks t111rilig that
occupation �in particular tkr doninatioll of tlu�
Bulgarian church by Greek Aergy and attcniht> to
Hellenize Bulgarian eulturt- _contributed to t?:
enduring feeling of hostility towan 1;reece. Nonethr?ss
the Bulgarian regime has correct ant,f,�quent (.,,itacts
with the new Greek regime, which achieved Dower in the
April 1967 military coup in Athens, and the Bulgarian
press has been markedly restrained in its handling of the
coup and of the subsequent military leadership in Greece.
The Macedonian problem has on occasion accentuated
tensions between Greece and Bulgaria, but not to the
extent it has between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. There is
some evidence that Yugoslavia and Romania enjoy a
measure of popular support in Bulgar; for standing up to
the U.S.S.R. in recent years, but the ..ulmiration has not
changed the regime's longstanding opposition to the
Yugoslav Macedonian policy nor the traditional
suspicion of Romanian intentions in the Dobruja.
E. Manpower and labor (C)
1. Size and characteristics of the labor force
Bulgaria's labor force totaled 4,392,000 in mid -1970,
according to U.S. estimates; it accounted for about 52%
of the total population and about 76 of the population
of working age (15 -64). Although the labor force has
slowly but steadily increased in size, only since 1966 has it
20
kept pace even with the modest growth of the
population. In 1956 the labor force was 54.7% of the
population; by July 1966 :t had decreased to about 51.9%
of the population, at which point it has leveled off.
Present population trends indicate, however, that
Bulgaria can expect a slowdown in the growth rate of its
labor force and even might experience an absolute
annual decrease in the number of available able bodied
workers. The manpower situation is already becoming
critical in some areas.
Despite the rapid industrialization that has been a top
priority of the Communist regime, Bulgaria remains one
of the less industrialized countries in Europe;
approximately 37% of the economically active
population was still engaged in agricultural work as of 1
July 1970. The regime, however, has succeeded in
bringing about a substantial development of industry
since its accession to power, as is evident by the increase
in workers engaged in the nonagricultural sectors of the
economy. The proportion of all workers and employees in
nonagricultural activities increased from 23% in 1946 to
nearly 63% in 1970. Distribution of workers by broad
category of employment during the period 1948 to 1969 is
shown in Figure 18.
The largest growth in employment between F) 18 tilld
1969 was clearly in the industrial sector, amounting to
over 860,000 persons. This increment was almost one -half
the total employment increase in all nonagricultural
sectors of the economy. Within the industrial sector, the
most rapid gains were made in heavy industry, although
light industry, including food processing, had the greater
proportionate increase in employment between 1953 and
1957. Growth of employment in the industrial sector has
moderated slightly in recent years, and industry's share of
FIGURE 18. Distribution of the labor force, 1948 -69 (U /OU)
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the nonagricultural labor force fell by 02% behveen 1965
and 1969. The distribution of nonagricultural workers
among the other economic sectors has remained relatively
stable since 1948. The greatest change was registered in
the public administration sectors, a decrease of 7.3%,
while the proportion of industrial workers increased by
about 3.5 Slight decreases were also registered during
this period in communications, education, finance, and
distribution. Both the health and housing sectors
experienced a 2% gain in their share of the
nonagricultural labor force. Distribution of the socialized
nonagricultural labor force from 1948 to 1969 is shown in
Figure 19.
The number of self employed persons continues to be
small, even though greater freedom was granted to
private enterprise in the mid- 1960's in an attempt to
improve the availability of services and small consumer
goods. As a result of those measures, the ranks of the
small, private entrepreneur increased from approximately
10,000 in 1965 to nearly 26,000 in early 1967. In 1966,
according to one reliable source, private artisans
produced goods valued at approximately 4,288,000 leva,
more than doubling the value produced in 1965.
Beginning in 1968, however, decrees against speculation
and nonlabor income were clearly aimed at the successful
artisan and eroded his position through the imposition of
additional taxes and restrictions. The crackdown
continued into 1970 and was inspired, in part, by the
preference of the public for private artisans' services and
by the exodus of qualified workers from state and
cooperative enterprises in order to work privately.
The large agrarian population traditionally has been
the main source of urban labor, but in recent vears the
demand for skilled workers has outstripped the supply.
While the rural population and the natural increment of
able bodied males remain the principal reservoirs,
housewives seeking employment outside the home
provide a needed increment. In determining the
deployment of the labor reserve throughout the economy,
special attention continues to be given to technical
training to overcome shortages both of skilled workers
and of agricultural specialists who have become scarce in
some regions.
Approximately 45,000 to 50.000 voting men have been
taken annually from the labor market for induction into
military service, and about the same number have been
discharged from the military each year. Thus, although
the armed forces continually hold some 50,000 able
bodied men from the civilian manpower pool, this does
not appreciably affect the growth of the labor force,
although it may have an inhibiting effect on population
growth in general.
At the time of the last census in 1965 -the most recent
complete data available -about 95% of Bulgaria's male
population in ages 25 to 54 were economically active, a
proportion comparable to that in other Eastern European
countries. In ages 16 through 24 years, however,
employment rates were somewhat lower than in other
Eastern European countries, partly because of increased
educational opportunities; at age 65 and over they were
higher, generally reflecting the large agricultural sector of
the Bulgarian economy, where numerous older persons
continue to be employed. Employment rates for women
age 20 and older were generally high, reflecting the
Bulgarian practice of counting part -time workers in
agriculture as part of the economically active group.
Employment rates for men differ little between urban
and rural areas, but rates for women are much lower in
cities than in villages. Two factors which tend to hold
rates down are rising educational opportunities for young
people and wider pension coverage for the aged.
The female participation rate in the economy has
increased significantly in recent years. In 1956 women
accounted for 36.7% of the labor force, and by 1965 they
had increased their participation to 41.7%. Official
Bulgarian statistics claim that in 1969 women comprised
FIGURE 19. DISTRIBU'T'ION OF EMPLOYMENT IN rm.; SOC'IA1.1ZED NONAGRICULTURAL ShCTORS FOR
Shl.EC'TED YEARS,
BY BRANCH OF
ECONOMIC ACTIvrn% BY NUMBb:R AND Ph:RC[:N'I
(UIOC')
(Nur.hcrs
in thousands)
1948
1000
1065
1069
ACTIVITY
Number Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Nmnber
Percent
Industry
263.2
44.4
7118.6
48.2
953.9
48.1
1.132.1
47.9
C onstruction
64.7
10.0
160.7
10.1
224.5
11.3
284.:3
12.0
Transportation
-11.4
7.0
114.:3
9.1
152.6
7.7
182.8
7.7
Communications
12.2
2.1
25.4
1.6
27.9
1.4
31.:3
1.4
Education, culture, arts
54.2
9.1
133.8
8.4
174.4
8.8
194.4
8. 2
Public health
15.6
2.6
133.9
4.0
88.5
4.5
104.9
4.5
Finance and credits
7. ii
1.3
10.3
0.6
11.2
0.6
15.2
0.6
Administrat ion
57.8
9.7
50.2
3.1
43.7
2.2
:56.:1
2A,
Housing
13.9
1.2
411.7
2.9
63.5
.3.2
713.3
3.2
Distribution
60.4
10.:?
160 .8
10.1
200.5
10.1
221.0
9.4
Science and science services............
1 .13
0.3
14.7
0.9
21 .13
1. 1
40.2
1 .7
Other
7.3
1.2
161.11
l .0
20.2
1.0
23.:;
1.11
Total
592.9
100.0
1 595. �1
100.0
1,982.5
100.0
2,:3112.:3
100.0
Source:.Sln(isticheski Godishnik na Narodna Repuhlika Bulgariya, 1970.
4
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42.6% of the labor force; this figure undoubtedly
understates the reality, however, because it is based on
data that exclude the labor force of the collective farms,
known to be female intensive. Women have been
especially recruited for jobs in industry since 1938 and are
widely employed in such sectors us muchine building and
metal cutting, in the chemical and rubber industries, in
textiles, ready -to -wear goods, and in food processing.
Long plans call for extensive female employment
in industries connected with processing ferrous metals
and for wider employment in the chemical industry. In
1969 the percentage of women employed in various
branches of industry ranged from 21.3% of the total labor
force in electric power and steam power production to
83.3% of the textile labor force. Employment in the
socialist sector of the economy is shown in Figure 20.
The regime does not release information on
unemployment, but with its rapidly declining labor
reserves and authoritarian allocation of labor, it is
22
iploymst is
unlikely that the nation has a very large number of
unemployed. An estimate of the number of unemployed
is difficult to make, because many Bulgarians do not
register as unemployed for fear they will be pressured into
taking an undesirable position. According to one
Bulgarian source, once an offer from the unemployment
office is turned down, the worker may experience
difficulty getting working papers for a job he has
acquired on his own initiative. Therefore, individuals
often try to locate a more suitable vacancy through
private connections, after which they go to the
unemployment offices for the necessary approval slip.
The inefficiencies of the economy� especially in a
number of agricultural sectors� suggest that the economy
may he plagued by persistent underemployment.
Although the Communist regime has undertaken
centralized planning for the allocation of labor since
shortly after its accession to power, this authority was not
utilized vigorously until the late 1950's, when shortages
of trained workers became acute. The regime prefers to
rely on indirect measures to encourage tabor movement,
however, and direct coercion is not a prominent part of
the labor policy. Not surprisingly, efforts to channel
population movements have not always been wholly
successful, and have occasionally had unforeseen (and
undesirable) side effects.
Rural -urban migration, necessary for the growth of the
industrial base, was consistently encouraged during the
early years of the Communist regime. Higher wages,
increased welfare benefits, and the attractiveness of
urban life were incentive enough for this migration.
Between 1936 and 1965, according to official statistics,
almost 2% of the population annually changed its
permanent residence, and the majority of these moves
were from village to town. In the 1948 68 period about
1.7 million persons reportedly Icft the agricultural sector
of the economy, nearly all in the younger age brackets.
The migration has been at the cost of decreased
agricultural labor productivity because of the progressive
aging of the rural population, a decrease, only partly
overcome by the increase of mcchani�athn.
Migration to the city soon strained ho..sing and other
facilities in such major cities as iofiva, Plovdiv, and
Varna, a situation which in turn, caused the regime to
attempt the shift of the urban labor force to less
populated urban areas. Measures adopted have included
restrictions on settling in Sofiya and the requirement that
all higher education graduates must work for 3 years in a
place of the government's choosing. Since the early
1960's the government has followed a policy of placing
many new industrial enterprises (and relocating some
existing plants) in "underpopulated" urban areas.
During the 1960's, according to press reports, about 675
industrial plants were set up in middle -sized and small
towns. During the first 6 months of 1970, according to
official statistics, about 21 of the labor force changed its
place of employment. Movement continues especially
high among workers under the age of 30. In industries
where such turnov ,-r is deemed undesirable it is
discouraged through setting up wage differentials and
pay increases keyed to time spent in the same position.
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FIGURE 20. Employment in the socialist sector of the
economy, by branch of economic activity and sex, 1
November 1969 (U /OU)

Until the mid-1950's raw materials, tools and
machinery, and a still relatively unskilled but
numerically ample labor force were the most important
factors in production. Clearly by the 1960's skilled
workers had become the key factor in productivity.
Despite their rapid increase, the demand for skilled
workers continues to exceed the supply. Growing
shortages of trained manpower have interfered with the
fulfillment of output and investment goals in various
sectors of the economy. Data are spotty and no recent
figures are available, but the problem continues to he at
least of the same proportion, notwithstanding the
expansion of technical educational facilities. Illustrative
of the problem then were pros reports which claimed a
deficit of 66,000 qualified persons to fill 184,000 positions
requiring specialists with higher education and a shortage
of 41,000 qualified persons for 272,000 positions
requiring at least a secondary education. Additionally,
the government in early 1967 noted that in the machine
building and metal processing industries, 94,710 workers
out of a total of 123,377 did not possess a high school
education or any other kind of preliminary training.
Figure 21 gives a breakdown of the educational level of
employees in various branches of the economy.
During 1971 -75 the regime plans to train a minimum
of 250,000 qualified ,vorkers in professional schools and
to upgrade, the qualifications of 300,000 workers. A
minimum of 175,000 specialists with higher (exclusive of
university education) and specialized secondary
education is to he graduated in the 5 -year period. Fields
to he emphasized during the plan include scientific
research, draft- design, computer utilization, and
autornation of production.
Specialized vocational and technical training is
emphasized increasingly in the school system. According
to the Sixth Five Year Plan, secondary education by 197.5
5.n
0.3
1.7
1.3
4.1
19.5
1.7
36.9
15.7
17.8
1.3. 1
27.8
FIGURE 21. I:DUCATIONA1. 1.1 ?ylsl, OF ERIPLOYEES, 131' BRANCH OF h:CON0;1tIC AC'I'11'rri% IN PERCE'N'T J "OU)
AITICITY
With higher
education
1959 1961 1968
Industry
2.0.
Construction
6.9
Agriculture
2.!1
Forestry
4.0
Cransportation
1.5
Communications
1.1
Distribution
4.0
Other branches of material Industr3
43.
(lousing and communal economy
2.6
Science and science services
30.0
Education, culture, the arts
15.9
Puhhe health, social insurance, and sports
19.6
Finance, credits, and insurance
1 4.4
Administration
25.5
Other branches not contributing directly to
material
production
10.2
will be almost completely restructured on the basis of a
compulsory unified secondary polytechnical school. As
envisaged by its main proponent, party chief "Fodor
Zhivkov (who overruled educational specialists
advocating a differentiated secondary school systern), the
ne secondary school, probably to the detriment of
general education, will combine general and polytech-
nical education in order to prepare every graduate for
quick entrance into the labor force. The reform in part
attempts to overcome the strong bias among young
people against blue- collar training. The abolition of
entrance examinations for technical and professional
technical secondary schools was decreed in March 1970
to encourage more young peopl^ to become qualified
semiskilled workers.
2. Productivity and working conditions
As in neighboring Communist countries, there has
been arnple airing of labor productivity shortfalls in the
press and over the air. The indifferent labor force and an
inefficient management appear to be the prime causes of
low productivity. The regime periodically bemoans such
contributing factors as high labor turnover, nonutiliza-
tion of work time, and high absenteeism. Ancillary
factors, such as toleration of substandard production
quality, are also the subject of sporadic open criticism.
The regime endeavors to improve worker performance, as
evidenced in a year -long campaign in 1970, by
demanding greater productivity through "social
discipline" and by passing laws punishing workers for
lack of "conscientiousness."
Detailed statistical data on output per man -hour are
not available. Reliable estimates place the annual growth
rate of industrial labor productivity at almost 8% for
recent years, somewhat below official target figures. The
economic plan for 1971 forecasts labor productivity
2.4
4.3
2.3
0.1
2.1
1.2
4.6
15.6
1.9
34.4
16.9
16.3
12.0
30.5
15.5 20.0 13.8 17.2 21.5 35.5 .34.4 33.6 40.5 32.9 24.9
23
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EDUCATION
With
secondary
Without
vocational
With secondary
secondary
training
education
oducation
19:59
!964
1968
1959
14161
1968
1959
1961
1968
4.8
6.0
7.9
9.8
10.3
1 �.1
83.4
81.5
77.6
9.1
8.6
8.8
9.8
8.7
7.5
74.2
77.7
79.4
3.5
3.0
3.4
4.1
2.5
2.4
89.5
82.4
91.9
3-9
0.3
0.2
3.2
0.3
0.3
88.9
99.1
99.4
6.1
6.6
7.8
8.2
9.4
10.5
84.2
82.3
711.6
11..3
14.7
16.5
35.1
33.7
35.4
52.5
50.3
46.9
7.1
7.2
8.8
17.9
19.5
19.5
71.0
159.2
67.1
8.8
6.5
6.0
31.2
�1.7
16. .5
16.9
52.3
61.9
5.8
4.9
6.7
9.0
8.2
10.8
82X li
85.2
80.5
12.9
17.7
�?2.1
15.0
17.1
15.9
42.1
28.3
27.6
47.8
43.4
45.0
8.2
11.7
10.0
28.1
29.�
28.1
30.4
34.1
36.8
6.2
6.2
6.6
43.8
41.9
40.3
22.9
04.1
27.4
38.3
38.6
38.9
2 4.4
24.
21.7
8.2
10.�
13.6
24.9
2-5 4
28.3
41.4
36. 67.6
15.5 20.0 13.8 17.2 21.5 35.5 .34.4 33.6 40.5 32.9 24.9
23
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increases in different sectors, ranging from 2.4% for the
transportation sector to 7.91 for the construction
industry.
The Sixth Five Year Plan (1971 -75) forecasts a 55% to
605; growth in industrial production, with 70% to 80% of
this growth to be realized through increased labor
productivity. Agricultural labor productivity is slated to
increase during the same 5 -year period by 40% to 45
No estimate on tNe relative efficiency of the economic
sectors is possible, but regime spokesmen have admitted
that the gradual aging of the rural labor force has caused
a leveling off of agricultural labor productivity despite
iiiechanization.
The legal workweek for most workers ranges from 42
hours to about 48 hours. Since December 1967 Bulgaria
has been in the process of replacing the 6 -day workweek
with a 5 -day week. The transition was to have been
completed by 1970, but press reports in that year indicate
that implementation of the shorter week has made little
headway. The experimental phase of the changeover
(reduction of the workweek in Stara "Zagora and Gabrovo
districts), scheduled for completion by late 1968, had not
yet been accomplished by early 1971.
The Inspectorate for Supervision of Labor Safety, an
agency of the Council of Ministers, directly voordinates,
controls, and reports on labor safety work in the national
economy. Decrees of the inspectorate are theoretically
binding on all sectors of the economy. Safety regulations,
however, may often he compromised in an effort to attain
greater output and, therefore, are not consistently
implemented or enforced.
Wage scales are set by the central government in
conjunction with the trade unions and are used to
influence the utilization of manpower resources.
Preferential wage levels are set for certain types of needed
employment, for encouraging the acquisition of skills,
and for promoting output and productivity increases.
Prevailing average yearly wage scales are shown below in
Ieva:
Welfare benefits, notably family allowances, may
increase total family income by as much as 15% to 20%
in households with more than three children.
3. Labor relations, co :ditions, and attitudes
As in other Communist countries, trade unions serve
chiefly as instruments for carrying out the social and
economic policies of the government and party.
Specifically, the three main functions of the trade unions
are to promote the fulfillment of national economic
plans, to administer the social insurance program, ane, to
21
control the enforcement of labor laws. Labor legislation
consists almost wholly of regulations and codes designed
to subordinate the worker to the politicoeconornic
objectives of the regime. Trade unions do not represent
the interests of labor, because their leaders are actually
appointed functionaries of the party. Bulgarian labor
unions are members of the World Federation of Trade
Unions, the Communist- dominated international labor
organization.
The highest Bulgarian trade union body is the Central
Trade Union Council. A trade union congress is held
every 4 years (the most recent in early 1972) and is made
up of delegates from each of the l 1 national trade unions:
Administrative Establishments and Communal Enterprises
Agriculture
Commerce
Machine Building, Chemical and Power Plants
Mining and Metallurgy
Public Health
Construction, Building, and Woodworking
Education and Cultural Institutions
Forests and the Lumber Industry
Light and Food Processing Industry
Transportation and Communications
The trade union congress acts as a forum for critical
examination of union activities and labor productivity,
and it theoretically elects the secretariat and central
committee of the council. A-tually these officials are
"nominated" by the party, which is tantamount to
appointment. Their "election" is then staged to provide a
democratic facade. The central committee is composed of
176 full members and 56 alternate members; it meets two
to four times each year to formalize policies governing
trade union activities between congresses. The rea!
leadership of the trade union movement rests with the
secretariat of the council, which determines policies and
provides day -to -day direction and coordination of the
regional and local bodies and their activities. In a move
reflecting the regime's concern over improving the trade
union's role as an organization for channeling worker
grievances, alternate Politburo member Kostadir,
Gyaurov replaced Rosa Koritarova as chairman of the
Central Trade Union Council in the wake of the Polish
labor troubles of December 1970.
The labor policies of the regime are often represented
as emanating from the council, particularly decrees that
appear in the interest of the worker. Among these was the
June 1967 Decree on Labor Discipline and Against
Fluctuation of Labor, requiring 3- months' notice for
dismissal or resignation and providing for increased
material and moral incentives for workers. The decree
also stipulates that each worker must have a labor book
which reflects the following:
1) The worker's legal position with the enterprise of his
employment.
2) The workers acquired skills and qualifications.
3) Awards achieved by the worker.
4) Time accrued on the job or jobs for retireme-it benefits.
5) Eligibility for additior. ^1 remuneration under uninter-
rupted duration of service regulations.
6) Annual leave.
7) Any compensation received for temporary disability.
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1960
1969
Construction
1,154
1,689
Administration
950
1,649
Transportation
1,074
1,559
Scientific research
873
1,540
Industry
961
1,406
Finance and credit
810
1,340
Education
844
1,321
Trade
801
1,296
Municipal services
785
1,237
Public health
822
1,233
Welfare benefits, notably family allowances, may
increase total family income by as much as 15% to 20%
in households with more than three children.
3. Labor relations, co :ditions, and attitudes
As in other Communist countries, trade unions serve
chiefly as instruments for carrying out the social and
economic policies of the government and party.
Specifically, the three main functions of the trade unions
are to promote the fulfillment of national economic
plans, to administer the social insurance program, ane, to
21
control the enforcement of labor laws. Labor legislation
consists almost wholly of regulations and codes designed
to subordinate the worker to the politicoeconornic
objectives of the regime. Trade unions do not represent
the interests of labor, because their leaders are actually
appointed functionaries of the party. Bulgarian labor
unions are members of the World Federation of Trade
Unions, the Communist- dominated international labor
organization.
The highest Bulgarian trade union body is the Central
Trade Union Council. A trade union congress is held
every 4 years (the most recent in early 1972) and is made
up of delegates from each of the l 1 national trade unions:
Administrative Establishments and Communal Enterprises
Agriculture
Commerce
Machine Building, Chemical and Power Plants
Mining and Metallurgy
Public Health
Construction, Building, and Woodworking
Education and Cultural Institutions
Forests and the Lumber Industry
Light and Food Processing Industry
Transportation and Communications
The trade union congress acts as a forum for critical
examination of union activities and labor productivity,
and it theoretically elects the secretariat and central
committee of the council. A-tually these officials are
"nominated" by the party, which is tantamount to
appointment. Their "election" is then staged to provide a
democratic facade. The central committee is composed of
176 full members and 56 alternate members; it meets two
to four times each year to formalize policies governing
trade union activities between congresses. The rea!
leadership of the trade union movement rests with the
secretariat of the council, which determines policies and
provides day -to -day direction and coordination of the
regional and local bodies and their activities. In a move
reflecting the regime's concern over improving the trade
union's role as an organization for channeling worker
grievances, alternate Politburo member Kostadir,
Gyaurov replaced Rosa Koritarova as chairman of the
Central Trade Union Council in the wake of the Polish
labor troubles of December 1970.
The labor policies of the regime are often represented
as emanating from the council, particularly decrees that
appear in the interest of the worker. Among these was the
June 1967 Decree on Labor Discipline and Against
Fluctuation of Labor, requiring 3- months' notice for
dismissal or resignation and providing for increased
material and moral incentives for workers. The decree
also stipulates that each worker must have a labor book
which reflects the following:
1) The worker's legal position with the enterprise of his
employment.
2) The workers acquired skills and qualifications.
3) Awards achieved by the worker.
4) Time accrued on the job or jobs for retireme-it benefits.
5) Eligibility for additior. ^1 remuneration under uninter-
rupted duration of service regulations.
6) Annual leave.
7) Any compensation received for temporary disability.
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Punishments or circumstances derogatory to the worker
are not permitted in the labor hook.
Workers do not have the right to strike, but work
stoppages have been reported on several occasions.
During 1966 and early 1967 workers complained of
inadequate wages and reportedly refused to work for
short periods at the Maritsa coal mines, the State
Transport Enterprise in Ruse, and at three textile plants
in Gabrovo. In earl 1968 there were reports of work
slowdowns and work stoppages in various areas as a sign
of protest against the price rises introduced on 1 January
1968. There is no information regarding the success of
any of these stoppages in achieving the workers goals.
Worker dissatisfaction with norms, wages, or jobs has also
been expressed in absenteeism, waste, theft, malingering,
and deliberate slowdowns �all of which are punishable
by law.
Collective agreements are drawn up between the shop
council representing the workers and the enterprise
manager, and they must be approved by the appropriate
trade union and economic ministry. The agreements
serve primarily as means of mobilizing labor for the
attainment of econor r- objectives, and they differ in at
least two important respects from those drawn up in non
Communist countries. In the implementation of the
agreement, labor is represented by trade unions
controlled by the same party which controls manage-
ment, and basic points in the agreement are not subject
to bargaining. Labor disputes are normally adjudicated
by boards of arbitration appointed by the Central Trade
Union Council. These boards hear disputes over such
matters as the assignment of workers to wage classes and
grades; the adjustment of hours, leave, arid internal
transfers; arid termination of employment. Decisions of
local arbitration boards may be appealed to regional
boards, whose decisions are final.
F. Health (U /OU)
1. Health conditions and principal diseases
The level of public health in Bulgaria has steadily
improved in the past several decades, but is still one of
the lowest in Eastern Europe and significantly below the
high levels attained in Czechoslovakia and East
Germany. The rudimentary medical infrastructure
emerged relatively unscathed from World War II and
provided a solid if modest base for ensuing developments.
By 1971 the level of public health aril sanitation met
many of the needs of the population, although
deficiencies were still widespread.
Despite rapid strides in preventive health measures and
a more equitable c'istribution of medical care, congested
urban living conditions and inadequate sanitary facilities
in most rural arid in some urban areas result a lingering
high incidence of communicable diseases. The most
prevalent of these include influenza, infectious hepatitis,
dysentery, tuberculosis, arid syphilis. Serious outbreaks of
influenza occurred in 1967, and rubella flared up in 1964
aril 1969. In 1970 the Asian cholera epidemic spilled over
into Bulgaria.
Ilealth conditions in rural areas are often substantially
below those prevailing in urban renters. Despite the
government's programs in adult health education,
inattention to personal, animal, and general environmen-
tal hygiene and sanitation is still widespread among the
peasantry and has been the basic reason for keeping
animal health conditions and farm sanitation on a low
level in comparison with more advanced Western
European countries. The incidence of diseases among the
large animal population notably bovines, hogs, and
horses �is relatively high, despite increasing remedial
measures by the veterinary service. Among the prevalent
animal diseases are brucellosis in bovines, sheep, goats,
and possibly swine; foot and -mouth disease, which has
been enzootic in Bulgaria for many years; leptospirosis,
hog cholera, bovine tuberculosis; salmonellosis in all
classes of livestock; contagious agalactia in sheep arid
goats; and echinococcosis.
Notwithstanding the relative backwardness in
environmental hygiene, steady progress is reflected in the
gradual reduction or elimination of some of the more
readily controllable hazards to human health. As
indicated above, the principal killers of an earlier era
the communicable diseases �are slowly i, brought
under control. The regime has been able to reduce the
number of active cases of tuberculosis to less than one
fourth the number reported in 1944. It also claims to have
completely eliminated malaria, previously a major health
problem, and to have reduced typhus, diphtheria, and
typhoid fever to a few isolated cases. The leading causes
of death among adults are now heart disease and cancer,
just as in the more advanced West European countries.
Reflecting this progress, the death rate has declined
markedly in the postwar period, from 13.7 per 1,000
population in 1938 to 7.9 in 1961. It has fluctuated only
slightly since then, although in 1969 it jumped to 9.5
deaths per 1,000 population. The following tabulation
shows death rates per 10,000 population by the leading
causes of death:
Heart disease 3.15
Cancer 1.14
Pneumonia 0.64
Tuberculosis 0.08
Infant mortality rates are a sensitive indicator of
prevalent health levels and social well -being and provide
a valid measure for international comparisons, because
they are not affected by differences in age structure. The
marked decline of the Bulgarian rate during the two
decades following World War II reflects rising living and
health levels. Nonetheless, the Bulgarian infant mortality
rate of 30.5 per 1,000 live births in 1969 remains
relatively high, particularly when compared with rates
prevailing in the socially advanced Nordic area (average,
14:1,000), the rest of Northwest Europe (average,
18:1,000), or North America (average, ?.1:1,000).
Concomitant with the slow improvement in the infant
mortality rate in Bulgaria has been a rise in life
expectancy at birth �from 51.0 years for males and 52.5
years for females in 1937 to 69 years for males and 73
25
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years for females in 1970. The following tabulation
compares life expectancy at birth in several selected
countries:
Under the Communist regime medical care has
become readily available to more people; but, despite the
augmented number of physicians and facilities,
distribution remains uneven. As elsewhere, physicians
tend to be concentrated in urban areas. Living conditions
in large sections of rural Bulgaria, however, are so
primitive that not even the normally smaller proportion
of doctors is willing to take up residence there. Numerous
villages and provincial towns do not have sufficient
medical personnel for even minimal needs. The regime
has acknowledged that there are communities with as
many as 6,000 inhabitants served by only one physician.
The uneven distribution of medical personnel is
brought into sharp focus when account is taken of
Bulgaria's relatively strong standing in terms of the total
number of physicians available. The following tabulation
compares physician to population ratios in selected
countries:
POPULATION
PER PHYSICIAN
U.S.S.R. (1969)
MALE
FEMALE
BULGARIA (1967)
68.81
72.67
Austria (1968)
66.73
73.50
Poland (1966)
66.85
72.83
Hungary (1964)
67.0
71.83
Albania (1966)
64.9
67.0
Turkey (1966)
average 53.7
Turkey (1967)
Under the Communist regime medical care has
become readily available to more people; but, despite the
augmented number of physicians and facilities,
distribution remains uneven. As elsewhere, physicians
tend to be concentrated in urban areas. Living conditions
in large sections of rural Bulgaria, however, are so
primitive that not even the normally smaller proportion
of doctors is willing to take up residence there. Numerous
villages and provincial towns do not have sufficient
medical personnel for even minimal needs. The regime
has acknowledged that there are communities with as
many as 6,000 inhabitants served by only one physician.
The uneven distribution of medical personnel is
brought into sharp focus when account is taken of
Bulgaria's relatively strong standing in terms of the total
number of physicians available. The following tabulation
compares physician to population ratios in selected
countries:
POPULATION
PER PHYSICIAN
U.S.S.R. (1969)
435
Czechoslovakia (1967)
510
BULGARIA (1967)
570
United States (1967)
650
East Germany (1967)
650
Greece (1968)
680
Romania (1967)
690
Denmark (1967)
710
France (1966)
850
Yugoslavia (1966)
1,130
Turkey (1967)
2,760
The three medical schools at Sofiya, Plovdiv, and Varna
together annually graduate about 1,000 new physicians.
Thus, the total number of doctors in relation to
population should remain high. To assure a better
distribution, the regime has required since the late 1960's
that all medical school graduates, following their 1 -year
internship, serve 3 years in the provinces. Emphasis
continues to be given to rural placements. Doctors then
are alb: wed to return to Sofiya only if there is an opening.
Shortages of professional medical care in rural areas
have been mitigated to a large extent through the use of
Feldshers, i.e., trained medical assistants and technicians
who are competent to deal with routine treatment or
preventive health measures. In addition, most rural areas
that are far from available medical facilities and
personnel rely on the traditional system of midwives not
only in cases of childbirth but also for routine medical
care of all members of the family.
Shortages of nurses, medical assistants, and laboratory
technicians continue to be serious in some major
26
hospitals, largely because of low pay scales. In mid-1971,
for example, the Higher Medical Institute of Sofiya,
which specializes in intensive care of very serious diseases,
acknowledged a continual shortage of 70 nurses and
laboratory technicians. The institute pays lower salaries
than hospitals and has experienced a continual outflow of
personnel.
The competence of professional physicians and their
training are believed to be adequate, although
assimilated medical theory is often compromised by the
lack of specialized drugs and of modern diagnostic and
other hospital equipment. In -depth knowledge of many
recent medical advances and techniques, particularly in
surgery, anesthetics, and therapeutics, is limited.
The maldistribution of medical personnel also pertains
to hospitals. Although hospitals in urban areas have
improved markedly in the postwar period and are
probably now at least comparable to facilities in any
other East European country, those in rural areas are
undermaintained and understaffed. Reflecting a
consolidation of resources, the number of general
hospitals has decreased slightly since 1939, as the number
of available beds in these general hospitals has increased
more than fourfold. More than half of the total number
of available beds (45,000) were located in 152 general
hospitals; about 16,000 other beds were in specialized
hospitals and sanitariums (Figure 22). Many newly
constructed health facilities arc outpatient clinics or rural
first aid stations and may contain only a few beds. The
following tabulation shows the availability of medical
personnel and facilities in 1969:
PER 10,000
POPULATION
Medical doctl rs
15,406
18.2
Stomatologists
3,114
3.7
Pharmacists
2,305
2.7
Feldshers
4,862
5.7
Midwives
5,603
6.6
Nurses
24,174
28.6
Hospital beds
77,787
91.9
Medical practice and facilities, including ambulance
and other emergency transportation, are nationalized
and centrally controlled by the Ministry of Public
Health, which administers the system through
appropriate sections of the district and local government
bodies. Health services are free. Drugs dispensed by
hospitals and doctors are also free, but persons desiring
them on their own pay a modest fee. The state has
assumed all expenses for contracting, equipping, training,
and paying medical personnel, therapy, and other
services. While the system has been generally effective, it
is hindered by inadequate and uneven distribution of
resources. Moreover, sporadic and sudden drug shortages
are common.
Physicians rarely have special social status, and their
earnings from the state medical service are generally low.
Over 50% of the doctors maintain a private practice
(limited to consultations) during off -duty hours in order
to increase their incomes. According to one source, many
Bulgarians who can manage the extra cost prefer the
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FIGURE 22. Nursery for newborn in-
fants in the city of Ruse (above left);
hospital for the aged in the environs
of Sofiya, 1971 (above right); and show-
piece children's sanitarium in Sofiya,
mid- 1960's (right) (U /OU)
physicians private practice to avoid the sterile,
unfriendly atmosphere of clinics, where service is often
slow, and the patient is shuffled from one physician to
another. Most treatments, however, are provided only in
government hospitals and clinics.
The Ministry of Public Health, headquartered in
Sofiya, oversees the state health apparatus through four
major departments. The Medical Services and Preventive
Medicine Department controls hospitals and clinics as
well as the distribution of pharmaceuticals. The
Sanitation Department establishes health standards,
inspects public facilities, and approves new construction
plans. Another department administers medical institutes
and the postgraduate research center, and the fourth
department has charge of all sanitariums.
Expenditures for running the system are funded from
the public health and social insurance sections of the
annual state budget. Projections in the 1971 budget
allotted 269 million leva for the maintenance of health
facilities during the year; this figure is five times the 56
million leva spent on health in 1952. Nonetheless, since
the mid- 1950's health expenditures have averaged about
4% to 5% of the budget.
Basic medical research in microbiology, epidemiology,
immunology, and parasitology is carried out at Sofiya's
Scientific Research Institute for Epidemiology and
Microbiology, formerly the Institute of Public Health. In
addition to research, the institute is charged with the
development, production, and quality control of
biological preparations used to control infectious diseases.
The Ivan Petrovic Pavlov Advanced Medical Institute in
Plovdiv, the erstwhile Medical Academy, is responsible
for the control of epidemics throughout Bulgaria. Despite
these and other medical research institutions, research
efforts have not been significant, and scientists have few
opportunities to exchange ideas. At present, sophisticated
devices for medical treatment, such as laser beams, are
not in use.
There has been constant expansion of facilities to treat
nervous and mental disorders, reflecting improved
diagnostic techniques as well as an increase in such
diseases. These facilities are under the jurisdiction of a
special section in the Ministry of Public Health for
neurology and psychiatry, which organizes and plans
psychiatric services for the whole country. There is also an
Institute of Neurology and Psychiatry for Scientific
Research. Information on the success of handling mental
illnesses in terms of patients cured is inconclusive.
"Che network of pharmacies, the total number of which
has not been published, was scheduled to be expanded by
84 pharmacies and 118 pharmaceutical branches by
1970, according to the 5 -year plan for 1966 -70. Currently
27
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they stack oil the average of 700 to 800 different drugs
and medicines, although serious shortages often occur.
Bulgaria is able, however, to produce sufficient quantities
of vaccines, antiserums, and antibiotics to treat those
diseases for which public health authorities have
responsibility. health authorities carry out routine
countrywide immunizations for typhoid fever, cholera,
poliomyelitis, and various children's diseases. These
immunizations are free, just as are medicines distributed
in hospitals. Pharmacies charge for certain medicines,
however. The several pharmaceutical manufacturing
facilities have been combined into a single enterprise
called Pharmakhin.
Preparations for medical needs in emergency situations
appear to be fairly extensive. The Bulgarian Red Cross,
with its many local branches, coordin aes and organizes
much of the emergency medical service, although a
number of other organizations are involved in emergency
planning. General hospitals are equipped to care for
emergency situations involving large numbers of people,
including natural disaster relief and civil defense. In
preparation for emergency exigencies, hospital nursing
staffs are trained to work in all departments, and hospital
physicians serve both hospital and clinic patients. A few
hospitals are organized to deal exclusively with
emergency cases, emphasizing surgical and toxicological
procedures. One such hospital, the N.I. Pirogov Institute
for Emergency Medical Assistance, in Sofiya, has
maintained a tissue (skin, tendons, cartilage, and arteries)
bank which has served local medical facilities since 1960.
Major disaster contingency plans provide for support
by the railroad system, including the prompt dispatch of
hospital trains maintained by the military services and
staffed by military physicians. During epidemics the
military has released antibiotics and vaccines to civilian
facilities. The national blood donor program is geared to
both normal and emergency conditions. Organized,
directed, and conducted by the Bulgarian Red Cross, the
national blood collection program receives its most
important contributions from the army. Resuscitation
stations have been set up at Black Sea beaches, and the
regime claims the number of deaths from drowning has
dropped sharply because of this equipment.
A branch of the Bulgarian Red Cross, Ready for
Medical Defense (GSO), works closely with civil defense
organizations to plan and set up medical procedures for
wartime. In Sofiya, antiepidemic disease teams have
been established to identify and decontaminate
bacteriological agents and persons exposed to them. In
addition, local civil defense units would coordinate the
following services and their respective activities in time of
crisis:
1) Medical services responsible for the decontamination
of personnel, enforcement of quarantines, and the
testing of food and water.
2) Sanitary services which maintain supplies for decon-
taminating personnel and clothing.
3) Area- Equipment Decontamination Service, which adapts
vehicles and other equipment for decontamination of
streets, buildings, and equipment.
4) Veterinary Protection Service, which is in charge of
the protection of animals, farm buildings, and equip-
ment.
28
2. Food, water, and sanitation facilities
Along with the slowly rising levels of living, the diet of
the average Bulgarian has improved markedly since mid
centurv. In terms of nutritional value it approximates
that of the neighboring Romanian, although the
Bulgarian diet probably lags in both quality and variety.
Because the Bulgarian Government does not release
complete statistics on dietary norms, collateral evidence
must be used to approximate how the average citizen
fares, in terms of diet, relative to residents of other
selected countries. The daily per capita consumption of
calories in the following tabulation ranges from the best
fed countries in Europe and America to those in
neighboring East Europe and .Asia:
There are seasonal shortages of fruits and vegetables,
stemming partly from inadequate storage and
distribution facilities. Spices are also occasionally in short
supply. Meat is generally available throughout the year
in urban areas, but smaller towns and villages
particularly those removed from the areas of intensive
agricultural production chronically suffer shortages of
one type of meat or another. The emphasis placed by the
regime on increasing the production of the food industry
seems aimed principally at the fairly lucrative export
market.
Sanitary regulations for food handling have often been
ignored by meat stores and dairies, resulting in frequent
outbreaks of food poisoning involving several bacterial
agents and Trichinella. Food sold in open markets is
usually unprotected from contamination, and some
farmers use night soil to fertilize fruits and vegetables.
The requirement that restaurant, hotel, and food store
employees receive monthly physical examinations rarely
has resulted in more than superficial inspections. Aware
of the weaknesses in sanitation regulations, the Council
of Ministers in 1966 ordered the establishment of 10 new
hygiene and epidemiological institutes to complement
the 10 existing sanitation- epidemiological stations. The
goal of these institutes is to increase and improve the
quality of sanitary inspections throughout the country.
Food processing, storage, refrigeration, and daily
facilities have been far from adequate, except for fish
refrigeration facilities. Larger cities, however, do have
deepfreeze units for meats, and there are refrigeration
units for fruits and vegetables at shipping centers.
Current plans calf for a considerable increase in the
frozen food industry, particularly in the production of
frozen fruit. Modern technology, which prior to 1965 was
seldom applied in the food industry, is now apparently
being employed in many processing plants.
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CALORIES
United States
3,200
Denmark
3,150
France
3,100
Hungary
3,140
Switzerland
3,170
Austria
2,920
Greece
2,900
Romania
3,100
BULGARIA
3,200
Y ugoslavia
3,190
Turkey
3,100
There are seasonal shortages of fruits and vegetables,
stemming partly from inadequate storage and
distribution facilities. Spices are also occasionally in short
supply. Meat is generally available throughout the year
in urban areas, but smaller towns and villages
particularly those removed from the areas of intensive
agricultural production chronically suffer shortages of
one type of meat or another. The emphasis placed by the
regime on increasing the production of the food industry
seems aimed principally at the fairly lucrative export
market.
Sanitary regulations for food handling have often been
ignored by meat stores and dairies, resulting in frequent
outbreaks of food poisoning involving several bacterial
agents and Trichinella. Food sold in open markets is
usually unprotected from contamination, and some
farmers use night soil to fertilize fruits and vegetables.
The requirement that restaurant, hotel, and food store
employees receive monthly physical examinations rarely
has resulted in more than superficial inspections. Aware
of the weaknesses in sanitation regulations, the Council
of Ministers in 1966 ordered the establishment of 10 new
hygiene and epidemiological institutes to complement
the 10 existing sanitation- epidemiological stations. The
goal of these institutes is to increase and improve the
quality of sanitary inspections throughout the country.
Food processing, storage, refrigeration, and daily
facilities have been far from adequate, except for fish
refrigeration facilities. Larger cities, however, do have
deepfreeze units for meats, and there are refrigeration
units for fruits and vegetables at shipping centers.
Current plans calf for a considerable increase in the
frozen food industry, particularly in the production of
frozen fruit. Modern technology, which prior to 1965 was
seldom applied in the food industry, is now apparently
being employed in many processing plants.
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The State Health Inspectorate develops compulsory
hygiene regulations and standards and controls their
enforcement with the right to ;:lose down all enterprises
not complying with its prescribed health standards.
Previously fax inspection policies were reversed in the late
1960'x, and a vigorous inspection campaign reportedly
resulted in the firing of 4,400 service employees and the
prosecution of 22 "officials." The State Health
Inspectorate closed down 1,900 establishm -tits
temporarily and 140 permanently because of poor
hygienic conditions.
Water requirements, both drinking and industrial,
have increased greatly over the last 30 years. Demands in
Sofiya alone were 20 tithes greater in 1966 than in 1936.
Water consumption in the Black Sea area increased at a
10 r annual rate between 1955 and 1966. Despite
improvements through the construction of modern
pipelines and purification stations, however, Bulgaria's
w,,;, pply still fads short of the demand. Furthermore,
the s� t.ply of potable water has been inadequate because
of uneven precipitation, industrial pollution, and poor
sanitation practice, in the more remote areas. Regulations
and standards for hygienic protection and the expansion
of water supplies, however, have generally been observed,
while the quantity and quality of piped water and the
extent of the piped supply increased.
In 1960 about 70% of the population was served by
piped water, including all of the town population and
62% of the village population. Since World War II
Sofiya's water supply has been greatly expanded and now
includes a new water filtration plant constructed by the
French in 1966. The Sofiya water system serves 34
villages along with the capital; water is piped from the
Vitosha mountains and, to an increasing extent since the
1950's, from the Rila mountains. It is not regularly
treated with chemicals. In many rural areas water
supplies are obtained by means of stone or concrete lined
village wells. In 1961, among the 2,890 water supply
systems in 2,465 communities, only 18 (including Sofiya,
Stanke Dimitrov, Kyustendil, and Dimitrovgrad) used
water from rivers and reservoirs. Although the systems
have been expanded since that time, no figures have been
released on the number of water systems employing these
sources.
During the 1971 -75 5 -year plan, upwards of 800
million leva will be spent on constructing and upgrading
water reservoir systems. About 570 villages are slated to
receive water supply systems, and construction is to be
completed on such major water sources as the Kamchiya
and Yasna Polyana reservoirs, which will serve Varna,
Burgas, and other Black Sea resorts. By 1975 work will
also be completed on four other major reservoirs
(Yovkovtsi, Lobosh, Studena, and Srechenska Bara) and
a major complex designed to channel water from the
terrace of the Danube River to the villages of
northeastern Bulgaria. Construction of a typical village
water supply system is shown in Figure 23.
Regular checks are made for chemical and
bacteriological content, and water sources for public
supply systems are evaluated, but water inspection has
often been improperly performed, or recordings have
been falsified. Despite requirements for treatment by
sedimentation or chlorination after storms and rapid
thaws, village water supplies have often been polluted,
primarily because of the low level of sanitation. In the
summer, during the period of water shortage, water
contamination becomes a serious health problem, and
the incidence of waterborne enteric infections reaches a
peak.
Facilities for the disposal of sewage have been
inadequate in cities and larger towns, and there are no
central systems in rural areas. In Sofiya the system
permits untreated wastes to be emptied into canals or
underground storm sewers. 1'he city's streets are cleaned
regularly, and garbage is collected once a week. In
smaller cities, septic tanks, refuse pits, and open sewage
ditches are the main methods of waste disposal. 'Chere are
no known sewage farms or biological treatment plants. In
1967 sewage disposal facilities served 79 cities, 29 more
than in 1960.
Sanitation practices in the villages and rural areas
remain primitive, although the government has initiated
health education programs to encourage the use of septic
tanks and refuse pits. Usually sewage is used as fertilizer;
sewage water and irrigation water are rarely separated.
G. Welfare and social problems (U /OU)
1. Level of living
The Bulgarian level of living, although still low by
European standards, has risen steadily since 1960.
Advances have not been as great as claims by the regime
would indicate, however, and continuing priority has
been given to investments rather than to the needs of the
consumer. The growth of per capita gross national
product has far exceeded increases in per capita
consumption.
Furthermore, although per capita consumption of
consumer goods and services is on the increase, it remains
29
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FIGURE 23. The new water pipeline to provide
inside plumbing for homes in Samokov (U /OU)

far behind consumption in the advanced northwest
European countries. The level in Bulgaria is roughly
comparable to other major Balkan countries- Romania,
Yugoslavia, and Greece and is clearly superior only to
neighboring Albania and Turkey and to Spain and
Portugal to the west. The prewar level of per capita
consumption of consumer goods and services is presumed
to have been regained about 1955. Since then, per capita
vonsumption has increased by about 40 Quantities of
certain consumer items in use in selected countries are
shown in Figure 24.
According to official statistics, per capita income in
1970 was 1,062 leva, an increase of 47.7% since 1965.
During this same period, real income increased by 38.9
largely because of wage increases and only moderate
price increases. Not all incomes advanced equally in this
period, however, with collective farmers experiencing a
slightly better increase. The average household income
for collective farmers in 1969 was 3,078 leva, compared
with the 3,045 leva earned by manual and white collar
worker households. Wages accounted for only a portion
of 0- average annual household income. Sources of
iN i for both kinds of households are shown in Figure
L\
l he increased purchasing power of the average family
is illustrated by the rising consumption rate of foodstuffs,
increased expenditures for "cultural needs," and stepped
up demands for household appliances. In relation to the
cost of most goods, real wages were lower in 1955 than
before World War II but were higher in 1960 and have
steadily increased since then. Sales of consumer durables
have increased significantly during the 1960's, as shown
by the following tabulation comparing the sales of
consumer durables per 1,000 inhabitants:
The average family still spends 43% to 44% of its income
on food products, according to official sources. In 1967
the per capita expenditures on food ranged from 49% of
total expenditures for low income workers to 37% for high
income recipients. Per capita expenditures according to
income size for 1967 are shown in the following
tabulation:
As the level of living has risen, basic household
amenities are more in evidence, although still lagging far
behind those available in Western Europe. The following
tabulation lists the percentage of dwellings with such
amenities in Bulgaria and in other selected European
countries where there has been a recent census:
F IXED
INSIDE FLUSH BATHING
PLUMBING TOILETS FACILITIES ELECTRICITY
1966 United
Kingdom
1960
1969
Radios
109.9
177.3
Television sets
0.3
95.6
Washing machines
4.8
15.3
Refrigerators
0.4
16.0
Bicycles
6.3
8.4
Automobiles
0.3
2.4
The average family still spends 43% to 44% of its income
on food products, according to official sources. In 1967
the per capita expenditures on food ranged from 49% of
total expenditures for low income workers to 37% for high
income recipients. Per capita expenditures according to
income size for 1967 are shown in the following
tabulation:
As the level of living has risen, basic household
amenities are more in evidence, although still lagging far
behind those available in Western Europe. The following
tabulation lists the percentage of dwellings with such
amenities in Bulgaria and in other selected European
countries where there has been a recent census:
F IXED
INSIDE FLUSH BATHING
PLUMBING TOILETS FACILITIES ELECTRICITY
1966 United
Kingdom
LEVA
LEVA
Total 99.0
98.2
85.1
na
1965 Denmark
351 -460
PERCENT
Total 96.7
90.9
63.4
na
Urban 99.7
97.8
67.5
407
Rural 88.9
73.1
52.8
795
1968 France
997
Total expenditures
Total 91.5
53.2
48.9
98.8
Urban 96.5
63.4
57.4
99.4
Rural 79.4
28.8
28.4
97.7
1963 Hungary
Total 25.9
22.5
18.5
81.3
Urban 55.7
50.6
37.1
93.2
Rural 4.2
3.0
4.9
72.7
1965 Bulgaria
81
13.9
106
Total 28.2
11.8
8.7
94.8
Urban 55.0
25.9
18.3
98.1
Rural 7.8
1.0
1.3
92.2
1966 Romania
13
3.2
25
Total 12.3
12.2
9.6
48.6
na Data not available.
In availability of even the most basic household
appliances, Bulgaria still lags far behind most West
European countries, and is about on a par with
neighboring Romania. Thus, in 1970 about 7% of
Bulgarian households possessed either a refrigerator or a
washing machine, as compared with 80% of French
households owning a refrigerator and 55% owning a
washing machine. Vacuum cleaners, still virtually
unknown in Bulgaria, wer owned by 52% of French
households. In Bulgaria nearly all of these appliances are
available only in urban areas. Exceptions are the few
model collective farms and indusWl id villages dispersed
over the countryside.
As elsewhere in Europe, housing has been very tight
since World War I1. Remedial construction of new
housing has progressed slowly, however, because the
regime has chosen to concentrate investment in heavy
industry. Such concentration not only diverts funds that
would normally be channeled to housing construction,
but has stimulated mass migration from rural to urban
Not pertinent.
30
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LEVA
LEVA
LEVA
LEVA
351 -460
PERCENT
551 -650
PERCENT
751 -850
PERCENT
951 -1050
PERCENT
Average total income
407
600
795
997
Total expenditures
402
100
582
100
733
100
943
100
Of which:
Food
197
49.0
248
42.6
292
39.8
353
37.4
Clothing
57
14.2
81
13.9
106
14.5
125
13.3
Housing
11
2.7
20
3.4
29
4.0
39
4.1
Cultural needs
13
3.2
25
4.3
45
6.1
77
8.2
Not pertinent.
30
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r. Per JAW Persom
0 100 300 500 0 100 300 500 0 100 300 5000 100 300 500
UaRei Slabs USfg 590' 7� E ,.ri
Sweden USS3.530 x r +s`e 4. 1969
France USf3,220
East Germany USf2,120 M 1969
11.31 q
Czechoslovakia U851.970
USSR. USf1.970'
It* UIf1.830
Hungary USf1,450
Poland USf1.290 1967
Bulgaria US$ 2.170 1967
Romania USS1,140 2
Greece US$ 94 5
Yugoslavia. US$ 860
Portugal- US$ 570 1967
Turkey US$ _370 3 1
Albania USf 350 N.A. 6 5
1966
likkAdIfiX
IL )w
GNP
per uylb
l9if 1969 1969 1969 1966
FIGURE 24. Levels of living in Bulgaria and selected countries (U /OU)
FIGURE 25. SOURCES OF INCOME, IN LEVA (1.17 LEVA US81.00), FOR AVERAGE.
WORKER AND COLLECTIVE FARM HOUSEHOLDS (Lr/OU)
WORKERS
1965
Leva Percent
1969
Leva
1,860
408
259
374
144
3,045
Percent
61.1
13.4
8.5
12.3
4.7
100.0
1969
Levu Percent
Farmer remuneration
Levu
Percent
Wages
1,434
64.4
State funds
233
10.5
Private employment (part time)............
177
7.9
Private farm
268
12.0
Other
155
5.2
Total
2,227
100.0
160
COLLECTIVE FARMERS
199
6.4
1965
Leva Percent
1969
Leva
1,860
408
259
374
144
3,045
Percent
61.1
13.4
8.5
12.3
4.7
100.0
1969
Levu Percent
Farmer remuneration
1,023
45.5
1,234
40.1
Private farm
675
30.0
873
28.4
Wages (part -time industrial employment).
217
9.7
369
12.0
State funds
173
7.7
403
13.1
Other
160
7.1
199
6.4
Total
2,248
100.0
3,078
100.0
NOTE -These figures do not include invisible income, such as educational and medical benefits
31
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areas, greatly overtaxing the already inadequate housing
in the cities and towns. In recent years an average of only
5.3 dwelling units per 1,000 persons has been constructed
annually, one of the lowest rates in Eastern Europe.
Figure 26 compares housing among selected European
countries where there has been a recent census. Although
Bulgaria lags far behind prosperous northwest Europe in
housing and housing amenities, its standing is about
average for Eastern Europe. There is not yet any recent
pertinent census data on East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
and Poland; however, it is estimated that in housing
Bulgarians fare worse than the East Germans and the
Czechoslovaks and somewhat better than the Poles. In
1971 plans called for the construction of 560,000 new
dwellings, mainly apartments, by 1980, with 250,000 of
these to be built by 197 Emphasis is being placed on
greater construction by the state, slated for an increase of
80% between 1970 and 1975. The overwhelming
majority of housing starts will be in urban and industrial
areas. Figure 27 provides a view of new urban housing in
the capital city and also th more typical provincial
urban scene.
FIGURE. 213. HOUSING OCCUPANCY AND RELATIVE SIZE OF ACCOb1ODATIONS, BULGARIA AND
SELECTED COUNTRIES (UIOU)
FIGURE 27. In the larger w rps new residential con-
struction is following modern trends, as in Sofiya
(above). Veliko Turnovo (right), an ancient capital
and cultural center on the Yantra river in north
central Bulgaria, retains much of its traditional
appearance. (U /OU)
32
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AV }:RAGE
AVERAGE
PERSONS
PERCENT
AVERAGE
PERSONS PER
CATEGORY OF
PER
HOME-
PERCENT
OCCUPIED
ROOMS PER
ROOM PER
COU NTRY
1 "1..
POPULATION
IIOUSE11OLD
OWNERS
RENTERS
DWELLINGS
DWELLING
DWELLING
United Kingdom......
1966
Total.........
2.9
47.8
45.1
1.1,976,610
5.5
0.6
Denmark
1965
Total.........
2.8
44.4
49.7
no
3.5
0.8
urban........
2.6
30.21
64.3
3.2
0.9
Rural.........
3.2
81.3
10.4
4.2
0.8
Sweden
1965
Total.........
2.7
35.5
52.4
2,777,673
3.6
0.8
Urban........
2.7
25.7
59.0
3.5
0.8
Rural.........
3.0
72.5
27.5
4.0
0.7
France
1968
Total.........
3.1
44.7
48.0
15,189,980
3.4
0.9
Urban........
3.0
87.5
50.8
10,731,720
3.2
0.9
Rural.........
3.3
62.1
24.3
4,458,260
3.6
0.9
BULGARIA..........
1965
Total.........
3.2
71.0
17.1
2,019, 140
3.2
1.2
Urban........
2.9
51.9
27.9
873,672
2.4
1.4
Rural.........
3.5
90.0
6.3
1,145,468
3.4
1.1
Romania
1966
Total.........
3.2
IIR
nR
5,249,532
2.6
1.4
Hungary
1963
Total.........
2.9
64.7
55.3
2,844,000
2.3
1.5 (1960)
Urban........
2.7
37.6
62.4
1,197,800
no
no
Rural.........
3.1
84.3
15.7
1,646,200
no
Ila
nn Data not availablP.
FIGURE 27. In the larger w rps new residential con-
struction is following modern trends, as in Sofiya
(above). Veliko Turnovo (right), an ancient capital
and cultural center on the Yantra river in north
central Bulgaria, retains much of its traditional
appearance. (U /OU)
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centers, where there were 163 divorces per 10,0(9)
residents in 1969. The divorce rate has been highest in the
20- to 24 -year age group.
'I'll(- pressures arising from the shifting social structure
are exacerbated by governmental attempts to exercise
broad control over daily life. '1'hc regime must enforce the
rnanN decrees issued to form and regulate the r ew society,
and the people endlessly seek ways to circumvent controls
and to hedge against the arbitrary exercise of government
power.
Consumption of alcohol has increased for over a
decade, as illustrated by the following tabulation, which
depicts annual per capita consumption of alcoholic
beverages in liters:
1957 1968
Wine
5.5
5.04
Hard liquor
1.83
2.39
Sweet liqueurs
na
2.19
Beer
7.44
27.47
Much of the increase has occurred among young people,
including youths in secondary school, and has been tied
with the rise in juvenile delinquency.
The regime has tried hard to curb the increasing
consumption of alcohol by limiting licensed premises in
urban areas to one establishment per 1,000 inhabitants
and, since 1967, by forbidding the sale of spirits in
confectioners' shops. "Sobering -up" stations were set tip
throughout the country in the early 1960's, art(] in 1970
the government decreed alcoholism to be the subject of
compulsory treatment. Of the persons being handled by
Sofiva's "sobering -up" stations in 1969, more than 50%
were "youngsters." In April 1967 there were more than
2,500 high school sobriety clubs, enrolling some 150,000
members, scattered throughout the country.
The role: of the government is especially pervasive in
matters related to employment. Citizens are required to
carry labor books, and the government sometimes
restricts freedom to seek or to change jobs. Graduates of
secondary schools and universities are directed to
employment on leaving school and are frequently
required to work in isolated parts of the country.
Moreover, workers are subjected to continuous pressure to
meet production goals and other economic objectives by
it combination of rewards and punishments, as well as by
constant -diortations. Regimentation is imposed on
peasants in collective farms.
Controls also affect leisure time. A considerable portion
of free time is spent attending compulsory meetings of the
party, trade unions, and other mass organizations which
support the regime and which exhort the people to
greater efforts for the building of socialism." Even social
and cultural activities are arranged for indoctrination
purposes. Church attendance is discouraged by
pamphlets and speeches, pointing out fallacies and
superstitions of religious teachings, as well as by personal
intimidation. 'These attempted controls, as well as
economic changes, are contributory factors for many
social ills.
H. Religion (C)
1. Role and importance of religion
Religion played a major role in the emergence of a
peculiarly Bulgarian ethnic identity. According to
legend, Christianity carne to the country as early as 865,
when King Boris accepted the Christian faith from the
Byzantine Empire. Conforming to the more loosely
federated structure of the Eastern branch of the Christian
Church, Bulgarian believers soon came under the
mandate of a national Bulgarian church. The status of
the Bulgarian church varied over the years. Disputes
within the Eastern Orthodox Church arid the gradual
polarization of Christendom leading to the Great Schism
of 1054 directly affected the degree of autonomy enjoyed
by the Bulgarian church. It attained self- governing
patriarchate status in the 10th arid again in the 13th
centuries. Bulgaria was the center of religious and
cultural activities among all the Eastern -rite Slays,
especially in the late 10th century, partly because of the
creation of Church Slavonic (Old Bulgarian) by the two
monks Cyril and Methodius. With the Great Schism, the
Bulgarian Church identified with the patriarchate of the
Eastern Rornan Empire that broke with the Roman Sec,
arid, like them, was henceforward referred to as
"Orthodox."
Under the Ottomans the Bulgarian Orthodox Church
lost its independence and some of its Bulgarian character.
The Turkish system of religious administration allowed a
large measure of freedom, but all Orthodox churches
were subordinated to the Greek Patriarchate. The Greek
Patriarch, in turn, used the tremendous power given hire
by the Ottomans to increase Greek influence in the
Bulgarian church. Opposition to the Greek encroachment
never died out, and the struggle for an independent
Bulgarian church in the later years of 'Turkish suzerainty
provided the main rallying point for Bulgarian
nationalism and also laid the seeds of the dispute over
Macedonia. The creation of a semiautonomous
Bulgarian Orthodox Church in 1870 (largely a result of
Russian pressure on the 'Turks) led to competition for
"souls" in Macedonia mainly between Greeks arid
Bulgarians �a rivalry which has carried down to more
recent times.
During 'Turkish rule the church was the main channel
for keeping alive Bulgarian culture and history. The
Orthodox priest exercised a strong influence in village
life. In the overwhelmingly rural society the church was
the center of social life, and the organizer of the ever
popular religious holidays and festivals, which frequently
had nationalist overtones. It was during this period that a
number of church monuments were erected, most notable
of which is the Rilski Monastery (Figure 28). 'I'll(-
monastery was partly destroyed and restored several times
in the course of Bulgaria's troubled history. Most of the
buildings originally date from the 16th, 17th, and 18th
centuries and reflect strong Greek influence.
The impact of other religious faiths on Bulgaria has
been relatively minor. The Pomaks, Bulgarians who
35
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A
rr
FIGURE 28. Rilski Monastery is set deep in the mountains of
southwest Bulgaria. Originally a fortress, the medieval tower
remains in the center of the compound. The arcade aiong
the inner court is elaborately decorated with religious
4 motifs. (U /OU)
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1 L
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A
A J 1 y 4 f.
Pf
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1

adopted the Muslim faith, probably never accounted for
more than one -sixth of the population at the high point
of the 'Turkish occupation. By 193 -1 resident Muslims
constituted only 1:3.55. In the same year, which marked
the last official census report on religious affiliation,
34. 5x;- of the total population were identified as
adherents of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, 0.85 were
identified as Jewish, 0.75 were Roman Catholic, 0.4S'
were Gregorian Armenian, and 0.15 were Protestant.
Not vithstanding its infinitesimal size in Bulgaria,
Protestantism has had a significant impact. First brought
to Bulgaria in the 19th century by U.S. missionaries, it
contributed to the development of higher education and
provided publicity for Bulgaria's independence
movement. By 1971 the non Orthodox Christian
communities had shrunk considerably because of
harassment by the regime, while emigration to Israel
markedly reduced the size of the Jewish community.
As in other Communist countries, the Communist
Party, either directly or through the government, has
attempted to control all religious activities. A twofold
effort has been directed at restricting the activities of
religious institutions and at encouraging atheism among
the population. Control of churches and religious
organizations is delegated to the Committee on
Denominations, subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. This organization holds a close rein over the daily
activities of all religious institutions. The committee
approves church bylaws, clears personnel wipointments,
and screens religious publications. Additionally, the
committee is the channel for any church contacts with
foreign organizations (hence, its placement in the foreign
affairs ministry).
Official policies toward the religious communities,
aside from the general objective of neutralizing them as
potential opposition, have changed with time and with
different religions. In general, those religions conunnni-
ties ,sith strong ties i+i the Wvst (such as Roman
Catholicism and the Protestant sects) have been brutally
repressed. A more moderate policy has been taken vis-a
vis the Orthodox Church �the traditional symbol of
Bulgarian independence an(! nationalism. Religious
groups have been used to disseminate "peace 11
propaganda and to provide the illusion of religious
freedom.
In fact, religious rights are vigorously circumscribed,
and the regime has exerted considerable effort to
discourage the observance of religions ceremonies.
Intensive programs of atheist "education" have
attempted to ridicule religion as an outdated superstition
and :unscientific." A favorite tactic of the regime has
been to foster civil rituals designed to rep.ace religious
holidays, customs, aril ceremonies. Harassment of
worshipers �more violent in the early days of Communist
rule �has occurred on the main church holidays of Easter
and Christmas. The regime appears to have abandoned
the more physical aspects of harassment since 1963.
'Also called during its 25 -year existence the Committee for Religious
Affairs or the Committee on Questions of the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church and of Reirgious Cults.
Estimates of religions strength in Bulgaria are difficult
to make. Although it is likely that the majority of young
people who have grown up under the Communist regime
have little interest in religion, some young Bulgarians
occupying governmental positions aril even party posts
attend services and have a religious orientation.
However, strong religious feeling is found almost
exclusively among the older generation.
Anxious to show the diminishing influence of religion
among Bulgarians, the regime has issued statistics
showing that during; the first 18 years of Communis, rule
"nonreligious people" increased from 205 to 645 of the
total population. However, the weakness in classifying
people as "religious" and "nonreligious" is apparent
when the same report indicates that even among the
"nonreligious" certain religious ceremonies find
adherents- -thus, for at least the first two decades after
the end of World War II about 265 of the civil marriages
of "nonreligious" couples were followed by a religious
ceremony as well.
2. Bulgarian Orthodox Church
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, headed by Patriarch
Maxim (Figure 29) since the death of Kiril in early 1971,
is divided into 10 dioceses, each of which is headed by it
metropolitan, who administers an unspecified number of
church communities. Two exarchates in the United States
provide spiritual leadership for Bulgarian Orthodox
believers in North and South America and in Australia.
Church policy is formulated by the Holy Synod, which is
herided by the patriarch and is composed of the 10
metropolitans (Figure 30). The Holy Syrtod supervises the
religious and political activity of the bishops to assure
that no antiregime speeches are made from Orthodox
pulpits. The Holy Synod is nevertheless merely a formal
institution designed to preserve the illusion of Orthodox
autonomy, while in reality conforming to guidance from
the Part- Central Committee.
In the late 1940's a series of laws disestablished the
Orthodox Church as the Bulgarian national church
(although the regime continues to recognize it as
Bulgaria's "traditional church confiscating much of its
property, prohibiting its charitable activities, and forcing
it to become self supporting. Strict measures were
adopted against those who resisted, and numerous priests
and lower level church officials were arrested. All
functioning priests were dragooned into a typical
Communist mass organization, the Union of Bulgarian
Orthodox Priests.
The strained state- church relations were punctuated by
periods of open hostility until 1938, when a compromise
was reached between the two. Since that time no
Orthodox priests have been jailed, and the government
has recognized the "right" of the Bulgarian Orthodox
Church to hold services in every community with a
church. The church reportedly still retains use of a small
amount of property (perhaps 25,000 acres), receives a
yearly state subsidy of possibly 800,000 leva (1969), and
is allowed to operate a seminary and theological
academy, whose curriculum and enrollment are strictly
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FIGURE 29. Investiture of Patriarch
Maxim, 1971 (U /OU)
FIGURE 30. Organization of the Bul-
garian Orthodox Church (U /OU)
38
PATRIARCH
HOLD SYNOD
Meets twice a year to ad on the agenda
prepared by the Small Holy Synod
SMALL HOLY SYNOD*
Meets daily (in theory) ka"
rig .r t
Prepares agenda for
N Holy Synod
J y X
�T rrMSc 2jpt
W 44
Rg
rr
r s e VA- e
�lZ gaSankr b. prbv6fiv t
STAVROPIGIALNI EPARKHIYA (DIOCESE)
MONASTERIES
10 dioceses, each headed by
e Troyanski Monastery one of. the metropolitans
o Bcchkovski Monastery
Preobrazhemkiy Each diocese contains one or
Monastery more bishops and /or
archimandrates to assist
the metropolitan
ENORIYA PARISH)
'Composed of four
metropolitans on N:mierous parishes within a diocese
a rotating basis Each parish headed by a priest
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FIGURE 31. One of the most prominent Orthodox cathe-
drals in Bulgaria, the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral was
built in the early 20th century and is named for a 13th
century Russian nobleman. The cathedral is famous for its
murals by well known Russian and By %jarian painters. Its
imposing appearance is enhanced by gilt domes. (U /OU)
supervised by the government. In return, Bulgarian
Orthodoxy either supports government policies or refrains
from comment. Apparently the regime considers it
advantageous to allow a certain amount of religious life,
thereby hoping to gain increased allegiance among the
populace. The regime has allowed such symbols of past
national greatness as the beautiful Alexander Nevsky
Cathedral to be maintained (Figure 31).
Regime policies seem to be causing an inevitable
stagnation of the church. There are only 2,000 active
priests among a population of more than 8 million
persons, and a great majority are elderly men serving the
elderly rural population. Infusion of new blood into the
priesthood is slow, and in 1971 only 200 young priests
were being trained in the seminary; another 200
experienced priests were in the theological academy.
3. Religious minority groups
In 1961 the Bulgarian Government reached an
accommodation with the large Muslim minority. Up to
that time the regime had vigorously persecuted Muslims,
claiming they "inflicted serious damage on the Bulgarian
national consciousness" (the great majority of Muslims
are Turkish). The regime has since attempted to gain
suppoi from the Muslims. At public banquets.
ceremonies, and receptions Muslim leaders hawo
appeared on an equal basis with Orthodox clergy. The
situation was further eased in early 1968 by the
Bulgarian Turkish agreement permitting certain ethnic
Turks to leave Bulgaria for Turkey.
Persecution of Roman Catholics has been especially
strong, since the regime looks upon Catholic tics with the
Pope as a channel threatening the introduction of
"decadent" Western ideas into Bulgaria. Mock trials of
priests were staged in the 1940'x, and 40 leading Catholic
clergy and laymen were tried in 1952 on charges of
espionage. No new priests have been allowed to enter the
country, and practicing Catholics are excluded from all
civil service jobs, commissioned and noncommissioned
ranks in the army, the police, and important
administrative positions in industry. There are no
accurate figurev on the number of Catholics in Bulgaria.
Unlike the situation in other Eastern European
countries, anti- Seraitism has never been strong or
spontaneous in Bu;garia. Although some Bulgarians
thought it expedient to adhere to German anti Jewish
policies during World War II, Bulgaria remained the only
Axis satellite which did not allow deportation of its
Jewish population. Following the war Bulgaria was the
only Eastern European Communist country with a
consistently liberal policy on Jewish emigration to Israel,
and the bulk of the Jewish population (then estimated at
50,000 60,000) left Bulgaria. By 1966 the number of
Bulgarian Jews had shrunk to approximately 7,000. All
remaining Jews are under the control of the Central
Jewish Spiritual Council, which coordinates Jewish
activities with government policies.
Protestant minorities numbered several thousand in
1965, including Pentecostals, Seventh -day Adventists,
Baptists, Methodists, and Congregational Evangelistic
Churches. Just as in the case of Catholicism, these groups
are looked upon by the regime as a source of "bourgeois
decadence," and severely repressive measures are used to
curtail their activities.
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The antireligious stance of the Communist regime has
been one factor in the passive opposition of many
Bulgarians to the government and has particularly
offended the more religiously inclined peasant
population. At the same time, however, it does not
appear that popular religious sentiment alone presents
any serious problem for the regime, being generally
secondary to economic and political considerations.
I. Education (U /OU)
1. General
Under communism, Bulgarian education has
expanded significantly. Enrollments, teaching personnel,
and facilities have increased at most levels of the
structure. Growth has been les dramatic, however, than
may have been expected in a rural Balkan country, partly
because the system was fairly well developed at the lower
levels. Since 1939 the total number of students has
increased by 45 while the general population has
grown by 34 The prewar (1939) illiteracy rate of 25%
has been sharply reduced. By the latter 1960's the regime
claimed there were no illiterates under 50 years of age.
Accompanying measures to extend mass education have
been increased concentration on a vocational and
technical training and an infusion of significant doses of
Marxist- Leninist ideology. The increasing technical
orientation is considered excessive by outside observers
because of the present near total neglect of liberal arts.
out from the regime's viewpoint, the major deficiency of
education continues to be inability to provide the skilled
manpower so necessary for industrialization.
Great progress was made in education after Bulgaria's
liberation from Turkish suzerainty in 1878. An illiteracy
rate estimated at over 90% in 1878 was reduced to 31.4%
by 1934. Basic steps in education came even before
liberation. The first secondary school opened its doors in
Gabrovo in 1831; numerous elementary schools were
established throughout the country in the succeeding
years, enabling the Turnovo Constitution of 1878, with
some realism, to declare elementary education to be
compulsory and free. By the end of World War I the
country had an extensive system of public instruction
under the Ministr� of Public Education. Complete basic
and secondary education consisted of 12 years of
instruction divided into three segments along German
standards: 1) a 4 -year elementary school, 2) a 3 -year
progymnasium, and 3) a 5 -year gymnasium. Heavy
emphasis was placed on the humanities and the
preservation of traditional values, with relatively little
concern about the possible uses of education to solve the
problems of everyday life. Many people completed the
obligatory 4 -year elementary school, and the few who
finished all 12 years usually went on to higher education,
which hied become available with the founding of the
University of Sofiya in 1888. As the only state- sponsored
full university in Bulgaria, it grew rapidly, and by 1939
had 345 faculty members instructing 7,396 students.
During the interwar years there was a chronic surplus of
11:11
university graduates, unable to apply their learning to the
practical problems of the rural, underdeveloped country.
The government attempted to expand vocational and
technical training with little success, as Bulgarians
persisted �often at considerable financial sacrifice -in
giving their children as extensive a traditional education
as possible.
Several foreign sponsored private schools, where
instruction normally .Nas conducted in European
languages, were founded in Bulgaria. These schools
enjoyed special esteem, and the American College at
Simeonovo, supported by Protestant missionaries, was
among the leading institutions. Other major develop-
ments in education during the pre Communist years
included the founding of the Art Institute of Sofiya in
1896, and the Bulgarian State Conservatory in 1904. The
Bulgarian Academy of Arts and Sciences, formed in 1911,
incorporated a number of academic societies and
provided new impetus for original research, much of it in
agronomy, biology, and mineralogy.
By 1939 all medium -size villages had at least a 4 -year
elementary school, but some 2,000 small villages had no
school at all. Thus, about 100,000 children of elementary
school age were not attending any classes. Of those who
did attend about half went on to the 3 -year
progymnasium, and about a third of the latter number
went on to the gymnasium �a relatively large proportion
for any European country at that time. But the quality of
upper secondary education did no compare with that in
the traditional German Gymnaslen or the French lycees,
which set the pace for Europe. As noted above, technical
education was especially poorly developed, even in
relation to the inadequate West European technical
programs. Fewer than one -fifth of those in upper
secondary school pursued any technical courses, and
there was virtually no provision for university level
technical (as opposed to scientific) education.
Between the Communist takeover in 1944 and 1950 a
series of enactments established new schools, instituted,
transformed, and integrated technical programs, and
merged the courses of the elementary schools and the
progymnasium into a basic 7 -year school. The teaching
of Communist ideology became mandatory at all levels.
Virtually all textbooks were replaced, all teaching
personnel were closely checked for political loyalties, and
any "unreliable" students were barred from higher
education.
The Dimitrov Constitution of 1947 proclaimed that all
schools are "owned" by the state and impart a
curriculum that is "secular, democratic, and progressive
in spirit." Amplification of these points was provided by
the Public Education Law of September 1948, wherein
the goal of the educational system was given as the
development of "socially useful" (as defined by the state)
labor at all educational levels. The law underlined the
importance of technical specialization at the secondary
school level and stressed that ideology was to be the main
guide in all fields, most especially in literature, music, art,
and jurisprudence. A joint party government resolution
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it August 1949 dictated that education was to be
conducted in the spirit of socialism, based on Marxist
Leninist teaching, and tied to "the rich experience of the
Soviet Union." By 1949 all private schools, including
those under religious and foreign sponsorship, had either
been abolished or brought under strict state super ision.
Only an Orthodox sernivary and a theological academy
were allowed to operate.
The main tenet of educational policy, increased
vocational- technical training, has been :.pparent in
subsequent measures, which have enhanced the role of
education in economic life and the development of
national resources. The reduction of the period of basic
and secondary instruction front 12 to 11 years in 1949,
following the Soviet model, was intended to expedite the
entrance of young people into the labor force. The
deleterious effects of this measure became evident over
the next few years, and it was rescinded in 1957. The
regime attempted to cope with an acute labor shortage in
the early 1950's by establishing Schools of Labor Reserves
in 1952 to upgrade the skills of older workers. This
program was largely successful and was succeeded by an
expanded program in the early 1960'x.
Another major reform in 1959 aimed at increasing
edtt,:ation's "link with life." Largelv a copy of
Khrushchev's 1958 "polytechnicalization' efforts in the
U.S.S.R., the resulting restructuring attempted further to
harness the school system to economic goals. 'rite main
lines of the reform, which continues in effect in 1971,
included the introduction of a unified 12 -year school
called the "secondary polytechnical school" and the
lengthening of compulsory education to 8 years. The new
12 -year school replaced the existing basic school and
secondary school (gymnasium) and attempted to give its
pupils a general education plus polytechnical knowledge.
Closely following the Soviet model, an alternate
secondary stream was provided through the founding of
the technical schools.. the tekhnikumi, which offered a
more concentrated technical program at the expense of
some of the academic course work undertaken in the
gynnasia. Other more exclusively vocational and
technical schools were also founded. More "practical"
work, including on- the -job training in the factories and
in the fields, was inserted into the curriculums in all
secondary schools.
A long -term aim of the 1959 reform was to standardize
all secondary schools leading to Higher education, with
approximately the same division of effort among
academic subjects, technical subjects, and on -the -job
training; only the nature of the technical training and the
supporting academic work was to vary. In this connection
the new tekhnikumi were gradually to set the pattern. In
1971, however, secondary schools were stili specializing in
varying degrees, and the gymnasitim continued to be
very much a part of the system. But the program of
polytechnicalization" has had its effects in the
gymnasia a:: in the tekhnikumi, often to the detriment of
a broader university- preparatory education. Proposals by
Bulgarian educators in 1967 professed concern for
practical training, but in reality pressed for the
curtailment of the excessive "practical" emphasis and
called for it more highly differentiated secondary school
systern reincorporating more humanities.
Contrary to the advice of educational experts, Premier
Todor Zhivkov proposed in July 1969 to reduce again the
period of school attendance. lie urged that a 10 -year
"unified secondary pulytechnictd school" be created to
replace all existing basic and secondary schools. As
envisaged by Zhivkov, the proposal would merge general
education and practical work into one standard
curriculum,. Zliivkov added that these 10 -year schools
should be trade compulsory, thereby qualifying all
young people to enter the labor force at about age 16.
Details of Zhivkov's reform and the progress toward its
implementation are surrounded by ambiguities. The
directives of the Sixth Five year Plan (1971 -75) call for
"gradually" reforming secondary education on the basis
of the new "unified secondary polytechnical school,"
presumably by 1975. Plans also call for almost complete
transition to compulsory secondary education by 1975
and project that 85% of basic school graduates in 1975
will be enrolled in secondary schools that prepare for
some form of advanced technical or higher education.
The overzealous nature of Zhivkov's proposals precludes
their implementation in the near future, and hints at a
slowdown in the timing were clearly evident in 1971. At
that time it was revealed that the 10 -year school was not
to be tested until 1974, and that some thought is being
given to the establishment of a supplementary grade 11,
designed to prepare students for higher education
entrance examinations.
Of the 1,538,000 students in 1969/70 (excluding
16,942 students in schools for the handicapped), about
95,000 persons were enrolled in evening or correspond-
ence courses. The number of schools in 1969/70, their
.,nrollment, and educational level were as follows:
SCHOOLS PUPILS
P.imary course grades I -IV)
1,437
539,772
Progymnasiurn course grades V -VII)
97
524,428
Gymnasium grades VIII -XI)
137
102,795
Vocational technical schools
147
53,482
Secondary vocational technical schools..
184
68,163
Tekhnikumi
255
153,248
Postsecondary institutions
20
10,031
Higher education
26
85,675
Total
2,303
1,537,594
'rite gymnasia and tekhnikumi prepare students for
admission to institutions of higher education. Various
degrees of additional vocational technical and
professional training at the secondary level are provided
by the vocational technical and secondary vocational
technical schools and teklinikunri. Postsecondary
institutions train teachers of the elementary course (first
four grades) of the basic school, and normally require
matriculation from the gyninasitun or t1w tekhnikum.'
-'Since public education in Bulgaria continues to he patterned closely
after the Soviet model, attention is invited to the comprehensive
U.S.S.R. General Survey, which includes a detailed discussion of
education in that country.
41
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While the quality of education has been compromised
by excessive concentration on practical training as well as
Communist ideology, and in any event never measured
up to the quality obtaining in most of Western Europe,
Bulgaria has made remarkable progress in providing
schooling for the masses of people. Compulsory primary
schooling, at least through the fourth grade, is now
universally enforced, with 99� %0 of young students
completing the first 4 years of the basic 8 -year school in
1969, and 80% completing the full 8 years. Over 60%
remain in some stream of formal education until the age
of 18. The :Alowing tabulation shows the percentage of
students completing upper secondary (university
preparatory) education in 1969 in nations that have
made the most progress toward mass education through
the secondary level:
United States ..........................'55
Canada
40
U.S.S.R
est 30
BULGARIA
26
Japan
20
Sweden
19
Norway
19
France
18
Among the weaknesses in the quality of education,
over and above the neglect of the liberal arts and social
sciences, are the inordinate attention given to political
indoctrination, inadequate training and improper
assignment of teachers, and the revision of textbooks to
comply with Communist ideological concepts. The
subordination of traditional intellectual inquiry to
unquestioned acceptance of Communist dogma has led
not only to open criticism of Bulgarian education, but
also to the as yet unresolved dilemma of two value
systems in conflict �the traditional versus the
Communist. Furthermore, despite repeated reforms and
reorganizations, Bulgarian education is heavily
unbalanced. Not only is there now almost complete
neglect of the humanities, but a whole generation is
without even an elementary idea of the development of
art and literature in the 20th century, as well as current
intellectual trends in the West.
The task of educating minority groups is also difficult.
In principle, the regime holds that minorities should have
the opportunity to acquire an education in their
language, and it asserts that educational opportunities for
minorities (specifically, the Turks) have been steadily
broadened. In practice, however, the Bulgarian press
frequently stresses the efforts made by the regime to
educate the Turks in the "Marxist-Leninist manner" and
"to incorporate" (i.e., Bulgariae) them. In this respect,
since the mid- 1960's nearly 6,000 Turkish Bulgarian
women have been trained in the schools for women
activists of the Fatherland Front. Such efforts to inculcate
materialistic and neoscientific tenets in the predom-
inantly Muslim Turks have met with stubborn resistance.
According to Article 43 of the Constitution, all
Bulgarian citizens have a right to free education in all
types and levels of educational establishments "under
42
conditions defined by law." In aetc:tl practice, however,
children whose parents have been labeled as disloyal and
students whose political loyalty is in doubt are often
denied an education beyond the 8 -year basic school level.
Admission to higher educational institutions is governed
by an elaborate set of regulations and quotas, and
preference is given to loyal subjects. A tough examination
system further restricts entrance into higher education; in
1970/71 fewer than one -fifth of the 67,000 applicants
gained entrance on a full -time basis.
With the exception of some preschool training,
education is provided free of charge. Additionally,
scholarships are provided for about 30% of the students at
higher educational institutions and about 15% of the
students in various secondary technical- vocational
schools. 'These stipends help pay for room, board, and
other expenses.
Administration of education is completely within the
jurisdiction of the government, making it ultimately
subject to the direction and control of the B ilgarian
Communist Party. The party, in turn, defines thu goals
and character of education to meet the needs of the state.
With the exception of higher education, which is
supervised by the ministerial -level Committee for
Science, Technical Progress, and Higher Education,
much of the educational system is under the specific
purview of the Ministry of National Education.
Exceptions to this generally include military service
schools and certain secondary professional and technical
schools, including some teknikumi, which because of
their special character or the regime's economic goals,
have been subordinated to other relevant ministries or
enterprises. At the local level, education departments of
the executive committees of people's councils (units of
local government) serve as local offices of the Ministry of
National Education and exercise immediate supervision
over the schools in their areas which are under the
jurisdiction of the ministry.
In conformity with the overall goals of the national
economic plans, the educational system is financed by
allotments from the state budget. Between 1952 and 1962
annual educational expenditures rose from 107 million
leva to 245 million leva, with the 1971 allocation calling
for an expenditure of 491 million leva. Although the
money allocated to education has increased greatly since
1952, the proportion in relation to total expenditures for
social and cultural measures has declined from 37% in
1952 to 35% in 1962 and to a projected 26% in 1971. This
decline reflects the completion in the 1960's of much of
the physical plant of the greatly expanded system and the
lack of demographic growth. Since the 1965/66 academic
year the student population has declined; whereas in
1965 there were 1,981 students per 10,000 population, in
1969/70 there were only 1,837 per 10,000 population. It
should be noted that 26% of national expenditures is still
a large proportion to allocate to education, comparing
favorably with proportions so allocated in the most
socially advanead countries of northwest Europe.
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2. Educational system
The educational system, still based in large measure on
the reform of 1959, is divided into five stages: preschool,
general 8 -year, secondary, postsecondary, and higher
education (Figure 32). Preschool education is provided it!
half -day, all -day, and seasonal kindergartens for children
in the 3 -7 years age group. Child care in the half -day
schools is free, while tuition varies in the other two
institutions according to the size and income of the
family. Half -day kindergartens prepare 6- year -olcl
children for admittance the following year to elementary
school. About 50 of the children entering compulsory
schooling have received training in the half -clay
kindergartens. All -clay kindergartens care for children of
working mothers, and some of these schools even board
children whose mothers must work at night. Seasonal
kindergartens exist in rural areas for children whose
mothers engage in such work as harvesting. In 1969,
about 67% of all preschool age children were enrolled in
some type of kindergarten.
An obligatory 8 years of general education for children
(ages 7 -14) is conducted in separate elementary (grades 1-
and intermediate (grades 5 -8) schools, in unified 8 -year
schools (grades 1 -8), and in the first eight grades of the
secondary polytechnical schools (grades 1- 11/12). These
schools provide the pupils with the basic elements of
academic, ideological, moral, and physical education.
After completing the compulsory 8 years of basic
education, normally at age 14, a student may continue at
the secondary level for 4 years.
The secondary school system, which has been the
object of much attention in ree -m years, is comprised of
the secondary polytechnical schools, the technical schools
(tekhnikunii), the vocational- technical schools, and the
secondary vocational technical schools. General
education, oriented toward preparation for higher
education, is provided in the secondary polytechnical
schools' final four grades �often still called by their old
name, gyn:nasiums. Tekhnikumi offer 4- to 5 -year
courses for pupils with a basic 8 -year education, and 1- to
2 -year courses to students who have completed 12 years
of education. 'These technical schools train supervisors
and skilled workers, and graduates receive the title of
"certified technician (secondary)." Some academic work
is included in the curriculum and graduates are eligible
for study in higher educational institutions. Vocational
technical schools offer 1- to 3 -year programs of vocational
training leading to the title of "skilled workmen." These
schools are often attached to plants, enterprises, state
farms, or tekhnikumi.
Vocational technical schools that have been upgraded
by increasing the academic instruction in the curriculum
are called secondary vocational technical schools.
Graduates of these more diversified schools� unlike
students in fliv other vocational- technical schools �are
eligible for higher education. The so- called postsecondary
educational institutions, created in 1960, offer 2- to 3-
year courses beyond the secondary school, and for the
most part prepare their students to teach the first four
grades in the educational system. Programs for school
librarians have recently been added to these institutions.
Higher education courses are from 4 to 5 years in most
fields except medicine, which requires 6 years. Applicants
to higher educational institutions must be secondary
school graduates and compete for admission in a written
entrance examination on a proposed area of specializa-
tion. All males, as of September 1970, must complete
service in the armed forces or the construction troops
before pursuing higher education, unless their enrollment
is completed before the age of 18. Graduates of higher
education usually are obligated to work for at least 3
years wherever assigned by the government.
Admission to higher educational institutions is highly
competitive and is subject to a differentiated quota
system. Applicants outnumber successful candidates by
almost four to one. For example, in the 1970/71
academic year, about 67,000 persons applied for
admission to higher educational institutions, but only
17,500 students were accepted. Of this number, only
13,000 were full -time students, the remainder attending
correspondence courses. In 1970 about half the
applicants failed the entrance examinations. Another
fourth was eliminated through the operation of a quota
system.
The quota system governing entrance into a university
level course of study is proclaimed by government decree
every year prior to the nationwide examinations. The
system is used by the regime to give preference to certain
applicants; it is complicated and subject to yearly
changes, but several examples will illustrate its thrust. In
1969 regulations prescribed that male students must
comprise 30% of Sofiya University's student body, and
that 20% of the available slots in all higher education
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FIGURE 32. Educational system (U /OU)

specialties were to be rese- rA for males who had
completed their military ser. c. Candidates whose
parents perished in the "anti- Fascist struggle" are
granted admission without having to undergo
examination, and the children of "active fighters against
fascism" compete only among themselves for a certain
number of slots.
Higher education is provided in 26 institutions
throughout the country and since July 1971 has been
controlled by the "public- state" Committee for Science,
Technical Progress, and Higher Education. The
University of Sofiya (Figure 33), the oldest of the three
universities, provided education in 1967/68 for 8,000
full -time students distributed among nine faculties
(Figure 34). During 1971/72 two new state universities
were founded: the "Cyril and Methodius" University in
Veliko Turnovo and the "Palsy Khilendarski" University
in Plovdiv. Among the other institutions of higher
education are the Bulgarian State Conservatory and the
Institute of Art in Sofiya, two agricultural institutes, three
institutes for economic study, three medical institutes,
and a number of industrial technological institutes.
Study programs are narrow and extremely specialized,
with curriculums closely paralleling those of higher
education in the Soviet Union. The end result is a high
degree of competence in a narrow field, with consequent
lack of flexibility. Courses in Communist political and
44
FIGURE 34. STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY OF SOFIYA,
BY ACADEMIC FACULTY, 1967/68 (U /OU)
economic theory and practice and the history of the
Bulgarian Communist Party are required of all students.
At the end of his last year of college a student is required
to demonstrate his competence by solving difficult
problems in his narrow specialty. These tests are
demanding and do not equip the student to cope with the
broader spectrum of problems he will later encounter in
his field.
Higher education is free, and the state, along with
some economic enterprises, provides scholarships to help
defray living expenses. In the 1969 /70 academic year
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FIGURE 33. University of Sofiya "Kliment Okhrid" (U /OU)
PART
REGULAR
TIME
TOTAL
Philosophy /history............
604
796
1,400
Slavic philology
988
846
1,834
Western philology
1,292
390
1,682
Mathematics
1,017
402
1,419
Physic.;
1,129
247
1,376
Chemistry
1,304
698
2,002
Biology
647
397
1,044
Geology/geography.
354
248
602
Law
665
1,012
1,677
Total
8,000
5,036
13,036
economic theory and practice and the history of the
Bulgarian Communist Party are required of all students.
At the end of his last year of college a student is required
to demonstrate his competence by solving difficult
problems in his narrow specialty. These tests are
demanding and do not equip the student to cope with the
broader spectrum of problems he will later encounter in
his field.
Higher education is free, and the state, along with
some economic enterprises, provides scholarships to help
defray living expenses. In the 1969 /70 academic year
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FIGURE 33. University of Sofiya "Kliment Okhrid" (U /OU)

"3% of full -time students reportedly received scholar-
ships, and since 1968 the state scholarship fund has
dispensed about 2 million leva annually. State
scholarships are distributed largely on the hasis of need
(recipients must, however, maintain a certain grade
average), but all students who attain excellent grades
receive stipends, rega of their personal finances.
Economic enterprises, since 1965, have been allowed to
finance students, but graduates are then obligated to
work in the sponsoring enterprise for 6 years. Other
student benefits include low -cost hoasing and eating
facilities, use of rest camps, and reduced travel cha -ges
during vacation periods. Shortages of housing And the
quality of student cafeterias have come in for much
criticism.
Bulgarian is the official language of the school system,
but several other languages are widely taught. "Turkish
minorities have a right, enshrined in Article 43 of the
Constitution, to study Turkish, but concurrently must
undertake study of Bulgarian. Compulsory Russian
language training begins in the fifth grade and continues
into the higher educational levels. English and French
rank next to Russian in importance, and German, Italian,
Spanish, and Czech are, for the most part, readily
accessible to all qualified students. Concentrating on
developing language fluency, Bulgaria has a number of
secondary schools using foreign languages as a medium of
instruction. There are seven such scnvols using English,
three using French, at least two using German, and
several using Russian.
Adult education, which initially played a major role in
reducing illiteracy and then in upgrading the skills of the
labor force, started in earnest in 1952, when the
Communist regime established labor reserve schools.
These schools, from 6 months to a year in duration.,
provided the older generation with new industrial skills
and required only 4 years of primary schools for
admission. The scope of the adult education program has
expanded in recent years, and in theory higher
educational work can be completed in evening schools of
correspondence courses. According to the law on higher
education in 1953, a university education can be
completed in 7 years by correspondence courses. In the
1969/70 academic year, about 95,000 persons at all levels
out of a total school enrollment of 1.5 million were
enrolled in evening and correspondence courses.
Enrollment in part -time education courses has declined
slightly in recent years, as shown by the following
tabulation giving combined evening and correspondence
course enrollment by school level:
3. Foreign students
According to official figures, Bulgarian higher
educational institutions in the 1970/71 academic year
were atttended by 3,342 foreign students from 92
countries of the world. Among these students were 700
from North Vietnam, 550 from Syria, 230 from Sudan,
170 from Iraq, and 100 from Nigeria.
While Bulgarian higher educational establishments
have played an active role in providing educational
facilities for students f-om less developed countries,
particularly from Africa, foreign students have presented
special problems with both racial and ideological
overtones. The difficulty has centered or: the reluctance
of a large number of these students to accept Communist
indoctrination. In addition, both Bulgarian student and
popular attitudes toward Africans studying in Bulgaria
have generally been hostile. The main sources of this
hostility appear to be resentment by Bulgarian students
of the higher stipend given the Africans, the language
harrier, and racial animosity stemming in part from the
attention shown Bulgarian girls by African students.
Recently the regime found it necessary to establish a
special school which foreign students would attend for
the first year. This school is designed to help these
students make the adjustment to normal university life
and thus to minimize the cultural conflict between
foreign (particularly African) and Bulgarian students.
Numerous African students have resisted Communist
indoctrination and have complained about Bulgaria's
low academic standards, inadequate language instruc-
tion, and the generally poor treatment they have
received. Despite these problems, the number of foreign
students rose from an estimated 1,500 in 1962 to more
than 3,000 in 1970.
4. Extracurricular student activities
The regime attempts to control and organize all
extracurricular student activity. No politically independ-
ent student organizations have been allowed, and all
student and youth groups are under the supervision and
"coordination" of the Committee for Youth and Sport, a
"state public" organ of subministerial rank formed in
early 1968. The main instrument for organizing the
students' free time is the Dimitrov Communist Youth
Union (DKMS), more commonly called the Komsomol.
Other organizations also active include the Bulgarian
Union for Physical Culture and Sports and the Tourist
Unions. The Voluntary Organization for Cooperation in
Defense (DOSO), formed in 1951 to direct the
paramilitary training of youth, was abolished in early
1968, and its functions have been assumed largely by the
Komsomol.
The Komsomol enlists young people 14 to 28 years of
age in a variety of social, academic, sports, and political
activities. Its two junior organizations �the Pioneer and
Chavdarcheta organizations �arc closely tied to the basic
school system. The Dimitrov Pioneer Organization
(Young Septembrists) provides school children (ages 9 -13)
with organized recreation and work experience to
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1966/67
1968/69
1969/70
Seconda,v-polytechnicalscLools
(at all levels)
29,520
23,589
21,800
Vocational- technical schools
367
251
174
Secondary vocational technical
schools
472
1,315
Technical schools and schools
of art)
61,604
51,716
48,194
Postsecondary institutions
1,403
1,053
1,063
Higher education
25,484
22,768
23,308
Total
118,378
99,849
95,854
3. Foreign students
According to official figures, Bulgarian higher
educational institutions in the 1970/71 academic year
were atttended by 3,342 foreign students from 92
countries of the world. Among these students were 700
from North Vietnam, 550 from Syria, 230 from Sudan,
170 from Iraq, and 100 from Nigeria.
While Bulgarian higher educational establishments
have played an active role in providing educational
facilities for students f-om less developed countries,
particularly from Africa, foreign students have presented
special problems with both racial and ideological
overtones. The difficulty has centered or: the reluctance
of a large number of these students to accept Communist
indoctrination. In addition, both Bulgarian student and
popular attitudes toward Africans studying in Bulgaria
have generally been hostile. The main sources of this
hostility appear to be resentment by Bulgarian students
of the higher stipend given the Africans, the language
harrier, and racial animosity stemming in part from the
attention shown Bulgarian girls by African students.
Recently the regime found it necessary to establish a
special school which foreign students would attend for
the first year. This school is designed to help these
students make the adjustment to normal university life
and thus to minimize the cultural conflict between
foreign (particularly African) and Bulgarian students.
Numerous African students have resisted Communist
indoctrination and have complained about Bulgaria's
low academic standards, inadequate language instruc-
tion, and the generally poor treatment they have
received. Despite these problems, the number of foreign
students rose from an estimated 1,500 in 1962 to more
than 3,000 in 1970.
4. Extracurricular student activities
The regime attempts to control and organize all
extracurricular student activity. No politically independ-
ent student organizations have been allowed, and all
student and youth groups are under the supervision and
"coordination" of the Committee for Youth and Sport, a
"state public" organ of subministerial rank formed in
early 1968. The main instrument for organizing the
students' free time is the Dimitrov Communist Youth
Union (DKMS), more commonly called the Komsomol.
Other organizations also active include the Bulgarian
Union for Physical Culture and Sports and the Tourist
Unions. The Voluntary Organization for Cooperation in
Defense (DOSO), formed in 1951 to direct the
paramilitary training of youth, was abolished in early
1968, and its functions have been assumed largely by the
Komsomol.
The Komsomol enlists young people 14 to 28 years of
age in a variety of social, academic, sports, and political
activities. Its two junior organizations �the Pioneer and
Chavdarcheta organizations �arc closely tied to the basic
school system. The Dimitrov Pioneer Organization
(Young Septembrists) provides school children (ages 9 -13)
with organized recreation and work experience to
45
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supplement the formal academic program, while the
Chavdarcheta plans activities for children in the first 2
years of basic school (ages 7 and 8).
The feces of Komsomol activities shifts with the party's
different campaign programs especially in the junior
organizations, which are more closely connected with the
basic educational system. Since early 1968 particular
emphasis has been placed on scientific technical training
and on military and patriotic education. The Station of
Young Technicians, organized by the Komi and
patterned after a similar Soviet institution, uses a variety
of methods including pamphlets, traveling exhibits, and
national competitions, to stimulate scientific- technical
awareness. Its most publicized activity is the annual
nationwide Mathematical Olympiad, a competition
which leads to an "international Olympiad" held
annually in the U.S.S.R. fu all national Eastern
European winners. Studentska T,?.buna and Narodna
Mladezh, publications of the Komsomol central
committee, carry articies on current programs and
campaigns for student youth.
J. Artistic and cultural expression (U /OU)
Prior to the 500 or so years of Turkish rule, which
greatly inhibited the development of an indigenous
culture, the Bulgarians had produced some artistic
artifacts rivaling those of their neighbors. The early
influence of Byzantium stimulated indigenous trends to
make Bulgaria, for brief periods, a cultural center in its
own tight, especially under Tsars Simeon (893 -927),
Samuel (976 1014). and Ivan Asen II (1218 -41). Under
Simeon the newly created Glagolithic alphabet (invented
by the brothers Cyril and Methodius) was perfected into
Church Slavonic, subsequently the literary language of
most Slavic countries for centuries.
Cultural expression under the Turks was confined
mainly to written literature, and significant develop-
ments were few until the 18th century. Early nationalist
writings produced while Bulgaria was still under the
"Turkish yoke had at least spotty literary merit and were
very instrumental in sparking the will to independence.
Artistic and literary attainment from the liberation until
the Communist takeover was again sporadic and
inconsistent. Written literature remained the main field
of accomplishment, although the theater and various art
forms experienced some growth. Cultural developments
were notable for their gradual disengagement from the
church. Folk culture continued to be strong, as the
country was still overwhelmingly rural.
Under the Communists, all art and culture have been
subject to Communist cultural theories, foremost of
which is the concept of "socialist realism." The
restrictions of this concept have, of course, been felt most
heavily in literature because of the easier censorship of
this art form. Other forms have not been exempted from
control and criticism, however.
Although the general approach to culture has been one
of tight control, cultural policies have shifted, since they
are c'csely intertwined with party politics and often
46
related to other domestic policies. Two liberalizing
movements, in 1956 and in 1961 -62, highlighted
Bulgaria's otherwise rigid control of cultural activity since
1944. These shortlived moments of "liberation" were
!nought to an abrupt end, when the party became
alarmed by the extent to which writers used their freedom
to criticize the regime. In both cases controls were
reinstated, giving rise to a general mood w cynicism and
frustration among she intelligentsia.
Some casing of cultural restrictions in 1966 proved
short lived, and the party's strict policy has presumably
continued, although it only periodically becomes visible.
Since 1968 high -level attacks have been made on literary
satirists, playwrights and dramatists, and cinematog-
raphers. Premier Todor Zhivkov in March 1969 was
strongly critical of writers who use their craft to serve
bourgeois ideals and values rather than to build the new
socialist man.
Final authority in cultural affairs rests with the
Comme :ist Partv and its Commission on Ideological and
Cultural Questions. The highest governmental body in
the cultural field is the 25 -year old Committee for Art
and Culture, a "state- public" organ of ministerial rank.
Reorganized five times in its history, the committee has
branches in all Bulgarian towns and large villages. In
March 1970 the committee was expanded by the
addition of the Cultural Policy Department, whose task is
the long -range application of party policy in all cultural
spheres.
1. Literature
The oral literary tradition, in Bulgaria as in other
Balkan countries, is rich in themes and material and has
been a basic swirce of inspiration for all branches of
modern creative art. Such folk literature, entirely
committed to print by the 19th centur-, displays
characteristic lyric and epic qualities. It includes a variety
of legends, heroic deeds, ballads, songs, proverbs, and
riddles. While flourishing throughout Bulgaria, certain
genres have been associated with specific geographic
regions. Thus, epic poetry developed especially in the
southwestern regions. The most famous epics concern
Krali Marko, who ruled 14th century Macedonia and
successfully challenged the Turkish hegemony. On the
other hand, love songs appeared most frequently in the
central part of Bulgaria and portray the everyday life of
the countryside. Songs associated with Christian
ceremonies also flourished mainly in central Bulgaria.
Tales of the haidriks, Bulgarian Robin Hoods, who waged
partisan warfare against the Turks, were widespread and
have been popularized under the Communist regime as
part of an official "nationalism" program.
Early written Bulgarian literature was almost
exclusively religious and consisted for the most part of
church chronicles, and translations or adaptations of
foreign works. Activity vas especially intense during the
'golden age" of King Simeon I in the 10th century and
during a literary revival centered on Turnovo in the late
14th century.
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Much housing is financed entirely or partly by private
funds. In 1969, of 47,900 dwelling units built, almost
32,000 were constructed with 1_..vate funds. A large part
of the funds for housing construction comes from private
savings, although bank loans have increasingly become
available. In rural regions the peasants themselves do
most of the work during slack seasons, using local
building materials. Faced with rising costs and the failure
o past policies to alleviate the housing shortage, the
Council of Ministers in July 1966 issued a decree
providing :or new specific remedial measures. New
factories are to be opened for the production of
construction material, state and cooperative housing is to
be expanded, and bank loans for private housing are to
be given priority treatment. The regime has further
instituted economic incentives for young people to enter
the construction business.
Bulgaria has recently followed the example set in
Poland and Czechoslovakia in encouraging private home
ownership through attractive financing plans. The state
has substantially reduced, and in some cases eliminated,
the required down payment for the purchase of "state
apartments i.e., apartments built before 1964 by the
now defunct housing councils. The price for a small
apartment, which usually does not have a private bath or
kitchen, is between 7,000 and 9,000 leva. A typical rural
dwelling, often surrounded by a fenced -in yard
containing a vegetable garden, is made of brick or
plaster, has three or four large rooms, and is modestly
furnishe.'i. In addition, mud cottages with thatched roofs
can still !;e seen in the countryside.
2. Social programs
The regime places great emphasis on various social
welfare programs as a means of raising overall levels of
living and equalizing the distribution of income. The
Communist leadership is further aware that the elaborate
social security system enjoys wide popular support. 'Che
social security system, desigi-3ted social insurance by the
regime, is modeled on that of the U.S.S.R. and is one of
the most inclusive systems in Eastern Europe. The system
was first codified in 1951 in Part III of the Bulgarian
Labor Code. The recodification which occurred in 1958
has been supplemented by several decrees that broadened
the coverages of the system and increased pensions and
other benefits. Welfare work by religious institutions or
other private organizations is not permitted.
The social security system includes old age and
disability pensions for all civilian workers and military
personnel, payments for temporary disability (illness,
accident, and maternity leave), and burial and maternity
payments. The system also provides for the upkeep of a
variety of rest homes and sanitariums for disabled,
mentally ill, and mentally retarded persons, and
provides, free of charge, orthopedic and prosthetic
appliances and similar aids, as well as many
pharmaceuticals dispensed by state physicians.
Moreover, trade unions and most large enterprises run
holiday and rest homes for their members and employees.
Such establishments often provide their service entirely
free of charge but may levy a very nominal fee. Homes
for the aged are numerous, and local government welfare
authorities also give old people cash grants either in lump
sums or as periodic payments.
In accordance with Communist doctrine that
unemployment cannot exist in a socialist .hate,
unemployment insurance is not provided. There are,
nonetheless, provisions for pensioning persons discharged
before reaching retirement age or before achieving the
required length of service for retirement because of the
reorganization of their enterprises.
Implementation of the social security system falls
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor and Social
Welfare. For administration of the system of retirement
pensions, sickness benefits, and disability payments, the
population is divided into three categories, based on the
Pension Law of 1957: 1) workers in the state sector; 2)
members of farming cooperatives; and 3) members of
producer cooperatives. All pensions are administered by
the State Pension Administration, which receives funds
from the three agencies handling each worker category.
The General Workers Trade Union and its local unions
are responsible for the program covering workers in the
state sector, i.e., all industrial workers, those working on
the state farms and in machine tractor stations, and most
professionals, including writers and lawyers. Social
security benefits in the state sector are financed in part by
contributions from the employing enterprise, which
amount to 12.5% of the payroll, and by the payments of
individual workers. Only dues- paying union members
receive the full pensions; other pensioners receive 50% of
tho full amount This arrangement is a powerful
incentive for union: membership and is designed to
facilitate the effort of the unions to strengthen labor
discipline and to increase labor productivity �their two
major assignments. The Farmers Cooperative Pension
Insurance Fund and the Handicraft Cooperatives
Mutual Insurance Council collet and pass on to the
State Pension Administration revenues from the working
groups (farmers and members of producer cooperatives)
which they represent.
Qualifications for old -age and permanent disability
pensions and the amounts disbursed vary according to
sector and branch of the economy. A higher percentage of
industrial workers, particularly in heavy industry, is
covered than are persons in agriculture or in the private
sector. An industrial worker's eligibility for old -age
pension is based on length of service, age, sex, and job
category, taking into account the difficulty or hazards of
the job. Basic old -age pensions range from 20 to 80 leva
per month. In 1969 over 1.6 million pensions were paid
more than double the number in 1957.
Responding to changing needs and conditions, the
pension system was revised at a joint session of the
Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee and
Council of Ministers on 28 December 1967. The number
of categories of pensioners was reduced to three, the
amount of small pensions was increased by an average of
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15% as of 1 July 1968, and Article 9 of the pension law,
which granted the right to reduce pensions to persons still
capable of work, was abolished.
Old -age pensions are calculated as a percentage of the
highest gross average monthly earnings during any three
consecutive years of the last 10 at work. The proportion
awarded as pensions decreases as average earnings
increase. Pension increments of 2% of earnings are given
for each year of service beyond the qualifying period. If
permanently disabled by injuries sustained at work,
persons in the state sector qualify for disability pensions,
which vary in amount according to the extent of injuries.
Full wages are awarded oily to persons who are severely
hurt on the job and who have gross monthly earnings
below 120 leva. In addition, financial support for the
families of deceased workers is provided through
survivors' pensions. The amount of such pensions is .)aced
on the age, relationship to the deceased, and the working
capacity of the survivors.
The social security and health care programs provide
relatively comp ?hensive benefits. The system has
expanded so rapidly, however, that antiquated facilities
must still be utilized to care for all those in need. There is
a notable lack of uniform modern facilities and
techniques in hospitals, rest homes, and sanitariums.
Nearly all hospitals are crowded, particularly in large
urban centers; private hospital rooms, except for the
Communist elite, are virtually unavailable; and the beds
in hospital wards are packed close together.
The number of persons covered by social security has
increased significantly �from less than 50% of the
population in 1956 to an estimated 90% to 95% in 1964.
The amount disbursed by social welfare programs
increased more than threefold between 1960 and 1969. In
1969 expenditures on insurance and pension programs
were about 1.3 billion leva, with 65% of these funds
going to pensions. Payments for temporary disability and
various single payment benefits absorbed 29% of the
social welfare expenditures. Social welfare expenditures
(including health care) in 1969 are given in millions of
leva in the following tabulation:
Work disability payments 110.2
Birth payments 18.2
Family allowances 204.8
Subsidies for disabled or large families 10.9
Pensions 720.3
Health 240.0
Total 1,304.4
Funding of social welfare programs has been derived
largely from the payments of individual workers and
collective farmers, a source wbith in 1969 provided at
least 39% of revenue. In the same year about 28% of
revenues came from the state budget. Between 1960 and
1969 the average annual pension increased by almost two
and a half times, and in the latter year stood at 430 leva a
year. Sizes of yearly pension in 1969 r.,nged from 641 leva
for work disability to 322 levy for retired farmers.
34
3. Social problems
The political and economic changes since World War
11 have had a profound impact on the lives of the people,
both at home and at work. Social tensions have sprung
from the conflict between Communist and traditional
values, and from large numbers of people shifting from
agricultural to industrial activities and from rural to
urban areas. These tensions have been heightened by the
totalitarian character of the regime.
Severe housing shortages in urban areas, with
concomitant difficult living conditions, have created
many social conflicts. The urban dweller has resented the
influx of illiterate peasants, which frequently required
sharing living quarters and household facilities.
Adjustment to a new way of life has been difficult for the
peasant, who has had to adapt to the competitive pace of
urban life in an often hostile atmosphere. The peasant
family has ceased to provide the traditional cohesive
force, as the younger members have moved away to seek
greater economic advantages in the cities. The state has
taken over the role of providing for the older generation,
a role which the sons and daughters had traditionally
assumed. In the cities the state has likewise become the
guardian of the youth. A large proportion of urban
mothers must work, leaving their children at government
operated nurseries. Schools and other government -run
institutions have not, however, fully compensated for the
decline of family influence on the moral training of the
youth. As a result, juvenile delinquency has become a
relatively serious problem.
With communism's failure to fill the gaps left by the
breakdown of many traditional Bulgarian mores and
values, young people have cr en sought outlets for their
frustrations in alcohol. As a result, drunkenness is
increasingly in evidence among young people and has
contributed to the rise in juvenile delinquency. Juvenile
delinquency had become so widespread by 1958 that the
Central Commission for Juvenile Delinquency Control
was set up to study and solve the problem. It has since
reported that poor parental supervision, "adventurism,"
and dissolute companions are the principal contributing
factors to the rising crime rate among young people.
Since the founding of the commission in 1958, some
360 regional commissions have been organized
throughout the country to give psychological assistance
to problem children and to offer guidance to youthful
offenders and their parents. The success of this work is
questionable; regime statistics report a highly unrealistic
90% of the delinquents as successfully "reeducated."
The rise in juvenile crimes has been almost matched by
the increase in crime across the board. The annual loss to
industrial plants through theft and destruction has
become so extensive that it has caused considerable
concern among government officials. Such concern is
reflected in press reports and radiobroadcasts.
A modest breakdown of traditionally strong family ties
is illustrated by the divorce rate, which most recently
increased from 10.1 per 10,000 inhabitants in 1962 t*)
11.6 per 10,000 in 1569. The highest rate is in urban
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Bulgarian literature in the latter years of Turkish rule
emphasized patriotic themes which we, particularly
prominent from 1850 to 1878, when authors were
concerned with awakening the Bulgarian national
consciousness and preparing the people for liberation.
The most significant precursor of the national movement
was Father Paisi. This Orthodox monk was the first
Bulgarian to c -pture arrestingly the new spiritual force of
nationalism from the West stemming from the French
Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. His history of the
Bulgarian Slays, the Tsars and Saints of Bulgaria, acrd All
the Bulgarian Events, an idealized picture of the
background and tradition of the country, inspired
feelings of Bulgarian identity and national purpose.
During the latter 19th century literary inspiration came
from riot only the Russian nationalists and radicals, with
whom the Bulgarians had relatively easy contact, but
especial;y from the Ukrainians, who in a similar situation
of national subjugation were becoming aware of their
o%vP national individuality. Democracy and social justice
became predominant literary themes due in no sm ;,ll
measure to the influence of the Ukrainian poet, Tarrs
Shevchenko.
Several prominent writers from the period of Bulgaria's
liberation deserve special recognition. Ivan Vazov (1850-
1921), perhaps the country's foremost novelist,
contributed greatly to the concept of a Bulgarian
fatherland. Under the Yoke, his most famous novel,
which has been translated into several languages,
immortalizes Bulgaria's struggle for independence
through it depiction of an anti -Turk uprising. Pencho
Slavciko (1866- 1912), a Nobel Prize nominee, noted for
his epic poem, "Bloody Song," is regarded as the greatest
Bulgarian poet.
Written literature under the Communists has been
greatly inhibited by the restrictions on the choice of
thematic material. Consequently, little of note has been
produced. Glorification of achievements in "socialist
construction" and of dv:! sacrifices made by patriots to
achieve the Communist takeover has been required, as
has the vilification of the capitalist world. Historical
novels have been encouraged, although the latitudes for
subject matter have widened only in recent years. Diving
the earlier period of Communist rule historical novels
were restricted to events which directly related to or were
close parallels of the "arduous" Communist struggle for
power. Since the middle 1960's a strong sense of the past
has been emphasized in literature, as the regime has
moved to encourage again such appeals to national
consciousness. Periods of history considered correct for
literary settings were expanded to include the "golden
ages" of Bulgaria: the First and the Second Bulgarian
Empires (852 -927 and 1218-41). The regime has still
attempted carefully to manage the use of history and
periodically issues warnings against excessive "historic
idealism."
Thematic content of novels has been constricted by
"socialist realism its precepts have greatly inhibited
character and plot development. The regirr,c's demand
for didactic "inspirational" literature has been translated
into an official demanI for "positive" characters and
happy endings. Such an approach to literature has
devolved more into an exercise in the "idealism"
allegedly deplored than in the "realism" ostensibly
desired by the regime. True realism seems acceptable
only whey it deals with the struggling peasant of pre
Communist times or the oppressions of capitalist society.
Poetry, which again can do little but praise the virtues
and undertakings of the regime, is for the most part
declamatory and sterile. Literary criticism is oversimpli-
fied and dogmatic in tone.
Satirical works are the most sought after in Bulgaria
today, as the skilled satirist, in time honored fashion, can
lampoon contemporary conditions and regime foibles in
clever disguise. Such works are often sold out within a few
days after they appear on the stands The works of Radoy
Ralin, the leading satirist, have managed to escape
suppression despite his biting criticism of current
conditions.
Bulgarian author Andrey Gulyashki has had
overwhelming popular success with his book Avakum
Lakhov Versus 07, which is patterned after the books on
James Bond, British Secret Service Agent 007, by the
Western author lan Lancaster Fleming. Despite the
obvious deviation from the proletarian norm, Gulyashki
has captured large audiences throughout Eastern Europe
and in Austria, Italy, Finland, and Australia. His hook
may prove to be the most successful piece of Bulgarian
literature financially since the turn of the century, but
there has been no Bulgarian prose of recognized literary
merit since the 1920'x.
Part of the regime's cultural policy has been its practice
of officially recognizing "great" works through the
biennial Dimitrov Prizes. Na, ed for the Bulgarian
Communist Party leader active when the Communists
zoasolidated control of the country, the prizes are
awarded for cultural attainment as well as for science and
engineering achievements. Since their inception in 1949,
however, only seven have been awarded to literary
personalities." Recipients have been noted snore for
their obeisance toward the regime than for any artistic
experimentation or originality.
2. Performing arts
The theater in Bulgaria dates back to the kuker
(mummer) plays of the 1850's. Liberation from the Turks
was followed by the establishment of professional
theaters, the oldest purportedly being the Plovdiv
National Theater established in 1881. By 1939, 12
theaters, five of diem st:.t..- supported, had been founded;
they most often staged foreign plays. Between 1939 and
1969 the number of permanent legitimate theaters
increased from 12 to 46, as annual attendance in the
same period ruse by over 3 million to a total of 4,798,000.
In the latter year, the city of Sofiya alone boasted 11
theaters, attended by almost 2 million people annually
(Figure 35).
47
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i r
t
v f.
ss
41
FIGURE 35. National Theater in Sofiya (U /OU)
U.S. plays have gained a great dead of popularity in
Bulgaria in recent }ears. Such productions as My lair
Lade, Kiss Me Kate, and Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf
have received extended runs in Sofiya's theaters. Both the
dramatic and the muical versions of West Side Story
have hccn staged. 'f he musical version of the latter, as is
trot of other U.S. works performed in Bulgaria, contained
pointod anti U.S. statements.
In oiler the Bulgarians have gained some interna-
tional renown. The basso Nikolay Cyaurov has hccn
enthusiastically acclaimed in the United States, Italy,
and numerous other European countries. The success of
-18
B n opera stars outside the Comm! mist world has
been so relati\ely extensive and financially rewarding to
the indkidua! performers that the Party Central
Committee has prohibited performers from appearances
in the West Nv,thotit prior approval. Moreover,
performers' scheduler must include at least 30
appearances a year in Bulgaria, the U.S.S.11� or other
Communist countries.
3. Art and music
Distinctively Bulgarian art dates hack to the medieval
period, and, as with written lilk rature, is intimately tied
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FIGURE 36. Bulgarians in native costume play
the gaida (above) and the kowal (below) (U /OU)

to religion. Among the best examples of medieval art are
the magnificent Rilski Monastery and the church frescoes
in Veliko Turnovo. The influence of Byzantium was
paramount, but distinctive Bulgarian schools developed
in mural and icon painting. As with other forms of
cultural expression, the Turkish period dampf ned or
arrested artistic development.
Renewed artistic activity after the liberation produced
no well- developed Bulgarkm school, altho; r 1i much
energy and determination were expended. TI. paintings
of Prof. Ivan Mrkvicka, a Bohemian who moved to
Bulgaria, were exhibited throughout Europa The most
recent Bulgarian artist of real distinction was the
internationally famous watercolorist Konstantin
Shtarkelov. Born in 1891, Shtarkelov was a mature artist
before the Communist takeover. His works therefore
represent values and concepts other than those of Marx
and Lenin and are repeatedly criticized by the regime as
"sentimental."
Contemporary Bulgarian art has produced no painter
of international note. There are, however, a few men of
relative merit locally. Tsanko Lavrenov, a leading
Bulgarian oil painter, is highly regarded by the regime.
His works, more sophisticated than those of his "socialist
realist" contemporaries, center on Bulgarian history and
scenes of Plovdiv, the artist's native city.
Restrictions on creativity have not prevented popular
interest in art and some recent originality in artistic
expression. In 1965 then were 174 art exhibits displaying
13,189 professional items; in 1966 the number increased
to 207 exhibits showing 14,839 works. Moreover, since
1944 over 30 galleries and painting collections have been
opened to the public. The redeeming factor in most of
these shows has been the emergence of a somewhat
unique art style which in effect compromises between
party dictates and experimentation in modern art forms.
Bulgarian music possesses a rich folk heritage
has only recently been rediscovered by the regime.
Traditional themes ranged from heroism to subjects of
social life and were usually sung to the accompaniment
of such instruments as the gusla or gadulka (a two or
three stringed fiddle), the tambura (lute), the gaida
(similar to a bagpipe), and the kowal (long wooden flute
or reed pipe) (Figure 36).
Under the Communists, music, more than any other
form of artistic endeavor, has reflected Western
influence, especially among the younger generation. The
popularity of jazz, Western songs, and modern dances
among youth coupled with a growing lack of
familiarity or concern with traditional forms of Bulgarian
music, dances, and entertainment �is of major concern
to the regime. To counteract the contagion of Western
influences, the regime has provided considerable
financial support to the orchestras, operas, and ballet
companies. Increased subsidies have been granted in part
to lure famous Bulgarians back from the West and
thereby to improve the quality of the performances.
Bulgarian writers and composers have been encour-
aged to make use of national traditions to emulate the
"national Bulgarian emotional life." Toward this goal,
between 1944 and early 1967 Bulgarian writers and
composers created 20 musical stage works and 10 modern
musicals.
Not all Western music is frowned on by the regime.
The Ruse Philharmonic Orchestra devoted the final
concert of its 1966 season to the works of George
Gershwin, and a one -act ballet based on his "Rhapsody
in Blue," which was puilormed in Sofiya in May 1966,
was given wide publicity :.nd was enthusiastically
received by the audiences.
While popular dances and music, the oldest form of
Bulgarian culture, remain strong in rural areas, the
growing number of foreign tourists in urban centers and
along the Black Sea coast has further undermined the
nationalist stance on music. With the growing emphasis
on tourism as a means of getting hard currency, the
regime has apparently decided to compromise some
cultural purity for financial expediency.
K. Public information (U /OU)
Integration of the information media into the
governmental structure is total, providing the regime
witn absolute control of them. The Propaganda and
Agitation Department and the Culture and Art
Department of the Central Committee are the chief party
agencies for the control and dissemination of public
information. These departments !supervise the press,
radio, television, and motion pictures, as well as other
media of lesser importance, and in general they monitor
adherence to party policies by all media.
In recent years the preeminence of the press as the
leading domestic information medium has been lost to
radio and television, which are now regarded as the most
effective mass media for explaining party policy and for
the education of the people along Communist lines.
Domestic films are handicapped by a lack of technical
facilities and skills but are slowly enhancing their popular
appeal and sophistication. The legitimate theater has
been recognized as a desirable mechanism to stress
themes of Bulgarian patriotism and Soviet- Bulgarian
friendship. Other significant media, in approximate order
of importance, include public and private meetings,
museums, displays, and posters; they are consciously used
by the regime for indoctrination. Public meetings are
almost invariably convened on the initiative of party or
government functionaries, and museum exhibits and
other visual displays either i enuously advance the
party line or tend to associate past and present
phenomena with the inexorable triumph of socialism.
Parallel to its control of domestic information, the
regime also attempts to exclude access to outside or
uncontrolled sources of information by jamming some
foreign radiobroadcasts or preventing entry of foreign
publications. The overall purpose of these policies is to
further Communist indoctrination by the intellectual
isolation of the population from the non Communist
world.
49
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i. Radio and television
The regime has made considerable effort to augment
its broadcast facilities, and radio installations increased
from a meager three transmitters in 1939 to 23 by the
beginning of 1970. Since 1965 alone, nine transmitters
have been placed in operation, the most powerful one
being a 250,000 -watt mediumwave transmitter. Other
parts of the radio network have also expanded. "rhe
number of radio sets has increased from almost 63,000 in
1939 to about 2 million in early 1971, with the ratio of
radio sets standing at approximately one for every four
Bulgarians. Additional radio coverage is provided,
moreover, through a network of about 720,000 wired
loudspeakers. These speakers are connected to about
1,800 radio relay points, where received transmissions are
selected by the local authorities and relayed to the wired
loudspeakers. The majority of these loudspeakers ure in
rural areas. Poor reception and shoddy workmansh.-j) in
wiring villages has decreased the potential effective less
of the system, and interest in radio programs has decli ed
in some areas. Broadcasts are frequently available in rui a;
settlements from public radio receivers.
All domestic radio transmissions originate in Sofiya.
Radio Sofiya broadcasts daily three major programs
which are retransmitted or relayed throughout the
country: Horizont, Kristo Botev, and Orfei. Horizont,
which broadcasts about 20 hours a day, has some news
and short commentary but features mainly light music,
much of it being Western popular music. The second
program, Kristov Botev, continues the traditional
Communist radio programing and serves up a mixture of
heavy propaganda features and assorted cultural specials.
It is on the air for 14 hours a day. Orfei is a literary and
classical music FM station broadcasting for 5 hours a day
and heard only in the Sofiya area.
Rad' has slowly moved from the boring, ideological
drivel that long dominated its programing and drove
listeners away. Horizont, begun in 1965, is the most
notable step toward modernization. Further changes in
its format and programing, implemented in early 1971,
should allow the state radio to compete more effectively
with Western broadcasts. Nonetheless, according to a
Bulgarian survey in early 1971, the average Bulgarian
listened to radio for only 2 hours 17 minutes a day, and
an undetermined share of this listening time, in localities
where they could be received, went to Western programs.
Bulgaria is one of the few Communist countries in
Eastern Europe continuing to jam Bulgarian- language
transmissions of the Voice of America and Radio Tree
Europe. The jamming is not entirely effective in cities,
and reception is clear in almost all areas of the
countryside.
Television broadcasting began on an expert mental
basis in early 1953, with regular programing apparently
having started about 1960. The one TV station now in
operation at Sofiya broadcasts two program schedules.
Bulgarian television has expanded programing in recent
years, and its total weekly output in 1971 was 62 hours.
The daily schedule is split into a short morning segment
50
and about 6 hours of evening viewing. The morning
broadcasts were initiated in early 1970 to provide reruns
of the evening programs for swing -shift workers.
Programing on Sunday is continuous from 10 a.m. until
11 p.m., while Friday evening is devoted to 7 hours of
broadcasts from Moscow in the Russian language.
In early 1964 there were 66,000 TV sets, but only
10,000 of these were located in nonurb kn areas. By 1971
the number of sets had reached about 1.2 million. Six
transmitters and 80 relay points carry a TV signal to 65%
to 70% of the country, according to Bulgarian sources,
and the Tv audience is estimated at 3.5 million people.
Bulgarian television is tied into Intervision, a network
which enables the country to exchange programs with
other Eastern European countries and the U.S.S.R. A
direct radio -TV link between Bulgaria 'and Yugoslavia
provides Bulgaria with indirect access to Eurovision, the
radio -TV network that links countries of Western Europe.
Bulgarian television has been subjected to much
criticism and, according to a Bulgarian press poll of 1970,
only 24% of those questioned had a good opinion of the
system. A survey in early 1971 revealed that the average
B-dgurian watc! es about I hour of television a day.
Bulgarian television loses many viewers to networks in
neiguboring countries. Viewers on the Yugoslav border
consistently favor Yugoslav over Bulgarian broadcasts;
Romanian TV is easily received in Bulgaria's northern
areas and apparently is preferred over domestic
television. Acceptable signals from Yugoslav television
can be received in Sofiya by using high gain antennas.
2. Newspapers, periodicals, and wire services
The principal role of the press is to disseminate party
and governmental decisions, appeals, and information to
facilitate the development of socialism. Only party
doctrine and views are expressed. Press content is also
limited by the Law on State Secrets. In 1966 authorities
claimed Bulgaria to be among the world's first in per
capita press distribution, with over 714 copies of
newspapers and periodicals per 1,000 inhabitants. Such
claims are exaggerated, however, because they are based
on statistics which include insignificant regional and
local publications. Among the Eastern European
countries, Bulgaria ranks only fifth in the circulation of
daily newspapers, according to U.N. statistics.
Total circulation of newspapers for 1969 exceeded 777
million copies of some 759 newspapers compared with an
annual circulation in 1939 of 130 million copies. The 13
daily newspapers in 1969 had a total single issue
circulation of 1,764,000 copies. Sixty weeklies were
printed in 1,682,000 single -issue copies, and less
frequently published newspapers (including such items as
factory "news boards had a total single -issue
circulation of 1,686,000. 'rhe circulation figures in
themselves, however, are not an accurate indication of
the popularity of the press, because many persons are
compelled to subscribe because of their positions. High
pressure subscription drives are also staged periodically.
Rabotnichesko Delo (Wc.rkers Cause) alone accounts for
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approximately one -third of the total annual volume of
newspapers. According to it Bulgarian news agency, there
were 600,000 Bulgarian subscribers to 13 Soviet
newspapers and other periodicals in 1967. A total of
25,000 copies of Pravda and Izvestia arrive daily in
Sofiya, along with leading papers from other Eastern
European countries.
The average newspaper consists of four pages and
generally includes little advertising. Rahotnichesko Delo,
the official Bulgarian Communist Party daily, is closely
patterned after the Soviet papers Izvestia and Pravda,
which serve as models for the entire Bulgarian press. 1t
contains, in addition to some news coverage, long
theoretical arguments, articles on economics, and
exhortations to fulfill norms and plans. Bulgarian
newspapers have regular sections with articles on party
life, :)griculture, economics, letters from readers, foreign
ne%Ns, literature, science, art criticism, biliography, and
financial news. Although articles are in general dull,
there has been an effort to liven up the editorial format
and increase the readability of papers, particularly
Otechestven Front, Lemedelsko Znanie, and Pogled (now
a weekly). Figure 37 lists selected newspapers and their
circulation.
Most Bulgarians are skeptical of information
disseminated by the press and other media and regard it
as propaganda circulated by urban politicians. The
regime clumsily feeds this skepticism by omitting
mention of occurrences which quickly become general
knowledge through word of mouth, clandestine listening
to foreign radiobroadcasts, and reading of bootlegged
foreign newspapers and periodicals.
The Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA), which was
founded in 1918, is the official Bulgarian news service.
Attached to the Council of Ministers, BTA, like its Soviet
counterpart "PASS, is the channel for government
declarations on international issues, usually rather
propagandistic in tone. In addition, BTA foreign
correspondents cover selected international developments
for the Bulgarian national press in the characteristic
Communist mariner. BTA operates in all the Communist
countries and in nine other countries. However, much of
BTA's foreign news is obtained from TASS, and it also
has agreements with Agence France Presse (AFP),
Reuters, Associated Press (AP), United Press International
(UP[), and other major services. Sofiya Press, founded in
1967, has been touted by the regime as an indep, at
news agency (analagous to the Novosti news service in
the U.S.S.R.), but it has no branches abroad and more
accurately hould be called a publishing agency.
Bulgarian perio.'.:c-als have less importance as media
than do newspapers, 'gut they still are widely circulated.
More than 750 differeit periodicals and bulletins were
published in Bulgaria during 1969. Probably only one
half of these were true periodicals. Most are technical
publications, and all are semi official journals which
emanate from either party, scientific, or mass
organizations. In addition, about 8,000 Western
periodicals and other publications in the fields of science,
technology, culture, economics, and politics are received
by Bulgarian libraries and research institutions. Figure :38
lists selected periodicals and their circulation figures.
The overall goal of the periodicals appears to be an
explanation of socialist construction in Bulgaria, the
development of the "World Socialist System," the
international situation, and the "struggle for peace."
Generally speaking, party magazines and party
controlled literary periodicals arouse little enthusiasm.
3. Other public information media
Siatistics on book pubhsiung, along with the prevailing
system of material privileges and incentives for
conforming writers, lend some credibility to the
Communist claim that conditions for creative literary
work exist in Bulgaria. Official statistics reflecting the
steady increase in the output of the state publishing
houses are used by the regime to foster an impression of
freedom of expression. The total annual number of all
books published in the country increased from
approximately 6.5 million volumes in 1939 to over 39
million in 1969, with a total of 576 million books being
published between 1945 and 1967. The striking disparity
between quantity and quality, however, which has
dogged industrial and economic development in Bulgaria
since the Communist takeover, also has its depressing
counterpart in literature. The publishing house and
editorial offices regularly receive for publication
manuscripts which do not satisfy even minimum
requirements of literacy. In addition, there is the restraint
imposed on writers by the ideological straitjacket of
"socialist realism," which requires that all writing
represent and serve the objectives of the regime.
In November 1967 a newly founded foreign language
and publishing agency called Sofiya Press began
operation. The agency is an organ of the Writers Union,
the Union of Bulgarian journalists, and the Union of
Bulgarian Artists, and replaces the Foreign Languages
Publishing House and the Bulgarian Information Bureau.
Supplying articles and photos for the press, radio, and
television, Sofiya Press also publishes books, magazines,
and albums in foreign languages as well as a newspaper
for foreign tourists and vacationers.
Although Western publications, books, plays and
movies are very popular in Bulgaria, the regime very
carefully controls their entrance. The government allows
the translation and publication of some Western books
and plays; the editions are small in number and quickly
sold out.
The regime has directed efforts toward increasing the
number of museums, libraries, theaters, movie houses,
and films. The role of these media in shaping the public's
political outlook, however, has probably been relatively
minor. The number of museums has increased from 80 in
1938 to 146 in 1969; libraries, feom 4,024 in 1951 to
11,066 in 1969; theaters, from 13 in 1939 to 46 in 1969,
including five opera houses; films produced, from 45 in
1939 to 316 in 1969, and movie houses, from 155 in 1939
to 3,104 in 1969. Many churches have been converted
51
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t j
0
FIGURE 37. PRINCIPAL NEWSPAPERS, 1971 (U /OU)
NAME AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION FREQUENCY CIRCULATION
RABorxtCIIESxo DELO (Worker's Daily Cause), Daily
Sofiya.
NARODNA MLADEZII (People's Youth), Sofiya.. 6 times per week........
OTECIINESTVEY FRONT (Fatherland Front), ....do
Sofiya.
ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME (Agricultural Banner), ....do
Sofiya.
VERCHERNi NovlNl (Evening News), Sofiya... ....do
THUD (Labor), Sofiya ....do................
NARODNA ARMIYA (People's Arm;;), Sofiya.... ....do
KOOPERATIVNO SELO (Cooperative Village), ....do
Sofiya.
NARODNO DELO (People's Cause), Varna...... Daily
CHERNOMORSKI FRONT (Black Sea Front), ....do
Burgas.
DUNAVSKA PRAVDA (Danubian Truth), Ruse.. ....do
*1966 figures most recent available.
PUBLISHER
M 1TERIAL EMPHASIZED
630,000
Central Committee of Communist Party......
National, t�, rty, governmental, and foreign.
200,000
Central Committee of Dimitrov Communist
National, youth, party, governmental, and
Youth Union.
foreign.
360,000
Presidium of the People's Assembly and the
National, party, governmental, and foreign.
National Council of the Fatherland Front.
145,000
Bulgarian National Agrarian Union...........
National, agricultural, party, governmental,
and foreign.
150,000
Sofiya City Party Committee, Sofiya City
Local, party, governmental, and foreign.
People's Council, and Sofiya City Committee
of the Fatherland Front.
114,000
Central Council of General Workers Trade
National, labor, party, foreign, and gcvern-
Union.
mental.
*61,400
Ministry of National Defense
National and military affairs.
150,000
Ministry of Agriculture
National and agricultural affairs.
*22,000
do
National, party, and local.
*12,000
do
Do.
*11,300 do Do.
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FIGURE, 38. PRINCIPAL PERIODICALS, 1971 (U(OU)
NAME AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION FREQUENCY CIRCULATION
POOLED (Look), Sofiya Weekly.
NARUCIINIK NA AGrrATORA (Agitator's Weekly ....do............
Handbook), Sofiya.
ZHENATA DNFs (Today's Woman), Sofiya..... Monthly..........
NOVO VREME (New Times), Sofiya ....do............
ZHAR (Fervor), Sofiya Weekly...........
BULGAP.O- .SUVETSKA DRUZIIBA (Bulgarian -So-
viet Friendship), Sofiya.
BULGARSKI VOILA (Bulgarian Soldier), Sofiya..
PARTIFN ZHIVOT (Party Life), Sofiya........
SEPTEMVRI (Septemberists), Sofiya
SLAVYANI (Slays), Sofiya
N
NARODINA PROSVETA (People's Education),
Sofiya.
Monthly.
....do............
....do............
....do............
do............
....do............
RADIO I TELFVIZIYA (Radio and Television), do............
Sofiya.
PLANOVO STOPANBTVO I STATISTIKA (Economic ....do............
Planning and Statistics), Sofiya.
FINANSI I KREDIT (Finance and Credits), ....do............
Sofiya.
NAsHA RODINA (Our Motherland), Sofiya..... ....do............
KOOPERATIVINO ZEMEDELIE (Cooperative Agri- ....do............
culture), Sofiya.
PLAMAK (Flame), Sofiya Biweekly..........
LrrERATURNA MISAL (Literary Thoughts). Bimonthly........
no Data not available.
rs
co
PUBLISIIER MATERIAL EMPHASIZED
220,000
Union of Bulgarian Journalists
National, party, governmental, foreign, and local.
80,000
Propaganda and Agitation Department of
Propaganda on domestic and international affairs.
the Party Central Committee.
370,000
Committee of Bulgarian Women...........
Socialist women's affairs.
27,000
Party Central Committee
Marxist theory and party problems and activities.
Includes the following sections: "Out of the Ex-
perience of Party Work," "Criticism and Bibliog-
raphy,' "Lectures and Constitutions," and "Ques-
tions and Answers."
100,000
Central Committee of Dimitrov Communist
National, youth, party, governmental, and foreign.
Youth Union.
40,000
Union of Bulgarian Soviet Friendship Socie-
Bulgarian and Soviet cultural and economic ties.
ties.
18,000
Ministry of National Defense
Political indoctrination, military tactics and strategy.
40,000
Party Central Committee
Party organizational journal; emphasizes implementa-
tion of party policies; discusses party problems.
15,000
Union of Bulgarian Writers
Artistic, literary, and other cultural affairs.
10,0%10
Bulgarian Slav Committee
Slav cultural unity; the role of the Soviet Union as the
leading Slav nation.
10,000
Central Committee of the Union of Bulgarian
Communist educational theory and practice; also
Teachers.
general coverage of educational affairs in Commu-
nist and capitalist countries.
20,000
Ministry of Transport and Communications..
Technical radio and TV articles and news.
5,000
State Planning Committee
All phases of state economic plt,nning.
5,250
Ministry of Finance
Financial subjects.
26,000
Party Central Committee
General coverage, includes political, sociological, and
economic articles; illustrated.
na
Ministry of Agriculture
Bulgarian cooperative farm matters.
11,000
Union of Bulgarian Writers
Literature, art, publishing, and domestic and foreign
affairs.
4,500
Institute for Literature at the Academy of
Literary history and criticism.
Sciences.
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into museums; libraries vary considerably in their
holdings: :ind the films emphasize political indoctrina-
tion and generally lack artistic merit. Attendance at film
showings increased from 13,103,000 in 1939 to
126,362,000 in 1965, but since then has decreased to
110,22:3,000, apparently due to an official policy of
reducing the number of film screenings. Nineteen state
controlled libraries in 1969 contained 2,965,000 volumes.
Additionally, the National Library (Figure 39) held
360,000 volumes.
L. Suggestions for further reading (U /OU)
I. General works
L.A.D. Dellin's (ed.) Bulgaria, 1956 stands as the most
informative and readable overview; some weak chapters,
notably on religion and education, diminish its
usefulness. A recent work dealing with modern Bulgaria,
concentrating on political affairs but also containing
informative sections on cultural and educational policies,
is J.E. Brown's Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, 1970.
Useful and detailed essays on the Communist
regimentation of youth activities are found in Peter
Ceorgeoff's The Social Education of Bulgarian Youth,
1968. Education in Bulgaria, one of the comparative
education studies done by the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, is indispensable for a
54
thorough un landing of the educational system under
the Commur. care should be exercised, hc%v ver, in
using the incorrectly transliterated educational flow
charts. Irwin Sanders' Balkan Village, published in 1949,
provides some insight into the rural nature of Bulgaria at
the time of the Communist accession to power. Joint
Publications Research Service (JPRS) (Department of
Commerce) and Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) translations of both speeches by Bulgarian leaders
and daily Sofiya press articles constitute important,
almost invaluable, sources on recent developments,
especially in education, public health, population, and
labor force.
2. Basic reference works
Basic reference works include the official Bulgarian
statistical handbooks (Statisticheski Spravochnik, 1971
and Statisticheski Godishnik na Narodna Republika
Bulgariya, 1970). The Spravochnik is more timely, being
issued in handsized paperback, but not nearly as
comprehensive as the Godishnik, which runs more than
600 pages. Population studies on eastern European
countries done by the U.S. Bureau of the Census provide
valid statistics and bases for useful comparisons. U.N.
reference works usually have information on Bulgaria,
although the information is often spotty and in some
cases dated.
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FIGURE 39. National library "Cyril and Methodius," Sofiya (U /OU)

Government and Politics
A. Summary and background (U /OU)
The political development of Bulgaria, at times it
creature and pawn of Great Power interplay in the
Balkans, has been conditioned by shifting alliances,
unfulfilled irredentist ambitions, and alternating
impulses toward aggressive self assertion and subservi-
ence to foreign domination. The consolidation of
Communist rule after World War 11 �in which it had
been allied with the Axis powers �has continued to
illustrate these varied political characteristics, even while
the strongly pro Soviet rulers have attempted to create
new political, economic, and social bases for it stable
totalitarian state.
Bulgaria emerged as it nation -state in 1878 under the
auspices and tutelage of Imperial Russia, which sought
thus to extend its influence in the Balkans at the expense
of the dying Ottoman Empire. After almost five centuries
of Turkish rule, the country's emergence as it sovereign
entity was a protracted event, midwifed by Russia,
complicated by the disposition of Macedonia, and
ultimately determined by the other Great Powers acting
in concert. The Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878,
imposed on 'Turkey by Russia, created an autonomous
Bulgarian state with boundaries that encompassed most
of the Macedonian region as well as the Thracian areas of
Greece. Russia's Great Power rivals, mainlv Britain and
Austria- Hungary, viewed the settlement as contrary to
their interests and forced a renegotiation. The resultant
Congress of Berlin of July 1878 provided for a,i
autonomous Bulgaria under Turkish suzerainty and
reduced to one -third the size of the country as projected
at San Stefano.
The Bulgarian principality, which had achieved a
large degree of independence by 1879,'' was generally
homogeneous in ethnic teniv, with only it Turkish
minority of 10% to 20% remaining inside its borders. A
large number of ethnic Bulgarians remained outside the
borders of the new homeland, and territorial ambitions
soon dominated the country's internationa*I stance and in
many ways shaped internal political developments up to
the middle of the 20th century. Bulgarian nationalists
continued to dream of a return to the boundaries of San
Stefano. This dream, raised by frequently demagogic
political leaders to the status of it national goal, impelled
successive governments, supported by broad segments of
the population, to side with Germany in two World Wars
and to oppose its neighbors in two local conflicts.
Bulgaria's claims to Macedonia added to the controversy
Tinal independence came only in 1908.
over the nationality of the peoples living t:: Macedonia,
and were only modestly requited after Bulgaria suffered
defeat in three of the four imbroglios.
The Bulgarian alliance with Germany in World War 1,
contrary to historical pro- Russian sympathies among the
populace, was motivated by Bulgaria's desire to regain
the greater part of Macedonia from Serbia and Greece,
and the area of southern Dobruja from Romania
territories that Bulgaria lost during the Second Balkan
War (1913). The Treaty of Neuillv in 1919 reaffirmed
Bulgaria's territorial losses after the Second Balkan War
and divested the country of Western Thrace and the
access to the Aegean Sea that it had gained in 1912.
During World War 11, Bulgaria- -once again allied with
Germany� reoccupied Macedonia and Western Thrace,
only to be forced to relinquish them under the terms of
the armistice agreement of 28 October 1944. Bulgaria
retained only southern Dobruja, which Romania had
ceded by the Treaty of Craiova in 1940. Figure 40 shows
Bulgarian territorial changes since the 'Treaty of San
Stefano.
Preoccupation with territorial ambitions, aside from
engaging the country in futile conflicts, engendered
domestic political violence, which, encouraged by radical
Macedonian emigree organizations, seriously inhibited
social and economic growth. The Constitution of 1878,
which in its time was a model of Western democratic
thought, had introduced the trappings of Western
political institutions but could not provide the tradition
and experience necessary to make them succeed. Polii;..al
parties were founded as early as 1890, but political
strongmen using authoritarian methods restricted any
incipient democratic impulses.
1n this context, two of Bulgaria's most gifted and
creative leaders, Stefan Stambolov (Prime Minister 1887-
94) and Alexander Stambolisky (1919 -23), were able to
force economic and social developments, often overriding
considerable opposition. Both men fell victim to the
assassin's bullet, Stambolov after relinquishing his
government leadership and Stambolisky after having
nurtured an innovative policy that offered the olive
branch to Yugoslavia. Political violence, especially acute
during the period between the two World Wars, was
generated mainly by Macedonian terrorists who
continued their single minded advocacy of reclaiming
Macedonia at any price. By the middle 1930's the few
feeble attempts at democratic interplay were thoroughly
discredited, and aimless political intrigue gave way to an
authoritarian pro Fascist consolidation.
55
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Western (English and Austro- Hungarian) Pressure I
on Turkey's Behalf (Congress of Berlin, July 1878).
0 o
o w
O
Victory in First Balkan War
(Treaty of London, May 1913)
a
o.
NOTE South,wsee..Aundory o.
not difinod V TMQ* O
Reward for Siding with Germany in World War 1
(September 1915)
0
O
Defeat by Former Allies and Turkey in Second
Balkan War (Treaty of Bucharest, August 1913)
O
0
a
0
Postwar Penalty (Treaty of Neuilly. November 191
0
b
FIGURE 40. Major changes in Bulgaria's borders, 1878 -1971 (U /OU)
56
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Bulgaria's overwhelmingly rural and agricultural
character dominated its social and economic structure
from liberation in 1878 until the advent of the
Communist era. Modest state- spo;:iored industrial
development, most prevalent around the turn of the 20th
century, helped to diversify the economy and to stimulate
the growth of a small urban industrial class. Events after
1912 forestalled any further sustained development, as
the burdens of war debts and reparations combined with
the trade barriers of the 1920's to inhibit significant
industrial investment. Some agricultural successes in the
1930's helped create a relative prosperity, and agrarian
Bulgaria found a profitable trading partner in industrial
Germany. Nonetheless, arable land remained divided
among numerous, conservative small landowners and per
capita agricultural production in Bulgaria in the 1930's
stagnated at only half of the European average. Domestic
violence discouraged modernization, and, indeed, many
Bulgarian nationalists saw economic stagpation as the
price for regaining "lost territories." Of the social gains
registered, the most notable was expansion and
diversification of the educational system, with
elementary education made available throu,;hout most of
the country by the and of the 1930's.
The Social Democratic Party, the forei unner of the
Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), first sprang up in the
1880's out of secret Marxist societies ;,uneed by Dimiter
Blagoev, a Marxist radical only recently returned from
study in Russia. Venerated as the founder of the BCP,
Blagoev patterned his organization on the Russian
experience, and, as was true of Lenin, had to contend
with factional challenges. A split within the party ranks
in 1903 produced the so- called narrow wing, which later
changed its name to the Bulgarian Communist Party.
The BCP's early years culminated in its unsuccessful coup
attempt in 1923, a move undertaken on orders from
Moscow. A brutal anti- Communist repression followed
and party activity until World War II was confined to
often ineffective clandestine political operations. At the
end of the 1930's BCP membership totaled some 30,000
at a maximum.
As in other Eastern European countries, the
Communists' accession to power in Bulgaria had its roots
in the political and military turmoil of World War II.
Bulgaria's pro- German, noncombatant course during the
war spared the populace much of the suffering of direct
conflict or occupation, at least until the last phases of the
war. There never was any significant resistance to Nazi
troops, and the Bulgarian partisan movement, A its peak,
totaled perhaps 12,000 men. A number of Communists
were involved in the modest resistance effort but, in
contrast to their Yugoslav and Albanian counterparts,
they were unable to use it as a springboard to power.
Communists during the war focused instead on political
maneuvering, and issued appeals for the formation of a
broad anti- Fascist coalition as early as late 1941. The
deterioration of Germany's military posture in 1943 made
the previously uninterested large political parties more
receptive toward such a grouping, and the Fatherland
Front (Otechestoen Front �OF) gradually took shape in
late 1943. The OF, consisting of the Communist and a
number of other leftwing parties, had little impact on the
Bulgarian domestic scene until the unexpected Soviet
occupation in late 1944, after the equaily unexpected
capitulation of Romania. These developments permitted
the Fatherland Front to assume effective power as a
coalition government. Communists held only few posts in
this government, but their control of the key Ministries of
Justice and Interior gave them the tools to harass,
intimidate, and eliminate political opponents. With the
unspoken assent and covert aid of the Soviet occupation
army, the Bulgarian Communists conducted the
bloodiest, most extensive purge in all of Eastern Europe.
Terror was used in concert with a political action
program theoretically aimed at rebuilding political
institutions, but in reality directed at splitting and
weakening the opposition through classic tactics of
attrition. The then formidable Agrarian Party, which
continues to exist in current Bulgarian political life as a
decimated puppet of the Communists, was stripped of its
traditional political greatness, and the execution in 1947
of its leftwing leader, Nikola Petkov, signaled the end of
all legal opposition to Communist rule.
The subsequent consolidation of Communist control
was engineered by Georgi Dimitrov, long -time
Comintern functionary and a loyal Stalin man, in whose
name the new Bulgarian Constitution of 1947 was
endowed. Dimitrov's death in 1949 led to a struggle over
the leadership of the party, in which Dimitrov's
Sovietized brother -in -law Vulko Chervenkov eventually
triumphed with Soviet support. Since 1954 the leadership
of the party and, therefore, of the country has rested with
Todor Zhivkov, who from 1962 to 1971 was also
Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier), and
currently holds the post of Chairman of the Shute Council
(chief of state). Under Zhivkov, Bulgarian national
interests have been virtually identified with those of the
U.S.S.R., and Sofiya's policies have closely followed
Moscow's lead. The repressive methods characteristic of
the Stalinist period have generally persisted, despite some
slight moves toward liberalization during the Khrushchev
era. Bulgaria in 1971 maintained a reputation as one of
the most orthodox Eastern European regimes.
The BCP maintains a nonopoly of political power, but
at least until the mid- 1960's internecine struggles and
tenacious factionalism plagued the higher leadership
circles. Zhivkov's efforts to consolidate his personal
position were long bedeviled by rival contenders for
power, among them Yugov and the arch- Stalinist
Chervenkov. The latter was the most formidable
opponent Zhivkov faced, and Chcrvenkov's final ouster
from the ruling clique came a full 8 years (in 1962) after
his loss of the top party position (1954) and the
relinquishment of the premiership (1956). Soviet support
was, as it has continued to be, the essential factor in the
struggle for power. The fall of Khrushchev in 1964 and an
abortive antiregime conspiracy in Bulgaria ti months later
placed Zhivkov's leadership in doubt, but he quickly
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regained the confidence of the new Soviet party leader,
Leonid Brezhnev, and in 1971 he appeared to have
greater command over Bulgarian affairs than at any time
following his assumption of power.
The impact of a quarter of a century of Communist
rule on the domestic institutions and traditional ways of
life has been sharp and painful to many Bulgarians. The
regime's continued attempts to bring all aspects of daily
life, including the individual's social activities, under
pervasive controls have aroused popular resentment and
passive resistance. 'rite effort to reorient traditional values
has been troublesome for a population little removed
from the tenets of the Orthodox religion's piety or the
strong familial loyalties of a peasant society. Attempts to
engender atheism among the populace, a major
imperative of Marxism- Leninism, have been modified by
the regime's ancillary desire to preserve the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church as a useful tool of controlled, regime
inspired nationalism. Such careful nurturing of national
pride has been employed by the regime to aid in its
political consolidation and to stimulate economic
growth, but this effort has been complicated by Sofiya's
self admitted, long standing dependence on the U.S.S.R..
The vast majority of the Bulgarian people, with their
generally apathetic attitude toward Communist
ideology, have accommodated themselves to the
Communist regime and probably will continue to do so.
Bulgarians have traditionally manifested an acceptance
of authority, a characteristic that has been bolstered by
the frustrations and defeatism resulting from being on the
losing side in both World Wars. Moreover. the
Communist aim of industrialization and some of the
regime's public welfare policies, such as medical benefits,
social security, and free education, have received popular
support.
B. Structure and functioning of government
(LT /OU)
Immediately upon seizing power in September 1944,
the Communist regime embarked upon a program
designed to replace prewar political forces and
institutions with those molded along the Soviet pattern.
With the help of the Soviet occupation forces, it
eliminated all political opposition within 3 years. The
traditionally influential Democratic and National
political parties were quickly infiltrated, disrupted,
harassed, and then ruthlessly forced out of existence; the
powerful Agrarian Party was allowed to exist only under
the control and direction of the Communists.
As in other Communist -ruled countries, the structure
and functioning of the Bulgarian Government is
determined by and subordinated to the interests of the
ruling Communist Party. The party, exercising a
monopoly of power, formulates all political, economic,
and social policy. The party's "leading role," established
by the Constitution, thus enables it to use the
government structure as the principal tool for supervising
the implementation of policy at all levels and for
imposing the party's will on the people. Supreme
58
authority in both party and government is vested in
Todor Zhivkov (Figure 41), who is simultaneously the
First Secretary of the party and chairman of the State
Council, i.e., head of state. Similarly, a group of
Zhivkov's top assistants forms the main line of command
in both party and government councils and, together
with the frequent practice of announcing national policy
in joint decrees of the party and the government,
illustrates the integration of the party and government
structure.
1. Constitution
With the consolidation of Communist rule, the regime
canceled the Turnovo Constitution of 1879 �which to
many authorities was at the tine of its drafting one of the
most democratic constitutions in the world. In its place
the regime adopted in December 1947 the so- called
Dimitrov Constitution, patterned after the Soviet
Constitution of 1936. It became known as the Dimitrov
Constitution because of the then dominant influence of
Georgi Dimitrov, the former Secretary General of the
Communist International, who returned to Bulgaria from
Moscow in 1946 to establish the new Communist regime.
With only minor amendments, the 1947 Constitution
remained in effect until 1971, when the regime published
and adopted a new basic law after a decade of drafting
effort. The 1971 Constitution is not radically different
from the earlier document, merely formalizing in law the
changes in practice that had evolved since 1947, and
further emphasizing the party's primacy over all spheres
of national life. The major structural change made by the
new Constitution is the formation of a powerful State
Council, replacing the Presidium of the National
Assembly as the country's chief executive organ, and as a
theoretically collective "presidency." As was the case
with its predecessor, the State Council is selected by the
National Assembly from its membership. Changes of
lesser importance include the open acknowledgment that
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FIGURE 41. Todor 7-hivkov, First
Secretary of the Bulgarian Com-
munist Party since 1954 (C)

the Communist Party is the "leading force" in society;
the provision that Bulgaria's alliance with the U.S.S.R. is
the cornerstone of the country's development; and the
designation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria vs a
"socialist state," without, however, formally changing
the official name (if the state. Because these changes are
portrayed as reflecting Bulgaria's "highs I age of
socialist development," they are ideologically iu.portant
to the party's self- image, but they neither enhance nor
detract from its established monopoly of power.
The 10 chapters and 139 articles of the 1971
Constitution may be grouped into five broad categories:
sociopolitical system, socioeconomic system, rights and
obligations of citizens, structure of the government, and
miscellaneous articles dealing inter alia with the capital,
flag, coat of anus, and the state seal. According to the
Constitution, all power emanates from the people and
belongs to them. This power theoretically is exercised by
direct balloting ar.d, subsequently, through elected
representative organs.
Like its predecessor, the 1971 Constitution provides for
executive, legislative, and judicial organs of government.
There is no provision, however, fora separation of powers
as in the United States, nor would such a provision be
meaningful in view of the Communist Party's avowed
and genuine control over the governmental structure as a
whole. The legislative branch of the government, the
National Assembly, is described as the supreme organ of
state authority. The State Council, which also functions
as the assembly's standing executive body, does most of
the legislative groundwork. Aside from the National
Assembly committees, which perform some year -round
legislative tasks, the activity of the National Assembly is
limited to brief sessions when it formally approves
legislation and decrees already put into effect by the
State Council. The 1971 Constitution provides for such
National Assembly sessions at least three times a ,year, an
increase of one over the semi- annual meetings required
by the 1947 Constitution. If one -fifth of the members so
desire, the assembly may be convoked in special session.
The State Council is called the supreme organ of the
National Assembly and the supreme "permanently
acting" state organ. It wields power in the name of the
National Assembly and, according to Article 93, exercises
"general leadership of the state's domestic and foreign
Policy" while the National Assembly is riot in session.
The question of the constitutionality of an existing law
has never been raised, nor does the Constitution provide
for judicial review of legislation. Article 85 of the
Constitution provides that the National Assembly alone
has the right to decide whether all requirements of the
Constitution have been observed in the making of a law
and whether the law is contradictory to its provisions.
The Constitution assigns the function of "interpreting"
laws to the State Council, which also has the theoretical
right to repeal executive orders that contradict the
Constitution. Far from being a meaningful constitutional
safeguard, these provisions merely underscore the existing
prerogatives of the State Council in arbitrarily initiating,
implementing, or annulling legislation.
Like its predecessor, the new Constitution stipulates
that judges are independent, being subordinate "only to
the law." judges, however, .ire elected by local
government bodies from lists of candidates prepared by
the Ministry of justice and approved by the BCP. In
essence, therefore, the BulgL Tian legal apparatus
continues to function as an extension of party authority.
Typical of a Communist -state system, and in line with
a Bulgarian tradition of centralism, the central or
national government bureauracy completely dominates
local government. The organs of local government
(people's councils) are constitutionally defined as "organs
of state rule and people's self- government." In reality,
the powers and functions of local government are
delegated and delineated by the central authorities, while
its organization is that of a highly structured hierarchy.
The clear subordination of each local government body
to the next higher echelon is spelled out in Article 120 of
the Constitution, which grants district people's councils
authority to repeal "illegal or incorrect" acts of councils
on the communal level. The ultimate authority of the
central authorities over the entire local government
structure is defined further in Article 120 which gives the
Council of Ministers authority to resolve disputes
between central administrative organs and executive
committees of district people's councils.
The Constitution nominally grants to the people the
following "basic rights freedom of speech, assembly,
and press; equality before the law; freedom f religious
�.iorship; universal suffrage and the right to hold public
office for all citizens who have attained the age of 18
years (with the exception of those deprived of political
rights); secret ballot; inviolability of the home and person
(except on th- basis of extant laws); and the right to form
organizations (with the exception of those which
propagate "Fascist or antidemocratic" ideologies).
Both in theory and practice, however, the Bulgarian
citizens' constitutionally defined freedoms are open to
abridgement by both governmental decrees and the
caprice of officials. The police can legally forbid any
public meeting. The formation of political parties and
organizations is subject to the legal requirement that all
public organizations be registered with the police.
Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to public
organizations, and freedom of religious worship is sharply
limited. Religion, for example, cannot serve as grounds
for refusal to fulfill obligations imposed by the
Constitution or laws.
Amendments to the Constitution can be proposed by
the State Council, the Council of Ministers, or at least
one fourth of the National Assembly, where adoption
requires a two- thirds vote. The Constitution expressly
permits the enactment of legislation altering official
procedure. Special laws have already been passed to
establish larger administrative units; to create, abolish,
merge, or renam: ministries; and to specify the rules
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governing the election of judges and to refine and
amplify the criminal and civi! codes.
2. Structure of government
a. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
The National Assembly is a unicameral body
composed of 4W delegates popularly elected for a 5 -year
term. Of the deputies elected to the Sixth National
Assembly in June 1971, about 66% were members of the
BCP, and 25% were members of the Agrarian Union
(BZNS), which is controlled by the BCP. The remaining
9% included a number of members representing the
Komsomol youth organization and a handful of
"nonparty" delegates. Since the BZNS members
represent more than one -fifth of the total delegates, they
are able, according to the provisions of the Constitution,
to convoke the National Assembly on their own initiative.
The assembly, however, has never been convoked in this
manner since the Communist takeover of Bulgaria.
Although the 1971 Constitution stipulates that the
National Assembly is 'he sole legislative body, it actually
performs little legislative work, and its three mandatory
sessions a year are of aly 2 or 3 days' duration each. As
indicated above, the activities of the assembly are largely
confined to the formal approval of the decrees issued by
the State Council after having been prepared in advance
by the Council of Ministers or by the BCP Politburo.
Legislation encounters no opposition as such when
presc�ited for formal approval by the legislature. The
assembly also ratifies major appointments made by the
chairman of the Council of Ministers and the State
Council.
The assembly thus continues to perform the role of a
rubberstamp, contrary to press claims of its broadened
po% and responsibility. The right of legislative
initiative rests with many different agencies, both within
and outside the formal structure of government, a fact
which further negates even the theoretical legislative
powers of the assembly. Under the 1971 Constitution
legislation may be proposed by the State Council, the
Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, the permanent
commissions of the National Assembly, and the central
organs of major mass organizations. The right of debate
and discussion although enshrined in the new
Constitution �is severely limited by the short duration of
the assembly sessions. Some departure from the normally
rigidly controlled sessions of the assembly was observable
in the late 1960'x, but such more lively meetings have
since then proved to be the exception.
b. S'L'ATE COUNCIL
The State Council is a standing body nominally
elected by the National Assembly and responsible to it.
As with all other government bodies, the State Council is
in fact completely subservient to the Communist Party.
The State Council has considerably more constitutional
authority than its predecessor (the Presidium of the
National Assembly), and there are strong indications
that, particularly with Zhivkov vt its head, it will become
the most influential government body. As initially
constituted in July 1971, the council is composed of 23
members including a chairman (Tudor Zhivkov) who is
60
ex officio head of state, a first deputy chairman, three
deputy chairmen, and a secretary. Billed as the" supreme
and permanently acting organ of state rule," the council
has extensive theoretical powers, including the overall
leadership of the country's defense and security,
representation of the country in its international
relations, and the enactment of legislation when the
assembly is not in session. The State Council's authority
in foreign relations extends to the appointment and recall
of Bulgarian representation abroad, establishment of
diplomatic ranks, and the ratification of international
treaties. The latter power is exercised by the State Council
on a permanent basis, even during the few days the
assembly is in session. When the National Assembly is not
in session, the State Council may declare a state of war in
case of armed attack, decree general or partial
mobilization, and appoint and dismiss the armed forces
supreme command and the members of the State
Committee for Defense. One of the State Council's most
important executive functions is that of supervising the
activities of district and local administrative organs �the
district and community people's councils �a power that
is shared, however, with the Council of Ministers. It is
empowered to abrogate their acts if it finds them
unlawful and to dissolve people's councils or to remove
their executive officers.
C. COUNCIL OF M INISTERS
The Council of Ministers (cabinet) is defined by Article
98 of the Constitution as the principal executive and
administrative organ of state rule. As such, it directs the
daily affairs of state by supervising and controlling the
operation of the numerous ministries and other executive
agencies of government and oversees generally the
implementation of governmental policy in accord with
guidelines established by the party hierarchy.
In early 1972 the Council of Ministers, in addition to
Premier Stanko Todorov, two first deputy premiers, and
five deputy premiers, consisted of 20 ministers with
portfolio, and three heads of committees with ministerial
rank with the following areas of responsibility:'
Ministries:
Agriculture and Food Industry
Internal Affairs
Architecture and Public Works
Internal Trade and Public
Construction and Construction
Works
Materials
Justice
Finance
Labor and Social Welfare
Foreign Affairs
Light Industry
Foreign Trade
Machine Building
Forests and Environment Pro-
National Defense
tection
National Education
Heavy Industry
Public Health
Information and Communica-
Supply and State Reserves
tions
Transport
Committees:
State Planning Committee
Committee for Science, Technical Progress, and Higher
Education
Committee for Art and Culture
'For a current listing of key government officials, consult Chiefs of
State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published
monthly by the Directorate of IrAciligerim, Central Intelligence
Agency.
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The Constitution empowers the National Assembly to
create new ministries and to abolish, merge, or rename
existing ones. Individual members of the Council of
Ministers are nominally appointed and dismissed by the
National Assembly, or, when the assembly is riot in
session, by the State Council "at the recommendation of
the Premier." In the latter case, final approval is
,opposed to be secured from the assembly. Deputy
ministers and administrative heads at the subministerial
level are appointed by the State Council without the
need of assembly approval. In practice the composition
and structure of the Council of Ministers is
predetermined by the party, with the National Assembly
automatically approving the Premier's recommendations.
Numerous committees, commissions, and independent
agencies whose chairmen are not accorded ministerial
rank swell the relatively large bureaucracy of the central
government.
d. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Local government is based on a two -level system of
people's councils �the okrug (district level) and the
obshtina (municipality; community or commune level)
which exercises authority over corresponding areas of the
country's administrative- territorial divisions. In mid -1971
there were 28 administrative okrugs (inset on Summary
Map) in Bulgaria (one of which was the capital city,
Sofiya) and 1,095 obshtina, of which 977 were rural and
118 urban communes. The city of Sofiya is divided
further into rayons. The Constitution allows for the
creation of other administrative territorial units. Deputies
of the people's councils are elected for 2- and 3 -year terms
from candidate lists prepared by the party dominated
mass organization, the Fatherland Front.
Deputies of a people's council elect from among
themselves an "executive and managerial" body called
the executive committee, which is in continuous session
and carries on the work of the council between its
sessions. "Party groups" are attached to the executive
committees to insure party control at the local level.
Okrug people's councils are required by the
Constitution to meet at least four times a year, and the
obshtina and city rayon councils not less than six times a
year. Extraordinary meetings may also be convoked,
usually at the initiative of the council's executive
committee. At the district level, people's councils are
assigned broad responsibility for management of the
district economy, and for health, education, cultural, and
social matters. Through their own executive committees,
district councils control and direct the activities of
planning and construction organizations, of state farms,
of locally important industrial enterprises, and of
wholesale and retail commercial establishments. They
formulate and administer their own district budgets
(within the framework of the overall state budget),
provide leadership for the cooperative farms, and share in
the coordinated direction of the economic activities of
cooperative farms and of enterprises.
The executive committees of the people's councils on
each level are subordinate to the next higher level
executive committees and, through them, to organs of the
central government. The central government (the
Council of Ministers and the State Council) has the right
to abrogate measures of executive committees of people's
councils, a frequent way in which disputes arising
between the central authorities and executive committees
of okrug people's councils are resolved by the Council of
Ministers.
e. JUDICIARY
Although the Constitution states that "judges and
people's assessors (lay judges) are independent and
subordinate only to the law," the entire court structure,
the bar, and the state prosecution are viewed by the
regime as component parts of a system designed to
protect "socialist legality," that is, to administer such
"justice" as is in the interest of the state. Indeed, the
subordination of the judiciary to the party is underscored
by the constitutional provisions that the Supreme Court,
which supervises the activity of the entire court system, is
"accountable" to �i.e. controlled by �the National
Assembly and, when the assembly is not in session, to the
State Council. Since the aSF :mbly is controlled by the
Communist Party working through the State Council, the
"independence" of the judiciary is clearly a sham.
The hierarchical structure of the court system
comprises a Supreme Court at its apex, about 12 regional
or district courts, numerous communal courts, people's
courts, and special courts such as military courts and
transportation courts. According to the Constitution,
members of the Supreme Court are elected for a 5 -year
term by the National Assembly to which they are
accountable. Judges and assessors (lay judges), of all
lower courts are elected by the appropriate people's
councils. The new Constitution of 1971 does not make
clear .whether judges sitting on people's courts will
continue to be elected directly by registered voters as
hitherto. In theory, judges are responsible to the bodies
which elect them. In actual practice, however, the entire
judicial system is centralized under the Ministry of
Justice, which selects prospective judges for the bench at
all levels, appoints all judicial personnel except judges,
and supervises all judicial personnel and initiates
disciplinary action against them.
People's courts are the courts of first instance for petty
civil cases, criminal cases except crimes against the state,
and juvenile cases. Decisions and sentences of these
courts are reviewed by district courts. Each people's court
is presided over by one professional judge and two lay
judges.
District courts try civil cases concerning marital,
inheritance, and adoption questions, large civil claims
against state enterprises, and crimes against the state
committed by private citizens. Decisions and sentences
are reviewed by the Supreme Court. One judge and two
lay judges preside over each district court.
The Supreme Court tries in the first instance crimes
against the state committed by state officials. It may also
assume jurisdiction over any civil or criminal case which
61
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originally came before either a people's or a district court.
The chairman of the Supreme Court may reopen any
case, even after judgment or sentence has become valid.
In contrast to the U.S. system, interpretation of laws and
testing of their constitutionality are not functions of the
Supreme Court, nor of any segment of the judiciary. By
constitutional decree, the State Council interprets the
laws and the National Assembly alone rules on their
constitutionality.
There are three special court systems: the military court
system, which includes military courts of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs; transportation courts; and comradely
courts. Military personnel, civilians employed by military
establishments, and civilians who commit crimes as
accomplices of military personnel conic under the
jurisdiction of the military court system. Transportation
courts try workers and officials of the Ministry of
Transportation who commit "socially dangerous" crimes
in connection with their work. In 1960 a system of quasi
judicial comradely courts was established and given the
right to decide cases of a private nature and minor
offenses against public order and discipline. These courts
have only limited power to impose and enforce judgment
and sentence, which normally consists of varying degrees
of social opprobrium and pressure.
A key figure in the judicial system and law
enforcement agencies is the Chief Prosecutor, who
supervises the district, municipal, and communal (radon)
public prosecutors. The Chief Prosecutor, elected to a 4-
year term by and theoretically responsible to, the
National Assembly, is in practice an instrument of the
party for suppression of political opposition. In theory
both the lower courts and the public prosecutors are
subject to overall supervision by the Supreme Court, but
the prosecutors, in cooperation with the regular and
secret police, actually dominate the entire judicial
process.
The legal code includes the right of appeal, and from
time to time decisions of lower courts are overruled on
various grounds, including that of arbitrary judgment.
3. Legal codes and penal system
a. CRIMINAL CODES
On 15 March 1968 the National Assembly adopted a
new Penal Code, in preparation since 1963, which
superseded the old Penal Code of 2 February 1951. The
1951 code, Bulgaria's first under Communist rule, had
replaced the Penal Law of 1896 which was derived from
German sources through Hungarian penal law. The most
recent penal statute of 1968, as was true of the 1951 code,
is patterned closely after Soviet jurisprudence.
The Penal Code of 1968, divided into general and
special sections, contains 424 articles. The former sets
forth the Communist concept of justice, while the latter
enumerates crimes and lists specific penalties. The code
differs front its predecessor in the inclusion of a greater
number of modern concepts of penology, including
parole and pardon (both absent from the 1951 code), and
62
in the increased emphasis on rehabilitation "educational
measures and on compulsory medical treatment. At the
same time the maximum term of imprisonment has been
generally reduced from 20 to 15 years, except for murder
and in some cases of recidivism. The death penalty is
reserved as an "exc, measure" in cases involving
the "gravest crimes.'
The defined objectives of the Penal Code are the
protection of the social and legal order of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria as well as of the rights of the citizen,
protection of the socialist economic system and socialist
property, and "educating citizens to observe the rules of
society." Protection of the individual rights is a new
theme, absent from the old code but found throughout
the new document. Thus, the definition of a "socially
dangerous act" has been expanded to include actions
that endanger or harm individual rights in addition to the
hitherto specified actions against the state and its social
and legal order. The essentially propagandistic value of
these changes is perhaps illustrated by the addition of a
chapter in the special section entitled "Crimes Against
the Rights of Citizens," even though this chapter
contains no new additions to the old code.
Under the 1968 code the most severe sentences are
reserved for such political crimes as high treason,
espionage, diversionary activity, sabotage, and offenses
against Bulgaria or another Communist state, which with
few exceptions are punishable by 20 years' imprisonment
or death. A Bulgarian Communist legal writer has listed
poLtical crimes as high treason, espionage, conspiracy,
armed riot, terrorist acts, participation in an attempted
coup, sabotage, counterrevolutionary agitation and
propaganda, providing asylum for a person who has
committed a crime against the state, and failure to
inform the authorities of a crime against the state.
The code does not differentiate between major and
minor crimes (felony and misdemeanor) and merely uses
the term crime (prestuplenie). Article 9 of the code
defines a crime as every socially dangerous act (of
commission or omission) which is covertly perpetrated
and which is punishable by law. The criminal code also
provides punishment for so- called economic crimes
against the state; these are defined as acts intended to
disturb or undermine industry, transportation, agricul-
ture, the monetary system, or other economic activity, or
a failure to carry out entrusted major economic
assignments (mismanagement). Such economic crimes
are labeled sabotage and are punishable by prison terms
of 3 to 10 years, and, in particularly severe cases, by
sentences of up to 15 years.
The code of criminal procedure describes the process to
be followed from the apprehension of a criminal to the
final disposition of the case by the courts. Criminal
proceedings are initiated by the investigative agencies
(police) and the prosecutor on their own initiative, in
response to accusations by citizens, enterprises, mass
organizations, or public officials, or as a result of a
confession.
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1). PENAL SYSTEM
The three types of prisons provided for in the 1938
General Regulations for Prisons are still in existence: 1)
central prisons for those sentenced to 3 years or more; 2)
local prisons for terms of less than 3 years; and 3) special
prisons for women, political prisoners, mentally
incompetent persons, and juveniles. forced labor camps
(so- called labor rehabilitation camps), first created in
1945, were originally regulated by the provisions of the
1948 Militia Law (Articles 52 -55), but a 1955 Decree on
the Militia made no mention of such camps, probably
because of the post Stalin thaw and the regime's
allegations at that time that the camps were being
eliminated. They still exist, however, and amendments
made in 1956 to the code of criminal procedure mention
prisons, prison camps, and corrective homes. Many of the
labor camps as well as the prisons provide labor for
specific projects; their primary purpose, however, is
confinement of politically unreliable elements. The
Bulgarian Government provides no statistical informa-
tion on the number of prisons and labor camps or the
number of inmates, and no manner of making reliable
estimates is known.
C. Political dynamics (C)
1. The political system
Communist rule imposed on Bulgaria in the aftermath
of World War II resulted in the destruction of prewar
political, social, and economic patterns, the elimination
of all genuinely free political organizations, and the
establishment of a rigid, Soviet -style political framework.
Prewar political parties were either not permitted to
resume their activities after the war, or they were
eliminated as meaningful, independent entities during
the postwar consolidation of Communist power. The
latter applied to the Agrarian Union Party.
Throughout the postwar period, therciore, Bulgaria has
been a one -party dictatorship in a modern totalitarian
state. The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) has been
formally acknowledged "the leading force" in the
"society and state" by the 1971 Constitution, and the
only other political party �the National Agrarian Union
(BINS) �has been depicted as working "in close fraternal
cooperation" with the BCP in building a developed
socialist society. The BZNS, however, is it mere shadow of
the dominant pre -World War I I party of the same name.
With a membership of 120,000 in 1971 �a figure which
has not changed in several years �the BINS is wholly
controlled by the BCP, and in most respects should be
considered as another Communist -run mass organization
rather than as a political party. Its organizational
structure closely parallels that of the BCP.
There exists no postwar legislation dealing specifically
with the role of political parties. The Constitution
guarantees all citizens the right to form organizations for
political and other purposes (Article 52), but adds that
such organizations cannot be directed against the
socialist system or advance "antidemocrat; programs
Although this provision theoretically sanctions the
continued tolerance of a norninally multiparty system,
the reality of unquestioned Communist power makes the
right of citizens to organize for political expression
meaningless. Sirr.'larly, the apparatus of the state can be
viewed as a bureaucracy parallel to, but under the control
of, the BCP; the countrv's National Assembly as well as
its local government system are thus used primarily as
forums from which the party's policies are explained to
the nation. A similar function is served by the selected
mass organizations which together form the so- called
Fatherland Front. The chief task of the Fatherland Front
is the presentation of a single list of Communist- approved
candidates at election time and the conduct of pre-
election propaganda. Thus, in spite of the apparently real
concern of the Communist leadership for the observance
of political protocol in interinstitutional relationships, the
locus of political power is unquestionably the BCP's
policymaking body, the Politburo, a body unmentioned
in the Constitution.
Since becoming First Secretary of the Party in 1954,
Todor Zhivkov has weathered purges, intraparty
factionalism, and shifts in the Soviet leadership to
become head of both party and government at the end of
1962. Since an abortive antiregime conspiracy uncovered
in 1965, and particularly since the Ninth Party Congress
in late 1966, Zhivkov has increasingly dominated a
strongly pro Soviet regime that has exhibited an
unprecedented measure of stability and cohesiveness.
The 10th Party Congress in April 1971 symbolized his
complete control over all reins of power. Zhivkov has
achieved a careful balance in the political makeup of the
Politburo, the party's most powerful political body, by
co- opting more pragmatic, technically qualified, and
usually younger functionaries to serve alongside the
older, cteran revolutionaries. The younger group seems
self assured and dedicated to helping Zhivkov reshape
the regime along somewhat more pragmatic but no less
orthodox lines.
Since 1966 changes in the top leadership have been
few, as Zhivkov appears to have overcome the endemic
factionalism of the party. At the IOth Party Congress in
April 1971 only former Minister of Foreign Trade
Luchezar Avramov lost his central leadership positions,
perhaps because of a foreign trade scandal uncovered in
late 1969. At the congress, Zhivkov demonstrated his full
control over the party machinery and there were few
personnel changes at the highest (Politburo) level.
However, some new blood was brought into the Central
Committee, which was expanded from 137 to 147 full
members, and the alternate membership was increased
from 87 to 110,
The leadership councils of the country in 1971 were
under the unquestioned dominance of party boss Todor
Zhivkov, who relies to a large degree on his senior
lieutenants Stanko Todorov and Boris Velchev. Velchcv
(Figure 42) is the ranki ig secretary of the Central
Committee after Zhivkov with main responsibilities for
cadres and ort;anizationul affairs. Stanko Todorov
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attempt to maintain flexibility in foreign affairs may in
part have caused the setback to his career.
(Figure 43), who is believed to have long handled
economic affairs in the secretariat, succeeded Zhivkov in
mid -1971 as Chairman of the Council of Ministers
(Premier) and no longer has party secretarial duties. Past,
unconfirmed reports state that Zhivkov has selected
Todorov (age 51 in 1971), as his successor to the top party
position in the event of a mishap. Zhivkov Zhivkov �no
relation to the party chief �who handled key
governmental responsibilities until his demotion in July
1971 from First Deputy Premier to one of six deputy
premiers �had been considered as a "comer" because of
his age (56 in 1971) and experience in economic affairs.
However, his reputedly strong advocacy that Bulgaria
r:
2. Party organization
Organizationally, the BCP parallels the government
apparatus and exercises effective control over it (Figure
44). The basic rules for the organization, functions, and
membership of the party are contained in the party
statutes, adopted in 1945 and revised periodically at
party congresses. The statutes incorporate verbatim many
of the most important articles of the statutes of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
As in other Communist parties, the leading
organizational principle of the party is democratic
centralism. The main elements of this principle include
the election of all party leaders, periodic accountability
to higher party organs, strict party discipline with
subjection of the minority to the majority, and the
indisputable and compulsory nature of decisions of
high, party bodies. In theory, power flows upward, but,
in pi.acticf the centralist aspects dominate. Party
positions, for example, are filled by appointment from
abo� and elections are v mere formality. Every
Communist is expected to obey the orders of his superior
without question.
The party is organized in accordance with the
country's territorial subdivisions, with a central apparatus
in Sofiya, and with subordinate organizations in districts
and cities. The lowest level is referred to as the basic party
organization (purnichna partina organizatsiya), which
varies greatly in size. Each level is generally similar in
structure to the next higher level. The representative
bodies are the Party Congress for the national party, the
conference for the district and communal organizations,
and the general meeting for the basic party organization.
a. NATIONAL LEVEL
The Party Congress, formally designated the supreme
party organ, stands at the apex of the party structure. As a
collective body, the congress hears and approves the
reports of the outgoing Central Committee and Central
Control and Auditing Commission, adopts and amends
the bylaws of the party, and affirms the party line on
basic questions of current policy. It also elects the
members of the Central Committee and the Central
Control and Auditing Commission. In practice, however,
the principal role of the congress is to endorse policy and
personnel decisions already formulated by. the Politburo
and the Central Committee.
Delegates to a congress are usually elreted
approximately 2 months before its convocation; these
elections are pro forma inasmuch as the delegates are
handpicked in advance by the central party alratus in
consultation with the district, city, or communal officials.
The minimum period between congresses was 4 years
until 1971, when the BCP followed the Soviet lead and
established 5 years as the standard interval. Since the
Ninth Party Congress in 1966, the party statutes have
provided for convening National Party Conferences
between congresses as forums for "more fully using the
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FIGURE 42. Boris Velchev, Polit-
buro member and second- ranking
party secretary (C)
FIGURE 43. Stanko Todorov,
Chairman of the Council of Min-
isters (Premier) and member of the
Politburo (C)

BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
NATIONAL
It
Prosecutor
I
CENTRAL
t
COMMITTEE
COURT
PARTY s,
CONGRESS
i
.m
C..:unal
I
I
I
1
06 Councils
1
Secretariat
Court
i
Comradely
Court
Central Control
and Auditing
Commission
DISTRICT
COMMUNAL
PARTY
COMMITTEE'
PARTY
CONFERENCE
Pony
Bureau
Saaatarlat
Control and
flM
Auditing i
Secretory
Commission
GOVERr:.NENT OF BULGARIA
COUNCIL NATIONAL
OF MINISTERS ASSEMBLY
Premier State Council
`I'
Ministries
and
Central Agencies
�St
C
Administrative
Agencies
FIGURE 45. Session of the 10th Party Congress, April
1971 (C)
BASIC
PARTY a
MEMBER Bureau
MEETING
Secretary
ELECTORATE
t
1
1
1
District
It
Prosecutor
I
t
I
COURT
District
.m
C..:unal
I
Prosecutor
I
1
06 Councils
People's
Court
i
Comradely
Court
Appeal control Nden icol organizations exist of both Broad party control over
District and Communal levels. policy implementation AIeOI
Conir.1 i Nominal election or
appointment
FIGURE 44. Party control of governmental structure (U /OU)
collective mind and experience of the party" on special
and important problems. This provision has yet to he
exercised. A session of the 10th Party Congress in April
1971 is shown in Figure 45.
The Central Committee is assigned the task of
directing the work of the party between sessions. The
party statutes state that the Central Committee
represents the party in its relations with other parties and
public organizations, organizes the various executive
agencies of the party and supervises their activity,
appoints the editorial board of the party's central press,
and maintains central funds. The Central Committee is
also supposed to hold plenary sessions at least once every
3 months awl Io keep lower party organizations informed
of its %work, c :andidate members of the Central
Committee can attend plenary sessions but do not have
the right to vote.
Like the Party Congress, the Central Committee does
not have any decisive power, although individual Central
65
CHIEF PROSECUTOR
�StCommittee
E
COURT
ate Control
ommittee
06 Councils
1
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PEOPLE'S
COUNCIL�
EscaaNre
Commlnee
Prmldent

Committee members are politically influential. The size
of the Central Committee, as fixed by the various
congresses, has increased through the years:
Of the 147 full members of the Central Committee
elected in 1971, 106 were reelected and 41 were newly
elected; of the 110 candidate members, 68 were newly
elected. Some emphasis on "youth" is evident in the
composition of the 257 -man Central Committee, as
shown in the following tabulation:
AcE 1966 1971
Under 40 11 33
41 -50 95 117
51 -60 80 79
Over 60 38 28
Thirteen percent of the Central Committee's full and
alternate members now are under the age of 40, a
significant increase over the 5% of the membership in this
age group after the last Party Congress in 1966. The new
members, however, have not changed the overall
dominance in the Central Committee of Zhivkov's
associates from th- partisan days of World War I1. Fully
61 of the members of the new Central Committee were
active in party work before the 1944 takeover.
The Central Committee elected in 1971, like its
predecessor, is made up of about 30% party functionaries,
40% national and district government administrators,
10% military personnel and 10% personalities in art,
culture, and science. There is token representation from
economic amalgamations and mass organizations such as
the trade unions and women's groups.
The real locus of political power in the Bulgarian
Communist Party is the Politburo, whose members
many of whom simultaneously hold top government
positions �are the dominant political figures of the
country. The Politburo exercises control over the party,
and formulates all national policies concerning defense,
internal security, political, social, and economic affairs.
Figure 46 illustrates the interrelationship of top positions
in the party and government.
FIGURE 46. Members of the Politburo and Secretariat and their positions in the govern-
ment and mass organizations (U /OU)
66
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PARTY GOVERNMENT MASS ORGANIZATIONS
FULL
CA NDIDATE
PARTY CONGRESS
MEDiHERS
MEDiDEAS
TOTAL
Fifth (1948) 47
28
75
Sixth (1954)
6
32
97
Seventh (1958)
89
48
137
Eighth (1962)
101
67
168
Ninth (1966)
137
87
224
Tenth (1971)
147
110
257
Of the 147 full members of the Central Committee
elected in 1971, 106 were reelected and 41 were newly
elected; of the 110 candidate members, 68 were newly
elected. Some emphasis on "youth" is evident in the
composition of the 257 -man Central Committee, as
shown in the following tabulation:
AcE 1966 1971
Under 40 11 33
41 -50 95 117
51 -60 80 79
Over 60 38 28
Thirteen percent of the Central Committee's full and
alternate members now are under the age of 40, a
significant increase over the 5% of the membership in this
age group after the last Party Congress in 1966. The new
members, however, have not changed the overall
dominance in the Central Committee of Zhivkov's
associates from th- partisan days of World War I1. Fully
61 of the members of the new Central Committee were
active in party work before the 1944 takeover.
The Central Committee elected in 1971, like its
predecessor, is made up of about 30% party functionaries,
40% national and district government administrators,
10% military personnel and 10% personalities in art,
culture, and science. There is token representation from
economic amalgamations and mass organizations such as
the trade unions and women's groups.
The real locus of political power in the Bulgarian
Communist Party is the Politburo, whose members
many of whom simultaneously hold top government
positions �are the dominant political figures of the
country. The Politburo exercises control over the party,
and formulates all national policies concerning defense,
internal security, political, social, and economic affairs.
Figure 46 illustrates the interrelationship of top positions
in the party and government.
FIGURE 46. Members of the Politburo and Secretariat and their positions in the govern-
ment and mass organizations (U /OU)
66
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PARTY GOVERNMENT MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Although fornally elected by the Central Committee,
t!lc composition of the Politburo is in reality determined
principally the Party First Secretary and, secondarily,
by the Politburo members themselves. 'There is little
evidence to indicate how the work of the Politburo is
organized, or what its precise relationship is to the other
leading bodies of the party.
At the 10th Party Congress in April 1971 almost the
entire Politburo was reelected in tolo. Only alternate
member Luchezar Avrarnov, former Minister of Foreign
Trade, was ousted, presurnably for deficiencies connected
with the foreign trade scandals uncovered in late 1969.
The Polithnro in 197 l has in its I l full members and six
candidate members a still considerable representation of
the older Cormmnnist generation, but it seems to be
dominated by the younger, more technically oriented
supporters of 'Lhivkov. Such energetic personalities as
Poncho Kubadinski, Tano Tsolov, and Ivan Popov have
held full membership in this body since 1966, Popov
having been elevated to the Politburo without prior
membership in the Central Comittee. This emphasis on
vigorous technocrats is also strongly evident in the
promotion of Venelin Kotsev to candidate Politburo
rnernhership, replacing Luchezar Avramov. At the same
time, however, veteran nenbers such as Ivan Mikhaylov
auul Boyan Bnlgaranov were retained. In 1971 fourof the
full members were over the age of 70 and the average age
of the Politburo members was 63.
The Secretariat of the Central Connnittee in 1971 was
composed of seven party secretaries (tour of whom were
also Politburo members) and two other high- ranking
party officials designated as "rnenrbers" of the
Secretariat. Although the party statutes do not define the
structure of the Secretariat, prior to 1966 only party
secretaries belonged to this body. Led by Party First
Secretary %hivkov, the Secretariat is charged with
irnplementing the Politbnro's decisions within the party
and effectively supervising their implementation by the
government bureaucracy. The Secretariat carries out
these tasks through various functional departnents
within the Central Committee, one of the most vital of
which is that controlling personnel assignments.
The effectiveness of rigidly centralized party and state.
rule in Bulgaria depends to it large extent upon the chain
of secretariats which exist at all levels of the party
structure. These secretariats serve as transmission belts for
instructions and directives at each level of party and
government organization, and as control organs over the
selection of delegates to party conferences and congresses.
Each secretariat is subordinated to the secretariat above
and is bound under the principle of democratic
centralism to execute all superior directives without
question.
b. DIS'IUM' AND Coxxu`AI, r.evrtrs
Party organization at the lower levels closely follows
the country's administrative structure. There are 27
district organizations, a separate organization for Sofiya,
and approximately 1,100 cornrnuna l organizations for
connnunitics of widely varying sizes. All organizations
are responsible to the party's central apparatus. Main
party headquarters is shown in Figure 47.
The supreme body in party organizations at the district
and cornmunal levels is, in theory, the conference and,
when the conference is not in session, the comrn'ttee (the
C
ounterpart of the Central Connnrittee at the national
level). The party statutes require that district party
conferences he held at least once every 2 or 3 years, and
that lower level party organizations �at the city, rayon,
municipality, plant, office, and similar levels �must
coordinate the timing of their party conferences with the
district meetings. The principal functions of these
"accountability and election" conferences are to elect
committees and anditing commissions, to hear and
approve their reports, and to discuss party, state, and
economic work in the respective adn laistrative- territorial
area. Communal conferences elect delegates to district
conferences which, in turn, elect delegates to the Party
Congress. Although the election of delegates to the
conferences by Party mernbers at the lower level gives the
appearance of a democratic process, control over the
selection of delegates is always exercised from abo
The basic party organizations (cells), constituting the
lowest echelon, exist in schools, industry, agriculture, the
armed forces, and in the state apparatus. Their size varies
from three to about 300 numbers, with the larger
organizations being subdivided into sections. These basic
organizations are responsible for mobilizing workers for
plan fulfillment, for recruitment of new members, and for
ideological indoctrination of the youth. They are an
important basis for the party's control structure since they
work directly with the rank and file as well as with
nonparty individuals.
Prior to 1971, secretaries of basic party organizations
were required to have been party mcrnbers for at least 3
years. The repeal of this provision at the Tenth Party
Congress was evidently intended to case the selection of
qualified secretaries, especially in rural areas.
C. Mtanen ;su1
BCP membership is open to any working Bulgarian
citizen 18 years of age or older who sloes not "exploit the
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FIGURE 47. Communist Party headquarters, Sofiya (C)

labor of others," who accepts and upholds the party's
program and statute, actively works in a party
organization for the implementation of party decisions,
and regularly pays his membership dues. Party members
are recruited on an individual basis; however, applicants
who are 18 -20 years of age must be members of the
Dimitrov Communist Youth Union (Komsomol). All
prospective members are carefully screened, and the
character, background, and work of the applicants are
thoroughly considered. A change in the party statutes at
the Ninth Party Congress in 1966, eliminated the
previous requirement of candidate party membership as
p,eliminary to full membership.
Membership in the BCP, shown in Figure 48, shows a
sharp increase since 1964 Before World War lI the party
claimed no more than 30,000 members. On 9 September
1944, when the Fatherland Front coalition took over the
government, the party claimed only about 25,000
members. The immediate postwar period saw a rapid
increase in membership, a result of the party's stress on
mass recruitment. The Titoist Kostovite purges of the late
1940's, however, significantly reduced membership.
Since then, membership generally has been on the
increase, although there probably was a slight decline
after the Eighth Party Congress in late 1962. The
apparent reason for this decline was the gradual removal
of Stalinists from the party's rank and file.
The acceleration of recruitment of new members in the
late 1960's reflects Zhivkov's attempt to broaden the base
of party membership. At the 1971 Party Congress he
stressed that it is "absolutely natural" that the
composition of the party be made systematically
younger. He also specified that the "most worthy
representatives of the workers, farmers, and people's
intelligentsia" must be enlisted into party ranks.
The social structure of the party's membership since
1948 is shown in Figure 49. Two trends are discernible: 1)
a steady rise in the membership of the worker and
employee groups, and 2) a corresponding decrease in the
peasant group. In his report to the 1966 Party Congress,
Zhivkov called for an even greater increase in the
membership of the worker group and, in so doing,
charged that some party organizations had not admitted
enough people "engaged in material production." By
FIGURE. 48. GROWTH OF THIs BULGARIAN
COAINIUNIST PARTY (U /OU)
NUMBER PER
TOTAL CLAIMED 1,000 TOTAL
YEAR MEMBERSHIP POPULATION
1946
190,000
69.7
1918
4951,658
69.4
1950
428,846
59.0
1954
455,251
61.0
1958
484,255
612.7
1960
500,()00
6:3.6
1962
528,674
64.9
1964
525,444
64.8
1966
613,000
73.6
1971
699,000
122.6
68
FIGURE 49. DISTRIBUTION, BY PERCENT, OF BCP
MEMBERSHIP ACCORDING TO SOCIAL
STRUCTURE (U /OU)
1971 the number of workers on the party rolls had
increased to 40.1% of total party membership.
3. Mass organizations
The BCP controls numerous auxiliary or mass
organizations which it uses as transmission belts between
the party and the population. Through these
organizations, the party has been able to maintain
political control over all sociopolitical groups; there is
scarcely an adult Bulgarian who does not participate to
s"lmr extent in one or another political, economic, social,
or cultural mass organization. Although membership is
allegedly voluntary, those who refuse to join are restricted
in their activities and are usually regarded as political
unreliables. Statutes of mass organizations generally
imitate the statute of the party, and their top leadership
consists almost entirely of leading Communists. The most
Important mass organizations include the Fatherland
Front, the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, and the
Central Council of Trade Unions.
'The Fatherland Front, headed by aged Politburo
member Boyan Bulgaranov, is the largest and most
influential Communist controlled mass organization.
The major tasks of the front are to mobilize workers for
the fulfillment of production plans and to organize
national election campaigns. Other tasks which the front
performs are recruiting voluntary labor for farms,
afforestation work, and urban perk development;
popularizing Soviet Bulgarian friendship; assisting local
people's councils to meet their obligations; and, through
the system of comradely courts and commissions, to
combat waste, disorderliness, and red tape.
At its 1967 congress, the Fatherland Front reported a
membershir of 3,768,436 which, according to Bulgarian
claims, was 67% of all the voters of the country. Women
made up 1,833,000, or slightly more than 49% of the
membership. Of the total membership, aboilt 84% had
no party affiliation. Yet, of the 1,700 delegates at the
congress, 52% belonged either to the BCP or to the
puppet Agrarian Union. This clearly revealed the extent
of Communist control of the front in that the 16% of the
members who were party affiliated accounted for more
than half of the delegates to the congress.
The Dimitrov Communist Youth Union (Komsomol or
DKMS) in 1970 organized some 1,161,000 young people
between the ages of 14 and 28 in a variety of free -time
educational, recreational, and cultural activities. Acting
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WORKERS
PEASANTS
EMPLOYEES OTIIER
1948..........
26.5
44.7
16.3
12.5
1954..........
34.1
39.8
17.9
8.2
1958..........
36.1
34.2
21.7
8.0
1962..........
37.2
32.0
23.5
7.3
32.4
1966..........
38.4
29.2
1971..........
40.1
26.1
28.2
5.6
1971 the number of workers on the party rolls had
increased to 40.1% of total party membership.
3. Mass organizations
The BCP controls numerous auxiliary or mass
organizations which it uses as transmission belts between
the party and the population. Through these
organizations, the party has been able to maintain
political control over all sociopolitical groups; there is
scarcely an adult Bulgarian who does not participate to
s"lmr extent in one or another political, economic, social,
or cultural mass organization. Although membership is
allegedly voluntary, those who refuse to join are restricted
in their activities and are usually regarded as political
unreliables. Statutes of mass organizations generally
imitate the statute of the party, and their top leadership
consists almost entirely of leading Communists. The most
Important mass organizations include the Fatherland
Front, the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, and the
Central Council of Trade Unions.
'The Fatherland Front, headed by aged Politburo
member Boyan Bulgaranov, is the largest and most
influential Communist controlled mass organization.
The major tasks of the front are to mobilize workers for
the fulfillment of production plans and to organize
national election campaigns. Other tasks which the front
performs are recruiting voluntary labor for farms,
afforestation work, and urban perk development;
popularizing Soviet Bulgarian friendship; assisting local
people's councils to meet their obligations; and, through
the system of comradely courts and commissions, to
combat waste, disorderliness, and red tape.
At its 1967 congress, the Fatherland Front reported a
membershir of 3,768,436 which, according to Bulgarian
claims, was 67% of all the voters of the country. Women
made up 1,833,000, or slightly more than 49% of the
membership. Of the total membership, aboilt 84% had
no party affiliation. Yet, of the 1,700 delegates at the
congress, 52% belonged either to the BCP or to the
puppet Agrarian Union. This clearly revealed the extent
of Communist control of the front in that the 16% of the
members who were party affiliated accounted for more
than half of the delegates to the congress.
The Dimitrov Communist Youth Union (Komsomol or
DKMS) in 1970 organized some 1,161,000 young people
between the ages of 14 and 28 in a variety of free -time
educational, recreational, and cultural activities. Acting
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also as a "feeder" organization of the Communist Party,
the DKMS provides a forum for political indoctrination
and the preliminary selection of potential party stalwarts.
Since the late 1960's, the focus of Komsomol activity has
been on scientific technical training and military and
patriotic education.
The Central Council of Trade Unions (CCTU)
oversees 11 subordinate unions which together organize
perhaps 64 0 of the labor force. As in other Communist
countries, trade unions in Bulgaria do not represent the
interests of the worker; they serve, instead, as propaganda
forums for the regime's economic campaigns and as
instruments of government control.
4. Electoral procedures
There have been no free sections in Bulgaria since
1931, and no elections with opposition parties
particip -ting since 1946. Since the Communisi
consolidation of power, only candidates selected by the
BCP and presented to the people by the Fatherland Front
have appeared on the ballot. Balloting is a civic duty,
and failure to vote has frequently resulted in loss of
employment or other economic sanctions. Both the high
participation rates and the results of national elections
held since 1949 indicate the rigged nature of Bulgarian
elections, as shown in Figure 50.
Preparations for it nationwide election campaign begin
several months in advance. Agitation and propaganda
teams advertise the forthcoming elections as free and
democratic, and public media extoll the achievements of
the regime and make optimistic promises for the future.
In addition, high party officials address electoral
meetings throughout the country and urge the voters to
cast their ballots for the single slate of candidates
presented by the Fatherland Front.
All citizens 18 years of age and older, except those who
have been deprived of civil rights by law, are eligible to
carte. Nationality, sex, race, religion, or social class cannot
be used to deny a citizen the right to vote, according to
the Constitution. Voting is direct and nominally by secret
ballot, but it is very often difficult for the voter to dissent.
Voters may, but do not have to, use screened polling
booths to mark ballots. They must then openly place
ballots that contain the single list of candidates into an
envelope. The envelope, scaled, is dropped into a ballot
box in front of judges. Only one candidate is lisl:ed for
each position. The voter's only choice is to strike from the
list the names of candidates of whom he disapproves.
Because only those voters wishing to do this are likely to
use the polling booths �and thus become suspect �even
this limited form of dissent is rarely exercised.
At the last national elections held in June 1971 �for
delegates to the National Assembly, district and peoples
councils, and courts �all major party leaders were
reelected to the National Assembly. The Fatherland
Front list of candidates received 99.9% of all votes cast.
D. National policies (C)
The principal objectives of the Bulgarian Communist
Party since it seized power in 1944 have been the
consolidation and maintenance of political power, the
ultimate creation of an idyllic "Communist man"
inculcated with the regime's values and goals, and the
achievement of the transition from "socialism to
communism." Domestically, this has meant suppressing
opposition to communism and consolidating an initially
factionalist regime, and, in foreign affairs, pursuing a
co -lrse of nearly complete subservience to the Soviet
Union.
The stress placed on attaining these goals has resulted
in the regimentation of all social groups and the
mobilization of basic institutions, including the
maintenance of a government monopoly of communica-
tions media through which the populace is subjected to a
continuous barrage of propaganda. Coercion has been
used frequently to enforce the implementation of
unpopular policies, to achieve internal uniformity, and to
secure acceptance of Commumist objectives. The regime
has not only used the entire party and government
apparatus toward these ends, but it has also relied
extensively on "mass" organizations reaching into every
sector of society.
Although lagging behind in the liberalizing trend that
swept most other Eastern European Communist countries
until the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Bulgaria
began in 1965 to shed the cloak of stolid conservatism
and dogged Stalinism that characterized the political
scene for most of the postwar years. Th post -1968 events
in Czechoslovakia destroyed the euphoria of liberal
expectations in Eastern Europe, and in Bulgaria resulted
in an immediate retraction of the minor concessions ihut
FIGURL 50. ELECTION RESULTS, 1941) 71 (U/OtlI
PERSONS VOTING VO`r F.S FOR FATIIERI.ANU MONT
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Percent of
Percent
REGISTERED
regi.stered
of votes
YEAR
VOTERS
Number
voters
Number
cast
1949
4,751,849
4,698,979
98.9
4,588,996
97.7
1953
5,017,667
4,991,638
99.5
4,981,596
99.8
1957
5,218,602
5,206,428
99.8
5,204,027
99.9
1962
5,482,607
5,466,517
97.7
5,461,224
99.9
1966
5,774,251
5,751,886
99.6
5,747,133
99.9
1971
6,168,931
6,159,942
99.85
11,154,082
99.9
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in themselves had not vet even become a trend. Domestic
political and cultural rigidity, therefore, has tended to
overshadow the limited innovative aspects of Zhivkov's
economic and foreign policies that had been introduced
in the late 1960'x. With Soviet approval, the regime has
initiated various policies containing clernents of
Bulgarian nationalism and self interest. Zhivkov has
continued, however, to demonstrate unswerving fealty to
the Soviet Union by consulting with Soviet leaders on all
major departures from past policy. Frequent political and
economic consultations are held, both in Sofiva and
Moscow. Figure 51 shows Zhivkov arriving in Moscow in
late 1970 for one of these routine consultations.
1. Domestic
Since seizing power in September 1944, the
Communist regime has been almost continually
reorganizing and adjusting the economic bureaucracy in
an effort to achieve more and better industrial and
agricultural production. This tinkering was most evident
from 1962 -68, a period when the regime initiated a policy
of partial decentralization of economic activity. Marked
by vacillation and uncertainty, and never developed
beyond the experimental phase, the program aimed at
lessening the rigidity of centralist planning and
management by giving subordinate levels a number of
functions and responsibilities. Specific goals included
considerable independence for enterprises in the planning
process, wider application of profitability as a spur to
productivity, and more extensive use of economic levers.
Centrally determined compulsory plan indices were
reduced; "production committees" were formed to
facilitate worker participation in decisionmaking; and
greater freedom of action was allotted to foreign trade
enterprises.
The reform program launched in December 1965 after
almost 4 years of talk, did not abandon central planning,
but an attempt was made, at least on paper, to combine
central control with increased enterprise independence to
permit greater flexibility. These December "theses"
indeed were a liberal document, but many of the most
advanced features were never implemented and the
entire program was overtaken by events elsewhere in
Eastern Europe.
At the party plenum in July 1968 party leader Zhivkov
outlined a "new" blueprint which rojected the concept of
"planning from beiow" as stressed in December 1965 and
advoc4ted a return !a centralized planning. Recentraliza-
tion has meant, in the industrial sphere, delegating many
enterprise responsibilities to state economic trusts (DSO).
Since January 1971, the socialized, nonagricultural sector
of the economy has been run by approximately 70 state
trusts, while the formerly independent enterprises have
become branches of the DSO. In the agricultural sphere
the counterparts of the DSO are the huge "agricultural
industrial complexes" created in 1970 and 1971 to link
d rectly agricultural related industry to large specialty
farms. Some j70 complexes now dominate the
agricultural sector.
Collectivization of agriculture was essentially
completed by 1958, with all but I% of agricultural land
brought into the socialized sector. Over 80% of gross
agricultural output originates on collective and state
farms. Much of the country's agricultural output is
exported, in part to hard- currency West European
markets in order to finance imports. Only a very small
amount of agricultural land has been opened up in the
hist 20 years and there is no new marginal farm land to be
developed. The regime has sought more intensive and
efficient use of the land by mechanization, irrigation,
and the upgrading of the rural labor force. During the
Sixth Five Year Plan (1971 -75), it is envisaged that
irrigated land wili be increased by 250,000 hectares, a
figure which might be scaled down, however, in order to
modernize already existing irrigation systems.
In the industrial sector, the regime has continued to
give preferential treatment to heavy industry, and
particularly to "those branches which contribute to
speeding up technical progress and which yield the
greatest economic results." During the 1.971 -75 plan high
priority is to be given to the "complex mechanization and
automation" of production processes. By the end of 1975,
according to these probably overoptimistic Bulgarian
projections, nearly 70% of economic activity is to be
computerized. Large amounts of Soviet aid are expected,
and, according to some reports, the Bulgarian
FIGURE 51- Soviet leaders Brezhnev
(right) and Kosygin (left) greeting Todor
Zhivkov in Moscow (U /OU)
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automation program is a pilot project for future Soviet
efforts in this field.
The consumer goods industry is promised speedy
development in the 1971 -7:5 period, but past performance
provides grounds for skepticism. A major theme of the
Tenth Party Congress in April 1971 was "concern for
man," portraving the party's solicitude for the welfare of
the consumer. These pronouncements, however. ,were in
large part prompted by the regime's reaction to':u Polish
w orkers' riot in December 1970, aril were not translated
into higher plan goals for consumer- related industry. The
draft of the Sixth Five Year Plan approved at the Party
Congress in April 1971 was little changed from the
version unveiled before the Polish events of the previous
December.
After its ruthless destruction of Bulg :Aria's traditional
small and handicraft industries in the ear "y postwar
period, the regime in the mid- 1960's temporarily eased
some of the rigid controls that had prevented their
reappearance. By 1970, howev+ r, strict controls had once
again been reinstated, primarily hecause many small
scale er` �rprencurs had become too successful. Large.
number:. ,)i artisans had left the "socialist" sector to enter
private business, and a high demand for handicraft goods
arid services had evidently swollen their income. By
contrast, concessions made to the peasantry permitting
them to cultivate private plots have not been reversed,
and 'Lhivkov himself has paid tribute to the importance
of the plots (approximately 10% of the tilled acreage but
officially included in the socialized sector) to the
country's agricultural economy. 'rhe private plots have
been an important source (40 of the farmer's income
and a significant source of vegetables and meat. Income
derived by the peasants from private plots has also
allowed the regime to keep agricultural wages very low.
'rhe regime has regimented all labor in support o its
economic program by maintaining tight government
control of the trade unions and by rigidly planning the
full utilization of manpower. In a campaign to improve
labor discipline, the regime has been attempting to
reduce absenteeism and the prevalence of idle
machinery. Regime authorities, however, have also
decried management's tendency to shift the blame for
laxity to individual workers, and have emphasized that
management itself has contributed to production
shortfalls through inefficient organization and failure to
improve the workers' living arid working conditions. The
regime has attempted to counter a high degree of labor
mobility by implementing wage incentive programs and
improving the quality of on -the -job training.
The regime's cultural policies have been characterized
by a consistently rigid orthodoxy, punctuated only
occasionally by brief periods of respite. Since 1966 -67 a
vigorous campaign has been waged to "integrate," aril
thus better control, all cultural workers and creative
unions under a ministerial level "public 'Late"
Committee on Art and Culture. By 1971 the conin ittee
had set up a network of committees throughout the
country and had Jurisdiction over all creative unions
except the Bulgarian Writers Union (BW
Many classics of Western lite rature are availabie in the
country, but Bulgarian authorities as a natter of policy
carefully screen and control the dissemination of
Coll terrlporary Western literature. Much of the selection
of Western works allowed in the country has centered on
material which either directly or indirectly tends to
support the regime's anti- Western propaganda.
evertheless, Western literature: has been more evident in
recent years, although the Bulgarian reader's diet is still
more limited than that of citizens of niwr other
Communist countries of IE;. +stern Europe. Recognizing
that even this limited "door -ajar policy" toward the West
could result in an influx of "undesirable" influences,
'Lhivkov has consistently warned the people against
"modernism" and "indiscriminate mimicry of decadent
bornrgcoi schools of art." "These warnings have become
particularly pointed as Bulgaria has continued to
encourage its tourist industry.
The regime's emphasis on Bulgaria's historical heritage
is intended in part to counter the effect of foreign
influences on Bulgarian youth. Alienation from
traditional Bulgarian life and society, admiration of what
is foreign, arid lack of strong patriotic feelings are among
those characteristics of Bulgarian youth which are
disturbing top party leaders. The increased efforts by the
regime, in sonic cases employing a more realistic arid
reasonable approach to these problems, have not yielded
expected results, however, arid have had no discernible
success in engendering support for the regimg among
yon��g people.
Regime policies toward religion are ambivalent.
Although actively propagating atheism, especially
among thft youth, the regime considers it expedient to use
existing religious organizations and clergymen for the
mobilization of public opinion behind Communist
policies and goals. "Thus it seeks to harness the
nationalistic tradition of the Orthodox Church to
Communist goals, while generally tolerating religious
services arid practices� within limits �as long as the
religious leaders cooperate.
As in all European Communist countries, social
activities and organizations come under intensive party
and governmental direction and scrutiny. Social activities
fall vv;thin a policy framework which stresses service to
the state arid society as determined by the party. Heavy
stress is placed on indoctrination of young people in
Communist ideology through the educational system and
youth organizations; linking "education with life"
through a polytechnical- oriented educational curricu-
lum; aril assimilation of minorities through the
expansion of cultural and educational programs.
2. Foreign
The formulation of foreign policy is the prerogative of
the Politburo and Secretariat of the BCP. The policy is
then implemented through the party's pervasive
hierarchy within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Major
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questions of policy are sent by the chairman to the
Foreign Policy and International Relations Department
of the Party Secretariat for decision or referral to the
Politburo. Matters of prime importance are forwarded
directly to the Politburo, while on rare occasions an
urgent matter can be relayed directly to party chief Todor
Zhivkov. The newly formed State Council, headed by
Zhivkov, has extensive powers and responsibilities in the
field of foreign affairs. Central among these is
appointment and recall of Bulgarian representatives
abroad, ;:ontrol over the diplomatic service, and
ratification of international treaties. Constitutionally,
ratification of treaties is also a responsibility assigned to
the National Assembly, thereby giving rise to an apparent
overlap of authority that has not yet been resolved.
Additionally, the Constitution grants to the State Council
the general leadership of the state's foreign policy and the
charge to represent Bulgaria in its international relations.
Bulgaria's postwar foreign policy has coincided in all
important respects with that of the U.S.S.R., and Zhivkov
periodically reiterates Bulgaria's continuing loyalty to the
Soviet Union. Zhivkov summed up this aspect of
Bulgarian foreign policy at the Party Congress in April
1971 when he declared that the BCP and people "were,
are, and always will be with the Soviet Union," and that
"there is no power in this world capable of diverting
Bulgarian Communists from this road of unbreakable
friendship." The new Constitution adopted in 1971
formalizes this Bulgarian- Soviet relationship by declaring
that the Bulgarian state serves the people" by developing
and strengthening friendship, cooperation, and mutual
assistance with the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries."
Bulgaria's reaction to major international events has
given substance to these expressions. The regime quickly
followed the Soviet Union in breaking relations with
Israel following the 1967 Arab Israeli war, and it has
continued to hold Israel completely responsible for
Middle East tensions. Sofiya has also aligned itself with
Moscow's line on Vietnam, duly charging the United
States with aggression and professing full solidarity with
the North Vietnamese. Bulgaria was one of the staunchest
supporters of the Soviet -led invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968, a fact which temporarily cooled Bulgarian relations
even with the postinvasion Czechoslovak regime.
Despite the dogmatic position of the government on
international issues, many Bulgarians have been inclined
toward a more moderate position. They argue that both
the Vietnam and the Middle East conflicts have cost the
country money and resources which they feel would be
better used at home. In addition, Bulgaria has never had
a tradition of anti Semitism, and they fear that the
militant anti Israeli stance of the government might
cause anti- Semitism to develop and spread.
On some issues, Bulgaria has been used as a
mouthpiece for Soviet policy, as was evident during the
U.S.S.R's protracted effort to convene an international
conference of Communist countries. Party chief Zhivkov
surprised the delegates at the Bulgarian Party Congress of
72
November 1966 by reviving the call for such a
conference, and he worked actively for its final
convocation in June 1969. Bulgaria has also made
Moscow's principal adversary, China, its own primary
enemy by periodically criticizing Peking for rejecting
joint proposals on Vietnam, for attacking the U.S.S.R.,
and for its splitting activities within the world
Communist movement. This criticism has resulted in a
sharp deterioration of Sino Bulgarian relations, an
animosity only slightly lessened by Peking's assignment
of a new ambassador to Sofiya in 1970. Bulgaria's role
within the Warsaw Pact, its overtures to Albania, and its
political efforts in North Africa and the Middle East are
also fully in accord with Soviet policy.
In carrying out the dictates of Soviet policy, however,
Bulgaria has gradually evolved from the sycophant of the
1950's into a staunch ally in the 1960's, with a more
flexible and active policy designed to serve Bulgaria's
own national interests as well as those of the Soviet
Union. Foreign policy came under intensive review
following the antiregime conspiracy in 1965, and in
December of that year Zhivkov, in a speech to the
National Assembly, pledged to employ all means "to
develop economic and cultural relations with all
countries and peoples on the basis of equality, mutual
advantage, and noninterference in domestic affairs."
Bulgaria's implementation of this policy was nothing
less than dramatic for the 2 to 3 years that it was pursued
most intently. From 1965 until early 1968 the regime
made a concerted effort to improve relations with the
West, mainly with Western European states. High -level
exchanges took place with every country of Western
Europe except West Germany, Spain, and Portugal.
Relations with France improved significantly, largely
because of the simultaneous interest of the French
Government in Eastern Europe. 'Zhivkov himself visited
Paris in October 1966, his first visit to a nonsocialist
country.
Contacts with the Western world were sought on a
broad but selective front, with emphasis on economic,
scientific, cultural, and tourist ties. Bulgarian diplomatic
activity during the first 7 months of 1967 alone included
economic and political consultations with 28 delegations
from various non- Communist countries. As a result of
these and other initiatives, agreements for increased trade
were signed with Sweden, France, Italy, Egypt, Sudan,
Syria, and Iran; joint trading companies were formed
with France and Australia; tourist agreements were
signed with Norway, Austria, Iraq, and Egypt; and,
finally, agreements on scientific, technical, and
agricultural cooperation were reached with Iraq,
Denmark, and France.
Bulgaria's more vigorous diplomatic activity slowed
down in late 1967, and was almost completely stifled for
a time following the Soviet -led invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia in August 1968. Many factors account for the
foreign policy retrenchment of 1967, among them the
increased vehemence of the Sino Soviet dispute,
sharpening differences between the U.S.S.R. and
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Bulgaria's neighbor Romania, the accession of a military
junta in Greece, and increased polemics with Yugoslavia
over Macedonia. Moreover, Bulgaria's foreign trade
deficit became increasingly troublesome in 1967, with the
largest debt registered in the West German account.
Bulgarian -West German economic relations increased
markedly in the mid 1960'x, and by 1966 Bonn became
Sofiya's fourth largest trade partner and the first among
Western countries. At one point in late 1966 Sofiya
appeared closer than any other East European nation to
establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn. Pressure
from the Soviet Union and East Germany forestalled this
development, however, and a mounting trade deficit in
West Germany's favor led to a steady decline of Sofiya's
imports from Bonn. Relations have since continued at a
low -key pace, and Sofiya is clearly staying in the
background of East -West detente, awaiting the Soviet
lead.
Diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the United
States were broken in 1941 because of Bulgaria's alliance
with the Axis powers in World War II. Relations were
resumed in 1947, but the United States withdrew its
diplomatic representation in 1950 after the regime
charged the U.S. Minister with espionage activities and
with plotting to overthrow the Bulgarian Government.
The regime engaged in vitriolic attacks against the
United States throughout the early 1950'x, although in
1953 it expressed willingness to renew formal relations.
With the resumption of relations at the Legation level in
1959, Bulgaria moderated its posture toward the United
States, enabling relations to improve somewhat during
the early 1960's. This period featured settlement of claims
of U.S. citizens arising from war damage and from
nationalization of property in Bulgaria, and an increase
in cultural and official exchanges.
The regime revived its anti -U.S. policies in 1964,
however, following the December 1963 trial of foreign
ministry official Asen Georgiev and his execution as an
American spy. The pervasive anti American propaganda
that prevailed throughout 1964 gradually diminished
despite the stiAns of the Vietnam war, permitting in
November 1966 an agreement to raise U.S. Bulgarian
diplomatic relations to embassy level. Relations have
improved little beyond the "cool and correct" level since
1966. Bulgarian efforts to increase exports to the United
States have generally been unsuccessful mostly because of
the noncompetitive nature of such exports. For its part,
Sofiya blames the lack of trade on U.S. unwillingness to
extend it most- favored nation status. Bulgaria's eager
participation in the Soviet -led invasion of Czechoslova-
kia cooled relations with the United States considera-
bly� leading the United States in 1968 and 1969 to refuse
participation in the annual Plovdiv trade fair. A certain
degree of normalcy, at least, had been reestablished in
bilateral relations by 1971, but Sofiya continues to be
periodically obstinate and uncooperative, often on
seemingly minor issues.
Anti- American propaganda continues at a high level
and the regime invests considerable money in insulating
the populace from Western, especially American,
influences. Bulgaria alone among the Eastern European
countries continues across- the -board jamming of all
Western radio broadcasts.
The outstanding bilateral problem between Bulgaria
and Turkey has centered on the relatively large (8.5
Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Emigration of the Turks,
although briefly permitted and even forcefully
encouraged in 1950 -51, had been prohibited throughout
the rest of the postwar period. Beginning with the visit of
the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Trade to Ankara in
1965 �the first such cabinet -level visit to Turkey since
World War II �the atmosphere of relations improved
enough to allow substantive negotiations on this issue. An
agreement on very limited emigration was formally
signed in March 1968. Cooperation between the two
countries has proceeded smoothly on a number of other
matters, including border controls, health protection, and
transportation regulations. The visit to Sofiya in October
1970 of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel Inspired a
Bulgarian press campaign stressing traditional friendli-
ness between the two countries and was accompanied by
the signing of a consular agreement and setting up of a
joint economic commission.
Bulgarian -Greek relations long foundered on the
"outstanding problem" of payment of Bulgaria's war
reparations debt to Greece, fixed by the Paris peace
treaties of 1947 at US$45 million. Haggling over this
issue, as well as other problems, had produced no results
and a virtual iron curtain existed between the two
countries until 1964, when the reparations deadlock at
last was broken. A number of other agreements
involving trade, cultural cooperation, tourism, and
communications �were signed at the same time, thereby
laying the groundwork for better relations. Since 1964
relations have been relatively correct, becoming slightly
cooler after the Greek military junta assumed power in
1967 and again after the Soviet -led invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Relations improved, however, in
1970 with the signing of a partial border demarcation
agreement and an exchange of high -level visits. In early
1971 Bulgaria made a series of wideringing proposals for
extensive economic cooperation between the two
countries, whose fruition could significantly improve
bilateral relations.
Bulgaria's contacts with the other Eastern European
Communist countries have consistently been :n line with
Moscow's stress on the fraternity and unity of the
Communist nations of Eastern Europe. The country has
been one of the staunchest advocates of "socialist
economic integration" under the aegis of the Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Economic
integration with the Soviet Union, from the enterprise
through the ministerial and national level, is a real goal,
actively pursued, and the subject of daily media
exhortations. During 1967 Sofiya renewed its bilateral
treaties of friendship and mutual assistance (before their
actual expiration) with Poland and the U.S.S.R. and
signed a new treaty with East Germany. This was part of
73
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the Bulgarian effort to help Moscow restore the solidarity
in Eastern Europe's policy toward Bonn that had heen
partially broken when Romania unilaterally established
relations with West Germany in January 1967.
Bulgaria's relations with Albania are cool because of
Albania's support of China in the Sino- Soviet dispute. In
July 1968 relations with Albania reached a low point
marked by the mutual expulsion of embassy staffs.
Relations have improved somewhat, as indicated by the
mutual exchange of commercial representatives in early
1969 and of charges d'affaires in late 1970.
Bulgaria has labored to maintain good relations with
Romania despite the long period of coolness that began
with the award of southern Dobruja to Bulgaria following
Gcrinan occupation of Romania in 1940. Relations
between the two countries became quite close and
remained so until the mid- 1960's, when Romania becarne
more vocal in asserting independent positions within the
Warsaw Pact and CEMA. In 1971 relations were fairly
good, with the overall tone being set by the state of
Soviet- Romanian relations. Sofiya and Bucharest
renewed their friendship treaty in November 1970, some
3 years late. The delay was clearly caused by Romanian-
Soviet difficulties over the text of their own friendship
treaty.
Bulgaria's relations with Yugoslavia have closely
followed the Soviet lead, deteriorating immediately upon
"Tito's break with the Coninform in 1948 and improving
at the time of the Khrushchev Tito reconciliation in
1955. After the Hungarian revolution in 1956 the level of
polemics increased markedly until a second rapproache-
ment between Moscow and Belgrade at the end of 1960.
Relations fluctuated only slightly during the next 8 years,
but deteriorated considerably in the wake of the invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which Yugoslavia, like
Romania, vocally opposed. By 1971, little improvement
was noted in relations, with the Yugoslays failing to send
an official delegation to the Bulgarian Tenth Party
Congress in April.
Apart from being it function of fluctuating Soviet
Yugoslav relations, Sofiya's relationship with Belgrade
has been continually colored by the Macedonian
problem. As a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912 -13 and of
frontier changes during and after World War I,
Macedonia was divided, as shown in Figure 52 among
what are now Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria. Since
then it has been the source of violent debate and
controversy among the many factions seeking to establish
legitimate claims to all or portions of the area. Yugoslavia
looks on Bulgaria's refusal to recognize the existence of it
separate Macedonian nationality claiming that
Macedonians are Bulgarians �as a potential threat to
Yugoslav territorial integrity. In Bulgaria the issue is
exploited for domestic consumption, affording the regime
it safe outlet for Bulgarian nationalism without rebuke
from Moscow. The Yugoslays do not believe that Sofiya
at present aspires to annex Yugoslav Macedonia by force,
but Belgrade is aware that the Bulgarian leadership
fff
FIGURE 52. Approximate division of Macedonia
since 1919 (C)
w ould seek to exploit any eventual opportunity to loosen
Yugoslavia's hold over Macedonia in the post Tito era.
Through late 1967 and early 1968 Bulgaria took the
initiative in the dispute, forcefully promoting its claims to
Macedonia. In mid -1968, because of festering problems
in the Kremlin's relations with Eastern Europe reformist
regimes, the U.S.S.R. took a more active pro Bulgarian
stance in the confrontation. Since late 1969, however, the
Yugoslays have taken the propaganda initiative on the
issue, despite some evidence that both Moscow and
Sofiya desired at least a temporary abatement in the
intensity of the polemics. Thus, in 1971 the future
direction of the Macedonian controversy depended
largely on Belgrade's assessment of Moscow's intentions
vis -a -vis Yugoslavia.
As an enemy of the Allies during World War II,
Bulgaria was ineligible for charter membership in the
United Nations. After unsuccessfully seeking admission
for 8 years, Bulgaria was accepted under the terms of the
16- nation package deal of December 1955 and has since
been a firm supporter of the U.S.S.R. in the United
Nations. Bulgaria is also a member of the following
specialized agencies of the United Nations: International
Atomic Energy Agency; International Labor Organiza-
tion; United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization; World Health Organization; Universal
Postal Union; International Telecommunications Union;
World Meteorological Organization; International Civil
Aviation Organization; and the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization.
The most important Communist nondefense organiza-
tion to which Bulgaria belongs is the Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). The establish-
ment of CEMA was partly in counteraction to the
Marshall Plan, hut, more important, it was a Soviet move
designed to dominate, coordinate, and ultimately
integrate the economics of the Communist East
European countries and to pool economic experience and
technical assistance.
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ROMANIA
YUGUsLnyl:
BULGARIA
VARDAR
BLACK
1
SOFIYA SEA
PIRIN MACEDONI
TIRANE
ALBANIA
AEGEAN
ro c
TURKLY
IONIAN GREECE
2
SEA
ATHENS
FIGURE 52. Approximate division of Macedonia
since 1919 (C)
w ould seek to exploit any eventual opportunity to loosen
Yugoslavia's hold over Macedonia in the post Tito era.
Through late 1967 and early 1968 Bulgaria took the
initiative in the dispute, forcefully promoting its claims to
Macedonia. In mid -1968, because of festering problems
in the Kremlin's relations with Eastern Europe reformist
regimes, the U.S.S.R. took a more active pro Bulgarian
stance in the confrontation. Since late 1969, however, the
Yugoslays have taken the propaganda initiative on the
issue, despite some evidence that both Moscow and
Sofiya desired at least a temporary abatement in the
intensity of the polemics. Thus, in 1971 the future
direction of the Macedonian controversy depended
largely on Belgrade's assessment of Moscow's intentions
vis -a -vis Yugoslavia.
As an enemy of the Allies during World War II,
Bulgaria was ineligible for charter membership in the
United Nations. After unsuccessfully seeking admission
for 8 years, Bulgaria was accepted under the terms of the
16- nation package deal of December 1955 and has since
been a firm supporter of the U.S.S.R. in the United
Nations. Bulgaria is also a member of the following
specialized agencies of the United Nations: International
Atomic Energy Agency; International Labor Organiza-
tion; United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization; World Health Organization; Universal
Postal Union; International Telecommunications Union;
World Meteorological Organization; International Civil
Aviation Organization; and the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization.
The most important Communist nondefense organiza-
tion to which Bulgaria belongs is the Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). The establish-
ment of CEMA was partly in counteraction to the
Marshall Plan, hut, more important, it was a Soviet move
designed to dominate, coordinate, and ultimately
integrate the economics of the Communist East
European countries and to pool economic experience and
technical assistance.
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Other Soviet sponsored international Communist or
Communist -front organizations in which Bulgaria is
represented are the World Peace Council; World
Federation of Democratic Youth; International Union of
Students; Women's International Democratic Federa-
tion; International Federation of Resistance Fighters;
International Association of Dii n eratic I.;rwyers; World
Federation of Scientific Workers; International
Organization of Journalists; International Medical
Association; and International Radio and Television
Organization.
3. Defense
Bulgarian military policy is keyed to Soviet defense
needs and is coordinated through the Warsaw Pact with
the defense policies of the other East European countries
adhering to the pact. A major objective is the creation of
it large, well -armed defense force to buttress Soviet
military forces and to fulfill Bulgarian commitments
under the Warsaw Pact. Bulgarian defense policies also
include: the use of the armed forces as a symbol of
national sovereignty and as an agency supporting
Communist purposes for the political indoctrination and
regimentation of virtually all able- bodied men during
their 2 -year term of active service. This ideological
objective is also furthered by means of a number of youth
organizations which provide extensive premilitary
training and physical conditioning.
Thee Bulgarian military establishment is under the
control of the BCP. Although national defense policies
are formulated by the top elements of the BCP, actual
defense planning appears to be conducted on a bilateral
basis between the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria. Faithful
implementation of Soviet formulated defense policies has
corresponded to the power interests of the Bulgarian
ruling elite. Bulgarian military forces adhere to Soviet
training methods and tactical doctrine.
Planned defense expenditures since 1965 have been
between 6% and 7% of total expenditures. The actual
level of the military effort is difficult to measure because
there is price manipulation within the planned economy
and concealment of defense allocations under other
budgetary headings. Bulgarian defense policies have
been largely successful in maintaining and improving the
country's military position with respect to nearby
potential adversaries.
Bulgaria has taken some measures to provide for
defense against chemical, biological, and radiological
(CBR) warfare. Publications on the subject have
indicated an awareness of the threat, and have
emphasized the necessity for defensive measures.
Responsibility for C:BR defense for civilians is shared by
the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of
National Defense.
The basic task of civil defense in Bulgaria is providing
for the protection of the population from weapons of
mass destruction. Civil defense policies aim to
accomplish this through the evacuation and dispersal of
the population from threatened cities, the organization of
medical and veterinarian support, and the protection of
water supplies and food products. In the event of attack
local civil defense organizations are responsible fc
maintaining civil order; insuring, insofar as possiblv
uninterrupted functioning of industry, transport;ition,
communications, and other vital services; and guiding
cle arance, salvage, and repair operation cat damaged
facilities. In peacetime, civil defense wi4 iti ore used to
maintain medical and sanitary facihtly.. ,.,d to p My
general assistance in the event of natural disaster4
Both the State Council and the Council of Ministers
are responsible for formt,lating civil defense policy, while
direct supervision over civil defense matters probably is
exercised by the Ministry of National Defense. The State
Committee for Defense, appointed and supervised
directly by the State Council, has some central planning
duties in the civil defense field. Regulations and
instructions issued by the Civil Defense Chief, who along
with his staff is appointed by the State Council, are
binding on government agencies at all levels and on the
general populace. Authority to impose sanctions for
noncompliance with regulations is vested in civil defense
chiefs at all levels.
Existing laws require that every Bulgarian citizen over
the age of 18 undergo civil defense training. Employed
citizens are automatically registered at their place of
work; unemployed citizens are organized with a local
residential block organization. Each block is comprised of
several streets depending on the number of houses per
street. Each block chairman supervises one secretary, one
civil defense specialist and instructor, and five or six
squad leaders to direct the activities of their bloeK
members in case of an emergency.
Civil defense training is carried out in close
cooperation with the military services, the Bulgarian Red
Cross, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Although
compulsory, training is brief and elementary in nature. In
1960 the civil defense organization prepared a manual for
high school students describing in a simple manner the
nature of biological agents and methods for their
dissemination. The publication stressed the need for
protection of crops and forests in war, and assigned this
task to state and cooperative farms. In 1966 the
Bulgarians translated and updated a 1962 Soviet
handbook entitled Civil Defense. Their printing of
50,000 copies of this publication indicated the regime's
intention to make widespread use of it for basic
instruction purposes.
Since the late 1950's, underground shelters have been
incorporated in the design of certain large ap. Onient
developments. However, shelter construction in 1:.jIgaria
has probably not been widespread. There have been
many open complaints that public shelters are too few,
arc poorly constructed (faulty ventilation; thin,
nonairtight doors), and have little or no equipment
installed. [n 1962, for example, it was reported that
public shelters had been provided for only about 13% of
Sofiya's population, a deficiency which could well
indicate the low level of investment in shelter
75
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construction throughout the country. There is little
evidence to suggest that this situation has changed in
recent years. Reports indicate that top officials of the
regime are to take refuge, in case of attack, in a series of
underground shelters in the Vitosha Mountains, near the
Sofiya suburb of Boyana. These shelters are reportedly
equipped with independent power units, ventilating
systems, food and water supplies, and military stores. A
restricted area surrounding the Boyana shelters is
patrolled by special guard units, and passes are necessary
to enter.
E. Propaganda programs (U /OU)
The Bulgarian leaders attach considerable importance
to a highly developed and pervasive propaganda
mechanism designed to influence the Bulgarian
population in favor of the regime's domestic and foreign
policies and to provide for dissemination of regime views
abroad. Moreover, the tight censorship and direct
operational control exercised over all information media
prevents effective dissemination of views and facts not
approved by the regime and insures intensive and
ubiquitious propagation of the Communist line within
the country.
The press is the most important domestic propaganda
medium, but either radio or television ranks a close
second. Domestic films, becano, ,.r the lack of technical
facilities and skills, rank 4ourth in irfectiveness. In
addition, all educational ir itutions conc lt themselves
with Communist r,cc�loclnlrttion of the wkvh, while the
various mass coAanizulloll4 Nerve as effectiv channels for
indoctrinatioll III 1111 wglllenls of the p(,, 'ation.
The BCP Pulll1utu exercises completr .,utrol over the
propaganda appa,,.,o propaganda dirctives from the
Politburo are normally c,r,rdinated ..;u the Party -Stale
Commission for Ideologic,l arid Questions and
then channeled through the tropaganda and Agitation
Department of the Party Central Committee (the top
party agency concerned solely with propaganda) to lower
party levels, mass organizations, and agencies of the
government. 'These in turn relay them to their
appropriate administrative and operational elements. All
informational media are guided by these specific
directives, but they are also expected to keep abreast of
the propaganda line established in official pronounce-
ments of party and governmental leaders. Despite its
complete domination of informational media, however,
there is good reason to doubt the effectiveness of the
regime's domestic propaganda program. The pervasi e-
ness and exaggeration that characterize the regime's
propaganda appears to be generally counterproductive
arid, according to Western observers, Bulgarians in nearly
all walks of life regard the propaganda effort with
skepticism and suspicion.
1. Domestic propaganda
The fundamental long -term themes of Bulgarian
domestic propaganda are identical to those of other
European Communist states. 'These include the
76
superiority of the socialist Communist system over the
capitalist system of the West; the eventual victory of
socialism and communism over capitalism by means of
economic competition; the progressive and democratic
character of Soviet political, economic, and social
institutions as contrasted with the reactionary arid
undemocratic nature of similar Western institutions; the
"peaceful" aims of the Communists as contrasted with
the cold war aims of the capitalist imperialist world; the
improvement in domestic conditions in comparison with
prewar conditions; and, the identification of certain
national institutions, leaders, and sentiments with the
progressive ideals of socialism arid communism.
In addition to these basic themes, the regime's
propaganda elaborates a number of appropriate
specialized subthemes directed at specific special interest
groups within the population. The three major targets are
the peasants, workers, aril youth. The military
establishment and the national minorities are also
important target groups. Propaganda directed at all these
groups has the same ultimate objective as all domestic
propaganda �the achievement of a socially, politically,
arid economically homogeneous Communist state.
Shorter range specialized propaganda is designed to
obtain the fullest possible integration of the target group
into the so- called new society, as well as its support for
Communist objectives.
Thc effectiveness of domestic propaganda has been
vitiated by the constant exposure of the populace to
exaggerated claims and boring diatribes. This has been
particularly true of propaganda directed at the youth
who, attracted by the popular music and general youth
culture of the West, has ignored the regime's simplistic
blandishments and exhortations. For this reason, the
authorities in recent years have attempted �wi,h some
success �to modernize the broadcast media in terms of
both technical equipment and sophistication of content.
2. Propaganda directed abroad
The primary objective of the regime's foreign
propaganda is to contribute to the overall effort of the
Soviet oriented Communist countries to proselytize the
Communist system and Soviet sponsored policies.
Secondary objectives of Bulgarian propaganda
broadcasts to the non- Communist countries are more self
seeking, and include developing an image of
respectability for Bulgaria, and portraying it as a modern
country with a rapidly developing economy. Like most
other East European Communist states, Bulgaria
consistently follows the propaganda lead of the U.S.S.R.
on current international issues. Thus, Bulgarian foreign
propaganda asserts that only the U.S.S.R.'s foreign
policy� invariably described as just and correct �will
lessen international tension and preserve world peace. By
contrast, Western diplomatic moves and pronouncements
are generally characterized as attempts to further
imperialist goals and increase international tensions.
Although radio constitutes the major medium through
which Bulgarian propaganda is disseminated abroad,
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diplomatic and trade missions, cultural exchanges, books
and periodicals, and the Bulgarian 'Celegraph Agency
(BTA) are also important parts of the propaganda
apparatus. BTA operates in all Communist capitals and
maintains branches in nine countries outside the
Communist world� Greece, 'Turkey, Iran, Algeria,
'Tunisia, Egypt, Argentina, Uruguay, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany. Sofiya Press, which
purportedly has subscribers in 75 countries, fills its role as
an "independent" news agency by disseminating longer,
feature materials on Bulgaria.
fter a rapid growth in both coverage and volume after
the total number of broadcast hours by Sofiya
�ational Service has remained relatively stable
n 1967 and 1971. Beginning in 1945 with
..s in nine languages totaling about 18 broadcast
It -ekly, the country's official international
I.i. oh ,i rig output in 1967 totaled about 161 hours
11, 10 12 languages. By 1971 Bulgaria was
acting about 170 hours weekly in 11 languages,
.1deasts in the Macedonian language having been
dropped and Serbo- Croatian and Bulgarian language
program hours having been increased. Programs are
targeted at audiences in Europe, Africa (especially
central and west Africa), the Western Hemisphere, and
the Arab world, utilizing six shortwave and three medium
wave transmitters. One "clandestine" radio station Radio
Peak -e Iran, (the Iran Courier), is located in Bulgaria,
and broadcasts a total of 25 hours of programs weekly in
three languages (Azerbaidzhani, Kurdish, and Persian).
Figure 53 provides an overall comparison of Bulgaria's
radio transmissions to specific foreign areas.
The changed allocation of broadcast time devoted to
specific geographic areas is consonant with Bulgarian and
Soviet foreign policy objectives as well as with the
ideological competition growing out of the Sino- Soviet
dispute. Radio Sofiye broadcasts to Arab countries have
increased from 3 hours 30 minutes it week in 1956 to 18
hours 30 minutes a week in 1967. Other notable increases
in transmission time have been evident in Turkish
language programs which accounted for 21 hours 30
minutes weekly in 1967 as compared with only 5 hours 15
minutes in 1955, and Greek language programing, which
increased to 21 hours 30 minutes a week from 5 hours 15
minutes in 1955. Since 1967, Yugoslavia has been the
target of in increased Bulgarian propaganda effort. Thus,
Sofiya has increased its Serbo -Croat programing from 4 to
1.1 hours weekly, and, in keeping with its "nonrecogni-
tiori" of a selarate Macedonian nationality, has dis-
continued `tacedonian- language broadcasts.
3. Propaganda from Western countries
Informational activities conducted by non- Communist
countries within Bulgaria are negligible because of
restrictions imposed by the regime. As a result,
information from Western countries reaches Bulgaria
primarily in the form of radiobroadcasts. Fight major
Western broadcasting services can be heard in Bulgaria,
with a combined Bulgarian language schedule of about
FROM BULGARIA
Total Broadcasts
196:00 hours
Turkish Arabic
21:30 18:30
Spanish Bulgarian
14:00 27:20
Serbo- Croatian English
14:00 24:30
BULGARIA
Esperanto
1:00
Azerbaidzhani
Kurdish,
Per sian�
25:40 French
Italian 14:00
7:00
Greek German
21:30 7:00
*Radio Peyk -e Iran
Greece Radio Free Europe
1:00 52:30
United Kingdom Vatican
14:45 2:05
Turkey oice of America
3:30y 10.30
BULGARIA U.S.S.R.
Italy 10:30
2:20
West Germany Yugoslavia
14:00 8 :00
Albania Monaco
28:00 1:30
TO BULGARIA
Total Broadcasts
148:40 hours
FIGURE 53. Radiobroadcasts to and from Bulgaria,
1971 (C)
148 hours weekly in 1971. The weekly schedule of major
broadcasting services in the Bulgarian language to
Bulgaria is shown in Figurc 53. The regime stopped
jamming British Broadcasting Corporation transmissions
in the spring of 1964; but as of 1971 Bulgaria was one of
the few Eastern European countries still consistently
77
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jamming both Radio Free Europe r= Voice of America
broadcasts.
Western propaganda directed cgaria generally
attempts to counter Bulgarian domestic and Soviet
propaganda, to exploit the propaganda vulnerabilities of
the Bulgarian regime, and to furnish objective
information about developments in both the Communist
and non- Communist areas of the world. Western
radiobroadcasts in recent years have employed an
increasingly sophisticated and factual approach in their
news and political reporting while simultaneously
providing more entertainment and special- interest
programs directed to specific groups youth, workers,
and women. ']'his change in emphasis has been in
response to Bulgarian listeners who reported that they
were most interested in factual, medial, scientific, and
educational programs presentee in a simple and
nw;polen ical manner.
The effectiveness of foreign broad cast irig to Bulgaria is
limited by the regime's concerted i�i.rnming efforts,
u +111 in major cities w iilost n�e tend
to i, n eentrated, a0l by 11lt' lINuutainciiis errain of
the country. It is k 1l0%%'PNTr, that the lulgarian
people listen extensivl\ to Western radio srrwirs despite
the regime's use of pr'ssrtrc tactics and intirdation.
F. Threats to g stabili (S)
Bulgaria has virtually no tradition of active political
resistance, and there are no known subversive
organizations operating in the country on a national
side. Indeed there is only scant evidence that small,
localized, informal groupings of anti regime individuals
exist. For all practical purposes, domestically initiated
subversion is virtually nonexistent being limited to
isolated individuals and small groups which occasionally
voice grievances or clam' 'incly distribute pamphlets.
Expressions of discontent leading at the most to work
stoppages, student demonstrations, or intellectual
defiance� undoubtedly upset the party's concern for
orderliness but constitute no meaningful threat to the
regime. Far more pervasive and more debilitating from
the regime's viewpoint is the passive resistance
manifested by many segments of Bulgarian society, an
apathy visible in shoddy workmanship, low productivity,
and it high incidence of theft and drunkenness.
That such apathy has seldom been translated into
ac ;ion is to sonic extent a measure of the effectiveness of
the police system. Moreover, the bleak prospects for
successful action �even in light of the Polish events of
December 1970 when workers forced a change of
regime �are further diminished by the general
expectation among the populace that scriou.; internal
troubles would precipitate Soviet intervention. Such
intervention could be more easily executed in Bulgaria,
where the country's historically closer relations with
Russia have diluted the intensity of anti- Soviet feeling.
'I'hc favorable terrain for guerrilla warfare found in many
sections of the country is thus of little importance. Highly
effective border and travel controls coupled with a
78
pen...ve. internal security system �have insulated the
country from subversion, despite the proximity of non-
Communist Greece and Turkev to the south and of
traditionally hostile Yugoslavia to the west.
An influx of Western tourists in lire late 1960'x, a result
of Sofiya's need for a hard currency earning industry, has
made insulation of the population more difficult. The
increasing inroads of all aspects of Western culture have
elicited cries of "ideological subversion" from the regime
and have spurred it to e ven greater efforts to limit contact
between Western tourists and the Bulgarian people.
"Ideological subversion" has also been a watchword for
the party's guardians of orthodoxy, and the raising of 'I is
specter often has signaled a cru�k(l-m nu dissident
intellectuals.
Perhaps the greatest potential for serious subversive
activity has in the past rested within the leadership circle
of the party and government, largely because of the
chronic factionalism which beset the party. Differences
between the "nativist" and "Muscovite" leaders have
been especially troublesome, perhaps reaching a peak in
April 1965 with the uncovering of an attempted coup
against the Zhivkov regime. Discovered by the Soviet
Committee for State Security (KGB) before fruition, the
Plot was reportedly planned by nationalist military
officers advocating a policy of less subservience to the
U.S.S.B. The accused leaders of the plotting� '('solo
Krustev and Ivan Todorov� evidently had a strong
power base in the northwestern district of Vratsa as a
result of their leadership of the region's anti German
partisan brigades in WW 11. The area long harbored
opposition to Zhivkov's rule, and, indeed, continued to
show evidence of political unrest several years after the
abortive 1965 coup was uncovered. By 1968, after
considerable purging, however, Zhivkov had eliminated
virtually all the malcontents.
Since 'q65 the political controls and informant
network in the military have been considerably expanded
and strengthened. Signs of disaffection among the
enlisted ranks have been few, although the average
conscript undoubtedly brings into the service the same
resentments and antagonisms that are prevalent among
his social class in civilian life. Unconfirmed reports
periodically tell of the arrest or trial of army officers,
often for dissenting activity, but meaningful specific
information is not available. Nonetheless, the military
establishment's main mouthpiece, the defense ministry
daily Narodnya Armiya, consistently infuses its reporting
with nationalistic overtones. In a country labeled in the
past "the Prussia of the Balkans," the status and the
influence of the military evidently continues to be strong.
Official complaints about shortcomings on the part of
some Bulgarian youth have frequently been coupled with
charges of indiffcienee, carelessness. and failure to fulfill
tasks assigned to than. Bulgarian youth especially the
more educated �view their country as corrupt,
overbureaueratic, and too closely allied with the Soviet
Union. Combining idealism and materialism, they
advocate the formation of a "genuine" socialist system,
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free from corruption and able to provide the "good life."
Such disaffection is mitigated by the absence of a clear
idea of differing life styles and is expressed, if at all, in
small -scale incidents. 'ridicule and satire are part and
parcel of student holidays and reflect it resigned cyuicisn
and disillusionment. Government control of both the
"carrot" and the "stick" has engendered an outwardly
apolitical youth, whose values emphasize the importance
of material success. In this light the mass organization
Komsomol �one of the regime's main organs of control
over youth �is considered important by most young
people only because it is a recognized prerequisite for
professional success.
Apathy has seldom been translated into violence. At a
tine in 1968 when embittered Polish youth, infected by
the Dubcek reform period in Czechoslovakia, were
battling police, the Bulgarian authorities were confronted
only by "I'he Disaffected," it small but countrywide
grouping of university students syho advocated a return
to the ideals of past Bulgarian Communist heroes (such as
Dimiter Blagoey and Georgi Dimitrov) and who opposed
the "revisionist" leadership of Todor 7.hivkov. There
continues to be dissatisfaction among university students
over such perennial grievances as excessive study loads,
housing shortages, and overpriced cafeteria facilities.
Some scattered and unorganized demonstrations have
occurred. Other irritants include the highly competitive
and specialized higher educational structure, and
resentment of the better treatment especially higher
stipends afforded foreign students.
Unrest among the peasantry has not been evident since
the� initial shock of forced collectivization in 1950 -51.
Even that period of rapidly forced regimentation
(perhaps 40 of the peasantry was collectivized in one
year) elicited relatively little open resistance and only
scattered sabotage, this in at country whose population
was 80% rural and composed almost entirely of
independent small landowners. Nevertheless, the initial
1950 -51 phase of collectivization was followed by i t 3-
year slow -down and consoli- lation phase, in apparent
deference to the disgruntled peasant whose morale and
productivity fell in equal degree. The 1.easant response to
government pressure has been varied, including apathy,
diffidence, and thievery, but has almost totally excluded
violence. The rapid migration to urban areas, spurred by
industrialization, has been part of the peasant's response
to collectivization. Various agricultural problems �the
marked increase in erosion, the deterioration of land
quality, and the shortages of intensively cultivated
produce �also stem in part from the peasant's attitude.
Concessions to this attitude and to economic necessity
have included the retention of the 11rivate plot and the
curtailment of compulsory deliveries of certain scarce
produce.
Industrial workers, theoretically the group most
favored by Communist governments, are at times restless
and show little enthusiasm for the regime, but they
possess little subversive potential. Their chief complaints
are the high cost and the loNv level of living, poor pay and
long hours, and pressure for fulfillment of high
production norms. Unconfirmed reports of wildcat strikes
and work stoppages circulate periodically, often at the
time of commodity price increases, and may indeed have
some substance in fact. The regime apparently has been
able to cope with such unrest easily, although the high
level attention devoted to trade union activities in the
wake of the Polish worker unrest in December 1970
suggested that the leadership felt the need to reexamine
its policies and capabilities to handle labor unrest.
Potential for subversive activity probably exists among
the largely unassimilated Turkish community, but the
security apparatus keeps close and successful watch on
the activities of this minority through a network of
informers in its midst. Unrest and disturbances among
the 'Turks, reported sporadically, appear most often to be
in the nature of street brawls between Turkish and
Bulgarian youths, and probably present little organized
or actual threat to the regime. The Macedonian minority
in southwestern Bulgaria is much smaller and accordingly
presents even less of a potential threat than the 'Turks.
Nonetheless, Belgrade's policy on the Macedonian issue
is interpreted by Sofiya as one threatening to create a
Macedonian fifth column in support of Yugoslav
interests. As a result, Sofiya has vigorously attempted to
"Bulgarize" the Macedonians. Since 1965, all activity
associated with a Macedonian national identity
including cultural and linguistic expressions �has been
officially forbidden.
The danger of subversion from elements favoring the
Chinese Communist ideological position has been
minimal both within the Bulgarian party and among the
people in general. The leaders of the attempted coup in
1965, however, were condemned is "town criers of
Maoism in Bulgaria," a charge clearly trumped up by the
regime to mask the anti- Soviet thrust of the plot.
Nonetheless, the "Maoist" label has some, albeit only
potential, relevance to the Bulgarian political scene; the
party rank and file still contains substantial numbers of
old -line Stalinists, and Bulgaria, alone among the Eastern
European countries, in 1959 attempted a "great leap
forward" in apparent, but short lived, admiration for
Chinese style and methods.
G. Maintenance of internal security (S)
Public order, internal security, and intelligence are the
responsibilities primarily of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVB) and secondarily of the Intelligence
Division (11UMNO) of the Ministry of National Defense,
which retains a mandate for the collection of military
intelligence. The Ministry of Internal Affairs discharges
its functions through two mail: components �State
Security (which ineludes the secret police) and People's
Militia (regular uniformed police). State Security (DS),
which was independent of the MVR from 1963 to 1968, is
the ministry's major component; it directs the collection
and reporting of foreign and domestic intelligence and
supervises counterintelligence activities. The People's
Militia (NM) discharges the regular police function in
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25X1

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25X1

and A.A. Vasiliev's classic work History of the Byzantine
Empire includes an examination of the role Byzantine
influences played in the shaping of the Bulgarian
national character and its political manifestations.
Bulgaria's role in the Balkans in moa- recent times, and
its relationship with its neighbors are well and reliably
discussed in Rober; Wolff's The Balkans in Our Time.
The origins and pAitieal impact of the perennial Balkan
P?
problern �the issue of Macedonia �has been examined
by Elisabeth Barker in her definitive study Macedonia,
Its Place in Balkan Power Politics. Reliable and
nonpolemical studies of the development of the
Bulgarian Communist Party are few, and most are not
comprehensive; the best of these perhaps is Joseph
Rothschild's The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins
and Development, 1883 -1936.
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SECRET
The Economy
A. The basic setting (S)
Traditionally an agricultural country, Bulgaria has
been industrializing rapidly. The country has it litnited
natural resource base mainly deposits of lignite and
various nonferrous nictals as well as a good hydroelectric
potential. Its economy is more closely tailored t;) the
Soviet model than is any other in Eastern Europe, and
much of its growth has been it result of U.S.S.R. aid and
trade. Bulgaria, however, is still at a relatively low Ieve! of
development.
In 1970 gross national product (GNP) was estimated at
US$I 1.1 billion (in 1969 prices). By aggregate measure,
the economy has progressed quite well. Bulgaria's per
capita GNI' was $1,305 in 1970 (in 1969 prices), which
was greater than Rorm,nia's ($1,142) and almost as large
as Poland's ($1,347). During the Fourth and Fifth Dive
Year Plans 196 1 -65 awl 1966-70. respectiv(ly). total
GNP grew at a respectable average annual rate of 6.7`,'1
(Figure 55). Estimated gross industrial product led the
way with an annual rate of increase of 11.5 Yet,
because of occasional poor harvests and the overall
importance of the agricultural sector to econotic
SECRET
performance, potentially higher GNP growth rates were
not achieved.
Without it large aniount of aid, the economy would
not have grown as rapidly as it did. The U.S.S.R. has
been inure gencrotts to Bulgaria than to any other Eastern
European country, providing over US$2.5 billion in
credits prior to 1970. It also guarantees a market for many
products of Bulgarian industry offering a big advantage
to a country at Bulgaria's level of development, in
contrast to the more advanced countries of Eastern
Europe which have been hcid back by dependence on the.
Soviet market.
In the future, a continuation of rapid development
niay be more difficult. So far, growth has been achieved
by shifting labor from agriculture to industry and by
extensive investment. Future growth will become rnore
and more dependent on increased productivity and will
thus involve improvements in management and more
effective use of technology. The regime's policy reflects
an appreciation of these needs, although plans for the
future are very ambitious.
1. Structure of the economv
A 20 -year policy of forced growth has changed the
economic landscape of Bulgaria. In 1950 industry
accounted for only 22% of (;NJ' compared with 47% in
1970 (Figure 56). The change was led by a concentration
of investment :n industry (primarily basic and heavy
industry), averaging over 45% of total investment in the
1960's.
"rhe manufacturing sectoi is responsible for over 70%
of industrial output (Figure 57) and 60% of industrial
employrnent. Within manufacturing, two of the more
important and faster growing industries have been
machinery and equipment and chernicals (Figure 58).
Much of the output of the rapidly growing machinery
and equipment industry is produced underspecialization
agreements for export to other ccumtries belonging to the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).
Another rnajor industry both in terms of the value of
output (26% of gross industrial production in 1970) and
in exports (32% in 1969) is agricultural processing.
Although a substantial share of industry is hampered
by inefficient plant and equipment, new powerplants
and heavy industrial facilities generally embody
technology modern by Soviet standards. The U.S.S.R. has
supplied po% %erplant facilities, equipment for the
Kremikovtsi combine, the oil refinery and petrochemical
plant at Burgas, and machinebuilding plants. Many
chemical plants use Western technology and equipment,
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FIGURE 55. Estimated growth of GNP and industrial and
agricultural production (5)

although because of price and credit considerations these
are not always the best or newest obtainable. In light
industry and agricultural processing, growth has been
achieved mainly by using existing plants more
intensively; however, modernization of the textile
industry has been planned for 1971 -75. In any event, by
Western standards most equipment is obsolete and
inefficient, but it is sufficiently sophisticated for Bulgaria
at its present stage of development.
A relatively successful agricultural sector has paved the
way for industrialization. Gross agricultural output grew
by 37% between 1960 and 1970, a rate much faster than
for any other Eastern European country. Although in
labor productivity and yields the sector still lags behind
the West, the policy of collectivization and mechaniza-
tion enabled the regiine to reduce the labor employed in
agriculture to less than two fifths of the working
population by 1970. The modernization of agricu'Fure
has not only released labor to industry, but it has
provided capital goods as well, secured through growing
agricultural exports.
Recently, Bulgaria adopted a new organizational
framework for agriculture -the agroindustrial complex
(AIC). Unique in Eastern Europe, the complexes are
formed by the horizontal and vertical integration of state
farms, collective farms, and onsite processing plants. The
dual economic objectives are to expand production and
to lower unit costs through increased industrialization
and large -scale operation. If the AIC's eventually prove
to be successful in increasing output, the regime is likely
to attempt to eliminate private and subsidiary plots. For
the present, however, private plots are expected to
continue providing an important segment of agricultural
output -14% to 16% of crop production and about one
third of all livestock production -and a necessary
increment to the income of agricultural workers.
Bulgaria has also expanded its energy base to provide
the basis for development. Although electric power
quadrupled and fuel output quintupled in the 1960's, the
country is becoming more and more dependent on
imports, particularly for fuels. Bulgaria is also dependent
on imports of ferrous metals. Interestingly, although the
raw material base of the nonferrous metal industry is
FIGURE 57. DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, BY BRANCH OF ORIGIN (U;OU)
(Perrent of total)
BRANCH OF INDUSTRY 1960 1965 1968 1969 1970
Manufacturing
73.0
71.5
71.9
71.7
71.6
Of which:
Machinebuilding and metal working
12.4
16.5
19.1
19.6
20.0
Chemicals and rubber
3.7
4.8
6.1
6.7
7.5
Light industry
23.4
18.4
19.2
19.0
18.3
Of which:
Cellulose and paper
0.9
0.9
1.1
1.1
1.0
Glassware, porcelain, and faience
0.6
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.9
Textiles
13.5
10.1
9.3
9.3
9.'1
Clothing
5.5
4.4
5.4
5.2
4.9
Leather, fur, and footwear
2.3
1.8
2.0
2.0
1.9
Printing
0.6
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.5
Agricultural processing
33.5
31.8
27.5
26.4
25.9
Electric power (including steam heat)
2.0
2.3
2.5
2.5
2.6
Fuels
2.8
3.8
3.7
4.2
4.7
Ferrous metallurgy (including ore mining)
1.1
2.2
2.9
�.9
3.1
Nonferrous metallurgy (including ore mining)
4.4
4.4
3.6
3.3
3.3
Building materials
3.1
3.8
3.9
3.7
3.6
Logging and wood processing
6.3
4.8
3.9
3.8.
3.6
Other branches
7.3
7.2
7.6
7.9
7.5
84
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FIGURE 56. GNP, employment, and output per worker,
by major sector, 1970 (S)

FIGURE 58. GROWTH OF GROSS INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION (U;OU)
(1960
100)
BRANCH OF INDUSTRY
1950
1955
1960
1965
1:166
1967
1968
19119
1970
Manufacturing:
Of which:
Machinebuilding and metal working
12
29
100
231
278
336
:377
428
481
Chemicals and rubber
12
:33
100
219
263
316
:398
471
570
Light industry:
Of which:
Cellulose and paper
36
till
100
174
218
266
:311
:333
357
Glassware, porcelain, and faiencee
1.1
:32
100
243
278
:3:37
:383
-315
.1.18
Textiles
30
57
100
131
141
157
1119
184
1911
Clothing
1:3
35
100
147
181
219
252
265
271
Leather, fur, and footwear
�12
51
100
1
1116
190
214
229
2213
Printing
�15
65
100
126
1.17
167
1811
204
219
Agricultural processing
313
51
100
159
173
187
196
207
215
Electric power (including steam heat)
15
'13
100
200
226
263
304
338
378
Fuel
33
67
100
238
265
290
321
:399
�183
Ferrous metallurgy (including ore mining)
3
32
100
333
391
498
61119
663
755
Nonferrous metallurgy (including ore mining)
1.1
39
100
171
177
189
197
202
217
Building materials
18
43
100
214
233
273
295
:308
:334
Logging and wood processing
43
64
100
130
135
141
149
161
167
Other branches
:i
43
100
164
186
210
2:36
267
298
Total gross industrial production
25
48
100
172
193
219
242
266
291
NOTi. Indexes for branches of industry are based on production by socialized industry
much larger, its growth has been much slower than that
of ferrous metals.
2. Economic policy
The regime that came to power in 1946 has applied the
traditional Communist methods of economic manage-
ment more successfully than has any other Eastern
European government. The rural populace has accepted
Communist agricultural policies more readily because
Bulgarian farmers were already accustomed to
cooperative fanning. Moreover, the standard of living
was at a very low level, so that increases in the
availability of basic necessities have kept the population
generally satisfied to date, in spite of deficiencies in
quantity and mix. However, a number of signs are
beginning to suggest that demand for more and better
consumer goods is increasing.
The structure of domestic priorities has remained
remarkably stable, and plans for the future generally
mirror plans of the past. Although the regime claims that
Bulgaria has now become un industrial state, rapid
economic growth continues to dominate decisionmaking
criteria. Plans for 1971 -75 include: 1) an 8% to 9%
annual increase in national income; 2) capital investment
totaling 20 to 21 billion Ieva, of which 75% is assigned to
material production; and 3) a 55% to 60% increase in
gross industrial output. Light industry and agricultural
processing combined will receive only 10% of the
investment in industry, while the bulk of investment is to
go into heavy industry.
After growth, in terms of priority, is efficiency. Thus
far, however, the regime has had little success with its
programs; the ratio of gross output to employment is one
of the lowest in Eastern Europe. The desire for greater
efficiency lies at the heart of Bulgaria's economic reform,
one of the more visible aspects of which is the integration
and rationalization of economic activity. This
reorganization is based on the premise that greater
control should improve management� leading to more
effective utilization of inputs, larger output, and lower
unit costs.
Another aspect of the reform is the formulation of more
realistic wholesale prices and provisions for their periodic
adjustment. The results should be a quicker response to
changes in the supply of raw materials and intermediate
products as well as improved resource allocation. In turn,
enterprise managers can forecast costs more accurately
and, perhaps, begin to reduce excess inventories.
3. Foreign trade
At first blush the growth of Bulgaria's foreign trade is
impressive, averaging approximately 13% in the 1960's;
however, most of it has been with other CEMA countries.
The regime's few attempts to expand trade with the West
have been disastrous, leading to large deficits in the
balance of payments. Bulgaria has had to appeal to the
U.S.S.R. for help on these occasions and, as a result, has
had to accept increased economic dependence upon the
U.S.S.R. Within CEMA Bulgaria pursues a very
aggressive foreign trade policy in an attempt to get an
expanding market for its heavy industrial products,
especially machinery.
Agricultural products and processed foods still make up
the largest category of Bulgarian exports (42% of total
exports in 1969), but exports of machinery and
equipment� insignificant in 1950 �grew to one fourth of
total exports in 1969, while exports of industrial consumer
goods rose from 2% to 22% of the total during the same
period. Bulgaria is also a heavy importer, especially of
machinery and equipment, which accounted for about
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Total land area: 42,800 square miles (11.1 million hectares)
40% of total iriports in 1969. Total imports averaged
18i( of GNP during 1966 -70, making Bulgaria the
Eastern European country most dependent on foreign
t rack.
In foreign trade police tho key word is still
integration �both with the U.S.S.R. arid, to a lesser
extent, with other members of CEMA. By 1975,
Bulgaria's total trade is planned to grow 60% to 65 and
82% of trade is to be conducted with other socialist
countries.
B. Sectors of the economy (S)
1. Agriculture, fisheries, and forestry
a. A(;mcut:ruiuS
Still the mainstay of the economy, the agricultural
sector covers almost all domestic food requirements and
continues to provide it large share of total exports. In
1970, -1.1 of all exports were still food and other
agricultural products, clown from slightly more than 57'
in 1960. In addition, agricultural production has
provided the basis or the relatively rapid industrializa-
tion of the country.
Agricultural output grew far more rapidly in Bulgaria
than in any other Eastern European Communist country
during the i960's. "I'he average annual growth rate of
3.2% (luring 1961 -70 was more than twice that of the
entire Eastern European region. Bulgaria has been more
successful than the other Communist countries in
boasting agricultural production, largely because its
surplus agricultural labor has permitted a concentration
on higher valued crops and because investments in
agriculture have been large enough to have a significant
effect on raising agricultural ter�hnology to it higher level.
Despite the favorable rate of growth, agriculture in
Bulgaria still is backward and inefficient by Western
standards.
(1) Land use and climate Bulgaria has the
smallest agricultural area of any Eastern European
Communist country, although its total [arid area is
greater than that of East Germany or Hungary. Almost
two thirds of the country is mountainous or hilly, and
nearly one -third is forested. Only about half of the total
area is suitable for agriculture Figure 59), compared with
about three fifths in neighboring Romania and
Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Bulgaria has one of the highest
ratios of arable land to population in Europe (0.35
hectare per capita). Most of the arable land is in the
Danubian plain in the north and in the Thracian plain in
the southeast (See Land Utilization inset on Summary
MaP).
There is it wider range of climate in Bulgaria than in
most countries comparable in size. The weather is cool in
the mountainous areas aril warm along the Black Sea
coast and in the southwest, where the Mediterranean
exerts it moderating influence. Most of the country has
moderately cold winters and warm summers. Rainfall
ordinarily is adequate for crops, but there are periodic
surnmer droughts that cause pronounced fluctuations in
86
Cultivated
land
37.5%
rchards and
vine yards
FIGURE 59. Land use, 1969 (U /OU)
crop yields and, consequently, in livestock production. A
great range of soil types in addition to the climatic
variations makes possible a diversified agriculture.
(2) Organization and policies Collective and
state farnis i nuke up the important socialized "ector of
agriculture in Bulgaria. Collective farins. called agri-
cnlhral labor cooperatives. are all of the saiue uvpe
and resemble the kolkhosy of the U.S.S.R., except that
Bulgarian collective farm members retain, in theory, an
equity in land contributed to the farm. Since 1967
however, collective farms have not paid rent for the land
contribute(, and new members have been able to join
collectives without contributing land. The Cooperative
Congress in 1967 removed the requirement for payment
of rent. Payments to members depend only on the
amount and type of work clone. In 1958, (luring the
preliminary phase of the Chinese- inspired "leap
forward" period, 3,244 collective farms were consolidated
into only 665 units. Some of the overly large units proved
difficult to operate and subsequently were broken up, but
Bulgaria still tends toward large farming enterprises. At
the end of 1969 there were 795 collective farms. The
average size, =4,136 hectares, was the largest in any
Eastern European Communist country. In 1969 they
farmed 73% of the total arable land and produced 629i, of
total gross agricultural production.
State farms make up the other major farming
enterprise in Bulgaria. Numbering only 159 in 1969, they
held about 13% of the arable land but produced only
about 9% of total gross agricultural production. Intended
to specialize in the production of seed and breeding stock
for collective farms and in the introduction of new
farming techniques, they have been more important in
supplying farm products to dorestic and foreign
markets. Although they receive priority treatment in the
allocation of funds and materials, state farms have been
inefficient because of poor management and the
indifference of workers.
The most significant change in agricultural policy
since the collectivization drive of the late 1950's was the
introduction of AIC's at the April 1970 Central
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Pastures and
meadows
13.2%

Committee Plenum. Approved as a means of* introducing
industrial methods into agriculture, the complexes will
merge state and collective farm enterprises under a single
management -the first such move by an Eastern
Erlropean country. lay July 1971, 156 AIC; s had brcn
approved by the government, accounting for more than
901 of both arable land and agricultural labor. The
average size of a complex is 26,200 hectares. It is expected
that by 1980 this form of farming enterprise will
predominate. The regime believes this new organiza-
tional farm will result in increased productivity_ of labor,
higher output, and lower per unit costs. flow successful
the regime will be remains to be seen. Prior to 1971 the
AIC:'s established were no more than bookkeeping
operations. Reported wariness of local -level farm officials
toward the AIC may cause the government to implement
the program more slowly than originally planned.
(3) Crops -Crops account for about two thirds of
gross agricultural production. Grains, for which the soils
and climate of the northern and eastern plains are
favorable, are grown on nearly 55% of the cultivated
land. Fc.rage crops, such as alfalfa, clover, an(] corn for
silage, arc becoming increasingly important because of
the increased emphasis on livestock production. In 1969,
forage crops accounted for nearly one -fifth of the
cultivated area, more than twice as large it share as i-,.
1950. The following tabulation shows the shifts in the
percentage distribution of cultivated area since 1950:
1950 1960 1969
Grains
69.7
59.3
54.3
Industrial crops
122
12.2
13.1
Vegetables, potatoes, and melons
2.9
3.4
3.5
Forage crops
7.2
18.4
17.0
Other crops and fallow
8.1
6.7
12.1
Wheat, the most important grain, is used almost
exclusively for food. It accounted for nearly one -half the
total area soNvn to grains in 1969, compared with about
26i for corn, 18Sb for barley, and only 19(' for rye. The
area planted to wlivat -us well its all other grains hilt
barley -has been declining since 1950. Reduced acreage
of wheat, rye, and corn accounts for most of the drop in
total area devoted to grains. Barley acreage has been
increasing over the gars largely at the expense of oats.
Despite the decline in grain area Bulgaria in recent years
has become self sufficient in grain, which accounts for
about 22% of total gross agricultural production. The
introduction of improved varieties of seed and increased
input of chernical fertilizers helped to stabilize yields at u
higher level and permitted the country to become a net
exporter of grain daring the 1966 -70 period. Wheat
production in 1967 set a record of 3.:3 million metric tons
(Figure 60). Similarly, exports of wheat in 1967 reached a
high of 535,000 tons, dropping to less than 300,000 tons
in 1970. Yields of corn also grew, setting it new high in
1970, but exports are estimated to have dropped below
the 300,000 tons exported in 1969 because of higher
domestic feed requirements.
Production of fruits and vegetables amounts to about
one -fifth of total gross agricultural production, nearly as
large a share as that of grains. Fresh and canned fruits
and vegetables remain in important source of foreign
exchange earnings, but less so than in earlier years. They
accounted for 6% of total exports in 1969 compared with
about 9% in 1965. Unfavorable weather and a decline in
the area planted to vegetables has held clown the output
of fruits in([ vegetables since 1968.
The output of industrial crops, especially sunflower
seed and tobacco, has increased and accounts for about
12% of total gross agricultural production. Although
FMMIE 60. PRODUCTION AND YIELD~ OF PRINCIPAL. CROPS T
19.5(3 -130 1961 135
AVERAGE AVERAGE 1916 1967 1968 1969
PrMuetion (in thousand metric tons):
Total grains
Of which:
W heat
Cors
Barle\
Oats
Rye
Sugar beets
Potatoes
Sunflower seeds
Tobacco oriental)
Yields Uri quiidals per hcetarr�):
W heat
C orn
Barb N
Oats
HP
Lugar beets
Potatoes
Sunflower seeds
Tobacco oriental)
1970
1,321
1,702
6, 702
6,417
5,22.1
5,996
6,681
2,247
2,208
3,193
3,254
2,549
2,569
'1,98'2
1,288
1 601
2,207
1 971
1,768
2 41
2,380
489
694
1 013.1
985
807
905
1 174
187
1.11
182
169
76
78
118
110
58
56
38
24
29
27
1,271
1,440
2,528
2,032
1,407
1,628
1,1i51
335
-100
421
381
369
357
367
2.19
3:38
423
�178
459
541
405
76
101
125
110
107
90
111
16.3
18.1
27.9
30.6
24.0
24.7
29.6
2.1.9
25.1
38.1
:34.8
31.3
41 .:3
:3" 5
18.1
20.5
25.5
25.4
20.0
22.0
28.9
10.9
10.0
15.8
14.1
7.9
10.3
11.8
9.9
9.9
1 :3.5
12.3
10.6
11.6
12.3
2(1:5.0
205.4
404.0
341.2
264.5
282.3
304.3
87.4
85.5
113. 1
106. 1
11-1.0
1 18.4
15. tl
I I .6
1:3.4
16.6
17.8
16.:3
18.9
1.1.5
7.13
8.7
11.0
11.3
10.0
8.3
10 2
87
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higher yields from the use of improved seed, irrigation,
and more fertilizer contributed to this growth in output,
almost of equal importance was the expansion in the area
planted. Despite the use of more improved technology,
relatively large fluctuations in yields of roost crops still
occur as a result of extremes in weather.
(4) Livestock -The average rate of growth in the
livestock industry was slightly higher than that for crops
during most of the 1960's, but it still only accounted for
about one -third of gross agricultural production in 1969.
Growth of output was higher in the first half of the 1960's
than in the second because fodder shortages and
unprofitable farm prices helped to depress growth during
the last 3 years. Consumer demand for livestock products,
especially red meat and fats, grew much faster than
supplies, thereby creating an especially tight retail
market situation during 1969 and 1970. Increased
investment, new producer incentives, an expanded feed
industry, and specialization of production have been
programed to provide the lift needed to boost output in
the 1970's.
The output of most livestock products showed a steady
upward trend between 1955 and 1967, but since has
stagnated or declined (Figure 61). In 1970, output of red
meat was below 1965 and that of milk, eggs, and wool no
better than 1967. Increased productivity of livestock has
prevented a more significant decline in output, because,
except for poultry, there were smaller numbers of
productive livestock at the end of 1970 than in 1965.
All categories of livestock have declined in numbers
since the early 1960's largely because private owners
decreased their herds faster than herds were increased by
state and cooperative farms. Recognizing this
shortcoming, the government took steps in 1969 to
encourage private production of livestock by guarantee-
ing increased availability of livestock feed and by raising
procurement prices for slaughter animals. Between 1965
and 1969 the private sector's share of total livestock
output had dropped from 37% to 33 The share of
private production in the total, however, is expected to
decline further over the long run. Current plans call for
large specialized livestock farms to be the major
producers of all livestock products by 1975, with
emphasis on pork, beef, and poultry meat.
(5) Manpower and investment- Agricultural
employment has been reduced substantially by
industrialization and collectivization since World War 11,
but there is still surplus agricultural labor. In 1950, about
75% of the working population was employed in
agriculture; by 1970 the share had dropped to about
40 The expanding industrial sector will be able for
some time to continue drawing labor from agriculture,
because as mechanization and specialization of farming
enterprises progresses, fewer people will be needed on
farms. Keeping young and skilled workers in sufficient
numbers on collective farms is a necessity if the operation
of large -scale specialized farming enterprises is to be
efficient.
The substantial share of state investment funds
allocated to agriculture during the postwar period
(averaging about one fourth of total investment) has
been used mainly for farm buildings, agricultural
machinery, and irrigation projects. In the 1959 -63 period,
during the "leap forward" which saw a rapid expansion
of collective farms, the share reached about one third,
but it declined to less than 16% in 1969. Between 1965
and 1970, however, the use of collective funds for capital
investment increased from less than 19% to 30 The
irrigated area has been expanded, from about 37,500
hectares in 1939 to more than 1 million hectares in 1970
(about one -fifth of the total arable land) and is planned
to reach 60% by 1980. The number of tractors (15-
horsepower units) increased from 8,657 in 1950 to about
94,000 by the end of 1970. Although the preparation for
and planting of most crops is highly mechanized,
harvesting is less so. Also, the mechanization of livestock
raising lags considerably behind that of crop production.
Draft animals are used mostly on private plots and
collectives in mountainous areas. They accounted for
FIGUIth 61. NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK AND OUTPUT OF LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS (U(OU)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970*
\umber of livestock (in thousands, at
end o f near):
Ilorse.........................
Cat tb
Hogs
Nheep r
Goat.
Poultr,V
Livestock products (in thousand.+
of metric tons):
Bleat, red
Cows milk
Eggs (millions)
Wool (grease basis)
"relin inary estimates.
*Estimated.
88
498
472
312
240
229
224
199
182
:65
1,664
1,6102
1,452
1,450
1,385
1,363
1,297
1,255
1,218
818
1, 413
2,553
2,408
2,276
2,314
2,140
1,967
2,370
7,820
7,829
9,333
10,312
9,998
9,905
9,652
9,223
St. 68(1
715
652
246
436
409
384
376
350
3.15
9,703
13,817
23, 366
30,845
23,637
27,726
24,874
29,590
:3:3,706
13-1
155
174
278
29:3
296
320
285
268
382
:383
7.14
1,000
1,098
1,210
1,198
1,204
1,210
585
811
1,221
1,449
1,490
1,683
1,627
1,519
1,613
13.8
11.4
21.0
25.8
25.0
27.3
29.0
28.0
27.0
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only We of the total draft power available in 1969,
according to official statistics.
Machine tractor stations (MTS) were established in
Bulgaria, as in the other Eastern European Communist
countries, to regulate the use of agricultural machinery
and to strengthen state control over agriculture. The
MTS work on ,I contract basis, mainly on collective
farms. 111 1959 the regime began phasing out the MTS,
and by 1966 more than 60% of the 212 MTS operating 7
years earlier had been dissolved and their machinery sold
to collective farms. Whereas in 1960 the MTS held 77%
of the inventory of tractors, by 1970 the share had
declined to less than 15 Collective farms now may buy
new machinery, fuel, and spare parts on the same terms
as MTS and state farms.
Bulgaria now surpasses Ilungary, Poland, and
Romania in the use of fertilizers. Application of chemical
fertilizers increased sharply from about 37 kilograms of
active nutrient per hectare of arable land in 1963 to
about 131 kilograms in 1970.
b. FisnLum-s
The fishing industry in Bulgaria, relatively new and
rather small, is growing rapidly. Established in 1964 with
only two vessels, by early 1971 the ocean fishing fleet was
composed of 20 trawlers and four refrigerator ships.
Curiously, the fleet has been acquired from East
Germany and the U.S.S.R., although Bulgaria produces
trawlers in its own shipyards. The composition of the fleet
is given in the accompanying tabulation:
NUMBER COUNTRY TOTAL GROSS
AND TYPE OF ORIGIN REGISTER TONS
Trawlers:
5 Tropik East Germany 12,175
3 BMRT U.S.S.R. 9,510
12 Atlantik East Germany 31,884
Refrigerator:
4 Sibir U.S.S.R. 23,857
1 Altair do 3,556
.al 25 80,982
The catch has increased in proportion to the growth of
the fleet. [n 1966, 24,000 metric tons were caught, and in
1970, 85,000 tons were landed. The 1971 catch was
expected to equal 100,000 tons. During the Fifth Five
Year Plan the total catch equaled 186,658 tons. The Sixth
Five Year Plan provides for a doubling of the fleet and an
annual catch equaling 180,000 tons by 1975.
To cope with the growing fleet and larger catch, shore
facilities are being constructed at Burgas. The complex
includes, among other items, a port to handle and refit
the vessels, refrigerated storage for 10,000 tons, a cannery
with a 10,000 -ton annual capacity, and shops for
handling smoked and salted fish and fish products. Also,
a plant will be built at Varna with an annual processing
capacity of 1,250 tons of salted fish and 850 tons of frozen
fish, as well as a capability for producing fish delicacies,
fis' flour, and other products.
Imports of fish and salted fish have fluctuated widely,
totaling 20,170 tons of fish and 4,596 tons of salted fish in
1966 -69, most of which was from the U.S.S.R. Fish has
been exported to Ghana, Nigeria, Romania, and
Yugoslavia, but on]c in small amounts.
Slightly less than one -third of Bulgaria is covered by
forest, but past neglect and excessive exploitation limits
its economic importance current timber output is 2.5
million cubic meters. The logging and wood processing
industries employed 6.5% of the industrial labor force in
1970 (30% less than in 1960) and accounted for only
3.6% of gross industrial production (43% less than in
1960). The major reason for the decline is the lack of
capital investment, averaging only 1.3% of total
investment for both the forestry industry and logging and
wood processing in the late 1960's.
The mayor forest areas are in the Balkan Mountains in
central Bulgaria and in the Rila, Pirin, and Rhodope
Mountains in the west and southwest. Most of the
coniferous forests, which make up 26% of the total
forested area, are in the mountains of southwestern
Bulgaria. Broadleaf forests, which account for 23% of the
forested area, are more dispersed and are found along the
lower slopes of the Balkan, Rhodope, and Rila
Mountains, in the river valleys, and along the Black Sea
coast. Nearly one fourth of forest land supports only
coppice and brush.
Timber and wood products generally account for
slightly more than 2% of exports annually. Also, some
timber and wood products are imported, especially from
the U.S.S.R. under an agreement by which Bulgaria
supplies labor brigades for logging in the Komi
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in exchange for
timber.
2. Fuels and power
Bulgaria's energy base continued to expand rapidly in
the 1960's. Output of electric power increased three times
and output of fuels nearly five times, compared with a
tripling of industrial output. Like other Eastern
European countries, Bulgaria is steadily shifting to a
greater use of coal substitutes. In 1969, for example,
petroleum accounted for 43% of energy consumption
compared with about one -third in 1966 (Figure 62). Coal
FIGURE tit. CONSUMPTION OF
P111iltARY F.NEIMY,�
1969 (C)
(Pcrrcnl
Production:
Solid fuels:
Hard coal
15.8
Brown coal and lignite
31.3
I' uelwood
2.6
Petroleum:
Crude oil
1 3.0
Natural gas
2.7
Elvetric power
.G
Total
100.0
*Includes net imports of coal, coke, crude oil, petroleum
products, and electric power.
89
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consumption, however, has continued to rise and still
amounted to 47W of total consumption in 1969.
Rapidly growing consumption has been accompanied
by an increasing dependence on imports of energy.
Imports accounted 56% of primary energy in 1969,
compared with of rout 10% in 1960. The U.S.S.R. is
the main supplier, providing electric power, crude oil,
and hard coal.
a. COAL
Production of coal nearly doubled during the 1960's
and provided nearly 75 "1. of the total output of primary
energy in 1969. The entire increase was accounted for by
growth in the output of lignite (Figure 63). Production of
brown coal has been declining since 1963 because of
dwindling reserves, and Output of hard coal has been
negligible� anunmting to 400,000 metric tons in 1970.
Because of the pw)r quality of coal reserves, Output in
1970 represented only about 9 million tons in hard coal
equivalents.
Proved and probable reserves of coal total less than 5
billion tons, mainly located in the central and western
parts of the country. Lignite deposits make up over 90%
of reserves and are found primarily in the Maritsa River
basin in central Bulgaria. Most brown coal reserves
which total Only about 300 million tons �are located 20
miles west of Sofiya in the Pernik basin. Anthracite is
found in the Svoge basin just north of Sofiya, and the
only commercially important bituminous coal deposits
arc in the Balkan basin which lies between Gubrovo and
Sliven. The presence of a rich coal deposit has been
reported in the Dobruja region.
Efforts have been made �with meager results �to
upgrade the coal from the Balkan basin for use in making
coke. A cleaning plant put in at Tvurditsa has been
operating below capacity and yielding a high -cost, low
quality product. The country's only good coking deposit,
discovered in 1966 on the Black Sea near Kavarna, lies at
a depth of nearly 3,300 feet, and there are as yet no plans
to exploit it.
'Thus, the only facility for producing metallurgical
coke �at the Kremikm k \10allurgic�al Combine �must
rely almost exch"t, t I oo imports. 'Phis combine
produced 837,000 tons of coke in 1970, adequate to cover
the needs of its own blast furnaces and part of the needs
of the Lenin Plant at Pernik. The deficit in the industrial
coke supple �about 465,000 tons in 1970 �is usually met
by imports from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the
U.S.S.R. But in 1970, Bulgaria imported 128,000 tons of
coke from the United States because traditional suppliers
were able to cover only 50% of the deficit.
1lousehold needs for coal have been satisfied by
Bulgaria's growing output of lignite. lignite briquets are
of increasing importance; new facilities to produce
briquets raised output from 600,000 tons in 1966 to
900,000 tons in 1969.
Bulgaria will continue to push the development of coal
in contrast to other countries such as Yugoslavia, where
cutb acks are in progress. Output of lignite in particular is
expected to more than double in the 1970'x, while
production of brown coal will continue to decline.
Production of hard coal will remain insignificant, and
imports will continue to rise rapidly.
1). PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS
Production of crude oil has been erratic since
commercial development began in 1954. In the 1960'x,
output varied between a high o 500,000 metric tons in
1967 and a low of 160,000 .)ns in 1964. Production of
334,000 toes in 1970 was far below the 1 million tons
predicted in the 1966 -70 plan. Imports account for over
90% of crude oil requirements, and shipments from the
U.S.S.R., which amounted to 4 million tons in 1969,
made up 80% of all crude oil supplies. Imports from non-
Communist countries, which ran at 1.2 million tons in
1970 account for pra ctically all the rest.
Bulgaria's main oil fields are at Gorni Dubnik and
Dolni Dubnik, and Tyulenovo. In addition, drilling has
begun offshore at 'Tyulenovo, although Soviet experts
reportedly are not impressed with the, potential. Explored
reserves of crude oil and natural gas are very small and
are located in fractured dolomite strata of a type that
usually cannot sustain commercial rates of production for
a prolonged period. Prospects for significant new
discoveries are poor, because exploratory and develop-
mental drilling must be conducted at 3,000 to 5,000
meters, and the torbodrilling equipment now in use in
Bulgaria is inefficient at such depths. Consequently, it is
FIC 6:3. i UC "rION OF ENERGY, 13Y PRINCIPAL. SOURCE'S (S)
UN IT I i1511 19.55 1960 1965 1969
Elvetric po%%er
The rural
I f %-droelect ric
Petroleum and natural gas:
Crude oil
Petroleum products
Natural gas
Coal Uu�tl
Of %%hic6:
Brown coal
L ignite
*(cross production.
90
Million kilnu�nll- hours..... 797 2,117:3 .1 657 111,24.1 17,2:3.1
....rlrr 530 1,.125 2,771 8,244 15,:391
.do 267 648 1,886 3,000 1,8:39
1970
19 :iOS
nu
ua
Thousand rnorir lens......
11
150
200
329
:325
:3:31
....do
0
:30
125
2,225
4,685
5,1 ;1111
Million r�uhir� m0crs.
1)
Il
Il
7:3
525
171
Thonsnml urrdrir� loos......
*5,928
9. 128
m), 981;
25,042
29,002
29,229
do
*4,1170
6,1211
10,061)
9,564
6, 875
6,876
da
1,101
2,706
:5,:3:56
11,926
21,757
21,9:56
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probable that domestic production will provide a
decreasing share of total supply as demand rises during
the 1970's.
Bulgaria has had far better results in developing oil
processing Facilities than in opening up its own crude oil
deposits. Output of petroleum products rose from 500,000
metric tuns in 1963 to about 5.6 million tons in 1970.
Nearly all of this production conies from two modern
refineries built with Soviet equipment and technical
assistance �the Burgas complex at Karneno completed in
1963 -65 and a new petrochemical combine at Pleven put
in during 1969 -71. The Burgas refinery, using both
domestic and imported crude oil, produces motor
gasoline, jet fuels, diesel fuel, and fuel oil. A small and
outdated refinery at Ruse, which processes domestic
crude only, produces a less sophisticated mix of diesel
fuel, fuel oil, nuazut, and lubricating oil bast. stocks.
'these three refineries have a combined capacity of 6.5
million tons of processed oil; in 1970 they provided over
70% of Bulgaria's consumption of oil products. The
balance of consumption is supplied by imports, almost all
of which come from the U.S.S.R.
Projected requirements of about 15 to 17 million tans
of oil products in 1975 will be provided partly from
imports of refined products, including 2 million tons from
the U.S.S.R., but mainly by an expansion of domestic
refining capacity. The crude throughput capacity of
domestic refineries is thus expected to be about 13 to 14
million tuns. Existing agreements with the U.S.S.R.
provide for the import of 10 million tons of crude oil by
1975, hut, if domestic production of refined products is to
reach the anticipated level, additional imports of crude
oil will be necessary.
Output of natural gas rose from 109 million cubic
n( ,ors in 1966 to -174 million in 1970. The main deposit is
the first one discovered, at Chiren, near Vratsa. New
discoveries have been made in the last few years at
Goletno Peshtene, near Vratsa and at Devetaki, near
Lovech. The C:hiren deposits supply the Wilhelm Pieck
cement plant in Beli Izvor and the Nitrogen Fertilizer
plant near Vratsa. Rather ambitious plans for 1975 call
for in output of I billion cubic meters of natural gas, plus
the import of 3 billion cubic meters via a pipeline from
the U.S.S.R.
C. ELECTRIC Powt�:n
Compared with other Eastern European Communist
countries, Bulgaria has a small electric power base. In
installed capacity and gross production, it outranked only
Hungary and Albania in 1970. Its per capita output of
2,295 kilowatt -hours (kw. -hr.), however, placed it ahead
of Hungary, Poland, and Romania, and output grew
faster than in any other Eastern European country during
the 1960's. Starting with a very small electric power base
in 1960, the expansion of capacity was the product of a
high and rising rate of capital investment (during the
decade electric power was the most significant iten in the
country's annual industrial investment, averaging almost
15%, of the total industrial outlay each year).
Generating capacity almost doubled after 1965 and
increased by 3.4 times during the 1960's. At the end of
1970, installed capacih totaled 4 million kilowatts (kw.),
and production during the year amounted to 19.5 billion
kw. -hr. In spite of the growth in capacity, the amount of
electricity produced still is inadequate to meet the
expanding needs of industry and other consumers. Power
is frequently rationed to all consumers, and periodic
shortages still hamper industrial output and force
emergency restrictions on household use as well. 'These
shortages are caused by a nundwr of problems:
difficulties in meeting powerplant construction
schedules; burning low -grade domestic fuel in imported
equipment which is not designed for such fuel;
unsatisfactory functioning of thermal plant cooling
systems; and poor maintenance of equipment that, in
any case, is being overworked. ']'here are frequent
breakdowns, and there is not enough reserve capacity to
meet emergency and peakload requirements.
Consumption of electric energy is concentrated in the
south central and western areas of the country. Industrial
consumers principally the chemical and rubber,
metallurgical, fuels, and rnachinebuilding industries
account for about 70% of the total consumption, and
households for 14% (nearly all have enough electricity for
lighting, but riot for other uses). Agriculture, commerce,
and transportation are supplied with enough electricity to
meet minimum needs.
Thermal powerplants accounted for 80% of the total
installed capacity and provided about 89% of the total
production in 1970; hydroelectric facilities contributed
the balance. More than one -third of the thermal capacity
is in the southeastern part of the country, where the
greatest deposits of lignite occur. About 18% is in the
west central region, which contains the country's largest
concentration of industry, urban areas, and brown coal
mines. Another significant concentration is along the
Danube River and the Black Sea coast, where plants are
fueled primarily with imported coal. Approximately 30%
of the thermal production is provided by plants operating
on imported fuels. Almost two- thirds of the hydroelectric
capacity is in plants on the Maritsa and Arda River
systens in the southern part of the country. 1 Eydre
facilities also have been developed on the Iskur River in
the southwest. Approximately 85% of the total generating
capacity is classified as a public utility and is designed to
serve multiple classes of consumers. The remainder of the
capacity is designated as industrial and serves particular
plants or industries; the largest plant serves the
petrochemical complex at Burgas (Figure 69).
Power is transmitted by a well developed national
network that connects all major powerplants and extends
to all economically important areas. Transmission
facilities are concentrated around Sofiva. The highest
voltage lines now in use, 220- kilovolt (kv. join the
principal powerplants and consuming centers and are
used in international exchanges. Bulgaria exchanges
electric power with Romania and with Yugoslavia
through the CEMA network. An extra -high voltage
91
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transmission line from the Moldavian Soviet Socialist
Republic was scheduled to be completed by the end of
1971. This line is designed to carry an estimated :3 billion
kw. -hr. of electricity per year and will be a significant
link for importing additional power from the CEMA
network. Electric power is exchanged with Yugoslavia
over two transmission lines. Bulgaria also is developing a
link with Greece.
Plans call for expanding the electric power base by the
end of 1975 to 7.6 million kw., which will provide an
annual production of 30 to 31 billion kw. -hr. Besides
building new facilities, including one nuclear
powerplant, Bulgaria plans to expand existing thermal
and hydroelectric facilities. The largest new thermal
powerplant will he built at Bobovdol, near Stanke
Dimitrov, and thermal capacity will be enlarged at the
Maritsa Istok industrial complex near Dimitrovgrad, and
at the Ruse plant, among others. Several generating
plants will be added at the Sestrimo and Vucha River
hydroelectric projects. The country's first nuclear
powerplant, at Kozloduy, is scheduled for initial
operation in 1974 and completion in 1975. The plant, a
pressurized -water type designed in the U.S.S.R., is based
on an existing Soviet plant and is to be constructed under
Soviet supervision.
3. Metals and minerals
Bulgaria has a fairly good supply of metals and
minerals by Eastern European standards. Current
reserves of lead, zinc, and copper appear able to sustain
production for 20 years or more, and there are ample
supplies of materials for the cement industry� limestone,
clay, shale, and gypsum. The main deficiencies are poor
quality reserves of iron ore and manganese and only small
supplies of chromium, cobalt, molybdenum and other
ferroalloying materials. Bulgaria relies on imports for tin,
mercury, and aluminum.
a. FERROUS Nrls'TALS
Bulgaria's output of ferrous metals (Figure 64) is the
smallest among the Eastern European Communist
countries. Even though output of crude and rolled steel
has tripled since the mid- 1960's, Bulgaria still depends on
imports for over 205c of its pig iron needs, 25% of its iron
ore, and nearly one fourth of its rolled steel supply.
Exports of rolled steel have risen steadily but are dwarfed
by imports of ferrous metals.
The two main producers of iron and steel are the Lenin
Plant in Pernik and the Kremikovtsi combine near Sofiya.
Two other plants �the Electrornetal Foundry in Sofiya
and the Pernik Machine Building Plant� produce small
amounts of crude steel. The Kremikovtsi Iron and Steel
Works, behind schedule since construction began in
1960, has belatedly become Bulgaria's �and the
Balkans' largest steel mill. In 1970, the plant began
producing cold rolled sheet; output of tinplate,
galvanized sheet, and high -grade steels is to begin in the
next few years. Kremikovtsi is expected to provide most of
the planned increase in rolled steel output, from 1.4
million tons in 1970 to about 3 million tons in 1975.
Planners studied the feasibility of a third metallurgical
combine �a costly proposition even without the
construction delays that plagued Kremikovtsi. However,
the plan was reportedly rejected in favor of a joint
venture in the U.S.S.R. A third plant would have put a
considerable strain on raw material supplies.
Not only does Bulgaria now import nearly all of its
coking coal; it also faces serious problems in supplying
other raw materials. Bulgaria's iron ore reserves amount
to some 250 million tons, and most of the ore, located
near Kremikovtsi, averages only about one -third Fe
content and requires expensive beneficiation. As a result,
the development of the Kremikovtsi deposits has been
extremely slow output of iron ore has increased only
slightly since 1968.
Reserves of manganese �some 28 million tons �also
require concentration because of an excessive phospho-
rous content. Reserves of chromium amount to only
100,000 tons, and supplies of other ferroalloys are limited
to the small amounts obtained as byproducts from
processing copper and lead -zinc ores.
1). NONFERROUS NIEFALS
Bulgaria is self sufficient in lead, zinc, and copper.
Reserves of lead -zinc ore in terms of metal content are
estimated to contain 4.1 million tons of lead and 1.5
FIGURE 64. PRODU('TION OF SELECTED MINERALS, ME'T'ALS, AND CONs
NIA (S)
(Thousands of metric Ions, unless otherwise indicated)
92
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1950
1950
1960
1965
19179
1970
Iron ore (gross weight)
40
113
-I15
1,804
2,688
2,107
Manganese ore
8
63
25
-12
39
:32
Pig iron (including ferroalloys)
3
8
192
695
1,134
1 ,2.52
Crude steel
5
120
300
650
1,667
1,980
Rolled steel
6
7�1
193
431
1,208
1,429
Refined lead
3
5
4o
9:3
95
96
Refined zinc
0
1
17
66
76
74
Refined copper
0
*4
111
21
:317
10
C ement
602
812
1,586
'2,681
3,551
3,668
Bricks (million units)
237
-14.1
931
1, 196
1,351
1 548
*Data are estimated because official
Bulgarian statistics do not reflect the full output
of crude
steel.
*Blister copper.
92
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million tons of zinc. Copper reserves are estimated at 2.5
million tons of metal. Bulgaria is the chief producer of
lead in Eastern Europe and ranks second, after Poland, in
the production of zinc and copper. Bulgaria could
produce a great deal more of these metals, for even
though the raw materials are abunvlant nonferrous
metallurgy has been one of Bulgaria's slowest growing
industries �in sharp contrast to the steel industry with its
greatly inferior raw materials base. In 1965, nonferrous
metallurgy accounted for 4.4/. of gross industrial output
and received 9.�1% of capital investment in industry; in
1970 these shares dropped to 3.391 and 5. 1 "'C,
respectively. here, as in other cases, Bulgaria has
emphasized import substitution at the expense of
developing exports. Most of Bulgaria's eight plants for
concentrating lead -zinc ores are in the Rhodope
Mountains, where about 75% of the lead -zinc ore is
mined. Metallic lead is produced at Kurilo, Kurdzhali,
and Plovdiv (the latter two plants producing zinc as
well). About 30% of the production of lead and two-
thirds of zinc was exported in 1969, primarily to Western
countries.
Copper is refined at three plants: an older plant at
Eliseyna: a newer, larger one at Pirdop; and at the newest
facility, Medet, near Panagyurishte. Almost two thirds of
Bulgaria's output of electrolytic copper is processed into
rolled products at the Dimiter Canev combine near
Sofiya �the only factory in the country which turns out
rolled nonferrous metal products. The combine is
currently being expanded; output by 1973 is to total
10,01 tons of serni man u fact ured copper, brass, bronze,
zinc, and aluminum products.
Bulgaria has at least one facility for concentrating
uranium ore, which is mined northeast of Sofiya. Over
500,000 tons of uranium ore containing 1,000 tons of
recoverable metal arc produced it year. All concentrates
are shipped to the U.S.S.R. Bulgaria also recovers small
amounts of gold from copper processing and from river
sands in Chirpan, \'urshilo, and Vitosha.
c. NoN \trrALLIC %IINEIIALS
Most of Bulgaria's s.nall production of nonmetallic
minerals, chiefly asbestos, bentonite, salt, and sulfur is
exported. Bulgaria is the only F,astern European
Communist country that produces asbestos, but the type
produced is suitable only for nonstrategic uses. Better
grades have to be imported. Output of barite, mica, and
fluorspar covers most domestic requirements.
Production of major construction materials has kept
pace with the growth of construction activity and is more
than adequate to meet domestic requirements. Bulgarian
cement has improved in quality and variety in recent
years and is produced in sufficient quantities to permit
export. 7'he Wilhelm Pieck cement plant is shown in
Figure 65. Yugoslavia, Libya, and Turkey have been the
principal foreign buyers of Bulgarian cement in recent
years.
4. Manufacturing and construction
Manufacturing industries �the machinery and
equipment industry, the chemical and rubber industry,
light industry, and agricultural processing� accounted
for 60% of total industrial employment and 72% of gross
industrial output in 1970. Agricultural processing
accounted for the largest share of manufacturing output,
followed closely by the machinery and equipment
industry. 1'he heaviest concentrations of employment are
found in machinery and equipment and in light industry.
a. MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
A primary objective of Bulgaria's economic plan is to
expand and diversify output in the machinery and
equipment industry. It provided only 12.4�%0 of industrial
output in 1960, but forced expansion Increased its share
of output to 20% in 1970. Over the same period, the share
93
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FIGURE 65. The Wilhelm Pieck cement plant, which is equipped with
East German machinery (C)

FIGURE tiff. PRODUCTION OF ITEMS OF MA1'lll\1�:RY AND EQUIPMENT t' 1)t
Electric motors
runsformers
Metalcutting muchill" tools
Of which:
Lathe
ISIecuic forSlift trucks
Freight cars
Maritime freighters
Tractor cultivators
Tractor plows. I
Radius
Refrigerators
Motorcycles
I NITS
1950
1955
14160
1965
1969
Thou sit rtd kilmratl.................
135
11-1
1 119
2,801
:3.9211
Thousand kilt, u�ull- a tit lit ns.........
160
557
1,172
2,1772
2. 62 1
I 'If its
SS6
I. 100
3,150
8,013:3
12,7~9
du
1113
5S1
1,519
3,:350
3,935
du
1)
Ili
:3,14)1
16,
�_Ii, 15K
do
0
986
2,007
1,r5 h6
1,761
Thousund Itross rrylshr lun.s........
0
0
3.R
:3.2
3:3.s
mils
110
1,315
:3,560
7,111
:3,327
du
900
1,41-17
-1,911
2,120
1,0"'(;
7'h a list) nd.s of units
S
66
157
1:30
160
Unit
179
952
6, -189
10,591
1 Is, 835
dn
0
11
7,5:30
6,:70:7
:3,52:3
of industrial workers engaged in the production of
machinery and equipment grew from 15.1% to 21.4
Growth in the output of selected items is shown in Figure
66. If the rapid growth is sustained, the industry should
surpass agricultural processing in the late 1970's and rank
first in terms of value of output.
Besides trying to produce a !arge share of the capital
goods for domestic investment, Bulgaria has also pushed
exports of machinery and equipment. Within the
framework of CEMA specialization agreements, Bulgaria
manufactures 270 engineering products and supplies 95%
of other CEMA countries' imports of electric trucks and
electric telphers. By 1969 exports to CEMA accounted for
96% of all the machinery Bulgaria sold abroad. Bulgaria
raised the share of machinery arid equipment from 13.9%
of total exports in 1960 to 19.1 in 1970. How ambitious
Bulgarian aims are may he ju(!ged by the target for 1970,
which was to make machinery and equipment 40% of
total exports. During the Fifth Five Year Plan the export
import ratio for machinery was lowered to 1:1.7, arid the
ratio is to drop to 1:1.2 )y 1975. however, in absolute
t rins, imports are still ble the value of exports.
By the end of 1970 there were 440 enterprises in
Bulgaria producing machinery and equipment. Many of
the enterprises are located in and around Sofiya, but it
few plants are located in and around each of the other
major urban centers. In addition to the profitable
production of electric trucks and electric telphers,
Bulgaria produces a lot of heavy machinery� boilers,
turbines, earthmoving equipment, agricultural machin-
ery, textile machinery, processing machinery for foods,
beverages, and tobacco, and transportation and
materials handling equipment.
The development of a shipbuilding industry has been
another profitable venture for Bulgaria. Most ships are
destined for the U.S.S.R. or other CEMA countries, but it
few have been sold in the West. Current output is
approximately 120,000 deadweight tons (d.w.t.), but by
1975 output is expected to reach 400,000 d.w.t. Bulgaria
1-as three major shipyards. The Georgi Dimitrov shipyard
at Varna specializes in 23,500- d.w.l. mixed cargo vessels,
and 38,000- d.w.t. dry -cargo vessels. The yard plans to
build 70,000- d.w.t. tankers by 1975. The Ivan Dimitrov
H
shipyard at Ruse specializes in river and seagoing ships up
to 5,000 d.w.t. The newest facility is the Iliya Boyadzhicv
shipyard at Burgas. Capable of producing seagoing
vessels up to 3,000 d.w.t., most of the production at
Burgas is smaller- 300 -ton trawlers for the U.S.S.R.
Baltic fishing fleet, passenger vessels for the Black Sea
coast, and colliers anti tugs for rivers and seaports.
Bulgaria has had only a little success in developing an
automotive industry. Begun in 1966, the assembly of
automobiles was forecast to be approximately 35,000
annually by 1970. Actual 1970 production was closer to
7,000. The automotive industry is controlled by the
Autoprom State Economic Association (DSO). Its
branches include two automobile assembly plants, one at
Love h (Figure 67) and the other at Plovdiv. The
Madara plant in Shurnen produces trucks, and a plant for
the production of buses is being constructed at
Botevgrad.
The Lovech plant was equipped to assemble the Rila
1400 (Soviet Moskvich 408) and the Pirin -Fiat (Italian
Fiat 850 and 124). In 1970, the Lovech plant assembled
approximately 6,000 Rila 1400's, but the Pirin -Fiat line
has not yet got underway. The Plovdiv plant was
constructed under a US$25 million contract with Renault
to produce the Bulgar Renault (French Renault 8 and 10)
and the Bulgar Alpine. Although the plant produced
2,500 automoliles in 1969, mnlract difficulties caused
1970 production to fall to an estimated I:, of its 1969
level.
Production of truck:; in 1970 amounted to 2,850,
including 2,700 Soviet C ,'L 53 -A units and 150
Czechoslovak Skoda trucks. which entered into
production late in the year. Projected production of
Skoda trucks in 1971 was 500. Other future production
plans include 7,000 Rila 1400's in 1971 at the Lovech
plant. In 1973, the Lovech plant will begin assembly of
the Soviet Zhiguli.
Total automobile assembly at Lovech is expected to
reach 40,000 50,000 by 1975. Output of Chavdar buses
at the Botevgrad plant is projected at 2,500 units in 1975.
Bulgaria's cooperation with Italy and France has been
hampered by contract difficulties and shortages of hard
currency; production of Fiats and Renaults will probably
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cease, leaving the automobile industry inexorably
entwined with the U.S.S.R. and other CEMA members in
both production and sales.
1). CHEMICALS AND RUBBER
The subject of special attention in the 1960'x, the
chemical and rubber industry expanded its output at an
average annual rate of 19% -much faster than the 11.3%
annual growth rate reported for total industrial
production increasing the industry's share of total
industrial output from 3.7% in 1960 to 7.5% in 1970.
`r
However, Bulgaria still ranks far below the other
countries of Eastern Europe in the production of most
chemical products; output of selected products is shown
in Figure 68.
Most of the output of the chemical and rubber
industry is used domestically, but, as the industry has
grown, chemical exports have increased -from 2.7% of
total exports in 1960 to 8.1 in 1970. In addition exports
of rubber products accounted for about 1 of the total.
The only major export products are soda ash, sulfuric
acid, chlorine, and calcium carbide. In the late 1960's,
FIGURE 68. PRODUCTION OF INIA,1011 CHEMICAL PRODUCTS (S)
(Thousands of metric tons, except inhere otheneise indicated)
*Expressed in terms of nitrogen content
95
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FIGURE 67. The Lovech automobile assembly plant, showing relatively un-
sophisticated manufacturing techniques (U /OU)
1950
1955
1960
1965
1969
Calcium carbide
3.0
8.9
21.7
55.1
72.4
Caustic soda (100
O.l
2.4
17.1
32.4
49.0
Nitrogen fertilizer
0
31.2
83.6
215.8
261.2
osphorous fertilizers (1'2(
0
0
40.9
93.7
139.9
!da ash (100
0
70.6
128.4
222.7
264.9
Sulfuric acid (100
0
19.0
122.6
317.6
498.1
Svnthetic ammonia
0.015
41.4
110.8
337.7
712.:3
Plastics, artificial resins, and gums........
0.4
0.9
7.3
:33.2
74.4
Penicillin (in billion international units)
O
2,630
7,327
21,860
29,547
Motor vehicle tires (in thousand units)
38.1
72.5
196.2
348.6
3:3:3.2
*Expressed in terms of nitrogen content
95
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FIGURE 67. The Lovech automobile assembly plant, showing relatively un-
sophisticated manufacturing techniques (U /OU)

the importing of chemical and rubber products began to
level off, although the Bulgarians still run a deficit on this
trade account.
One of the largest centers of the heavy chemical
industry is on the Devnya plain, near Varna. Located in
the area are the Karl Marx Soda Works and chlorine and
polyvinylehloride plants. Plans for 1971 -75 call for
continued expansion of the chemical industry in this
area. A new soda works being constructed at Devnya is
designed to produce 1.2 million tons of soda ash and
other products a year �three times the output of the Karl
Marx plant. Also, a plant for the production of artificial
fertilizer and other chemicals is to be constructed in 1971.
Other large chemical complexes are located at
Dimitrovgrad, Nevin, Vratsa, and Stara Zagora. These
plants specialize in the production of ammonia, urea,
carbon bisulphide, nitrate fertilizers, and sulfuric acid.
Three plants have been built for the production of
chemical fibers. Polystyrene fibers are produced in
Yambol, acroylonitrile fiber in Burgas, and polyamide
fiber in Vidin; total output is expected to reach 100,000
metric tons a year. The petrochemical complex located at
Burgas Figure 69) is being expanded, and other facilities
are being developed at Pleven. Developing in step with
refining capacity, the expansion of the petrochemical
industry will be of great benefit to the rubber industry.
The production of synthetic rubber amounted to only
15,000 tons of butadiene- styrene in 1970. Plans for 1975
call for 40,000 tons of butadiene- styrene and 60,000 tons
of polyisoprene rubber. There are two tire plants, one in
Vidin and the other in Sofiya. By 1975 these plants are to
increase production of new tires by 500% in an attempt to
make Bulgaria self sufficient in tires.
c. LIGHT INDUSTRY
Light industry has played a minor role in Bulgaria's
economic development. In order to construct a socialist
state out of a backward, agricultural society, the regime
needed a foundation, and, according to socialist theory,
the bedrock of socialism is heavy industry. Given a
limited amount of available funds for capital investment,
the direction of investment flows was obvious. Another
factor was the lack of an export market to give incentive
to production. The products were of too poor quality to
be readily sold in the West, and in other Eastern
European countries similar policies of minimum self
sufficiency were being followed.
As industrialization progressed and the economy
matured in the 1950's, a greater volume of consumer
goods and other light industry goods began to be
produced. However, enterprises in light industry were
required to fulfill only rather naive targets. Conse-
quently, variety and quality were subordinated to
quantity as output plans were met, and unsala!>le goods
accumulated on the shelves. In the early 1960's the more
annoying aspects of the product mix were corrected, and
output increased modestly (Figure 70). Yet, light industry
was still relegated to a secondary position as the
development of heavy industry continued to occupy
almost all of the regime's attention. The lack of emphasis
96
on the development of light industry has resulted in a
lower- than average rite of growth, and the sector's share
of gross industrial production has continually declined.
In 1970 the various branches of light industry-
cellulose and paper; glassware, porcelain, and faience;
textiles; clothing; leather, fur, and footwear; and
printing accounted for 18.3% of industrial production
and 18.6% of industrial employment. The most
important branch in terms of either output or
employment is textiles, and in terms of exports the most
important branch is clothing. The fastest growing branch
during the Fifth Five Year Plan was cellulose and paper,
at an average annual rate of 15.3 Textiles grew the
least, 8.6% annually; the four other industries grew at
rates ranging from 11% to 13
During the Fifth Five Year Plan tht- regime intended
for light industry to begin to play a larger role in foreign
trade. Even though the level of fixed capital investment
remained relatively constant, exports did rise from a
sluggish annual increase of 7.2% during 1961 -65 to 11.3%
during 1966 -69. However, light industry accounted for
only 10.5% of total exports in 1969. Since total exports
experienced a similar growth pattern, light industry's
share of exports was unchanged from 1965, and lower
than in 1960. Although imports of light industry products
matched the change of pace, the Bulgarians have been
able to maintain a modest surplus in this sector's trade
account.
The economic plan for 1971 -75 exhibits the same lack
of emphasis that has been characteristic of earlier plans.
Capital investment for most branches will remain
constant, with one major exception. The development of
chemical fibers and use of more synthetics call for new
machinery and equipment as well as new techniques;
thus, extensi-c modernization is planned for the textile
industry. Other measures include greater quality control
and greater varieties of output, particularly in consumer
goods such as clothing.
d. AGRICULTURAL 1 1 110CESSING
With rapid industrialization, agricultural processing
has declined in importance, yet, it remains the most
important single industry in the econGn :y, both in the
value of output (approximately US$2.9 billion in 1970)
and in terms of exports ($579.4 million in 1969). It
continues to employ a large share of the industrial labor
force -15% in 1970. In the 1960's the product of the
agricultural processing industry increased at an average
annual rate of 8.4 well below the rate for gross
industrial production; consequently, its share of total
industrial product fell from 33.5% in 1960 to 25.8% in
1970. The output of agricultural processing has been one
of the mainstays in Bulgaria's foreign trade. Since 1960
exports have grown 12% annually, averaging one -third of
total exports in the late 1960's. Growth in the output of
selected items is shown in Figure 71.
Besides food preparation, the industry includes fish
processing, and alcoholic beverage and tobacco
processing. The meat processing branch is the most
important, accounting for 20% of total industry product
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G
L1-/ J!
OFMft ~�_ifj
i
'A"
FIGURE 69. The petrochemical complex at Burgas with its powerplant, which is the
largest industrial heat and power plant in the country (U /OU)
in 1969. One of the most rapidl, .owing branches is
canning (of both fruits and vegetables), which accounted
for 15 of the industry's output in 1969. The two other
major branches, alcoholic beverages and beer, and
tobacco and tobacco products, accounted for 15% and
IOSc of the value of the industry's output, respectively.
In 1970, 326 enterprises were engaged in processing
agricultural products. "l'he processing plants are widely
distributed throughout Bulgaria, but heavy co ,-entra-
tions, particularly of the canning branch, are found in the
districts of Pleven, Plovdiv, and Veliko 'I'urnovo.
Tobacco and tobacco products compose nearly half of
Bulgarian exports from the agricultural processing
industry. Exports of alcoholic beverages have grown the
most rapidly. Since 1960 exports of wine and spirits have
increased about 20% annually and now compose more
than one -fifth of the industry's exports. The other major
export branch is canning, but its rate of growth has hccn
relatively slow, and the branch's share of exports
decreased from 32.4% in 1960 to 21.1% in 1969. Dairy
and meat products, taken together, account for only 10%
of the industry's exports. Bulgaria's largest foreign
customer for processed agricultural products is the
U.S.S.R. In fact, in 1969 cigarettes accounted for I I% of
all Soviet imports from Bulgaria, and total Soviet imports
of canned fruits and vegetables, alcoholic beverages, and
tobacco and tobacco products were valued well in excess
of imports of Bulgarian machinery and equipment.
FIGURE 70. I'll 01)UCTION OF SELECTED PRODt'CTs OF IM INDUSTRY (t' OU)
U N* ITS 1950 1955 1 960 19135 19139
Colton fabric.
Million linear enters..................
8:3.1
1:32.1
218.1
291.:3
3:31.7
Woolon Lcbric�.�
do
8.9
10.7
18.7
20.1
213.0
Footcc e:rr
Million pair
:3.2
:3.5
7.5
10. 1
15. 1
Of cchich:
Lcathcrfool \%ear
do
1.7
I.ri
d.3
5.2
1.8
Paper
Thousand m(fric tons..................
25.4
13.2
5:3.9
85.2
191 .13
Plate glass
Th nrsand square mcfers................
1.8
:3.2
7.13
17.1
IS.3
Plcccood
Thousand cubic meters.................
21.1
:36.5
131.3
81. 1
7:3.7
97
'r
0
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FIGURE 71. PRODUCTION OF SELECTED PRODUCTS OF THE' AGRICULTURAL.
PROCESSING INDUSTRY (U /OU)
(Thousands of rnetrie tons, except inhere otherwise indicated)
+\feat slaughtered in slaughterhouses only
e. CoNsTltu( rloN
The regime's policy of rapid industrialization, and the
consequent high level and rapid growth of capital
investment, has fostered a relatively high, sustained rate
of growth in the construction industry averaging 9.4%
annually, in spite of the slow growth of housing
construction. The share of fixed capital investment
allocated to construction and assembly is given in the
following tabulation, in million of U.S. dollars:
1960 1965 1970
Total fixed capital investment 1,167.0 1,696.2 2,705.1
Investment in construction and
assemble................... 700.3 940.9 1,428.5
Percent of total 60.0 55.5 52.8
The Bulgarian construction industry, despite its rapid
growth, is backward even in comparison with
construction in other Eastern European countries. The
industry has been slow to train skilled workers and to
mechanize. Management also has been poor, both on the
site and in organizing supply. Enterprises were slow to use
machinery and equipment for more than one shift.
Moreover, both capital and labor were often idle because
of poor scheduling and the lack of materials and spare
parts.
Concentrated efforts have been made to put
construction on a more industrialized basis, especially
since 1969. Management has been told to adopt the
critical -path method to shorten construction time and to
maximize the use of productive factors. Prefabricated
construction, particularly the type involving concrete
slabs, has become more common. The amount of
machinery and equipment in use has continued to
increase. For example, the number of bulldozefs acquired
since 1965 is greater than the number acquired in the
previous 15 years. In spite of this increase, Bulgarian
officials estimate the capital -labor ratio in construction to
be only one- fourth that in industry, and even two- thirds
that in agricultu,
The shortcom'kag.s of the construction industry are
particularly evident in housing. In Bulgaria housing
standards have always been low, and there has been little
real improvement. Since 1956 Bulgaria has reportedly
constructed an average of 45,000 dwellings per year, but
a constructed dwelling is not "finished." Before a
dwelling can he occupied the new owner must correct the
mistakes and deficiencies of the construction process at
his own expense.
In 1970 the dwelling stock was estimated ai 1,764,000
units -10.9 square meters per capita. The hulk of the
dwelling stock is of postwar origin. Approximately 38% of
the units are located in urban areas, but the area per
capita (9.4 square meters) is less than in rural areas (12.4
square meters). Although a large migration to urban areas
has been observed since the early 1950's, it was not until
1964 -65 that the regime finally began to react. Since 1965
twice as many dwellings have been constructed in urban
than in rural areas. This effort has been, however, too
little and too late. A byproduct of concentrating
construction in urban areas was a net decrease in the
dwelling stock in rural areas. Fortunately, the migration
to the cities has been somewhat faster '.hall the decline in
the number of rural dwellings. Co families
remaining in rural areas arc housed better, at least in
terms of space, than urban families.
The regime has promised substantial improvement of
the housing situation during the 1970'x. Other
construction works should also be improved. Planning
officials have pinpointed what they consider to be a
major explanation for the industry's lagging perform-
ance -the spreading of construction activity too thinly
over the economic landscape. In the Sixth Five Year Plan
a smaller number of projects will be constructed. The
result of this measure may reduce the volume of
unfinished construction, removing a source of continuing
frustration for the regime.
5. Domestic trade
The development of internal trade reflects the slight,
but nevertheless very real, policy shifts that have affected
the Bulgarian economic system. There have been three
periods in the development of domestic trade: 1) the
period previous to 1952, when the economy was being
socialized, was characterized by great shortages and
market instability and by planners operating under
Stalin's thesis that demand should outstrip supply to
stimulate production; 2) in the second period, 1952 -60,
prices were manipulated in an attempt to balance supply
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1950
1955
1960
1965
1969
Meat*
54.3
9.1.0
148.0
207.2
259.3
Canned vegetables
23.1
58.6
15:3.1
196.5
224.6
Canned fruit
24.6
36.6
124.0
165.8
223.2
Vegetable oils (edible)
29.4
-18.5
78.1
98.3
1:37.6
Flour
1,097
1,534
1,506
1.589
1,572
Bread
278
619
877
1,459
1,556
Sugar, refined
37
63
171
315
316
;rape wine (in millions of liters)
101.6
138.1
119.2
278.0
:3:37.5
Tobacco products (in rnetric torts)
9,956
8,860
13,606
32,148
52.58'1
+\feat slaughtered in slaughterhouses only
e. CoNsTltu( rloN
The regime's policy of rapid industrialization, and the
consequent high level and rapid growth of capital
investment, has fostered a relatively high, sustained rate
of growth in the construction industry averaging 9.4%
annually, in spite of the slow growth of housing
construction. The share of fixed capital investment
allocated to construction and assembly is given in the
following tabulation, in million of U.S. dollars:
1960 1965 1970
Total fixed capital investment 1,167.0 1,696.2 2,705.1
Investment in construction and
assemble................... 700.3 940.9 1,428.5
Percent of total 60.0 55.5 52.8
The Bulgarian construction industry, despite its rapid
growth, is backward even in comparison with
construction in other Eastern European countries. The
industry has been slow to train skilled workers and to
mechanize. Management also has been poor, both on the
site and in organizing supply. Enterprises were slow to use
machinery and equipment for more than one shift.
Moreover, both capital and labor were often idle because
of poor scheduling and the lack of materials and spare
parts.
Concentrated efforts have been made to put
construction on a more industrialized basis, especially
since 1969. Management has been told to adopt the
critical -path method to shorten construction time and to
maximize the use of productive factors. Prefabricated
construction, particularly the type involving concrete
slabs, has become more common. The amount of
machinery and equipment in use has continued to
increase. For example, the number of bulldozefs acquired
since 1965 is greater than the number acquired in the
previous 15 years. In spite of this increase, Bulgarian
officials estimate the capital -labor ratio in construction to
be only one- fourth that in industry, and even two- thirds
that in agricultu,
The shortcom'kag.s of the construction industry are
particularly evident in housing. In Bulgaria housing
standards have always been low, and there has been little
real improvement. Since 1956 Bulgaria has reportedly
constructed an average of 45,000 dwellings per year, but
a constructed dwelling is not "finished." Before a
dwelling can he occupied the new owner must correct the
mistakes and deficiencies of the construction process at
his own expense.
In 1970 the dwelling stock was estimated ai 1,764,000
units -10.9 square meters per capita. The hulk of the
dwelling stock is of postwar origin. Approximately 38% of
the units are located in urban areas, but the area per
capita (9.4 square meters) is less than in rural areas (12.4
square meters). Although a large migration to urban areas
has been observed since the early 1950's, it was not until
1964 -65 that the regime finally began to react. Since 1965
twice as many dwellings have been constructed in urban
than in rural areas. This effort has been, however, too
little and too late. A byproduct of concentrating
construction in urban areas was a net decrease in the
dwelling stock in rural areas. Fortunately, the migration
to the cities has been somewhat faster '.hall the decline in
the number of rural dwellings. Co families
remaining in rural areas arc housed better, at least in
terms of space, than urban families.
The regime has promised substantial improvement of
the housing situation during the 1970'x. Other
construction works should also be improved. Planning
officials have pinpointed what they consider to be a
major explanation for the industry's lagging perform-
ance -the spreading of construction activity too thinly
over the economic landscape. In the Sixth Five Year Plan
a smaller number of projects will be constructed. The
result of this measure may reduce the volume of
unfinished construction, removing a source of continuing
frustration for the regime.
5. Domestic trade
The development of internal trade reflects the slight,
but nevertheless very real, policy shifts that have affected
the Bulgarian economic system. There have been three
periods in the development of domestic trade: 1) the
period previous to 1952, when the economy was being
socialized, was characterized by great shortages and
market instability and by planners operating under
Stalin's thesis that demand should outstrip supply to
stimulate production; 2) in the second period, 1952 -60,
prices were manipulated in an attempt to balance supply
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and demand for the goods produced, even though in
many cases this resulted in products being sold below
cost; 3) in the period since 1960 trade has been used more
frequently as an indicator of what should be produce([
rather than serving as an intermediary between producer
and consumer.
Wholesale and retail sales are largely controlled !y the
state. Only enterprises engage in wholesale trade, and
transactions are recorded on the enterprises' accounts by
branches of the Bulgarian National Banta. Retail trade is
strictly it commodity- monetary exchange; credit
transactions are rare. The only private trade is on the free
market, where farmers and self employed craftsmen sell
their products at market determined prices. Yet there is
Borne regulation of private trade because only those
persons who have been licensed by the local people's
council can trade witl the public.
The conduct of domestic trade is overseen by the
Ministry of Internal Trade and Public Works. Below the
ministry level, coordination and direction are provided
by an administration for retail trade, public catering, and
baking. Day -to -day control of trade enterprises, however,
is exercised by the district people's councils.
In 1969 state -owned enterprises accounted for 62.4% of
retail trade turnover and 59.4% of public catering sales.
Cooperatives accounted for all but a minute fraction of
the remainder. Although the trade network is no longer
territorially oriented, ((,operatives account for the bulk of
trade conducted in rural areas. All cooperative
organizations have been merged into the Central
Cooperative Union which, in addition to engaging in
trade, is involved in industrial activity (with output of
USM0 ir0lion in 1969) and in the development of
several agroindustrial complexes. By late 1971 the union
was composed of 835 consumer cooperatives, 744
agricultural organizations, and 420 production
cooperatives with a total membership exceeding 3.5
million.
The regime periodically has adjusted the structure of
retail and wholesale prices. In the 1950's prices were
reduced because of economies from increased production
and the attempt to clear the shelves of an accumulation
of low- quality items, as well as by the desire to increase
t "e standard of living, in effect, by subsidizing goods
deemed socially desirable. During the 1960's the policy
changes[ gradually, and attempts have been made to
eliminate or reduce the subsidy on consumer goods and
services so that price would become more reflective of
cost.
More is known about the structure and movement of
retail prices than of wholesale prices. During 1961 -63
retail prices were raised by 6 including an 11 increase
in food prices, mainly meat, alcoholic beverages, cheese,
and vegetables. A long delayed price reform in 1968
boosted prices of foods, rents, services, and public
transportation, largely items that previously had been
sold at a loss. The price increase for popular meats and
cheeses was more than 50 and for transportation 50%
to 100 Prices were decreased somewhat for sugar, fish,
lard, and bacon, but the net effect was a 4% increase in
the retail price index. Another token price reduction in
1969 did not substantially alter the impact of the 1968
price reform. Prices remained constant in 1970, and,
although a price rise was rumored toward the end of the
year, public opinion and till Polish experience may have
caused the regime to delay it (on the other hand, there
were reports that no changes in retail prices were
planned).
Under the New Economic Mechanism the criteria used
to form wholesale prices are norms for the cost of
production, norms for profitability, and foreign trade
prices. Wholesale prices must be high enough to insure
both the quality of the product and sufficient
profitability to accumulate funds for internally financed
investment, vet prices must also be low enough to be
competitive. A new wholesale price schedule became
effective in January 1971 arid, if plan directives are
followed, the wholesale price schedule will be
reformulated once a year in response to changing
conditions. The regime declared that the 1971 price
revision reduced wholesale prices 10 The only visible
effect of the new prices, coupled with revision in the
prices of some imports, was a reduction of retail prices in
June 1971, affecting only poultry, certain textiles, a few
medicines, and some consumer durables. Again, the
consumer experienced no substantial gain.
Per capita consumption seems to have improved more
in 1966 -70 than in 1960 -65, but it is still lagging behind
retail sales. It should be noted, however, that a large part
of consumption especially on farms �comes from the
consumer's own production, from payments in kind, and
from the free market. In fact, the Bulgarians estimate
that, over 1965 -69, income from private plots accounted
for an average of 17% of per capita income. Although the
free market will continue to be important, consuming
from one's own production or from payments in kind will
decrease in the 1970's because of continued urbanization,
which, in turn, will boost the volume of retail sales shown
in official statistics.
Despite sporadic attention, Bulgaria's retail trade
network is still inadequate. Under the Fifth Five Year
Plan the number of trade outlets expanded slowly, from
28,153 in 1965 to 32,705 in 1970. In addition, Bulgaria in
1970 had 19,775 eating places, of which 21% were
canteens. Although the 8.7% annual increase in retail
sales in 1966 -70 was an improvement over the sluggish
performance of the preceding 5 years (7.2 the growth
in sales was still well below the 11% average increase of
the last half of the 1950's. The distribution of retail sales
remained static during 1960 -65. Since 1965 a small
change has taken place, with the sale of nonfood items
increasing more than the sale of food items at a ratio of
1.7:1. The percentage distribution of total retail sales (in
terms of 1960 prices) is given in the accompanying
tabulation:
1966
11.0
1967
9.0
1968
6.5
1969
7.7
1970
7.0
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inspired "great leap forward" program, only two slight
detours were taken �a halfhearted attempt at economic
reform and an abortiv attempt to e xpand trade with the
West.
The 1971 -75 5 -year plan calls for reconstruction and
improvement of the internal trade network and more and
better consumer goods as part of the program of "concern
for man." Although past experience indicates that much
of the emphasis is probably rhetoric, the variety and
quantity, but not the quality, of goods on the shelf has
increased perceptibly since December 1970. Emphasis
has also been placed on rapid development of consumer
services. The goals of the plan for services are ambitious,
detailing a 70% to 80% increase in commercil.l services,
including a 580% increase in dry cleaning alone.
Employment in industrial services is to increase 250%
more than in the preceding 5 -year plan.
C. Economic policy, planning, and the
financial system (S)
1. Economic policy
Bulgaria entered the 1970's in the same manner it
began the 1950'x, borrowing its economic policy from the
U.S.S.R. In the 1960'x, after abandoning the Chinee-
100
a. D o.NlESTIC
Sitice 1950, economic activity has been dominated by
the push for industrialization. Planned investment
increased by about 10 times, reaching approximately 2.5
billion leva in 1969 (Figure 72). By 1960 industry was
receiving about one -third of total capital investment, and
by 1965 its share increased to 45% (Figure 73). (More
detailed information on thr distribution of total
investment among the economic sectors is contained in
Figure 74.)
Within industry, important shifts of emphasis occurred
in the early 1960's, as shown by changes in the shares o!
investment going into the various branches (Figure 75)�
investment in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy rose
from 18% in 1960 to nearly 25% in 1965, while the shares
for electric power and fuel and light industry declined.
Structural change and growth resulted in an
increasingly complex and inefficient economy. A variety
of factors were at work: the extreme centralization of
planning, lack of enterprise incentives, and the
inappropriateness of performance indexes to help guide
investment decisions �in short, all of the problems
inherent in a command economy. Bulgarian officials,
contemplating reform to deal willi these problems, kept
*Health, welfare, science, education, culture, art,
communal services, and housing.
FIGURE 73. Fixed capital investment by eco-
nomic sector (U /OU)
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FIGURE 72. Level and composition of fixed capital
investment (U /OU)
Millions of lore
1,365A
1,984.6
3,220.3
i 00�/,
100
100x/
Other
26.5
23.0
21.2
3.1
3.3
Trade
2.2
6.7
9.6
T�ansporta' ion and
5.8
Con.,..aaleatlons
29.7
19.7
1t.3:
Agriculture and
Forstry
2.3 Construction
2
1.6
34.2
44.8.
47.3
Industry
1960
1965
1969
*Health, welfare, science, education, culture, art,
communal services, and housing.
FIGURE 73. Fixed capital investment by eco-
nomic sector (U /OU)
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FIGURE 72. Level and composition of fixed capital
investment (U /OU)

FIGURE 74. DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT, BY ECONOMIC SECTOR (1?1;OU)
(Percent of total)
1949 1956 1960 1965 19611) 11167 1968 1969 1970
Industry
31.4
36.8
34.2
44.8
45.1
45.8
45.8
47.3
47.2
Construction
2.2
0.5
1.6
2.7
3.6
3.S
3.0
2.3
2.2
Agriculture
11.7
21.6
27.9
18.8
17.7
16.2
16.9
15.4
15.2
Of which:
4.2
Other branches of industry
9.6
Total
100.0
1.0
1.7
!.1
Labor Cooperative Agricultural Farms (TKE8,1
2.7
9.6
18.0
11.8
no
9.8
10.0
9.9
no
Forestry
0.7
1.3
1.8
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
1.0
Transportation
16.5
6.2
5.4
6.1
7.5
8.9
8.4
8.6
S.:i
Communication
1.6
0.7
().4
0.6
0.8
1.3
1.1
1.0
0.9
Trade
2.4
2.0
2.2
3.1
2.8
2.8
3.1
3.3
3.0
Other branches of material production
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
Housing and com mereW economy
22.9
23.8
19.2
16.9
15.2
13.7
13.8
14.7
15.0
Of which:
Housing
20.0
18.6
14.1
12.0
10.6
9.1
8.7
9.6
9.7
Science and science services
0.2
0.6
0.9
0.8
0.7
1.0
1.1
0.9
1.0
Education, culture, and arts
2.7
3.0
3.5
3.0
3.0
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
Public health, social insurance, and physical culture
2.2
1.9
1.5
1.2
1.5
1 .5
1.7
1.2
1.4
Other branches not contributing directly to material
production
5.5
1.5
1.3
1.1
1.1
1.4
1.5
1.7
1.9
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
NOTE Figures may not add to totals because of rounding
na Data not available.
FIGURE 75. DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL, INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY, BY BRANCH (UIOU)
(Percent of total)
INDUSTRY 1950 1955 1960 1965 1966 1967
Heavy manufacturing:
%lachinebuilding and metalworking
13.3
Chemicals and rubber
*10.9
Electric power (including steam heat)
37.1
Fuel
7.3
Ferrous metallurgy (including ore mining)
3.8
Nonferrous metallurgy (including ore mining)
15.6
Light industry:
14.3
Cellulose and paper
Glassware, porcelain, and faience
Textiles
3.5
Clothing
Leather, fur, and footwear
0.3
Printing..
Agricultural processing
6.1
Building materials
3.8
Logging and wood processing
4.2
Other branches of industry
9.6
Total
100.0
NOTE- Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
*Chemical industry only.
*Data are included in "Other branches."
close watch on attempts by the other countries of Eastern
Europe to solve similar problems, particularly
Czechoslovakia. Yet, as they watched with interest the
events in Eastern Europe, they were constantly aware of
reactions frorn ?Moscow. Consequently, they approached
economic reform with great circumspection.
The period of reform in Bulgaria can be broken into
two stages, 1966 -68 and 1969 -70. Reform was officially
initiated with the publ'c :ttion of the "Draft Thesis on
10.5
10.3
12.2
13.3
15.4
17.8
*1.6
5.3
9.1
14.4
18.7
15.6
28.0
14.3
15.8
15.9
15.1
20.1
15.5
12.9
11.1
9.5
S
3.2
6.4
15.1
11.0
9.3
8.6
14.0
11.9
9.4
6.5
5.9
5.1
1.0
1.7
!.1
0.9
0.9
2.1
1.6
:.5
0.7
0.8
2.7
6.2
4.
1.3
3.2
5.2
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.2
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.�4
0.3
5.1
13.2
8.0
9.0
9.5
10.1
3.0
5.9
3.8
5.3
5.2
4
2.9
3.3
2.7
3.3
2.3
2.3
8.7
3.1
2.5
3.0
3.1
2.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
the New System of Planning and Management of the
National Economy," in December 1965. Actually, the
New System of Management was first discussed in 1963
and introduced experimentally in 1964. The reform was
designed to promote managerial efficiency and improve
the quality of Bulgarian production without sacrificing
the central control of the Communist Party. The 1966 -68
stage, however, should not be likened to the policy of
decentralization adopted at that time in Czechoslovakia
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or Hungary but rather to the policies of Poland or East
Germany.
The reform's overall goals efficiency and adaptabil-
ity� policy changes in the first stage were focused on the
basic economic unit, the enterprise. Incentives were to be
devised to encourage greater productivity and technical
progress. Investment was to be internalized, relying on
enterprise accumulation and 'bank credit. Fixed and
liquid assets were to be subject to taxes to insure that they
would be productively used. Enterprises were also to be
given an increase in contractual responsibility, so long as
the contracts negotiated did not violate plan directives.
In planning, enterprises were to work out the details in
order to reduce exaggerated centralism and make
planning more scientific �Le., to improve central
planning, riot to weaken it.
The old system of supervision of the enterprises by
administration and ministries was replaced by the
formation of state economic trusts (DSO's), which in turn
were guided by the Council of Ministers. Although
enterprises were administratively subordinate to the
DSO's, they were legally independent. In addition to
these changes, the regime revised the price and tax
structure and linked wage payments more directly to
labor productivity.
In the second stage 1968 -70� liberalization of
planning was in effect abandoned as a way of attaining
efficiency. Bulgarian leaders now stressed computerized
control through scic-,itific planning far more than
increased efficiency through enterprise incentive. The
principles of reform were eulogized, not practiced; the
tools were modified, but policy remained the same.
The latest available data indicate that the reform did
little to alter the overall investmrat trend of the early
1960's �the share going to industry remained about
constant and equalled only 47% in 1970 (Figure 74). By
1968 the share going to heavy manufacturing had
increased, but only to 33% (Figure 75). The share going,
to electric power and fuel decreased somewhat �to
24 �as did the share for ferrous and nonferrous
metallurgy �to 14 'l'he share for light industry
remained approximately the same,, slightly in excess of
8%.
Over 1969 -70, discussion of reform centered on the
necessity of adopting the newest techniques of scientific
management of the economy via computer control of a
more streamlined, integrated economic system. In 1969
an experiment with vertical and horiontal integration
began with the formation of agroindtutrial complexes.
The plan for 1971 -75 calls for continuation of the 1965
reform in the spirit of the second stage. It began in 1971
with the adoption of integration as the norm for
agriculture. Other sectors of the conomy were
rationalized, and the number of DSO's was decreased
from 120 to 68. Enterprises lost their legal independence,
becoming instead branches under the direct control of the
new economic organizations. Thus, the flSO are now
economic rather than administrative in nature and
directly responsible for the performance of their
102
enterprise branches to the Council of Ministers. Although
titled the New Economic Mechanism, the po ;icy is only
old wine in ;iew bottles.
b. FonFIG\
In conjunction with the domestic reform policy the
Bulgarians believed that the road to modernization
pointed in the direction of vastly increased imports of
machinery and equipment from the West. In the late
1950's they had tried a similar policy which failed when
exports did not increase fast enough to keep the debt
manageable. In the late 1960'x, this new policy thrust was
blunted and redirected, partly as a result of the
Czechoslovak experience, but more importantly because
of the same difficulty of producing exports acceptable to
the West, the unsustainable increase in debt to the West,
and, ironically, the excessive sophistication of the
Western imports. The Bulgarians watched history repeat
itself until 1968, when the Soviets were compelled to
render them financial assistance. Blocked from Western
technology because of their disadvantageous trade
relationships, they began to eye CEMA with renewed
interest.
Despite the small economic gains received from
CEMA to date, the Bulgarian leaders hope that CEMA
will facilitate Bulgaria's transformation from a backward
agricultural state to an advanced industrial state. They
realize that the small size and limited resources of the
country prevent obtaining optimum levels of production,
economies of scale, and concentrated research and
development. They would like to have CEMA assign
Bulgaria a monopoly on production of particular lines of
goods, especially of machinery and equipment, which
would guarantee a ;arge ma within the bloc. They
have also argued for the establishment of joint projects
within CEMA for which Bulgaria would produce
specified components (e.g., automobile parts). As a
byproduct, the partner states would provide technologi-
cal assistance and licenses.
Bulgaria generally supports Soviet policies in CEMA.
For example, during the price disputes in the mid 1960'x,
Bulgaria fully endorsed the Soviet view that prices should
be adjusted within CEMA in favor of agricultural and
raw material exports, since such changes would favor
Bulgaria, too. But the regime has, on occasion, taken a
position at variance with the Soviet view when concrete
Bulgarian economic interests were at stake. For instance,
Bulgaria campaigned for the establishment of quotas
within the Investment Bank according to national
income despite Soviet insistence on relating quotas to
foreign trade.
Relationships with other CEMA states have not been
entirely tranquil and smooth. The R; Igarians have
resented what they considered to o inadequate
assistance from the advanced states of CEMA, notably
East Gernwny and Czechoslovakia. The differences have
a logical economic basis Bulgaria wants "equalization
of the economic levels of the CEMA countries," but the
more advanced CEMA countries are not eager to
contribute to equalization.
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2. Implementation of economic plans
The basic instruments for stating the regime's policies
are the economic plans. There are three types of plans:
long -term, 5 -year, and annual. Long -term planning
i.e., 15 -20 years �is used to project major structural
changes in the economy. Long -term plans are divided
into 5 -year periods which are used as a basis for
development of the 5 -year plans. Originally used only to
give general continuity to planning, the 5 -year plan has
become the basic planning document. The plans contain
specifications for the economic and cultural development
of society, including the rate and distribution of
investment, targets for foreign trade, increases in the
living standards of the people, and educational and
medical requirements. Annual plans are more detailed
than the 5 -year plan which they enforce because they
adapt the 5 -year projections to changing conditions and
regulate the activities of economic organizations.
The fundamental responsibility of planning is shared
by the Council of Ministers and the State Planning
Committee. Once the plan has been drafted and
coordinated, it is submitted to people's councils and trade
unions for discussion. Although, in principle, the
planning draft is subject to modification during those
discussions, a substantial change would be rare.
Annual plans are automatically submitted to and
enacted into law by the National Assembly. Conversely,
the 5 -year plans in the past were approved by Party
Congresses. According to the regulations of the New
Economic Mechanism, 5 -year plans are now required to
be submitted to the National Assembly and thus gain the
status of law. This regulation, however, was ignored
when the directives for the 1971 -75 plan were approved.
Planning since World War 11 falls into five periods
1947-53, 1953 -57, 1958 -60, 1961 -65, and 1966-70
roughly corresponding to the regime's long -term
planning periods. The first period, one of strenuous effort
to develop the economy, included the Two Year Plait
(1947 -48) and the First Five Year Plan (1949 -53). A
period of consolidation of achievements, coinciding
approximately with the Second Five Year Plan (1953 -57)
followed. With the adoption of the Third Five Year Plan
(1958 -62) there began another period of ambitious
planning, culminating in the "leap forward" program of
1959 -60. Since 1960, planning has become more realistic,
and the period following the "leap forward" was again
one of consolidation.
The original Third Five Year Plan, approved at the
Seventh Party Congress in June 1958, was similar to the
Second Five Year Plan, but more conservative; for
example, by the end of 1962 gross agricultural production
was to reach the goal that had originally been set for 1957
in the Second Five Year Plan. In November 1958,
however, the party introduced the "leap forward"
program. This program, probably inspired by the Chinese
Communist "leap forward" campaign of 1958 -60,
greatly raised the goals for 1962, and also set the objective
of fulfilling major goals of the revised plan 1 or 2 years
early.
Under the "leap forward" program Bulgaria increased
the rate of growth of industry and investment in 1959,
but the program as a whole was an expensive failure. It
left a legacy of imbalances that probably had
unfavorable effects on industrial growth for several years.
During 1960 the economy grew at a slower rate than in
1959, and the rate declined further in 1961 -63.
The 1958 -62 plan was declared "st.l>stantially
fulfilled" at the end of 1960, and a new 5 -year plan was
drawn up. The aims of this plan, the Fourth Five Year
Plan (1961 -65), were further industrialization, consolida-
tion of the gains of the "leap forward" period, and
correction of the imbalances that developed at that time.
National income was to increase by about 60 gross
industrial production by 70 and gross agricultural
production by 45% to 50 Capital investments for the
period 1961 -65 were scheduled to be double the amount
for 1956 -60, emphasis being put on completing projects
begun during the "leap forward" program. The goal for
industrial growth was attained, but results in agriculture
were disappointing and national income did not grow as
planned. Capital investment also fell short of the planned
figure.
The Fifth Five Year Plan, covering the period 1966 -70,
also projected high growth rates. National income was to
increase by 50 industrial production by 70 and
agricultural production by 30 '.,vestment during 1966-
70 was to total 12 to 13 billion Ieva compared with the
7.5 billion Ieva invested in 1961 -65.
Regardless of official claims to the contrary, the plan
was unfulfilled �no doubt because of the 1968
agricultural failure. Annual growth rates of national
income during the Fifth Five Year Pi-an are given in the
following tabulation, in percent:
Financing the national
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
economy
52
54
55
53
52
50
Social and cultural ex-
penditure
28
26
27
28
29
32
National defense
7
6
6
6
6
6
Government adminis-
tration
2
2
2
2
2
2
As a result, national income increased slightly less than
the planned 50
The aggregate increa ;c in industrial production was
71.1%, indicating fulfillment of the plan. However,
output in key sectors was far short of what had been
envisioned. The lack of reporting on sectors overfulfilling
the plan casts doubt on the validity of the "official"
figures.
Agricultural production increased only 26% during the
plan period. After an excellent first year, production fell
off in 1967 and had a negative growth rate 10.5 in
1968. Since 1968 agricultural production has managed to
rise to approximately the 1966 level.
The. plan for capital investment was substantially
overfulfilled, amounting to 14.9 billion Ieva over the
period. However, much of this investment was dissipated.
Under the New Economic Mechanism, the allocation of
103
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investment among enterprises will be determined by the
DSO's to avoid wasteful expenditures and facilitate the
concentration of investment.
The Sixth Five Year Plan continues the emphasis on
rapid growth, but to a degree it is more realistic. National
income is to increase by 45% to 50% during the period
and industrial production by 55% to 60 Capital
investment will amount to 20 to 21 billion leva; 75% of
this investment is destined for industry. The planned
increase in agriculture, 17% to 20% over the 1960 -70
average, probably reflects awareness of the anticipated
effects of reorganization on production.
The theme of the Sixth Five Year Plan is "concern for
man." Given the lack of support for this theme in the
directives, it seems likely that this is a reaction to the
Polish riots of December 1970. One item receiving
emphasis is the plan to increase housing from 10.9 square
meters per person in 1970 to 12.5 square meters in 1975.
The space available in the dwelling stock in rural areas is
more than adequate, but in the cities it has been in
critically short supply since the early 1950's when labor
began migrating to work in industry. Although housing
has received periodic attention, the remaining severity of
the crisis serves as an indictment of the regime's excessive
emphasis on industrial growth.
3. The financial system
a. FINANCIAL PLANNING
The annual financial plan on the national level
projects the flow of funds within the economy according
to the production and consumption goals set by the
economic plan. Regional levels of government and
economic organizations incorporate and coordinate their
financial plans with the state plan. Projections are also
made for the financial needs of private enterprise and for
the incomes and expenditures of the population. The
main components of the financial plan are the cash plan,
the credit plan, and the budget.
The cash plan is drawn up by the State Planning
Committee to balance currency flows within the
economy. Since the government has prohibited cash
payments of more than 100 leva between enterprises, the
cash plan is largely restricted to balancing the incomes of
the population� wages, pensions, social security benefits,
payments for the sale of agricultural products, and so
forth against the available supply of consumer goods
and services. Through the cash plan the government
attempts to identify and control the inflationary F
built into an economy in which not enough consumer
goods are available to satisfy the demand generated by
steadily rising incomes. The extent of unsatisfied demand
is :Ilustrated by the rapid growth of savings deposits,
which i,: the 1960's rose at an average annual rate of
15.6�%0. The government encourages savings, paying from
2% to 4% interest to depositors, but greater reliance is
placed on taxation to reduce effective demand.
The credit plan, drafted by the Bulgarian National
Bank (BNB), covers both long -term (over 1 year) and
short -term credits. The function of the credit plan is the
identification of all sources of loanable funds and the
allocation of these funds among branch banks, which in
104
turn grant credit to economic organizations for working
capital and capital investments.
After 1955 the volume of short -term credit expanded
steadily, reaching 2.7 b-Pion levy (US$2.3 billion) in
1965. Of the amount which was not overdue in 1965 (2.5
billion leva), 53% was used to ypplement working
capital and 9% was used for seasonal expenditures and
supply. The domestic trade sector received the majority
of the credit, 49 and industry received 37 Under the
New System of Management, enterprises were
encouraged to use retained earnings to finance working
capital, but credit for this purpose still averaged 53% of
all nonoverdue short -term credit for 1966 -69. Over the
same period an annual average of 11% was allocated for
seasonal expenditure and supply. By 1969 the volume of
short -term credit had grown to 4.6 billion leva ($3.9
billion); of this amount, 37% was still received by
industry, but the share received by domestic trade had
fallen to 41
Long -term credits have been used to finance capital
investment in industry, agriculture, and housing. As in
other Communist countries, most industrial investment
in Bulgaria originally was financed by direct, interest -free
grants from the budget. In 1965, long -term credits totaled
only 860 million leva (US$735 million). The population
received 37% of the total. The remaining 63% went to the
national economy, heavily favoring cooperative farms
53% of the total; other cooperative enterprises received
only 1% and state enterprises received 9 However, the
New System of Management replaced budgeted grants to
industry with interest bearing loans to encourage more
efficient use of investment funds. By 1969 the volume of
iong -term credit had grown by 225% and equaled 2.8
billion leva ($2.4 billion). The distribution in 1969 was
changed markedly from 1965. Only 18% of the available
credit was received by the population virtually all of it
used fcr construction and repair of housing. Cooperative
farms received 15% and other cooperative enterprises
received 2 Thus, the amount of credit backed
investment ;n state enterprise grew to 66% under the New
System of Management.
b. THE BUDGET
Drafted by the Ministry of Finance, the budget
includes transactions of the state and district
governments as well as contributions to and payments
from the state social security system. The function of the
budget is to redistribute funds collected from enterprises
and the population to finance economic development,
government administration, national defense, and social
welfare. Although most investment is now allocated
outside of the budget framework, the budget remains a
powerful tool for implementing the i onomic plan. The
following tabulation shows the distribution of planned
expenditures by main categories, in percent:
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1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Turnover tax
39
38
33
35
37
37
Profit tax
18
14
12
11
3
3
Capital use tax
2
3
4
4
5
5
Enterprise income tax
3
8
11
14
21
21
Individual income tax
7
6
6
7
6
8
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The category "financing the national economy includes
some direct capital investment and credit for capital
investment channeled through the banking system,
subsidies to industrial and foreign trade enterprises, and
additions to state reserves of materials. E ;penditures for
social cultural purposes including .,ocial insurance,
education. health, and cultural ac�ti�.ities� represent the
second largest outlay of the budget. Defense expenditures
were about 84i; of total expenditures in the early 1960'x,
but declined to tiro beginning in 1966. Some defense
related spending may he included in the noniteinized
residual in budget expenditures; also, some defense items
are hidden in other budget categories. Government
administration accounted for about 4% of total
expenditures during most of the 1950's and 2.5% in 1961-
65.
Before 1965 turnover taxes and deductions from profits
of enterprises accounted for about two thirds of budget
revenu:.,. The turnover tax �in effect, a sales tax on
consumer goods, with widely different rates for different
types of products accounted for one -half of receipts.
and enterprise profits accounted for another one- fifth.
Starting in 1965 the turnover tax began to decline in
importance, but quickly regained its significance. The
profit tax has been gradually displaced by two new taxes
designed to give greater incentive to enterprise efficiency:
1) the capital use charge on fixed and working capital
with rates ranging from 1 in agriculture to 5% in the
processing industry �was introduced in 1965, when it
accounted for 2%' of budget receipts (by 1970 it had risen
to about 5% of total revenues); 2) the tax on net
enterprise earnings, introduced in 196.1 and now known
its it �`gross enterprise ;ncorne tax" because of changes in
the method of assessment, is applied to returns from sales,
minus turnover tax and m aterial costs of production (i.e.,
excluding wages and salaries). The enterprise incornc tax,
paid only by enterprises working !older the New System
of Management, has increased in importance as the New
System was expanded. In 1970 this tax accounted for 2l
of planned budget revenues. In 1968 the introduction of
reforms caused further change in the distribution of the
tax payments. Economic enterprises working under the
old system, inchding banking and insurance institutes,
paid the profit tax. Enterprises under the new system paid
the capital use tax as well ats the gross enterprise income
tax. The structure and change in relative shares of
revenue by source is shown in the accompanying
tabulation:
C. F INANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The Ministry of Finance. has the responsibility for the
financial system as a whole. In practice, however,
financial authorities have had no policymaking
functions. Under the New Economic Mechanism the
BNB should begin to take more part in policy decisions
comme�ttsurate with the increase in its control over
investment spending.
Three times in the last 4 years the banking system has
been reorganized as policy vacillated between
specialization and concentration. Since I January 1971,
the BNB has been the only commercial bank operating
domestically, with i40 branches. Attached to the BNB
are two semi-independent banks: the Bulgarian Foreign
"Trade Batik (BFTB) and the State Savings Bank. The
BNB controls the issue of curre buys and sells foreign
currency, collects taxes, maintains accounts for all
enterprises, and makes long -term and short -term credit
available to DSO's. Although major investment loans are
only made with the advice of the State Planning
Committee, it is through the latte function that the BNB
call influence the nianagernent of DSO's.
All foreign banking activities are conducted by the
BFTB. The BNB o vns 70% of the BFTB and must
approve its actions. The main functions of the BFTB are
to conduct foreign exchange credit transactions and to
provide short -term loans to foreign trade organizations
for imports of machinery and equipment. The State
Savings Bank holds individual savings deposits and
provides loans for the construction of residential housing
by individuals.
Insurance other than social insurance is under the
Jurisdiction of the State Insurance Institute. The largest
category of insurance is compulsory property insurance,
which is required on the property of state enterprises,
cooperatives, and public organizations, and on some
types of priv.'itc n:operty. From 1951 to 1965, state
economic enterprises were not insured; property losses
norm ally covered in non- Communist countries by
insurance were handled in Bulgaria through the budget.
In 1965 insurance was made compulsory for all
enterprises under the New System of Management.
Almost all crops, certain animals, and beehives must also
be insured. Accident insurance is obligatory for travelers
using public transportation facilities, the premium being
included in the fare. Life insurance and protection
against hisses resulting from fire, personal accidents, and
daniare to crops and livestock are available on it
voluntary basis.
D. International economic relations (S)
1. Foreign trade
Bulgaria is the most dependent on foreitt �t trade of the
Eastern European Communist countries. In 1966 -70,
imports averaged about 18% of GNI'; the co,mtry having
the next highest share was Hungary with 14 'Total
trade turnover nearly tripled 'tiring the period 1956 -60
(Figure 76). Trade slowed clown in the 1960'x, but still
n1w Bulgarian unit of exchange, the Icv, is used exclusively for
internal transactions. In c(,mnm(lity trade transactions 1.17
Ieva= US81.00; for noncommercial lransiclions and tourist use the
exchange rate is l.99 Ieva US$1.Ot). 'I'6e purchasing poecr of tle� icy is
generally Iotver than these rates indicn!e, and it is much lower for high
grade consumer goods and most investment goods.
105
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1960
1965
1970
Catering
19
20
19
Food
26
25
21
Nonfood
55
55
60
Total
100
100
100
C. F INANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The Ministry of Finance. has the responsibility for the
financial system as a whole. In practice, however,
financial authorities have had no policymaking
functions. Under the New Economic Mechanism the
BNB should begin to take more part in policy decisions
comme�ttsurate with the increase in its control over
investment spending.
Three times in the last 4 years the banking system has
been reorganized as policy vacillated between
specialization and concentration. Since I January 1971,
the BNB has been the only commercial bank operating
domestically, with i40 branches. Attached to the BNB
are two semi-independent banks: the Bulgarian Foreign
"Trade Batik (BFTB) and the State Savings Bank. The
BNB controls the issue of curre buys and sells foreign
currency, collects taxes, maintains accounts for all
enterprises, and makes long -term and short -term credit
available to DSO's. Although major investment loans are
only made with the advice of the State Planning
Committee, it is through the latte function that the BNB
call influence the nianagernent of DSO's.
All foreign banking activities are conducted by the
BFTB. The BNB o vns 70% of the BFTB and must
approve its actions. The main functions of the BFTB are
to conduct foreign exchange credit transactions and to
provide short -term loans to foreign trade organizations
for imports of machinery and equipment. The State
Savings Bank holds individual savings deposits and
provides loans for the construction of residential housing
by individuals.
Insurance other than social insurance is under the
Jurisdiction of the State Insurance Institute. The largest
category of insurance is compulsory property insurance,
which is required on the property of state enterprises,
cooperatives, and public organizations, and on some
types of priv.'itc n:operty. From 1951 to 1965, state
economic enterprises were not insured; property losses
norm ally covered in non- Communist countries by
insurance were handled in Bulgaria through the budget.
In 1965 insurance was made compulsory for all
enterprises under the New System of Management.
Almost all crops, certain animals, and beehives must also
be insured. Accident insurance is obligatory for travelers
using public transportation facilities, the premium being
included in the fare. Life insurance and protection
against hisses resulting from fire, personal accidents, and
daniare to crops and livestock are available on it
voluntary basis.
D. International economic relations (S)
1. Foreign trade
Bulgaria is the most dependent on foreitt �t trade of the
Eastern European Communist countries. In 1966 -70,
imports averaged about 18% of GNI'; the co,mtry having
the next highest share was Hungary with 14 'Total
trade turnover nearly tripled 'tiring the period 1956 -60
(Figure 76). Trade slowed clown in the 1960'x, but still
n1w Bulgarian unit of exchange, the Icv, is used exclusively for
internal transactions. In c(,mnm(lity trade transactions 1.17
Ieva= US81.00; for noncommercial lransiclions and tourist use the
exchange rate is l.99 Ieva US$1.Ot). 'I'6e purchasing poecr of tle� icy is
generally Iotver than these rates indicn!e, and it is much lower for high
grade consumer goods and most investment goods.
105
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FIGURE 76. GROWTH OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (U /0U)
more than doubled over the decade as Bulgaria raised
imports of machinery and materials for industrialization
and increased exports of agricultural products and
consumer manufactures. Plans for 1971 -75 call for
continued growth, with an increase of 60 -65% in trade
turnover.
a. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION
Among the CEMA countries, Bulgaria is uniquely
dependent on trade; it also relies more heavily on trade
with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet share of trade, amounting to
about one -half of Bulgaria's turnover during 1950 -67,
rose to 55% in the late 1960's (Figure 77). Trade with
other Eastern European CEMA countries has been more
volatile -the share has ranged from nearly 40% in the
early 1950's to around 20% since the mid 1960'x. Other
Communist countries- Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and
those in Asia- normally have accounted for a very small
share of Bulgarian trade. The value of trade with the
major trading groups is shown in Figure 78.
Bulgarian exports to other CEMA countries, excluding
the U.S.S.R., have grown by 8.2% annually since 1965
and averaged 10.8% of total exports. Imports from other
CEMA countries sin(- 196+ grew somewhat faster
11.3% annually -and accounte(1 for an average of 19.8%
of total imports. Appm,:imately two fifths of Bulgaria's
trade within CEMA ..,is with East Germany, whose
overall importance as a trade partner has been second
only to that of the U.S.S.R.
Within the non Communist area, the developed
Western nations made up 16.6% of Bulgarian trade in
1970, while less developed countries accounted for under
6 About 40% of Bulgaria's trade with the West is with
West Germany and Italy; Austria, Switzerland, France,
and the United Kingdom account for almost A the rest.
Trade with non Communist countries mainly the
developed West -has been marked by two Bulgarian
spending sprees. The first, in 1959 -60, reflected Bulgaria's
Other Communist
Countries
Eastern European
Communist
Countries
U.S.S.R.
Non.Cormnunist
Countries
10.5 160. 232 19.0�
195' 1960 1965 1969
NOTE: Components may not add to totals because of rounding
FIGURE 77. Geographic distribution of foreign
trade (U /OU)
disenchantment with the terms and commodities
involved in its goods exchange with Eastern Europe
together with a new Soviet policy of encouraging Eastern
European imports of Western equipment, financed
largely by Soviet -owned banks in the West. Bulgaria's
large purchases of machinery boosted the share of the
developed West from about 8% in the mid- 1950's to 13%
in 1960. But the Bulgarians failed to meet their debt to
106
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TOTAL
TRADE
EXPORTS
IrtPORTS
TURNOVER"
HALANCF
EXPORTS
1 \t PO RTS
TOTAL
Value in millions
of U.S.
dollars. a current
prices
Indexes of rolunte (1955
100)
1939
54
46
100
9
51.4
57.8
54.7
1955
236
250
486
14
100.0
100.0
100.0
1956
302
251
553
51
136.5
101.8
118.7
1957
370
332
702
38
166.9
135.1
150.5
1958
373
366
740
7
169.0
152.1
160.3
1959
467
579
1,046
112
214.4
255.5
235.5
1960
572
633
1,204
62
279.2
262.1
270.4
1961
663
666
1,329
-3
321.5
278.6
299.5
1962
773
785
1,557
12
380.2
334.4
356.7
1963
834
933
1,767
99
412.0
394.4
402.9
1964
980
1,062
2,042
-83
485.2
444.9
464.5
1965
1,176
1,178
2,354
-2
573.8
496.3
534.0
1966
1,305
1,478
2,783
-173
649.3
624.1
636.3
1967
1,458
1,572
3,030
114
756.9
661.8
708.1
1968
1,615
1,782
3,397
-167
865.4
766.6
814.4
1969
1,794
1,749
3,544
45
953.3
752.2
850.2
1970
2,009
1,816
3,825
193
1,057.1
783.4
917.0
'Figures may not add to totals
because of
rounding.
(In percent
more than doubled over the decade as Bulgaria raised
imports of machinery and materials for industrialization
and increased exports of agricultural products and
consumer manufactures. Plans for 1971 -75 call for
continued growth, with an increase of 60 -65% in trade
turnover.
a. GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION
Among the CEMA countries, Bulgaria is uniquely
dependent on trade; it also relies more heavily on trade
with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet share of trade, amounting to
about one -half of Bulgaria's turnover during 1950 -67,
rose to 55% in the late 1960's (Figure 77). Trade with
other Eastern European CEMA countries has been more
volatile -the share has ranged from nearly 40% in the
early 1950's to around 20% since the mid 1960'x. Other
Communist countries- Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and
those in Asia- normally have accounted for a very small
share of Bulgarian trade. The value of trade with the
major trading groups is shown in Figure 78.
Bulgarian exports to other CEMA countries, excluding
the U.S.S.R., have grown by 8.2% annually since 1965
and averaged 10.8% of total exports. Imports from other
CEMA countries sin(- 196+ grew somewhat faster
11.3% annually -and accounte(1 for an average of 19.8%
of total imports. Appm,:imately two fifths of Bulgaria's
trade within CEMA ..,is with East Germany, whose
overall importance as a trade partner has been second
only to that of the U.S.S.R.
Within the non Communist area, the developed
Western nations made up 16.6% of Bulgarian trade in
1970, while less developed countries accounted for under
6 About 40% of Bulgaria's trade with the West is with
West Germany and Italy; Austria, Switzerland, France,
and the United Kingdom account for almost A the rest.
Trade with non Communist countries mainly the
developed West -has been marked by two Bulgarian
spending sprees. The first, in 1959 -60, reflected Bulgaria's
Other Communist
Countries
Eastern European
Communist
Countries
U.S.S.R.
Non.Cormnunist
Countries
10.5 160. 232 19.0�
195' 1960 1965 1969
NOTE: Components may not add to totals because of rounding
FIGURE 77. Geographic distribution of foreign
trade (U /OU)
disenchantment with the terms and commodities
involved in its goods exchange with Eastern Europe
together with a new Soviet policy of encouraging Eastern
European imports of Western equipment, financed
largely by Soviet -owned banks in the West. Bulgaria's
large purchases of machinery boosted the share of the
developed West from about 8% in the mid- 1950's to 13%
in 1960. But the Bulgarians failed to meet their debt to
106
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FIGURE, 78. VALUE OF FOREIGN TRADE, BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA (U101J)
(millions of U.S, dollars)
the Soviet banks and, faced with a cutoff of new credit,
they were forced to curtail imports in 1961. The lesson
was u.c!:!y f., tt e n, In 1964 -66 the Bulgarians were
back in the Western market, running the West's share of
trade up to 23% and the trade deficit up US$140 million
in 1966. Imports were cut back in 1967 but indebtedness
continued to mount, financed this time largely by
Western credits. In 1968, the Bulgarians had to call on
the U.S.S.R. for a hard currency loan to pay off Western
creditors. In return, the Bulgarians have tried to restrain
imports from the West. The Western share sagged to less
than 15% in 1969, although it increased somewhat in
1 970.
During 1971 -75, the Bulgarians will become even more
dependant on trade with the U.S.S.R. The new 5 -year
plan foresees a rise in the Communist share of trade from
79% in 1970 to 82% in 1975. All of this increase is to come
from trade with the U.S.S.R. which is planned to reach
58% of total turnover by the mid- 1970's.
Only in recent years has Bulgaria shown interest in
developing its trade with the United States, which in
1969 accounted for 0.5% of Bulgaria's trade with non
Communist countries. The regime would like to interest
U.S. businessmen in trade, partly to stimulate
competition among Bulgi,iia's trade partners. The
potential U.S. market for Bulgarian products, however, is
too small to induce U.S. importers to make majo fforts
to increase trade.
b. CoJlxloorry COMPOSITION
Agricultural products and processed foods still make tip
a large share of exports (Figure 79). The fastest growing
exports, however, have been industrial consumer's goods
and machinery. Based on data in constant prices, the
share of consumer manufactures has grown from 13% of
exports in 1955 to over 20% during 1967 -69, art(]
machinery and equipment reached one fourth of exports
1966
2,783.3
1,370.1
525.6
129.3
758.4
1,478.3
706.5
269.7
51.7
450.3
1,305.0
663.6
255.8
77.6
308.0
-173.2
-42.9
25.9
1967
3,030.1
1,555.0
627.6
117.2
7:30.3
1.571.9
782.8
:322.6
59.3
407.2
1,458.2
772.2
305.0
57.9
323.1
-113.7
17.6
-1.�1
_84.1
1968
3,:397.4
1,840.0
658.9
138.4
760.1
1,782.3
946.2
347.9
72.8
415.4
1,615.1
893.8
311.0
65.6
344.7
1617.2
-36.9
7
1 S)64)
:3,643.8
1,953.4
738.3
124.8
727.'1
1,749.3
973.8
361.5
58.5
:355.5
1,794.4
979.6
376.8
66.3
371.7
45.1
5.8
15.3
7.8
161.2
in the last half of the 1960's compared with only 3% in
1955. Industrial raw materials, on the other hand,
dropped from 20% of exports in 1955 to about 6% in
1969.
Most of the rise in exports of machinery and consumer
manufactures has been accounted for by the U.S.S.R.
Machinery currently makes up about 30% of exports to
the U.S.S.R., and consumer goods about 21 Food
accounting for one -third of exports -is the only other
large category; the remaining 15% is a varied mix of
metals, chemical:;, building materials, and other
products. The Soviet- Bulgarian trade agreement for 1971-
75 calls for the share of machinery to reach over 40% of
Bulgarian exports during the 5 -year period.
In contrast, exports to non Communist countries -and
particularly to the developed West -have been light on
machinery and consumer manufactures. Agricultural
products still amount to about half of exports, while raw
materials and semimanufactured goods account for
about 40% and machinery and consumer manufactures
less than 10% taken together. These shares have not
changed much since the mid- 1960's, and no significant
shifts in the export pattern appear likely in the 1970's.
Compared with exports, the commodity structure of
Bulgarian imports has not changed much since 1960. The
largest shift reflecting trade troubles with the West
was a drop in the share of machinery and equipment
from 49% in 1966 to just over 40% in 1969.
Machinery and equipment including materials for
complete plants -have consistently made up almost half
of Bulgaria's imports from the U.S.S.R. during the 1960'x.
In 1969, fuels and metallurgical products each accounted
for 17% of imports, chemical products about 5 and
consumer goods only 3 Under the 1971 -75 trade
agreement, machinery, including computers, automo-
biles, and equipment for light industry, is to account fc,r
about �17% of Bulgaria's imports from the U.S.S.R.
107
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1955
1960
1965
Turnover
�186.2
1,204.0
2,353.5
U.S. S. It
237.9
639.6
1,202.2
Eastern European Communist countries.....
183.5
:325.5
510.13
Other Communist countries
13.8
-15.8
95.4
Non Communist countries
50.9
193.2
545.3
Imports
239.9
632.6
1,177.7
ti. S."
118.5
332.3
588.6
Eastern European Communist countries.....
9n.1
174.3
2:35.8
t,,,:eer Communist countries
5.6
24.2
49.9
Non- Communist countries
26.6
101.8
30:3.3
Exports
236.2
571.5
1,175.8
U.S.S.R
119.4
307.3
613.6
Eastern European Communist countries.....
84.4
151.2
274.8
Other Communist countries
8.1
21.6
45.5
Non Communist countries
24.4
91.4
242.0
Trade balance
-13.7
-61.1
-1.9
U.S.S.11
0.9
25.0
25.0
Eastern European Communist countries.....
14.8
-23.1
39.0
Other Communist countries
2.5
-.2.6
4.4
Non Communist countries
--2.2
the Soviet banks and, faced with a cutoff of new credit,
they were forced to curtail imports in 1961. The lesson
was u.c!:!y f., tt e n, In 1964 -66 the Bulgarians were
back in the Western market, running the West's share of
trade up to 23% and the trade deficit up US$140 million
in 1966. Imports were cut back in 1967 but indebtedness
continued to mount, financed this time largely by
Western credits. In 1968, the Bulgarians had to call on
the U.S.S.R. for a hard currency loan to pay off Western
creditors. In return, the Bulgarians have tried to restrain
imports from the West. The Western share sagged to less
than 15% in 1969, although it increased somewhat in
1 970.
During 1971 -75, the Bulgarians will become even more
dependant on trade with the U.S.S.R. The new 5 -year
plan foresees a rise in the Communist share of trade from
79% in 1970 to 82% in 1975. All of this increase is to come
from trade with the U.S.S.R. which is planned to reach
58% of total turnover by the mid- 1970's.
Only in recent years has Bulgaria shown interest in
developing its trade with the United States, which in
1969 accounted for 0.5% of Bulgaria's trade with non
Communist countries. The regime would like to interest
U.S. businessmen in trade, partly to stimulate
competition among Bulgi,iia's trade partners. The
potential U.S. market for Bulgarian products, however, is
too small to induce U.S. importers to make majo fforts
to increase trade.
b. CoJlxloorry COMPOSITION
Agricultural products and processed foods still make tip
a large share of exports (Figure 79). The fastest growing
exports, however, have been industrial consumer's goods
and machinery. Based on data in constant prices, the
share of consumer manufactures has grown from 13% of
exports in 1955 to over 20% during 1967 -69, art(]
machinery and equipment reached one fourth of exports
1966
2,783.3
1,370.1
525.6
129.3
758.4
1,478.3
706.5
269.7
51.7
450.3
1,305.0
663.6
255.8
77.6
308.0
-173.2
-42.9
25.9
1967
3,030.1
1,555.0
627.6
117.2
7:30.3
1.571.9
782.8
:322.6
59.3
407.2
1,458.2
772.2
305.0
57.9
323.1
-113.7
17.6
-1.�1
_84.1
1968
3,:397.4
1,840.0
658.9
138.4
760.1
1,782.3
946.2
347.9
72.8
415.4
1,615.1
893.8
311.0
65.6
344.7
1617.2
-36.9
7
1 S)64)
:3,643.8
1,953.4
738.3
124.8
727.'1
1,749.3
973.8
361.5
58.5
:355.5
1,794.4
979.6
376.8
66.3
371.7
45.1
5.8
15.3
7.8
161.2
in the last half of the 1960's compared with only 3% in
1955. Industrial raw materials, on the other hand,
dropped from 20% of exports in 1955 to about 6% in
1969.
Most of the rise in exports of machinery and consumer
manufactures has been accounted for by the U.S.S.R.
Machinery currently makes up about 30% of exports to
the U.S.S.R., and consumer goods about 21 Food
accounting for one -third of exports -is the only other
large category; the remaining 15% is a varied mix of
metals, chemical:;, building materials, and other
products. The Soviet- Bulgarian trade agreement for 1971-
75 calls for the share of machinery to reach over 40% of
Bulgarian exports during the 5 -year period.
In contrast, exports to non Communist countries -and
particularly to the developed West -have been light on
machinery and consumer manufactures. Agricultural
products still amount to about half of exports, while raw
materials and semimanufactured goods account for
about 40% and machinery and consumer manufactures
less than 10% taken together. These shares have not
changed much since the mid- 1960's, and no significant
shifts in the export pattern appear likely in the 1970's.
Compared with exports, the commodity structure of
Bulgarian imports has not changed much since 1960. The
largest shift reflecting trade troubles with the West
was a drop in the share of machinery and equipment
from 49% in 1966 to just over 40% in 1969.
Machinery and equipment including materials for
complete plants -have consistently made up almost half
of Bulgaria's imports from the U.S.S.R. during the 1960'x.
In 1969, fuels and metallurgical products each accounted
for 17% of imports, chemical products about 5 and
consumer goods only 3 Under the 1971 -75 trade
agreement, machinery, including computers, automo-
biles, and equipment for light industry, is to account fc,r
about �17% of Bulgaria's imports from the U.S.S.R.
107
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Industrial consumption
FocA and food raw mate
Ot;rer agricultural -aw a
Building materials�
Chemicals. fertilizers. ar
Fuel. mineral raw mater
Machinery and equipme
FIGURE 79. Commodity composition of exports and imports (U /OU)
Machinery amounted to about one -third of Bulgaria's
imports from non- Communist countries in the latter part
of the 1960's; most of the rest �about 50% �was raw
materials, chemicals, and metallurgical products.
Imports of food and other consumer items accounted for
about 15% of the total. Major purchases from the West
since 1962 have included petrochemical and fertilizer
plants from France, Italy, Belgium, the United Kingdom,
and West Germany, and ore carriers and other merchant
ships from J apan, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
2. Balance of payments
a. CURRENT ACCOUNT
Bulgaria's trade balance moved from a cumulative
surplus during the 1950's to a chronic deficit during most
of the 1960's, especially with non Communist countries,
as shown below, in millions of U.S. dollars:
1952 -58 1959 -66 1967 -69
Communist countries 139 �193 �97
Of which:
U.S.S.R 110 �237 �57
Non- Communist countries �2 �353 �139
Of which:
West Germany
7 180 21
France �2 �85 �48
Austria �4 �74 �40
Total 137 �545 �236
A tighter import policy, however, yielded a surplus of
US$45 million in 1969, including $16.2 million with non
Communist countries (Figure 80). In 1970, Bulgaria ran a
huge surplus with Communist countries and a small
deficit with the rest of its trade partners.
Tourism is a major plus item among Bulgaria's current
account transactions. Excluding visitors in transit, 1.7
million foreign tourists went to Bulgaria in 1970, of which
about 360,000 were from non- Communist countries.
Total tourist receipts were only US$16 million in 1962
and $53 million in 1966. Gross tourist earnings in 1970
are unknown, but hard currency earnings are estimated
FIGURE�. 80. TRADE BALAN E (U.OU)
(:Millions of U.S. dollars)
1967 1965 1969 1970
Communist countries.........
-30
-96
29
208
Of which:
U.S.S.R
-11
-52
6
rra
Non- Communist countries.....
�84
�71
16
15
Of which:
West Germany...........
12
-18
9
no
France
13
3I
3
an
Austria
18
11
10
rea
Total
114
-167
45
193
na Data not available.
108
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to have amounted to no more than $25 million.
Bulgarian travelers to foreign countries represent an
insignificant outflow of foreign exchange. Only 306,000
Bulgarians left on outside visits in 1970, and less than
50,000 went to non- Communist countries. Earnings from
transportation undoubtedly have increased �cargo
carried by Bulgarian merchant ships alone has doubled
since 1965, and there are indications that Bulgaria is
currently running a surplus on transportation. Invisible
earnings from all sources, however, have not been able to
C :C.' much of the large deficit in commodity trade.
b. F0IIER,is AID
Bulgaria has had to rely heavily on credit from both
Communist and non Communist countries. Phe U.S.S.R.
provided over US$2 billion in credits during 1947 -69 and
extended an additional $550 million in 1969 to be drawn
during 1971 -75. Credits from other Eastern European
Communist countries have amounted to less than $130
million since World War I1. Outstanding indebtedness to
the U.S.S.R. at the end of 1970 is estimated at $1.1
billion. Most, if not all, other Communist credits have
been repaid.
During 1959 -68 Bulgaria bought more than US$500
million worth of Western machinery and equipment on
credit. By 1968, Bulgaria's indebtedness to the West
reached about $400 million. The outstanding debt has
been cut back since then �to an estimated $300 million
in 1970. Most credits from the West have been medium
term �only 13% of the credits outstanding in 1967, for
example were for more than 5 years.
Through early 1971, Bulgaria had extended credits of
more than US$64 million to other Communist countries
and about $250 million to less developed countries. The
latest Bulgarian loans include a 10 -year credit for $12
million granted in 1970 to Iraq for petroleum
development, to be repaid in crude oil, and a $20 million
credit extended in 1971 to Chile for purchase of
Bulgarian plant and equipment. Bulgaria also has
extended credits of $12 million to Bolivia, $13 million to
Peru, and $5 million to Colombia.
109
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Science
A. General (C)
Although Bulgaria has made progress in scientific
research and development since 1966, it continues to
have the weakest overall scientific v..nd technical
capability among the East European countries with the
exception of Albania. Government policy calls for the
development of science and technology as a means of
speeding industrialization and of furthering technical
progress in all branches of the national economy. The
1971 -75 5 -year plan contains a section entitled
"Development of Scientific Research and the Accelera-
tion of Technological Progress" and forecast an
expenditure by 1975 of almost 3% of the national income
on scientific and technical research and development.
The government is attempting to refine the structure of
the scientific organization in order to simplify the
integration of science with production and to speed the
application of research results. Numerous research
organizations have been established over the years, but a
lack of coordination and inadequate funding have made
their operations inefficient. These institutes and
laboratories have not been capable of solving the
complex technical problems of accelerated national
development. Much of the research underway in
Bulgaria is essentially an effort to adapt foreign
technology to conditions existing in the country.
Bulgarian scientific personnel, many of whom were
trained in the West, have been cut off from most contacts
with Western scientific institutions. Bulgarian scientists
continue to teach and use obsolete techniques and for the
most part have remained unfamiliar %%ith new Western
methods and precision equipment. The State Committee
for Science and Technical Progress (DKNTP) is
attempting to correct this situation by replacing older
scientists and professors with younger men. The younger
scientists, however, are inexperienced and insufficiently
qualified to carry out extensive scientific research.
Scientific development also is hindered by political
discrimination, whereby scientists who are not members
of the Communist Party usually are placed in less
important research facilities than their politically reliable
fellows. This practice has had a harmful effect on
individual initiative and interest.
Bulgaria has attempted to make the transition' from a
completely agrarian to an industrial agrarian economy
with insufficient capital and with little, if any, capability
for scientific instrumentation. Consequently, it has been
forced to rely on foreign scientific and technical
assistance. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAN),
Sofiya (Figure 81), concludes yearly agreements for
scientific cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and is continuing
to develop and strengthen scientific collaboration based
on bilateral agreements with other Communist countries.
All of these agreements provide for joint investigations
and for the exchange of technical personnel.
Collaboration has occurred on the application of science
to industry, on the investigation of semiconductors, on
problems of computer technology, and on scientific
investigations using artificial earth satellites. Bulgari has
close ties with the U.S.S.R. in space science, aeronomy,
and meteorological research activities. A joint Yugoslav
Bulgarian Commission for Scientific- Technical Coopera-
tion meets annually to approve programs for the coming
year. The BAN also has agreements for an exchange of
scientific personnel with the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, the French National Center for Scientific
Research, the British Royal Society, and the National
Research Council of Italy.
BAN is a member of more than 30 international
scientific organi-;ations and has participated in important
scientific :onierences and events such as the
International Geophysical Year, the International Quiet
Sun Years, International Biological Program, Interna-
tional Upper Mantle Project, and the International
Hydrological Decade. Delegates from the BAN
participate each year in many scientific congresses,
conferences, symposiums, and other events. In addition,
a number of Bulgarian scientists are members of the
executive committees of some international orgarib
tions �for example, Academician L. Krustanov in the
World Meteorological Organization and Academician G.
Nadzhakov in the International Atomic Energy Agency.
111
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FIGURE 81. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAN),
Sofiya (C)

Many other scientific institutes and organizations not
affiliated with the BAN also maintain agreements with
related foreign institutions. While substantial delegations
of Bulgarian scientific personnel are sent to participate in
international scientific conferences in the Conmunist
countries, only single delegates have been sent to
scientific meetings in Western countries. Separate
bilateral agreements in applied science, outside the
jurisdiction of the BAN, are concluded under the auspices
of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA).
B. Organization, planning, and financing of
research (S)
The organization of science and technology is
controlled by the party and the government. The party
exercises authority through its Central Committee
Department of Science and Education and the
government through its top executive body, the Council
of Ministers. The DKNTP, established by governmental
decree in 1962, is a supradepartmental agency under the
Council of Ministers and is the highest scientific
organization in Bulgaria. It is concerned with
coordinating, planning, directing, and allocating funds
for research and development; with expediting the
practical application of scientific achievements; and with
controlling the training and utilization of scientific
personnel. The DKNTP is aided by a Scientific Council
of specialists and by various scientific committees
responsible for research in specific scientific areas. The
DKNTP is assisted by the State Committee for Planning
in planning annual and long -range research projects and
by the Ministry of Finance in establishing requirements
for manpower and funds for the maintenance of scientific
research and development institutes. The DKNTP also
coordinates Bulgarian scientific research with that of
other member nations of CEMA.
The DKNTP has been an important factor in the
expansion of scientific facilities, particularly for
technological research. In addition to the approximately
50 research institutes and several research centers under
the BAN and the large number of agricultural research
facilities under the Academy of Agricultural Sciences,
there are about 80 scientific research and development
institutes which are administratively under government
ministries or departments but whose activities are
coordinated and directed by the DKNTP. The DKNTP
also directs the Scientific and Technical Information
Center and the Patents and Inventions Office. The
DKNTP is looked to for policy guidance and technical
assistance in the industrialization of Bulgaria and has
played a significant role in increasing Bulgarian interest
in Western achievements. It is the leading advocate of
rapid, large -scale automation of Bulgarian industry and
has openly favored the use of Western over Soviet
techniques and equipment, which it considers obsolete.
Although technically under the Council of Ministers,
the BAN actually is supervised by the DKNTP, which
approves the plans of BAN before their submission to the
Party Central Committee. The BAN� formerly the
112
highest scientific coordinating establishment in the
country �is governed by a general assembly consisting of
nearly 50 academicians and a slightly larger number of
corresponding members, together with honorary and
foreign members. The position of full member of BAN is
still one of honor in Bulgaria. BAN's assembly decides the
general course of research activity in the BAN in the
context of national policy. The assembly's decisions are
implemented by a presidium, which consists of 15 persons
elected by the assembly from its members and which
organizes and directs research activities in all
departments. The main aim of the BAN is the promotion
of science, with the purpose of raising the level of the
national economy, improving the management of the
state, ar,d enriching the culture through scientific
achievements, discoveries, and inventions. It also
furnishes the government with expert advice on scientific
matters. BAN has nine departments, six of which are
concerned with science and technology, specifically the
Departments of Physics and Mathematics, Technical
Sciences, Geology and Geography, Chemical Sciences,
Biological Sciences, and Medical Sciences. It is interested
mainly in basic rescaren but also works on applied
problems and is responsible for the country's modest
nuclear energy program. It is also responsible for the
publication of numerous technical journals and is
concerned with international scientific affairs. Figure 82
shows some of the more important scientific research
institutes operated by BAN and indicates the general
organization of scientific research and development
activities in Bulgaria.
Scientific and technical research is carried out
primarily by the scientific research institutes of the BAN
and the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, by the
University of Sofiya and the higher technical schools, and
by numerous scientific and technical research institutes
under various government committees and ministries,
such as the Committee for Industry, the Ministry of
Heavy Industry, and the Ministry of Public Health.
Institutes and laboratories of higher educational
establishments, most of which are wider the Ministry of
National Education, carry out both theoretical and
applied studies. Institutes at the University of Sofiya,
many of which have been established by BAN, are
directed more toward basic research, while those attached
to higher technical schools are more concerned with the
applied aspects of science in support of industry,
agriculture, or transportation. In the institutions of higher
learning, especially the University of Sofiya, many of the
professors conduct research within the BAN and the
university simultaneously. Institutes under the
government industrial ministries concentrate on applied
research.
In an effort to channel research into applied areas
supporting economic advancement and to apply the
result of research more quickly, the government set up in
January 1971 centers for scientific research and
development within the framework of the state economic
enterprises. The centers, designated TsNIRD's, will take
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'.State Committee for. Science,
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Atomic Energy Board
Progress, and
Hlysr Ed Katlon (OKNTP)
Higher, E
Main Administration for
the Microbiological and
3 dentifk Council
Pharmaceutical Industry
e. state, Committee for Planning
Minisvy of Other
Bulgarian Academy of
Ministry Ministry
Ministry
Academy Agricultural
of Public of National
of Natloh al
Heavy Ministries
of Sciences
Health Defense
Educatio..
Indust. v
Sciences
I
(BAN) I
6.
Institutes and
Department of
Institutes Research
University of Sofiya
Laboratories
Animal Husbandry
Institutes
and Veterinary
and
Higher Educational
Medicine
Laboratories
Institutes
Institute of Chemical
Pharmaceutical Industry
I
Chemical Industry
Agricultural and
Research Institute
Veterinary Institutes
Research Mstitute of
Ferrous Metallurgy
Research Institute of
Nonferrovs Metallurgy
Deparfinenh
Other Research Institutes
Physics and Technical
Chemical
Biological
Medical Geology and
Mathematics Sciences
Sciences
Sciences
Sciences Geography
Institute of Institute of
Institute of'
Institute of Zoology
Institute of Institute of
Electronic Tedehlcal
General
Epidemiology Geology
Cybernetics:
.and Inorganic
Hydroblological
and
Institute'of
Chemistry
Laboratory
Microbiology Institute of
Geophysics Institute of
Geography
Wafer
Instllutq`of
Institute of
Other Institutes
Problems
Organfe,
Other Institutes
Hydrology and
Chemistry
Scientific Institute
Me Mstitute of
forFlshery and
Tec hr cal
Fish Industry
Wtute'of Problems
Institute of
Mathematics
Physical
Marine
Other Institutes
Chemistry
Laboratory
Institute of Physla
Other Institutes
.Atornil Base
Other Institutes
Other Institutes
FIGURE 82. Organization of scientific and technical research in Bulgaria, 1971 (C)
over the direction of scientific organizations and
institutions that are subordinate directly to ministries and
offices, to BAN, or to higher educational institutions �to
the extent that they are working in fields of activity of
corresponding state economic enterprises. Each TsNIRD
is charged with carrying out an annual check and
analysis of its basic products and technology, comparing
the latter with the best models in the world, and then
working out programs for attaining and surpassing these
models. The establishment of TsNIRD's represents an
effort to concentrate previously dispersed scientific
research and development organizations. At the
beginning of 1971 there were 180 Bulgarian scientific
research and development institutes serving state
economic organizations. With the initiation of the new
organizations, however, the number has been reduced to
only 49. In addition, the Faculty of Mathematics of the
University of Sofiya and the Institute of Mathematics of
BAN are to be joined into a TsNIRD for mathematics
and mechanics. If this experiment proves successful, other
faculties of the university and institutes of BAN will be
merged. Not all institutions will be placed under
TsNIRD's; the director of the Central Scientific Research
Institute for the Technology of Machinebuilding, located
in Varna, has stated that his institute will not be attached
to a state enterprise because the institute's activities have
broad application to machinebuilding.
Military research activities are conducted by various
research institutes and laboratories under the Ministry of
National Defense, which provides technical supervision
for the military research and development program.
Overall control of the military research effort is probably
exerted through several agencies under the Council of
Ministers.
Funds for scientific research and development are
largely provided for in the state's annual budget, which is
established by the State Planning Committee and the
Ministry of Finance in accordance with plans approved
by the Council of Ministers. The DKNTP is responsible
for the allocation of the budget's funds devoted to science
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and technology. The funds for research and development
centers of the state economic enterprises do not come
from the state budget but from the income of the
amalgamations. Ir 1970 the proportion of the national
income allocated to science amounted to 1.8% and,
according to official government sources, is expected to
increase to 2.5% of the national income by 1975. In 1960
only 0.5% of the national income was used for science.
Because the term "science" probably includes a number
of activities which would be considered part of
management in the United States, the exact amounts
allocated for research and development alone are not
known. The rapid rise in the proportion of the national
income allocated to science may reflect in part the
planned incorporation of automated data processing into
the management of the national economy; the plan calls
for tk a establishment of 15 to 16 large national systems of
automated management, along with a number of
computing centers to handle socioeconomic, scientific,
and technical infoemation.
The largest share of government funds for research has
been granted to the ministerial scientific research
institutes, reflecting the increasing emphasis on applied
research in Bulgaria. There has been a trend toward
financing research expenditures of scientific organiza-
tions through direct contracts with manufacturing
enterprises and organizations rather than through the
government budget. In 1965 contract research
expenditures amounted to 42% of the entire cost of
scientific activities. The trend toward meeting research
and development expenditures out of production costs is
another indication of the government's effort to force
research laboratories to engage in more applied research.
Still financed out of the government budget are BAN, the
Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and the establish-
ments engaged in medical scientific research.
Since 1969, the percentage breakdown of the funds
allocated by the DKNTP for research has averaged as
follows:
Technological sciences
64
Fundamental sciences
14
Agricultural sciences
14
Social sciences and the humanities
4
Medical sciences
2
Nuclear sciences
2
During the same period the percentages of funds received
by BAN for research and development were distributed as
follows:
Exact and natural sciences
47
Hydrological and meteorological se -vices
1i
Social sciences and humanities
10
Nuclear sciences
8
Medical sciences
3
General expenses
21
C. Scientific education, manpower, and
facilities (S)
The quality of scientific manpower varies widely in
Bulgaria. While there, are some very competent scientists,
chiefly those trained in the West and at Soviet higher
educational institutions and research institutes, the
114
majority of younger scientists and technicians are
inexperienced and lack sufficient qualifications to
conduct an extensive research program. Frequently, their
research assignments are merely a reworking and
reevaluation of investigations originally conducted in
more advanced countries. Moreover, students have
lacked inducements for a career in science, because
salaries, which are comparable to those of skilled workers,
are low and scientific appointments are influenced more
by political activity and assumed political reliability than
by qualifications and merit.
Higher education in science is provided by the
University of Sofiya; several higher institutes which
specialize in such fields as chemical technology,
engineering, agriculture, mining and geology, and
medicine; and the teachers colleges. Although entrance
to the university and to the higher institutes is by
competitive examinations, some young people are still
barred from higher education because of their family
background or political "unreliability." The quality of
training is generally adequate, but the lack of modern
research equipment restricts the teaching of the latest
scientific techniques.
Only a few of the higher educational institutions are
important in the training of scientists and engineers: the
University of Sofiya, with an enrollment of about 13,900
students; the Higher Institute of Electrical and
Mechanical Engineering, Sofiya, with about 13,800
students; and the Higher Institute of Chemical
Technology, Sofiya, with about 5,500 students. Training
in the basic sciences is concentrated at the University of
Sofiya, while technical training is available at the higher
technical schools. Programs have been introduced
through which students are expected to gain practical
work experience in factories where they spend one -third
of their time in training while studying in technical fields.
Many students acquire a higher education as
correspondence or evening students while working full
time in production. The regime considers the education
of these workers important in its efforts to acquire an
increasing number of trained specialists with higher
education (especially in mechanics, automation, and
chemical technology). A program of adult education also
has been introduced to help agricultural, engineering
technical, and other production specialists to keep
abreast of the newest scientific achievements and to
implement new techniques. Courses and lectures are
given and technical schools have been established at
factories, machine tractor stations, and state farms.
Graduate programs were initiated in 1948 to upgrade
scientific workers for the national economy. However, the
Bulgarians are not strong in postgraduate training. Only
30% of the students expected to receive an advanced
degree were granted the degree during the 1969/70
school year. This was partially attributable to the
selection of unqualified persons for postgraduate training
and to the poor organization of the work itself. The
DKNTP determines the number of science students to be
accepted each year for graduate study as well as the
specialties to be followed. Candidates for postgraduate
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work must pass language examinations in their
specialties. Graduate work is organized by the scientific
research institutes of BAN, the Academy of Agricultural
Sciences, and the higher educational institutions. BAN
ranks hig:ay as an educational institution, enrolling
approximately 260 students for postgraduate work each
year and some who are in their final undergraduate work
at the University of Sofiya. Students who show
considerable promise have opportunities to continue their
postgraduate education in the Soviet Union or in other
East European countries, the United Kingdom, France,
or the United States. The Candidate of Science degree is
granted after successful completion of a 3'/2 -year
graduate program, passing of an examination, and
defense of a dissertation. 'The Doctor of Sciences degree
requires a doctoral dissertation involving a signific -nt
scientific contribution or theoretical conclusions and
discoveries of great significance for the advancement of
science, technology, and the national economy.
Bulgaria sponsors a program of student exchange on
the basis of cultural agreements and existing scientific
technological collaboration. It also sends scientists
abroad to take special training, to lecture, and to
exchange experience with their foreign counterparts.
Other exchange agreements involve employment
contracts for Bulgarian specialists to work in other
countries.
Bulgaria is attempting to increase the number of
scientific and technical personnel and to raise the
qualifications of personnel already engaged in teaching
and research. According to offiJal Bulgarian sources,
45,000 persons were concerned with scientific and
developmental activities in 1970; of this number, BAN
employed 5,500 in its institutes and facilities. One or two
of the scientific research centers attached to state
economic enterprises had even more workers than BAN.
As a measure of Bulgarian commitment to automated
data processing and automated systems of management,
during the next few years the Coursed of Ministers plans
to promote training for 20,000 students in higher
educational institutions and special schools in organizing
and operating data processing and automated
management systems. An additional 42,000 persons,
ranging from ministers to shop -level managers in
enterprises, are to be familiarized with the principles of
automated management systems and the applications of
electronic calculating techniques.
Bulgarian research and development facilities suffer
from a lack of modern instrumentation and equipment,
although considerable funds have been used for the
purchase of foreign computer hardware. Because the
country does not have sufficient foreign exchange for
most needed purchases, Bulgarians are being forced to
develop and manufacture much of their own
instrumentation and equipment. Among the best
equipped facilities are those concerned with the nuclear
sciences, but even these are considered modest and
conventional by world standards.
D. Major research fields
1. Air, ground, and naval weapons (S)
Bulgaria, which suffers from a lack of funds and of
trained personnel, does not have a research and
development program for weapons systems, although a
minor amount of work is done which could offer limited
support to such a program. Most of the country's
defensive armament requirements are satisfied by the
U.S.S.R., with some also supplied by other Warsaw Pact
countries. Bulgaria produces small arms, ammunition,
antitank ti. capons, and explosives.
Bulgaria has no capability to design, develop, or
produce modern air weapons systems beyond that
required for light aircraft. The last aircraft known to have
been designed and developed in Bulgaria was the LA'L-
series of low- speed, propeller driven planes which are of
limited significance in terms of modern aircraft.
Although efforts in aerodynamics, structures, and
materials research arc very limited, the work in materials
and structures shows competence and appears to
complement Soviet investigations. Occasionally
theoretical papers on supersonic flow have been
published, and in recent research the Bulgarians have
used numerical methods to solve the problem of Mach
5.5 flow about a cylinder and a plate. However, there is
no evidence to associate this work with any experimental
program. Research studies at the BAN Institute of Physics
in Sofiya demonstrate a degree of indigenous competence
and strong Soviet influence in shell theory, but no
applied research in structures has been noted. There is no
discernible research activity on missile systems or in any
of the associated technologies. Space related activity is
confined to the operation of several satellite optical
tracking stations.
Research in naval weapons is virtually nonexistent.
The primarily nonmilitary Shipbuilding Research and
Design Institute in Varna was reorganized and enlarged
under the guidance of Soviet design specialists and
probably provides a potential. for such research. A
scientific and research section was established to solve
problems in the fields of ship design and technology and
to organize production in shipyards. Special sections also
were established for development of standardizations in
work and for designing ship deck machinery.
Research on ground weapons is nonexistent. The only
significant capability for research on ground equipment
is in the area of materials- handling equipment. As a
member of CEMA, Bulgaria has the responsibility for
developing and producing electric- driven forklift trucks.
Balkancar, a state commercial enterprise, including some
30 installations, specializes in the production of hoist
transport -type machinery at its Lovech plant.
Developments have included over 40 types of electric and
motor driven trucks, starter and industrial truck batteries,
and spare parts for electric trucks.
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2. Biological and chemical warfare (C)
Bulgaria is not known to have an offensive biological
warfare (BW) research and development program.
However, microbiological research is conducted which
yields information and data that could be useful in a BW
offensive program. Work related to BW defense is
underway at the Scientific Research Institute for
Epidemiology and Microbiology, Sofiya. Scientists at this
institute are investigating bacteriopFages as diagnostic
and therapeutic agents. Other defensive oriented BW
research being conducted includes rapid detection of
micro- organisms in aerosols; fluorescent antibody
technique for detection of BW agents; and the
epidemiology, prevention, and prophylaxis of various
endemic diseases.
The Bulgarian chemical warfare (CW) research
program is oriented toward defensive research and is the
least diversified of the active Warsaw Pact countries. The
development of antidotal or prophylactic compounds for
protection against C -type nerve agents (tabun, Sarin, and
soman) has received the largest part of research attention
during the 1960'x. Research on an antidote identified
only as Nemikol -5 (believed to be a mixture of oximes
and cholinolytic glycolates) has been reported, but its
efficacy apparently is no better than known oxime
derivatives. Some work also has been done on the V- series
organophosphorous compounds, on psychotomimetic
agents, and on stabilization of mustard gas. Bulgaria also
reportedly is compcting intensive research on drugs of
vegetative origin, some of �hich may have CW potential.
CW- oriented research is conducted at the Research
Institute for Chemical Warfare in Sliven, and at the
Research Institute of Radiology and Radiological
Hygiene, under the direction of Col. (Dr.) Ivan Nikolov,
the Institute of Chemical Warfare, and the Military
Medical Research Institute, all in Sofiva. Work at the
Higher Military Medical Institute is directed by Col. G.
N. Kotev, Bulgaria's leading CW scientist. There are no
known research facilities engag,. �1 in process development
studies in the production of nerve agents, but a few plants
are manufacturing toxic compounds of World War 1
vintage for commercial application which could be
diverted to CW if required.
3. Atomic energy (C)
Bulgaria has established a very modest nuclear energy
program confined to basic research and the use of
radioisotopes. It lacks the necessary industrial and
educational bases for a significant program and is
hampered by a shortage of qualified personnel. The few
accomplishments to date have been achieved through the
assistance of other countries, and future progress will be
dependent upon continued foreign collaboration.
The program was initiated in 1955 after the conclusion
of the Soviet Bulgarian agreement for nuclear energy
cooperation, and in 1957 a Committee for the Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy was established under the Council
of Ministers to direct the program. BAN, responsible for
carrying out the program, established the Atomic
116
Scientific Experimental Base cf the Institute of Physics,
called the Atomic Base, a few miles southeast of Sofiya.
Under the terms of the Soviet Bulgarian agreement,
the U.S.S.R. has supplied a 2- megawatt, swimming -pool-
type research reactor to the Atomic Base. The reactor
went into operation in September 1961 and has been used
for research, training, and the production of
radioisotopes. Most of the research conducted in the
nuclear sciences in Bulgaria is basic in nature and is
carried out in cooperation with other countries. Bulgaria
has agreements for nuclear cooperation with the Soviet
Union and other Eastern European countries and has
signed a bilateral agreement for cooperation with France.
Bulgaria has also benefited from its membership in the
Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) at Dubna in
the U.S.S.R.
Exploitation of uranium ore deposits is being carried
out by the Soviet Bulgarian Mining Co., which was
established in 1946 to administer the development,
mining, and processing of uranium ore in Bulgaria. The
U.S.S.R. completely controls this company, although
theoretically it is a joint enterprise. Bulgarian uranium
deposits are located throughout the country; the greatest
concentration is in the region of Bukhovo, a well -known
base -metal mining area east of Sofiya. The Bulgarian
deposits are of low to medium grade, and a concentration
plant has been constructed at Bukhovo to process the ore.
All of the uranium mined and concentrated in Bulgaria is
shipped to the U.S.S.R.
The principal application of nuclear energy in Bulgaria
has been the use of radioisotopes for medicine and
research. However, in 1966 the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria
concluded an agreement for the construction of a nuclear
power station which is to consist of two pressurized water
reactors having a total installed electric power capacity of
880 megawatts electrical. Construction was started in
August 1969 at a site on the Danube near the village of
Kozloduy, with the first reactor scheduled for completion
in 1974 and the second in 1975.
4. Electronics (S)
Although Bulgaria's electronics indushv has undergone
some expansion and modernization, its research and
development capabilities remain very limited. Some
theoretical research is being accomciished, but most of
the research effort is devoted to the adaptation of Eastern
European and Western equipment to Bulgarian
requirements. Progress toward achieving an indigenous
capability in any electronics subfield has been slow but is
improving steadily and is evident mainly in the research
and development of computer systems. Even here
Bulgarian electronics research capabilities are too small to
support the development of any broad range of computer
models. Attempts are being made to develop a capability
in electronic computers by concentrating on a limited
number of types of high quality computing equipment.
Since 1961 three small but well designed analog
computers have been developed. The second in the series,
Analog -2, using Bulgarian manufactured transistors, was
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scheduled to enter production in 1967, but the
production status of this computing system is not known.
An improved model hearing the de Analog -3 is
knc,.vn to have been pr Juceo. Bulgaria also has
developed and prv,iuced solid -state desk calculators
competitive with the best Soviet models. Some work has
been clone or the development of it small digital
computer based on domestic designs. The greatest
emphasis, hcnvever, is on the use of foreign technology.
Since 1967 it program has been underway to acquire
modern digital computers from Japan and to license
Bulgarian 1,oduction of Japanese computing equipment.
The benefit derived from this association is enabling
Bulgaria to manufacture its first high quality scientific
computer. Dcxignated ZIT-151, t; ;s computer is a
licensed version of a third generation Japanese computer
incorporating m integrated circuits. The
advanced technolog; reflected in the circuitry is beyond
the Bulgarian development and production capability,
and the country will hav^ to rely on the Japanese to
supply the needed circuit elements for the next 2 to 3
yea rs.
In early 1967 several institutes, formerly engaged in
research on computers, were consolidated into the state
economic enterprise "IZOT" (formerly the State
Economic Association for Computer nd Organization
Technology), which will design, produce, market install,
and maintain computer equipment and provide
organizational and technical facilities. Analog computer
developments appear to concentrate at the Electronika
Development Enterprise, Sofiya.
Bulgaria is maintaining an active research interest in
semiconducting materials as part of its overall program to
develop miniaturized and microminiaturized compo-
nents. Most of the research on semiconductors is
performed by institutes under the state economic
enterprise "Electronic Elements." Research on
electromagnetic wave propagation is limited b: a
relatively simple, almost routine, exploration of the
ionosphere and its effects on medium- frequency (MF),
high- frequency (HF), and very- high frequency (VI-11")
radio waves. The BAN Institute of Electronics in Sofiya
successfully operated Bulgaria's first ruby pulsed laser in
1964. In 1967 the same laboratory successfully operated
the country's first helium -neon gas laser. The Radio
Electronics Research Institute is conducting research on
thin film for microelectronics, on equipment to produce
vacuum stream for nickel chromium thin film for
application to ultra- high frequency (UHF) TV receiver
circuits, and on VHF solid state portable transmitter /re-
ceiver sets.
5. Medical sciences, including veterinary medicine
(S)
Bulgarian medical research in general is mediocre
when compared with that of Western aril more advanced
Communist countries. The regime has acknowledged the
country's shortcomings in Medical research and has
created new organizations with the objective of achieving
some world rece;gnition in medical studies. A Department
of Medical Sciences has been established in BAN, and a
Scientific Medical Coune_i nas been created within the
Ministry of Public 1lealth to coordinate research and to
generate: trained manpower and material support.
Emphasis continues to he placed on applied medical
sciences rather than on basic research. Studies are being
pursued in the biology, biochemistry, and biophysics of
the cell; protection against toxicological hazards in
industry aril agriculture; and the protection of industrial
environments. Primary focus is on clinical medicine,
including the search for new drugs and problems related
to cancer. tuberculosis, and endocrine, gastroenteric, and
hepatic diseases.
Microbiology has received preferential attention from
Bulgaria's political leaders. A Main Administration for
the Microbiological and Pharmaceutical Industries has
been established directly under the Council of Ministers.
Researchers have emphasized the selection of micro-
organisms for application in industrial microbiology,
especially for production of antibiotics and edible
protein. Interest has been shown in the physiology of
herpes simplex virus, the morphology of tobacco mosaic
virus, and the biochemical analysis of deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) and ribontcleic acid (RNA) of viruses.
Practical investigations have stressed the identification,
immunology, and genetics of familiar micro- organisms.
The government has spent large sums of money to
promote research in pharmaceuticals and chemicals that
could he used in combating diseases, including diseases of
the nervous system. Research is directed primarily toward
the synthesis of new medical compounds, and production
of antibiotics has received considerable attention.
Bulgaria is one of the few countries producing
oleandomycin, which is used against micro- organisms
resistant to penicillin. Some of the most successful work in
pharmacology is in the development of drugs from
indigenous plants, which have yielded an important
neuromuscular relaxant and a valuable antihentorrhagic
preparation.
Work in biochemistry has been concc-ned chiefly with
nucleic acids, enzymes, and the synthesis of protein.
Biochemists have succeeded in separating pure messenger
RNA fractions. Investigations have been conducted on
the metabolism of connective tissue as related to
pathological processes and diseases, such as arteriosclero-
sis. Research in biophysics, a relatively new field of
research in Bulgaria, has included research on the active
and passive electrical properties of tissues, on the
characteristics of erythrocytes, the analysis of
biopotentials, and the mechanism of metabolism
regulation in cells. Bulgarian work in intracellular fluids
using electron paramagnetic resonance techniques is
original. Also, clinical biochemists have developed it
simplified blood compatibility test and are applying sera
and erythrocyte testing agents.
Research in physiology at the BAN Institute of
Physiology in Sofiya has been undistinguished, but
progress is being made. Studies have been done on the
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analysis of the mechanism of visual response to sight
stimuli. Interdisciplinary studies have examined the
physiological elements of body response to psychotropic
drugs, environmental changes, and physical strain. The
work at the Research Institute of Neurology and
Psychiatry in Sofiya on cerebral hemodynamics and
metabolism in disturbances of circulation parallels
investigations in U.S. laboratories. High altitude research
is designed primarily to test the therapeutic effects of
mountain climate.
Bulgaria has initiated a program involving an
underwater habitat, designated Shelf -1, under the
direction of the DKNTP, the Research Institute of
Fisheries and Oceanography, and the Bulgarian Navy.
The scientific program includes physiologicai and
psychological research on aquanauts who spend
protracted periods beneath the water at increased
pressure.
The Institute of Radiology and Radiological Hygiene
in Sofiya, under the Ministry of Public Heaith, has
underf.aken the study of radiation ha.ards. The work,
which is poorly financed, has examined postradiation
disorders of the thyroid and kidney and the effects of
radon on the respiratory tract of uranium miners.
Genetics study is employing modern approaches, and
gamma irradiation of seed has achieved mutagenesis. In
addition, forms of wheat and barley have been
developed.
An extensive program is being established under which
information on all public health problems in the country
would be analyzed centrally, and a center for hygiene
and epidemiology has been established in Sofiya.
Epidemiologic�11 surveys have recorded the incidence of
cardiovascular, pulmonary, and rheumatic diseases.
Malaria, endemic in certain sections of Bulgaria, has
been eliminated, and there has been a sharp decrease in
tuberculosis and endemic goiter. Bulgarian scientists are
active in research on cancer. Dr. Rayko Raychev has
received international recognition for his work on
malignant melanoma, the effect of hormonal factors on
melanoma, and its development and metastasis.
Military medical research is controlled by the medical
service of the Bulgarian Army. It is carried out at the
Higher Military Medical Institute, Sofiya, and the
Aeromedical Institute at Vrazhdebna. Research has been
concerned mainly with wound healing and the
recognition, prophylaxis, and treatment of biomedical
effects of chemical, biological, and radiological agents.
Some work on the toxicology and pharmacology of
chemical warfare nerve agents has been attempted, and
several a .icles on the prophylaxis and treatment of agent
effects have been published. A limited number of
aerospace medical research articles also have been
published. Military medical research facilities are of
higher quality in both personnel and equipment than are
civilian facilities.
The Department of Animal husbandry and Veterinary
Medicine of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences in
Sofiya has initiated a program to coordinate closely all
118
veterinary research programs to insure application to
important animal diseases. The veterinary research
institutes conduct all diagnostic, microbiological,
serological, parasitological, and other research on
cooperative and state farms under actual production
conditions. Veterinary research efforts have been
increased, resulting in more scientific publications. The
decline in the reported incidence of animal diseases
indicates an adequate supply of veterinary biologicals
and sufficient veterinary personnel to initiate and
maintain animal disease control programs. An improved
tissue culture vaccine for foot and -mouth disease
produced by the Veterinary Institute for Contagious and
Parasitic Diseases, Sofiya, has been effective in the
control of this disease. The last outbreak of the disease
was in 1967. Concern has been expressed about the
Possibility of having introduced scrapie disease into the
country through the importation of sheep from the
United Kingdom. Veterinary research is conducted on the
following diseases: Aujeszky's disease, Johne's disease,
Newcastle disease, anthrax, chronic respiratory disease,
coccidiosis, tuberculosis, and avian leucosis. Research
also is done on sterility problems, nutritional disorders,
and parasitic infestations. The Bulgarians have shown an
active interest in the application of radioactive isotopes
for the control of insects through sterilization. Veterinary
scientists attended the International Atomic Energy
Symposium in Vienna in 1970.
6. Other sciences (S)
a. CHEMISTRY AND ME
The Bulgarians are moderately active in chemical
research and have made some progress in basic research
since 1966. Compared with most other European
countries, however, the chemical research effort remains
very weak. Applied chemical research is particularly
weak because of past emphasis on basic research and a
tendency to rely heavily on imported chemical
technology. The Bulgarian chemical industry, partly
because of the small market for chemical products,
remains the smallest of any of the Eastern European
Communist countries except that of Albania. Most of the
significant chemical research is done at the University of
Sofiya and at the Higher Institute of Chemical
Technology. The university has maintained a modest
academic research program for many years, which has
been strengthened by the location of three important
chemical research institutes at the university: the
Institute of Physical Chemistry, the Institute of General
and Inorganic Chemistry, and the Institute of Organic
Chemistry.
The Bulgarians have a well developed capability for
research in organic chemistry, including synthesis and
physical organic chemistry. Prof. B. I. Kurtev, director of
the Institute of Organic Chemistry, has been active in
organic chemical research for many years and is
interested in the synthesis and configurations of amino
acids and other organic nitrogen compounds and in
stereospecific synthesis. Researchers under his direction
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are involved in studies on beta- ureido acids and
dihydrouracils. Other research underway at the institute
consists of noteworthv studies directed by Dimitar
Shopov on kinetics and reaction mechanisms of catalytic
hydrocarbon conversion reactions, such as cracking,
dehydrogenation, demethylation, and isomerization.
Physical chemistry is most highly developed at the
Institute of Organic Chemistry, where research is done on
the electronic structure of organic compounds and on
nuclear magnetic resonance. Research at the University
of Sofiya has included studies on the reactions of
organophosphorous compounds, on the synthesis of
phenothiazines and other heterocyclic compounds, and
on the synui psis of azo (Ives. Chemists at the Higher
Institute of Chemical Technology are concerned with
liquid -phase oxidation of alkylaromatic hydrocarbons
and the effect of organic borates on such oxidations.
A significant amount of research on high polymers is
underway at the Institute of Organic Chemistry, where
Marin Mikhailov and his associates have worked on
epoxy resins, polyesters, methacrylatcs, polvarmides, and
polyformaldehycle. The Ifigher Institute of Chemical
Technology has been concerned with studies on the
production of polyformaldehycle. Work on chemical
fibers was begun in 1967 at the Institute of Chemical
Technology and has included studies on polyester fibers
and the :modification of wool by synthetic resins.
Only a limited amount of biochemical research is done
in Bulgaria. The Institute of Organic Chemistry has clone
some work on the structure and reactions of myoglobin
and its derivatives, whi!e the University of Sofiya has
engaged in studies on acetylcholine.
The Institute of General and Inorganic Chemistry
engages in both physical and inorganic chemistry and
does work on catalysts, adsorbents, aril analytical
methods. Georgi Bliznakov, director of the institute, is an
active investigator in the fields of crystal growth,
adsorption phenomena, catalytic processes, preparation
of inorganic compounds, and inorganic reaction kinetics.
Bulgarian chemists have been engaged since 1928 in
theoretical and experimental studies on the process of
formation and growth of crystals, and some of the work
has received international attention. The Institute of
Physical Chemistry is concerned largely with electro-
chemistry. Studies have been done on electrolytic crystal
growth and on inclusions in nickel aril other metals
during elect rodeposition. Because of the continuing
importance of agriculture to the Bulgarian economy,
there is considerable interest at several facilities in the
chemistry of soils, fertilizers, and plant nutrition.
Chemists at the University of Sofiya are active in
studying the effects of zinc, copper, manganese,
molybdenum, and other trace elements on the growth of
crops. The N. Pushkarov Institute of Soil Science in
Sofiya also is concerned with trace clement effects aril
with the uptake of nutrients from soils.
Bulgaria does relatively little metallurgical research
and development. Extensive deposits of nonferrous ores
make nonferrous metal production the most significant
activity of the metallurgical industry. The small research
and development effort is directed primarily toward
applied research in solving steel and nonferrous metals
production problems. Some research on foundry processes
and gray iron production, as well as on steel- making
operations, is undertaken. A modest amount of research
on extractive metallurgy of copper, lead, and zinc is
(lone. Essentially no fundamental or solid state
metallurgical research is conducted, although some basic
work on germanium single crystals from semiconductor
applications has been clone at the University of Sofiya.
Metallurgy is taught at the university and at the Institute
of Chemical Technology.
1). PHYSICS AND MATHS- MATICS
Physics research, while minor when compared with
that underway in scientifically advanced countries,
represents a sizable effort for Bulgaria. The research is
concentrated primarily in solid -state and nuclear sciences
and related technologies. The major and best effort is
devoted to a very narrow field of solid -state physics,
although efforts in the nuclear sciences are being
expanded. A number of other branches of physics are
being studied, partly because they are of some
importance to the .rain effort and partly to maintain
some awareness of world activities.
In solid -state physics, the Bulgarians continue to
concentrate on photoconductance and photovoltaic
parameters of cadmium sulfide semiconductor devices. A
major portion of these studies is done at the BAN's
Institute of Physics, where specific projects deal with
spectral distribution of surface potential on cadmium
sulfide. Interest continues to be focused on the
development of sulfide compounds and the expansion of
knowledge surrounding their properties. The work is
being directed by Dr. P. Kircheva, who also has worked
on Raman stimulated self modulation in carbon
bisulfide. Investigations associated with condo livities
and photopolarization properties of arserii< sulphide are
being carried o to determine the eff is on spectral
frequency as t :.e compound is pulsed with lasers.
Bulgarian capabilities to develop semiconductors and
integrated circuits have impriwed, and the Bulgarians
have produced high- fmttuenc.�y switching transistors, MOS
transistors, and planar diodes. BAN's Institute of
Electronics has been successful in growing epitaxial films
and has contributed to a production capability for
integrated circuits. BAN has provided generous support
to laboratories that specialize in the growth of thin
germanium crystals, and these are being examined for
structural defects. Studies also have been carried out on
the semiconducting properties of zinc and aluminum
oxides, which are normally used in producing low
temperature thermistors. Solid -state research associated
with magnetic materials is of top priority at the Institute
of Physics. The University of Sofiya's physics laboratory is
doing research on the physics of magnetism in connection
with fcrro- chromium copper oxide complexes in relation
to the compound's magnetostatic, Mosshauer, and
neutron diffraction effects. Bulgarian scientists working
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in crystallography and crystal growth techniques have
concentrated on the role of transient nucleation in crystal
growth as it applies to the cooling stages. 'These and r:uiWr
studies indicate it desire to improve Bulgarian capabilities
in producing perfect crystals. Some good work is being
done in investigations of the,- growth mechanism o f
pert lanes by examination of natural galena whisker.;.
Research related to plasma is carried out by about six
competent Bulgarian physicists at the University of
Sofiya, BAN'S Institute of Electronics, and BAN's
Institute of General aril Inorganic Chemistry. Dr. N. K.
Martinov has been engaged since 1960 in important
research dealing with solid -state plasma at the university.
He has been studying the collective properties of plasma
in relation to interactions with strong electric arid
magnetic fields. A large portion of his work concerns
definitions and verifications of formulated models
developed during the past 15 years. fie has clone some
research at the Institute of Physics on relaxation behavior
of solid -state plasma from the standpoint of collisions.
Dr. Martinov has worked closely with Dr. N. Niko!ov on
occasion on subjects related to nuclear fusion at the
University of Sofiya, where they studied low- frequency
resonances and potentials in a plasma for the purpose of
determining hydrodynamic fluid approximations. At the
Institute of Electronics, Z. H. Genehev researched the
areas of plasma with applications to communications.
This work involves excitation of surface waves in a
plasma waveguide bounded with a magnetic wall. A.
Petrakiev arid R. Milanova of the University of Sofiya
have done extensive research on problems of ionization.
Their recent work involves research on the relationship
between the magnetic field intensity and the excitation
potential for examination of spectral line intensification
of oxygen and nitrogen in pulse discharges. Petrakiev was
chosen for this research because of his competency in
plasma analysis and its associated spectrographic
instrumentation that would be needed in studying spatial
and time functions of plasma parameters.
In both high- ar.d low- energy physics, the Soviet
Union is contributi.ig to Bulgarian capabilities by
training Bulgarian specialists and making advanced and
modern equipment available to them at the Joint
Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) at Dubna in the
U.S.S.R. Bulgarian centers of nuclear research are the
Institute of Physics and the associated Atomic Base and
the Department of Physics at the University of Sofiya.
These facilities are investigating neutron physics, physics
of reactors and reactor operation, elementary particles,
nuclear dosimetry and spectroscopy, and the techniques
for production arid application of radioactive isotopes.
The reactor at the Atomic Base is being used for studies of
relaxation and deformation in power spectrums of
neutrons to gain better understanding of the shielding
mechanisms. The Institute of Physics, which has access to
the research reactor, is concerned mainly with training
activities and the carrying oil of radiation effects studies.
Students and researchers at the University of Sofiya are
active in research on radioactive gases in reactor sections
120
and the measurements of activation of specimens in the
environments of the reactor beam tubes. The specialists
in isotopic studies have been emphasizing the disposal of
radioactive wastes and dosirnetry. Most of the studies
appoar oriented toward obtaining data needed for
building power reactors and can be classed as applied in
nature and closely associated with nuclear technologies.
The absence of theoretical research along these lines has
been lamented by top -level government officials.
Bulgarian physicists at the Dubna facility also engage in
low- energy research, and their current work deals with
cross sections of fission arid interactions between fission
fragments. One of the major handicaps of the Bulgarian
nuclear scientists has been the lack of sophisticated
nuclear instrumentation. However, in 1965 the Nuclear
Device Plant was set up in the former prison at Pleven for
the manufacture of equipment for measuring or using
radiation, such as radiometers for protective devices and
gamma measuring ncters for process control in industry.
A large portion of the high energy nuclear physics
research conducted by Bulgarian specialists is performed
at the JINR. The Bulgarians have a good reputation for
their research at the Dubna facility and have held top
positions there. P. Markovic is well known as a deputy
director of the JINR's [high Energy Laboratory. Dr.
Khristo Khristov of the University of Sol'iya's Chemical
Technical Laboratory is considered the leading Bulgarian
high energy nuclear physicist and also once held a
leading position at the JINR. The most recent Bulgarian
research at the Dubna facility is related to the elastic
dispersion of protons from protons and protons from
deu: runs. The approach being used involves the fine
target technique which employs semiconductor radiation
detectors in place of the conventional photoemulsions.
With this new approach, more precise measurements are
possible for energies above 20 GeV and approaching the
accelerator's maximum energy of 70 GeV. Academician
G. Nadzhakov, director of the institute of Physics,
appears to be highly competent in theoretical research.
Quantum electronics research is being conducted on a
small scale at the Institute of Electronics, Sofiya. In 1964,
laser specialists were successful in operating the first ruby
pulsed laser in Bulgaria. The first Bulgarian helium -neon
gas laser was successfully operated in 1967 at the same
laboratory.
Mathematical research in Bulgaria is very poor and
shows very little evidence of improving. The country has
no history of achievements in creative mathematics, and
the program for scientific advancement ignores both pure
and applied mathematics. A minor amount of research is
undervay in analysis, algebra, geometry, logic, topology,
and probability. The approach is most often classical and
does not appear to be creative. The greatest emphasis in
research is on ordinary differential equations and is
oriented toward engineering. insignificant work has been
done on complex variables, Fourier analysis, projective
geometry, and statistics. Some significant work has been
clone in Fluidics, however, at the Institute of Mathematics
and Mechanics and the Institute of Engineering
Cybernetics, both in Sofiya.
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There is considerable interest in the use of electronic
computers, but the programs are still in the formative
stage. The computers in use are old Soviet computers of
the accounting type, but plans call for the purchase: of
new analog computers during the next few years at a cost
of about US$10 million. The Bulgarians have sought
permission to manufacture a Japanese computer under
license. The Bulgarians hope to get delivery of new Soviet
large scale, high -speed computers. Although the
Bulgarians have established a Training Center for
Computer Engineering, they will have to rely on the
U.S.S.R. to furnish manpower to apply computers in
engineering and scientific uses.
c. ASTROCEOPHYSICAL SCIENCES
Capabilities for research in the earth sciences are small
but fairly proportionate to the country's size and
economic political situation. The principal effort is
directed toward the development of natural resources.
Most of the fields lack facilities, equipment, and well
trained manpower.
Geodesy is the strongest discipline of terrestrial science
in Bulgaria; however, there is only a minimum of
capability to conduct basic research. The major weakness
in the field has been in the design and development of
geodetic instruments. Research has been concentrated in
triangulation and leveling, a post -World War II
development in Bulgaria. The most notable work has
been performed by Prof. Vladimir K. Khristov, director of
the Central Laboratory of Geodesy, Sofiya, on the
Krasovksiy ellipsoid and Gauss Kruger projection and the
preparation of tables of geodetic parameters for
conversion to the Soviet geodetic systems. Khristov and
Prof. Vasil Peevski, head of the Geodetic Department of
the University of Sofiya, are Bulgaria's outstanding
personalities in geodetic research. As a member of the
East European Subcommittee for Satellite Geodesy,
Bulgaria participates in geodetic satellite observations
and studies based on these observations.
Geomagnetic research is conducted by the Institute of
Geophysics, whose principal geomagnetic observatory is
at Panagyurishte. The work includes both data
accumulation and theoretical studies. Palcomagnetism is
a specific area of specialization. Some geomagnetic
research is also directed toward mineral prospecting. The
seismological section of the Institute of Geophysics is
studying past earthquakes in Bulgaria and is compiling a
seismic map of the country. It maintains a seismic station
in Sofiya which is one of a network of central European
stations.
Geological research appears to be almost entirely
directed toxvard mineral prospecting. BAN'S Institute of
Geology conducts research in several areas of scientific
geology and has emphasized petrology. A Committee for
Geology is subordinate to BAN'S Department of Geology
and Geograph..
With assistance from the U.S.S.R., the Bulgarians have
undertaken exploration foroil in Bulgarian coastal waters
in the Black Sea. In 1960 a Soviet geophysical expedition
completed the first seismic investigation of the seabed off
Bulgaria. In 1968 -69 the second stage of geophysical
investigation was completed, and in September 1970 a
third phase was begun. The third phase expedition has
involved three Soviet scientific research vessels and two
Bulgarian vessels; the latter reportedly are equipped with
modern geophysical apparatus.
While capabilities in astronomy are low, there are
indications of improvement, and new observatories
reportedly are under construction. The principal
established astronomical observatory is at the University
of Sofiya. The director, Dr. Nikola Bonev, also heads the
Section of Astronomy in BAN'S Department of Physics
and Mathematics; the section is concerned principally
with theoretical astronomy. The Institute of Physics also
engages in theoretical astronomical research, principally
in the areas of cosmology. Astronomical research has
included the analysis of stellar spectrographic data
obtained from the U.S.S.R.; statistical studies of certain
clusters of galaxies; studies of planetary parameters; and
studies of techniques for predicting solar activity.
Little significant space research has been developed
independently of the Soviet Union. Primary operational
activity is in the field of optical satellite tracking, with
links to the Cosmos Computing Center in Moscow, the
Radio Research Station, Slough, England, and the
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, Cambridge,
Massachusetts. Bulgaria also participates in the Soviet
sponsored intercosrnos program for the cooperative study
of the ionosphere by means of radiofrequency
transmissions from satellites. In 1970 an agreemcat was
concluded with the U.S.S.R. for the constructic n of a
communications satellite ground terminal in Bulgaria.
BAN's Institute of Geophysics has a small but active
ionospheric physics Section, which operates the Sofiya
Ionospheric Observatory. The work of the section consists
of theoretical studies and empirical analyses of data
accumulated both in Bulgaria and by foreign stations.
Interest is about equally divided between the lower and
middle regions of the ionosphere. The subjects
emphasized are ionization and recombination processes,
solar influences, u! density profiles, and absorption
characteristics of the lower ionosphere. Cosmic ray
research is conducted by the Institute of Physics'
Laboratory for Cosmic Radiation, at an elevation of
2,925 meters on Vrukh Musala in the Rila Mountains.
The laboratory is maintained in collaboration with the
Central Physics Research Institute of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, and studies are made of both
galactic and solar cosmic :auliation. The laboratory was
established in 1979 as w joint venture of the Bulgarian,
Hungarian, and Romanian Academics of Science and is
one of the best equipped stations in Europe. It also
collaborates with the U.S.S.R.'s Crimean Astrophysical
Observatory.
Meteorological research is conducted on a small scale
by BAN's Institute of Hydrology and Meteorology,
Sofiya, which includes sections for aerology, climatology,
hydrorneteorology, and synoptic meteorology. Metcoro-
logical research also is conducted in the atmospheric
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physics section of the Institute of Geophysics. The work,
largely theoretical, is devoted to atmospheric turbulence
and cloud physics. The Hydrometeorological Service,
Sofiya, provides the national weather service and has at:
extensive network of observing stations.
In hydrology and hydraulics, research capabilities,
while fairly good and improving, still lag most other
Eastern European Communist countries. Most of the
research is of an applied nature and is directed toward the
full utilization of water resources for power, irrigation,
and supply. During the 1960's Bulgaria made extensive
use of hydraulic models for studies on sedimentation
processes, river channel dynamics, phenomena of
filtration under hydraulic structures, dissipation of
kinetic energy in tailraces, and characteristics of the
extreme discharge over spillways. Special tests are being
made with radioactive isotopes in the study of water
current phenomena, and specially designed television is
used to measure water volume in pressure pipes.
Consider:ible research also is underway on the correlation
of factors for the high -water -stage cycle, minimum
runoff, and drying -up of rivers. In tF field of
instrumentation, Bulgarian engineers have devised a new
lysimeter, flowmeter, and bathometer.
122
The oceanographic capability of Bulgaria is very low,
and little change has been noted since 1940. 'Techniques
in marine science are obsolete and facilities are
inadequate. Most of the effort is directed to applied
research for the development of economically valuable
coastal fisheries. The almost complete lack of training
facilities seems to preclude any significant increase in
oceanographic research potential.
During 1970, Bulgarian scientists successfully carried
out underwater diving tests using Shelf -1, which
apparently was constructed in Bulgaria. Capable of
submerging only to a depth of 20 meters, it was used to
investigate engineering and operational aspects of
underwater living. Marine biological studies using Shelf
1 were conducted by researchers from BAN's Institute of
Zoology in Sofiya and included taking plankton samples
and measuring oxygen content at varying depths.
BAN's Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanog-
raphy in Varna is the most important organization
concerned with marine sciences. Other facilities carrying
out oceanographic investigations are the Hydrobiological
Laboratory of the Institute of Zoology, the Hydrobiologi-
cal Section of the University of Sofiya, and the Marine
Laboratory in Burgas. Bulgaria is not a member of any
international oceanographic organization.
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Transportation and Telecommunications
A. Summary (S)
The transportation and telecommunication (telecom)
systems of Bulgaria are barciy adequate to meet the
country's growing economic needs and are among the
least developed in Europe. However, improvement and
expansion projects underway or planned are expected to
upgrade the transportation and telecom facilities
substantially by 1975.
The railroad, highway, and telecom networks center on
Sofiya, the capital, in the west and on Plovdiv in the
south central part of the country. Both rail and highway
systems are fairly evenly distributed. The commercially
more important routes run west to cast, connecting Sofiya
with the Black Sea ports of Varna and Burgas. The
strategically and commercially important Danube is the
only navigable inland waterway.
All forms of transportation and telecommunications
are owned by the government and controlled and
operated through the Ministries of Transport and
Information and Communications. Bulgarian railroads
are the most important long -haul mode and in 1969
accounted for 62.3% of the total freight ton -miles as
compared with 31% for highways and 6.7% for inland
waterways. Highway transport is of growing importance
to the economy but is used principally in a short -haul
role. Statistics for 1969 show that, of the total tonnage
moved, highways carried 86.5 railroads 12.7 and
inland waterways less than 1%.
A sparse system of pipelines totaling 73 miles and
moving crude oil, refined products, and natural gas
complements the surface- transportation facilities.
Railroads make international connections with Greece,
Yugoslavia, and Romania; early in 1971 a new Bulgarian
line was completed to the border of Turkey, but no
crossing is possible until the Turks complete their new
connecting line, which should be by early 1972.
Highways make connections with all adjacent countries.
The Danube, one of the more important waterways in the
world, provides connections with Romania, Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, West Germany, and
the U.S.S.R. Although the river forms most of Bulgaria's
northern boundary, it has only two established crossing
points: a combination rail highway bridge at Ruse and a
railroad car ferry at Vidin. There are no highway ferries,
but stockpiles of ferry equipment are held at several
potential crossing sites.
The merchant marine has 107 ships over 1,000 gross
register tons �a 23% increase in fleet size since 1968. In
1970 the fleet carried 84% of Bulgaria's total seaborne
foreign trade; this trade is adequately served by two
major and 10 minor seaports on the Black Sea coast and
by several river ports on the Danube. Both of the major
maritime ports have been expanded in recent years to
keep pace with the demands of increased trade.
Civil aviation, formerly maintained as a matter of
national prestige, has become economically important.
Under a major reorganization accomplished in 1968, the
former flag carrier Bulgarian Air Transport State
Enterprise (TABSO)� became BALKAN Bulgarian
Airlines (referred to as BALKAN). The new carrier has 32
major transport aircraft, all of Soviet manufacture, and
provides services to Europe, the Middle East, and North
Africa, as well as domestic points. Bulgaria has a total of
W operational airfields -25 military, seven joint, and 49
exclusively civil �and one seaplane station.
In line with some of the aims of the 1971 -75 Five Year
Plan, all transportation facilities are being improved or
expanded. The railroads are increasing their double -track
mileage, electrification, and axleload limits. Some roads
are being reconstructed to improve alignments, eliminate
bottlenecks, or upgrade surfaces. Work is continuing on
the development of an expressway system of highways,
and major urban centers are being provided bypass
routes. Inland- waterway improvements include increas-
ing and modernizing the river fleet and expanding the
inland ports. New ship purchases are expanding the
merchant fleet; plans call for an oceangoing fleet totaling
2.5 million deadweight tons by 1975. Facilities at the
maritime ports of Varna and Burgas are being improved,
and new port facilities are scheduled for construction or
are underway on a lake site west of Varna and at Shabla.
Ship channels are being dug between the Black Sea and
the new facilities along the lake.
The pipeline system is being expanded extensively with
about 690 miles of new lines (crude, refined, and natural
gas) under construction; included is the Bulgarian
portion of an international line that is to transport
natural gas from U.S.S.R. fields to Sofiya and other major
centers.
The :clecom system is based on an open -wire network
supplemented by a number of radio -relay stations.
Carrier- equipped landlines, radio relay, and high
frequency radio provide the main means of international
communication. Radiobroadcasting is extensive, but
reception in some mountainous areas is poor. Plans call
for updating and improving telecom services in general
and include provision for better and more extensive radio
and TV coverage; on a long -range basis the government
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aims to improve telecom services by installing more
automatic telephone exchanges and a fully automatic
telex.
B. Railroads (C)
The Bulgarian State Railroads (BLZ), a government
agency under the Ministry of Transpor., operates a total
of 2,650 route -miles of track and is the most important
means of long -haul transportation in the country. The
network trackage comprises 2,470 miles of standard -gage
(4'8 and 180 miles of 2'6" narrow -gage lines. Except
for 132 miles of double track on the standard -gage lines,
the network is all single track. Electrification of the BDZ
lines at 25,000 volts is continuing and in mid -1971
totaled 528 miles. The electrified lines �all single track
are the following: Sofiya Plovdiv, Mezdra -Gorna
Oryakhovitsa, Ruse -Gorna Oryakhovitsa, and Sofiya -Sli-
ven. Electrification work is progressing eastward from
Sliven. The rail system is not extensively developed;
however, railroads serve all important urban, industrial,
and major -port areas, and the greatest density of rail lines
is centered on Sofiya.
Because of its geographic position, Bulgaria acts as a
bridge between Europe and the Near East and Middle
East, and a variety of routes and transportation facilities
for commodities in transit is provided. Rail transit traffic
through Bulgaria has been increasing steadily since 1960.
Most of the transit traffic moves from Yugoslavia to
Turkey via the Dragoman Pass, Sofiya, and Plovdiv, and
thence to the Greece border (near Svilengrad), where the
line crosses the northeastern part of Greece before
entering Turkey. A newly constructed line providing a
direct connection with Turkey was opened to traffic in
October 1971. Two heavily traveled cast -west routes
connect Sofiva with Varna and Burgas, the major Black
Sea ports: the Sofiya -Gqw-a Oryakhovitsa -Varna line
and the Sofiya- Karlovo- Burgas line. In addition to the
connections with Yugoslavia and Greece, four other
international connections are made, one with Greece and
three with Romania. A rail line from Sofiya passes south
through the Struma River valley and connects with the
Greek rail system near the Bulgarian border town of
Kulata. The three connections with Romania are at
Kardam in the east, over the Danube bridge at Ruse, and
via a Danube railroad car ferry at Vidin.
Extensive tunneling and bridging are required because
of the mountainous nature of the terrain and the
numerous streams (Figure 83). Most lines have steep
grades, sharp curves, deep cuts, and high fills; over one
third of the standard -gage mileage is on grades of 1 and
over. The more important main lines generally have a
minimum radius of curvature of about 900 feet. It is
estimated that the network has 1,600 rail bridges (about
900 steel and the remainder stone or concrete), 95% of
which are less than 100 feet long. The 176 tunnels, which
total more than 151,000 feet in length, are concentrated
mainly between Sofiya and Cherven Brya� on the
Sofiya -Varna line, on the Sofiya General Toe arov line
through the Struma River valley, and on the noon -south
124
line from Ruse to Podkova. The bridges generally are of
steel- truss, stoncrnasonry deck -arch, steel- girder, and
concrete -arch construction; the longest, a double -deck
international rail highway bridge over the Danube at
Ruse (Figure 84), measures 7,300 feet and has plate
girder and through -truss spans. The lower deck carries a
single -track rail line and incorporates a lift span; the
upper deck carries a two -lane highway. The longest of the
tunnels, 19,019 feet in length, is about 5 miles west of
Klisura on the Sofiya- Burgas line. To improve low
average speeds, the BDZ has been spending heavily on
track reconstruction. Work has started on increasing
main -line axleload limits. All of the electrified main lines
have been reconstructed to bear axleloads of 24 short
tons, and sonic of the other lines are to be upgraded
eventually to the same standard. It is anticipated that by
1975 only a few lines will remain with the original 19 -ton
axleload design standard. Existing 62 71 and 83-
pound -per -yard rail is being replaced with 98- and 101
pound rail. Some welding has been carried out, but only
about 14% of the system has continuous welded rail.
Wooden tics (beech and oak) predominate, but
reinforced concrete tics are being used increasingly;
concrete ties have been laid over about 31 of the
system. Crushed -stone and gravel ballast is used almost
exclusively; in recent years some experimental work has
been done using roadbeds without ballast.
to 1970 the railroads employed 54,037 persons, carried
75.2 million short tons of freight, and produced 9.5
billion short -ton- miles; during the same year they carried
106 million passengers and produced 3.9 billion
passenger- miles. In 1970 diesel and electric traction
accounted for 61% of the total traffic, and the average
gross weight of freight trains on the network was about
1,152 short tons. The average length of freight haul was
126 miles; the average passenger journey, 37 miles.
Freight -car turnaround was 3.5 days, and the average
speed of trains �based on freight and passenger units
combined �was 23 miles per hour. Principal commodities
carried were coal, fuel oils, metals, and construction
materials (crushed stone, gravel, and sand).
Equipment data are fragmentary and in many
instances unavailable, but it is estimated that in 1970
Bulgaria had 37,800 freight cars, predominantly 2 -axle
with screw couplers, and 680 locomotives. Bulgaria has
imported diesel locomotives from Austria, Hungary, East
and West Germany, and Romania, and electric
locomotives from Czechoslovakia.
According to the Sixth Five Year Plan (1971 -75), 80
main -line electric locomotives from Czechoslovakia
(Figure 85), 50 main -line diesel- electric locomotives, 40
diesel switching locomotives, 56 electric train sets (from
the U.S.S.R.), 900 passenger cars, 25 sleeping cars, and
12,000 freight cars (number based on all cars having two
axles) are to be acquired by the end of the plan period.
Coal, coal dust, and mazut (a petroleum residue) are
the fuels used in the steam locomotives. 'fhc standard
gage cars are interchangeable with those of the
neighboring countries. Bulgaria participates in the
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IIVb1
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FIGURE 83. The Railroad bridge in the Iskur gorge. One of two northerly routes from
Sofiya, the line through this gorge crosses numerous bridges as it passes through the
Balkan Mountains. (U /OU)
FIGURE 84. Ruse Giurgiu combination rail- highway bridge across the Danube. The
span of the lower deck is lifted to permit passage of river traffic; highway traffic uses
the upper deck. (U /OU)

Improvements scheduled to be completed by 1975
include 125 miles of new double tracking and over 500
miles of electrification on the following lines:
Sliven� Burgas, Karnobat� Varna, Sofiya Mezdra,
Plovdiv� Zimnitsa, and Stara Zagora �Gorna Oryakho-
vitsa.
C. Highways (S)
FIGURE 85. Class 41 electric locomotive. These 4 -axle,
3,000- kilowat units, first used in 1962 on the Sofiya Plovdiv
line, complement similar Class 42 units on all electrified
lines. Top speed for both classes is 68 m.p.h. (U /OU)
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA)
freight -cur pool, formed in July 1964 to achieve more
efficient car utilization among the European Soviet
oriented countries, and has contributed 4,000 of the
110,000 cars forming the pool. Containerization
beyond the use of the CEMA 5 -ton container �has not
yet made much progress, but it is one of the major
projects to be initiated during the next 5 years. The first
terminal to be developed, in preparation for international
traffic, is to be at Varna. Initially the BDZ is to use 10-
and 20 -ton containers, probably built in Bulgaria. Some
experimental container trains have already operated
between Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R. and between Bulgaria
and East Germany. Palletization has been developed
since 1965, and as of late 1971 the system had more than
half a million flat pallets and 150,000 box pallets in use.
Some rail lines are still controlled by an absolute -block
system; dispatchers at principal division headquarters
transmit orders by telephone or telegraph through block
operators to train crews. The more important lines have
automatic signals, but many lines use a token system. A
semiautomatic block systwn has been installed on 1,360
miles of track, and the Sofiya� Karlovo sector has
centralized traffic control. The principal traffic
interruption factors are heavy snows, slides, and washouts
in the mountains and spring floods in the river valleys.
Principal repair plants reequipped for the additional
task of building rolling stock are at Sofiya, Dryanovo,
and Burgas. Prospective workers have to attend a 3 -year
training course at the Burgas Industrial School before
beginning work in the plants. The Sofiya plant builds
cement and tank cars; the plant at Dryanovo, passenger
coaches and dining cars. The Burgas plant builds it
variety of freight cars. Plants at Karlovo and Samuil
repair freight cars, and the plant at Huse repairs
locomotives an,i freight cars. The major classification
yards are in Sofiva, Mezdra, Pernik, Ruse, Stara Zagora,
and Karnohat. The railroad is organised into three
regional divisions; Headquarters are in Sofiya, Plovdiv,
and Gorna Oryakhovitsa.
126
Highway transport is becoming increasingly important
to the Bulgarian national economy. Rapid industrial
growth and the promotion of tourism in recent years has
brought on a concentrated effort to upgrade the read
network. The main routes are capable of meeting the
minimal requirements of the economy, but many
secondary roads remain unsuitable for the growing
volume of traffic. Movement and supply of military
forces by highway transport would not be seriously
hindered along the primary cast -west routes; however,
north -south movement would be limited by the lack of
alternative roads, the relatively inferior condition of the
highway surfaces, and poor alignments.
1'he road network is evenly distributed throughout the
country. Principle routes radiate from Sofiya to the
borders and to the Black Sea ports of Burgas and Varna.
The basic system consists of a grid -like network of main
routes connected by numerous secondary roads. The
network density of about 0.48 mile of road per square
mile of area is comparable to those of neighboring
Yugoslavia, Romania, and Greece but is significantly
greater than that of Turkey. International road
connections are maintained with all adjacent countries.
The Bulgarian highway network totals an estimated
20,700 miles and consists of 7,900 miles of paved roads
(bituminous, bituminous surface treatment, concrete,
stone block, cobblestone), 8,100 miles surfaced with
crushed stone or gravel, and 4,700 miles of earth roads.
The earth roads include unimproved tracks and are
generally only one lane wide. Surface widths are as great
as 50 feet on some stretches, but more typically are Ph to
21 feet wide. Shoulders, where they exist, are of earth or
gravel and generally range between 2 and 6 feet. Base
construction is principally of crushed stone or gravel and
is up to 12 inches thick on the more recently constructed
roads.
Bulgaria has an estimated 8,600 highway bridges, over
95% of which are less than 100 feet in length. Most of the
streams crossed are narrow and shallow and easily forded
during fair weather. Structures on the main highways are
built of steel, concrete, or masonry and are generally wide
enough for two lanes of traffic. Span types include
through truss, pony truss, beam, girder, and deck -arch
construction. Some one -lane low- capacity timber bridges
exist on second;iry roads, especially in mountainous
regions; these .ire gradually being replaced with two -lane
bridges cif modern design. It is estimated that there are
to 15 tunnels on the road system; the tunnels are lined
and unlined (Figure 86), and ki. ,vii lengths range from
100 to 750 feet. There are no known highway ferries
along the main routes of the network. Facilities for ferry
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operations have been built in the port areas of several
cities along the Danube, but there is no evidence that
they are available for regular civilian use.
Highway operations are chronically impaired by
physical bottlenecks and climatic conditions. Many roads
have numerous railroad grade crossings, narrow and low
capacity bridges. and sharp turns and narrow streets in
most urban areas. Travel through mountainous areas is
slowed by steep grades and sharp curves. Clearance
limitations are imposed by tunnels, numerous
underpasses, and through -truss bridges. Snow and ice are
common hazards throughout most of the country
between December and April; even on main routes,
winter extremes can halt traffic for several days. Snow
removal is inadequate and, normally, little more than
cindering is done on secondary roads. Spring thaws cause
severe damage to many of the main roads; highways
break up, and surfaces become a mass of potholes. The
damage inflicted on secondary roads is enough to make
them impassable until they are repaired.
The government controls all highway construction and
maintenance work through its Main Roads Administra-
tion. Design and planning responsibility is delegated to
the Road Planning Agency; construction and mainte-
nance is directed by the Road Construction Agency.
Work is performed by local road construction enterprises,
supplemented by military and civilian labor detach-
ments. Domestic production of bitumen, gravel, portland
cement, and steel are sufficient; however, most
construction equipment must be imported from the
U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia.
A highway modernization program underway, in
additior. to upgrading construction standards, aims to
eliminate serious bottlenecks, improve existing roads, and
construct cross country limited access highways. High
priority projects include the construction of urban
bypasses and the realignment of roads that now have
severe grades and curves. The most ambitious project is
the system of limited- access highways which will greatly
facilitate cross country movement and connect every
major city in the country. Most of the work has been
completed, but further refinements are scheduled
through 1980.
Highway transport is closely regulated by the
government. The Ministry of Tra,:sport directs and
controls all trucking and bus operations through its
transport or industrial enterprises. In 1970, trucks h4uled
some 511.5 million short tons of freight and produced 4.7
billion short- ton miles; the average length of haul was
just over 16 miles. Principal commodities shipped by road
are construction materials, coal, foodstuffs, and light
industrial products. Municipal and intercity bus service is
well developed.
Bulgaria has embarked on a major effort to develop its
automotive industry. Through agreements with France,
Italy, Czechoslovakia, and the U.S.S.R., several vehicle
assembly plants have been established. Present assembly
includes the French Renault car (Bulgar Renault), the
Italian Fiat car (Pirin), the Czech Skoda trucks, and
Russian Moskvich cars and GAZ trucks (both marketed
under the name Rila). Other Bulgarian automotive plants
produce limited quantities of a light pickup truck �the
Bal'.an M -10 �and some buses. In addition to the
imported components for its assembly plants, Bulgaria
also depends greatly on imports of complete vehicles to
fullfill its transport needs. Virtually all imports come from
Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. As of January 1969,
vehicle registrelions totaled about 151,500 units: 105,000
automobiles, 34,500 trucks, and 12,000 buses.
D. Inland waterways (C)
Inland waterway transportation is confined to the
Danube, the only rig er of commercial significance.
Domestically, the Danube supplements a rather sparse
pattern of major east -west land routes across northern
Bulgaria; internationally, the river forms the major
portion of the boundary between Bulgaria and Romania
and provides direct access from Bulgarian river ports to.
the Black Sea or northwest to countries of both central
and western Europe.
The Danube and its waterway facilities are adequate
for the demands of Bulgarian shipping. Most of the
navigation channel is in Romanian waters, and routine
maintenance is largely performed by that country.
Bulgarian maintenance is normally limited to dredging in
port areas or approaches and where unstable riverbanks
threaten the navigable channel.
In 1970, Bulgarian Danube waterway craft carried 4.0
million short tons of freight and produced 1.2 billion ton
miles in domestic and international river trade. During
the same year 275,000 passengers were carried and 18.6
million passenger -miles produced. Normally the
principal Danube River shipments in export trade are
pyrites and other ores, tobacco, and grain and other
foodstuffs. Major import shipments are bulk petroleum,
textiles, steel and other metals, machinery and
equipment, chemicals, and light manufactures. The
traffic pattern is directionally unbalanced with roughly
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FIGURE 86. Unlined tunnel. A number of this type are
encountered along mountain routes. (C)

two thirds of the anneal tonnage moved u, stream and
one -third downstream. The volume and density of
foreign transit traffic greatly exceeds the Bulgarian
domestic or international traffic. More than one -half of
the Bulgarian Danube River trade is still carried in
foreign bottoms.
The Danube provides it 1.608 -mile internationally
navigable route between the Black Sea and Ulm, West
Germany. The Bulgarian portico �about 300 stiles
long �lies within the lower Danube and is navigable
throughout by fully loaded 2,500 -ton craft for about 300
days a wear. The safe draft is 8 feet upstream to Ruse and
5 feet beyond. The island studded river is characterized
by s gentle gradient, a shoaled course reaching it
maximum width of 1.5 miles, and it normal high -water
current velocity of about 3.5 miles per hour. The left
(Romanian) hank is in general low, marshy, and fringed
by seasonally inundated swamps. The right (13rtlgaria1
hank is backed closely by it nearly continuous line of
bluffs averaging about 300 feet in height (Figure 87).
Bulgarian waterway operations are performed largely
by tug -towed dumb barges. Upriver barge trains on the
lower Danube often comprise 12 units towed astern in six
pairs or three rows of four units fleeted abreast.
Downriver trains ma consist of up to 14 units with four
alongside the tug and the remainder astern in two rows of
four and six units fleeted abreast. Operations on the
Bulgaria ;t Danube are aided by shore -based and floating
navigational aids, including route- kihuneter markers,
buoys, and range beacons. Two-way day- and -night
navigationi is practiced throughout the shipping season.
The principal traffic interruption factor is ice. All
traffic is halted during the average 40 -day fast -ice period
between mid-January and late February. Operations
normally continue during 45 -day periods of drift or rim
ice that precede and follow the freeze. Additional
interruptions result from autumn and winter fogs, which
suspend navigation when visibility is poor; floods, which
occur at irregular intervals and may alter the channel
alignment; and low -water conditions, which are
relatively rare and usually of short duration.
The Bulgarian portion of the Danube has no locks or
dams. The only fixed structure on the river is the
combination rail- highway bridge connecting Ruse with
Giurgiu, Rumania. I'll(- other principal crossing site is the
railroad ferry between Vidin and Calafat, Romania.
The eight Bulgarian Danube ports are generally small
and poorly equipped. Ruse and Lom, the major ports,
together probably handle more than 60l of the total
yearly port turnover. Ports of secondary significance are
Silistra, Tutrakan, Svishtov, Somovit, Orekhovo, and
Vidin. Ruse and Lorn are the only ports with protected
basins, extensive quayside fixed and mobile freight
handling equipment, and adequate open and covered
storage facilities. Riverfront berthing, handling, and
storage facilities at the other six ports are extremely
limited. All of the ports have direct rail or road clearance
to the national networks. Collectively thev have an
estimated total military unloading capacity of 30 ,000
short tons per day,' about 50% of which is provided at
Ruse.
In January 1970 the Bulgarian inland cargo fleet
consisted of 153 dry -cargo and tank dumb barges with a
total capacity of 189,700 short tons and 25 lugs with a
totui of 22,480 horsepower. Most barges are 670- to
1,000 -ton dry -cargo carriers; most tank barges are 1,000
ton units. The major::, of tugs arc 700- to 1,250
horsepower vessels. In 1970 there were nine passenger
vessels with it total scating capacity of 2,340. Between
1960 and 1970, total barge capacity more than tripled,
and the number of units more than doubled. Since 1960
the number of tugs has doubled and the aggregate
horsepower has increased 400, Ely the end of 1970 about
five pusher trains were operational �five 1,500
horsepower tugs and at least 20 pusher barges of 1,350
tun carrying capacity. Although the Bulgarian fleet has
increased its share in the transport of goods, there is still
need for chartering craft from other riparian fleets.
Bulgarian river transportation is controlled internally
by the Main Administration for Water Transporlation,
operating under tht- Ministry of 'Transport. The
government -owned Bulgarian River Navigation Co.
operates and maintains all vessels of the Bulgarian
Danube fleet and administers port activity. Waterway
construction and maintenance are the responsibility of
the Construction Department in the Ministry of
'See footnote, Figure 89.
FIGURE 87. Steep bluffs backed by low hills
at Somovit. This type of terrain typifies much
of the Bulgarian Danube shoreline. (C)
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Transport. International Danube regulation is pwvided
by the Danube Commission, established at the U.S.S.R.-
sponsored Belgrade Convention in 1948. Commission
membership includes all riparian states except West
Germany. Primary functions are the planning of
improvement projects, promulgation of operating
regulations, coordination of river maintenance, and
publication of pilot charts and other navigational data.
In recent years most waterway development efforts
have been devoted to enlarging and modernizing the
fleet and increasing port capacities. In port development
the expansion of the facilities at Ruse and Lom continues.
Long -range plans include construction of a lock and
hydroelectric dam complex on the Danube near Somovit,
concurrent construction of a navigation canal from the
Danube near Somovit to Pleven, and development of an
industrial port at Pleven. There is also under study a
grandiose plan for the construction of a navigation canal
between Ruse on the Danube and the maritime port of
Varna on the Black Sea.
E. Pipelines (C)
Bulgaria does not have an extensive pipeline system,
but an ambitious construction program underway is
expected to expand the network substantially by 1975. Of
the 73 miles of pipeline now in operation, 41 miles are
used for transporting crude oil, 3 miles for refined
products, and 29 miles for natural gas (Figure 88).
The main petroleum pipeline, 17 miles long, is used to
transport crude oil from the Burgas port area to a refinery
in Kameno. Shorter crude -oil lines extend between the
Dolni Dubnik oilfields and Pleven and between the
Tyulenovo oilfields and the port of Kavarna. Two
parallel lines �one for crude oil and one for refined
products� extend from Ruse to Giurgiu, Romania.
There are only two significant natural -gas pipelines.
One extends 12 miles from a gasfield at Chiren to the
Wilhelm Pieck Cement Works near the village of Beli
Izvor; the other extends from the gasfields at Staro
Oryakhovo to a glass plant in Beloslav, a distance of 17
miles.
Several new pipelines are being constructed to meet the
increasing needs of the economy (Figure 88). A 210 -mile
line under construction is to be used to transport crude oil
from the port of Kavarna to a new refinery being
constructed at Pleven. Another line, 160 -miles long, is
being constructed to move petroleum products from a
refinery at Burgas to Stara Zagora, Plovdiv, and other
points in southern Bulgaria. Also under construction is an
international line to transport natural gcs from U.S.S.R.
fields, across Romania, to the Bulgarian cities of Varna,
Burgas, and Sofiya; total mileage of this line from the
FIGURE 88. SELECTED PIPELINES* (C)
TERMINALS
DIAM-
PRODUCTS
THROUGHPUT
From
To
LENGTH
ETER
TRANSPORTED
CAPACITY
Miles
Inches
Burgas
Kameno.......
17
16
Crude.........
na
Tyul enovo............
Kavarna......
12
10
....do........
na
Dolni Dubnik.........
Pleven........
9
na
....do........
7,300
Giurgiu, Romania.....
Ruse..........
3
40
....do........
41,000
Kavarna
Pleven........
210
na
....do........
140,000
Giurgiu. Romania.....
Ruse..........
3
40
Refined.......
41,000
Burgas
Plovdiv.......
160
na
....do........
41,000
Pleven
Somovit.......
20
na
....do........
na
Pleven
Sofiya.........
85
na
....do........
na
Staro Oryakhovo..
Beloslay.......
17
na
Natural gas....
na
Chiren
Beli Izvor.....
12
na
....do........
2,000,000
Romania border.......
Sofiya.........
320
40
....do........
na
(about 5 miles NE. of
Kardam).
na Data not available.
*Includes pipelines under construction or planned.
*Barrels per day for crude oil and refined products; cubic meters per day for natural gas.
REMARKS
Parallel pipelines beneath Danube River.
Under construction; completion ex-
pected 1972. Will serve new refinery
nearing completion at Pleven.
Parallel pipelines beneath Danube River.
Under construction; expected comple-
tion date not known. Will extend from
refinery in Burgas.
F .awned; expected completion date not
known.
Do.
Part of international line under con-
struction from U.S.S.R. gasfields to
Bulgaria. When completed, line will
serve Varna, Burgas, Plovdiv, and
Sofiya. Segment to Varna scheduled
for completion by 1972; entire line
expected to be completed by 1975.
An interconnecting branch line, about
275 miles long, from Varna to Sofiya
via Pleven, has been planned; sched-
uled period of construction not known.
129
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U.S.S.R. to Sofiya is about 470 miles, 320 miles of which
are to be within Bulgaria. Planned pipelines include a
branch natural -gas line to extend from a connection with
the intemationai line at Varna to Sofiya via Pleven. Also
planned are two pipelines for transporting refined
products, one from Pleven to Somovit, the other from
Pleven to Sofiya.
F. Ports (C)
Bulgaria has two major ports and 10 minor ports
distributed along its Black Sea coast. Varna and Burgas
are the only important maritime ports (Figure 89); the
minor ports Kavarna, Balchik, Nesebur, Pomorie, Nos
Ativa, Chernomorets, Sozopol, Primorsko, Michurin, and
Akhtopol �serve primarily local fishing enterprises and
small naval activities.
Although there are no natural well- sheltered harbors
along the coastline, shoreline characteristics are the
predominant factors influencing the location and
distribution of ports. Varna Burgas have been
constructed at the heads of the t ly large bays, Varnenski
Zaliv and Burgaski Zaliv. Minor ports are located either
along the exposed coast or in small coves, and few have
artificial protection. Burgas and eight of the minor ports
are located along the southern section of the coast, which
is characterized by numerous small coves and bights;
Varna and the remaining two minor ports are located
along the northern section of the coast, which is more
regular and has few indentations.
Varna and Burgas are both linked to the national road
and rail transportation networks; all of the minor ports
are cleared by road, but only Pomorie has rail clearance
as well.
FIGURE 89. MAJOR PORTS (C)
NAME; LOCATION;
by breakwaters and 1 protected by
ESTIMATED MILITARY
breakwater and configuration of
PORT CAPACITY
ACTIVITIES
Varna
Largest and best- equipped commercial
43 �13 27 �55'E.
port. shipbuilding center, naval base.
19,300
Principal shipments� engineered
Anchorage For 11 large passenger
products, tobacco, cement, food-
ships, 15 ocean -type cargo ves-
stuffs. Principal receipts�fertil-
sels, numerous small cargo ves-
izers, parer, steel, machinery, trucks,
sels in area E. of ;Hain Harbor.
construction materials, military
equipment, other manufactured
goods, coal, petroleum. Three major
commercial shipyards primarily for
construction but able to perform
above- and below -water repairs;
largest drydocking facility 810 -ft.
graving dock; 2 building docks, 775
and 645 ft.; 2 floating drydocks,
lifting capacities 4,500 and 1,000
tons. New port facilities under con-
struction for handling timber in
Varnensko Ezero, and new port
planned at Gorno Devnensko Ezero,
a lake 13 miles W. of Varna.
Burgas
Important export center; handles
42 �30 27�28
mostly bulk cargoes; secondary naval
12,700
base provides operational and logis-
tical support. Principal shipments
machinery, lumber, tobacco, canned
fruits and vegetables, lead, zinc.
Principal receipts� apatite, phos-
phate, coal, pig iron, machinery,
fish, crude and refined petroleum.
Two small shipyards: commercial
yard builds and repairs small vessels,
naval -base shipyard effects minor
repairs to small naval vessels; largest
drydocking facility is marine railway
with 200- to 400 -ton hauling capac-
ity. New fishing port facilities at head
of Burgaski Zaliv just W. of Main
Harbor still being developed.
IIAABOR
Artificial, breakwater- protected har-
bor with 3 divisions: Outer Harbor,
60 acres, depths up to 34 ft., ap-
proach deep; Inner Harbor, 90
acres, general depths 19 to 32 ft.,
least depth in approach through
breakwater entrance 30 ft.; Varna
Canal, 70 acres, general depths 13
to 24 ft., but least depth through
channel 18 ft.
BERTHS
Alongside For 3 large, 7 standard,
5 small ocean -type cargo vessels;
10 standard, 23 small coaster
type cargo vessels; 7 lighters; 2
shall ocean -type tankers: 2 me-
dium, 14 small naval vessels.
Moorings �When not used for
alongside berths, naval wharfage
can provide 32 medium and 62
small Mediterranean mooring
naval berths.
Anchorage For 3 large passenger
ships, .1 ocean -type cargo vessels,
12 sma!l cargo vessels in area E.
of harbor.
Three harbor divisions (2 protected Alongside -8 standard, 5 small
by breakwaters and 1 protected by
ocean -type cargo vessels; 4 stand
breakwater and configuration of
ard, 8 small coaster -type cargo
land): Main Harbor, 72 acres with.
vessels; 5 lighters; 1 large. 1
central depths of 27 to 29 ft.;
standard ocean -type tankers; 5
Fishint, Harbor, 80 acres (part of
small naval vessels.
which being filled) with depths up
Anchorage For 11 large passenger
to about 20 ft.; and POL Harbor,
ships, 15 ocean -type cargo ves-
somewhat less than 100 acres, cen-
sels, numerous small cargo ves-
tral depths of 36 ft.; fairway lead-
sels in area E. of ;Hain Harbor.
ing to Main Harbor has least depth
of 29 ft.; fairway to Fishing Har-
bor believed to have depth of about
20 ft., and fairway to POL harbor
has depth of over 36 ft.
'The estimated military port capacity is the maximum amount of general cargo� expressed in long tons �that can be unloaded onto the
wharves and cleared from the wharf aprons during a period of one 24 -hour day (20 effective cargo- working hours). The estimate is based on
the static cargo transfer facilities of the port existing at the time the estimate is prepared and is designed for comparison rather than for
operational purposes; it cannot be projected beyond a single day by straight multiplication.
130
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Maritime port cargo tonnage has been increasing
steadily at an annual rate of roughly 10% in recent years;
the amount handled in 1969 was 13,864,000 tons. It is
anticipated that the amounts handled will continue to
increase because of improvements in port facilities now
being developed at Varna and Burgas, and the new trade
agreements that have been made with the U.S.S.R., the
country which alone accounts for over 50% of Bulgarian
foreign trade. Coastal trade (cabotage) in 1969 amounted
to only 233,000 tons. The most important types of exports
(according to value) are machinery and equipment,
consumer goods, agricultural commodities and products,
livestock, aril livestock icy- products; the most important
imports are machinery and equipment, fuels, raw
min ^rats and metals. An increase in the import of steel
and fuels from the U.S.S.R. is projected.
All Bulgarian maritime ports are controlled by the
Black Sea Shipping Co., which has headquarters in
Varna; the company is subordinate to the Ministry of
Transport.
Varna, (Figure 90) located about 50 miles south of the
Romanian border, is the third largest city and the most
important port in Bulgaria. It also serves as headquarters
and chief operating, administrative, and logistic base for
the navv. In 1969 this port handled 5,222,000 tons of
cargo. V
O Serrai GREECE p Xanthi
0 20 40..t ute miles
20 40 K
0 ilometers
1
yl
-2 r
C'K
S/s.I
I
T U R K E
24' 26�
42"111
PROFILE
CENTRAL LOWLANDS
Feet DANUBE PLAINS BULGARIAN HIGHLANDS AND HILLS BULGARIAN HIGHLANDS Meters
7000 Y 2100
6000 I I I
I I I 1800
5000 /AuruLr Illy rn i tl rril. rr i tray+ 1500
4000 1200
3000 I I 900
2000 I 1 I 600
I I I
1000 I 300
0 0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
A Statute miles B
Approximate vertical exaggeration 30:1
FIGURE 93. Military geographic regions and terrain (C)
140
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Local Relief"
Plains 0 to 500 feet
fr
I_J
Hills 500 to 2000 feet
Mountains Over 2000 feet
*Differences
in elevation between tops and
bottoms of adjacent topographic features.
Forest
Military Geographic Region boundary
790
Spot height (in feet)
24' 26�
42"111
PROFILE
CENTRAL LOWLANDS
Feet DANUBE PLAINS BULGARIAN HIGHLANDS AND HILLS BULGARIAN HIGHLANDS Meters
7000 Y 2100
6000 I I I
I I I 1800
5000 /AuruLr Illy rn i tl rril. rr i tray+ 1500
4000 1200
3000 I I 900
2000 I 1 I 600
I I I
1000 I 300
0 0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
A Statute miles B
Approximate vertical exaggeration 30:1
FIGURE 93. Military geographic regions and terrain (C)
140
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Surface winds are mostly light and variable, but strong
winds often accompany thunderstorms and migratory
pressure systems and fronts.
2. Military geographic regions (C)
Differences in topographic conditions are the basis for
dividing Bulgaria into three military geographic
regions �the Danube Plains, the Central Lowlands and
Hills, and the Bulgarian highlands (Figure 93). The
combination of environmental conditions within a region
would have a relatively uniform effect on military
operations, but there would he marked differences
between regions.
a. DANUBE PLAINS
Paralleling the Danube River, this region consists of a
gently undulating, mostly unforested, loess covered plain
which ranges in width from 20 to 80 miles and slopes
gently northward from thr foothills of the Balkan
Mountains in central Bulgaria and terminates in low
bluffs along the Danube. Except for several swampy or
marshy areas along the river, the region is relatively well
drained and covered by fields of low- growing grains,
meadows, and scattered groves of broadleaf deciduous
trees. Numerous northward- flowing tributaries of the
Danube, which divide the plain into segments about 25
to 30 miles wide, meander across the plain in narrow
valleys. Differences in elevations are generally less than
300 feet from valley bottoms to the drainage divides, and
slopes are commonly under 5 Beginning in August, the
width and depth of the streams are reduced considerably.
From early April to early May, melting snow and rains
quickly raise water levels, often by 15 feet or nwre, and
cause fairly extensive flooding. Most of the cities and
towns are located in strearn valleys or along the roads and
railroads which crisscross the region.
Terrain conditions in this region are generally
favorable for large -scale ground operations. Local or
seasonal factors influence the predominantly favorable
conditions for cross country movement of men and
vehicles. Practically all of the region is open, nearly flat,
and relatively dry and the few steep slopes and patches of
permanently wet ground could be bypassed easily. The
road and rail network %ould facilitate year -round
military movement. Alternate routes are available for
nearly all the cities and towns. Most of the area is well
suited for road construction, but alignments would be
restricted in dissected areas, mainly in the eastern half.
Although the relatively flat surface of the plain is
favorable for ground operations, the streams are major
obstacles during the high -water period. From mid
December to rnid -April and following the short but heavy
spring and summer rainstorms (usually from early May
through july), miry soils would also slow offroad
movement. Scattered forests afford only limited
concealment. Caves in the extreme cast and steep
streamhanks throughout the region afford natural cover
from flat- trajectory fire. Deep soils provide many sites for
bunker -type installations.
Airmobile and airborne operations could be executed
with little difficulty on the Danube Plains. The area is
widely cultivated, providing many sites suitable for
parachute landings and some scattered sites are available
on the dissected areas of the plains. helicopter landing
sizes are numerous in the western half of the plains, but
are fewer and scattered in the eastern half because of
forested areas. Except for the dissected areas of the plains,
sites for airfield construction are numerous and only
minor construction problems would be encountered.
The coast of the Danube Plains region is mostly
unsuited for amphibious operations because of partly
obstructed nearshore approaches, the prevalence of low
cliffs, bluffs, and marshes near the shore, and poor exits
inland. The most Suitable area for large -scale landings is
northeast of Varna.
The Danube Plains provide fair to unsuitable
conditions for operations by irregular forces. Small
elements of foot troops would have few opportunities for
cover and concealment on the sparsely forested, generally
flat, nondissected plains between Ruse and Lom.
Elsewhere, operations would be favored by more
extensive forest coverage and by surface irregularities
such as bluffs, cliffs, and levees associated with
streambeds on the dissected plains. There are also some
large caves in limestone, particularly in the vicinity of the
contact between the Danube Plains and the Bulgarian
Highlands. The urban areas are predominantly situated
along rivers and streams emptying into the Danube and
are connected by the most dense network of roads in the
country. Food is readily available because this region is
the agricultural center of the country. However, much of
the food and water is biologically contaminated.
1). CENTRAL LOWLANDS AND HILLS
Stretching approximately 200 miles east -west and
about 70 miles north -south at its widest point, this region
consists of slightly dissected lowlands, scattered patches
of low hills, and a concentration of rugged hills along the
eastern half of the Turkey border. Local relief in the
lowlands is mostly less than 325 feet; slopes generally are
less than 10 The rugged hills have slopes ranging from
25% to over 45 Several large rivers and a number of
small streams cross these lowlands between the scattered
141
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FIGURE 94. Georgi Dimitrov Boulevard, Sofiya, with Sofiya
Museum in center (S)

SOFIYA
100
J i. T
so
60
D
1 FMAMI lASONDI�
BOTEV
i
1 B0
I
60 I I j1yu!1y 01 40
I
0 !ii;i:111_
1FMAMIJASONDI
VARNA
LDO T
BO
01
1 01 1 S
)FMAMI JASONDJ
MEAN CLOUDINESS AT SPECIFIED HOURS (LST)
MEAN ANNUAL PRECIPITATION (INCHES)
SOFIYA BOTEV VARNA
0 r� -7-r 10 �1 10
iiii!!!I!i iili I I
S 5 Ili'
Ili j li ii it
it lip
0 1FMAMJJAS0N 0 i)FMAMJJASON 0 JFMAMJIASONC
MEAN MONTHLY PRECIPITATION (INCHES)
SOFIYA BOTEV VARF�'A
30 30-{
I
i
20-- I Ili I I 20- 20
II i
I
10- I Iii 10- 10 iI
0 0 0
I FMAMI 'AS OND )FMAMI IASOND 1FMAM1IAS6N
SOFIYA
100
80
60
li
,0 0
2 01 itt-
JF MAMJ JASOT:G:
VARNA
100
Bo
I
60
AD
20
o -1.-
1FMAMIJASONDJ
MEAN RELATIVF HU,AIF I I Y 1 AT ECIFIED HOURS (LST)
BOTEV
100 s
r
so C
60 1
/0
2D
0 1 -I
'a,kM1 IASONDI
P.)TEV
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH SNOWFALL
SOFIYA VARNA PLEVEN
30- {1 30 I 30
20 .0 20- 4JFMA
1 011 1 0. 1 0
FMAMI IASON JFMAMIIASONO OND
MEAN THUNDERSTORM DAYS
ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE
MEAN DAILY MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE
MEAN DAILY MINIMUM TEMPERATURE
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM TEMPERATURE
TEMPERATURES �F)
FIGURE 9.. Precipitation, snowfall, thunderstorm days, cloudiness, relative humidity,
and temperatures (U /OU)
142
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hills; stretches of marshy lowlands, which are generally
flooded during the spring thaw, border the principal
rivers, the Tundzha and Maritsa. Concentrations of
population are significant both inland, along rivers,
roads, and railroads, arid on the coast. These include such
major cities as Plovdiv, Burgas, and Stara "Zagora.
Numerous agricultural towns and villages dot the� fertile
lowlands of this region. Brush, scrub, and scattered
patches of deciduous forests cover about 605 of the
region, and about 40% is covered by cultivated fields
planted in low- growing grains, vegetables, orchards, and
vineyards. Most fauns in Bulgaria are collectivized and
include large buildings and sheds which form the core of
the farm headquarters (Figure 96).
The lowlands and hills are moderately suited for
conventional ground operations. Most of the open,
slightly dissected owlands and the scattered, gently
rolling hills are fair for rapid cross- country movement of
ground forces; but, between mid-December and mid
April and after heavy rains, movement would be
impeded by miry ground arid .,wollen rivers. The road
network is in fair to good condition, but the railroads
have relatively low capacities. The hest transportation
route is the highway and railroad through the Maritsa
River vallev. Cross country movem� it is restricted in the
southern half of the region because of steep slopes, brush,
scattered stands of forest, and deep snow in winter. Off
road dispersal is generally good, but it is hindered in
places by steep slopes in the south and by miry ground
between mid December and mid -April and after heavy
rains. Conditions for road construction are favorable in
the northern half, where alignments would be normally
unrestricted and only minor construction problems would
be encountered. Populated places provide the hest cover
and concealment; the deciduous forests in the hills
furnish the only effective natural concealment. The high
hills along the 'Turkey border offer the hest sites for
tunnel-type installations, and numerous sites for bunker
type installations are available in the deep soils of the
lowlands.
Good sites for airmobile arid airborne operations are
restricted to the� cultivated, flat to rolling plains. There
are mai:.� sites for parachute drops and helicopter
landings. The hills and dissected plains in the southern
half provide sites of fair suitability. The areas north of
Plovdiv, so: ;theist of Stara 'Zagora, and west of Burgas are
especially favorable for the construction of airfields aril
also serve as sites for most existing airfields.
The coast of this region is generally unsuited for large
scale amphibious landings because most stretches of
sandv shore have partly obstructed ncarshorc approaches
and poor exits. The only suitable site, northeast of Burgas,
has generally clear offshoie arid ncarshorc approaches.
Exits from most stretches of shore are by tracks and trails
and are generally poor.
Natural conditions for operations by irregular forces
are poor to fair in the greater part of the Central
Lowlands and Hills. The directional trend of this region
favors cast -west movement. The steeper, thickly forested
slopes in the more dissected terrain in the north and south
are the best suited areas for undetected movement by
small units of foot troops. Nearly half of this region
consists of flat to rolling, cultivated plains which provide
little or no cover and concealment. Many areas are
subject to flooding in the spring months. The heavily
forested hills in the south provide good concealment from
ground and air observation and, locally, good cover.
Extensive ricefields, mulberry groves, and vineyards offer
a good seasonal source of food in the Maritsa River
valley, although biological contamination of food arid
water supplies is it hazard in many areas. 'Timber for
shelter and fuel is scarce or lacking in the cultivated
areas. Existing airfields, evenly dispersed in this region,
could be used in air supply operations. The hilly and
rugged coastal terrain would hinder supply operations by
sea.
c. BULGARIAN 1lIGHLANDS
This rugged region. covering approximately half of
Bulgaria, consists of two mountain chains. From a
topographically complex juncture in the west, one chain
(the Balkan Mountains) extends eastward, ending in
cliffs along the Black Sea, and the other (the Rhodope
Mountains) extends southeastward and continues into
Grecce. The mountains are generally low and rounded in
the cast and southeast and relatively sham and rugged in
the west arid southwest (Figure 97). Elevations in the cast
for the most part do not exceed 2,500 feet; in the west,
particularly in the area south of Sofiva, elevations
bet%veen 7,700 and 9,600 feet are common. In the cast,
near the Black Sea, local relief is mostly less than 2,000
feet, and slopes are commonly between 10% and 30�x. In
the more rugged section to the west, differences in
elevation between ridge crests arid valley bottoms are
commonly more than 2,000 feet and slopes generally
exceed 30 Most of these mountains are heavily
forested. Coniferous trees predominate from elevations of
143
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FIGURE 95. Collective farm near P!ovdiv on the
plains in the Central Lowlands and Hills Region
(U /OU)

3,200 to 6,700 feet, and deciduous trees, principally dense
stands of oak and beech, are characteristic of the lower
slopes and valleys. Brush and scrub cover most of the
higher elevations. Cropland is most extensive in the area
around Sofiya; elsewhere, cultivated areas are small,
widely scattered, and mostly in the wider stream valleys.
Most of the inhabitants and the relatively sparse
transportation facilities of the region are in these stream
valleys and the few basins. The largest population
concentration is the Sofiya area.
Terrain conditions preclude large -scale ground
operations. Steep slopes, narrow valleys, brush and
forests, and deep snow in winter combine to render
movement in this region difficult for both foot troops and
N eh?cles. Movement along existing transportation routes
would be retarded by narrow roads, steep grades, sharp
curves, narrow or low- capacity bridges, and snow and ice
in passes. Off -road dispersal along many roads would be
very difficult because of steep, forested slopes. Although
construction materials are generally available, the
rugged terrain presents major problems for roadbuilding.
Seasonal concealment from air and ground cbservation is
provided by deciduous forest. Conik'crous forests found
mainly in the southwest provide local areas of good year
round concealment. Surface irregularities afford cover ;r
most places in the mountains. Tunnel -type installations
could be constructed in hard rock in iuost of the region;
in the basins, where soils are deep, bunker -type
installations could be easily constructed.
144
Steep slopes, higl 'evatiwis, and extensive forest cover
greatly restrict airmobile end airborne operations.
Scattered, flat to rolling, :ultivated or brush- covered
plains in the vicinity of S fiya and along the Struma
River valley contain numerous sites for parachute drops
and helicopter landings. There are also several large
airfields. The plains and a few low hills of the Bulgarian
Highlands region are generally suited for the construction
of small airfields, but only the east -west trending plain
containing Sofiya is suited for large airfields.
The 15 -mile length of Black Sea coast within this
region is mostly unsuitable for large -scale amphibious
operations because of partly obstructed nearshore
approaches, rugged coastal terrain, and poor exits inland.
Much of the coast is fronted by cliffs or closely backed by
steep, forested slopes of hills. Few stretches of shore are
suitable for landings, and the number of routes affording
exit inland from the beaches are limited.
The Bulgarian Highland, lion is well suited for
operations by irregular for,.;b. The rugged mountain
terrain and generally dense forest vegetation favor the
undetected movement of small units of foot troops. In
most of the region there are few roads and railroads, but
good roads radiate from the basin containing Sofiya to
the borders of the four countries adjoining Bulgaria and
to the coast. Floods in spring render most of the roads in
mountain valleys hazardous. Scattered patches of
coniferous forest, mostly concentrated in the Rhodope
Mountains, afforu year -round concealment, and natural
cover is abundant throughout the region. Population
concentrations, cultivated areas, and the few airfields in
the region are generally in basins and along major river
valleys. The Struma and Tundzha River valleys and the
basin containing Sofiya are the best areas for obtaining
food supplies; procurement of food in the rugged parts of
the region would be difficult. Biological contamination
of food and water supplies is a hazard everywhere. Shelter
and natural fuel are most plentiful in the forests.
3. Strategic areas (C)
There are four strategic areas in Bulgaria� Sofiya,
Plovdiv, Varna, and Burgas (Figure 98). They are
significant as transportation, industrial, and agricultural
centers and as sites of military installations.
a. SOFIYA
Sofiya, the capital and largest city (1971 population
879,000) in Bulgaria, is one of the principal urban
complexes on the Balkan Peninsula (Figure 99). The city
(Figures 27 and 94) is a major junction of international
transportation lines; it is situated on a rail route linking
western Europe to Istanbul, Turkey, and is on the rail line
extending through the Struma River valley to Greece. It is
on:; of the major road and rail centers in the country,
especially for routes extending westward from the ports of
Varna and Burgas, and nearby airfields serve both
military and civilian traffic. The city also contains
national and international telecommunication facilities.
Sofiya is the primary industrial center of the country,
accounting for one -fifth of the national output,
principally based on nearby sources of coal, iron ore, and
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FIGURE 97. Rugged mountains in southwest Bulgaria,
where steep slopes, high elevations, and sparse popu-
lation density would provide good conditions for
operations by irregular forces (U /OU)

hydroelectric power. Among the city's many industries
are large locomotive and railroad car repair shops,
metalworking and mach;ne shops, food- processing
plants, aril facilities for the manufacture of textiles,
rubber products, electrical and communication
equipment, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. The two
largest steel mills in the country arc located it this
strategic area, at Kremikovtsi and Pernik. In addition, the
largest and most important uranium mines in Bulgaria
are northeast of Kremikovtsi; the associated ore
processing plant is one of the largest in the Communist
Eastern European countries. Sofiva is also the control
center of the Bulgarian armed forces; military
installations within the strategic area include numerous
barracks and several military schools. Petroleum storage
facilities have a capacity of about 490,000 barrels.
b. PLOVDIV
Plovdiv (Figure 100), the transportation center of
southern Bulgaria, is the second largest city 1971
population 2- 15,000) and of considerable economic
importance as an industrial and agricultural center.
Chemicals, metallurgy, and food processing are
important industries; and textiles, leather footwear, and
electrical equipment are manufactured in the city. A
plant located southwest of Krumovo is the country's
principal producer of lead arid zinc. Plovdiv contains an
array headquarters and is the site of several military
installations. Storage facilities for refined petroleum
products have a capacity of approximately 98,000
barrels. 'There are four large airfields in the strategic area.
C. VARNA
Varna (Figure 101), the largest port and the third
largest city (1971 population 217,000), is the principal
naval base arid center for shipbuilding and ship repairs in
the country. Military facilities include naval mine and
torpedo storage depots, a seaplane base, and two
airfields. Significant industries are textiles, cement,
industrial chemicals, and petroleum products. Refined
petroleum products storage facilities have a capacity of
about 850,000 barrels.
d. Br; nGAs
Burgas (Figure 102) is the second- ranking port and the
fifth largest city in Bulgaria (1971 population 140,000).
The strategic area accounts for two thirds of the coun-
try's petroleum refining capacity; a pipeline extends
from the port to the refinery and petrochemical combine
near Karneno. Storage capacity for refined petroleum is
about 1.8 million barrels. Freight -car production,
shipbuilding, ship repair, flour milling, arid salt
processing are other important industries. A naval base,
two airfields, military headquarters, aril several storage
depots are located in the strategic area.
e. OTnEfi SIGNIFICANT AREAS
A total of three urbanized areas which are of varying
degrees of importance as r,ilitary, industrial, and
transportation centers and may, under special
circumstances, becorne strategic, are described in Figure
103.
4. Internal routes (C)
The selected internal routes (Figure 98) are the easiest
avenues of movement between the land approaches and
strategic areas, between strategic areas, and, in places, are
connecting links between routes. All contain improved
roads and most contain railroads over at least a part of
their length. Conditions for offroad dispersal arid cross
country movement range from unsuited in areas of high
hills and mountains to fair to good in low hills and plains.
On most of the plains, however, oonditions may be
unsuited for extended periods between mid December
and mid -April because of miry soils or swollen streams.
Detailed information on the selected routes is supplied in
Figure 104.
5. Approaches
The perimeter of Bulgaria consists of 220 miles of
coastline and about 1,170 miles of land boundaries
Figure 105). Bulgaria claims territorial jurisdiction for 12
nautical miles offshore. (U /OU)
a. LAND (C)
Southern and western land approaches to Bulgaria are
generally along valleys in mountains and high
hills (Figure 107). Approaches from the north extend
across the Danube Plains and generally terminate
near the Danube River. The condition of the ap-
proach routes is variable, their courses extending across
mountainous terrain except in the north. Most of the
routes contain both roads and railroads, and cross
country movement would be seasonally good along the
valleys and on the plains. Directional restrictions are
exerted by the mountains on the western and southern
borders and by areas of swamp north of the Danube
River. 'The approaches shown in Figure 98 and described
in figure 108 are the best means of land access to
Bulgaria.
1). SEA (S)
Sea approaches to the coast of Bulgaria are from the
Mediterranean via the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara,
the Bosporus, and the Black Sea. A passage 825 yards
wide restricts the entrance to the Black Sea from the
Bosporus. In the Black Sea the offshore approaches are
clear except for a few widely scattered obstructions such
as rocks and shoals but the nearshore approaches are
partly obstructed by shoals, rocks, shifting sandbars, and
other local obstacles such w wrecks. Surf 4 feet or higher
may occur up to 25% of the time on exposed coastal
stretches. The tidal range in the Black Sea is negligible,
and ice forms along the coast only during unusually cold
winters, mostly in January and February. Nearshore
bottom materials are mostly sand, with varying amounts
of shell, gravel, rock, and mud. Stretches of shore suitable
for landing are numerous and fairly well distributed
along the coast, but rugged coastal terrain would
seriously hamper inland movement in many places; exits
are mainly by tracks and trails or cross- country
movement. Elsewhere, cliffs, especially along the central
145
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R O M A A a, r,
onstenla
6 p G
as R Veda de Unygd sire j
Veda /$i
Giurgiu
Lom DANt I e egru Voda'
Oreir i urnu Migurete
ikopof 1
Tolbukhi 1
i l Witte
Mlkhay wad I v91a
sr r ni Priam f r akhik
Ipovlts
Cherven aryaE
Y&IS&
bnik
Road
Shdme
not i
�tom Railroad
ovech
Tgrgovishte
Provadye
4
..J'
Gum Orrakhovitsa
umaritsa Kremi vtsi
z3 ;o z3 4
Bhovo
YUGOSLAVIA
rt
Ban y
ehko. urnpvo
a
4110 1-esn vo
drys
25'00
f
Radomir
Dam
.,y
r (I 1I L A C li
i pgrn
',p
Karlov
I
argobat, �'t' f ti E:1
Ya odovo
hnegrovo
P VDIV
Tuo
tbov
imnrlse .Name 1
�1
N
samokov
9Stet Zagoo
Nova
Zagora
Yambol
Palenk Y ndit to ke
vueahevo imttrov rdil
eat o ,c. Ctl,m� JT i d i ^...r.>
eI pdtivRr dtt' 4 r mitrov rad
az enov4re 1
NAgskn
7 man /I
Y
111k: l A 1i ;f �Sqo" 'w treli�pzi
General ,1 omc dgiad t
G! R E E C E
'ta AeRnan Sao
U R K E Y
Strategic area
Fus1+ Internal route
r_ Amphibious
landing area
Railroad
Road
0 20 Miles
0 20 40 I. �I er,
CONFIDENTIAL
20
FIGURE 98. Strategic areas, internal routes, and approaches (C)
23'ar 23'15'
24'45'
Road
Road
I �r Railroad
�tom Railroad
Airfield
Shvnitsa WHO
unnel
6 12
4
Statute miles
Tunnel
zhurisht
Tunneh
umaritsa Kremi vtsi
z3 ;o z3 4
Bhovo
unnel
Ban y
SOFTY az thane E in Pelin
(Noboseltsi)
Pernik
4110 1-esn vo
drys
25'00
f
Radomir
Dam
Dam
FIGURE 99. Sofiya strategic area (C)
146
FIGURE 100. Plovdiv strategic area (C)
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24'45'
Road
of
Ign
�tom Railroad
tievo
Airfield
0 3 6
Art
Trud
Statute miles
25'00
Man
Ya odovo
hnegrovo
P VDIV
he
j
Kr movo
gyp'
I
Asenovgrad
FIGURE 100. Plovdiv strategic area (C)
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27`35'1 27 4 51 2 1 55'
15 Aksakovo
qW 1
Devnya
Beloslav Seaplane! VARNA
Razdelna base i
Road
Railroad
Airfield
43'05' u 3 6
Statute miles
FIGURE 101. Varna strategic area (C)
FIGURE 102. Burgas strategic area (C)
2715'
Mauufacwring and mining ceuU r; lurg-
12 25 0 :36'1�:,
est chemical conihine in Bulgaria:
.1 /unuanrako
twain center of brown -coal alining:
7275.
6'n�rn
Cam
Ka N.uker
meno
1
Sarafo
-%Pornorie
Refinery
Kazanluk
Large garrison and army division head
Dofno
gtiartere at important mountain pas,
t
erovo
Ravnets
1.%Te small arias, antitank weapons,
ammunition for small arms, artillery,
and mortars, and explosives.
BURGAS
I.argest Bulgarian port on Danube:
Pi eli
Chernomorets
t2
J/
S opol
to ltontania; largest inland shipbuild-
ing center; important manufacturing
Road
Airfield
ehiner}� and vonuuunication equip-
T Railroad
0 Salt pan
0 2 4
6
Statute miles
coast, would seriously limit landing possibilities. Two
aniphihious landing areas provide access to internal
routes leading to strategic areas (Figure 98).
The best amphibious landing area is a 3 -mile stretch of
beach northeast of Burgas and centered 2 miles
northwest of Nesebur, near the northern end of the
Central Lowlands and hills region. "t'he beach is 3 miles
long, 25 to 30 yards wide, and all usable except for an 80-
yard stretch in the southern part. The offshore and
nearshore approaches are essentially clear, and surf 4 feet
or higher is uncommon in all months. In the nearshore,
bottom slopes are mild to gentle, and bottom materials
are sand, inud, and shell. The beach has a moderate
gradient and is composed of fine sand which is firm in the
wet area and soft where drv. Immediately behind the
beach is a sandy are with (tunes, which extends 300 to
1,500 yards inland to it nearly level to undulating plain.
Exits from the beach are by numerous roads and streets
leading to a hard- surface road 425 yards to 1,000 yards
inland.
The other area suitable for large -scale amphibious
landings is a beach centered 13 miles northeast of Varna.
The beach is 1,200 yards long, 15 to 30 yards wide and all
usable. The offshore approaches are clear but in the
FIM'I3F. 111:3. O'HIISB al(;NIFICAN'I' AREAS
N A %I h:
LO('AT10
I�(11't'LATIO\ r 147 1 I Ixt l�U@n'A \('h:
Dinlitro gr:ul
Mauufacwring and mining ceuU r; lurg-
12 25 0 :36'1�:,
est chemical conihine in Bulgaria:
11,111111
twain center of brown -coal alining:
important electric power producer;
junction on FofiY:L- Istanbul, 'Turkey.
:wad Buse- Kurdzhah rail lines; city
rapidly expanding.
Kazanluk
Large garrison and army division head
.12 25 �21'b:.
gtiartere at important mountain pas,
:52,11011
to northern Bulgaria; principal aril'
materiel plants, producing Soviet
1.%Te small arias, antitank weapons,
ammunition for small arms, artillery,
and mortars, and explosives.
Buse
I.argest Bulgarian port on Danube:
1:3 �50'N., 25 �57'1�:.
inlportaat point on rail and road
1:55,11011
routes, also only bridge across Danube
to ltontania; largest inland shipbuild-
ing center; important manufacturing
center, producing agricultural ma-
ehiner}� and vonuuunication equip-
ment.
nearshore the approaches :ire partly obstructod by it bar
approximately 100 yards off the mean waterline and by
submerged and exposed rocks off the south end of the
beach. Surf 4 feet or higher never occurs more than 7% of
the time in any month. Nearshore bottom materials are
sand and mud, anti nearshore bottom slopes are mild.
The beach is backed by it nearly level to undulating plain
extending 150 to 200 yards to cliffs bordering a high
wooded ridge in the central and southern parts. In the
northern part, the beach extends I I to 2 miles tip a
valley to wooded hills. Exits are by tracks and trails which
lead from the beach to a hard- surface road 600 to 1,200
yards inland.
c. Ant (U /OU)
Air approaches" to Bulgaria are partly over water and
partly over land. "Throughout the year weather conditions
are usually better over water areas than over ]arid areas.
Weather conditions in all approaches are generally most
favorable for air operations in June through September,
when cloudiness is at a minimum (20% to 50 and
visibility is hest, and least favorable in November
through March or April, when cloudiness is at a
maximum.
Migratory pressure centers and their associated frontal
systems frequently affect all approaches in October
through April but are most frequent in winter.
Widespread multilavered cloudiness is usually associated
with these frontal systems. Mean cloudiness in winter is
about 50% to 80% in the north and only slightly less in
the south. In summer, frontal systems are rare and
cloudiness is usually scattered cumulus, with occasional
strong vertical development. "Thunderstorms are
riite discussion zone for air approaches cxtcnds approximately 300
nautical miles beyond the borders of Bulgaria.
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00
ROUTE: AND TERRAIN
Romania border at Vidin to Sofiya strategic area.
Forested, dissected plains near Vidin, brush- and
forest- covered hills and mountains, nearly flat to
rolling, cultivated plain containing Sofiya.
Yugoslavia border near Pirot. Yugoslavia, to Sofiya
strategic area. High hills and dissected plains.
sparsely to densely covered by shrub and brush.
Moderate grades and curves.
Extends from Kriva Palanka. Yugoslavia, approach to
Sofiya strategic area. Mostly mountainous; three
small, relatively flat basins and dissected plains
along route.
Yugoslavia border near Strumica. Yugoslavia. to in-
ternal route between Kulata and Sofiya strategic
area. N ^arty flat to rolling, cultivated and orchard
covered plains; shrub- and forest covered slopes of
high hills and mountains to the north and south.
Greece border near Kulata to Sofiya strategic area.
Generally flat river valley in south, mountainous
near Blagoevgrad. Series of small basins anti some
hills precede entrance into large, nearly flat basin
containing Sofiya. Terrain sparsely to densely
covered by brush, shrubs, and small trees.
Greece border near Yanthi. Greece, to Plovdiv stra-
tegic area. Route crosses Rhodope Mountains;
deciduous forest predominant.
Greece border near Komotini. Greece, to internal
route between Sofiya strategic area and Romania
border near Ruse. Route passes through mountains
and hills to the Danube Plains region. Route crosses
two east -west internal routes.
Turkey border near Edirne. Turkey, to Sofiya stra-
tegic area. Generally flat to rolling plains along
Maritsa River valley; high hills southeast of Sofiya.
Route passes through Plovdiv strategic area.
Connects approach from Kirklareli. Turkey, to Burgas
strategic area. Forested hills near border; nearly flat
to rolling plains near Burgas.
Burgas strategic area to Sofiya strategic area. Gen-
erall flat to rolling plains and internaontane basins.
Several hilly and mountainous areas west of
Kazanluk.
FIGURE, 104. INTERNAI. ROUTE'S (C
Rona
Two -lane, biturninous surface. good condi-
tion. Some short stretches of stoneblock.
Two -lane. cobblestone, good condition....
RA IL it OA II
Railroad parallels road for approximatel
first :30 miles. -f'8 gage; single track
to Mezdra; double track Mezdra to
Sofiya.
Single track 4'8I'_" gage to point .1 miles
west of Sofiya. double track to Sofiya.
Rail parallels road.
OFFROAn DISPERSAL AND CHOSS- UOUNTRY
\I0VE %I F.1T
C r country movement fair on plains and
io!, exceedingly difficult on steeply sloped
and forested mountains. Offroad dispersal
poor.
Fair on plains, unsuited in high hills Figure
107).
'rwo -lane, gravel, good condition......... Single track .1 gag( Unsuited in hills and mountains. Conditions
fair ;n basins; unsuited during miry period.
One- to two -lane. crushed stone. fair condi
tion.
Single track 1 gag(' L�unl Petrich to
General Todorov.
Few hindrances to cross country n1ovenient
and offroad dispersal along route. Unsuited
in bordering high hills and mountains.
'rwo -lane, bituminous surface, good condi-
tion. �1 miles north of Blagoevgrad steep
grades and curves for 2 -mile stretch. Steel
girder bridge over Struma River. 8.6 miles
south of Blagoevgrad, capacity 22 tons.
Two -lane, bituminous surface, good condi-
tion. Several sharp curves and 1(i� to
20 grades in mountains.
One- to two -lane, bituminous surface. Steep
grades and sharp curves in mountains
sout)i of Veliko Turnovo and hills south of
Monichilgrad.
Two -lane, biturninous, concrete, and cobble-
stone surfaces, good condition. Concrete.
masonry arch bridge over Maritsa River
at Plovdiv. Concrete bridge over Maritsa
River at Pazardzhik, capacity :33 tons.
Two -lane, bituminous surface............
Two -lane, bituminous surface, good condi-
tion. Sharp cures and steep grades in
high hills and mountains.
Single track 1'SI_" gage
N one..
Unsuited in mountains and near periphery of
basins. Fair in basins except during miry
period.
Unsuited for cross country movement; off
road dispersal poor in narrow river valleys.
Single track 4'8 gage north of Podkova. Unsuited in high hills and mountains, fair in
generally parallel to road; electrified plains except for extended periods (luring
north of Gorna Oryakhovitsa, miry season.
Single track �1'5 gage. electrified west of
Plovdiv. Railroad parallels road most of
length.
Fair in most of plains except during miry
period. Unsuited throughout year in high
hills and permanently wet areas west of
Plovdiv.
N one..
Single track V8 1 2 gage except for I l miles
double track Burgas Kauneno, 22 miles
double track Karnobat Zininitsa, (i miles
double track Dubovo Tulovo. Single
track electrified Tulovo Sofiva 106
miles).
Cross- country movement hindered by forests
and sparse to dense brush in high hills; fair
on plains. Offroad dispersal fair.
Offroad dispersal and cross country move-
ment conditions good in basins, unsuited
in high hills and mountains. Fair condi-
tions prevail during miry period in low-
lands west of Burgas.
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Burgas strategic area to Varna strategic area. Nearly Two -lane, bituminous surface; drawbridge N one 1'11suited in high hills and in marshes ad-
flat to rolling plains, mostly cultivated. and hills at Varna. jacent to streams; fair in most of nearly
covered by deciduous forest or brush. flat to rolling plains except during min�
period.
Romania border near Negru %'oda, Romania, to Varna
strategic area. Mostly flat to rolling, cultivated
plains.
Romania border near Ruse to Varna strategic area.
Nearly flat to rolling, cultivated fields and plains
with small patches of scrub and brush.
Romania border near Ruse to Sofiya strategic area.
Nearly flat to rolling, cultivated plains as far its
Dolni Dubnik; forest- and scrub- covered hills and
mountains thereafter.
Romania border at Nikopol to Plovdiv strategic area.
Nearly flat to rolling, cultivated plains and forest
and scrub covered hills and mountains. Route
crosses Ruse Sofiya and Burgas Sofiya internal
routes.
do Single track 1'8 gage between Tolbukhin
and Romania border.
Two -lane. bituminous surface. except for
ti -mile stretch of stoneblock between Ruse
and Razgratd. Condition: bituminous
good, stoneblock fair.
Two -lane. bituminous surface. good condi-
tion. Two -lane, stoneblock surface from
Ruse to Byala in good condition. Stone
block or cobblestone surface through
towns and villages.
Two -lane, bituminous surface, good condi-
tion. Several sharp curves and 10 �S to
20 grades in nountains.
Single track 4'8 gage parallel to but
generally 10 miles from road. Double
track for about 20 miles from Varna.
Road and rail line parallel as far as Byala
and from Pleven to near Chen�en Bryag.
Single track 4'8 gage, electrified as far
as Mezdra.
Single track 4'8 r_" gage from Nikopol to
Pleven runs parallel to, and west of,
internal route. Single track �1'Rar_" gage
ben% een Rarlovo and Plovidiv.
Good north of Tolbukhin: fair to poor eL
where because� of scattered forests and
moderate stream dissection.
Offroad dispersal good. (Toss country moco-
ment moderately hindered by stream dis-
section and patches of forest.
Conditions for offroad dispersal and cross
country movement range from unsuited in
mountains to fair in plains except during
miry period.
Unsuited in high hills auad mountains; fair in
plains except for extended periods during
miry season.
.A
ca
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sometimes associated with cold fronts moving through
the approaches and occur most often in the south;
activity reaches a maximum in June through September
with storms on S to 10 clays a month at some locations.
Severe turbulence and aircraft icing may occur in
thunderstorms and at times in frontal systems in winter.
The mean height of the freezing level is lowest in the
north and highest in the south. It varies front the surface
to about 12,000 feet in the winter and from about 5,000
to 16,000 feet in sununer. Winds aloft are predominantly
westerly in all approaches throughout the year. Mean
speeds usually increase with height and reach it
maximuun of about 50 to 60 knots in winter in the south
at about 10,000 to 45,000 feet.
B. Strategic mobility (S)
The capability of the transportation systems to support
major military operations is limited by a variety of
factors, principally the following: the high proportion of
single -track rail lines; a lack of alternate routes, especially
for north -south highway movement; poor alignments on
mountain routes; narrow roads and hridges; and marry
inferior road- surface conditions. Because Bulgaria forms
the southern houndary of the Warsaw !',let area and
hordeis NATO- oriented Greece and "Turkey, the north
south routes are militarily important; but they are of
comparatively low capacity, and, because of the terrain
traversed, alternate routes and bypasses would be
difficult to construct. As it principal transport artery, the
Bulgarian portion of the Danube is suitable for large
scale east -west nrovernenls of military supplies and
equipment.
The 8 -1 Bulgarian cargo ships have a connhincd lift
capability of abort 567,500 long tons of cargo, and units
of the coastal fleet could transport another 5,500 tons.
The 18 tankers could transport about 2 million barrels of
petroleum products. Deployed armed forces could he
supplied by these units of the fleet, and the heavy
lift /large -hatch ships could deliver all known Communist
military hardware.
With respect to transporting military personnel, the six
passenger ships would he able to transport about 5,500
troops under emergency conditions. The 25 fishing vessels
could he adapted to transport about 8,600 additional
troops.
Bulgarian civil aviation maintains a close relationship
with the military establishment. Virtually all airerexv
members have reserve status in the Bulgarian air force,
and it is presumed that plans have been formulated for
their mobilization in the event of a national emergency.
Many skilled ground personnel are also reservists. The
status of the BALKAN organization as a government
controlled enterprise and the military experience of its
personnel render it readily available for military
operations. 'I'he major transport aircraft of the civil fleet
could significantly supplement Bulgaria's troop and
cargo airlift capability. In addition, the light aircraft of
the agricultural and airtaxi fleets could be used in a
militarily supportive role, providing such services as aerial
reconnaissance and the transporting of medical supplies
and injured persons.
The airfield systern appears to he somewhat more than
adequate for military requirements. The consistent
improvement of the air bases, primary dispersal facilities,
and civil airfields since 1968 has provided the air force an
excellent network of facilities well suited to either
offensive or defensive operations.
C. Armed Forces
1. General
The regular armed forces of Bulgaria consis' of ground,
naval, and air and air defense elements known
collectively as the Bulgarian People's Arm\ They
constitute a single, highly unified military force
controlled by the Minister of National Defense, a ground
forces general. Total personnel strength is 157,100,
including 131,000 in the ground forces, 8,500 in the navy,
and 17,600 in the air force. Major combat elements
include eight ground forces divisions, five tank brigades,
three Scum brigades, 61 combatant ships, two naval
150
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FIGI'RI�: 105. liol'N0AH1ES
It0VN DAR
Lt: G'1'II
ST.M*S
TEH HA IN
Romania
380
Demarcated. undisputed. Nu'ortifieli-
Boundar follows thuhc(�l; of D.uutbe River to Nilistra.
tions of sil;nifivancr.
Low, cultkated. loess cover(d plains bordering Danube
River its far as Nilistra; flat to gently rolling plains and
hills between Nilistra and Black Sea.
1'u{ oslavia...
355
Demarcated. ut disputed. Ncattemd
lulls un(1 mountains: shrub vegetation predominant Figure
light fortifications.
106). Cultivated plains in north and along Nishava
river.
l7reec
305
Ih
Forest- and shrub- covered high hills and lode mountains.
"Turkey
150
.do............................
Forest covered mountains and high hills in eastern half.
Most of hill country shrub covered. Few treeless peaks
and cultivated vallv Barren. nearly flut to rolling
plains in western half.
Black Neu coastline......
220
'Territorial waters chtimed for 12 nau-
Nona(� beaches, many cliffs. and rugged terrain; foothills of
tidal miles offshore. Defenses scat-
Balkan Mountains.
tered; greatest con(�entr.ttionsaroun(I
Varna and Burgas.
sometimes associated with cold fronts moving through
the approaches and occur most often in the south;
activity reaches a maximum in June through September
with storms on S to 10 clays a month at some locations.
Severe turbulence and aircraft icing may occur in
thunderstorms and at times in frontal systems in winter.
The mean height of the freezing level is lowest in the
north and highest in the south. It varies front the surface
to about 12,000 feet in the winter and from about 5,000
to 16,000 feet in sununer. Winds aloft are predominantly
westerly in all approaches throughout the year. Mean
speeds usually increase with height and reach it
maximuun of about 50 to 60 knots in winter in the south
at about 10,000 to 45,000 feet.
B. Strategic mobility (S)
The capability of the transportation systems to support
major military operations is limited by a variety of
factors, principally the following: the high proportion of
single -track rail lines; a lack of alternate routes, especially
for north -south highway movement; poor alignments on
mountain routes; narrow roads and hridges; and marry
inferior road- surface conditions. Because Bulgaria forms
the southern houndary of the Warsaw !',let area and
hordeis NATO- oriented Greece and "Turkey, the north
south routes are militarily important; but they are of
comparatively low capacity, and, because of the terrain
traversed, alternate routes and bypasses would be
difficult to construct. As it principal transport artery, the
Bulgarian portion of the Danube is suitable for large
scale east -west nrovernenls of military supplies and
equipment.
The 8 -1 Bulgarian cargo ships have a connhincd lift
capability of abort 567,500 long tons of cargo, and units
of the coastal fleet could transport another 5,500 tons.
The 18 tankers could transport about 2 million barrels of
petroleum products. Deployed armed forces could he
supplied by these units of the fleet, and the heavy
lift /large -hatch ships could deliver all known Communist
military hardware.
With respect to transporting military personnel, the six
passenger ships would he able to transport about 5,500
troops under emergency conditions. The 25 fishing vessels
could he adapted to transport about 8,600 additional
troops.
Bulgarian civil aviation maintains a close relationship
with the military establishment. Virtually all airerexv
members have reserve status in the Bulgarian air force,
and it is presumed that plans have been formulated for
their mobilization in the event of a national emergency.
Many skilled ground personnel are also reservists. The
status of the BALKAN organization as a government
controlled enterprise and the military experience of its
personnel render it readily available for military
operations. 'I'he major transport aircraft of the civil fleet
could significantly supplement Bulgaria's troop and
cargo airlift capability. In addition, the light aircraft of
the agricultural and airtaxi fleets could be used in a
militarily supportive role, providing such services as aerial
reconnaissance and the transporting of medical supplies
and injured persons.
The airfield systern appears to he somewhat more than
adequate for military requirements. The consistent
improvement of the air bases, primary dispersal facilities,
and civil airfields since 1968 has provided the air force an
excellent network of facilities well suited to either
offensive or defensive operations.
C. Armed Forces
1. General
The regular armed forces of Bulgaria consis' of ground,
naval, and air and air defense elements known
collectively as the Bulgarian People's Arm\ They
constitute a single, highly unified military force
controlled by the Minister of National Defense, a ground
forces general. Total personnel strength is 157,100,
including 131,000 in the ground forces, 8,500 in the navy,
and 17,600 in the air force. Major combat elements
include eight ground forces divisions, five tank brigades,
three Scum brigades, 61 combatant ships, two naval
150
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A
coastal defense missile independent battalions, about 360
aircraft, and five surface -to -air missile regiments. The
regular forces are supplemented by about 14,500 frontier
troops subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense. A
Maritime Frontier Guard with 300 personnel is
adininistratively subordinate to Frontier "Droops but
operationally integrated in the navy. It operates 33
patrol -type craft. (S)
The mission of the armed forces includes offensive and
defensive actions on the Balkan Peninsula, in consonance
with Warsaw fact objectives, and the maintenance of
border and coastal security of the Bulgarian homeland.
For purposes of regional administration of the armed
forces, the country is divided into three army areas. Units
of the ground forces are distributed among these three
areas, generally near the larger cities, but they are
capable of rapid deploynwnt to the strategic Yugoslav,
Greek, and Turkish borders. Most of the naval forces are
concentrated in the Varna and Burgas areas on the Black
Sea. 'I'll( navy mission is to provide for the defense and
security of home waters and coastal lines of
cotn it) unication. The primary mission of the air force, in
conjunction with the ground forces elcnwnts of the Air
and Air Defense Forces Command, is to provide air
defense of the homeland and its coastal waters; the
secondary mission is air support of the ground forces. Air
units and surface -to -air missile units are deployed
generally along the frontiers of Yugoslavia, Greece, and
"Turkey, and the Black Sea. (S)
The armed forces are organized, trained, and equipped
largely along Soviet lines; however, they lag significantly
behind Soviet standards in modern equipment. The
Bulgarian forces have received at least a few of most post
World War 11 items of Soviet design, but the delivery of
weapons and equipment to Bulgaria has been somewhat
slower than Soviet deliveries nra de to East Germany and
Poland. Despite the time lag in modernization, the armed
forces compare favorably with forces the\ probably
would oppose in wartime. "They are capable of significant
though limited offensive and defensive actions on the
Balkan Peninsula, either independently or is a part of a
FIGURE 106. Yugoslavia- Bulgaria bor-
der near Kalotina, Bulgaria. View is
toward Bulgaria. Approximate location
42 59'N., 22 52'E., 1960. (C)
FIGURE 107. High, steep slopes
along the gorge on route from Pirot,
Yugoslavia, to Sofiya would restrict
offroad dispersal and cross country
movement (C)
larger force under the Warsaw Pact Command. Large
scale nwhilization and sustained combat would require
extensive Soviet logistic support. (S)
Bulgaria is hordered on the north by its Communist
neighbor Ilomania, on the west by Communist but
nonaligned Yugoslavia, and on the south and southeast
by NATO allied Greece and Turkey. Because of
Btl aria's location, its military forces are the primary
Warsaw Pact force oriented against NATO troops in
Creek and Turkish Thrace, and they constitute an
important sector of the outer air defense perimeter for the
Warsny Pact countries. (C) r
The fact that Bulgarian armed forces have participated
with Soviet and Romanian air, ground, and naval units
in a number of Warsaw Pact and combined exercises in
the Balkan area and naval exercises in the Mediterranean
Sea in recent years strongly suggests that Soviet
contingency planning for war on this southern Balkan
front calls for a combined effort instead of independent
Bulgarian action. (S)
151
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tQ
FIGURE. 108. LAND APPROACHES (C)
APPROACH
ROAD
RAILROAD
OFFROAD DISPERSAL AND CROSS- COUNTRY
MOy E\IFNT
Good to poor. Wet ground and northwest-south-
east oriented dunes restrict direction of
movement.
Restricted by high, steep slopes bordering
Nishava river and miry ground December to
mid April.
Poor to unsuited. Locally feasible in narrow river
valley.
From Craioya, Romania. Nearly flat plains. Two -lane, bituminous treated surface, good Single track 4'8 gage. 48 -car rail
mostly cultivated. condition. road ferry crosses Danube River to
Yidin. Bulgaria.
From Pirot, Yugoslavia. Nearly flat to gently Two -lane, bituminous surface, good condition.. Single track 4'8 gage............
rolling, cultivated valley floor.
From Kumanovo, Yugoslavia. Shrub- covered
hills with bordering steep mountain slopes.
From Strumica. Yugoslavia. Cultivated and
shrub covered, nearly flat to gently rolling
plains.
From Serrai. Greece. Cultivated fields on river
plain north of Serrai, forest and scrub covered
halls and mountains in border zone.
From Xanthi. Greece. Forested high hills and low
mountains.
From Komotini, Greece. Forested high hills and
low mountains.
From Edirne. Turkey. Nearly flat to rolling.
cultivated plains along Maritsa river.
From Kirklareli. Turkey. Hills and logy moun-
tains, mostly forested.
From Negro Yoda, Romania. Nearly flat to
rolling plains, mostly cultivated.
From Bucharest, Romania. Nearly flat to rolling
plains, mostly cultivated.
Two -lane. bituminous surface, good condition
to Kriva Pulanka. Yugoslavia; I -lane, crushed
stone or gravel, fair to good condition, from
Kriva Palanka to border. Serious snow
blockage.
One- to 2 -lane, crushed stone, fair condition...
None
None Fair most of year. Poor to unsuited December to
mid -April because of miry or flooded ground.
One to 2 -lane, bituminous and crushed -stone Single track 4'8 ga:ge............
surfaces, fair to good condition
One- to 2 -lane, bituminous and gravel surfaces,
fair to good condition.
One- to 2 -lane, crushed stone, poor condition..
Two -lane. bituminous treated surface, good
condition.
Two -lane, gravel and crushed -stone surfaces.
fair to good condition.
Two -lane, bituminous surface, good condition..
None.............................
N one.............................
Single track 4'8 gage............
N one.............................
Single track 4'8 1 gage............
do Single track 4'8 gage. Combination
rail and road bridge. 1.4 miles long.
Generally fair on plains. Cross country movement
slowed in winter by soft ground. Hills and
mountains unsuited.
Unsuited because of steep slopes. Some movement
possible along stream valley.
Unsuited because of steep slopes.
Generally good. Unsuited November to May
because of soft and miry ground.
Poor to unsuited on steep hills and highly dis-
sected uplands. Unsuited on mountains.
Fair to good. Moderate hindrance from stream
dissection. Ground miry March through April.
Good to fair. Scattered marshes and moods main
hindrance.
across Danube River to Ruse.
From Rosiori de Yede. Romania. Nearly flat Two -lane, crushed stone or gravel surfaces, fair Single track 4'8 2" gage. No bridge or Generally good. Wet depressions slight hindrance
plains, mostly cultivated. condition. ferry across Danube River. in March.
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a. IIs�rotuc:At. (S)
Bulgaria's strategic position on the Balkan Peninsula,
which has been a center of strife for centuries, has
provided the Bulgarian people with it military tradition
dating back to the Middle Ages. 'Themes of war and of
military folk heroes derived from the period of the
Bulgarian kingdom in the ninth century and from the
long series of struggles against Turkish rule beginning in
the 15th century dominate Bulgarian folk legends and
songs. The Bulgarians have. not forgotten that the
Russians freed than from "Turkish rule in N78; ties of
friendship have sustained good relations between
Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Since the signing of the
"Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, following the Russo
Turkish War which made Bulgaria an autonortous
principality, the nation has maintained it relatively large
and efficient military organization. Militaristic
traditions, along with Bulgaria's territorial ambitions in
the Balkan area, have been reflected in numerous local
disputes and in ill -fated alliances with Germany during
both World Wars.
The rivalry between neighboring states over disputed
territory led Serbia to attack Bulgaria in 1885 and
induced Bulgaria to participate in both Balkan wars of
1912 -13. Revisionist claims also motivated t1w Bulgarians
to side with Germany in World War 1. Although this
alliance resulted in losses of territory for B-Igaria, the
array performed well during the campaign. 'rile
Bulg Irians drove the Serbian Army out of Mricedonia
aril kept the Mlied expeditionary force at 'Thessaloniki
bottled up until the last months of the war.
As a result of agreements between the Bulgarian and
Nazi governments, the Bulgarian Army was organized
into it 25- division force and partly reequipped along
German lines during the 1930's. Bulgaria joined the Axis
powers in 1941 the country was occupied by German
forces and bec:�.mc an important base for theiroperations
in the Balk When the Russians invaded and the
Communist- dominated Fatherland Front seized power in
September 1944, Bulgaria declared war on Germany and
fought alongside the Red Army in the Yugoslav, Austrian,
and Ilungarian campaigns. The quality of the Bulgarian
Army was demonstrated again during this period,
particularly in the hattle of the Drava River, when the
Bulgarians were instrumental in preventing the Germans
from turning the Soviet flank.
Following a pattern familiar throughout the
Communist countries of Eastern Europe after World War
11, the array was gradually inactivated, politically
unreliable officers were purged, and by 1948 it had been
reduced to v small, ineffective force. The military
establishment was then rapidly rebuilt with Soviet
guidance and assistance. Displacement of German
influence and reorganization of the army were
accomplished by assignment of Bulgarian Communists to
posts of command. 'These men were well trained,
experienced, and politically reliable; all had served as
officers in the Soviet Red Army. Soviet officers from units
stationed in Bulgaria, until their departure in 1948,
supervised the development of the next' Bulgarian
People's Army; they were replaced by it large Soviet
mission which continued supervision of the reorganiza-
tion.
By 1950 the basic combat units of the ground forces
had been substantially r: organized and reequippe�d to
resemble their Soviet counterparts. Nevertheless, the
ground forces still suffered from inherent weaknesses,
notably a lack of homogeneity of equipment and it
shortage of trained field -grade officers. Shortages of
specialized technical equipment and it lack of trained
mechanics and technicians were also apparent. "These
defects were overcome gradually over a number of years
by building up the Bulgarian military school system and
through imports of new equipment from the U.S.S.R.
In the late 1950's it further reorganization of Bulgarian
tactical ground units and improvement in logistic
capabilities became apparent. This modernization has
been continuous and has resulted in the transformation of
the ground elements into it modern, mohile force with
considerably increased firepower. Former rifle, mountain
rifle, and tank units, comparable to Soviet units of the
early 1950's, have been reorganized and equipped as
modern motorized rifle divisions and tank brigades, but
with some modification in types and quantities of
equipment.
Aside from some notable motor torpedo boat exploits
during the Balkan wars, the navy has never distinguished
itself. Long it rather neglected branch of the armed
forces, it has, nevertheless, developed under Soviet
guidance since World War 11 to become the most
significant naval force in the history of the country. The
pattern of transition for the navy, under Communist rule,
which had been a very gradual process of improvement
and modernization, was changed noticeably in 1970 with
the acquisition of about 10 fairly modern naval ships.
The air force was formed under the influence of the
German Luftwaffe in 1938. In March 1941 the air force
had some 300 aircraft, half of which were modern
German types. When Germany invaded the U.S.S.R. in
1941, Bulgaria, for reasons of close, historic ties with the
Russians, did not declare war against that country. In
fact, apart from having a few aircraft based in Yugoslavia
for it short period during the first years after Bulgaria's
entry into the war, the air force role was confined
principally to home defense. Since most of the war was
fought well away from Bulgarian territory, there was little
opportunity to join in combat until the Allied raids on
Sofiya and the Romanian oilfields began in November
1943. After the war, a basic reorganization of the air force
was effected under Soviet guidance and along Soviet
lines. Soviet equipment began to replace German types,
and by 1946 it new Bulgarian air arm had emerged. By
1950, aircraft strength had reached a total of 425, all of
which were piston engine fighters and light bombers. The
first jet fighters, 10 FLORA (Yak 23), appeared in Bulgaria
in 1951. By 1956, Fthsco(MiG -17) aircraft, including 10
Ftt�:sco D all- weather models, had been introduced
increasing the jet fighter strength from 150 to 215. With
153
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phasing out of obsolete conventional models, 1 ,otal
t t L,.......... �I
the center of military outrol in Sofiya, gives the navy a
combat aircraft strength decreased gradually u,til it
degree of autonomy' naval representation at
reached its present level of approximately 360
the Ministry of National Defense level is provided by
Improvements also have been made in shipping,
small naval liaison groups in the General Staff and
handling. storage, and maintenance capabilities to
directorates which support and supervise all branches of
support the modernization of ground, naval, and air
the armed farces. Coordination of these naval elements in
materiel inventories.
Sofiya is exercised by the navy's Deputy Chief of the
b. DEFENSE ORGANIZATION (S)
General Staff.
Soviet control of the armed forces k achieved through
The air force units are part of the Air and Air Defense
the interrelationship of the Bulgarian Government and
Forces Command, which also includes those units of
the Soviet dominated Bulgarian Communist Party.
surface -to -air missiles (SAM antiaircraft artillery (AAA),
However, the only formal instruments of Soviet military
and air control and warning (ACW) radar troops that are
direction are the unified command under the Warsaw
assigned to the territorial air defense: mission. The
Pact and the Soviet Military Mission to Bulgaria.
The military administrative organization within the
Commander of the Air and Air Defense Forces
government, modeled after that of the Soviet Ministry of
Command, a ground forces colonel general, is directly
Defense, provides for cop control of the armed forces
subordinate to the Minister of National Defense.
(Figure 109). The Minister of National Defense exercises
The Frontier 'Troops, which as auxiliary ground troops
full administrative and operational control over the
represent potential augmentation of ground forces
armed forces in accordance with military policy
strength in wartime, are controlled by the Minister of
formulated by the Council of Ministers and the State
National Defense.
Committee for Defense. He is assisted by a First Deputy
C. M ILITARY MANPOWER ANn NLORALE (S)
Minister, who is also the Chief of the General Staff, and
by six deputies. The high command has a general staff
(1) Manpower �There are an estimated 2,263,000
and various administrative, political, logistic, training,
males between the ages of 15 and 49, of whom about
and branch directorates. The organization of the high
1,887,000 are considered fit for military service. It is
command facilitates a centralized control of all military
estimated that an average of about 68,000 males will
activity and achieves a high degree of service unification.
reach military age (19) annually during the period 1972
The function of the General Staff is to t�ccomplish the
76.
military planning, coordinating, and consultative work of
Manpower distribution by -year age groups, as of 1
the Minister of National Defense. The Chief of the
January 1972, was as follows:
General Staff is a ground forces officer. Deputy Chiefs of
MAXIDIOAI
the Genera! Staff, who are senior ground, naval, and air
NMIBER F:T FOR
officers, advise him on matters related to their respective
AGE TOTAL AIALES 11IILTARY SERVICE
services. The Chief of the General Staff has no'-ommand
15 -19 342,000 330,0 ,j0
20 24 359,000 335,000
authority over the tactical units; the chain of comm
25 29 303,000 275,000
passes directly from the Minister of National Defense to
30 -34 282,000 245,000
the three army headquarters, the naval headquarters, arid
35 -39 319,000 255,000
the headquarters of the air and air defense forces.
40 -44 327,000 235,000
The navv is one segment of a highly integrated armed
45 -49 331,000 210,000
forces structure; however, the location of naval
Total, 15 -49 2,263,000 1,885,000
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
CHIEF OF THE
GENERAL STAFF,
CHIEF OF THE
MAIN DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING
CHIEF OF THE MAIN
POLITICAL DIRECTORATE
FRONTIER TROOPS
(FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER)
(DEPUTY MINISTER)
BRANCH DIRECTORATES
ARMOR
ARTILLERY
CHIEF OF THE
MAIN DIRECTORATE OF
ENGINEER
SIGNAL
REAR SERVICES
CHEMICAL
AIR AND AIR DEFENSE FRONTIER TROOP UNITS
ARMY HEADQUARTERS NAVAL HEADQUARTERS FORCES COMMAND
(DEPUTY MINISTER)
AIR UNITS
TACTICAL GROUND UNITS NAVAL
UNITS SAM UNITS
AAA UNIT-
EW RADAR UNITS
Note, There ei6f4u. eddift"', deputy ministen who" functions have
yef to.fie'sseerteined,
FIGURE 109. Armed forces high command (S)
154
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The armed forces are supported by a form of
compulsory service comparable to that employed in all
Warsaw P-.ct countries. Conscription is governed by the
18 July 1958 Law on Universal Military Service, as
amended. All males register for military service in the
year of their 17th birthday and are inducted in the year of
their l9th birthday. In July 1970 the government decreed
that all male citizens would fulfill their military
obligation before being admitted to higher educational
institutions. At the same time, occupational deferments
were terminated. This change should provide rr.ore
conscripts of higher quality, who can more easily grasp
the operation of the increasingly complex equipment
being introduce d into the armed forces.
Over 18,000 men are inducted annually; of these,
about 10,000 are taken into the ground forces, 800 into
the naval forges, 2,600 into the air force, and 5,000 into
Frontier 'Troops. Bulgaria continues to conduct a single
annual induction of conscripts regularly during 0w first 2
weeks of October. The basic term of service is 2 years,
although certain technical and aviation specialists and
naval personnel serving afloat are retained fora period of
3 years.
The quality of Bulgarian military manpower compares
favorably with that of other Communist armed forces in
Eastern Europe. The Bulgarian soldier is noted for his
physical stamina and adaptability to the disciplines and
rigors of military life. Most conscripts are of peasant stock
and have little education. A small but increasing
percentage of the population has acquired technical skills
and capabilities, however, as a result of accelerated
Bulgarian industrial and technological development, and
this provides a source frorn which new military
operational and logistic specialties may be obtained.
Although selection standards are high for some ground
forces specialties, personnel selected for naval, air, and
militarized security forces are generally better educated
and of greater dependability than those selected for the
ground forces.
Bulgaria has a well- practiced and effective mobiliza-
tion system. A highly detailed mobilization plan is
maintained which provides for the rapid mustering,
assignment, and movement of all persons liable for
wartime service. Under the Bulgarian reserve system, the
conscript released from active service passes into the
reserve where he remains eligible for recall until age 55.
There are more than 720,000 reservists available for
Gallup who have served in the aimed forces. Of these,
over 250,000 have completed active military service
during the previous 5 years: 190,000 in the ground forces,
15,200 in the naval forces, 5,100 in the air force, and
40,000 in the Frontier Troops.
(2) Morale �The armed forcer: are considered to
be among the more loyal of the Eastern�. European
Communist forces. The capable corps of officers and
noncommissioned officers evinces a high degree of
reliability, and the individual soldier is well disciplined
and politically indoctrinated. A long history of friendly
relations with the Russians and a traditional hostility
toward the "Turks and Greeks would contribute to the
significance of Bulgarian military support of the
Communist cause in any future conflict in the Balkans.
d. STu �:\t.1 THENDS (S)
As part of the general (L-terioration of the Bulgarian
military establishment following World War II, the
strength of the armed forces %vas reduced from a high of
some 500,000 in 19 -14 to around 70000 by 1947. This
trend was reversed when the Soviets began rebuilding the
Bulgarian People's Army, which reached a high point
during the 1952 -55 period. Under the influence of events
during the Korean war, the total strength reached a peak
of almost 189,000. Another downward trend was initiated
in 1955, when the normal term of service for conscripts
w:,s reduce(] front 3 to 2 years. Some increase in strength
has been observed during the 1960's, duc to international
tension over the Berlin and Cuban crises.
Strength trends for the navy do not closely reflect the
fluctuations in the overall figures. The navy, with only a
limited defensive mission in the Soviet dominated Black
Sea, showed a gradual and continuing expansion through
1963. The abolition of the Danube River Flotilla in 1964
and of the Naval Infantry force in 1966 resulted in
reductions of 1,000 and 2,000 men, respectively. In 1967
the trend again turned upward, with the addition of
coastal defense missile and fleet support elements ashore.
Personnel strength of the air force has remain -d fairly
constant at a level of approximately 12,000 since 1962.
As piston engine aircraft were replaced by jets, pilot and
ground crew training was accelerated to keep pace with
the improved capability cf the equipment. This training
trend is expected to continue as aircraft numbers
gradually decrease with the introduction of improved
performance models.
Estimated armed forces strength figures for selected
years are shown in Figure 110.
c. TRAINING (S)
raining is based on the Soviet system. All training
activities are under the direction of the Main Directorate
of 'Training in the Ministry of National Defense and are
supervised by the army area, naval, and air and air
defense headquarters. Guidance in shaping the military
training program is provided by the Soviet Military
Mission, and the Bulgarian training schedule is
coordinated with the overall Warsaw Pact plan for
combined training.
Schools for officers, officer candidates, reservists, Fund
specialists arc maintained by the arms and services und, r
the supervision of the Main Directorate of Training. In
addition to it number of specialized branch schools for
officer candidates, instruction for field -grade officers of
all services is provided by a command and staff -type
college �the G. S. Rakovski People's Military Academy
in Sofiya. The N. Y. Vaptsarov Higher Peopie's N
School, in addition to training regular naval officers,
"The figure 17,600 for 1971 includes 5,600 in air defense �SAM,
AAA, and ACW radar �who had formerly been accounted for in the
ground forces.
t55
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Fi(ilAtIl.
110. ESTIMATED
ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
(S)
Gfolr'Nn
SE( lit
I'EA It
Fo U(I FS
NA II'
.IIn F010 P:
�rvrm.
1`01 'ES
1!11!1............
51),111111
3,300
7,500
S9, 8011
12,000
1951)............
!111,111111
2, 101)
5,200
!)7.6011
33,5011
1951.........
I10,000
3,111111
0,500
141,51111
25,500
19:72............
170,000
3,511111
0,500
180,000
:311,11(10
195:3............
1711,000
1,91111
8,51111
18:3, 111()
10,000
1941
170,000
1,900
11, 000
188, it()()
I o ,()0(
1!15
160.0111)
7,11111
11,111111
179.11111
10,0111)
195(;............
1:30,001)
i, Illo
17,11110
152, 100
3:7,000
1957 :i5,,
I111,000
13,200
16,000
133,2011
3(1,111111
1959
1 111,11011
6, 200
10, 0011)
126,200
30, 000
1!11711............
1 W,0011)
7, 01111
10,500
127, 500
:3:;,111111
1!1171............
I Io,()I)()
8,11011
I I 000
1311 'Ills;
:3:7,000
1!1132............
135,000
8,()()11
11,400
1 11,500
20,000
1963
125. 000
9.000
12, 000
I l li l ll ll l
311,11011
1961 0:i.........
133,000
8,O()1)
13,000
115,111111
17,000
19017
125,000
6, 0011)
12,000
1 1:3 ,111111
17,000
1!1177............
123,111110
7,000
12,000
111,()()1)
1(i,000
19118 70.........
13:7,000
7,000
12,000
111,0111)
I :i,()()O
1!171............
1:31,111)()
*8,301)
**17.600
157,100
*1- 1,500
Strength figures are as of .l:unlar of the
vear indicated.
*The 5011
11:u�it'no' frontier troops are
included iu regular
nal�c strength.
*"Includes
5,0110ti personnel forntertl'
included in ground
forces assigned
to SA \l, AAA, and ACC radar.
educates officers of the merchant marine who receive
naval reserve commissions. The primary facility for
preoperational flight training and pilot training is the
Georgi Benkovski Military Air Academy, located at the
airfield near Dolma Mitropoliya. Advanced pilot training
is conducted at Kamenets Airfield.
Joint air- ground training exercises, in which ground
units are provided tactical air support, are frequently
conducted. Helicopters are usca extensively in
conjunction with field exercises of and naval
forces, and filthier aircraft units emphasize interdiction,
air cover, and close support in their ground- attack
training. Naval units engage in annual Mediterranean
exercises with, and independent of, Soviet naval forces.
Bulgarian armed forces have participated in several
Warsaw Pact training exercises with Soviet and
Romanian forces. The most recent combined traini g Nvas
a joint ground -sca -air exercise in August 1967. Bulgarian
troops participating in this exercise included ground,
naval, and air personnel.
f. ECONOMIC SUPPORT AND \IILITABY BUDGET (S)
(1) Economic support- Bulgaria is able to provide
only partial materiel support to its aimed forces. The
predominantly agricultural country is self- sufficient in
food, but its industrial capability is riot sufficient to meet
military requirements. Most military equipment must he
imported.
Bulgaria produces small arms, antitank weapons,
ammunition, and explosives. Naval ship construction has
been limited to minesweepers, lauding craft, and small
service and auxiliary units. There is no aircraft or guided
missile. industry.
Most of Bulgaria's military equipment is imported
from the Soviet Union; however, some materiel is
supplied by other Warsaw Pact countries. Bulgaria has
obtained ground force and naval materiel, aircraft, and
guided missiles valued at US$680 million from
Communist countries during the period 1955 -70 of which
$615 million has come from the Soviet Union.
(2) Military Budget -The military budget is
drafted within the Ministry of National Defense and
reviewed by the State Committee for Defense. It is then
submitted to the Minister of Finance for incorporation
into Zhe national budget. The announced defense
budgets for 196 -70 are noted in Figure Ill.
Some defense expenditures may be included in other
national budget categories, although these would
probably not he significant in the case of Bulgaria.
g. Locis�rlcs (S)
Procurement, distribution, and issue of -ipplies and
equipment for the armed forces are managed by the
Main Directorate of Rear Services for common -use items
and by staff elements within the individual branch
directorates for specialized items. The most recent phase
of modernization of the ground forces has been
accompanied by improvements in logistic capabilities,
particularly with respect to the handling, distribution,
and maintenance of equipment. Large materiel- handling
FI(il'lil; Ill. ANNOUNCEID DEFENSE 13UD(I.E 'S
Of illions uJ lcrn
1967 1968 1969 1970
Defense budget 217 201 :3013 :321
Defense budget as percent of
total budget G.11 6.0 13.0 G.2
Defense budget :es percent of
e;slinueted (3N1 3.11 3.0 3.3 4.:3
156
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and storage facilities are located at Ruse and Vratsa to
accomplish the distribution of items received from the
U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Poland. A general
headquarters -type- .:Iainienance regiment in Vratsa
conducts depot -level maintenance on tanks and other
vehicles, and un ordnance and signal maintenance
facility, located at Bozhurishte, repairs various types of
artillery, radar, and telecommunication equipment.
Evidence that logistic capabilities of the military forces
have kept pace with progress in the modernization of the
organization and equipment of these forces is provided
by the existence of specialized repair units within the
individual branches and services.
UNIFORMS AND INSK:NIA (U /OU)
(1) Uniforms Personnel of the ground forces
wear the same uniform for both service =rnd field duty.
Officers are authorized blue dress uniforms; enlisted
personnel wear their basic uniform for all occasions.
Winter uniforms are made from wool, summer uniforms
from cotton. The standard color is olive -drab, with the
exception of the winter uniform for enlisted personnel,
which is brown. Generallv, the uniforms of officers are of
finer quality materials and tailoring than those of enlisted
personnel. Officers have two types of service coats �a
single- breasted coat with closed collar and a single
breasted coat having an open color with lapels.
Naval forces personnel wear uniforms which are navy
bIL10. Officers have dress and service uniforms in this color
for winter wea+. Both come in a white version for summer
use. Career noncommissioned officers wear uniforms
similar io those of commissioned officers. Other personnel
wear the traditional sailor uniform which consists of
navy -blue jumper and trousers, blue and white striped
jersey, and heavy black leather belt with buckle. A white
version of this uniform is available for summer use.
The air force uniforms are similar to those of the
ground forces except for the use of blue piping instead of
red on various parts of the uniform and a light -blue cap
band on the service cap.
Master sergeants and senior sergeants of the ground
forces and air force wear the same style field service
uniforms as officers.
(2) Insignia Insignia of rank in the ground and
air forces is displayed either on houlderboards or
shoulderloops of all uniforms. Ranks of officers are
indicated by varying numbers and sizes of stars and
stripes. Ranks of enlisted personnel are indicated by
horizontal stripes �gold for the combat and support
branches, and silver for the technical and administrative
services. The rank of master sergeant is shown by a
longitudinal stripe in addition to a horizontal stripe.
Insignia of rank in the naval forces, except for the
senior chief petty officer, are identical to those worn by
their counterparts in the ground and air forces. Officers
also wear sleeve stripes on certain uniforms.
The various branches of the ground forces arc-
identified by the use of silver metallic, or plastic, devices
worn on collar tabs. In addition, there is red piping on
shoalderboards, service caps and, for officers only, on the
sleeve cuffs and on the outer seams of trousers and
breeches.
Air force personnel wear a wings and propeller device
on collar tabs, use blue piping instead of the ground
forces red, and have a light -blue cap band on the service
cap.
Uniforms and insignia for officers are shown in Figure
112; for enlisted personnel in Figure 113.
2. Ground forces (S)
The ground forces, with a strength of about 131,000,
have been modeled after the Soviet ground forces in
organization, training, and equipment. Much has been
accomplished in a new phase of modernization of the
tactical units to give them a degree of the mobility and
firepower of modern Soviet rifle and tank divisions.
Although manning levels range between 35% to 95% of
authorized strengths, the eight motorized rifle divisions
and the five tank and three SCUD brigades are considered
to be ready for early commitment. In addition, plans call
for creating three additional motorized rifle divisions
from reserve personnel in case of hostilities. The receipt of
new items of equipment necessary to a modern force as
well as the participation in combined training exercises
with Soviet and Romanian troops have considerably
enhanced the capabilities of the Bulgarian ground forces
and increased the Warsaw Pact strength in southeastern
Europe.
a. ORGANIZATION
The ground forces are controlled directly by the
Ministry of National Defense. For purposes of regional
administration, the country is divided into three army
areas, whose headquarters function like the military
district headquarters in the Soviet Union. The army
headquarters are responsible for administrative, logistic,
and training matters within their respective territories;
they serve as tactical commands as well. Other territorial
headquarters, in locations selected on a basis of civil
administrative organization, participate in the operation
of the military reserve and mobilization system.
The motorized rifle division, the basic combat unit, is a
well balanced combined arms force. The division
contains, as major units, three motorized rifle regiments,
one medium tank regiment, and one artillery regiment.
Organizational structure of the Bulgarian motorized rifle
division is patterned after the Soviet model.
The major components of the Bulgarian tank brigade
consist of five battalions �four tank and one motorized
rifle. These brigades are believed to be completely
equipped with T -54 and T -55 tanks (Figure 114).
1). STRENGTH, COMPOSITION, AND DISPOSITION 14
The strength of the ground forces is now estimated to
be 131,000. Major combat units consist of eight
motorized rifle divisions, five tank brigades, and three
14 As of 1 April 1972. For current information, see Order of Battle
Sumrnary, Foreign Ground Forces(DIA- 220- 1- 4- Yr -INT.) published by
the Defense Intelligence Agency.
157
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Scut) (SS -1) tactical missile brigades (Figure 115).
Ground forces tactical units appear to be deployed
generally opposing Yugoslav forces in the west and the
NATO strongholds in the south and southeast. In
addition, individual regiments are positioned in a logical
strategic relationship to their divisional headquarters and
to each other to insure a constant readiness posture
against these potential foes.
c. TRAINING
The ground forces achieved a combat capability by
1950, and corps -level maneuvers were held by 1953.
Tactical training is based on the annual cycle traditional
in Eastern Europe for many years. This training cycle was
designed to achieve tl .e highest level of combat readiness
of the forces in the fall. Bulgaria still follows this cycle,
which is supported by a single induction of conscripts
annually. From their induction in early October until
approximately 1 January the conscripts are engaged in
individual training (Figure 116). Unit training begins in
January and progresses through battalion level by March,
when troops take to the field for 2 months of spring
training. The summer training period begins in May.
During this phase, units rotate periodically from garrisons
to field training areas and conduct exercises, often of a
joint forces and combined arms nature. Large -scale
maneuvers occur in the fall when the maximum level of
proficiency of the force is reached. Normally, large -scale
maneuvers are conducted in south( zstern Bulgaria in the
territory between Burgas, on the Black Sea, Kurdzhali,
and the Greek border.
Some deviations from this training cycle have been
observed in recent years. Field training exercises and
command post exercises have been held during Januar;
and February at a time when formerly only low -level unit
training at close -in areas was conducted. This trend,
noted elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact countries, is believed
to represent an attempt to maintain a higher state of
readiness during the winter months.
The ground forces conduct a well organized school
system, which includes military high schools, branch
officer candidate schools, noncommissioned officer
schools, and basic. and advanced officer schools. Ground
forces officers may attend the G.S. Rakovski People's
Military Academy. Selected ground forces officers also
attend nilitary academics and schools in the Soviet
Union.
Between 30,000 and 50,000 reservists receive refresher
training each year; several callups take place annually
between April and September. There are no reserve units
in the armed forces, and reservists train in existing regular
units. The program for school training of reservists has
been expanded and improved. The Khristo Botev Reserve
Officers School, located in Pleven, provides realistic
tactical training to reserve officer candidates, officers,
and noncommissioned officers. A motorized rifle
regiment is garrisoned in Pleven with the mission of
providing support to this school.
158
d. LOGISTICS
The Chief of the Main Directorate of Rear Services is
responsible for the procurement, storage, and issue of
general supplies for the ground forces and for the
coordination of all armed forces supply activities as well.
Each branch directorate has, however, a separate staff
element directly responsible for the procurement and
distribution of specialized supplies and equipment for the
branch. Major central supply depots are maintained lit
ministry and army area levels. Reserve stocks of
equipment and ammunition are located with each
tactical unit down to battalion. In addition, tactical units
maintain some separate mobilization reserve stocks of
new equipment or used items in good repair. Provisions
for wartime supply and movement are based on Soviet
planning, and Bulgaria's logistic contingency plan is part
of an overall logistic plan for Warsaw Pact forces.
3. Navy (S)
The mission of the navy is to provide for the defense
and security of home waters and coastal lines if
communication. Currently available forces are adequate
for this task under routine circumstances in the Soviet
dominated Black Sea. Special emphasis in naval
development after 1.963 was on improvement of
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. During 1970,
special attention was given to amphibious capabilities.
Bulgaria is strategically located with respect to the
Turkish straits, the sole entrance to the Black Sea.
Bulgarian naval ASW forces include both surface ships
and helicopters. Against a serious hostile threat, the
Bulgarians would require immediate and extensive
support from the Soviet Navy. The only real offensive
capability of the navy rests in its two submarines and
small, but improving, amphibious force. Only the
submarines are capable of unsupported operations
outside home waters. Over the years the capabilities of
the navy have been improved gradually, but
continuously, through the acquisition of more modern
equipment. Bulgarian ships hove exercised in the
mediterrancan together with Soviet naval forces. they
have also aided in the surveillance of U.S. destroyers in
the Black Sea.
a. ORGANIZATION
Direct operational and administrative control over the
navy is exercised by the Commander of the Navy, with
headquarters at Varna, although ultimate authority is
vested in the Minister of National Defense. Assisting the
Commander of the Navy is the Deputy Commander for
General Affairs, who is responsible for the shore
establishment; the Chief of Main Navy Staff, who directs
the operating forces; the Deputy Commander for
Political Affairs, who is responsible for political
reliability; and the Chief of Navy Rear Ser!lces, who
supervises logistics and support activities.
The submarines are subordinate directly to the
Commander of the Navy. The destroyer escorts, two large
submarine chasers, two of the utility landing craft, two
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COLONEL LIEUTENANT MAJOR CAPTAIN SENIOR LIEUTENANT JUNIOR
COLONEL LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT
NAV
99
ADMIRAL VICE
ADMIRAL
CAPTAIN CAPTAIN
2D RANK 3D RANK
X FORCES
9
REAR
ADMIRAL
CAPTAIN
LIEUTENANT
9
CAPTAIN
1ST RANK
9
SENIOR
LIEUTENANT
CAP INSIGNIA
LIEUTENANT JUNIOR
LIEUTFNANT
FIGURE 112. Officers' uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
159
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FIELD-SERVICE
UNIFORM
SERVICE
UNIFORM
FIC.D-SERVICE
UNIFORM

GROUND FORCES
MASTER SENIOR
SERGEANT SERGEANT
PRIVATE PRIVATE
1ST CLASS
CAP INSIGNIA
NAVAL FORCES
SENIOR CHIEF CHIEF PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER
PETTY OFFICER PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS 2D CLASS
I I
SENIOR SEAMAN CAP INSIGNIA CAP INSIGNIA
SEAMAN CHIEF JUNIOR SERVICE
PETTY OFFICERS PETTY OFFICERS UNIFORM
AND SEAMEN JUNIOR PETTY OFFICERS
AND SEAMF'J
AIR FORCE
MASTER SENIOR JERGEANT JUNIOR
SERGEANT SERGEANT SERGEANT
PRIVATE PRIVATE CAP INSIGNIA
1ST CLASS
FiGURE 113. Enlisted men's uniforms and insignia (U /OU)
161
SERGEANT JUNIOR
SERGEANT
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FIELD SERVICE
UNIFORM
SERVICE
UNIFORM
CHIEF PETTY OFFICERS
FIELD SERVICE
UNIFORM

FIGURE 114. Bulgarian army's T -55 tanks. Main armament
is the 100 -mm gun. Armor brigades are equipped with
this tank, the T -54 which is much like it, and the older
T -34 �all Soviet -built medium tanks. (S)
FIGURE 115. Bulgarian army's Soviet -built SCUD -A tactical
missiles, mounted on heavy tank chassis. Missile is about 34
feet long and weighs 5 tons; its range is about 100
miles. (5)
coastal inine:iwecpers, and most of the auxiliaries and
service craft normally report through the Varna Naval
Base Command. 'rhe remaining minesweepers,
submarine chasers, and landing craft are controlled by
the Burgas Naval Base Command. All the tact patrol
boats, motor torpedo boats, and large guided missile
boats are organized into it separate brigade reporting to
the naval cor. n under. Coastal artillery elements, coastal
defense missile batteries, and coastal observation stations
report to the appropriate local naval base commands.
b. S COMPOSITION, AND DISPOSITION"
The navy consists of approximately 8,500 officers and
enlisted ruen, including 3,000 serving afloat and 5,500
ashore 2,400 in fleet support assignments, 1,000 in
coastal artillery bakeries, 400 in coastal defense missile
batteries, 600 in c�: sltil observation stations, 200 in the
helicopter service, 100 frogmen, and 800 trainees.
Personnel, both afloat and ashore, are divided fairly
evenly between the Varna and Burgas naval base
commands. Perhaps one -third of the Burgas command
personnel are stationed at Sozopol and one- fourth at Nos
"As of 1 April 1972. For current in1 .anation see Automated Naval
Order of Battle (Ships), Vol unit 11, DIA- 230- 3- 4- Yr -INT., published by
the Defense Intelligence Age. c For detailed characteristics of ships see
Naval Ships Characteristics, Eastern Europe, ST- HB- 08- 43- 69 -INT.,
published by the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center.
Ativa. Another 500 quasi -naval personnel serve in the
Maritime Frontier Guard (250 afloat, 200 ashore, 50
trainees).
The principal combatants of the navy �two destroyer
escorts (Figure 117) and two submarines �are based at
Varna. Also at Varna are two large submarine chasers,
two coastal minesweepers (MSC) (Figure 116), two utility
landing craft (LCU), and most of the auxiliaries and
service craft. Two fleet minesweepers (MSF), four
medium rnincswecpers (MSM), six minesxsccping boats
(MSB), 13 LCU, two auxiliaries, and some service craft
lire based at Burgas. Six small submarine chasers, four fast
patrol boats (PTF) (Figure 119), four motor torpedo boats
(I and six MSB are at Sozopol. Another four PT and
two MSI3 operate out of Nos Ativa. There are Maritime
Frontier Guard activities in these areas and at Michurin,
Balchik, and Ncsebur. The eight HOUND helicopters
which serve the navy are believed to be baser{ .it Chayka,
on the southern shore of Varnensko Ezero.
Except for the newly acquired PTF, MSC, and LCU
(Figure 120), few ships of the navy are modern by
present -day standards, but all are adequate to the needs
of the navy. "rhe P'TF and MSC have been built since
1960 and the LCU since the mid 1960'x. Most of the
Other naval units are of post -World War II construction
and, because of continuing preventive maintenance,
material condition ranges from good to excellent.
c. TRAINING
Training in the navy is patterned after that of the
Soviet Navy and is generally adequate to the needs of the
service. Regular naval officers, both line and engineering,
arc educated at the N.Y. Vaptsarov Higher People's
Naval School. 'rhk academy also trains prospective
merchant marine officers who receive commissions in the
163
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FIGURE 116. Reconnaissance troops conducting surveil-
lance (U /OU)

r
FIGURE 117. Bulgarian Navy Riga class de-
stroyer escort Smeli (C)
FIGURE 118. Soviet Vanya class coastal mine-
sweeper. The Bulgarian Navy in 1970 became the
first naval force to acquire this class minesweeper
from the U.S.S.R. (S)
FIGURE 120. Soviet Navy Vydra class utility k a
landing craft similar to those transferred to 4
the Bulgarian Navy in 1970 (S) a L"
i
FIGURE 119. In 1970 the Bulgarian Navy
received four units similar to the Soviet
Shershen class fast patrol boat shown
here (S)
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f

naval reserve. Training at this school includes 2 months'
training afloat annually. Officers for the coastal defense
missile and coastal artillery forces probably are drawn
from ground forces schools. Selected naval officers, who
are to be assigned to staff and high -level technical billets,
attend the C.S. Rakovski People's Military Academy in
Sofiya. Some naval officers also receive advanced and
special training in the U.S.S.R. Naval officers, prior to
assignment as c(,mmanding officers, undergo mandatory
training at Soviet Navy schools. Ccrrespondence courses
also are offered.
Recruit training for enlisted personnel is cond:.icted in
three schools, located at Varna, Sozopol, and Nos Ativa.
This is followed by from 6 to 8 months of specialty
training in ship handling, communications, and weapons
proficiency at Varna; technical specialties at Sozopol; or
minesweeping and coastal observation specialties at Nos
Ativa. Enlisted personnel return to these schools for more
advanced training at regular stages in their careers.
d. 1,ocs�rics
The largest concentration of support facilities for the
navy is at Varna. Other facilities and stores are
maintained at Burgas and Sozopol. Logistic support
available ,t Nos Atiya is negligible. When the extensive
construction cu :rently i= progress at Nos Atiya has been
completed, it is expected that most of the naval facilities
and stores at Burgas will be transferred. Burgas is slated to
become solely a commercial port. Minor stores are
procured directly by the navy. Other materiel must be
obtained through centralized military supply channels at
Sofiya.
Naval ship construction in Bulgaria has been limited to
patrol launches, minesweeping boats, and landing craft.
The navy is almost entirely dependent upon the U.S.S.R.
for other types of naval ships. It is expected that this
dependence on the 'J.S.S.R. will continue.
Repairs to most navel ships are accomplished at the
Varna Naval Base Shipyard, adjacent to the Georgi
Dimitrov Shipyard. Adequate facilities exist at this yard
for extensive repair activity. These facilities include shops
for machine and engine repair, for ordnance work on
mines and torpedoes, and for boiler repair. Underwater
repairs for large naval units are performed at the port's
commercial graying clock. Underwater repairs can also be
carried out on the marine railway at the naval shipyard
(200 tons maximum capacity).
Minor ship repairs can be undertaken at the naval
bases at Ruse and Burgas. In addition, there is a naval
repair and construction yard at the western end of
Varnesko Ezero. Its facilities, generally unknown, include
a small floating drydock.
4. Air and air defense forces (S)
The air force is an integral part of the Air and Air
Defense Forces Command, a joint command which
includes personnel assigned to surface -to -air missile
(SAM), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and air control and
warning (ACW) radar units associated with the territorial
air defense mission. This command is similar to the air
defense (PVO Strany) organization in the U.S.S.R.,
except that all air units tactical as well as air defense, are
assigned to it.
The air force is the largest air force of the Balkan or
southern tier of Eastern European Warsaw Pact forces. It
constitutes the southernmost protective segment of the
Soviet Eastern European Communist buffer zone which
extends from the Baltic Sea to the Greek and Turkish
borders.
National air defense remains the primary mission of
the air force, but increasing emphasis is being placed on
providing close support to the ground forces.
Air force performance is limited by the small number
of late model, high performance aircraft in the
inventory, that is, the FISHBED (MiG in the fighter
role, and by the absence of F ITTER (Su -7) aircraft in the
ground attack role. However, the force contains a
proportionately larger number of F AR1IER S (MiC 19)
than any of the other Warsaw Pact participating Eastern
European air forces, and since these aircraft have been
assigned since 1.958, proficiency in their operation is
believed to be at a high level. Air personnel receive a high
standard of training, and they are, in general, tough,
dedicated, and well disciplined. Thus the force is capable
of putting on a good performance by day and in good
weather in the air defense role, and it is competent to
support ground forces under favorable conditions. At
night and in bad weather, its capability is somewhat
limited due to the obsolescence of most of the aircraft
equipped with airborne interception radar. However,
nearly 45/ of the fighter aircraft assigned to the air
defense role are all- weather variants. As more F ISHBED D
and F aircraft are added, the all weather capability will
improve. Some FISHBED 11 are employed in a
reconnaissance role (Figure 121).
SAM, AAA, and ACW radar effectiveness is good but
limited to some extent by the use of conventional
communication equips. nt and unsophisticated data
processing equipment. SAM and AAA weapons, largely
obtained from the U.S.S.R., are adequately maintained.
FIGURE 121. FISHBED H aircraft similar to those in Bul-
oaria (C)
165
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25X1

for techt.icians and officer pilots, respectively. The
general curriculum is as follows.
1st year
General instructions for all special-
ties (materiel specifications and
mathematics, Russian language,
political indoctrination, physical
training).
2d year
Specialized training. Pilots begin
basic flight training on light air-
craft.
3d year
Continued specialized training. Pilot
candidates are trinsferred front
Dolna hitropoliya to Kamenets
Airfield for instruction of advanced
types of aircraft. Successful com-
pletion of the course to this stage
earns a commission as junior lieu-
tenant. Pilots and technicians are
graduated at this stage and as-
signed to active units.
4th and 5th years
Advanced specialized training. Pilot
engineers are returned to Dolna
Mitropoliya for intense academic
training.
In addition to the Benkovskiv school, a flight training
institution in Pleven trains helicopter pilots, and another
in Graf Ignatievo produces aviation technicians and
mechanics. Mechanics are also trained for the Air and Air
Defense Forces Command in the various technical
schools and noncommissioned officer academies of the
Ministry of National Defense.
Reportedly, selected Bulgarian pilots receive training
in advanced aircraft and weapons at Krasnodar in the
U. S. S. R.
Aircraft utilized by the training school at Dolna
Mitropoliya, and also at its primary training branch at
Telish, are the Fnrsco and MAYA (L-29). Training at
Kamenets also includes flying in FlsnnEDaircraft. Piston
engine aircraft have disappeared from the training
picture.
(3) Opera. nal training Pilots in combat units
are graded into three classes: Class One pilots are
proficient in all- weather and night flying; Class Two
pilots qualify for clear air mass flying by both day and
night; and Class Three pilots fly only by clay in clear air
mass conditions. Regrading of pilots takes place
annually.
Operational training includes ground controlled
interception sometimes with the use of airborne
interception radar. A few FARxaEnaircraft, and probably
also F15riRF.D s are equipped with air -to -air missiles, and
presumal,iy swne ,Jr -to -air missile training is practiced.
Night flying has increased in recent years, and mobility
exercises are featured iii airfield familiarization training.
These exercises include deployment to auxiliary airfields.
Air defense exercises are held, sometimes in
conjunction with Soviet or Ronanian elements, or with
both together, and Soviet aircraft have been reported in
Bulgaria during these occasions. The tactical role of the
air force was highlighted during the autumn of 1964
when FRESCO and FAnxtEn aircraft were observed
practicing low altitude bombing techniques with a fair
degree of proficiency.
Training for officer candidates in the missile field is
conducted at the army artillery and mi drool. The 5-
year course, which includes all phases of tht SA -2 missile
system, is conducted by Soviet trained officers. Graduates
arz commissioned 2d lieutenants and are assigned it
specific SAM specialty.
SAM unit live- firing training is believed to takt: placc
at the Soviet Ashuluk SAM firing range located on the
desert north of Astrakhan, U.S.S.R. SAM units also
participate in air defense exercises with other Warsaw
Pact countries.
d. Locisrics
The air force is equipped with Soviet aircraft and
support equipment. Bulgaria depends upon the Soviets
for replacement engines and spare parts, but sonic
simpler kinds of parts may be domestically produced.
The supply system is patterned after the Soviet system,
and Soviet officers monitor the rear services organizations
of the air force. Common -use items are stocked by and
drawn from the ground forces, while air technical
supplies are handled by rear services units of the aviation
components. Air technical battalions provide the supply
and housekeeping services on airfields required to keep
both the airfields and the air regiment occupants in a
state of combat readiness.
The aircraft maintenance system is estimated to be
capable of maintaining peacetime serviceability rates
ranging from 55% for jet all- weather fighters to 75% for
jet day fighters. It is estimated that, following a stand
down for approximately 10 days, the air force could
achieve an initial combat serviceability of 80% for jet all
weather and jet day fighters. Under sustained combat
conditions, however, serviceability rates of 45% for jet all
weather fighters and 55% for jet day fighters would
probably be the maximum attainable.
SAM logistic support is patterned after the Soviet
system. Each SAM regiment has an organic technical
support battalion which provides all missile resupply and
maintenance. All SAM missiles and associated
equipment are provided by the Soviet Union.
5. Militarized security forces (S)
The militi%rized security force consists of the Frontier
Troops, wk, i are subordinate to the Ministry of
National Defense. The basic mission of the Frontier
Troops is to defend the borders against small -scale illegal
penetrations in peacetime and to serve as a forward
screening force for the tactical ground forces units during
it major invasion of Bulgarian territory by a hostile force.
The Frontier Troops number about 14,500 and are
organized into 16 otryads, which are equivalent to
understrength regiments. The otryads are located along
the borders, especially the Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish
frontiers. The Frontier Troops are organized, trained, and
equipped much like ground forces troops; they are
garrisoned in army -type barracks and wear the same
basic uniform.
The Maritime Frontier Guard, administratively
subordinate to the Frontier Troops, numbers about 500
167
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SECRET
AREA BRIEF
LAND (U /OU)
Area: 42,800 square miles; 54.3% agricultural land (37.5%
cultivated, 3.6% orchards and vineyards, and 13.2
pastures and meadows), 33.1% forest, 12.6% other
�EOPLE (U /OU
copulation: 8,601,000, average annual growth rate 0.9
males 15-49, 2,263,000; 1,885,000 fit for military s,;rvice;
about 68,000 reach military age (19) annually
I. :hnic divisions: 85.3% Bulgarians, 8.5% Turks, 2.6%
Cypsies, 2.5% Macedonians, 0.3% Armenians, 0.2% Rus-
sians, 0.6 other
Religion: Regime promotes atheism; religious background of
population is 8.1% Bulgarian Orthodox, 13% Muslim,
0.8% Jewish, 0.7% Roman Catholic, 0.5% Protestant,
Gregorian- Armenian, and other
Language: Bulgarian; secondary languages closely corre-
spond to ethnic breakdown
Literacy: 95%
Labor force: 4.4 million (July 1970); 37% agriculture.
33% industry, 30% other
GOVERNMENT (U /OU)
Communist dictatorship patterned after the U.S.S.R., ruled
by Bulgarian Communist Party; Todor Zhivkov, Chair-
man, State Council; Stanko Todorov, Premier
Principal Political parties: Bulgarian Communist Party and
its puppet, the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union
Member of: CEMA, GATT, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMCO, ITU,
U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, Seabeds Committee,
Warsaw Pact, International Organization of Journalists,
International Medical Association, International Radio and
Television Organization
ECONOMY (S)
GNP: US$11.1 billion, 1970 (estimated, in 1969 prices);
$1,305 per capita
Food: Basically self- sufficient
Major industries: Agricultural processing, machinery and
equipment, textiles, mining and ore processing
Electric power: Installed capacity, 4 million kw. (1970)
production, 19.5 billion kw.-hr., 2,295 kw.-hr. per capita
(1970)
Exports: Agricultural products, machinery and equipment,
textiles and clothing
Imports: Machinery and equipment, hard coal and coke,
petroleum, chemicals
Currency: In commodity trade transactions, 1.17 leva=
US$1.00; for noncommercial transactions and tourist use,
170
the exchange rate is 1.99 leva= US$1.00. The purchasing
power of the lev is generally lower than these rates
indicate, especially for high -grade consumer goods and
most investment goods
COMMUNICATIONS (C)
Railroads: 2,650 route miles; 2,470 miles standard gage
(4 180 miles 2'6" narrow gage; 127 miles double
track all standard gage); 477 miles electrified lines;
government owned
Highways: 20,700 miles (estimated); 7,900 miles paved
(bituminous, bituminous surface treatment, concrete, stone
block, cobblestone); 8,100 miles crushed stone, gravel;
4,700 miles earth including tra,
Inland waterways: About 306 miles Danube River
Pipeline: 73 miles total; 41 miles crude, 3 miles refined, 29
miles natural gas. New lines under r:onstruction total 690
miles: 210 miles crude, 160 miles refi;:ed, 320 miles natural
gas
Ports: 2 major (Varna, Burgas), 10 minor
Merchant marine: 107 ships (1,000 g.r.t. and over) totaling
658,311 g.r.t. and 950,386 d.w.t.; consists of 55 dry cargo,
28 bulk cargo, 1 refrigerator cargo, 17 tanker, 1 com-
bination nre /oil, 5 passenger
Civil air: 30 major transport aircraft (estimated)
Airfields: 81 airfields having runways at least 2,000 feet long;
14 have runways 8,000 11,999 feet; and 24 have runways
4,000 -7,999 feet; 1 seaplane station
Telecommunications: Inferior to most European countries;
meets only minimum requirements of government and
public; radiobroadcasts and wired broadcasts available to
most of population; about 2,000,000 radio receivers;
1,200,000 TV sets; 415,000 telephones; 8 AM and 4 FM
stations; 6 TV transmitters plus 80 TV relay stations
DEFENSE FORCES (S)
Personnel: Ground forces, 131,000; navy, 8,500; air force,
17,600; militarized security forces. 14,500
Ground force units: 8 motorized rifle 6visions, 5 tank
brigades, 3 Scun brigades, 7 regiments (4 artillery, 3 anti-
aircraft artillery), 3 battalions reconnaissance, mountain
assault, airborne)
Ships: 2 destroyer escorts, 2 submarines, 25 coastal patrol
ships, 28 river /roadstead patrol types, 22 minesweepers,
15 landing craft, 8 auxiliaries, 59 service craft
Aircraft: 360
SAM sites: 19 all SA-2)
Supply: Dependent primarily on U.S.S.R.; domestic produc-
tion of small arms, antitank weapons, ammunition, and
explosives
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
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PLACES AND FEATURES REFERRED TO IN TEXT (U/OU)
I COORDINATES I I I COORDINATES
o fN. 0 1E. c PN. o f
Akhtopol 42 06 27 57 Nos Chukala (cape) 42 27 27 32
Arda River (sirm) 41 39 26 29 Odessa, U. S. S.R............................ 46 28 30 44
Astrakhan', U.S.S.R 46 21 48 03 Orekhovo 43 44 23 58
Atiya, Nos (pt) 42 28 27 35 Panagyurishte 42 30 24 11
Balchik 43 25 28 10 PfLzardzhik 42 12 24 20
Balkan Mountains (mis) 43 15 25 00 Pehfivank6y, Turkey....................... 41 21 26 55
Balkan Peninsula (peninsula) 44 00 23 00 Pernik..... 42 36 23 02
Beli Izvor 43 16 23 28 Petrich 41 24 23 13
Beloslav 43 11 27 42 Pirdop 42 42 24 11
Black Sea (sea) 43 00 35 00 Pirin (mis) 41 40 23 30
Blagoevgrad 42 01 23 06 Pirot, Yugoslavia 43 09 22 36
vpoi
e
Iya
71
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POPULATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
1 D
a
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C l �Pleven
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA� RDP01- 00707R000200110035 -5
LAND UTILIZATION
U
Uranium are
Machinery and equipment
Fe
Iron ore
e Agricultural processing
pZ
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g Iron and steel
Cu
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g Textiles and clothing
it
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA� RDP01- 00707R000200110035 -5
LAND UTILIZATION

riarer�>r�er.a,G r�
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o
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I, i
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h
28
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