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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R00020011 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory o Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Ag rlcy under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecti the national defense of the United States, within the ii pt by an d 79 of its contents 'it,. 18 unauthorized person l is prohibited by i Its tran or revelation CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11632 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES DIRECTOR B O (3). EN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. ON APPROVAL OF THE APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern meW or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in acccrdance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS contaning unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National IntAigence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually clas :ified according to content. Class; fication /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 d I 5 s s yH i M ir r_ Magyar arise, the homeland callsat a t Now or never, the hour falls! Will we be slave or free? W To this what will your answer be? We swear, we swear that we will i no longer be slaves!, From the Nemzeti Do/ (National Song) by Sandor Petofi (1848). Used as a y cr rallyin in the revolts of Y g rT E iy i ,N \F1 1848 and 1956. Jz r y k i. 1 Fv t,r hi r I V s V r s v_ lr c Wiarkx ,y,Sl l t Jty tp. 10.' i &'Sx� x .r` 1 44 i I ttl 4 nn I t It t 2, r .r 17 x X n4. The Hungarian, na;ionvvvoultl`hate \perished long ago if its political Naomi had'nor succeeded 1 ii t t r It is very' characteri in preserving stic. that by giving up. the battle itha m fact consolidated its position and its o pgftunitesr p has been a es of d n and an in Europe. seri people uninterrupted rtteditation on its artual x r I possibilities C 3 1 8 Mihaly Babits 1939 On -the ,Hun arar Character, d is e a V APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 Revolution or Evolution? A Hungarian Dilemma With almost cyclical regularity hardheaded realists and romantic nationalist firebrands have alternately dominated historical events in Hungary. Through centuries of foreign subjugation the Hun- garians have proved to be reluctant and rebellious subjects, and a general pattern of repression-revolt- reform- repression has characterized their national experience. The decade of the 1960's was a period of orderly reform, and the Communist regime in Budapest rode a tide of political stability into the early 1970's. Whether this situation lasts or declines into more repression and turmoil will depend largely on how well the leadership adjusts to new challenges and whether it can continue to deliver on its promises of a better life through g- and pragmatic reforms. (U /OU Throughout history, the Hungarians have been the victims but also the intimate beneficiaries of their circumstances. Originating in northeastern Europe and during their prehistory subject to con- siderable Turkic influence, Magyar tribes settled in the Danube River basin toward the end of the ninth century. As a small non -Indo- European people surrounded by hostile Slavic nations who were in turn at odds with their Germanic neighbors, the Hungarians became pawns in nearly all of the military and diplomatic struggles that have dis- rupted central Europe. The Turks, Habsburgs, Nazis, and finally the Soviets established themselves, in turn, as Hungary's "protectors" and sponsored Hungarian political leaders who would give them loyal service. (U /OU But Hungary's misfortunes were also a source of inner strength. They helped hone a special brand of nationalism and developed over the centuries a determination either to seek compromise with su- perior power for the sake of national existence, or at times to take up arms �even though facing cer- tain defeat �for the sake of national identity. The Magyar people, despite repeated invasions and attempts at ethnic assimilation, have maintained their national identity and a high degree of cultural and ethnic integrity. In the end, the foreign powers that have; successively denied Hungary's elusive dream of true national independence have had to rely on military force to maintain their hegemony. (U /OU) On the scale of Hungary itself, the Magyar record of military defeats and futile revolts is a bleak one. But on the larger European scale, the Magyar willingness to rise united against a stronger over- lord has helped to shape the rel4.Jons between one APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 or another dominant central European power and the weaker nations in the area that it sought to subjugate. For the Soviets in 1956 as for the Habsburgs in 1c 38 the use of military force to crush Hungarian revolts has had this effect. The 1848 revolt against the Austrians was crushed with critical assistance from Russia, but it so boldly dramatized Austrian misrule that the ensuing period of reforms led directly to the Great Compromise of 1867. It gave Hungary nominal equality with Austria in the Empire and almost total autonomy in domestic politics. The 1956 revolt against the Soviets similarly dramatized the evils of Stalinist imperialism in Eastern Europe. It set off a series of changes in the Soviets' relations with its satellites in Eastern Europe which in the early 1970's has still not run full course. (U /OU) The impact of 1956 on the Hungarian Soviet relationship has been massive. Efforts to recreate Hungary in the image of a small Soviet republic, following the same political formulas Moscow uses to rule its citizens, have ceased. Since early in the 1960's, Janos Kadar, the party leader im- posed on Hungary by the Soviet Red Army in the wake of the revolt, has charted an evoluticaary course. While remaining true to the fundamentals of Marxist Leninist ideology and strengthening the "socialist" character of Hungary, he has recognized and met to some extent the demands of his nation for a more humane, more Hungarian, form of communism. (U /OU The range of these compromises is wide. The reform of the economic structure, the more `liberal" cultural policies, the muted role of the secret police, and the wider array of consumer goods available to Hungarians represent some of Kadar's more visible improvements. They are appreciated by the vast majority of Hungarians, whose attitude of quiet compliance has helped Kadar achieve since the early 1960's a record of stability unequaled in Easter Europe. Kadar has gone even further, promising gradual political reforms, a few of which he has already introduced m watered -down form. (U /OU) Continued peaceful evolution will, however, de- pend on Kadar's ability to establish for his regime a more solid basis of support among the population. His acceptance clearly is conditional. The Hun- garians know that the price Moscow 1 is demanded of Kadar for permission to plot domestic reforms is to keep the domestic situation on an even keel and to give loyal support to Moscow's foreign policy 2 positions. And they also suspect that the Kremlin leaders may someday decide that the reforms are unacceptable. They doubt that when that time comes Kadar would, or could, effectively fend off Soviet demands for tighter orthodoxy in Hungary. (U /OU) Kadar, like other Hungarian leaders before him, has not found a means of controlling nationalism and transforming it into a creative force. He and his lieutenants have opted instead for a sterile policy of dampening almost all nationalist expres- sion. This hypercaution is unpopular with Hun- garians of all political persuasions, including signifi- cant numbers of Communist party members. Young people especially are materialistic and are be- ginning to show signs of disaffection with the com- promises their parents have had to make to secure any semblance of a decent standard of living. Nationalism bordering on chauvinism is a tradi- tional alternative for Hungarians in the absence of other guiding spiritual ideals ideals that com- munism, despite its philosophical pretensions, has not been able to instill. (U /OU One of the main factors that has helped Kadar keep down Magyar nationalism since 1956 has been the older generation's sense of "no alternatives." They realize that Hungary's options are frozen by the political and military balance in postwar Eu- rope. For them, especially, the Soviets' use of mili- tary power against the Dubcek reformers of Czech- oslovakia in 1968 reinforced the memories of what Moscow did to Hungary in 1956. (U /OU) The Hungarians, with their small numbers and shortsighted antipathy toward most of their neigh- bors, may well be doomed to continuing to ex- change one foreign "protector" for another and to engage in bloody demonstrations of their patriotism as the only safeguard against national extinction. But there are some among them who are deter- mined to find a new solution to this dilemma. One such vision rests on the creation of a "Danubian confederation," a `Tong alliance of all the states in the area based on mutual guarantees of inde- pendence within a larger entity. Whether this con- cept �based at least in part on nostalgia for the Austro- Hungarian Empire �is realistic even over the longer term may be doubtful, but it is a con- cept that Hungarians hope their neighbors will not lightly dismiss. It is, moreover, a tenacious dream, and, at the very least, a hopeful sign that the Hun- garian people have not resigned themselves to the grim prospect of unending strife and cyclical blood- letting in defense of their homeland. (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 The Hungarians: Their Habitat and History (U90U) Hungary ;.s endowed with a great natural re- source, the vitality of the people. Sorely beset over the years, Hungarians have endured, and so has the nation. Not even the wet blanket of Soviet imposed Communist rule has been able to dampen completely their fiery spirit. Eastern in origin and Western in outlook, they are inclined to consider themselves unique and even a trifle "superior." In short, they take pride in being Hungarian. Ethnically, they are related to the Finns. Both trace their ancestry to the nomadic Finno -Ugric peoples who migrated from a region between the Volga and the Urals. About 93% of the 10.4 million Hungarians are classified as Magyar, with a scatter- ing of Germans, Slovaks, Romanians, Serbo- Croats, and Gypsies (still partially untamed) constituting the remainder. Most of the Magyars, however, are actually of mixed blood through intermarriage which has gone on for centuries. Just as every Hun- garian "has a cousin in the United States," every Hungarian has a German or Slavic grandparent. Another 4.6 million people of Hungarian ancestry dwell outside the homeland: nearly 2 million in Romania, nearly 700,000 in Czechoslovakia, half a million in Yugoslavia, and not quite 200,000 in the U.S.S.R. In the prideful tradition of this region, the Hungarian people harbor grudges over alleged "injustices" visited on its people by neighboring governments. Hungary proper is a homogenous nation chiefly because Hungarians act as one people. The Magyars have assimilated large numbers of their one -time conquerors Slays, Austro Germans, and Roma- nians �and in the process have obliterated any sort of textbocok claim to racial purity. They are largely indistinguishable physically from other Europeans, although some Hungarians do possess the flattish concave nose of their Mongol ancestors or exhibit characteristics acquired through intermixture with the Turks. What sets apart the Hungarian more immedi- ately is his language, which is unrelated to any of the main European languages and is similar only to Finnish and Estonian. Linguistic isolation has contributed to a cultural tradition unusually free of foreign influences. During the centuries of Hun- gary's subjugation, national leaders have repeat- edly evoked the popular yearning for freedom in the mother tongue, thus bringing forth a marriage between the word and the soul of the people. This insistence on use of Hungarian is one of the reasons Hungary exists as a separate nation today. As the representative of an old and proud society, the Hungarian has uevelopcd a civilized and honest approach to life. He is not afraid to express his mood of the moment, whether it be rapturous joy or deep despair. He possesses the imagination and sensitivity of a poet, the intellig.:nee and volubility of a lawyer. Renowned as a wit, he is an unsur- passed teller of jokes, which frequently turn out to be wry commentaries on life. As a host he dis- plays courteous and gracious ways. With acquaint- ances he will be polite; with family (of which he is the ruler) and close friends, affectionate; with foes, argumentative or sullen. All in all, he is both hard:ieaded and romantic. The Hungarian experience is perhaps bast sym- bolized 'n the person of the peasant who has engaged in a never ending struggle with wind, weather, rapacious landlords, and alien masters. Al- though somewhat lost sight of in the inevitable rush to urbanization, the country folk still represent 3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 the historical Hungary. Small villages abound, with their unpaved roads, baroque churches, bullock carts, flocks of geese, and nesting storks. Scattered, low -lying abodes are frequently no more than white- washed mud -brick cottages �a tradition in con- struction dating back to the Turkish occupation when their destruction was frequent and wide- spread. And like their distinctive dwellings, the peasants themselves evoke the past in their holiday dress and observance of ancient religious customs. Isolated from the sea, Hungary is situated in a broad basin of south central Europe that has been traversed and contested by disparate peoples over the centuries. Once dominant over the entire area, Hungary now shares the basin with Romania and Yugoslavia which, along with Austria, Czechoslo- vakia, and the U.S.S.R., comprise a girdle of alien cultures. Comparable in area to Portugal or the state of Indiana, present -day Hungary extends only 280 miles from east to west and 122 miles from north to south. Cultural isolation and compactness of shape tend to reinforce Hungary's identity and integrity as a political entity. Location astride major east -west land routes has compensated in some measure for the limitation of size and has permitted extensive external ties that have enabled Hungary to progress beyond the limits of its own natural resources. The Danube River, more than any other physical feature, unifies the country. It provides access to the industrial and commercial heart of Europe and to the ports of the Black Sea. It is the core of the natural drainage system, and as it meanders across the land it evokes the free flowing spirit of a rest- less people. Balaton, Europe's largest warm water inland sea, is a mini Riviera for Hungary. Hungarians still require the ego massage they give themselves, for in various ways their small nation is the "poor boy of the neighborhood." Among the states bordering Hungary, it outranks only Austria in size and population. Since losing 707o of its territory following World War I, it has lacked naturally defensible borders. And, in con- trast to neighboring states, it features a relatively level terrain. Approximately 60% of the area con- sists of flat to rolling, practically treeless plains. A narrow chain of low mountains and hills extends a^ *oss the northern part of the country, and a small, low mountain mass occurs in the southwest. Less than a third of the country is over 1,000 feet above sea level. The highest elevation, 3,300 feet at Kekes,l occurs in, the Matra mountains northeast of Budapest. Climatic conditions in Hungary, like the moods of its people, vary considerably. Hungary is sub- jected to the mild oceanic climate of the northwest, the Mediterranean climate of the south, and the continental climate of the east. On average, winter is dismal cloudy and cold �but the unpleasant- ness of that time is compensated by long, warm summers when, in the heat of midday, a mirage For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the oron of the Summary Map and the map itself. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 may dance along the dusty horizon. An erratic pat- tern of precipitation during the growing season is a constant national concern, but the construction of irrigation works has provided some relief dur- ing extremely dry spells. Blessed with an abundance of fertile soil, Hungary was for some time the breadbasket of central Europe. Despite the inroads of industrial- ization, the cultivation of grains and vegetables continues to be a major venture. To the world out- side, Hungary would not be Hungary without its speciality crops: the apricots of Kecskemet, the paprika peppers of Szeged, and the wine grapes of Tokaj. Hungary is also celebrated as a land of cowboys (gulyas; and horseherders (csikos) This Wild West aspect of the national existence remains in view on the grazing land of the Hortabagy Steppe east of the river Tisza, the nation's other great natural water route. If rural life represents the traditional Hungary, then it is in the capital city of Budapest that "Hungary universal �a mixture of yesterday and today �is to found. The successor to the old Roman town of Aquincum, Budapest has lived the 1,000- plus -year history of the nation. It has been ravaged repeatedly, and its remaining historical treasures bear the marks of national suffering. Its vitality, however, remains intact. Long called "the pearl of the Danube" because of its beautiful lo- cation, Budapest has always had a lively charm that has even transcended the grayness of spirit that nor- mally shrouds a Communist capital. Budapest, the largest city in Eastern Europe, has grown to a population of 2 million in post -World War II times, -largely as a result of the regime's push toward industrialization. It is, in sum, the political, military, industrial, cultural, intellectual, and trans- portation hub of the nation, as well as the shrine of the Hungarian spirit. That spirit has weathered many storms, for Hungary i3 an old society. It has known times of glory and has its pantheon of heroes. Among them APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 of their own independence. When the Turks were finally expelled in the late 17th century, they left behind a country devastated, depopulated, and quite unable to resist the dynastic ambitions of the Habsburgs, who reigned until the end of World War I despite flareups of Magyar nationalism, in- cluding the 1848 revolt, and extended periods of passive resistance. In 1919, the nation briefly fell under the dictator- ship of indigenous Communists led by Bela Kun. His attempts to force drastic sicial reforms a la Lenin gave communism a bad name. In 1920, stability of a sort came to Hungary with the advent of the heavily paternalistic, semifeudalistic regency of Admiral Miklos Horthy. Successive cabinets played on such themes as irredentism, anticom- munism, and Hungarian nationalism; they grappled with a laggard economy and slowly steered the country into the orbit of newly arisen Nazi Germany. In 1940, lured by the promise of re- covering historic Hungarian lands, Budapest allied itself formally with Berlin. Four years later ad- vancing Soviet troops occupied the Hungarian capital. As in other East European states after the war, Hungary was permitted a multiparty, quasi -demo- cratic government for a short time. Soviet over lordship guaranteed that the Communists were to be the dominant factor. By the use of what party chief Matyas Rakosi called "salami tactics" the Communists sliced away at those institutions alien to their cause. In 1947, leaders of the "bourgeois" parties were bounded into submission or exile. In 1948, the Social Democrats were done in by a popu- lar front merger, and the collectivization of agricul- ture and industry commenced. In 1949, Cardinal Prince Primate Mindszenty was given life im- prisonment, ex- Interior Minister Laszlo Rajk �an example of an indigenous Communist �was given death, and the nation was given a Soviet -style con- stitution and a new name, the Hungarian People's Republic. Secret police terror reigned, and adulation of Rakosi was required. The new party boss, the son of a poultry butcher, became the most brutal of the early satellite leaders. Touting himself as "Stalin's greatest Hungarian pupil," he tried to transform the nation into a Soviet Union in minia- ture. There were 150,000 political prisoners, and at least 2,000 others had been executed by the time of Stalin's death in 1953. Out of favor with the new Soviet leadership, Rakosi then found himself edged aside by more humane elements who sought to abate the terrible tensions that gripped Hungarian society, only to become victims of the ensuing ex- plosion. The seeds of the Hungarian revolt had ger- minated long prior to 1956. Hungarians were singularly unreceptive to a political system lacking a national foundation, particularly one that em- bodied an atheistic and alien dogma and was im- posed by the Russians. More immediately, the pop- ulace was angered by the denial of individual liberty and alienated by the absence of material well- being. As a result, workers turned apathetic, the peasantry grew restless, and intellectuals be- came aroused. With an irievitability born of popu- lar desperation, violence erupted in late October. Under the uncertain leadership of Imre Nagy Hun- garian aspirations for a liberal socialist neutralist regime emerged �and within a fortnight were crushed under the tread of Soviet tanks. The revolt was over, but after this latest assertion of age -old Hungarian nationalism, life on the Danube could never be the same. The winds of domestic reform were sharpening and would have to be heeded, at some cost to Budapest's conformity to Soviet ways. The task fell to Janos Kadar, a purported friend of the revolution, but, as it turned out, more of a political opportunist, to find a course between the rocks and shoals of rampant nationalism on the one hand and Stalin style communism on the other. At first it seemed that little had changed, as the regime restored order in the approved Communist fashion. Finally, in December 1961, Kadar set the stage for a time of domestic relaxation and popular reconcili- ation by declaring that if the Rakosi era motto had been "Those who are not with us are against us," then his should be "Those who are not against us are with us." Still wary of its sullen citizenry, the government inched forward on two fronts: broadening the political system to give the individual a sense of participation, and liberalizing the economic system to permit the individual to share in the fruits of his labor. At the same time it compensated Moscow with almost slavish support of Soviet foreign policy. The regime was shaken by the Soviet move against Czechoslovakia in August 1968, seeing in it a possible indictment of its own reform pri. gram. With appropriate pauses, ho,vever, for soul -s -arch- ing reevaluations, Kadar groped forward tov and a position capatible with the popular mood and the demands of limited national sovereignty. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 iong the banks of the Danube in Budapest stands a monumental structure suitable for the suzerains of a great empire. Built in turn -of -the century neo- Gothic style, this house of government is reminiscent in outward appearance to the parlia- ment on the Thames. There the resemblance ends, for the Hungarian building houses bodies that in themselves enjoy little real power but rather are servile attendants of the ruling Communist party. Political theorists might wish to know that Parlia- ment, a unicameral assembly elected every 4 years, is by constitutional writ the highest organ of state authority and as such is empowered to make laws, determine the national budget and economic plans, create or abolish ministries and define the scope of their activities, declare war, conclude peace, and grant amnesties. Political realists understand that, despite talk of "unleashing" the legislature, it re- mains a captive beast barely capable of clearing its own throat. A Presidential Council, also supplied with an impressive list of powers, supervises the day -to -day operations of the government when Par- liament is not in session, which is all but 12 to lk 0 days a year. A Council of ;;finisters, in practice the dominant government body, is in effect a puppet cabinet whose members largely move to the tune played by counterpart officials of the party. As is readily apparent, the power of the Com- munist party is absolute; its glory, however, is negligible. Even the most dedicated follower is hard put to make the story of Hungarian communism creditable. The Hungarian Communist Party was founded in November 1918, tasted power briefly in the Bela Kun dictatorship (March -July 1919), and then lapsed during the interwar era into a largely underground organization with limited sup- port among industrial workers, the urban Jewish middle class, and intellectuals. Overmatched against strong conservative, Christian, and na- tionalist traditions as well as the police, the party receded into passivity by the time of World War II. Following the "liberation" by Soviet armies a "glorious" event by Communist accounts but a national disaster according to most others, the popu- lace was required to tolerate the Communists but showed little love for them. A friend of the Rus- APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 sians was considered an enemy of '3ungary, and even a nominal Jew, as were many party leaders, was an obje: of distrust. In the national ballot of 1945 Hungary's first and last free election �the Communists received only 177o of the vote, and in the semirigged ballot of 1947 they upped their share to only 229o. Rakosi and company, however, had a simple solution to the problem of popular disaffection: a one -party system abetted by a cam- paign of terror against party enemies. The result was to add a large dollop of fear to the reservoir of public contempt for the Communists. When the explosion occurred in 1956, the Hungarian Workers Party, as the Communist organization was then called, virtually fell apart. Since the Rakosi days, the reconstituted Hun- garian Socialist Workers Party HSWP as it is now called, has come a long way. Led by First Secretary Janos Kadar for over a decade and a half, the party has learned that it must react favor- ably to the concerns of the people and seek to enlist their support. At the same time it realizes that it must on occasion �as in the unpopular 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia� submerge Hungary's national self interest to the concerns of Moscow and thus risk the charge that its rule is just the most recent version of foreign domination. Both paths have had their pitfalls, but by and large the cautious Kadar has steered a safe course around them in the process of rebuilding the party's au- thority. Public policy aside, the HSWP organizationally is a fairly typical Communist party. About one Hungarian in 16 belongs �a ratio approximately equal to that in the U.S.S.R. and Poland, but be- low that for the Communist parties of East Ger- many, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. Its 700,000 members constitute a motley group: fervent young idealists; superannuated conservative functionaries; cynical opportunists; and largely apolitical estab- lishmentarians, among others. All are expected to react in disciplined fashion to the next higher echelon in the party command, and ultimately to the dictates of the 13 -man party Politburo. This prin- ciple of party unity frequently fails in practice, but at least strenur as intraparty debate lends credence to the part claim that the "cult of the personal- ity" has been banished in favor of "collective leader- ship." Kadar is beyond question "number one" in the political hierarchy. Rumors circulate from time to time that he has lost favor with the Soviets or is in increasingly bad health as a result of his imprison- ment during the Rakosi bloodbaths. There is no indication that he has lost control, but conserva- tive elements opposed to his liberal ways do exist. The Kadar style, if indeed such a spartan and largely colorless personality can be said to have style, is that of the team player. Poorly educated but gifted with good political instincts, Kadar has surrounded himself with a group of talented, fairly young advisers who generally share his point of view. The working levels of the party, conversely, are heavily seeded with hacks. If Kadar's policies fail in implementation, it is more likely due to the immobility or incompetence of this petty official- dom than to the intrigues of highly placed rivals. The Kadar regime has publicly committed itself to reform in the name of "broadening socialist democracy." If such a formulation seems vague, it is no accident, for the regime is loathe to elabo- rate on the concept. It appears, nevertheless, that Kadar and the party are in debt to the departed and discredited Imre Nagy, who postulated that a workable Hungarian government should take into consideration the views of the nonparty masses. Inherent in this thesis is the admission that the party, to its own detriment, has dictated national policy to a muzzled and largely indifferent popu- lace. Also inherent is the hope that by allowing persons other than the party faithful to have some say, the party will broaden its base of popular support. At this point, a difficult question arses as to whether an authoritarian body can afford to enhance significantly the rights of others without weakening and ultimately destroying itself. And, if such doubts exist, are Communist leaders in other capitals, particularly Moscow, willing to tolerate "dangerous experimentation" in their midst? Having weighed the delicate issue with great deliberation, Kadar has chosen to move ahead with inchworm precision and wariness. A first try at open- ing new lines of communication has come via the regime's "national reconciliation policy." Under it, all who are loyal to the homeland and not outwardly opposed to the party are welcome to participate in the state system. Talent that oherwise would have gone to waste is now available and frequently serves as a welcome alternative to the lame, old party warhorses at the lower and middle echelons of government and industry. Elsewhere the party has encouraged its mass organizations patriotic fronts, youth groups, women's organizations, and the like �':o concern themselves less with enforcing APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 ideological purity (a fairly hopeless task in any case) and more with the airing of grievances in open debate. best the organizations shy away from this new responsibility, as frequently has been the case, the party has undertaken private opinion polls to uncover popular discontents. At the local gov- ernment level, district councils have been granted a measure of autonomy over budgetary and devel- opmental planning. At the national level, electoral reforms have even allowed candidates "not hostile to the socialist system" to run against party-ap- proved men. In 1971 at least five "spontaneous" candidates won parliamentary seats �an encourag- ing number, though hardly enough to boost the regime's avowed hopes of upgrading the national legislature qualitatively. Through the use of these pluralistic techniques the HSWP has become a somewhat more benign and less pervasive influence. While loosening its hold, however, it has shown no inclination to abandon the single -party ideal or its dominance in practice. A new constitution, in preparation since 1969, presumably could lead to further liberaliza- tion, but the delay in its issuance may indicate that the party for now would prefer to mark time. Should Kadar go many more steps forward polit- ically, he always risks striking that great vein of nationalistic sentiment that lies so near the surface. And the consequent unleashing of anti- Soviet and irredentist emotions could easily result in an era of Warsaw Pact enforced repression. The Economy, the NEM, and the Consumer (G) Hungary, by exercise of its national pride, has overcome poverty but has failed to become a rich nation. As a result of Turkish conquest and Habs- burg oppression, Hungary remained backward long after other European countries had been fully de- veloped. Well into the 20th century, for example, remnants of semifeudal practice still persisted in its predominantly agricultural society. Ravaged by the retreating Germans toward the end of World War II and then despoiled by Soviet occupiers a point carefully omitted from Communist histories), Hvingary in 1945 lay prostrate �its industry in ashes, its farms untended, its population decimated and starving, and its currency virtually worthless. At this dire pass, the country fell into the hands of Marxian Socialist planners and their Moscow mentors. Their philosophy seemed to be that blood could be extracted from a stone. 10 Hungary, as with the other "people's democra- cies," was obligated by the Soviet Union at the start to push industrialization to the limit, without regard to its resources. Particularly trying was the effort to build from scratch �at a terrible cost to the laborer and consumer �a base of heavy indus- try. Lacking the necessary experience, Hungarians committed egregious planning, management, and production mistakes. In the process, the nation be- came a veritable sweatshop. Workers initially bore the br.rden, but then lapsed into apathy on finding little reward in terms of the ordinary comforts of life. At times during this era Hungary was hard put to compete even with its eastern neighbors. In sum, it received a heavy dose of Stalinist -style in- dustrial socialism, and nearly choked in the process. Virtually the same methods were applied to agri- culture, with virtually the same results. Enforced APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 collectivization proceeded spasmodically as former landholders showed a grand indifference to working their plots in the name of the state. Many fled the soil or were impressed by the state to work in factories. Food was in short supply, and the cities overcrowded. In 1961 the government could an- nounce that practically all cultivable land belonged to the "public sector," but what it failed to announce was that the campaign of "peaceful persuasion" that brought this result left many with broken heads. By the 1960's the government's commitment to a succession of multiyear plans had still produced little more than a subsistence economy. Farmers largely were sitting on their hands, while in in- dustry matters were not much better. It was clear that the government had to do something to get the country moving. The answer came in January 1968 in the form of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), an innovative scheme that provided for the injection into the system of certain thinly dis- guised and somewhat modified capitalistic features. They included a sort of supply and demand market, managerial and trade union responsibility for plan- ning and production, worker incentive offers, and a profit reinvestment program. In effect, Kadar was conceding that his central economic planners had botched the operation and that local expertise and initiative were needed. The NEM, however, should not be regarded as a shift toward capitalism. Kadar was careful to insure the continued Socialist character of the economy. As with other Kadar projects, the NEM did not represent a sudden plunge into the unknown. Rather, Bud ipest had carefully prepared this new departure over a 3 -year period. It studied Yugoslav and Czechoslovak precedents and conducted con- trolled experiments. Only then did it proceed within the limits of the possible. At the start the regime decreed that the program could not result in eco- nomic dislocations or increased dependency on the West, nor could it involve any serious break with orthodox views on the socialist planned economy. Thus, the reform retained planning as the key over- all guiding force and relied heavily on economic controls to manipulate the market forces inserted in the system. Except for a few strategic target areas, however, enterprises were freed from ..entrally imposed out- put and quality norms. It was up to them to decide what and how much to produce given expected de- mands, price regulations, and constraints on imports. The rewards for profitability were higher salaries and wages for ma*iag:;rs and workers. Moreover, profitable firms were given the means to finance plant expansion and modernization. Though mildly revolutionary in terms of standard Communist economics, the reform was not expected to produce startling results immediately. In fact, progress was slow at first, but at least economic shocks were held to a minimum. More important, the reform en- dowed the economy with a new rationale, proved agreeable to a public tir:siing for a better life, boosted the reputation of the party for clear think- ing, and, overall, helped supply the regime with a broader base of legitimacy. By the advent of 1971 the NEM had begun to show signs of success. Industrial productivity rose nearly 10% in 1970, a marked improvement com- pared with previous years. Trade with the West increased significantly, and consumer goods were in far larger supply. But just when the regime was starting to congratulate itself, setbacks occurred and were severe enough to demonstrate that the NEM was no panacea. The warning sign came in duplicate: runaway investment totals and a record trade deficit. After considerable delay, during which the Soviets made unpleasant noises about the direction the Hungarian economy was taking, the regime took corrective measures. By so doing, it seemed to concede that a larger measure of cen- tral direction than envisioned under the NEM was necessary for economic equilibrium in Hun- gary. In the longer view, Hungarian economists also have had to concede their inability to overcome either Mother Nature or human nature. Mineral resources are limited, leaving the country highly dependent on foreign sources chiefly the Soviet Union and allies �for such basics as iron ore and energy producing materials. A small population means both a chronic labor shortage and a con- tinuing search for foreign markets to supplement the small domestic market. Coming late to the in- dustrial scene, Hungary suffers a dire shortage of expert managers and skilled workers, and piracy of good administrators and artisans is common. Under the NEM, some crafty types in important places have enriched themselves, in part by sic cumbing to the old national habit of accepting a little under -the -table money. Workers have com- plained about getting a smaller share of the profit pie than do plant managers. Party loyal bureau- 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 ..n...; r iFh" r 111 crats and entrenched trade union chiefs have tried to block any takeover of their powers by young, ambitious technocrats. And, in this worker peasant state, the peasant has complained so bitterly of unequal treatment that the government has had 12 to increase farm wages, farm investments, and farm community amenities. In turn, the peasants have demonstrated their order of priorities to the regime by producing about as much on their small private plots as is produced on all the state farms combined. Though many are the complaints, the average Hungarian might admit to himself that he had never had it so good. He lives better today than at any time within the lifetime of the oldest living person, whether he appreciates it or not. He is bet- ter dressed and better fed than 10 years ago, has sufficient money for an occasional luxury item, and may spend his leisure time at a vacation resort. If be is one of the favored few who has profited heavily from the NEM, he may have developed a taste for "the finer things in life," including a private house and an automobile. These benefits of "goulash communism," as it is derisively called by anti- Kadarists, are largely attributable to a conscious effort on the part of Kadar to enlist the consumer as a prop for his regime. After long years of deprivation, the Hungarian finds that his government has brought him a con- siderable array of goods at prices he can afford. And, now that his possessive instinct has been aroused he may demand more than can be offered by a regime caught in the spiral of rising expecta- tions. Adequate housing, for example, is perenially in short supply, and the automobile remains a status symbol in a land where motorcycles outnumber cars three to one. With 2.5 million radios and 1.8 million TV sets available as opposed to 800,000 telephones, Hungarians find it easier to receive than transmit the spoken word. In a nation of hearty eaters, pro- tein -rich foods are still in short supply. And finally, the (mrative waters of the health spa still take up some of the slack left by inadequate state sponsored medical facilities. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 The Regime and the People (S) The seeds of liberalism planted by Janos Kadar have yet to yield a crop of popular allegiance. About the best that can be said in belialf of the regime is that the populace appears to be progres- sively less antagonistic toward it. Outright support, however, remains negligible. Rather, the citizenry by and large seems ideologically neutral and politi- cally passive. Pessimism to the point of fatalism is a characteristic of Hungarian They have learned to accept what comes a.nd to avoid that which will bring only pain. The failure of the 1956 revolt led. to the final realization that Hungary was enmeshed in the East -West power balance and that as a result the Magyars, once again, could not choose their own path of development. Still, they have resisted the regime's efforts to build a collectivist mentality and impose a Marxist- Leninist belief system. If anything, individu,:listic behavior has become more pronounced. Minor protests are mounted on oc- casion, but they are easily squelched by a govern- ment inclined to be more lenient than its predeces- sors. Moreover, active dissidence is isolated in character, usually emanating from small bands of romantic idealists at home and professional anti regime refugees abroad. Neither element poses much real danger to a system powerful in itself, assured of Soviet backing, and relieved of the threat of Western intervention. Reasonably secure in the present and relatively confident of the future, the regime has sought reconciliation with its largely submissive citizenry. It has posted notice that fealty to the party is no longer required for a citizen to live in peace. Variant life styles are tolerated if they do not represent open conflict with the principles of the 13 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 state. While the nonconformist may expect Jess in the way of favors from the system, he otherwise is likely to be left alone. To conformists, the regime holds out the lure of membership in its new elite of professionals, intellectuals, technocrats, and man- agers. Many accept, but their loyalty is largely superficial and opportunistic. To the common man, the regime poses as a partner in the appreciation of things Hungarian. It has joined the effort to preserve ancient folkways; rehabilitated national monuments such as the royal palace in Buda; and promoted excellence in such sports as fencing, soccer, water polo, swimming, boxing, and wres- tling. Still, most Hungarians see the regime heavily mortgaged to the Soviet will rather than committed to Hungarian fortunes, and Kadar, try as he may, cannot wash that stain from the record. In a variety of ways �by themselves unspectacu- lar, but in total significant �the people have made manifest a lack of "oneness" with the system. At bottom, Hungarians collectively have declined to meet the official standard of a burgeoning nation of uncommon character. The birth rate and growth rate of the population are lower in Hungary than in any other state in the Communist bloc. The suicide rate is the highest and the divorce rate the thud highest in the world. In practical terms, this erosion of the human spirit portends an increasingly aged population and a stagnating labor force. More im- mediately, other indications of individual alienation suggest that a social crisis of considerable dimen- sions may be brewing. Alcoholism is widespread, and prostitution flourishes. Psychiatric disorders ap- pear to be growing, and a minor drug culture may be forming. Crime is on the rise, and special appeals to help curb it have met with public apathy. Juvenile delinquency and youth offenses are partic- ularly mortifying to a regime that bases its future on a younger generation indoctrinated in the puri- tanical morality of state socialism. If anything, Hungarian youth seems more dis- spirited than the older population. The regime has bestowed unique favors on the young in terms of better educational opportunities, better health care, better recreation areas, and improved social facili- ties. Such heartily despised features of educa- tion as compulsory technical and Russian lan- guage training may soon be alleviated by a con- templated "NEM of the classroom" that would pro- vide greater local autonomy at the universities, wider latitude for the individual in choosing a pro fession, and increased opportunity for academics 14 to indulge in self expression. Still, youth continues to view itself as a submerges underprivileged, and somewhat forlorn minority in a small -time Com- munist state. The failure of any appreciable num- bers of the under -35 generation to advance to leading positions in the system is accepted as a sign that the ingrained paternalism of Hungary's past still holds. Apathy is the result, as even the low level of political commitment found in neigh- boring C ummunist countries is not met here. Compared with youth, Hungary's writer- intel- lectual caste represents a potentially far more sub- versive element in the eyes of the regime. Histori- cally, men of the arts and letters have raised the torch of freedom during Hungary's many dark hours. Whether poet or politician or both in the same person, they have transcended the barriers to understanding and evoked the essence of Magyar nationalism as rooted in the common man. Espe- cially have they idealized Hungary as an outpost of Christian- Western civilization holding against the alien hordes of the east. This conception, while it borders on national conceit, nonetheless is easily understood both as it applies to Constantinople in the past or to Moscow today. It is small wonder, then, that the Communist regime from it inception sought to strap its most creative people into the intellectual straitjacket of "socialist realism." After long periods of greater or lesser repression, Kadar finally chose as part of his liberalization program in the early 1960's to relax the death grip on dissident cultural expression. Since then, bureaucrats and intellectuals have ob- served an uneasy truce, with the former largely abandoning overt censorship and the latter ven- turing only very tentatively into the no -man's land of antiregime criticism. Occasiunal skirmishes still occur at the frontier of misunderstanding, however, and it is clear that the amount of trust felt on both sides could be measured by the thimbleful. Mean- while, a pall still hovers over intellectual output, and it seems evident that outright genius, as ex- emplified by recent musical greats Bela Bartok and Zoltan Kodaly, is unlikely to blossom in the Philis- tine setting of Kadarland. A third factor which has left the Communists' governing equation somewhat unbalanced is the church. Christianity came to Hungary shortly after its founding as a state, and over the centuries entered into the lifeblood of the nation. The domi- nant Catholic Church representing two- thirds of APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 the Hungarians as opposed to one -fourth for the Protestants) had become a spiritual and secular power long prior to this century. Unwilling to sac- rifice this privileged position, it faced an inevitable clash with the new creed of communism. Attacking hard and fast from the beginning, the regime na- tionalized the church-run school system, expropri- ated church lands, abolished religious orders, jailed recalcitrant clergy, and took overall charge through a State Office for Church Affairs. Faced with a merciless foe, the church slowly and stubbornly gave way. For its part, the regime came to realize that it could not win total victory, and from the early 1960's it began to abate its harassments and strike bargains with the church. Today, a modus vivendi obtains, uncomfortable though it may be. The church abstains politically. The state allows the church a modest subsidy. Ostensibly there is a reconciliation, chiefly in favor of the state. Yet, state authorities remain wary of an institution that continues to have such a powerful emotional hold on the people �one that they themselves cannot hope to emulate. Kadar, it would appear, has neutralized and pacified those individuals and institutions ho the to his cause. Presumably he has little to fear. Yet, the trauma of the anti- Communist, anti Soviet uprising of 1956 lives on in the minds of those now in con- trol. Never ones to take matters of state security on faith, they remain constantly watchful of their enemies, whether they be rightist emigrees in Vienna or former Rakosists in Budapest itself. The government has even drafted plans to deal with a future uprising �the possibility of which seems slim to all excopt those ruling Communists who might be its victims. Lest government opponents, latent or real, be- come overly optimistic about their chances, govern- ment authorities continue to exercise internal con- trol through an information and security network. The print and broadcast media, both regime -con- trolled, largely echo the party line (though far more subtly than in the past) and serve as channels of instruction to the populace. Censorship has been relaxed and independent views are at times permit- ted to circulate, particularly in the periodicals of the cognoscenti. In like manner, parades, mass rallies, party indoctrination sessions, and poster campaigns have been deemphasized in order to avoid propa- ganda overkill with resulting suspension of belief. Nevertheless, the regime's message remains strong and clearcut. It glorifies the Soviet Union, the socialist system, the party, and the national eco- nomic goals. There is no doubt as to who is in the saddle in Budapest. As with almost any government, the Kadar group seeks to stop trouble before it starts. Police in- formants and opinion polls are devices used to listen in on public sentiment. Mass organizations, as noted earlier, are encouraged to voice complaints and help defuse touchy situations. In the event that sterner measures are called for, the govern- ment comes well armed, chiefly in the person of the internal security police originally the AVO and now referred to as the AVH. In early days the AVO was essentially an elite intraparty group, largely Moscow- directed, that enjoyed virtually ab- solute authority over the nation's vital organs. Its tactics were crude but effective: swift arrest, forced confession, summary verdict, and lengthy imprison ment�or, perhaps more humanely, immediate ex- ecution. In short, the Hungarian authorities who closed out a 16th century peasant rebellion by fry- ing its leader on a metal throne and forcing his fol- lowers to eat the flesh had little on the sadists of the AVO. Since 1962 the regime has curbed the powers of the AVH and purged it of its worst elements, but some of its reputation for cruelty lives on. Regular legal procedures are now observed. But the statutes against antistate activity are broadly worded, and the regime is not averse to tightening the screws if need be. Should a national emergency occur, the armed forces would come in .o play. In view of lingering doubts about their oyalty and effectiveness, this prospect is a fairly cheerless one for the govern- ment. In terms of manpower, the regular armed forces are the smallest in the bloc, numbering only about 97,500. And, in terms of gross national product, Hungary spends less on defense (47o in 1971) than any other East European nation. Eco- nomic and social needs take priority, but, more important, the crisis of confidence in the military establishment resulting from its failure to respond during the 1956 revolt has not been completely overcome. Since then it has been rebuilt, politically purified, and reindoctrinated with the message of loyalty to the state. The armed forces returned to participation in Warsaw Pact exercises in 1966 and in small numbers joined the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Neither action, however, has been taken as a final judgment on their capabil- ity or reliability. 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 Foreign Policy: A Function of Reality (S) For years there was doubt that Communist Hun- gary had a foreign policy. In the cold war era it led a largely parochial existence as a Soviet satel- lite, and only in late 1955 was it finally accepted for membership in the United Nations. Recently a native Hungarian wit has allowed that there now is a foreign policy, but that it is mainly a screen behind which party leaders attend to their favorite occupation, the cultivation of the economy and the tranquilization of the country at large. This observation, while generally true, masks the more specific truth �that Hungary, as it focuses in- wardly on all- important domestic reforms, must at the same time work skillfully for the best possible relations with its Communist neighbors. Kadar's liberalization steps tend to disturb other East Euro- pean governors, who profess to see in them the seeds of Western capitalistic subversion. Thus far, Kadar's caution in prosecuting reform has staved off truly damaging criticism. More important, his hearty approval of most aspects of Soviet policy has served to insure that Hungary will continue to be accepted as a fully paid -up member of the "socialist commonwealth of nations." Generally, Hungarian Communists find it easy to conform to Soviet world views. In many situations they already agree on the basis of a common ide- ology, while in others they feel the issue is so remote as to be of little concern. Occasionally, how- ever, national self interest intrudes, and then Hun- garian leaders pursue their own special cause to the extent they believe Moscow will permit. In the balls of the United Nations Hungary regularly echoes Soviet positions. In particular, it mirrors the Soviet view on Vietnam, the Middle East, and the "struggle" of third world nations for unity and independence. Budapest backs Moscow against Peking, but, along with other East European capi- tals, frequently urges restraint. The Kadar regime hews closely to the Russian line on the large ques- M. tion of European security and cooperation, although here, given a choice, the Hungarians would seek to accomplish more. They have also shown interest in participating in the International Monetary Fund, but they have held off pending a Soviet move. In bolder action, Hungary has proposed, aspite Soviet displeasure, that CEMA Moscow's would -be com- mon market for East Europe) be converted into an integrated system along the lines of the European Economic Community. The basic logic of Budapest's position, as Kadar has acknowledged, is that Hungarians "cannot change geography." Hungary lies in the Soviet sphere of influence. It is an economic and military dependency of Moscow. And the U.S.S.R. is capable of strong, swift intervention at any time. By reason of this stark reality, Hungary's options are limited. Specifically, the Soviets have an important, per- haps even decisive, voice in Hungary's economic course. The U.S.S.R., for example, supplies three fourths of Hungary's iron ore and more than half of its lumber, coal, and oil. CEMA accounts for +ughly two- thirds of Hungarian foreign trade, and half of this total is attributable to the U.S.S.R. Additional leverage is supplied by the 50,000 -man military force the Soviets have "temporarily sta- tioned" in Hungary, presumably at cost to the host nation. In recent years, the Soviets have chosen to follow a "compromise" policy toward Hungary� neither heavyhanded intervention nor hands off. They know the location of the pressure points on `he Hungarians corpus, and they are not afraid to squeeze them when necessary. The Soviets appear to have some sense of confidence in Kadar, on the grounds that he has managed rather well in diffi- cult circumstances since 1956. On the other hand, Soviet suspicions of Hungarian domestic reform APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 are strong, as was shown in February 1972 when Kadar was hastily called onto the Kremlin carpet to further justify the NEM. With regard to the other nearby Communist states, Hungary strikes an amicable but less sub- servient pose. Its attitude is colored by the memory of the Trianon settlement following World War I. Hungarians have neither forgotten nor forgiven their losses, particularly the forfeiture (to Romania) of picturesque Transilvania, the historic bastion of Hungarian independence. On this account, the man in the street is disposed to grieve for his "op- pressed" Magyar brothers so long departed from Hungary itself. On an official level, needless to say, Hungarians pay regular tribute to the largely symbolic treaties of friendship with each of the Communist neigh- bors, as well as to CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. But they also stress Hungary's primary responsi- bility for its own affairs. With the interventionist- minded and militantly conservative East German regime, Hungary at most has "correct" relations. The Hungarian minority in Transilvania and Bucha- rest's maverick foreign policy are strong irritants in the Hungarian- Romanian juncture, but attempts in recent years at a better understanding appear to have borne some fruit. Foland under Gierek and Czechoslovakia under Husak are less well regarded than formerly, but allowance has been made for an improvement here too. The regime's attitude toward Western nations is now cautiously positive �a far cry from the time when the "capitalist- imperialists" were the scape- goats for everything from a small incident to the 1956 revolt itself. In the interest of retrieving Hun- gary 's image shattered when the 1956 revolt was crushed �and expanding his government's area of maneuverability, Kadar extended his liberalization program westward. Cultural and scientific agree- ments have been negotiated. High -level official visits have been promoted. The frontier with neutral Austria has been partially disarmed. Western litera- ture has been made available. And the famous Hungarian hospitality has been offered to increas- ing numbers of Western tourists. Ensuing good will aids in Hungary's deeper efforts to exploit Western technology and vie for sales in Western markets, both vital facets of the NEM. 17 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 On taking office in 1956, the Kadar regime faced the herculean task of restoring a nation torn asunder by revolt. It proceeded slowly and a bit uncer- tainly to build a Hungary that would first conform to the requirements of the U.S.S.R: s security and dogma and then be capable of meeting popular needs. Progress at times was almost imperceptible, but finally there has emerged a new political entity�one that can claim to be the most stable and liberal in Eastern Europe. At present, the Hungarian people are largely docile �a tribute of sorts to Kadar and his group. The NEM has offered the promise of a better ma- terial life. Intellectual horizons have been broad- ened a bit by a tolerance for greater freedom of expression. Increased visiting privileges to the West have alleviated the sense of physical confine- ment. Overall, tentative understanding between the party and the people has been established. Still, Kadar and his cohorts remain wary lest a misstep topple the delicate structure they have so carefully raised. In particular they are concerned, as ever, about a recrudescence of Magyar nationalism that might well trigger a Soviet move destructive of what has been accomplished thus far. To a large extent the prospects for Hungary are intertwined with the personal fate of Kadar. Sixty years old as of 1972, he may on account of health have few years left. His rule has been highly per- sonalized and a degree intuitive. No heir apparent exists, nor is there the promise of one who can match Kadar's example. In the event of Kadar's weakening or demise, proregime and antiregime forces may well be prepared to battle for control of his legacy to the Hungarian people. Even now, footdragging on some of Kadar's policies is more the rule than the exception. Sup- 18 port for the NEM in particular has shallow roots and may have been shaken further by late -hour economic reverses. And the success of NEM de- pends ultimately on political reform, which still must find its way around the doctrine of party supremacy. Then, too, it is evident that not all of Kadar's problems lie within his domestic line of sight. Hungary's "separate road to socialism" arouses deep years among neo- Stalinist element, elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The Soviets themselves, while praising Hungarian reforms in general terms, have also warned Kadar to go slow on several occasions. Kadar probably is in no immediate danger, but in dealings with Moscow he has little room for mis- calculation. Whatever the fate of Kadar and his program, Hungary over the longer term seems destined to remain a pawn of big -power politics. As a small nation, it can do little to improve its role in Europe cr on the international stage. At best it must p ay that the currents of change will permit a wider open- ing to Western influence and a consequent weaken- ing of Soviet domination. Given these trends, a Hungarian government would have a freer hand for the development of the nation on the basis of its own rather than alien requirements. Such an outcome is not considered a likely pros- pect by most Hungarians, however. On the basis of experience they are reasonably certain that the Soviets are not about to relax their grip on Eastern Europe. And so, the Hungarians must continue to accept foreign domination a:. they have so often in the past, uncomfortably and unwillingly, yet with a fortitude that seems to guarantee their con- tinuance as a nation. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110037 -3 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 Chronology (U/OU) 895-96 Prince Arpad leads Magyar conquest of Hungary. 1000 King (Saint) Stephen is converted to Christianity. 1241 -50 Tatars invade. 1458 -90 Reign of Matyas Corvinus: Hungarian Renaissance is at its apex and domination of the area is at its widest geographically. 1526 August Turks defeat Hungarians at Mohacs; Turkish conquest of Hungary ensues. Late 17th century Combined efforts of Austrians and Hungarians drive Turks from Hungary. Habsburg domination of Hungary begins. 1703 -11 "War of Independence the first effort to evict the Habsburg-, fails. 1848 March to 1849 August National revolt against Habsburgs almost succeeds. Hun- garian armies are crushed by the intervention of the Russian Imperial Army. 1867 Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy �the "Great Compro- mise' �is formed. 1914 July Hungary enters World War I as an ally of Austria and Germany. 1918 November Hungarian Communist Party is founded. 1919 March -July Hungarian Socialist Republic, a short-lived Communist dictatorship led by Bela Kun, is established. 1920 March Admiral Miklos Horthy is elected Regent of Hungary. June Hungarian Peace Treaty, also known as the Trianon settlement, is signed at Versailles; Hungary cedes three fourths of its territory and over one -third of its popu- lation to neighboring states. 1940 November Hungary signs Axis Pact. 1941 June Hungary declares war on U.S.S.R. 1944 March Germany occupies Hungary. October Regent Horthy is arrested by Germans. December Provisional government is established in Debrecen under Soviet auspices. 1945 January Armistice agreement is signed in Moscow. April Hungary is liberated from Nazi rule. November Only free election in Hungarian history is held; Small- holders get absolute majority; Communists receive 17% of vote. 1946 February Republic is proclaimed; Ferenc Nagy of Smallholders Party becomes Premier. 20 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 I A I ,nn rNIL ff 1947 February Hungarian Peace Treaty is signed in Paris; Hungary returns all territories acquired since 1939. May -June Hungarian Communists take over the government. 1949 January Hungary joins U.S.S.R. and other East European states in forming the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). February Cardinal Mindszenty (who had been arrested 26 Decem- ber 1948) is sentenced to life imprisonment. September Former Interior Minister Laszlo Rajk is tried on charges of plotting with Tito against the Hungarian Government; Rajk is sentenced to death. 1952 August Matyas Rakosi becomes Premier. 1953 July Imre Nagy sy Rakosi as Premier and outlines New Course to National Assembly. November Rakosi becomes First Secretary of Party Central Com- mittee. 1954 October Janos Kadar -'s released from prison and made party secretary of Budapest's 13th district. 1955 April Imre Nagy is removed as Premier and expellcd from Party Central Committee following 9 March condemna- tion for "rightist deviation Andras Hegedus becomes Premier. 1955 May Warsaw Pact is signed by Hungary. December Hungary is admitted to the United Nations as part of a package deal. 1956 February Bela Kun is rehabilitated. March Laszlo ".ijk is rehabilitated. July Matyas Rakosi is relieved as Party First Secretary and replaced by Erno Gero. October Revolt breaks out; Imre Nagy replaces Hegedus as Premier. Gero rep .:ces Kadar as Party First Secretary; coalition government is formed with Nagy remaining as Premier; Soviet troops intervene but later withdraw from Buda- pest; Cardinal Mindszenty is released. November Hungary proclaims neutrality and withdraws unilaterally from Warsaw Pact. Soviets again resort to massive armed intervention; Nagy and associates take refuge in Yugoslav Embassy; Kadar government is formed; Cardinal Mindszenty takes refuge in U.S. Legation. Nagy and colleagues leave Yugoslav Embassy under safe conduct, but ar-- immediately arrested by Soviet troops. December United Nations adopts resolution condemning Soviet in- tervention in Hungary. 1957 February Party and government is reorganized; Kadar consolidates party power by adding 3 new members to Politburo, 2 to Secretariat, 21 to Central Committee. September U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution condemning Soviet intervention in 1956; it appoints special repre- sentative to seek Iungarian compliance with earlier resolutions. November Government abolishes Workers Councils which had been established during the revolt. 1958 January Kadar is replaced as Premier by Ferenc Munnich but remains Party First Secretary. June Ministry of Justice announces that former Premier Imre Nagy and several of his close associates have been executed. December Party Centrai Committee decides to speed up collectiviza- tion. 1959 November December Seventh Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, the first since May 1954, meets in Budapest; Cen- tral Committee is enlarged from 53 to 71 members, Politburo from 11 to 12; Kadar is reelected Party First Secretary. 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 1960 January In government reshuffle, Gyula Kallai is made First Deputy Premier. March Amnesty for certain categories of political prisoners is announced, including some imprisoned in 1956. 1961 February Collectivization drive is completed; party announces that more than 90% of arable land is "within the socialist sector." June Travel restrictions on diplomats are rescinded mutually by Hungary and the United States. September Government undergoes major reorganization; Kadar as- sumes premiership, while retaining party leadership; two new deputy premiers are appointed. 1962 February Six deputy ministers and 12 high executive officials are relieved; regime fills posts with more technically pro- ficient party members. April Warsaw Pact maneuvers held in Hungary, with Hun- garian troops participating for the first time. August As part of de- Stalinization campaign, Central Committee expels Matyas Rakosi, Emo Gero, and 23 others from party. October Politburo member and party secretary Gyorgy Mamsan is dropped from all party posts. November Eighth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party is held in Budapest. Major party and government reshuffle is announced; Kadar reaffirms Hungary's posi- tion within Soviet camp and attacks Albanian regime and those who support it. December United Nations votes to abolish post of "special repre- sentative for Hungary." 1963 March Kadar announces dismissal of two government ministers who served under Rakosi, shifts others to different posts; amnesty is declared, affecting 2,000 to 3,000 prisoners; nearly all political prisoners from 1956 are released. May Negotiations are undertaken between Hungary and the Vatican; five Catholic bishops are released from house arrest. 22 June Hungarian delegation is fully accredited at the United Nations, for first time since 1956. September Kadar and Tito confer; meeting marks improvement in Hungarian- Yugoslav relations. November Trade agreement is signed with West Germany; Hungary accepts the 'Berlin clause." 1964 April Kadar publicly identifies himself with Khrushchev's policies during the latter's visit to Hungary, attacks Chinese Communists. September Hungary and the Vatican sign accord, the first such agreement between the Vatican and a Communist state; five new bishops are named. October Kadar publicly praises Khrushchev, who was ousted as Soviet Premier on 15 October; he assures Hungarians that there would be no repercussions in Hungary. Austrian F ureign Minister visits Budapest (the first visit of a Western European foreign minister to Hungary since the end of World War II); Austro Hungarian rela- tions improve. November United States and Hungary begin negotiations to settle outstanding bilateral issues. 1965 February Kadar tells Parliament that Soviet troops will remain in Hungary until West accepts "Soviet proposals for power disengagements" in Europe. May United States participates in the Budapest International Trade Fair for the first time. June Major party and government changes are announced; Kallai succeeds Kadar as Premier; party hardliners are downgraded; Kadar lieutenants are promoted. November Kallai addresses Parliament for the first time as Premier; education reforms are announced by Minister of Culture Pal Ilku. Party Central Committee approves "guiding principles' of the economic reform. December Permanent representative of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam arrives in Budapest. Details of 1966 economic plan are announced (approved by Central Committee on 8 December); some wages and pension allowances are increased; prices of various con- sumer goods are left to be increased during the first 6 months of 1966. The announcement of price increases generates widespreai popular discontent. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 1966 April Kadar speech at the Soviet 23d Party Congress endorses Soviet policies, blasts Chine -e and Albanians. May Party Central Committee approves resolution on eco- nomic reforms to be implemented between 1968 and 1970; Party Secretary Nyers announces that political re- forms will be considered by Ninth Party Congress in November. November- December Ninth Congress of Hungarian Socialist Workers Party is held in Budapest; Central Committee powers are in- creased; Central Auditing Committee and candidate membership in the party and Central Committee are abolished. 1967 April Government changes are announced; Jeno Fock replaces Gyula Kallai as Premier as economic experts move into top government positions. May Regime organizes destructive anti- Vietnam demonstrations at U.S. Embassy in Budapest. July Hungary hosts Communist summit discussions of support for Arabs. September Hungarian Soviet treaty of mutual aid and friendship is renewed. November U.S. Ambassador presents credentials in Budapest, com- pleting U.S. side of 1966 agreement to upgrade diplo- matic representative to the ambassadorial level. 1968 January Hungary's economic reform (New Economic Mechanism) is inaugurated. February Hungary hosts preparatory session for the World Com- munist Conference. March Premier Jeno Fock pays state visit to France. April Party daily announces support for Czechoslovakia s de- Stalinization campaign. June Debate in Secretariat over continued support of Czech- oslovaks is settled in favor of continued support. July Kadar argues for moderate course at Warsaw meeting of hardline regimes alarmed at developments in Czech- oslovakia. Kadar signs joint letter to Dubcek regime warning of excesses. August Kadar meets Dubcek on 18 August in last -ditch attempt to counsel gradualism and is rebuffed. Kadar joins hard- liners in sending troops into Czechoslovakia on 20 August. September Hungarian leaders publicly reassert their intention to continue gradual domestic reforms in Hungary. Hungarian ambassador to United States arrives in Washington. 1969 March Joint party- government meeting extends Kadar's gradual reform policies. Writers Union Congress marks rapprochement between Kadar regime and liberal authors who join regime or- ganization. 19'10 January Minister of Interior Andras Benkei calls for reforms limiting powers of secret police. November Tenth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party is held in Budapest. Kadar wins low -keyed endorsement of domestic reforms and silences critics who disturbed preparations for the congress with complaints about effects of internal liberalization. Brezhnev attends congress and gives Kadar a general �but vague endorsement. 1971 February Matyas Rakosi, Stalinist party boss of the 1950's, dies in exile in the U.S.S.R. May National elections are held. As first test of new elec- tion reform, elections prove to be generally disappoint- ing in extending limits of popular choice and participa- tion. July Hungary joins in Warsaw Pact polemics against Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania for their ties with China. Hun- garian- Romanian rapprochement is temporarily halted as a result. September Cardinal Mindszenty leaves refuge in U.S. Embassy, Budapest, for residence in Vienna. 1972 February Economic and political differences with Soviet Union surface. Kadar and Fock go to Moscow in February and March to smooth over problems. 2.3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 Area Brief LAND (U /OU) Size: 35,900 sq. mi. Use: 60% arable, 14% other agricultural, 16% forested, 10% other Land boundaries? 1,395 mi. PEOPLE (U /OU) Population: 10,405,000, average annual growth rate 0.3 (current); density 289 persons per square mile Ethnic divisions: 93.4% Magyar, 2.5% German, 2.4% Gypsy, 0.7% Jew, 1% other Religion: 68% Roman Catholic, 20% Calvinist, 5% Lutheran, 7.5% atheist and other Language: 93.2% Magyar, 1.8% other Literacy: 98% Labor force: 5.0 million (1 January 1971); 26% agricul- ture, 44% industry and building, 30% other nonagricul- tural; females account for 41% of industrial work force Males: 2,659,000, of whom 2,140,000 considered fit for military service. About 90,000 reach military age 18) annually GOVERNMENT (U /OU) Legal name: Hungarian People's Republic Type: Communist state Capital: Budapest Political subdivisions: 19 megyes (counties), 5 autono- mous cities in county status, 113 jaras (districts) Legal system: Based on Communist legal theory, with both civil law system (civil code of 1960) and common law elements; constitution adopted 1949; Supreme Court renders decisions of principle that sometimes have the effect of declaring legislative acts unconstitutional; legal education at Lorand Eotvos Tudomanyegyetem School of Law in Budapest and 2 other schools of law; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction Branches: Executive Presidential Council (elected by Parliament); legislative Parliament (elected by direct suffrage); judicial� Supreme Court (elected by Parliament) Government leaders: Jeno Fock, Chairman, Council of Ministers; Pal Losonczi, President, Presidential Council Suffrage: Universal over age 18 Elections: Every 4 years; national and local elections are held separately, two years apart Political parties and leaders: Hungarian Socialist (Com- munist) Workers Party (sole party); Janos Kadar is First Secretary of Central Committee GOVERNMENT (U /OU) (Continued) Voting strength (1971 election): 7,260,856 (98 for Communist- approved candidates; 76,725 (1.4 invalid and negative votes; total eligible electorate about 7.3 million Communists: About 693,000 party members (June 1971) Member of: CEMA, FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, ITU, UNESCO U.N., UPU, Warsaw Pact, WHO ECONOMY (S) GNP: $16.7 billion in 1971 (at 1970 prices), $1,610 per capita; 1971 growth rate 4.6% Agriculture: Normally self- sufficient; main crops �corn, wheat, potatoes, sugar beets, wine grapes; caloric intake 3,140 calories per day per capita (1970) Major industries: Mining, metallurgy, engineering indus- tries, processed foods, textiles, chemicals (especially pharmaceuticals) Shortages: Metallic ores (except bauxite), copper, high grade coal, forest products Crude steel: 3.11 million metric tons produced (1971), 300 kg. per capita Electric power: 3,150,000 kw. capacity (1971); 15 billion kw. -hr. produced (1971), 1,450 kw.-hr. per capita Exports: $2,500 million (f.o.b., 1971); 26% machinery, 23% industrial consumer goods, 27% raw materials and semimanufactures, 24% food and raw materials for the food industry (distribution for 1971) Imports: $2,990 million (1971); 26% machinery, 9% in- dustrial consumer goods, 54% raw materials and semi manufactures, 11% food and raw materials for the food industry (distribution for 1971) Major trade partners: $5,490 million (1971); 67% with Communist countries, 35% with non Communist countries Aid: U.S.S.R. �$338 million extended (1956 -64), $10 mil- lion extended in 1967 and $167 million extended in 1968; to less developed non Communist countries� $435.3 mil- lion (1954 -71) Monetary conversion rate: 10.81 forints =US$1 (arbitrary commercial); 27.63 forints =US$1 (p_oncommercial) Fiscal year: Same as calendar year; economic data re- ported for calendar years COMMUNICATIONS (S) Railroads: 5,908 route mi.; 5,098 mi. standard gage, 788 mi. narrow gage (mostly 2 22 mi. broad gage (5'0 688 mi. double track, 581 mi. electrified; all but 96 miles government owned (1970) 24 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 SECRET COMMUNICATIONS (S) (Continued) Highways: 18,360 mi.; 11,048 mi. paved, 6,558 mi. crushed stone or gravel, 754 mi. earth (1970) Pipelines: Crude oil, 500 mi.; refined products, 180 mi.; natural gas, over 1,200 mi. Inland waterways: 1,320 mi. (1972) Freight carried: Rail -129.8 million short tons (1971), 14.0 billion short ton /mi. (1971); highway -492.0 million short tons, 4.7 million short ton /mi. (1971); waterway 15.4 million short tons, 1.9 billion short ton /mi. includes international transit traffic (1971) River ports: 2 principal (Budapest, Dunaujvaros); no mari- time ports; outlets are Rostock, East Germany, and ports in Poland (1972) Civil air: 21 major transport aircraft (1972) Merchant marine: 18 cargo ships (1,000 CRT or over) totaling 33,061 GRT, 45,038 DWT Airfields: 61 total; 13 with permanent surface runways; 17 with runways 8,000- 11,999 ft., 20 with runways 4,000- 7,999 ft. Telecommunications: Services meet most government and industrial requirements, but local public telephone serv- ice is inadequate; radio and TV broadcasts can be re- ceived throughout most of the country; 11 AM, 4 FM stations, more than 2.5 million receivers; 1 major and 10 relay TV stations, 1.9 million TV receivers; 873,194 telephones (99.4% automatic) DEFENSE FORCES (S) Personnel: (estimated) Ground forces 90,000, naval forces 1,900, air force 6,000, frontier guard 20,000, interior troops 15,000; Soviet ground force troops in Hungary as of 1 October 1972, 50,000 Personnel in reserve (not on active duty): (estimated) Ground tortes 690,000, naval forces 2,800, air force 40; (estimated) pilot reserves, additional 60 -70 pilots and 110 other aircrews from civil aviation SECRET DEFENSE FORCES (S) (Continued) Major ground units: 6 divisions (4 motorized rifle, 2 tank), 1 SCUD (SS -1) tactical missile brigade, 4 regiments (3 artillery, 1 antiaircraft artillery), 1 airborne battalion Ships: 19 river patrol types, 42 minesweepers, 2 landing craft, 2 auxiliaries, 58 service craft Aircraft (operationaI): 163 (137 jet); 137 jet fighters, 2 turboprop transports, 7 prop transports, 19 turbine heli- copters, 5 piston helicopters Missiles: 14 SA -2 SAM sites (84 launchers); 3 SAM regi- ments (13 SA -2 SAM battalions); National SA -2 force capability is increased by the presence of 2 operational SA -2 sites and 6 operational SA -3 sites which are sub- ordinate to Soviet Southern Group of Forces (stationed in) Hungary. Deployment of SA -4 (6 SA4 battalions) is now in progress for defense of Soviet forces Supply: Produces small arms, ammunition, explosives, light artillery, naval ships and craft, an armored recon- naissance vehicle, some trucks, chemical warfare defensive materiel and small quantities of agents, some types of electronic equipment; dependent upon Communist coun- tries, primarily the U.S.S.R., for other military equipment including radar and missiles Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1972, 9.72 billion forints; about 4.5% of total budget INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (S) III Main Group Directorate (Intelligence and Security Services); Ministry of Interior (commonly referred to as the AVH); 1 Group Directorate of the III Main Group Directorate (Foreign Intelligence Service); II Group Di- rectorate of the III Main Group Directorate (Counter Espionage Service); VKF /II (or General Staff /II Vezer- kari Fonokseg), Military Intelligence Service NO FOREIGN DISSEM W APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110037 -3 .AkPPMC)NfaE3 FC3M MaL-aAk:Sa: 2009/06/16: COMIDINATES Places and Features Referred to in this General Survey (U/OU) COORDINATES o 'N. 1�. Ahaliget (rr sia) 41) 09 I 8 Adony 47 07 is 52 Ady (see of Budapest) 47 33 18 56 Ajka 47 06 17 34 AIgy5 46 20 20 13 Airmlisftizitii 47 43 is 16 Alps (mix) 16 25 10 00 Apafa (rr sta) 47 35 21 40 ApafAja 47 35 21 40 Arad, Romania 46 11 21 10 Asz6d 47 :39 19 30 Bab6csa 46 02 17 22 BAoIna 48 37 17 59 Baia Nlare, Romania 47 40 23 35 Baja 46 11 18 58 Balcony (mix) 47 15 17 50 Balaton (take) 46 �0 17 45 R.I.tembmilAr 16 47 17 40 Places and Features Referred to in this General Survey (U/OU) COORDINATES COORDINATES I 'E. Gyongy6soroszi 47 .10 19 54 Gy5r 47 41 17 38 Gyula 46 39 21 17 llsjd6szot)o.%z]6 47 27 21 24 Halimba 47 02 17 32 Hamburg, W. Germany 53 33 10 00 Saftirikovo, Czechoslovakia 47 40 19 41 Ilatvan 47 55 17 10 Hegyeshalom 47 56 18 -1 07 Neves 47 36 48 30 20 17 21 llidasn6wti 19 17 II0dmvz6v6sArhcIy 46 25 20 Hortabfigy (region) 47 35 21 05 Inota (see of Varpalola) 17 12 18 11 lszkaszentgy6rgY 47 14 IS 1 Sib 46 57 17 25 lzmail, 45 21 28 50 Habheg (-0 47 03 1 7 39 Kalush, U.S.S.R 40 01 .7.1 22 COORDINATES Hi International b magya bounds QQ National capita 1 Megye center APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3 0 I.V. 'E. RAkhegy 47 17 18 111 Rilkosszentmilhiily (.cc of Budapest) 47 32 19 10 116ts6g 47 56 1 08 Rijeka, Yugoslavia 45 21 14 24 Hoszke 46 11 20 03 RudahAnya 48 23 20 38 Saftirikovo, Czechoslovakia 48 25 20 20 Aahy, Czechoslovakia 48 04 58 Saj6 stns 47 56 18 -1 07 Salg6tarjiin 48 07 19 41) Sic ri 47 13 19 17 Siirmell6k 46 43 17 10 Silrviir 47 M, 10 Sitrviz (canal) .16 21 IS 46 ,assnitz, E. Germany 54 31 13 39 Sib 46 22 IS 48 Sib (canalized x1rin) 46 20 18 53 SiMok 46 54 18 03 Hi International b magya bounds QQ National capita 1 Megye center APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3 ^RRMC)VEE3 FOR F2ELEASE= 2009106/16: CIA- ME3RO1 00707M0002001 1 0037 -3 M?Y 'y h Y'n IR..J.` Halimt7a a r' u. r l "r iX. 5 �'f.,. C'. 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