Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
October 25, 2016
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110039-1.pdf5.37 MB
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009106/16: CIA- RDPOl- 00707R000200110039.1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R00020( APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual bans. These chapters� Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbool; omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and thf. Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US. code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B (1), (2), (J). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Clrssification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 Page Page 3. The Kadar regime: "Goulash commu- 1. Communist party 17 nism" at work 5 a. Organization and structure 17 Reorganization of Communist party, initiation Democratic centralism with power t of low -key reformism, restoration of inter- re d derived from lower organs and national image; New Economic Mechanism; o people but in practice localized in top Kadar s success in maintaining domestic sta- leadership; layers from central apparatus bility while loyally supporting U.S.S.R. foreign in Budapest to cells at local level parallel policy directives. to political territorial subdivisions; Party B. Structure and functioning of the government 6 Congress, party conference, urban party 1. Constitution 6 organizations, general membership meeting 1949 Constitution on Soviet pattern, absence for cell. of limitations on state power; Kadar's efforts (1) Parry Congress 17 to adopt a new constitution. Highest organ of HSWP; chronology 2. Structure of government 7 of sessions; statutory functions. All powerful character of extragovernmental (2) Central Committee 18 Communist party, government as principal Responsibility for party affairs be- avenue of party control. tween Party Congresses; representa- a. Parliament 8 tive of party in relations with other Unicameral rubberstamp of party policies; parties, mass organizations, and state theoretical powers; 4 -year term of mem- administration; operations and com- bers; gradual growth in interpellative position; Politburo as controlling sub action. organ. b. Presidential Council 9 (3) Politburo 18 Collective presidency elected from among Locus of power in HSWP� dominant members of Parliament; formal adminis- political leaders as members; respon- trative body to conduct day -to -day me- sibility and control of all party and chanics of government. government affairs. c. Council of Ministers 9 (4) Secretariat 20 Executive organ of government subject to Second most important party execu- members of party Secretariat and Political tive agency; functions and composi- Committee; echnocratic character. lion. 3. Local government 12 Councils at three levels -19 counties and five (5) Committees 20 cities with county status, 97 districts, 1,184 Central Control Committee, National villages and 643 groups of villages; functions Economy Committee, Agitation and and composition. Propaganda Committee; five "working 4. Legal system collectives." a. Legal codes 13 (6) County, district, and lower levels 20 Traditional law similar to common law; b. Membership p 1 Communist efforts to codify civil and crim- Numbers and social makeup; membership innl law on Soviet model, emphasis on policies of party leadership; growth pat- crimes against the state; powers of courts; terns. multitude of investigative agencies. b. Courts 15 c. The decisionmaking process 21 Court system as tool by which Commu- Unquestioned party primacy in deter nists retain power; subordination to Min- mining national policies; utilization of ex- istry of justice; Supreme Court, county pert advice if Soviet interests or internal and district courts, juvenile courts, special party interests do not predominate. courts; composition and jurisdiction. (1) Procedure 21 c. Central People's Control Co.m.nittee 16 Role of Politburo, Secretariat, Central Watchdog over economic activity; invest Committee departments, nonvoting gative authority complemented by puni- experts; binding character of Polit- tive power since 1964; People's Super- buro actions. visors. (2) Important external influences 22 C. Political dynamics 16 "Socialist internationalism" �the ne- Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) as cessity for Hungary to gauge its controlling force in national political life; Kadar's actions to what other Warsaw Part balancing dependence on Soviet Union against nati-)ns will accept; political limita- careful attention to rapport with people. tions imposed by the U.S.S.R. ii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 Page (3) Important domestic factors 23 Popular attitudes; industrial and agri- cultural workers, youth, technocracy, intellectuals; respected pre- Commu- nist leaders. 2. Mass organizations 23 Buffers between party and population; char- acter, missions, P .rty control. a. Patriotie People's Front 24 Extension of party; vehicle to mobilize support for party's program ane,, to dis- seminate propaganda. b. Communist Youth League 24 Purpose of extending party influence among youth; general ineffectiveness. c. National Trade Unions Council 25 Politburo supervised organ to control all trade unions; mandatory membership of all industrial, government, and some service employees; function of assuring increased labor output and productivity; Labor Code of 19 and increased trade union au- thority in representing workers' interests as well as in overseeing management. d. Other major mass organizations 26 National Council of Hungarian Women, National Peace Council, National Federa- tion of Sports Associations, Hungarian Red Cross. 3. Electoral procedures Communist faihire in 1945 election �the only free and democratic election in Hungarian history; suppressiou of opposition candidates and parties and Communist domination of candidate selection and election process through Independent People's Front and the succeeding Patriotic People's Front; liberaliza- tion of nominating and voting procedures in 1967 and 1970. D. National policies Basic goals: maintaining Communist rule, sustain- ing regime in power, preserving domestic sta- bility, maintaining good relations with the U.S.S.R.; reed for cautious, piecemeal innova- tions toward more popuh:r form of communism; necessity to contain international initiatives with- in framework of Soviet policy. 26 Page b. The worker peasant alliance 30 Rakosi's pre -1950 bias favoring industrial worker over peasant; Kadar's successful collectivization of agriculture and efforts to equalize peasant status with that of in- dustrial proletariat. c. Safeguarding improvements in the standard of living 31 Past neglect of consumer interest, Kadar's recognition of need for consumer satisfac- tion; New Economic Mechanism in 1968, problems. d. Expanding socialist democracy 32 Consistent direction despite caution, lack of clarity, and slow pace; credibility as greatest danger. 2. Foreign 33 Ties with U.S.S.R., benefits and restrictions; sycophant repetition of Soviet pronouncements from 1947 to 1956, efforts to reestablish international credentials from 1956 to 1963, endorsement of Soviet position in Communist world since 1965, efforts to expand non -Com- munist relations; support for Soviet stand on European security; unsettling impact of 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; good rela- tions with Austria and Yugoslavia, problems with Romania; support for world Communist goals, involvement in CEMA and conse- quences of New Economic Mechanism; gen- erally good relations with Western Europe; provocative and strained relations with the United Mates from 1945 to 1963, modera- tion and improvement since 1963; membership in United Nations and other international organizations. 3. National defense 38 Orientation toward Soviet and East European defense needs, Politburo control, coordination with Soviet advisers; budget and strength trends; dependence on the U.S.S.R. for mili- tary protection; Soviet troops in Hungary; 28 morale problems in armed forces. 1. Domestic 28 Kadar's successful program of gradual domes- tic reform. a. National reconciliation 29 Official tolerance of private non- Commu- nist views if holders are not openly hostile; failure to accommodate Magyar na- tionalism. 4. Civil defense 39 Task of protecting population from weapons of mass destruction or during civil emer- gencies or natural disasters; training emphasis on evacuation, medical support, subsistence, and comu,unications. E. Threats to government stability 40 1. Discontent and dissidence 40 Minor proportions, safety valves; weaknesses containing potential for instability: necessity to continue to improve standard of living, Kadar's uncertain health, concentration of wealth and privilege in hands of party elite, nationalism and irredentism; general lessening of hostility toward party. iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110039 -1 Page 2. Subversion 41 No known subversive groups; general recog- nition of Soviet determination to crush all challenges to its authority in East Europe. F. Maintenance of internal security 42 Firm party control over complex organization; primary mission of enforcing conformity to dic- tates of party; significant role of secret police in political maneuvering; structural organization of intelligence and police system. 1. Ministry of Interior 43 Control by Kadar supporter; development and functions of: a. III Main Group Directorate (AVH). b. II Main Gi�oup Directorate. c. Frontier Guard. d. Internal Security Troops. Page 2. Other security elements 48 a. Workers Militia 48 b. Industrial Guard Force 48 c. Penal system 48 3. Intelligence 48 a. Nonmilitary intelligence 48 Responsibility of AVH. 3 b. Military intelligence 49 Second Group Command of the General Fig. 2 Staff of the Ministry of Defense (VKF -H). 4. Countersubversive and counterinsur- Politburo members (chart) gency measures and capabilities 50 Failure of security apparatus in 1956 revolt; 4 unknown reliability of regular security organs. Results of Hungarian elections table) G. Selected bibliography 50 Chronology 52 Glossary 56 FIGURES iv APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110039 -1 Page Page Fig. 1 Changes in Hungary's international Fig. 6 Political controls chart) 10 boundary map) 3 Fig. 7 Administrative subdivisions map) 12 Fig. 2 Matyas Rakosi and Imre Nagy Fig. 8 Politburo members (chart) 19 photos) 4 Fig. 9 Results of Hungarian elections table) 27 Fig. 3 Soviet tanks patrolling Budapest Fig. 10 Schedule of domestic reforms table) 29 photo) 5 Fig. 11 Modern apartment buildings photo) 32 Fig. 4 Interrelationship of top party and Fig. 12 Andras Benkei photo) 43 government posts (chart) 8 Fig. 13 Police and security services organi Fig. 5 Parliament in session photo) 8 zation chart) 44 iv APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 government and Politics A. Introduction (S) Under Communist domination since 1947, Hungarv's political development has mirrored, and in some ways helped to shape, the development of relations between dominant Soviet political and economic power in Eastern Europe and the indigenous regimes of the area. 'rhe trauma of the 1956 Hungarian revolt, an explosion of long repressed popular fury against Stalinist practices, served as the point of departure for the gradual, pragmatic reformism of Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar. Kadar's approach, which is closely studied by other Eastern European reformers, has gained Soviet confidence, improved living standards, and main- tained domestic tranquility, but it has not fully tamped down the potentially dang(_;ous nationalism of the Hungarian people. Small, landlocked, and astride one of the main European invasion routes, Hungary since the 16th century has been almost continuously subjugated by major foreign powers. Patterns of domestic rule have been largely shaped by this factor and, indeed, the major traditional task for Budapest leaders has been to arrange acceptable accommodations with dominant foreign powers. The severe limitations of Hungary's endemically inferior power position have precluded the achievement of lasting national autonomy, and the best compromise that the Hungarians historically have been able to attain is dom stic self -rule under the strong political and economic influence of one or another major ally. Such close foreign ties have also been the Hungarians' undoing; in World War 1, as a nominally equal partner in the Austro- Hungarian Empire, Hungary shared the defeat and disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy. When the resulting political chaos impelled the Magyars into World War H on the side of the Axis, a second defeat led directly to subjugation by Moscow. Hungary's subordinate relationship to dominant foreign powers historically has combined with deep social breaches within the Magyar nation to frustrate the growth of democratic political institutions. Ruling elites, whether sanctified by royal charter or Marxist dialectics, have maintained their power and privileges mainly on the strength of their relationship to the dominant foreign power. They have not, however, been able to rule with complete impunity. Populist nationalists, professing to interpret the national will, have always been willing to conspire against those rulers who proved to be tyrannical, ineffective, or too responsive to foreign dictates. Hungary's very modest economic resources also have posed limitations on its independence. Almost bereft of the raw materials needed by its industry, the nation now draws heavily on the massive resource base of the Soviet Union and, as under the Habsburgs, depends on exports of agricultural products to provide the economic basis for its future industrial development. Moreover, Hungary's economic ties t'; Moscow are so comprehensive that even minor shifts in Soviet trade policy could cause serious shocks to the Hungarian economy. The Hungarian experience with military conflicts has been nothing short of disastrous. Hungary's defeat in every major war it has engaged in as an independent or semi- independent state in the last two centuries has imbued the nation with suspicion and cynicism toward such adventures. The peasant aphorism "when elephants fight, only the grass gets hurt" accurately reflects the popular Hungarian attitude toward military solutions. The pre -1956 Communist regime ignored this basic attitude in its zeal to fulfill defense tasks assigned by Moscow. Under Kadar, such ambitious and economically exhausting military spending has been discontinued and the leadership has publicly professed its conviction that the nation can hope to thrive only under it long period of peace in Europe. Budapest is thus vitally interested in the movement toward European detente and disarmament, but its close adherence to Soviet guidelines restricts it from playing any significant independent role. The Hungarians have settled on a less daring course, using the prospects of East -West detente as a reason for �i)ancling political and, more important, economic relations with Western Europe. There remain, however, Soviet restrictions on these initiatives, and APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 Hungarian relations with the major capitalist powers �tht: United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany�arc hindered by Moscow's stance in foreign poliev and economic priorities. Although the international arena is generally closed to unilateral Hungarian initiative, the Hungarians have been allowed freer rein internally. The Kadar regirnc has tapped some of the best ininds available in an effort to devise means of working out i t more effective and humane style of communism within the limit: imposed by Moscow. Budapest's goal is the modernization and perfection of standard Communist methodology into it workable system satisfying real national needs. Economic reforms have alrcadv been successfully introduced, and the line in the sensitive area of political reform �where Soviet interests must be carefully weighed �has been breached. Kadar proceeds gradually and pragmatically, and progress is often retarded by overriding political factors. The viability of this kind of controlled, paternalistic reform is nevertheless still improved, since it has never before succeeded in the Sovici orbit. Over tilt: next decade, the nerve, political acumen, and inventiveness of the I Iungarian leadership and people will be sorely tested as they attempt to match their desires to the real Possibilities of their geopolitical position. 1. The beginnings of modern Hungary Hungary's defeat in World War I produced a precipitous collapse of the nation's essentially feudal structure, and initiated it quarter of it century of political chaos. The collapse of the monarchv in 1917 was followed by the so- called Aster Revolution, which brought it reformist Social Democrat regime under Count Mihaly Karoly into power. The new government was plagued by economic and social disruptions caused by the war and by discord over needed reforms. Meddling by foreign powers and by royalist plotters further �.vcakened Karoly's govern- ment, but its ultimate collapse was due to its failure to create it workable land reform that would have unified the peasantry behind it. With the collapse of Karoly's government, the Hungarian Communist Partv -4 months old at the time but buoyed up by the successes Of the Soviet revolution in Russia seized power, under the leadership of Bela Kun, in a coup on 21 March 1919. Kurt. who had only shortly before returned from Leningrad, initiated an unwise imitation of Lenin's policies without regard for local problems. Kin's fill tionalization of large landholdings angered the peasantry who instead wanted the estates parceled out to them. Similarly, the rising urban bourgeoisie was 2 outraged by the nationalization of private businesses. Economic chaos ensued. and by the end of July 1919 the Republic of Councils was overthrown by Drench and Romanian troops while Hungary's regular army, angered by Kim's policies, stood aside. Bela Kin's Republic of Councils was followed by a succession of weak governments. 'Their effectiveness was further eroded by extragovernmental conservative forces which directed nationwide roundups of Communist and liberal sympathizers, and generally suppressed even the milder aspects of Karoly's reforms. Land was returned to the wealthy landowners and determined steps were taken to restore privileges to the upper classes. During this period Hungary suffered the most significant and lasting of its post -World War I humiliations. As it result of the Trianon settlement 1920) Hungary was forced to accept the loss of 70% of its prewar territory and 60% of its population. Figure 1 shows changes in Hungary's boundaries from 1914 to 1972. The loss changed Hungary from a multinational state ruled by Magyars to an island of Magyars surrounded by newly independent countries in which significant Hungarian ethnic minorities were isolated and, in some cases, treated with hostility. 'rhe'rrianon settlement was to become the major political issue for the next 20 years in Hungary. Revision of the treaty became it national mania which both fueled and cloaked the policies of successive conservative regimes under the regency of Fascist- leaning Adm. Miklos I-lorthy (1920 -44). Impelled by it rise of indigenous fascism that predated even Hitler's rise to power, a campaign for the revision of the Trianon settlement by military force drove the Hungarians directly into the Axis camp at the beginning of World War 11. 'rhe wartime government in Hungary, sponsored by Germany and gambling on an Axis victory, annexed portions of Hungary's pre -World War territory from its neighbors. The price for this miscalcwation was high. When World War 11 ended, the interwar boundaries were restored, and even Hungary's legitimate grievances were, perhaps permanently, swept aside. Hungary, once again on the losing side of a major European conflict, had also sullied its international reputation by participating freely during the last months of the Nazi "final solution' to the Jewish question and in other racist nationalist aberrations under it Fascist government which had replaced Fforthy's independent and lass- tainted government. Moreover, Hungary had the misfortune to be "liberated" by the Soviet lied Armv, and, for the first time in its history, fell under the domination of its traditional enernv, Russia. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP0I-00707R000200110039-1 iq 29 50- m, F Rijeka m -50 15 w Krak6w.' 50 15 N-Y Krak6w Krakow.' 25 CZECHOSLOVAKIA POLAND L vov POUND CZECHOSLOVAKIA POLAND V 0 2' L'vow L' V Brno U.S.S.R A U.S.S.R. U. Vienna vo Vienna MukachiVo vo AUSTRIA AUSTRIA Cluj 'Arad r.b Rije ka Zagreb ROMANIA 0 45 ROMANIA f YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade 20 FIRST VIENNA AWARD-1938 Krak6w.' CZECHOSLOVAKIA POLAND L'voy 'Brno U.S.S.R. Vienna AUSTRIA A Zagreb Rijeka YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade 0 Arad ROMANIA SECOND VIENNA AWARD-1940; 50 is Krakow. 25 POLAND L'vov 1`797PUnel M/Awl. 45 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110039-1 'Arad ROMANIA -Zagreb 7 Rijeka YUGOSLAVIA 45 Belgrade 20 FIRST VIENNA AWARD-1938 Krak6w.' CZECHOSLOVAKIA POLAND L'voy 'Brno U.S.S.R. Vienna AUSTRIA A Zagreb Rijeka YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade 0 Arad ROMANIA SECOND VIENNA AWARD-1940; 50 is Krakow. 25 POLAND L'vov 1`797PUnel M/Awl. 45 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110039-1 2. The Communist era: the early years The establishment of Communist rill(- in Hungary was characterized by an array of political mistakes pe�petratcd by they part leaders. Larger� the products 01 the Soviet- c�outrolled Comintern, these leaders attained power by treacherous methods to which they later pointed xyith pride. Relying largely on the Soviet Red Army and on the Soviet secret police, the party under X1atyas Rakosi (Figure 2) immediately began it forced restructuring of Hungarian political, economic, and social institutions along Soviet lines. Religion, private landownersidl), and traditional cultural ties with the West were sohjected 'o unrelenting pressure by the secret police. Sycophantic praise of the Soviets became the order of the clay, aggravating further the party's mindless disregard of traditional Magyar national pride. Other serious mistakes included Budapest's acceptance of detailed Soviet interference in, and in some cases outright control of, the Hungarian economy. Paralleling these heavyhanded public policies was it series o f vicious intraparty purges which ended in demoralizing and disuniting the leadership as well as the rank and file. Despite the mounting morale problems, there was very little effort by Rakosi either to understand or to ameliorate popular grievances. The first steps toward correcting the situation were taken in response to an alarming lag in th(- national economy i 1955. lunre Nagy Figure 2), it Communist who was obsessed by the failure of Rakosi to work out solutions to legitimate national problems, became Premier in July 1953 and immediate) introduced the so- called New Course, un economic policy designed to improve consumer supplies and encourage workers to produce by relying ci FIGURE 2. Former party leader Matyas Rakosi, "Stalin's best pupil," and former Premier Imre Nagy, nationalist Communist head of government during the 1956 revolt (U /OU) cm incentives rather than force. As it corollary, Nagy took advantage of the confusion after the death of Stalin in March 19:53 to order an casing of police terror. Nagy's program, hoxvvver, was effectively undermined by Rakosi and his henchmen, and in early 1955 Nagy was ousted as Premier. Rakosi's success in choking Nagy's mild reformism proved to be the catalyst for it final buildup of popular pressures that ultimately exploded in the 1956 revolt. Although Rakosi's grip on the Hungarian political situation was finally wrenched loose by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Soviet Communist Party's 20th Party Congress in February 1956, it too late. In the early summer of 1956 the new Soviet lead.�rship pressured Rakosi to resign its party leader, but he passed on his authority to his protege and figurehead Erno Gero, who was it :capable of containing the anti- Stalinist fervor that had by th^n gripped the nation, including the party. Smell groups of students and writers held frequent meetings publicly denouncing the old regime and dernanding full exoneration for victims of the terror. Emboldened by the rise to power in Poland of a more nationalistic regirne in October 1956, and enflamed by emotional appals to Magyar nationalism at horne, Hungarian students and intellectuals took to the streets in spontaneotns demonstrations. 'Ch(- secret police overreacted by firing on the demonstrators, and in late October 1956 the Hungarian revolt was on. 1'h(! Rakosi -Gero regime resigned in the early days of the revolt but it still maintained control over much of the central part' apparatus and secret police. Indeed, Imre Nagy, who was reappointed Premier, was kept virtual prisoner by Rakosi mitil November. In this leadership vacuum, the Hungarian party disintegrated and popular demands for withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and for "neutralism" became it key factor in raising Soviet alarm. Soviet troops, who temporarily withdre% from Budapest under the guise of accepting demands that they leave the country, actually were deployed around the city waiting for reinforcements to arrive. There is strong evidence indicating that Soviet troops never intended to withdraw from the country. Under overwhelming pressure from the insurgents and from the workers councils which had seized control of factories, Nagy was forced to make concessions he normally would have considered excessive. During his few clays of independent authority, Nagy was forced to recognize the validity of workers councils as basic political organizations, to revive o_d non Communist political parties, to announce plans for free elections, and to set it neutral APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 course for Hungary based on withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Soviet troops, by this time heavily reinforced, returned to Budapest (Figure 3) and other insurgent strongholds and crushed the rebel forces by 4 Novernh 1956. Janos Kadar, a former victim of Rakosi's purges who was appointed party leader when Cero resigned, denounced Nagy as a tool of the counterrevolutionaries, and set up a new Hungarian government ender the protection of Soviet troops. The concessions made by Nagy were renounced, and harsh reprisals were ordered against those who had participated in the Nagy government. With the failure of the revolt, Nagy and his cabinet took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, but were later arrested and sent to exile in Romania. Nagy and three other rebel leaders were returned to Hungary and executed on 17 June 1958. 3. The Kadar regime: "Goulash communism" at work Confronted by the extraordinary impact of the revolt our all aspects of Hungarian society, and particularly on the party, the Kadar regime set about the task of reorganizing the Communist party, winning the cooperation of an alienated people, and reestablishing the international respectability of the country. Kadar successfully initiated a low -key policy of gradualism and relaxation that fitted the mood of the people and satisfied the desires of the Soviets. He demonstrated a remarkable willingness to use a pragmatic approach in resolving domestic problems and an ability to preserve a degree of maneuverability in dealing with the U.S.S.R. Despite popular resentment and obstructionism from former Stalinist elements within the party, Kadar accomplished the ex;:eedingly difficult task of reorganizing the Communist party and effecting a limited improve- ment in its popular image. Kadarsoon l gall to flex the political muscle he had gained during his party's rebuilding efforts after the revolt. In 1960 the first amnesty for some of the participants of the revolt was a benchmark of Kadar's growing power. By 1962 he had completely outmaneuvered his Stalinist opposition, expelled Rakosi and his cohorts from the party, and initiated a de- Stalinization campaign that ousted others identified with Rakosi's ru!c� from the party and government. Almost simultaneously, Kadar an- nounced a general amnesty, resulting in the release from prison of most of the remaining rebels of 1956. He also changed the party's relationship with the nation at !arge by reversing Rakosi's aphorism "Those who are not with us are against as" to read "Those who are not against us are with us." As Kadar opened the door for Hungarians to participate more in national affairs, and as he reestablished the international respectability of his regime, he gradually added new advisers mostly of a relatively liberal cast �to his retinue. These more highly educated Hungarian Communists helped in the difficult task of forming a program of political relaxation that would both ease internal divisions and vet stay within the limits acceptable to the Soviets. Building his position gradually on demonstrated successes, Kadar gently pushed the Soviets toward granting him a greater degree of domestic autonomy. Kadar's major structural change to date has been the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), a program of economic reform initiated in 1968. While its general thrust can be traced to Imre Nagy's New Course in 1953, the NEM essentially embodies those theories on decentralizing the economic structure that were suppressed in 1958 by the then still influential Stalinist elements. By 1962, however, a group of talented economic theorists within the party leadership convinced Kadar that the tightly centralized Soviet style economy could not satisfy Hungary's long -range economic goals. Recommendations were studied and tailored to satisfy cautious political criteria before the reform's introduction 6 years later. The reform's initially destabilizing impact on the Hungarian economy was carefully minimized, and the general success of the NEM has been reflected in a significant improvement in the standard of living with a concomitant improvement in the party's relations with the people. Paradoxically, as Kadar's reformist course began to yield fruit, popular anxieties over potential Soviet 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 FIGURE 3. Soviet tanks patrolling Budapest during the 1956 revolt (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 dissatisfaction increased. Part of the reason was Kadar's decision to enter the highly sensitive area of political reforms, in spite of the lessons of the ill -fated Czechoslovak experiment of 1 1968. Arguing that the economic reform called for parallel adaptations in the political arena, regirne liberals began to carnpaign for a more representative parliamentary system, a curling of the extralegal powers of the secret police, and a constitutional reform, that would ratify changes since the Rakosi era. Although Kadar repeatedly has assured both Moscow and domestic conservatives that he intends to shun the ill -fated Czechoslovak heresy of 1 M8, footdragging at horne and Kadar's own inherent �_Mtion vis -a -vis Moscow has made the movement toward political reforms glacially slow. Despite a gradual accumulation of reforms, the Ilungarian Communists are still dedicated to maintaining their power and retaining the means to protect it. The regime ultimately defends its prerogatives through the subtle manipulation of all the weapons available to a modern totalitarian state; the police, propaganda organs, and the judiciary are fully responsive to political direction by the party. Kadar, however, prefers to work in it sophisticated way, using indirect controls in order to avoid creating popular resentment and hostility. Where possible, persuasion and incentive are used rather than pure coercion. '['here is a growing degree of sincere observance of the principle "socialism with a human face," but the regime has not permitted any illusions us to the nature of its response should its monopoly of power come into question. Although the strict laws from the Rakosi cra have fallen into disuse, they remain oil the books, and few Hungarians doubt that the regime's reaction to any serious antistate activity would be severe. Kadar's success in effectively controlling Magyar nationalism is probably his strongest asset in dealing with Rlcacow. Kadar makes no concessions to vindently anti Soviet Magyar ,nationalists and tries drastically to limit even the more innocuous expressions of Magyar pride. 'this policy is the single greatest obstacle to wider popular identification with his regime, and Kadar has not vet found a formula that would allow him to channel suppressed nationalism in it politically henign direction. The core of Kadar's working relationship with Moscow is his maintenance of domestic stability and his loyal support of the Soviet Union's foreign policy directives. This all but total orthodoxy in Hungary's relations with the non- Communist world is unpopular with the great majority of Hungarians. Nevertheless, the isolation of the people from the West has been 6 eased, and most Hungarians welcome the U.S.S.R.'s interest in East -West detente. As it result, tensions within Hungary over the pro Seviet alignment of Kadar's foreign policy are at a relatively low ebb. Hungary's relations with the Communist world, however, are another matter. There is considerable evidence of active regime pursuit of its national interests within Communist bloc councils, particularly in economic matters having an important impact on domestic developments. Hungary has thus been vocal in calling for reforms of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), and has also led the way in the development of Eastern European cooperative agreements with individual Western firms. Neverthe- less, cooperation is the keyword; Hungary does not and, for the foreseeable future, will not indulge in the kind of flamboyant international foreign ,licy that Romania pursues to the irritation of the l S.S.R. Kadar and most of his immediate advisers appear committed to consumer welfare and political stability as the bases of their rule. These goals allow little room for daydreams about full national independence, but they do seem to have diverted the fervently nationalistic Magyars from backsliding into the sort of fanatic�m that has deeply scarred their recent history. The continued success of this compromise, however, depends in large measure on a wide range of potential developments in international affairs that are outside the regime's control. The Hungarians, however. have learned several lessons from their tragic past and have clone a relatively responsible job in preparing for the future. Kadar himself has said, "Let our reputation be 'the Hungarians know what they want and what they want they are able to achieve.' We want socialism, communism, progress, and peace in the world. This is what we are fighting for and, according to our powers, we contribute to it." B. Structure and functioning of the government (U /OU) 1. Constitution Oil 20 August 1919 the Hungarian Communist regime, replacing the quasi democratic Constitution of 1946, adopted a constitution based on that of the U.S.S.R. which provided the framework for the Sovietization of the country. Since then, the Constitution has been amended on numerous occasions �the most recent in April 1972 �but its basic character has remained unaltered. As arneuded, the Constitution declares the IIungarian People's Republic to he a socialist state in which "all power is APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 exercised by the working people.' Hungarian citizens are guaranteed the right to work, rest and recreation. protection of health, and universal education. 'I'll(! Constitution states that citizens are equal before the law and that women enjoy equal rights; that liberty of conscience ar.d freedom of worship are safeguarded; that the stale guarantees (although other provisions qualify these guarantees) freedom of speech, press, and assembly, the right to organize, and the freedom and inviolability of the person, home, and correspondence; and that discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, or nationality is forbidden. Minorities are guaranteed the carne rights as those extended to Hungarians, and provision is made also for the instruction of minorities in their own language in separate educational facilities. The nations political leaders �and indeed the citizens th-niselves �do riot view the Constitution as the suprerne law of the land or as an effective limitation on the power of the government. Moreover, although the government structure appears to he patterned in part after that of if Western political democracy, there is neither a constitutionally established system of checks and balances nor a separation of governmental powers. Provisions that appear to support the principle of popularsovereignty, democratic government, and civil 1; have little significance because of the absence of parallel provisions for their effective implementation and because of vague forrn. which in effect permit whatever police actions the government deerns necessary to preserve its monopoly of power. Similarly, provisions regarding the inheritance and acquisition of property are circumscribed by other provisions which hold that private property and private enterprise must not run "counter to the public interest.' [n the period immediately following the 1956 revolt the regime paid little attention to constitutionally entimercated civil rights, and, although in recent years it has avoided blatant contravention of these provisions and has attempted to control the population by means more in keeping with the wide latitude provided in the Constitution, numerous restrictions on the activities of all Iungarian citizens still exist. Contrary to the expectations of many observers, the April 1972 revisions of the Constitution failed to introduce any far reaching changes into the fabric of political life. Earlier suggestions that the revised Constitution strengthen Parliament's legislative competence and underwrite legal guarantees for citizens' rights never reached fruition. Perhaps the most notable addition is the acknowledgement for the first time that the Communist party is "the leading force in societv." Ili practice, constittitional distinctions of structure and function fade at the apex of the Hungarian administrative hierarchy. Supreme authority since 1956 has been held by Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Party Central Committee. Kadar also held the governmental post of Premier from 1956 to 1958 and from 1961 to 1965. In June 1965 he relinquished the premiership bt,' remained within the government as a member of the Presidential Council. Immediately subordinate to Kadar is a group of handpicked assistants who hold the rnain command posts of both party and government. The frequent practice of announcing national policy in joint decrees of the part\ and government illustrates the integration of these lines'of command. 2. Structure of government The most characteristic feature of the Hungarian Government is the existence of an all- powerful extragoverrimental organization, the ruling Com- munist party. Acting as "the leadership of the working class," the party has a commanding role in the economic, political, and social life of the country. Basing its pervasive role on a vague constitutional provision, the party dictates the functions of government, formulates national policy, and supervises the implementation of that policy without any system of direct popular checks. The government structure, therefore, must be examined in terms of its constitutionally undefined relationship to the dominant Communist party, which operates without any binding legal restraints. Despite the primacy of the party's position, however, the government is the principa! avenue through which the party's control over the nation is manifested. The national government is highly centralized and, as depicted in Figure 4, some key party leaders hold simultaneous positions in the government hierarchy. This form of dual responsibility was much more prevalent in the past, but Kadar has acted gradually to reduce the most visible aspects of high -level part influence in government. This reduction, however, has been more apparent than real since 27 of the top 45 government officials are members of the party's Central Committee and actively pursue party goals in their state functions. In any case, few Hungarians are fooled into believing that state authority is independent or distinct from party authority. 6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 PARTY GOVERNMENT (600,000 members) CENTRAL COMMITTEE PARLIAMENT (101 members) (349 members) SECRETARIAT POLITICAL COUNCIL PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS COUNCIL Q members) (13 members) (24 members) (21 members) Losanczl President Kadar, Kadar Kadar First Secretory Aczel Aczel Biszku Blszku Kamocsln Komocsin Fock Fock, Premier Nyers Nyers Nemeth Nemeth Faber Faber, Deputy Premier Gaspar spar, Vice President Kellar Kallal Benke Apra Names Ovary Pullal FIGURE 4. Interrelationship of top positions, HSWP and government, March 1972 (U /OU) a. Parliament According to the Constitution, the highest organ of state authority is the Parliament, which theoretically exercises "all the rights deriving from the sovereignty of the people," and to which all governmental agencies arc responsible. The unicameral Parliament is elected every -1 years, and in 1972 was composed of .352 members. The last pialiamentary election was held in 1971. In extraordinary circumstances Parliament may extend its mandate. :inch an extension took place in 1971, when, after the 1956 revolt, the Kadar regime did not feel sufficiently confident to face even Communist -style elections. Parliament (Figure 5) is empowered by the Constitution to make laws, determine the national budget and econonai;! plans, create or abolish ministries and define the scope of their activities, declare war, conclude peace, and grant amnesties. In practice, however, it has little actual power, and it functions as a rubberstamp legislature, endorsing laws 4 and decrees aiready formulated by the party. Such legislation may then he introduced by any member of the Parliament, by the Presidential Council, or by the Council of Ministers; most legislation is initiated by the latter two bodies. 'There have been indications since 1957 that committees of the Parliament, which generally meet in closed session, have played a growing role in the formulation of legislation, but the work of the committees is still far front decisive. Also, during each plenary session of Parliament there have been a few more interpellations of government leaders by the deputies. These interpellations are caaefully staged, however, with questions submitted in advance, and generally concern minor issues rather than overall government policies. In rare instances deputies have questioned members of the Council of Ministers about their stewardship and have rejected their answers. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 FIGURE 5. Parliament in session in the assembly hall (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 Only one of these interpellations, however, has resulted in a change in ministerial policy. Since 1965, there has been a small but gradually more vocal body of opinion dissatisfied with the impotence of Parliament and wanting its role expanded. Results have been sow in coming, but some basic improvemerts have been made. For example, parliamentary commissions are now given time for a critical review of the governments budget requests, and the annual budgetary session has come to be a sounding board `or some legitimate complaints about the porforrnance of individual ministries on the domestic scene. The most fundamental measure affecting Parliament to date was the change in the electoral law providing for representation by constituencies. This contrasted sharply with the previous pro forma election of all parliamentary delegates on the basis of a single national slate, on w hich all names appeared in all parts of the country. Other changes are being discussed, but, until the party is ready to let Parliament use its legislative authority, no Hungarian is prepa-,ed to view it as a serious political force. In the meantime, proponents of parliamentary reform are likely to concentrate on minor changes calculated to highlight the minimal degree of responsibility and integrity which the orga nization has attained so far. b. Presidential Council The Parliament elects it Presidential Council from among its members. This nominally collective presidency consists of a president, two vice presidents, a secretary, and 17 members. The president acts as titular head of state, the spokesman for the government at public ceremonies and in greeting other heads of state. In the intervals between sessions of the Parliament, the Presidential Council as a whole is empowered to carry out all the functions of the larger body except changing the Constitution. Decrees of the council are later ratified by Parliament. In addition, according to the Constitution, the Presidential Council is empowered to call general elections, convene the Parliament, hold plebiscites on matters of national importance conclude and ratify international treaties, appoint diplomatic representa- tives and receive letters of credence of foreign diplomats, appoint high -level civil servants and ranking officers of the armed services (in accordance with prevailing statutes), grant awards and titles instituted by Parliament and authorize the acceptance of foreign titles and orders, grant pardons, modify or annul any central or local law or ordinance which infringes on the Constitution or is detrimental to the "interests of th- working people," and dissolve anv local organ of government. The Constitution states that the Presidential Council is responsible to Parliament and must render aj account of its activities to Parliament, which has the theoretical right of recalling the entire council or any member of it. Despite the impressive array of powers entrusted to the Presidential Council, it exercises little real authority' or initiative in formulating policy. Its primary function in practice appears to be the conduct of the day -to -day mechanics of government, under provisions and procedures established by the party and enacted by the rubberstamp Parliament. Several top p arty leaders including party chief Kadar �arc members of the council, thus insuring party control. Most of the other members of the council elected by the Parliament in April 1971 are politically insignificant and exert no personal influence over government policies. The Presidential Council is assisted by a secretariat which acts as liaison with the party on the working level and employs a small staff of experts who prepare the documents coming before the council. The council meets about once a week to formalize decisions forwarded by the party or other government organs and to conduct the administrahve business of the government. Some of its decrees are promulgated in the official Hungarian Gazette (Magyar Kozlony); others, which are not published, usually deal with cases involving individuals and such matters as loss of citizenship or clemency actions. Some of the unpublished decrees are classified secret and these include such matters as appointments of high -level civilian or military authorities. Since about 1949 the Presidential Council has reportedly formalized the appointment of only the highest level persons, previously chosen and approved by the party; the official designation of new deputy ministers, field grade officers, judges, and attorneys of courts martial is said to have been transferred to the competence of the Council of Ministers. c. Council of Ministers The executive functions of government rest with the Council of Ministers, which in practice is the dominant government body. Members of the council are elected and recalled by Parliament and, according to the Constitution, may not simultaneously be members of the Presidential Council. In July 1972 the council was composed of the Premier, four deputy 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 premiers, 16 ministers, and four state office chairmen with ministerial rank, I the ministries were: Agriculture and Food Construction and Urban Development Culture Defense Finance Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade Health Heavy Industry Interior Internal Trade Justice Labor Light Industry Metallurgy and Machine Industry Transportation and Postal Affairs 'For a current listing of key government officials consult Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, pukiishecl monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. Figure 6 illustrates the general relationship of party and government units. Although in 1971 only two members of the Council of Ministers held simultane- ous positions in the Party Secretariat or the Politica! Committee, the influence of the latter two bodies over the Council of Ministers is pervasive and decisive. This influence is achieved through the subordination of the council's activities to the initiative and supervision of the individual members of the Secretariat and Political Committee. 'These individuals usually specialize in one or more areas of government activity and have the active support of Central Committee functional departments in developing policies. The Secretariat and the Political Committee issue binding and detailed guidance to the Council of Ministers on important and on many seemingly trivial topics. For the most part, this "shadow government" remains in the background and only occasionally issues public statements on important questions. HUNGARIAN. SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS COUNCIL OF PARLIA PARLIAMENT SUPREME YfllL MINISTERS COURT Political Presidential Council Committee Premier Supreme Prosecutor's I Office Secretariat Ministries and First Central Secretary Agencies Committees Military Colleglurn Central Control. Committee Military COUNTY Courts 40 DISTRICT PARTY COUNCIL County 8 CONFERENCE Prosecutor COMMUNAL Executive County Executive Administrative Comminee Court --p Committee Agencies Chairman District Prosecutor Secretariat District Juvenile Firs Court" Court Secretary BASIC I Party Members Party Meeting Directorate ELECTORATE Broad Party Control over ull Agencies Appeal NOTE: The County level includes Budapest and other cifies; the District level imkdes large towns and B udopesf didriNr, Nominal Election includes and the Communal keel irtdudes town didricls. Control or Appointment Parlial Control Nominal Responsibility "Judges alerted by County and District Council. FIGURE 6. Structure of political controls (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110039 -1 Despite this complicated system of duplicate bureaucracies, the Council of Ministers is the actual focal point of government and is the clearing house for the collection of information, implementation of policy, and solutior of problems which filter up from the inlividn