NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 19; HUNGARY; THE SOCIETY

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HUNGARY
CONTENTS
This General Survey supersedes the one dated
May 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.
Page
A. Historical background 1
Hungary, a state since the 10th century, the
Magyar tribes, Catholicism, the Golden Bull,
occupation by the Turks, domination by and
revolt against the Habsburgs, agrarian founda-
tions of society, growth of industry, social status,
changes under the Soviet occupation, role of the
intelligentsia, national survival.
B. Structure and characteristics of the society 3
1. Ethnic composition and language 3
Origin of the Magyars, physical characZrris-
tics, the Magyar tongue, a homogeneous pop-
ulation, minorities, the Jews, the Gypsies.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Page
2. Social structure
Coalition of disparate social entities to form
towns, semifeudal social structure, changes
in society to conform to Soviet model, social
stratification under the Communists, shifts in
employment, increase in the female labor
force, social mobility, competence and party
loyalty, preference for urban life, problems
in sociological research and planning.
3. National attitudes
Strong nationalism with antagonisms and
Western orientation, rebellions, pessimistic
materialism, influences of Western modernism
and West German progress, antagonism to-
ward Slays and Romanians, attitudes toward
Americans and Soviets, anti- Semitism.
C. Population
1. Composition 8 E.
About 10,400,000; composition of ethnic mi-
norities.
2. Population trends
Low rate of annual growth, high rate of
abortions, the Ratko Wave, child allowance
program.
3. Vital statistics
Rising death rate since 1967, comparison with
other Eastern European countries, marriage
and divorce, ratio of males and females,
median age, problems related to declining
birth and death rates.
4. Population density
Third highest density in Eastern Europe; mi-
gration to urban centers.
4
7
Page
4. Income 18
Average wages in state sector, wages in
selected industries, differentials f it branches
and skills, bonuses and fringe Benefits, real
wages, standard of living under the economic
reform, patterns of consumption.
5. Labor problems 19
Possible decline in growth and resultant un-
employment, inefficiency, scarcity of man-
power, job shifting by younger workers, need
for more skilled workers.
6. Labor legislation 21
Responsibility of workers to the state, relaxa-
tion of policy after 1956 revolt, negotiations
between management and labor, expanded
role of the trade unions, raise in status of col
8 lective farms.
'0
Health 22
Poor facilities, control by public health stations,
beds and doctors, poor hygienic practices, cost
of treatment, inadequate sewerage facilities, im-
pure water, unsanitary practices in handling food,
common infectious diseases, chief causes of death,
immunizations, nervous diseases, control by the
Ministry of Health, level of nutrition, animal
diseases.
F. Welfare and social problems 24
1. Social security and public welfare 24
Origin of concept, control by state, coverage,
12 provisions of and contributions to the pension
system, aid dispensed, persons not covered,
increases in allowances.
5. Emigration 13
Decrease since World War II, visits to the
West.
D. Manpower, labor conditions, and labor
relations 13
1. Manpower resources 13
Labor force of 5 million, participation rate,
rates for females, the aging labor force, unem-
ployment, labor reserve.
2. Characteristics of the labor force 14
Replacement of agriculture by industry, the
industrial force, percentage in state industry,
armed forces and security services, class of
workers, long -term plans.
3. Productivity and working conditions 15
Means for increasing productivity, use of man-
power, aging agricultural force, relocation of
workers, controls on mobility, job shifting
within industry, employment offices, pro-
visions for foreign employment, safety, incen-
tives to increase production, slowdowns, dis-
ciplinary measures, social courts, reduction in
working hours.
ii
2. Social problems 25
Effect of forced imposition of communism.
deterioration of moral authority, incidence of
crime, punishment, increase in juvenile crime,
civil cases, suicide, alcoholism, frustration
among young people, drugs, prostitution.
G. Religion 28
Introduction of Christianity, role of the Prince
Primate, affiliation of the population, attacks on
the church, arrest and exile of Cardinal Mind
azenty, reduction of religious opposition, state
jurisdiction over religious matters, attitude of the
Kadar regime, resumption of repressive measures,
high prestige of the church, the aging prelates,
greater freedom of priests, situation of smaller
religious communities, the Jewish community,
ecumenism.
H. Education 32
1. Background 32
Government control, traditional practices,
transformation of the system, combination of
study and work, provisions of the 1965 law.
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Page
2. Educ, tional system 33
Divisions of training, education for work, in-
equalities in opportunities, school enrollment
and facilities, weaknesses, shortage of teach-
ers, student activities and attitudes.
3. Adult education and illiteracy 36
Goals, extent, about 3% illiterate.
Artistic and cultural expression 37
1. Literature 37
Reflection of nationalism, association with
political events, the poet Sandor Petofi,
literary freedom, Endre Ady and the symbolist
school, the interbellum period, literary con-
ferences, controls and writers since World
War II, trends since the 1956 revolt, forms of
censorship, interest in polemical nationalist
literature, Western influences, accommodation
between intellectuals and the regime, new
literary journal, availability of Westem litera-
ture, literary criticism.
Page
2. Music and drama 40
Original nation.' music of Bela Bartok, folk
music of Zoltan Kodaly, popularity of the
theater.
3. Fine arts 41
Historical foreign influences, experimentation
with styles, golden age of painting, Western
European influences since World War I, Com-
munist criteria since World War II, Kadar's
cultural policy, folk arts, libraries and mu-
seums.
J. Public information media 43
Changes in the press, newspapers and periodicals,
coverage by and freedom of monthly journals,
news agencies, radio, television, government con-
trol, quality and variety of broadcasts, propa-
ganda by the regime, radio from abroad, the pub-
lishing industry, film industry, motion picture
attendance, legitimate theater.
K. Selected bibliography 49
FIGURES
iii
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Page
Page
Fig. 1
Lajos Kossuth photo)
2
Fig. 15
Per capita consumption of alcohol
Fig. 2
Active earners by social class (table)
6
(chart)
28
Fig. 3
Hungarians burning Eoviet litera-
Fig. 16
King Stephen photo)
29
ture photo)
7
Fig. 17
Saint Stephen's crown photo)
30
Fig. 4
Vital rates chart)
9
Fig. 18
Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty photo)
30
Fig. 5
Age -sex distribution chart)
9
Fig. 19
Educational system chart)
33
Fig. 6
Vital rates, compared with other
Fig. 20
School curriculums table)
34
countries (chart)
10
Fig. 21
Total school enrollment chart)
35
Fig. 7
Population by major age groups
Fig. 22
Model school photo)
35
chart)
10
Fig. 23
Sandor Petofi (photo)
37
Fig. 8
Population density map)
11
Fig. 24
Gyula Illyes photo)
38
Fig. 9
Population by administrative district
Fig. 25
Bela Bartok photo)
40
(table)
12
Fig. 26
Medieval chalice (photo)
41
Fig. 10
Labor force by economic activity
Fig. 27
Reconstruction of Castle Hill photos)
42
(table)
14
Fig. 28
Folk art (photo)
44
Fig. 11
Consumption patterns for selected
Fig. 29
Native costume photos)
45
years (table)
20
Fig. 30
Selected newspapers and peri-
Fig. 12
Adults convicted of crimes table)
26
odicals table)
46
Fig. 13
Juveniles convicted of crimes table)
27
Fig. 31
Radio and TV subscribers chart)
48
Fig. 14
Civil court cases table)
27
Fig. 32
Publishing, by type of book chart)
48
iii
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The Society
A. Historical background ;U /OU)
In contrast to some of its immediate neighbors,
Hungary has existed as a state and a cultural and
political entity since the 10th century. This
cohesiveness was hard won, in spite of numerous
invasions, occupations, unsuccessful revolts, and two
world ears. The fight to preserve the nation under
difficult circumstances is deeply ingrained in the
Magyar national consciou and it abides as an
active political factor in pr sent -day Hungary.
Originating in northeastern Europe and during their
prehistory subject to considerable Turkic influence,
the nomadic Magyar tribes settled in the Danube
basin toward the end of the ninth century. Originally
it society of semiwarlike nomads, the tribes coalesced
in the middle of the 10th century in a loose kingdom
under the leadership of Prince Arpad �known as
Arpad Apam, Arpad our father, even by contemporary
Hungarians. During the latter half of the 10th century
Christian missionaries arrived in the area, and about
the year 1000 King Stephen embraced Roman
Catholicism, which became the state religion. This
strong tic to the more developed West accelerated the
growth of a feudal monarchy and quickly over-
whelmed the remnants of the Magyar tribal system.
The influence of the Catholic Church grew through its
identification with the monarchy and its dominance
of the educational and legal systems. This influence
continued essentially unabated into the 20th century.
From the 13th to the early 15th centuries
Hungarian dynasties grew in power, culminating in
the reign of Matyas Corvinus, at that time one of
Europe's most active royal patrons of culture and
education. The economic and military power of the
Hungarian kingdom dominated central Europe from
Croatia to Silesia in the north and from Vienna to the
Romanian Carpathians in the cast. The promulgation
of the Golden Bull in the early 13th century, which
was similar to the Magna Carta issued at about the
same time, marked the beginning of the growth of a
constitutional- parliamentary system, which was
established much earlier in Hungary than in other
countries of Eastern Europe. The cohesion of the state
was ultimately upset by rebellious local barons, and in
1526 a gradual debilitation of the n;onarchv's
effectiveness ended in the defeat of the Hungarians by
the Ottoman Turks at Mohacs' and the opening of the
Great Plain to Turkish armies. Budapest itself was
seized in 1541, and a century and a half of harsh
occupation began.
The Turkish occupation, which lasted until 1699,
not only halted development but also actually reduced
the country to a situation similar to that found by the
original Magyar tribes. Deforestation and depopula-
tion of the Great Plain erased centuries of efforts t
make it arable. The political structure was replaced by
an Ottoman system whose most efficient function was
the collection of taxes, and the Hungarian peasants
lost every semblance of legal protection from
exploitation. Despite this bleak oppression, some
centers of Hungarian culture endured. The Szeklers, a
fiercely independent Magyar subgroup in Transil-
vania, effectively fought off the Turks and in the end
were instrumental in liberating Hungary from the
Ottomans. Moreover, the church was allowed to
function throughout the occupation, and, as in other
areas of the Empire, some domestic leaders were
allowed to continue in authority if they swore
allegiance and delivered taxes regularly to the Turks.
The devastation of Hungary was so complete,
however, that rebuilding the national economy and
political structure took several centuries.
Following the expulsion of the Turks, Austrian
Habsburg influence predominated for the next two
centuries. The I ungarians, nobles and peasants alike,
who had contributed heavily to the liberation of the
homeland, were disappointed in Austria's failure to set
up home rule. Throughout the Habsburg domination
the feudal system in Hungary was in turmoil, and
enmity between landed gentry and peasants
frequently broke out into bloody revolts which divided
the Hungarians and helped to extend Vienna's rule.
The revolt against Habsburg domination sparked in
1848 by the idealist- nationalist Lajos Kossuth (Figure
1) was a major part of the democratic revolutions
'For diacritics on place names see the list of names at the end of
the chapter.
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throughout Europe in that year. Strong anti- Slavic
attitudes among the Magyars were reinforced when
Tsarist Russian troops aided Austria in supressing the
184849 revolt; the crushing of the revolt by Soviet
troops in 1956 seemed to many f ungarians 'a tragic
instance of history repeating itself.
During the major part of their recorded history most
of the Magyar population survived by engaging .n
subsistence -level agriirultttre. Small -side industrializa-
tion did not corne to llungary until 1850, and it was
not until the closing years of the 19th ventury that
private artisans and businessmen hecame an
important social class. As a result, the social structure
has traditionally rested on agrarian foundations.
Smallholder peasants, landless agricultural laborers,
artisans, a small bourgeoisie, an administrative
professional intelligentsia, and a handful of medium
and large landowners were the main groups in rural
and provincial society. By the end of the 19th century,
however, Budapest and its surroundings had
developed into one of the three most important
industrial areas of eastern Europe. During the period
of industrialization the pressure of the labor influx
front the countryside on industrial employment was
kept raider control, because til landowners were
anxious to retain surplus agricultural labor on the
land. For this reason the skilled Hungarian industrial
worker led it tolerable prewar existence, hilt this was
maintained mostly at the expense of the unskilled
workers and the agricultural laborers. The skilled
workers developed considerable organizational
cohesion and strength during the first four decades or
a
the 20th century and were able to maintain their
Social Democratic affiliated trade unions until 1941,
in spite of increasing and finally overwhelming
German Nazi influence and pressure. '['his was also
true from 1945 until 1948, when the Social
Democratic Party was forcibly fused with the
Hungarian Communist Part', and the unions were
reduced to instruments of the Communist regime.
During the period of the Austro- Hungarian (Dual)
Monarchy (1867 -1918) and the Horthv Regency
(1919- 4.4), social status, once its economic basis was
estoblished through fortunes made in commerce,
industry, or banking, was usually formalized by at
least a token purchase of land and adoption of the
landowners way of life. Conversely, status once based
solely on landownership could he maintained to some
degree by government employment coupled with
appropriate soda, indicators of genealogical
association with the landowning gentry. The
imposition of communism after World War 11 brought
about basic economic changes, rapidly transforming
this social structure into it system closely patterned on
the Soviet model. The propertied classes of Hungarian
society were dispossessed: first, by means of land
reform, which distributed the large and medium -sized
agrarian holdings among landless and small peasants,
though only as a step preliminary to forced
collectivization; and then, through gradual nationali-
zation of all industrial and commercial enterprises,
with the exception of it small private sector consisting
of craftsmen and artisans. The influence and prestige
of the churches were markedly reduced, trade unions
were turned into instruments of government control,
and intellectual, cultural, and social organizations
were transformed from outlets of popular expression
into tools of the Communist regime.
The occupation of Hungary by Soviet troops, the
subsequent infringement of individual liherties, and
the imposition of political, economic, social, and
cultural ideas and institutions patterned on Soviet
models intensified traditional antipathies toward the
Russians. The closure of parochial schools, restrictions
on religious education, and stringent controls on
religious activities provoked sharp resentment among
the Roman Catholic and Protestant population,
especially in rural areas. The suppression of the 1956
revolt further exacerbated tile: hostility of the
I Iungarians toward the Soviets. The Kadar regime's
pro- Sovict political and economic orientation is a
continuing obstacle to its obtaining widespread
national support and is a dangerous incentive to
renewed expressions of Magyar nationalism.
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FIGURE 1. Lajos Kossuth (1802 -94), leader
of 1848 War of Independence (U /OU)

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The Hungarian intelligentsia, by tradition an active
source of nationalist political agitation, is well
represented in the historical pattern of defiance and
ultimate tragedy. For example, the idealist Kossuth
fl:d from his country to America in 1849 after the
failure of the revolt he inspired. Sandor Petofi,
Ilung_ ;ry's most revered poet, also participated
actively in the 1848 -49 revolt, only to be subsequently
slain by Russian troops; in 1956 his memory inspired
the intellectual upsurge that helped articulate for
Hungarians the goals of the uprising of that year.
flungary*s greatest composer, Bela Bartok, fled to the
United States (hiring the Fascist years and died in New
York City in 1945. Irnre Nagy, the father image of the
1956 revolt, was arrested and subsequently executed in
1958. Jczsef Cardinal Mindszenty, Primate of the
Roman Catholic Church in Hungary, was convicted
of "treason in 1949 and spent 6 years in prison and 15
years in U.S, diplomatic refuge in Budapest before
finally resigning himself to expatr_ation.
As a result of this tradition, Hungarian intellectuals
have resisted, though not completely frustrated,
Communist attempts to impose narrow ideological
restrictions on cultural expression and to elevate
supranational concepts over strictly national ideas.
Since 1961 the regime has all but abandoned the
arbitrary and vindictive cultural policies which
characterized the Stalinist era and the reconstruction
period after the 1956 revolt. In place of these
repressive measures, the Kadar regime uses a system of
censorship combining subtle threats and incentives to
limit c.utright hostility to the barest minimum.
Controlled expressions of discontent with the existing
situation and the self- inhposed silences of major
literary figures are the usual forms of protest employed
by leading members of the cultural milieu.
Communist rule has succeeded in eliminating
organized political resistance but has failed to weaken
the national will to resist, at least passively. Despite
the basic social, political, and economic changes that
have modified most traditional Hungarian values,
imposed an alien ideology, and altered the social
structure, the national idf-titity and individuality of
the Hungarians have not bten undermined. Indeed,
till' people seem to have evolved a technique of
national survival which alternates sporadic, open
defiance with nearly pervasive, sullen public apathy
toward the C:ornmunist leadership and its policies�"a
technique which frustrates efforts by the regime to win
Meaningful popular support for its goals and makes
Hungary an uncertain quantity in the East European
Soviet oriented Communist states.
B. Structure and characteristics of the
society (U /OU)
1. Ethnic composition and language
Hungarians (Magyars) are descendants of an ethnic
group which once lived in northeastern Europe
between the big bend of the Volga river and the Ural
Mountains, and included the Magyars, ancestors of
the present -day Finns, and other Finno Ugrian
Peoples. There is some evidence suggesting that the
Magyars originated beyond the Urals in Asia, but this
view is still disputed and needs further corroboration.
The Finno -Uaft tribes began dispersing probably
toward the middle of the second millennium B.C., and
by the end of the ninth century A.D. the Magyar
tribes had settled the area of Pannonia, in the Danube
basin. Over succeeding centuries, the Magyars
successfully resisted repeated attempts by neighboring
Slavic tribes to assimilate them, but they themselves
assimilated various indigenous peoples. 'Thorough
Magyarization of various latecomers to the area
enabled the Hungarians to preserve their unique
language and customs.
In their physical characteristics contemporary
Magyars closely resemble other Eastern European
peoples. Because of Mongolian, Tartar, and Turkish
inroads from the 13th to the 17th century, a few
unusual ethnic types do exist among the Magyars, but
similar ethnic anomalies may also he found among
other Eastern Europeans. Racial mixing brought
through migrations, conquests, and Magyarization of
minority groups has fairly effectively assimilated
Magyar physical features with those of neighboring
peoples. An estimated 2,5 of the population retains
some vestiges of Magyar physical characteristics, but
they are rarely found in pure form. The pure. Magyar
physical .ype tends to be dark haired, of medium to
short stature, and dark complexioned. The incidence
of such a type is more prevalent in the countryside
than in the large urban areas.
The Magyar language belongs to the Ugrian branch
of the Finno- Ugrian group of languages and is
characterized by the prevalence of suffixes and
postpostves, instead of the prefixes and prepositions
that characterize the Slavic, Romance, and Teutonic
1- .nguages of Furope that belong to the Indo-
European linguistic group. The Magyar tongue,
therefore, bears no resemblance to neighboring
languages (except for limited reciprocal ihse of
borrowed Slavic, Turkish, and Romance words), and
even its familial relationship to modern day Finnish is
3
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remote, permitting no mutual understanding. The
uniqueness of the Magyar tongue in Eastern Europe
has contributed heavily to the cultural and national
unity or` the Hungarian people.
The most common foreign languages spoken are,
according to the respective degree of usage, German,
Russian, English, and French. Despite compulsory
Russian language instruction in the schools, English
and French have become increasingly popular
electives, as Hungary's role in international
organizations has grown.
As it result of the loss of two- thirds of its territory,
including all border areas, after World War I,
Hungary lost its multiethnic blend. Present -day
Hungary is relatively homogeneous in that ethnic
minorities constitute only about 6.6% of the total
population. According to regime figures only 1.8% of
the population speaks a language other than
Hungarian ungarian as its native tongue.
The largest single minority is German and numbers
a little more than 250,000. Ethnic Germans still cluster
in a few scattered settlements akrng the western
boundary of Hungary, but, for the most part, they
have been assimilated into the industrial complexes of
the north central legions and the mining centers. The
Gypsy minority, somewhat smaller, is dispersed
throughout the country. Smaller groups of Slovaks,
Romanians, Serbo- Croats, and others �such as
Ruthenes and Ukrainians inhabit areas contiguous
to their national homelands. The 1949 Constitution
and subsequent legal guarantees theoretically insure
that minorities shall have the opportunity for
education in their native tongues and for the
development of their unique cultures. These provisions
appear to have been honored by the Communists, but
relatively little has been done to insure economic and
political equality with ethnic Magyars. Except for the
Gypsies, however, the minorities probably are content
With the curr.nt situation, especially in view of past
periods, when rigid Magyarization and suppression of
minority cultures were state policy.
The Jewish minority, which numbered about
I00,000 before World War II, now amounts to about
70,000, of which 90% lives in Budapest. Despite deep
seated anti Semitic attitudes among the population,
there are no overt restrictions on educational or career
opportunities for Hungarian Jews who are willing to
integrate. Orthodox communities which resist
assimilation, however, are frequently targets of low
level harassment. Jews still constitute a disproportion-
ately high percentage of Communist party member-
ship, and from 1945 to 1956 the top layer of the party
4
contained a large number of Jewish Communists who
had spent the war years in Moscow and had risen to
high positions during the Stalin era. Since the de-
Stalinization of 1956, most top party posts have gone
to Magyars, although there are significant and
continuing exceptions to this rule. In 1971, for
example, the regime promoted it Jew, Peter Valyi, to
deputy premier responsible for relations with the
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA).
This was the first promotion of any Eastern European
Jew to such a high office since the mid- 1960's.
The tenaciously separatist and conservative Gypsies,
so romanticized in the West, constitute an
embarrassing problem for the Communist regime.
Thev are a distinct ethnic group, with their own
language (Romany), tribal relationships, and
traditional customs. Despite persistent efforts by the
regime to settle them in permanent homes and
improve their cultural and social being, most Gypsies
continue to cling to a seminomadic way of life,
e,,isting in makeshift settlements where living
conditions are subnormal.
Since World War 1I the population growth rate
among Gypsies has been double that of the rest of the
population. Of the 60,000 Gypsies reported as working
in 1969, only 27,000 in fact had regular permanent
jobs. In 1969 between 30% and 50% of the children in
state -run children's homes and shelters were Gypsies.
In addition, an estimated one -third of the Gypsy
population is illiterate compared with the national
average of less than 3% �and many Gypsy children
remain in school no more than 3 or 4 years. The
official Hungarian policy of forced integration of the
Gypsy population, announced in 1961, has generally
been frustrated by indifference among local
authorities and by widespread popular ('Magyar
antagonism toward the Gypsies. The policy has been
abandoned in favor of a more selective program of aid
to Gypsies who willingly try to adjust to a settled life.
2. Social structure
Until the end of World War II Hungary�more
than any of its neighbors� preserved its traditional
social stratification, which was rooted in feudalism.
Society was divided into an elite ruling class composed
of the landed aristocracy and the clergy, a sizable class
of gentry or lower nobility, and the numerous,
impoverished peasantry. Local landed magnates
exercised almost total authority over the areas they
controlled and virtually isolated their domains from
neighboring regions as well as from the central
government.
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In the ntid 13th century nnuay of these formerly
.lisparate social entities coalesced to form towns; the
development of nuinerous such c�ontrrauuities
encouraged interurban contacts an d trade and
constituted one of the major factors of lasting benefit
to they economic and social structure. 'Throughout
stleceeciing centuries the landed aristocracy and tite
gent'} remained the dominant social forces; it was not
until the� latter half of the 19th century that an
indigenous middle class of artisans and businessmen
began slowly to develop and to assume it limited
degree e.f social significance. 'The major social and
Political ch;utges that followed \World War I brought
about the development of new and modified social
classes� whose nuvrnbe:s enjoyed status on the ba:,is of
wealth, education, and uwcupation. Nevertheless, their
social standing and national influence were greatly
restricted by the still dominant landed aristoc�racv.
Ilungary social structure in the interwar years
remained a semifeuclal system: ['lost peasants were
landless, unorganized, and u tied "Ca ted; the industrial
working class was small and exerted little influence;
power was concentrated in the hands of an elite which
controlled the land or was descended from people: who
had once controlled it. Tile econoric depression and
the repressive practices of the upper classes during the
1930's further limited social [nobility. Although a
number of political parties and social organizations
sought to remove or modify ti social and economic
barriers, little progress was trade, and scant
enc�ouragentent was given to the reformers by the
nations leaders. After the depression the country
achieved a degree of prosperity, and the growing
middle classes had, on the whole, a pleasant life,
despite mane unsolved social problems. housing
conditions were relatively good, food was plentiful,
and arts and sports flourished.
World War 11 and the German occupation brought
major social disruptions which heralded the end of
Hungary's stratified, sernifeudal social system. At the
end of the war, Hungarian Communists, working in
concert with the occupying Soviet troops, exploited
the unsettled conditions to take over and consolidate
nolitic�al power. By 19 17 they h:ad begun s
cally to reconstitute Hungarian society after the Soviet
Model. The Communists dispossessed tilt� landed
aristocracy, industrialists, financiers, small bttsi-
nessrne�n, and artisans; compelled religious, social, and
intellectual groups to submit to state control;
outlawed organized political opposition; and
generally restricted social and economic advancement
to those who stet COMMMMist political requirements or
could be Mseful to the party. Sinc: then, the party auad
government elite and intellectuals have formed the
apex of the new social pyraniid; Mext are th middle
level party membe an increasing) influential group
of nonparty economists and technical experts,
government bureaucrats, enterprise managers. army
officers, skilled workers, and professional people; at
the base are the semiskilled, and unskilled workers and
peasants, who are yirtwally %%ithout political power
despite their numerical superiorit
hungary �like other Communist countries �is
developing rigid social stratification, ,.although it
theoretically has it classless society. The social elite is
composed of the technocrats and the intelligentsia; its
children are disproportionately represented in the
uniycrsities and generally replenish the most
prestigious positions. At the botlorn of tile social scale
are the unskilled agricultural and nnanuad laborers,
who take little part in the cultural life of the nation
and whose children rarely get beyond secondary
schools. Those who manage to climb socially and
economically tend to become even more class
conscious, more jealous of prestige and social
prerogatives �a "mot.veau riche'* mentality than
those long accustomed to life at the upper levels of the
ocial scale.
Since 19:30 llungarian society has undergone a
major rest ratification. The change has occurred in the
reduction of the agricultural labor force and
tremendous growth in the number of white- collar
workers. As of 1971 there were 4.7 times as manv
white- collar and twice as many nonagricultural [)file
collar workers as in 1930. From 1960 to 1970 the
agricultural labor force was reduced by about half as a
result of the socialization of agriculture, the migration
of younger people to cities, and the retirement of older
peasants. The steady increase of the white- collar labor
force over these years reflects the growth of the
intelligentsia and technocracy, as society shifted more
and nwre to an industrial base. The growth of this
social group decelerated between 1966 and 1970,
however, and may be stabilizing at about 26% of the
active wage earners. Figure 2 illustrates shifts in
employment patterns.
A social phenomenon of the postwar period has
been the considerable augmentation of the work force
by women. The acute manpower shortages of the
immediate postwar years, the low salaries of most
workers (which make it husband's wages inacle(uate� to
maintain it family), and the general Communist
theory of female emancipation have all contributed to
the sharp increase in the female labor force. As of
December 1970, women comprised 4I.ti`.' of socialist
industry's labor force. I lowever, wages paid io wornen
5
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FIGURE 2. Distribution of economically active population by social groups (U /OU)
(thousands)
are often IWi. to 2Ki lower than those paid to males,
and opportunities for employment or advancement in
certain fields are severely circumscribed. The regime
has shown an unusually open attitude toward
women's rights and has dedicated itself to raising, as
much as possible, the status of women in society.
Under the Communist regime social mobility has
been stimulated by the expansion of the economy and
by rapid industrialization. The size of the industrial
working class doubled between 19.19 and 1963, largely
because of the increased number of peasants, youths,
and women who sought employment in new
establishments. During the same period, the regime
imposed discriminatory policies favoring park
members and the former "exploited class" of workers
over persons of bourgeois origin and even the
technically competent. The criteria of party
membership and social origin, however, proved
inadequate to cope with the many technical programs
of the econorny and the persistent need for skilled
manpower; as it result, the Kadar regime gradually
deemphasized such factor:: in determining career
advancement and granting educational opportunity.
Positions of importance in industrial enterprises have
[)(-come available to technically skilled nonparty
personnel, and social origin has been abolished as a
determinant for admission to higher educational
institutions.
The policy of national reconciliation under Janos
Kadar has emphasized the need for part� and
nonparty members to work together in order to
achieve the goals of the economy, and great stress has
been placed on the assignment of competent personnel
to leading economic positions, regardless of party
affiliation.
At the Ninth Party Congress, in November 1966,
Kadar reaffirmed his commitment to national
reconciliation, once again upgrading experts over
party loyalists. In essence this move assured openings
for more technically oriented individuals to take an
active part in the management of the economy. It also
caused anguished cries from party stalwarts, who
feared loss of their favored status if education and
expertise were further upgraded as yardsticks for
promotions. The regime's periodic fluctuations in its
public attitude toward this question stem from the
contradictions involved in attempting to implement
Far ranging economic reforms without advancing
parallel reforms in the political system. Kadar seems to
have decided on a course aimed at pacifying party
dissidents, while gradually increasing the role of the
experts. The New Economic Mechanism (NEM),
which was inaugurated in 1968, contains the seeds of
an eventual confrontation between political
expediencies and economic priorities.
Another aspect of social stratification is the contrast
between life in cosmopolitan Budapest and rural
communities. The understandable popular preference
for living in Budapest or Other urban centers has not
been diminished by regime efforts to restrain
movement to the cities. Some intellectuals prefer
manual work in Budapest to pursuing their professions
in the countryside, and at least 20% of the workers
interviewed in a 1967 survey indicated that they took
a cut in pay to live: in Budapest.
Until the early 1960's describing Hungarian society
was at best an amorphous task because of the lack of
Objective data and the tortured ideological
justifications imposed on sociological studies.
Ignorance Of and indifference to objective sociological
problems were common among the party leadership,
particularly during the Stalinist period, and these
factors were, in part, instrumental in fostering the
disaffection which exploded into the 1956 revolt.
During the early stages of his leadership, Kadar
concentrated On rebuilding the party and state
apparatus from the ravages of the revolt. Having
achieved stability in the early 1960'x, Kadar became
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NONAGRICULTURAL
AGRICULTURAL.
BLUE- COLLAR
WHITE-
COLLAR
T(IrAL
YEAH
Nunlher
"ercent
iii tlllll)er
Percent
Number
Percent
NUN111 ER
1030.........
2,025
54
1,410
89
272
i
3,737
10.11.......
2,160
51
1,725
41
:31.
8
4,202
1949
2,190
54
1,:95
36
400
10
4,085
1960
1,751
37
2,211
46
798
17
4,760
1963
1,:361
29
2,386
51
902
20
4,649
1068
1,011
21
2,641
55
1,136
24
4,791
1970...:
912
18
2,802
56
1,287
26
5,001
are often IWi. to 2Ki lower than those paid to males,
and opportunities for employment or advancement in
certain fields are severely circumscribed. The regime
has shown an unusually open attitude toward
women's rights and has dedicated itself to raising, as
much as possible, the status of women in society.
Under the Communist regime social mobility has
been stimulated by the expansion of the economy and
by rapid industrialization. The size of the industrial
working class doubled between 19.19 and 1963, largely
because of the increased number of peasants, youths,
and women who sought employment in new
establishments. During the same period, the regime
imposed discriminatory policies favoring park
members and the former "exploited class" of workers
over persons of bourgeois origin and even the
technically competent. The criteria of party
membership and social origin, however, proved
inadequate to cope with the many technical programs
of the econorny and the persistent need for skilled
manpower; as it result, the Kadar regime gradually
deemphasized such factor:: in determining career
advancement and granting educational opportunity.
Positions of importance in industrial enterprises have
[)(-come available to technically skilled nonparty
personnel, and social origin has been abolished as a
determinant for admission to higher educational
institutions.
The policy of national reconciliation under Janos
Kadar has emphasized the need for part� and
nonparty members to work together in order to
achieve the goals of the economy, and great stress has
been placed on the assignment of competent personnel
to leading economic positions, regardless of party
affiliation.
At the Ninth Party Congress, in November 1966,
Kadar reaffirmed his commitment to national
reconciliation, once again upgrading experts over
party loyalists. In essence this move assured openings
for more technically oriented individuals to take an
active part in the management of the economy. It also
caused anguished cries from party stalwarts, who
feared loss of their favored status if education and
expertise were further upgraded as yardsticks for
promotions. The regime's periodic fluctuations in its
public attitude toward this question stem from the
contradictions involved in attempting to implement
Far ranging economic reforms without advancing
parallel reforms in the political system. Kadar seems to
have decided on a course aimed at pacifying party
dissidents, while gradually increasing the role of the
experts. The New Economic Mechanism (NEM),
which was inaugurated in 1968, contains the seeds of
an eventual confrontation between political
expediencies and economic priorities.
Another aspect of social stratification is the contrast
between life in cosmopolitan Budapest and rural
communities. The understandable popular preference
for living in Budapest or Other urban centers has not
been diminished by regime efforts to restrain
movement to the cities. Some intellectuals prefer
manual work in Budapest to pursuing their professions
in the countryside, and at least 20% of the workers
interviewed in a 1967 survey indicated that they took
a cut in pay to live: in Budapest.
Until the early 1960's describing Hungarian society
was at best an amorphous task because of the lack of
Objective data and the tortured ideological
justifications imposed on sociological studies.
Ignorance Of and indifference to objective sociological
problems were common among the party leadership,
particularly during the Stalinist period, and these
factors were, in part, instrumental in fostering the
disaffection which exploded into the 1956 revolt.
During the early stages of his leadership, Kadar
concentrated On rebuilding the party and state
apparatus from the ravages of the revolt. Having
achieved stability in the early 1960'x, Kadar became
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seriously interested in long -range planning, and the
Official attitude toward sociological rese�areli began to
change. In 1962, Andras Ilegedus, a Stalinist officivi
in the Rakosi era, advanced the first public call f r international events radio
was the most widely used source, while the press was
slightly more influential for domestic news. The
percentage of the sample's respondents identifying one
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FIGURE 28. T "n art of decorating walls is handed
down from or aeration to another in the Kalocso
region of the Greg Plain (U /OU)

FIGURE 29. Traditional peasant dress. The bride in the villa%,e or Tord wears the
Motyo costume for her wedding. (U /OU)
or more media as the major source of their information
is shown in percentages in the followi.ig tabulation:
NOTE �Many respbndents named more than one
source.
About one- fourth of all radio receivers are located in
Budapest. In 1972 Hungary operated II AM and
seven FM transmitters, of which four AM and two PM
were located in Budapest.
'I'V facilities have been expanded dramatically since
1960 Figure 31). In January 1970 one -third of tile 'I'V
subscribers lived in Budapest, where the central
transmitter is located. Hungary began experimental
color broadcasts with French- Soviet SECAM
equipment in March 1969. The disc of the SECAM
system facilitates cooperation with other Wa saw Pact
countries that have adopted it.
1'hc radio and 'I'V network is administratively
,ubordinate to the Government Information Bureau of
the Council of Ministers, with the Ministry of
Transportation and Postal Affairs haying jurisdiction
over technical facilities and operations. Hungary
belongs to Intervision, an ?astern European and
Soviet regional network which coordinates exchange
of programs. Occasionally programs are also
exchanged with Western Europe's Eurovision
network.
Both the quality and the variety of radio and 'I'V
broadcasts have improved since 1960, although they
remain far below Western standards. In the early
1960's authorities consciwisly attempted to raise the
cultural level of their programs in order to frustrate the
growth of "pop" music and other Western influences.
As of 1972, however, Hungary's 'I'V schedule
presented a broad mixture of educational, cultural,
and light entertainment programs. Many educational
and cultural programs, including the Leonard
Bernstein young peoples concerts, were broadcast in
schoolrooms. Such U.S. 'I'V programs as "Bonanza"
46
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WORLD
DomESTIC
SOURCE
EVENTS
EVENTS
Radio
80
44
Newspapers
66
46
Television
23
8
Own experience
na
27
Friends, relatives
2
0
Other or no answer
2
Total
�173
�134
NOTE �Many respbndents named more than one
source.
About one- fourth of all radio receivers are located in
Budapest. In 1972 Hungary operated II AM and
seven FM transmitters, of which four AM and two PM
were located in Budapest.
'I'V facilities have been expanded dramatically since
1960 Figure 31). In January 1970 one -third of tile 'I'V
subscribers lived in Budapest, where the central
transmitter is located. Hungary began experimental
color broadcasts with French- Soviet SECAM
equipment in March 1969. The disc of the SECAM
system facilitates cooperation with other Wa saw Pact
countries that have adopted it.
1'hc radio and 'I'V network is administratively
,ubordinate to the Government Information Bureau of
the Council of Ministers, with the Ministry of
Transportation and Postal Affairs haying jurisdiction
over technical facilities and operations. Hungary
belongs to Intervision, an ?astern European and
Soviet regional network which coordinates exchange
of programs. Occasionally programs are also
exchanged with Western Europe's Eurovision
network.
Both the quality and the variety of radio and 'I'V
broadcasts have improved since 1960, although they
remain far below Western standards. In the early
1960's authorities consciwisly attempted to raise the
cultural level of their programs in order to frustrate the
growth of "pop" music and other Western influences.
As of 1972, however, Hungary's 'I'V schedule
presented a broad mixture of educational, cultural,
and light entertainment programs. Many educational
and cultural programs, including the Leonard
Bernstein young peoples concerts, were broadcast in
schoolrooms. Such U.S. 'I'V programs as "Bonanza"
46
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FIGURE 30. Selected newspapers and periodicals, 1970 (U /OU)
NAME
PLACE OF
PUBLICATION FREQUENCY
CIRCULATION PUBLISHER
Newspapers:
DF1.MAGYAII0RSZAO (Southern Hungary) Szeged............ Daily
DUNANTuI.I NAPLO (Transdanubia) Journal)
Pecs
....d0............
Es-rt HIRLAP (Evening Herald)
Budapest..........
..do............
EszAKMAC:YAROnsz. %u (Northern Hungary)
Miskolc...........
do............
HAJOu- BIIfAnINAPLO (Ilajdu- Bihar County Journal)..
Debrecen..........
do............
IIF:rFOI HIREK (Monday News)
Budapest..........
\Weekly...........
MAGYAR HIRLAP (Hungarian Herald)
....do............
Daily.............
Niec.YAH NF:\IZET (Hungarian Nation)
....do............
....do............
NEPH.IDSF:REC; People's Army)
....do............
Week] v...........
NEPSZARADSAG People's Freedom)
....(lo............
Daily.............
NF.P8ZAVA (PPOple'S WOice)
do............
do..
RADIO F.8 TELF:YIZao UJSAG (Radio and Television
do............
Weekly'...........
News).
Sz.iam) Fom) (Free Land)
do............
do............
Periodicals:
:11.Fol.D IL owlamU
Debrecen..........
Monthly..........
ELET ES IRODALOM (Life and I
Budapest..........
Weekly...........
Fwym.o (Observer)
....(10............
....do............
IFJU KONIMUNIST:\ (I'dung Communist)
.(t0............
Monthly..........
Ifjusagi Magazin (Youth Magazine)
.(lo............
....d0............
JELENKOR (The Present. Age)
Pecs..............
....do............
KATOLIKUS SZO (C'at,holic %%'Orld)
Budapest.........
Biweekly..........
KERESKEDMAII SZFM1.F: (C'(.:nmcrcial Review)
..do............
Quart.erly..........
KoIrrARS (C ontemporary
do............
Monthly..........
Kozc ;.lznns.0 ;I SzF:au.t: (Economic Reyic%v)..........
.do............
do............
KRITIKA Criticism
....do............
....do............
KULKERESKEDELENI Foreign' 1'raule)
....do............
....do............
LUDAS MATY (Matyi, the Gooseboy)
....do............
Weekly...........
NIAGY.ua IF.IUBAG (Hungarian Youth)
.(lo............
....(to............
MAGYAR JOG (Hungarian Law)
....do............
Monthly..........
11,000 Csongrad County Party Committee and Szeged City
Party Committee.
68,000 Baranya County Party Committee and County Council.
252,000 Budapest Party Committee.
52,000 Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (IISN1'P), Borsod
County.
53,000 Ilajdu -Bihar County Party Committee.
211,000 "Supports policy of the Patriotic People's Front."
48,000 Government.
111,000 Patriotic People's Front.
na NI nistry of Defense.
756,000 1 ungarian Socialist Workers Party.
277,000 National Trade Unions Council.
808,000 Itungarian Radio and Television.
373,000 Patriotic People's Front.
.a Independent literary journal.
25,000 The major independent literary journal.
28,000 Independent review of economic policy and statistical
analysis.
na Journal of the Central Committee, Communist Youth
League (KISz).
226,000 7'outh Journal for Teenagers, published by KISz; began
publication in November 1965.
na Independent literary journal.
na Journal of the regime sponsored Catholic Committee of
the Nation Peace Council.
na Journal of the Domestic Trade Research Institute.
13,000 Literary journal of the Hungarian Writers Federation.
na Journal of the Economics Institute, Hungarian Academy
of Science.
na Journal of the Literary history Institute of the Academy
of Science, the Hungarian Literary History Society, and
the Itungarian Writers Federation; critiques of Hun-
garian and world literature.
na Journal of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce.
590,000 Independent, popular, illustrated satire magazine.
226,000 Youth Journal of KISz.
no Journal of the Hungarian Lawyers Federation.
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MAGYAR KOZLO\ Y do............ Irregularly.........
MAGYARORSLAG (Hungary) ....do............ Weekly...........
MAGYAR TUDOMANY (Hungarian Science) ....do............ :Monthly..........
MOZGO VILAG (Moving World) ....do............ ....do............
.NIUSZAKI ISLET (Technical Life) ....do............ Biweekly..........
NAGYYILAG (Great World) Miskolc........... Monthly..........
NAPJAINK (Our Days ....do............ ....do............
NEPNUvF,LF.s (Popular Culture) Budapest.......... ....do............
NOK LAPJA (Women's Weekly) ....do............ Weekly...........
OHSZAG VILAG (Land and World) ....do............ ....do............
PARTELM (Party Life ....10............ Monthly..........
POLGARI V EDFLE.NI(Civil Defense) ....do............ ....do............
,%ATISZTIKAI SZF%11,E (Statistical Review) ....do............ ....do............
TARSADALNII S7.E \II.n (Social Review) ....do............ ....do............
TISZATAJ (Tisza Region Szeged............ ....do............
na
121,000
na
na
na
17,000
na
na
610,000
224,000
95,000
na
na
36,000
na
The Official Gazette, published by the Council of
Ministers.
Independent political journal dealing primarily with inter-
national affairs.
Professional journal of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences.
Literary journal for young writers.
Journal of the Federation of Technical and Natural
Science Associations; for and by the technical intel-
ligentsia.
Independent philosophical journal.
Independent literary.
Official organ of the Ministry of Culture; intended as a
practical aid to cultural workers.
Journal of the National Council of Hungarian Women.
.Journal of the Hungarian- Soviet Friendship Society.
Party organizations journal of the Central Committee,
HSWP.
Journal of the National Headquarters of Civil Defense.
Official statistical journal of the Central Statistical Office.
Party theoretical journal of the Central Committee,
HSWP.
Literary journal of the Southern Writers Group, Hun-
garian Writers Federation.
Independent, popular, illustrated journal.
Independent Jewish religious journal.
Journal of Catholic religious affairs, published by Actio
Catholica.
Independent literary journal.
Domestic social science journal of the Society for the
Propagation of Scientific Knowledge (TIT).
Atheist propaganda journal of TIT.
TUKOR (The Looking Glass) Budapest.......... Weekly........... 164,000
UJ ELF:T (New Life do............ Semimonthly...... na
UJ E\InER (New Man ..do............ Weekly........... est. 61,000
UJ IRAs (New Writing ....do............ Monthly.......... 17,00)
VALOSAG Reality) ....do............ ....do............ na
VILAGOSSAG Light) ..Ito............ ....do............ na
NO'T'E- -Daily newspapers do not publish on Monday, except Esti llirlap, which does not publish on Sunday.
no Data not available.
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Millions
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
FIGURE 31. Radio and television subscribers (U /OU)
and the "Flintstones" have been dubbed into
Hungarian and are shown regularly. Hungarian
officials admit that there is pressure from viewers for
more situation comedies and adventure series. Wi
television was first introduced to Heagary, ante,,:. -;s
near the Austrian border were turned toward Viem
now, the story goes, the Austrian frontier sets are tuna
in to Budapest.
Despite the increasingly sophisticated approach of
the regime to political and social issues as reflected in
better radio and TV programing, the propaganda
content of most media is still pervasive. There is no
good measure of its effectiveness. It can be said,
however, that inasmuch as propaganda accurately
portrays reality and concrete achievements, it is
accepted. Insofar as it reflects regime goals,
particularly support of international Communist
goals, it has not been accepted, even by many rank
and -file party members.
In domestic propaganda, the regime uses the media
to persuade the population to accept Hungary's
alliance with the Soviet Union, to remind the people
of the party's primacy over society, to hail the
"superiority" of the "socialist system," to denigrate
Lnany things Western, and to press fol further
participation in the pursuit of regime goals. Now that
the 1956 revolt is receding into history, especially as
far as youth is concerned, the amount of propaganda
concerning the origins of the revolt (reactionary
counterrevolutionaries at horne aided by U.S. Fascist
imperialists abroad) has decreased. Instead, domestic
propaganda is directed at what the regime considers its
most pressing problems, such as the ideological
training of voting people, getting them to make a
personal commitment to Hungarian society;
countering "negative" Western ideological and
cultural influences; and pushing the achievement of
48
economic goals. Counterreligious and atheist
propaganda, never very effective, has been
abandoned.
Radio serves as the principal medium for the
dissemination of information directed into Hungary.
The chief broadcasters are the Voice of ,1imerica,
Radio Free Europe, and the British Broadcasting
Corporation. The primary purposes of Western
broadcasts are to maintain a semblance of a Western
presence among the Hungarian people, keep alive
traditional friendliness toward the West, and combat
the image presented by regime media of developments
both within Hungary and in the outside the world.
The full effectiveness of Western broadcasts into
Hungary cannot be determined, but most Hungarians
seem to view them as a useful means of crosschecking
the information supplied by other media. Hungary
stopped jamming Western broadcasts in February
1964.
The publishing industry consists of 16 publishing
houses, all run by the state. In 1970 they produced
28,000 works in 85.5 million copies (including such
items as maps and sheet music). Publishing houses
printed 4,763 titles in 47 million copies in 1970, a ratio
of 47 titles per 100,000 citizens, which is surpassed in
Eastern Europe only by Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia. Figure 32 depicts the distribution, by
type, of books printed in 1970.
The output of the film industry, highly developed
and internationally respected prior to World War II,
considerably diminished in quality under the
Communist regime. The subordination of artistic
elements to ideological objectives, the dismissal of
talented but politically unreliable personnel, and the
establishment of elaborate bureaucratic production
NUMBER OF TMES
COPIES IN THOUSANDS
222
JUVENILE 4,400
678
SCIENTIFIC 1,300
655
EDUCATIONAL
11,100
1,010
TEXTBOOKS
15,800
1,525
PROFESSIONAL 3,300
673 1 1 1
1
LITERATURE
10,900
1 II 385
Prole 8,700 II
11
I I
1 it
I
III.. 136
Poetry 700
I
1 49
I I
tl
Drama 250
I
I
103
I
Belles Lettres 1,250...
1
NOTE. "Other" government pu 6litolions, ek.,
about 3,500,000 copies
FIGURE 32. Publishing, by type of book (U /OU)
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1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

procedures severely hampered the development of the
industry during the 1950'x. Since 1961, however, there
has been gradual improvement in the quality of
Hungarian films, commensurate: with a decrease in
ideological content. Several films have won awards at
international film festivals in both Eastern and
Western Europe.
The rapid spread of television, however, has led to
decreased motion picture attendance. For example, in
1967 Hungary had 4,448 motion picture theaters, but
by 1970 there were only 3,879. In 1960 over 140
million people patronized movies, but in 1970 the
number dropped below the 80 million mark. Despite
this pattern, in 1970 the state film industr., produced
64 feature films, compared with 41 in 1969, and onlv
23 in 1965. In 1970, 392 documentaries and newsreels
were also produced in Hungary, and 151 foreign films
were imported. Of this number 67 were imported from
non Communist cout,tries, and 25 of these were U.S.
films.
TI.' i- Kaemate theater in Hungary has traditionally
received wide support and attendance from the
literate population. There are 20 major theaters in
Budapest and 1.1 in provincial cities, with a total
capacity of 13,088 and 8,269 respectively. During
1970 Budapest theaters gave 5,049 performances, and
Provinci theaters gave 6,940 performances,
compared with 5,500 and 7,700 respectively in 1967.
As with movie attendance, the small decline is
probably due to the growth of television. Foreign plays
predominate in the Hungarian repertoire, with
Western plays being consistently the biggest box office
successes.
K. Selected bibliography (U /OU)
There is an exhaustive literature on premodern
Magyar history and society, but most of it is
unavailable in English translation (most often cited
among these works are Geza Roheim's Hungarian
Popular Beliefs and Customs, Ignae Acsadv's History
of the Hungarian Serfs, and E. Lederer's Structure of
Hungarian Society Before, the Middle Ages. Ferene
Eckhardt's Short History of the Hungarian People
London, 1931) is probably the best English- language
introduction to the premodern period.
For the modern period, C. Z. Macartnev's History
of ,Modem Ilunga,y, 1929 -45 (two volumes, London,
1957) is the standard classic. For an interpretation of
Hungarian history, politics, and culture from the
regime point of view, see the mammoth Information
Hungary, edited by Ference Erdei, the late Vice
President of the Hungarian Academv of Sciences
(Oxford, 1968)
Gyula Illyes' People of the Pus --ta (Budapest, 1967)
is an excellent sociological portrait of rural peasant
society before the 1930's, by one of the most gifted
Magyar writers of this century. Nicholas M. Nagy
Talavera's The Green Shirts and the Others (Stanford,
1970) offers a thorough treatment of the rise of fascism
in Hungary from 1919 until 1945. Hugh Seton-
Watson's East Europe Between the Wars, 1918 -41
(Cambridge, 1946) puts Hungary in the perspective of
surrounding events and powers in this period.
There is a paucity of objective literature on the
temper and direction of Hungarian society since the
Communist takeover �and especially since the 1956
revolt. Paul Zinner s Revolution in Hungary (New
York, Columbia, 1962) is generally considered the best
treatment of the revolt itself and has two excellent
sections (over half the book) on the rise of communism
from 1945 until 1956. Revolt of the Mind by Tomas
Aczel and Tibor Merav (New York, 1959) is an
excellent treatment of the role plaved by writers and
intellectuals in fomenting the revolt, as is Istvan
CsicseryRonay's Revolution of the Poets (Vienna,
1957).
There is an abundance of literature on current
attitudes and social problems. An interpretation of the
artistic intellectual mood is in A. Alvarez, Under
Pressure: The Writer in Society, Isast Europe and the
US (Penguin, Baltimore, 1965), which contains
interviews with leading Hungarian writers. I�or the
casual student, a general flavor of contemporary
Hungary can be gleaned from the mass consumption
magazine Hungarian Review and the literary
sociological journal New Hungarian Quarterly, both
of which are available in English. The latter often
Publishes articles dealing with such specific problems
as birth, crime, and housing, as well as poetry, fiction,
and book reviews. The government itself publishes the
annual Hungarian Statistical Pocketbook in both
Hungarian and English. In addition, the catalog
Books from Hungary, published quarterly, lists all
current Hungarian works available in English
translation.
49
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CONFIDFNTIAL
Places and features referred to in this chapter (U/OU)
COORDINATES
o ,N, o IE.
Bekesesaba 46 41 21 06
Budapest 47 30 19 05
Danube( strm) 45 20 29 40
Debrecen 47 32 21 38
Duna6jvuros 46 59 18 56
Gyo" r 47 41 17 38
Hodmezo" vilsurhely 46 25 20 20
Kaposvur 46 22 17 48
Kecskemet 46 54 19 42
Miskolc 48 06 20 47
M ohncs 45 59 18 42
N yiregyhaza 47 57 21 43
pees 46 05 18 14
`est (sto nl Budapest) 47 30 19 05
Sonwxy 46 07 18 19
Szeged 46 15 20 10
Szekesfehcrvbr 47 12 18 25
Szolnok 47 11 20 12
Szom b%thely.. I 47 14 16 37
Tard 47 53 20 37
TatahAnv+I 47 34 18 25
Veszprem 47 06 17 55
50
CONFIDENTIAL
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