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SECRET SOf i OS /CP Guinea May 1973 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in .i bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. Thesa chapters Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all ccuntries, are produced selectively. For small cc,lntries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverag, may be bound into one volume. Supplementing the General Survey is the NIS Basic Intelligence Fact book, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key sta- tistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations. Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those pre- viously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid. A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the Inventory of Available NIS Publications, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issu 7.; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, catalor j tng, and utilization. Initial dissemination, additional copies of P.IS units, or separate chapters of the General Surveys can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency. The General Survey is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and dissemi- nated by the Central Intelligence Agency. WAR \I \G This document contains infe affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of �tie 18, sections 793' and 794 of the US code, as amended Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by low. CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFI- CATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATFGORIES 5B (1), (2), (3). DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 WARN ING The NIS is National lrelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions _�o marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 (J"N'h:R-1L SL'RVEll' CIIA19 :Rti CO'�\TR) PROFILE Integr.trd perspective of the subject country Chronology Area Brief Summary -tap Tilt�: SOCII I'1 Social stmeture Population Labor Living conditions and social problems Health Religion Education Artistic expres- sion Public information CM I:RNMI:'s f M) POLITICS Political evo- lution of the state: Governmental strength and sta- bilih Structure and function Political dynamics National policies Threats to stahility The police Intelligence and security Countersub- versive measures and capabilities THE VCONOMY Appraka11 of the economy is Its structnre� agriculture. forestry, fisheries, feels and power, metals and minerals, manufactnring and construction l3omestie trade Economic policy and development Manpower International (-co- nomic relation, �1 \Sl)(M ATlO\ .V \1) TFILFCO`. M \CA- TIONS Appraisal of systems Strategic mobility Railroads Highways Inlilll(I waterways Ports Merchant marine Civil air Airfields 'Tele- communications Mli -HART (:1:U(:Lt:11'lll Topography and cli- mate Military geographic regions Strategic areas Internal routes Approaches: land, sea, air UNIJ F(MCES The d4ense establishment joint activities Ground forces Naval Forces Airforces Paramilitary This General Survey supersedes the one tinted Jule 1969, copies of chicle should he destroyed. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 Guinea The Decline of a Revolution 1 Promises, Problems, and Farancia The Guineims and 'their Cotintr% Unique Leader, Uni(pie System No alignment 14'ith a List to Port The Years Alwad Chronologyy li Area Brief li Summary Map ......................follotes 1 7 This Country Profile was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substan- tiall y completed by .1larch 197:3. S t:ct r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 1.. l MAW \1 1' POO fill i a h M l 3' p r. The Decline of a Revolution The ReprlMic of (mincer. forinerh French Cuinea. celebrated the 14111 annhi-min of it% indel(�ndenc��-- 441KI of the veiollolitic:d "molutiolt" initiated b% it. darablc� ruler. Pr�sid.ot :\hied Srkot 'four� �on 2 0d4slc�r If) 2. Of the 2S) Flack African that h :tie made the transition Will c�ilom 141 indelt�ndenl %tote in the Ilostaar era. onlc ClIal:t acltit.%ed fill %overrignh earlier and fm% hatie attracted %c mueh att.�ritiot at the time of d" r birth. Ind:�t�d. Cuin.a's enterl(ence on the inernatiop:d wene marked mimething of a turning Itoint in hi %ton. It' OU Tar v%enh set the %lag. for Guinea'� Imild break with France in the fall of 1955. First. Paris passed it lac in 1979; granting its mer%t�a% lerritorim in \frica� %till volonim in all lim name �a c�rmsid.rable degree of autonon) tithin the frann�aork of the 10 scar old French l'Ilion. (:nin.a's first g.n.ral election mach. Ittrssible h the provision% (If this l:aa. '444'1)1 S.koct Tour�*% radical nationalist I).nuc�ritic� Part% of (:nine: c PIX: t into li.c.r in March 195 The PI)(:"% rneM nc�1ming margin of %icton -56 c.til of howat %;n the Territorial ;%%w�mhl%� enabled Toure to effect it nun licr of administrative .hang., that undercut the :odliorit% of French officiate and tightviied Iris part% control otter Guinea*% domestic affairs. The sc�c�cmd critical development aas General de Gaulle s acres %inn to Immer in arid 1955. Sc�milke to dw gnMinq tidy of nationalism in Africa Imt final% bent on prem-minx France'% traditional splten� cif ipfln.nce on that nmtinent. de Cuplle decided to replace the French Union a ith it new and soinunhat looser form of as%odation lietneen hi% comitn and its mer%ea%�ssiom: the French Contnumily This challge aas inarlrrIed into the draft comtilution of tit. Fifth Republic. a11ic�h axis submitted to rcferendimi in metr liolitan Frame and .dl mer%. :ts compon��W of dw French ('pion oti ?S September 1955. Fr.anc�e% Mricun %tibject% aerc� true to reject the prctpowd wmstittitian and then�b% acclaim inunediatc aial compl.l. imlel(�t:dumv. lint de Gaulle trade it clear during a lour of French Mrica prior to the referendcun that it "im" wtc� could also result in annplea%ant .�..potpie cvmseclu.nce%. l Ol' De G aulle% threats did not scca% 'I'mire. From the out-1, the Guinean leader had indic�atcd that his supporl for the French Comimmit% project rested on the condition that the ne" i)manization Ie it free awiciation of eclpal partners that %%mild not %ulcrdinate Mric�an interest% to thou� of Paris. When de :utille :)alked at this demand. 'I'oure three the full reuurc�c% of the PI)G into organi. a "no" %ote in Ih. constitutional referendittit. Ili% ca tit paikn. org:uni /eel miden the slogan of" e prefer to be boor n freedonn than rich in 1a%er\." '.Meted dramatic re %tilt%. In it masske and urderl\ turnout. Guinean %otter% rejected de Gaulle. draft constitution and ehose the ri%k\ alternative of innnuc(liate in(lepenclenc�e b\ a 20 to -i majority. (V M*I Guinea stood alone ammitz France's \frica n dependcnc�ie% in making this choice. Overnielnt. it became it beacmi for African nationalists ever\ s\ here and it testing ground for the viabilit\ of a uniclucl) .%fricap path to %oc�i ;d and ec�ononnic� de\ eloptnent. \t the same time. Tome's socialist pliloscpla\ and e\ pressed millingn.%s to establish cordial political and .economic relalicns \%ith the Soyic�t HOC. c�ouplcd \\ill Frances sadden pullont, opened the way for the .oc�n%ion of Cold War competition into sub Saharan lifric�a. In short. Guinea abrctptl\ .assumed a political importaitm on the world stage far out of proportion to its size. muwrc�es. or geographic location. J' M' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 0 1'`tllfl' fill' I wilt 11 (.11 \11IIIIII'll) 111111 II tlrrrnit ill\ l'Iitl ill:; Utt ,III III1.1111 11 ,1`I'l,lill'I' ,VIII \\itllll,l�.\ill il` ,IClIIlilli`tr.lti\t .ulll II'I'lluil,ll t 11'1' \I ll1, ll 'l. till� (:III 1 lilt �Ill 'mil It ntt to .111 rlll'Irllt':I,III `t;lft. Inl' tilt' (.III III,III`. It \,I` ,I 111111' ut I' \l'Itl'llll'llf ,Intl 'I'lll�I,II rl1t1111iri,l II \1'Ir lnlll 111,11 f lull' tl 111111 l\ \,t` 111 In� ,l `t rl'IJII`I I't'\llllll ll 111.1 l\ I,It I' ,III .I f('l ll'llt'lll Ill 1'1 111 1111, 111 `111 .11111 ,I tlLlllltll .1 flt',III I1111'I,If 11111 .11111 Illtll'I ll'Ill lt'IIt t 111'\ 111111 1II lrt'l;l(III' till' III' Il.ltltlll II \'Illftl If` L111 \III' t l ,Illll f!1t' tl`\I ttlnit'.t \\itllill \\Ilil'll .111 Il.11illn,ll 1111L1 \\,l` (11I iI'1'i\I'I! .VIII init lll�nll'ntl'II flulrl t'Illllll`i,l`111 JIM Ili` 1'nll \it tlLlt \III fill �It�. ;I \\ill 1 11 1 'll .I \�1\ \t'I1' t'1 u1 \III 11111\ \,I` Ili` ,I ";1 {t ull 1111111L11 "III IIIIIIII `t'I\ Ill ll 1111.1 f. Illit Ili` till 111'1`1 tll ,1111111 ,I 11;1 II II'1 II. tlllllll't I. ,111(1 t�,Illt,l fl,lll >`c x APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 society grounded on the more progressive aspects of African c�ullure and tradition struck a responsive ch,cl among the Guinean people� parlic�ularly anong those groups which had been most disadvantaged b% preindependence� tribal cuslorrts and colonial practices. I lopes for the future were further bnoved by knowledge that Guinea possessed considerable mineral wealth and by timely offers of ec�onowic assistance from the Soviet bloc.. Toure's hold rhetoric was matehed by equally hold action. His highly organized PD(: was able to capitalize oin popular enthusiasm and nationalistic� fervor to launch it program of radical political and economic change in remarkably short order. Justification for potentially controversial moves was readily found in the broadly accepted imperative of national unity. All opposition political parties were either disbanded or absorbed into the PD(:. For its part, the PDG moved to insure its continued supremacy by tightening its control o% er all aspects of political and social life. The process of staffing responsible positions at all levels of the governmental bureaucracy with party militants was pushed to completion. Lt order to weaken old tribal and regional allegi:.tnces and to develop a pervading sense of national identity and pride, thi� PDGs leaders pressured virtually everyone �young and old, literate and illiterate. Europeanized urbanities and back country peasants �to assume an active role in the affairs of the country. Nationwide youth and women's organizations were established to complement the work of the party. The PDC's own grassroots structure was greatly expanded, and no town or village was neglected by its organizers. Within.2 years, some 5.000 party cells were in operation, and by 1964 Toure could boast that one out of every I I pe rsons in Guinea held a government or party post of some kind. The emphasis oil popular involvement spilled over into the economic field. where the regime was seeking ways in .which to resolve the basic contradiction between its commitment to revolutionary principles. including rapid "decolonization." and its continued need for financial and technical assistance from the West. Both to compensate for the country's shortage of investment funds and to impress foreign observers. the- PDG organized an cxtensiv,� program of vol labor �the so- called ill ceslissem enI luumain. "Their standard of living still largely unaffected by their country's break %with France and generally persuaded that preservation of their revolution merited almost any sacrifice, the Guineans flocked to contribute their time and energy to a number of ambitious public works projects. The program's initial results were encomagiug, and lilt- gmernnu�nt prernplI% accorded ill rr.Nli. M-111t-,I Inuni a major role in its first development plan. Fnll 20', of lilt- lolal 6udgt-1 allocation for the 191111 -lira planning period a:r staled to be contributed b% yolunlary labor. Revolutions. however, have it %%a% of running out of steam. and tilt- Guinean revolution soon pnyed to be no exception. Toure simply could not fulfill tilt- promise he had made. For erne thing. Gninva's n(.%% one -party system did not live up to advance nolice I opular enthusiasm gr dnal1% gave %ca% to apathy as more and more Guineans concluded thal rather than providing them with i t means for effec�tke participation in the nrana,rwinent of national affair,. Toure's political reforms had saddled thorn with a %asp and expensive ne%% bureaucracy. Monmer. this bureaucracy not only was totally snhst-rvient to tilt- Toure regime but was beset by inertia. incompetence. and petty graft. The regime's ivabilih to deal with Guinea's economic problems was �and still is� another major factor contributing to popular disillusionnienl. By arid 1960, Torrre's tendency to subordin;,te tilt- ec�ouontic implications of his policy\ choices h generalized political goals was beginning to have an adverse effect on living standards and efficienc�v. His haste in extending the public sector had outrun his abilih to find or train competent Cuiuean re- placements for departing European niauai;vri.d and technical personnel. Moreover, fear that their firers might be national I zed �o r, al the� ven least. be subjected to ever more burdensome ne\% governmental control prompte pram foreign businessmen to close their doors. thereby aggravating an already serious urban unemployment problem. Tourc's action in withdrawing Guinea front the F renc�It franc zone �a step be deemed necessary to both the appearroic�e Mid exerc�isv of full national soycreignh had an exert more disruptive inpact. IIItroductiOII of an inconvertible Guinean franc discouraged new and ouch- needed Western investment, induced it shift in Guinea's pattern of trade toward barter deals s\ith the Soviet bloc. and placed tile ambitious goal of C n Ary's 1960 63 development phut hope lessl 6 and reach. Smuggling became it major problen. affecting both internal and foreign trade. Domestic shortages of foodstuffs and consumer commodities. compounded by misnt:lnagenu�nt in the state operated distribution systvnt. bred inflation and black ntarketevring. Tonre's response to these problems and to the malaise which was spreading over the c�oontrx was to tighten party discipline, impose further curbs on civil APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 Iils�rli4.�. and aplmal fist gmatrr 4.fforl filed vigil:uas- :rtluin,l "c III III4.rn�r.olnti oil r% rlt-ne�lth. A, ll,r (,g111tn (�trge4)lnic ,ilualiute ctrnliltee�41 to (1rtrrioratl-. 1'1X: rhatllr, of "c,ueelt�rh�ltIletitte" It(�caent- 11141"� fn�4lurnt. (:uitl4.a", f:eilnn�. at-"� 41IM11u1t-41 to the' 11e:1c11iRation, elf Fracli4)llar% n(�tlt.doniali aced itlllt(�riali,l 4.114.Miv al 11411114. :still ahhtad. 1'rercluitning a %irhtal %title of �rigs-. t11s- g( �rr1111e�nt u14)t-tl,tradih toward a har,114'r and men� autheritariatt ,1% 1( of rah�. and Olitit-ati, as- otllcd to inforal tilt stilt- anstt11s-r. I..,cal trildef :ltd Rivals- hn,ht4..,n14.0 Itt-c:rne(� ties- e11jt-ct of par; il-olar ahu�t- and di,crimiti:etion. Plirur, and political trial, 11111it- .won�d 1114. halanl elf 4.%4.11 11111d oplttnitie11 to '1'4111n��, 114licit�,. From lilt- vatpilal in (:otiakr% caent- .till Item� (Is-clarttion, elf dl-tt-rnti seat iolt Ile cmal4� .1 %4wialht .toil 4.g:11itarian mwit�h. Fist mien) :oils hos"v% 'fours-' n�volulion had long ,int t.11-t -411u� a Matlt-r of ,lord, rath4.r than %oOntaotr. Ittut-.ti.. he## will dcgcncrats-d into a pn/gratn elf fol;�(�(1 610I alid ;114.11 graclualh fadveil into ol�curil,. Diwiiii111�d Giint-ao IN-gall to fl alnad 4)11 it ,a:th� c�4lmpa fill III to flit wt-,twanl ciitfelu, elf M'a,t (:crman, 1ls-fon� tilt 1�n�(�lion of the Bt-rlin Wall. h% 197 at Irael 1i1111.1NN1 01- -a figure. 4�4111al to 4)114.-fifth elf (:ui11t-a' Imlilliall�d belief Inytrtlati4)ti at im14.1ts-nds-ti(�4. 13 %vilr, l-arlit-r -had cmigratt�11 h% 1Mal or 1114�.164..% Ice( 1114)11,:.1141 t-vilt-, wiltun�d a, far a, Nigrria aped 4�wil Imes-. bell m.,t ,(�1tlt-(I th,t-r 14)� -in S(�rn�gal. the 1,4)" o tiot. Lile�ria. Sierra I.l-11114'. ,aid 1 (:oi11ca. 'fhs-ir pr4)%intih n�ie fnn�1�d 'fours-' gresuing 4)1r4'�io11 with flit- threat of (1ulttt-rn�.nlnti4)oan 4rnrpireit.. 'fill- r%jxo%iiry (luring till- 16Kid% 4)f wwral anlinvinel- con,piraHv-� :J14-godI% illwh ileg I'wrigtt Iacking 4)f (lone,tic 4.114-11eit- alld 1140,till- Goint-at, v%il4. t4mintr(1 T(Illn� that hi g111�rllltll�Ill N:1, 1114. 4)hi4.4.; 4)f a "It�rinwivia impt- rialkI plod." I'11l- attack on :4makr% taunt hr(I in \o,( tnlwr 1970 11. it ,stall P4)rbug114. militar% ftrt-v augne�1114(1 In C11int-a11 4.04., ,l-cne�d to out hi� et4)M .u%-pi(-ion,.' 'I'l 4.ff4.ct of ;hi, VI+41(14' 4)11 01i114.:1' forvigni and donel-,ti4. p4licil-, %t :t, drantalic. 111 1114 inlrnialiowil livid it m,nitl-d in vwii c14rwr tit- %i;h It'urwital. anotf-wd h% lourr..nplmlrt elf in.nrtl�nt% lighliut to Pl /rtlltt4ll 011rlra. Nllll 411 �ith�111 Claim .816 111 llrtaniiintt .mall IfIll -limp 111.411 wala /rim� atlark her the- 11111l"P/� /.l frl.�inu Porttltnl� 1111.4111 "..trikint at the� itwirltl�nl.' hradlluartrr. in Clnakn, ant, hopl�Inll%. topl4int Toner l'hr fort tall obj(.0%4�4- Li.lmen priman goal. ltrn� �Nifllti a t �nnl,li�I64 d 'rim PIIrtltgnrM� 1�Ir1111�nt of the raiding f+IrtY� Nid"114�0 III %%aitl tg shiln wit71 Ihr lila�rartl pn Nilhill 21 lalur% of 11164� illilm Lording. Tier :liar 411 di,.idrnt.. 114"A "4.r, "it"l a for a Im+p filar opri.itlt Ilhirh nr.rr nmirrialin�II It i, Urh th.It all tlrrr r.rntualk rithrr killyd or ralltllrrd. fill- (:olntnuni,l ,tilt�,. im�luding thr ,latimlilig of a st all prott-l-livt- Nn irl 4)a%al ftr4r j11,1 tc�r flit- h4)ritoo fnlm Comility .%I hortlt� it II�tl Ito a rvigii of It-rnr ultich ;,mph I4 (I 1114. I4. :unfornuttiolt 4)f 011111-all .4a�iah,nt front it ,iogh� -part% 1141puli.t affair into han14-114�41 It-ftt%ing tlit�laltr,hip. Tessier 11lane�(1 Ili. ,t-coril) ftrt�c,' iltabilil% to (14�:11 Midis tilt- imadvr uitIt grt-a,4.r di.-patch 4111 till vo4tt-rttr of a fifth (�tIst11m c.tnepri-wd 4)f ,11nviviiig b4mrgt-tli, do-ne�M,. ,%vvoI n liIIgI%. 114� launcht-d a .Mt-s�pinu putgt- elf part% and g4owrltnit-ltt official,. 111:11% of 0141111 appa"�1111% %%vry guilt% 4)l little- oe4)ry than LWIfiesg Mort- n1tdt-ral4. 11tlitival and vviiiwrtlic lt4Itl-il-. 'I'hi %%a, Follinwil I% tna� arr4.,t fonr(1 ctaeft �ilea Iriah. fuel ,cattrwd rf cuidi4)n,. c(,nling do Ili� 4) 1 11 �tatt�mt-ut,. 'I'oorc inepri,oncd I 4)f 21 cahirn�t ne�nelt-r 641"1 4)f Ihl- wtii4)r oftic�4�r, in tilt- arnu�(I font, and ,4.nil-t-, dewhiding tilt- c.nnm:uelt-r� 4)f flit- priti0pal neilitar% garri,on,, and I 1 of N pml+ncial go,t�ruo Ilv al jailed two forl11t-r aluba�atl.r 14) fit. :rhittgluti. flit- dtict 4)f hi, m(lt Imt4hguanl. thr Misstate Catholic .%rdhhkhop 4)f :on:tkn still �con� r civil .4.r%an doctt ir,. t-11gin4�41%. and other t-(l11cat4�t1 1>t�4lylt Tilt- iuepact 4)f Toom', Frowird lton,cclvai ing can11>aigti a:1, 1a4)f4)ld. Olt ern� haled it ,trolgth4vicd lei, grip lilt the It-tl-r, of allot cillicr cowl-d or dl-anleot all %i,ihl4. p4h�otial ri%al ()it thr 4)tli4.r h..nd. it n�,o114�41 in till- 4.lintinalion 4)t it v4.ry I argl- lerti4)n elf Ih4. 11110. of 11411iticall%. adini11j 31141 it. hnicall% 4.1t4�ril-nct�tl (aein4.:ut, uhich had Ie�ctt t14.v4.1olt4�(1 at gn�al tvl.l jilt.,. I'1.iti. '1'hi, I4)... togl-tltl-r %tith till- paral"i gcnl-rltcd 11, aii atino,phcrc 4)f fear and dcnunci oil. Nmtl Ivd to ill-%% difficltllic�- particolarh in th4. l-c4)tiomic fit Id But (:ui114.a lids t00%%; :ill 1t.,lidical dictalor :u,d I�c4uomic ,lagnation 41141111d not �1.cttrc .4)n14. of 1'onrl-'. uccc� a. 4)r hi c.nntr%' 1a�ic pilvi tia! for iahll- -if 114)4 pn�l1e roe �tuh�h4mld Feet othl-r %frican It-advr, Low dent� NI �l-ll in ovt�rconling divi,ivl- tribal altd rcgitnal It% :tltil-, or in milling di,ciplin4�d and trsth oati4)11al lullitival in,titotion,. \4: othl-r radical rl-gitnc in blit. Mrica ha, provt�d .o dural,lc. %till. dl-,pill- Ilk p.,tl-ntially i11ltihiIing c4t11ntitm4.ttt t4) al-i:lli,nl :still cclatoneic irnllgtl till 4.rIl-1�. 'I'o11rc La, mtoight and wvurl-d ;h4. a..i�tanl-c 4)1 prival4. Wo. :crii l-apital in flit- dcvclnplue�nt elf t :uinl-a'. neincral ur alth. Nv aua elf 11111, IwU lau,i!l- alining proit�4�t (:/nakr% can :11 Ita,t It4k fonvard to .1 11t-lpfal rims- in 4�vlt.trt rt�el-niw%. no ntattl-r ho4v great Iht- :I�I,rttnt-ot rf tilt- etht-r pr4)hlt-nt. it nt71.t face in till- war% alwad. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 The Guinea n.10 4 ).nd t .t- Como o y i ci 1,wiv rr�aIn rt/Grpr I�;\('I'It left Il11�Ir Itr�fj111h lM INII Ilt'I Itrlili(',1l .11141 I�(-Ilnr oil j(. .\�14.111. lht'rt� rI�.111\ j% ratlll�r litth� I It, a ch�tlns;ni�ht. flit- ;r1i11t�,ur� �or Ilivir ,'on11tr\ �Ir-Ili Illrlr IIIImi diatu tivi 11l4)rh fell fill' .ntllll\\t�.lt�r11 I III III 911�.It (Illt;t� of \.4.1 11ri(�.- (alirn�.t �i/4� it I% �lighll\ .mallur Ih.ul (:r,�Lt111 told Il11Io1.11ion .41041,11 1 millrotl .In� I'lo.t�1\ (�o1rlll,lr.lhh� h) Ilww 111 so .11141 (\or\ I :o.1�t '111Ilhn11t:11 It j. 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II i� ,111 ,1\\ k\\:Ir(I ('I )it IiuiIr,Ilil,n ati(I o11,� Ili(�II 11,1� (�1111trilmII�ll to 'I'mirI' I,1 r.r..lI,I1 \ith Hit- IIIrvat ill It)n�icn intl'r\I�lit it n ;nj Ili '.I'. lit r\aIiIit! tr( l)i( -aI l�limatl� ,ind il a.unl\ IIt (�q :i int� h :I\ I I(�11(Ic(I to (li�cOi11.1,, \\I,IIItI lit� (vllltni /I�r.. iII I�.I(Pr.. :In(1 II,IIri�t aIikl�. bill If ill' Iliv l'I fill Itr\ II itidc�t �1 /I'. It I� kind ,)I (�omilh'r.tlill- 41 \t�r.iI :IimI n.ltnr,ll \\(�:11th. I-'( ur iii i I)r I of )4)t;r.II)IIil�.,I ,Intl ('IiIII.Iti(' n�i_ (%i it I)I� (li� ii- Lui�llt�(I. thrl�I� ,I \\Ilil�h (�oi11(�i(II \\itIi .I r( i in \\Ili( i 1,11(� trtl)r 1� I) to It III111aI1I I \I'r:I IIII.I I)I Ir..('r I),'I B.I %m- ;IIiIII�I�. ,Iki) r,�I, rrl (I t4 ;1. \I:Irittnu ('I) 1i t:11. or I.ImI�r ;nin,vI. ('r of ;1 :ilt- to (ill mill� \\i(h� co 1.1�t:11 I)1:1i11 \\i111 .111 .1\1.1 t� 4'II'\ation of II�.. t11 .111 )f NO 14 .11)o\t�.I�.( II-\1.1 Bi�I�('tt�(I I,\ nl, Incl(�rinu ri\I'r. It APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 which empt% into broad estuaries a d tidal creeks bordered b% maiigroyr swamps all(] marshes, the region %vas dubbed lex Ricicres du Sud b% early French explorers �a name it retained until the late 10th century. Although it is characterized by extreme humidity, Heavy rainfall (well over 1511 u., %4, atnuaIIV), oppressive temperature and dense broadleaf evergreen forests. it is one of Guinea's more thickly populated areas. Pockets of rich alluvial soil permit the cultivation of it wide variety of tropical crops, and the movement of produce tp ports and urban markets along the coast is relatively cast'. Villagers grow rice, millet, c�om, kola Writ trues, and oil palms on thousands of small plots carved out of the t -rusts and swamps. Large -scale ,,gric�ulture, however. is limited to a fv w pineapple and banana plantations founded by Etiropeiws in the preindependenc�e period. And despite the fat�: that few places in Guinea. are oetter suited for ,risirtg food crops than the coastal plain prospects for markedly increasing production there either by increasing the acreage under cultivation or by achieving higher yields per acre through the introduction of more advanced farming methods �arc far from bright. At it scums likely to be it gong time before Conakry has the financial and human resources needed to dual effectively with the problems created by the area's heavy rainfall: excessive ground moisture. flc:,,.tng. reaching. and the formation of alkalitie pans. !doyenne Crtinee (vliddle Guinea, rses abri., tly from the coastal plain i i a curies of steep .�scents which cnlntinate in the massif of Fouta Djallon. It extends to the eastward reaches of that massif �a fact which has given rise to the widespread practice of using Moyenne- Gcince and Fouta Djallou as it.tcrchange- able regional desi, .ations �and embraces about one third of Guineas total land area. Although the terrait is relative rugged �much of it consists of scmb- covered hills and plateaus ranging from 1,300 to over 5.000 feet in altitn le� living conditions arc much more pleasant than along the coast. Rainfall is not so heavy, and there are wider daily and seasonal variations in temperature. Because of this, and because the region is geoerally well suited to both agricultural a pastoral pursuits, pohnlation densities ^nd to be high. The areas economic significance, however. is not limited to the livestock, citrus fruits, coffee, bananas, wheat, maize, and rice which are raised there. Some of west Arica's liirgest rivers including the Cambia and Senegal �rise in the Fouta Djallon and provide Guinea �.yith considerable k-droelec�tric� potential as they phinge downward in picturesque rapid, and falls toward more gentle 6 sloping tablelands. More important, the county. "s largest known deposits of bauxite �those at Kindia, Fria, and Bake �lie in the hilly terrain where Movenne- Guinee meets the coastal plain. Other promising d(�pos;t, naw been found at To(tgue and Dahola on.the Fotta Djallou massif itself, but these have vet to he fill! evaluated. haute- Guinee (Upper Guinea) lies to the east and south of the Fouta Diallon. It is Cuinea's largest �and least fa\ ored� geographic region. Consisting primarily of gently, rolling savanna plains wlu'Ah average about 10A) feet in altitude and whic�li are almost devoid of mineral resources, Ilaut. -Cuinec is it sparsel\ settled and relatively arid area. 'The southwesterly nunscons ..weeping in from the coast have lost much of their moisture h the time they reac�lt the suyanna. 'There are occas ..aad heap y rainstorms in the summer, but from November through \-larch dry. dusty winds blow across the area from the Sahara. creating it hot, withered desert environment. The sun is obscured throughout much of the year �in the wet season by clouds and in the dry scatun by dust and smoke from brush fires. Daily variations in temperature and humidity rut be extreme. The area's inhabitants tend to cluster along the forest lined banks (if the Niger and its tributaries, eking out an existence by raising cattle, hunting. and. during the wet seas -ii. growing cassava �the tropics' thick- rooted counterpart of the Idaho potato millet, peanuts. tobacco. sweet potatoes. and it little rice. Guinee Forestiere (Forest Region). which oc�cupivs the southermnost corner of the c�ouutry, is Guineas most primitive area. Fur from Conakry and served only by it sparse network of unpaved roads. it is cLaracterized by mountainous terrain. it hot and humid climate. and lush vegetation. The rounded hills acrd scattered peaks of the Guinea Ilighlands traverse the region from northwest to southeast. Most of the area is 1.300 feet or t.:ore above sea level. and on the Liberian frontier Mont Nimba �Gui :ea's highest nouutain �rises to over 6.000 feet. Except for it few of the higher hills and ridges, the land is covered with a dense rain forest which extends across Guinea's borders into the neighboring states of Sierra Leonc. Liberia, and Ivory Coast. Gantt and wild fruit abound, and crops are easily grown on cleared land. 1- lence. while portions of the rain forest are virtually uninhabited, Guinee Forestiere as it whole is rather densely populated. Most of the inhabitants earn their livelihood by collecting kola nuts, palm (oil kernels, and quinine bark in the forests and by raising rice. corn and cassava in the river valleys. But despite the general backwardness of the area. it is of considerable APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110061 -6 lxtential importance to the Guinean ecornonny. Its timber resources �as yet untapped �are vast. Extensive iron ore deposits have been found in the Souloumandou (Simandoti) mountain area and on the northern slopes of Mont Nimba. With additional investment and tighter controls on smuggling, the regions coffee plantations and diamond fields could yield substantial export revenues. Guinea's population is as diverse as the terrain it inhabits. There are at least IS distinct tribes, moony of which spill over onto the territory of one or more neighboring states. More than two dozen related �but generally not mutually intelligible languages or dialects are spoken. Some three of the people are Muslims, but animism flourishes in parts of Basse- Guinee and Guinee Forestiere, and nearly 40,0(X) Guinekuns roust of whom live in or near Conakry arc Christians. The country's three largest trn ��s, the Fulani, Malinke, and Sustn, together ioc�Iud,, nore than 70`,'i of Guinea population and continue to enjoy it corresponding preponderance of social and political power. The predominantly Muslim Fulani, some 1.6 million strong, hold sssav in iv1oyenne- Cuilive. Primarily it pastoral people and relatively recent arrivals in the area (the Fulani did not enter the Fouta Djallon in force until the 18th century), they are Guineas largest tribe, even though they constitute only one- fourth the total number of their kinsmen scattered elsewhere throughout west Africa. The Fulani gained their dominant position in Moye�nne- Gi inee through it series of holy wars waged against nonbelievers. By the early 19th century, most of the area's original inhabitants had been killed, converted, or expelled, and it Fulani elite was firmly established kit the helm of it feudal kind tight)% organized Islannic� domain. While the influence the Fulani subseyuentl% came to wield throcughotut much of what is now Guinea was curtailed �and the socipolitical system thee had established in the Fouta Djallon area disrupted th-� advent of French colonial rule, they remained the country's most po%verful and privileged tribe until the eve of independence. And although they r,ow enjoy it much less exalted status, neither the preindependence changes in the traditional political order nor Toure�s postindependence egalitarianism have completely erased the Fulani's elitist outlook. In fact, T oure has never really trusted the Fulani, and Fulani officials have generally been among the first to feel the imp- of Guinea's rec purge and internal crises. llaknte- Guince is dominated by the Malinke tribe� half of whose members reside in Mali and Capper Volta. The Malinke are Guinea's s:�zond largest tribal group, accounting for approxin lately 19 of the country's total population. Like the Fulani, they are Muslilw �in fact they were among the first Negroid peoples ilk west Africa to come in contact with Arab civilization and culture. But unlike the Fulani, the Malinke adhere to it highly localized version of Islam, and their traditional society was characterized by autonomous village units rather than by centralized political control. Proud descendants of the founders of the vast Mali empire which reached its zenith in the 14th century, the Malinke eventually fell under I� ulani domination. Although the\ proved to be remarkably adaptable to modern influences during the colonial era�developing a reputation as a hard- working people willing to my their hand at anything from agriculture to retail trading and soldiering �the \1alinke were unable to compete with the Fulani for power and prestige before Toure came to power. Nosy, however. the two groups' relative positions have been r-versed. Toure is part Malinke, and his tribesmen have rcceiye