HEARINGS BEFORE INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMM, SENATE COMM ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECU DEPTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-01773R000300010002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 14, 1950
• Content Type: MISC

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CONFIDENTIAL
Hearings before Investigatioris Subcomm, Comm on Expenditures
in the'Execu Depts, July 14, 1950 A
Hillenkoetter testifying on.the employment of homosexuals in
the federal govt.
"we could not endorse or.oppose any policy of the Untted
States because that will slant our own intell..F,So we take
no sides w/ any policy of what the Untted.S-does, but we do
gather facts, give them to the-Pres,..and interpret those."
Sen. McClellan asks if CIA-draws conclusions in its analysis.
Hilley: "YEs, sir, very definitely. I mean we will report
the condlusions, but we do not report any conclusions saying
that the United S should counter this thing by doing this
or that."
McClellan:"You do not follow your concludions w/ recommenda-
tions as to waht action should be taken?"
Hilley: "No, sir."
The chiarman, Sen. Hoey: "You just interpret the facts you find?"
Hilley: "Yes, sir, and very definitely do not make any con-
clusion as to what action we should take, because then you get
into --"
McClellan: "Policy." OVER
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Hilley: "And then you decide on a course of action you think
iS right and then you slant your intell to make your own
policy come out right.;.[S]ay invthe case of Formosa, for
a yr we would put in there whether Formosa can be defended
or not. In no case do we say we ought to defend it or not.
That is not our pigeon. Somebody else has to decide that."
Hilley: "We are not a policy-making agency. We merely supply
the facts and our evaluations of these facts, so that appro-
priate officials of the-Govt have the best available info upon
which to base national.policies. The reason we are not a
policy-making agency is quite sound, for it has always been
the case when an intell agency dabbles in policy, it commences
,.to slant its intell in support of the policies it favors."
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 Approved For Release 2007/01/17: CIA-RDPO1-017MR OQO }2-9t2, 1982
growth of staff B'1970,
in 1947, Cong. had 400 committee staff aides. Y
this no. had quadrupled to 1600. p. C4
[see if I can verify this figure before using]
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intell. officials formally met w/ cong. comms at least 175
times bet. 1955 and 1974.
[this book deals w/ substantive intell--I wonder if he is
counting only these formal meetings. I also wonder where he
came up w/ this no. It might be worth a letter of inquiry.]
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The Congressional obligation to "provide for eht common
Defence and the general Welfare" of the United States gives
it a constitutional basis for interest in for. intell.
matters.
And its power of the purpose gives it a handy and effective
means to express that interest.
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June 28, 1944--1st indep. appropriation for OSS--National
War Agency Appropriations Act of 1945.
approved expenditures of the Esecutive branch "for objects
of a confidential nature" plus accounteing by certificate
of the Director of OSS.
p. 3
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"[A] regular,%tatement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money thall be published from time to time." The Statement
and Account Clause
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Sen. Russell once warned an Agency official: "There
isn't a single member of this Senate that's so lowly that
he can't make life unbearable for you fellows if he decides
he wants to do it."
p. 5
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CONFIDENTIAL
Maury, who is not unenlightened re the need for the Agency
to play the public relations game w/ Cong and the Amer
people, nonetheless expresses the following implic&at
in : "We are already the most open major intell service
in the world. Even in some of the oldest democracies,
such as the U.K. rsic] and the Scandinavian countries,
neither the public, the press nor the politici r) are
supposed to know the identities of the chiefs of the
local service or the locon of its headquarters.
References to its activities rarely appear in pu3ic.
Because we are dete mined to play the game according to
American standards, we are already so overt that we have
two strikes against us before we start."
P. 9
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as Fulbright noted: "The dilemma posed by the CIA is that,
while we cannot do without secret intelligence activities in
a world of armed powers, these activities can never wholly
be reconciled w/ the values of our free society."
[chk in NYT Mag, 23 April 1967
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 cong-execu sp"@v {grlllease 2007/01/17: CIA-RDPO1-C 1Z~J 003 960jc
"Perpetual conflict amidst cooperation bet Cong and the
Executive is the inevitable consequence of the Amer system
of govt."
p. 160
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Although the specific task of oversight is no where given to
Cong by the Constitutional, it is generally agreed that this
task naturally falls to Cong by virtue of 2 other resp provided
in 1787: the resp to provide a check on the executive and to
ensure that actions being carried out by the White House are
being done so legitimately; and the supervision of public
expenditures, the famed "power of the purse."
p. 54
Indeed the principles of shared resp and diluted power form
the very basis of the Constitutional arrangements hammered out
in 1787.
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 consti. resAppcredic-$-ehe.2fl0i'8i/17akA-RDP01-01773R0gRAep0022 P Yrs.
UNCLASSIFIED
in U.S. v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp. et al (1936 or 39?), Sup
Ct held that Pres perfectly justified in w/holding certain info
from Cong in matters relating to for. affairs. Secrecy, it
ruled, might be necessary, and the premature deiclosure pro-
ductive of harmful results.
John Jay, in Federalist 64, touched more directly on an issue
which would be pertinent in the mid 20th cen. There are cases,
he wrote, "where the most useful intelligence may be obtained,
if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions
of discovery." No doubt, he went on, there are many, operating
both for mercenary and for friendly motives, "who would rely
on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in
that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular
assembly." Jay then goes on to suggest that the authors of
the Consti. had been wise to separate the treaty-negotiating
from the treaty-ratifying functions,'so that the Pres would
"be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a
manner as prudence would suggest."
[chk. before using and cite Federalist No. 641
pp. 60-61
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