MEETING WITH HPSCI STAFFER LOCH JOHNSON, 16 FEBRUARY 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01-01773R000400620009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 17, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
.. ? .
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 11
????? ?
Office of Legislative Counsel
Honorable Les Aspin, Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C . 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
OLC 73-0533
1273
In light of the interest of the Subcommittee on Oversight in the
issue of CIA relations with the media, I want to forward the enclosed
Agency study of the Soviet propaganda campaign against United States
production of a neutron bomb. A long-range objective of this campaign
was the creation of a public opinion climate which will give the Soviets
a favorable edge in SALT and CSCE negotiations.
This operation made use of every kind of printed and electronic
medium, and was supported by a variety of front organizations, with
their own means of influencing opinion. This use of the controlled news
media stimulated reaction in the uncontrolled and neutral media. The
study demonstrates the great resources of the Soviet Union in this field,
and th se with which they can advan own interests and damage
those of the U
Enclosure
Distribution:
Ori w/encl.
L.1) - OLC Subject
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OLC:
(6 Feb 73)
Sincerely,
Acting Legislative Counsel
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2 September 1977
SOVIET PROPAGANDA: THE NEUTRON BOMB -
fr
SUMMARY: The Soviet Union during July and August 1977
mounted a worldwide campaign against U.S. production
of the neutron bomb. The Soviets pursued this issue in
every media channel and wherever it was possible to
stimulate adverse public disc-ssion. These efforts were
directed toward pressuring th-2. U.S. to back away from
producing the bomb as well as accumulating political capi-
tal for Soviet use at future SALT and CSCE talks. As the
campaign peaked at the end of August, it was apparent
that the Soviet Union maintains an impressive capability
to promote international propaganda on issues it ? .
1, tonsiders important.-
BACKGROUND
. In early July 1977,
the Soviet Union was preparing a major propaganda campaign
against the United States. The attack was to focus on four themes:
the neutron bomb, obstruction of the Geneva Conference, support ?
of Israel and a self-serving policy toward South Africa.
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DATA BASE
3. Headquarters queried Field Stations regardino the . 25)(1
appearance of the above themes in local media. Replies were received 1
from Stations_ Also factored into the results were Department of 25X1
State telegrams from 19 Posts and incidental reporting by BIS and USIA, i
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The data so overwhelmingly centered on the neutron bomb issue
that the analysis was confined to this subject. ?
ANALYSIS
5. Thejnformation in this study points to a massive, well-
planned propaganda operation by the Soviets with both short and
lon -ran e objectives.
What follows is a characterization of the major aspects of the
Soviet campaign against the United States and the neutron bomb.
6. Initiative From Moscow. FBIS statistics in the weekly
"Trends in Communist Media" suggest that the earliest sustained
propaganda on the neutron bomb came from Moscow and that the Soviets
escalated this attack in later-weeks to support the propaganda
campaign as it got underway elsewhere. Of the 3000+ items of
Soviet commentary noted each; week by FBIS, the amount devoted to
the neutron bomb issue rose from insignificant during 4-10 July,
to dominate Soviet commentary during the three weeks of 25 July to
14 August. The attention given the neutron bomb then began to fade.
Period
4-10 .July
11-17 July
18-24 July
25-31 July
1-7 August
8-14 August
15-21 August
Total Items Neutron Bomb Issue
3,247
3,123
3,163
3,118
3,091
3,445
3,331
4101.4.
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No other topic during the 25 July to 14 Augost period received
so much attention. The campaign was sustained not only by volume
but with spaced, dramatic events. On 30 July, TASS for the first time
since December 1974 issued a statement on U.S. foreign policy,
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*denouncing the neutron bomb. During the week of 1-7 August,
significant attention was directed toward support of the "Week
of Action" organized for 6-13 August by the World Peace Council
front group. To keep up steam, Pravda on 9 August published an
appeal by 28 communist parties against production of the neutron
bomb. noted that the neutron
bomb was the prime Soviet propaganda target.
7. Echoes in Eastern urooe.
Aeutron bomb campaign there,
which took off in the latter weeks of July, was massive, well--
organized and faithfully mirrored the Soviet effort. The campaign
employed all channels of public communication: press, radio, tele-
vision, petitions, public letter writing and demonstrations. Some
comments: -
. . .
- This East European cacophony is seen as the second step in 4 ---
campaign to develop worldwide censure of the neutron bomb in general
and to stimulate adverse commeirt in Western Europe in particular.
-S. Front Group Action. In pronouncing an international "Week
of Action" during 6-13 August, the communist-dominated World Peace
Council established a focal point for action against the neutron
bomb. The Soviets' own Peace Committee used the occasion to pass
a resolution stating the development of the neutron bomb violates
the Helsinki CSCE agreement and threatens SALT negotiations.
Others followed:
- Peace Councils in various East European states
meetings andpassed resolutions-
- in Istanbul, a Peace Committee demonstrated in
-U.S. Consulate General.
held protest
front of the
?
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- in Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf, front groups delivered
notes to the Consulates General. In Bonn, two Soviet journalists
were observed at a demonstration at the American Embassy.
- a front group in Lima, Peru, sent a protest to the United Nations.
- in Tanzania, a WPC delegation sought propaganda assistance
from President Nyerere.
?
? - other major international front groups such as the International
? Institute for Peace and the World Federation of Trade Unions
participated in the "Week of Action."
The purpose of the front group activity was to keep protest
momentum going and to draw non-communists into the campaign,
particularly in Western Europe. To the extent that this could be
had .begun as largely a-Soviet effort could now '
----appear is a general public reaction to the horrors of the neutron bomb.
, 9. Western Europe. There were two types of adverse public attention
for the neutron bomb which the Soviets could hope to,generate in
-Western Europe and in fact did. The first might be called "hack
comment"
.1. -I" ill s and b ? lo s if
Parties.
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?The second type of.
comment, and the far more important, was that of the non-communist
.press situated politically in the center or on the left. A segment
of this press could be counted on to salivate editorially almost on
command once the neutron bomb receivedsuch enormous attention in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Others in this group could be
expected to react negatively to the bomb issue for various reasons:
anti-Americanism, doubts on NATO's viability, hopes of maintaining
a special status with the Soviet Union, or an honest dislike of the
neutron bomb.
10. For the Soviets, the real propaganda paydirt lay in editorial
treatment given the neutron bomb by this second group, a performance
judged by NATO Secretary General Luns in a 26 August speech as con-
sisting of untruths-and ignorance. Given-the emotional
themes which were raised in the neutron bomb debate--saving buildings
rather than people; the hypocrisy of Americans advocating human
rights in face of the bomb production; the endangering of detente--
it was an old-fashion editorial binge which many papers would not
deny themselves. And beyond the non-communist, anti-bomb press,
? /-
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there was the essentially objective sector of the media which
felt an obligation to carry both sides of the argument. For example,
the "International Herald Tribune" of 23 August carried a signed
article by Soviet Nobel Laureat Nikolai Semionov parroting the
Soviet line. The IHT later carried a rebuttal by Congressman ?
Robert Carr but the Soviets could care less. For use in editorial
replay and broadcast journalism, the Semionov piece in IHT was
priceless. Thus reported it impossible to distinguish
left from right on the bomb issue while' unconsciously
made the point of the Soviet pro a anda success by commenting that
? "in advanced countries" "such themes as those
cited...will appear in loca me ia, totally independent of Soviet
influence." As a Soviet propagandist might comment, "Right on,
comrade!" ,
Pro a anda Elsewhere. If there were any doubts.of the:: -.
- existence of a worldwide Soviet effort to stop development of the
neutron bomb, it was confirmed by efforts of the Soviet delegation
at the Pugwash meeting in Munich during the latter days of August.
There the Soviets pursued one theme: the dangers of the neutron
. bomb and the consequent need for mobilizing world opinion and. .
pressure against the U.S. This effort was perhaps the capstone
to a campaign which saw the same propaganda line appear in far-
scattered media:
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?? . . .
CONCLUSIONS *J.
. 12. Operational Mechanics. The volume of propaganda against the
neutron bomb, the timing and programmed developments within that
outburst,Ind the re-occurence of identical themes suggest only one
possibility: an intricate Soviet propaganda campaign involving heavy
Moscow media play, an East European cacophony, international front
group action, direct media placement where possible in non-communist
areas and the stimulation in the West of critical media comment.
In this, the Soviets were successful.
13. Soviet Objectives. The political objectives of the Soviet
Union in this campaign are clear: stopping production of the neutron
bomb andgaining room for maneuvering at SALT and CSCE talks. A State
telegram from Berlin commented: "In the GDR the groundwork is clearly
being laid to support whatever tactics the Soviet Union and its
allies may choose to employ at Belgrade." A Sofia telegram quotes a
Bulgarian official as placing the Soviet propaganda campaign squarely
in the context of Soviet SALT maneuvering.
14. StudY-Objectives. At the time -Field Statioh We-re-queried on
neutron bomb propaganda, the extent of the Soviet effort was not
apparent. One can see now the campaign'was meant to be worldwide and
intense from the outset. The campaign indicates the Soviets retain
a sophisticated capability to mount propaganda operations. (A parallel
effort against South African nuclear arms testing provides another
indicator of this capability.)
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DATE OF REQUEST ST)
I
OM
7 FE3 1978
SUSPENSE DATE ST)
SUBJECT:
NOTES
Last fall we sent
effort against the
concern of that Committee
No copy was sent to
Aspin Subcommittee,
this same report to
demonstrate the media
this report on the Soviet propaganda
neutron bomb to the SSCI because of the
SD
HPSCL Because of the interest in the
I recommend you sign this letter forwarding
Aspin. I believe it helps our cause to
capability of the Soviets.
, l7,
___,----1
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,-- 1,----
12
Al ),,,,,
,7 0.
COORDINATED WITH (list names as well as offices
NAME
Don Gregg
OFFICE
DATE
6 Feb 7STA
NAME
OFFICE
DATE
NAME
OFFICE
DATE
NAME
OFFICE
DATE
ACTION REQUIRED BY GLC
Signature.
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