MEMO TO (SANITIZED) FROM WALTER ELDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP02B05208R000100090011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 11, 1982
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/08/02 : CIA-RDP02B05208R000100090011-3
NOTE FOR:
11 February 1982
Executive Order 12333, Section 1.5, assigns duties and responsibilities
to the DCI, including:
"g Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of
common security and access standards for managing and handling foreign
intelligence systems, information, and products;
h Ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence
sources, methods, and analytical procedures;"
Section 1.6 charges the heads of executive branch departments and
agencies to:
"e Protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from
unauthroized disclosure consistent with guidance from the DCI."
There are two major jobs to be done. One, control access to systems
and products. Two, protect sources and methods.
Leaving to one side the issue of whether the DCI will ever have the
authority to carry out his responsibilities, the question is the role of
the Security Committee and how to state it in a way which will make sense
to the layman as well as the security experts. I qualify as a layman.
? I suggest that we have complicated efforts to understand the role
the role of the Security Committee by linking its how-to manuals to a
series of complicated directives.
First, why can't we follow the precedents set by other committees
and issue the manuals separately? We can cite the fact that they flow
from the enabling DCID, but I see no advantage in hooking them onto
the DCID's. The only guys who take up more space than you do are the
DCID 1/2'ers. I'm working on that, too.
Second, to take an extreme view, I suggest that you need a
maximum of two short DCID's. One to give guidance on access; another to
give guidance on protection.
While we await clarification on leaks, I am prepared to take the
existing DCID's and draft a couple of new ones for your consideration.
I will go no further until you have hoisted the foregoing aboard--
or thrown it in the wastebasket.
See you Tuesday.
WALTER ELDER
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 : CIA-RDP02B05208R000100090011-3