LETTER TO RICHARD V. ALLEN FROM WHEATON B. BYERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP02T06251R000900290001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1980
• Content Type: LETTER

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Wheaton B. Byers
October 19, 1980
Mr. Richard V. Allen
Dear Dick,
Enclosed is a paper on the PFIAB which you requested.
It is longer than you hoped, and it is certainly longer than
I would like. I believe it is important, however, for
you to have the historical background.
In considering the reestablishment of a PFIAB type
mechanism there is a logical sequence of steps.
The first decision is what do you want the Board to do ?
Historically the Board sought to discharge its responsibility
of insuring the best possible intelligence support for the
President by stimulation and innovation. Cost benefit ratios
were not significant and, generally speaking, the ends justified
the means.
With mature intelligence institutions, recently imposed
legal and budgetary constraints and serious residual effects
remaining from the investigations,a new board will face quite
a different set of problems and-pr - iorities. For example,
restoration of allied confidence in the U.S. ability to keep
secrets, low morale (particularly in the.DDO) and the degree
to which technology developed in the "black" world can be
released to the "white" world.
Should the compliance function now vested in the
Intelligence Oversight Board remain separate or, as recommended
by the Rockefeller Commission, be rolled into the PFIAB ?
What should be the nature of the relationship between the Board
and Congress ? Should the Board continue the practise of
eschewing publicity of any kind ? A very basic question is will
it truly be a presidnetial board ? Obviously this depends on
Governor Reagan's personal style and preferences but, it has
important implications in terms of the kinds of people who
might be asked to serve. Stature and prestige provide clout but
they also require attention, and tend to limit the demands which
can be placed on the members time.
STAT
STAT
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Some sense of the answers to these questions will help
shape the composition of a new board - the particular com-
bination of expertise and professional backgrounds desired.
It will also begin to define the staff requirements and
to answer the question of whether or not a full time Chairman
is desired.
From experience, and perhaps to state the obvious,
pressures for appointment to a board like the PFIAB come
from all sides. Let me urge that the Presidential Appointments
Staff, whose judgements must inevitably be influenced by
political considerations, not dominate the selection process
in this particular case.
Finally, you proposed that a new name be found for the
Board. I can see some good reasons for retaining the old one
but, in any event, the name should reflect as accurately as possible
the new boards mission and responsibilities. I think it will
be easy enough to come up with a name once it is determined
just- what is expected of the Board.
I will give you a call in a day or so to see when it
will be convenient for us to get together.
Regards,
"N I c.l.y*
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A Summary of the History, Operation, Role and Membership
Of
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
HISTORY
The 1955 Hoover Commission Report on the organization of
the Executive Branch recommended that:
A) The President appoint a citizens committee
to report on Government foreign intelligence
activities and,
B) Congress set up a joint committee on foreign
intelligence.
In light of the controversy surrounding the intelligence
community in recent years it is important to recall that these
recommendations did not reflect a Commission concern for "intelligence
excesses". Rather, there was a belief that intelligence resources
were not providing the President and his policy makers with
the intelligence support they required. Thus at that time the
concept of "oversight" implied "nourish" rather than "restrain".
Congress never did act on the Hoover Commission recommendation
but in January 1956 President Eisenhower established a bi-partisan
8 member-Board-of Consultants-on Foreign --Intelligence -Activities.
The members were distinguished private citizens with experience
in defense and international affairs. The first Chairman was
Dr. James Killian, President of M.I.T. The Eisenhower Board
met every three months, had five meetings with the President
and made 42 recommendations covering, among other things, the
management of CIA, covert operations and strategic warning.
With the admonition "not to let this happen to me again"
President Kennedy reestablished the Board in May 1961, one month
after the Bay of Pigs-invasion. The name of the Board was changed
to The President's Foreign Intelligence Advosory Board. Dr.
Killian was again appointed Chairman and, while the total
number of-Board members remained the same, the composition
was changed to reflect the growing application of science and
technology to intelligence - Dr. William Baker of Bell Laboratories
was retained and Dr. Edwin Land was added to PFIAB membership.
In the six months between its appointment and President
Kennedy's assination the Board met almost weekly, had nine
sessions with the President and submitted over 50 recommendations
covering, inter alia, the operation of NSA, paramilitary programs
and the application of science and technology to the intelligence
process. The Kennedy Board played a seminal role in the development
of photographic reconaissance.
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The PFIAB was retained in tact by President Johnson but,
reflecting his personal interests and style, met less frequently
with him than with his predecessor. The Johnson Board, however,
had a close working relationship with Johnson's National Security
Advisor, Walt Rostow. Board recommendations during the Johnson
era covered satellite reconaissance, the application of
electronic data handling to intelligence and deficiencies in
the collection and anaysis of intelligence from South East
Asia.
The Nixon Board was appointed in March 1969. The first
Chairman was General Maxwell B. Taylor and the traditions of
bi-partisanship and continuity (five of the ten members had
served previously) were reflected in the Board's membership.
The Nixon Executive Order ?(11460) was generally sim'lar to those
of past President's but more specific in instructing the Board
to work with the various elements of the intelligence community
on those matters where the support of the Board would further
the effectiveness of the national intelligence effort.
In 1970 President Nixon sent a delegation of Board members
to South East Asia to investigate the,~ffect of the U.S. incursion
into Cambodia, and in 1972 he directed the Board to do an indepen-
dent study on how to keep the U.S. Navy second to none. He also
directed the Board to assess the effectiveness of agent ope0rations
( Humint Report ). During the Nixon Administration there were a
number of changes made in Board membership and by 1974 the
roster had increased to sixteen members.
The Nixon Board met eight times with the President and made
over 70 recommendations covering such topics as the collection
and analysis of economic intelligence, overhead reconaissance
( it saved the KH-11 from becoming the victim of beaucratic
infighting ), weaknesses in the strategic Estimates specifically
and in the estimates process generally (team B) and counter
intelligence (the Board tenaciously focused Administration
attention on the massive Soviet intrusion into U.S. telecommun-
ications networks).
President Ford rained the PFIAB without change but
without much enthusi~ . He made limited use of the Board
and supported several important recommendations, however,
the barriers erected between the Board and the President in
the second Nixon Administration and subtile denogration of its
role (it was outside the circled wagons and therefore a.-
possible threat) were never sucessfully overcome.
In summary, each President found the Board an essential
instrument. The way in which the Board was employed by each
President reflected the needs of that President, the intelligence
community at the time and the particular requirements for
intelligence information as perceived by the President, his
principal advisors or the Board.
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OPERATION OF THE NIXON/FORD BOARD
The PFIAB met regularly in plenary session for two full
days every other month. The agenda for each meeting was worked
out by the Chairman and Executive Secretary and was based on
directives from the President, requests from the National
Security Advisor, cabinet members or senior administration
officials. It reflected the members perceptions of intelligence
issues, problems or deficiencies and their insights on new
ways to improve the intelligence process.
Schedules provided for the requisite briefings and discussions
with the directors and staffs of intelligence organizations,
meetings with cabinet officers and other administration officials
and for summary deliberations by the members. Following each
meeting the staff prepared detailed minutes and, as appropriate,
summarized Board findings ans recommendations in letters to
the President and/or the heads of the various departments and
agencies.
. In addition to its regular meetings the Board had an
informal committee structure where-in individual members devoted
substantial additional time to particular areas or problems
of intelligence which their special competsnces best equipped
them to assess for the Board.
At the request of the President or on their own initiative
members of the Board visited intelligence installations in the
U.S..and abroad. In those countries with which the U.S. had
intelligence exchange agreements Board members met with the
foreign intelligence officials, ministers and on occasion
with chiefs of state.
Through special committees or in plenary session the Board
did a number of post-mortems of intelligence failures (real or
alleged) such as Sihanoukville, Chile and the 1973 Middle East
War. It investigated intelligence compromises and directed
changes in security procedures.
By design the Board worked without publicity. The members
were convinced that if they were to effectively serve the President
in areas of the greatest sensitivity, the task would be made
more difficult by public discussion of anykind regarding the
Boards advice. However, there was a price attached to this.
With no public understanding of the role of the Board
and only a limited comprehension of its activities within
any administration, its real support was limited to those
intimately familiar with the intelligence process and who could
understand the significance of the close and completely
confidential nature of the relationship between the Board and
the President.
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Members of the Board were payed per diem and expenses
(many chose not to accept either) for the time spent and
travel on Board business. The Chairman served part time and
the Executive Secretary, his assistant and four secretaries
full time. Board members and the Executive Secretary held
presidential appointments.
THE ROLE OF THE PFIAB - WHY A BOARD ?
The responsibility for producing intelligence is shared
by a number of government departments and agencies. Each
carries out technically complex and humanly taxing functions,
each asserts competing claims for resources, each has strong
parochial interests and each is isolated, both physically and
conceptually, -by the security measures necessary to protect
intelligence sources and methods.
The programs and activites of the intelligence community
are necessarily exempt from public oversight and the checks
and balances which these impose on functioning of other
government departments. OMB examines intelligence budget
rationality, the Intelligence Oversight Board assess propriety
and the NSC (by statute) and the Director of Central Intelligence
exercise day-to-day responsibility for activities and resource
allocation.
The PFIAB has provided a different kind of overview.
Because it has no operational responsibility and answers only
to the President it looks at the inescapable conflicts, rivalries
and differences within the community solely from the standpoint
of the national interest - what will best meet the needs of the
country and the President rather than just the requirements of
a particular agency or department.
Board members possess all the necessary clearances and are
empowered to call upon all those who operate as well as manage
intelligence resources. There is no other forum in which national
intelligence priorites and issues can be debated free from
political and bureaucratic responsibility and departmental bias.
The PFIAB has been a unique and a working board. At times
its efforts have been frustrated and there have been occasions
when logically it might have been called upon but was not. It
has been the object of informed and uninformed praise, and it has
been criticised justly and unjustly. But, its reputation for
integrity and the personal stature of its members have meant
that its judgements and recommendations have benefited from
the frank expression of views by Executive Branch officials
at all levelsfas well as acknowledged experts from the private
sector.
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PFIAB MEMBERSHIP
Enclosed is a list of all former. PFIAB members. It
reflects a wealth of experience and dedication to national
service. It reflects men of wisdom and stature who have
achieved eminence in the fields of science, law, economics,
communication, diplomacy and politics. It reflects men of
unquestioned probity who can look at the problems and
difficult decisions of leadership through the eyes of the
President. And it reflects patriots in the deepest sense
of the word; men who derive sustenance from their contribution
to the preservation of the national security and welfare.
It is these qualities which have enabled the Board to
stimulate creativity and the development of new intelligence
concepts and techniques. And it is these qualities which have assured
five presidents of informed, critical and detached judgements.
Wheaton B. Byers, October 19, 1980
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