TASKS TO BE PERFORMED BY SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS OF SUB-REGION 6 IN SAIGON'S SURROUNDING RURAL AREAS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03-00975R000100020002-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 8, 1972
• Content Type: MISC

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_ _ ? -.u wnIW -ame V
S. COUNTRY. SOUTH VIETNAM ??V?I. REPORT NUMBER: 028 0496 72
:. su.,ECT: Tasks to be Performed by Subor- s. DATE OF REPORT' 8 November 1972
dinate Elements of Sub-Region Fin
Saigon's Surrounding Rural Areas. (U) 10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
~. ISC NUMBER: A707.000
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 17 Aug 72
S. PLACE AND DATE OF ACO: VS; 17 Sep 72
S. EVALUATIONS SOURCE. B INFORMATION
T. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT
"..$e, CPT
GILBERT McDONALD, MAJ, USA
DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC
IS. SUMMARY:
(U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and
concerns a directive, prepared by L71 ((possibly the Sub-Region 6 Party
Committee, COSVN)), prescribing the various activities to be performed by
subordinate elements in the rural areas surrounding Saigon ((possibly during
the remaining part of 1972)).
---------------------------------------
(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 17 Sep 72 in South
Vietnam (YS025935; RVN MR 3) by the 148th RF Co, RVN MR 3. The document
was received at CDEC on 11 Oct 72, and was summarized in Bulletin Number
50,348, dated 13 Oct 72, under CDEC Document Log Number 10-1137-72.
Translation was initiated by CDEC.
THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT FOR CAPTURE DATA, ALL REFERENCES TO THE COMBINED
DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION CENTER (CDEC), CDEC PERSONNEL, CDEC COMMENTS, LOG
NUMBERS, REMARKS INDICATED BY DOUBLE PARENTHESES, AND THE DECIPHERING OF
CODE W~~ , CO Eft ES GNO ''~~ A~ND ENEMY UN TS, WAS DECLASSIFIED ON 8 NOV 72
BY C'/'!_ ~~'"3~ _ DIR, US ELM, CDEC. THIS
tiji I 0jRjYJj0jFjTjHjEjVj 1,
E ltvlIIEFr INJAM WAR ON M 111C1R10 F ILM
DIRM 1D, 1DI, 1D2
13. PREPARED BY. f I(OLLA S. PARKS, MSG, E8
PROD DIV, US ELM, CDEC
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((Page 1 of O.T.))
17 Aug 72
DIRECTIVE FROM L71 ((POSSIBLY THE SUB-REGION
6 PARTY COMMITTEE, COSVN))
1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE RURAL AREAS OF L71
((POSSIBLY SUB-REGION 6))
II. SPECIFIC MISSIONS
III. GENERAL CONCLUSION
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RURAL AREAS MN SR 6)) AND FRIENDLY ((VC/NVA) )
ADVANTAGES
Comments
1. These rural areas surround key enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) agencies located
in Saigon. Thus, the enemy has established a strong defensive system consisting
of security belts from inside the city ((Saigon)) to surrounding areas.
This defense enables the enemy to react promptly and flexibly.
To perfect communication lines and establish a system for the(relOcation
of refugees ((from communism)), a system of factories, military bases, and
posts has been built. The enemy has levelled the ground and proceeded to
reconstruct some areas and establish. industrial areas, etc ... ((sic)).
Mn these rural areas)), there are some areas which have been controlled
by the enemy for a long time. The "white" areas and liberated hamlets and
villages have been subjected to enemy attacks under the guidance of ((VC))
defectors.
The number of families whose sons have been conscripted by the enemy
((in these areas)) is numeroustand enemy espionage activities are very
complicated. This requires us to pay great attention to these families and
use psychological measures to win then over. (This number of people has
critically increased since the nine-year ((anti-French)) resistances.
((Page 2 of O.T.) )
Our cadre operating under legal and illegal status in these rural
areas ((of Saigon)) are inadequate and most of them are military personnel.
In some areas, they are not local inhabitants but "Type C" recruits ((meaning
recruits from NVN)).
Our weakness is that the number of local natives that have been train
so far, to operate ((in their local areas)) is insufficient. Thus, our
ed,
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((underground)) agents operating inside ((GVN controlled areas)) are too few to
be able to either rely on or provide support to the outside forces ((meaning
in VC controlled areas)).
Therefore, we must develop our in-place forces and enable them to
carry out all types of activities.
2. Capabilities of specialized cadre and the working procedures of
((specialized cadre)) were not appropriate with ((the practical situation in))
local areas, thus they have encountered difficulties in rallying and regimenting
the people into organizations.
They have not flexibly executed directives for each activity phase
by adapting themselves to the practical situation in fringe areas. In many
areas, they have relied on outside forces in motivating the people; instead
of using native cadre who fully understand the people to select slogans suitable
to the people's aspirations in their struggles.
They have no specific plan for attacking the most tyrannical, individuals
and units that have exercised oppressive control over the.people, or
determining individuals_ or units to be proselyted. The armed and political
forces are not closely coordinated. Unit members have not ensured the secrecy
of their activities and have_failed..to_-suppress targeted individmIt4. They.have
not used the people's violence to annihilate the enemy.
These deficiencies have brought about unsatisfactory results and
unnecessary losses in personnel.
The more failures the enemy su??ers,, the more efforts he will make
to deprive the people of their property, the tighter oppressive control he
will exercise over them, and the more fascist measures he will take in these
areas ((surrounding Saigon)), particularly densely populated areas where
there are many hamlets situated close to the key enemy agencies.
((Page 3 of O.T. ))
II. THREE DIFFERENT RURAL AREAS IN GIA DINH PROVINCE
1. City outskirts
2. Surrounding rural areas
3. Intermediary areas ((meaning the areas situated between the city
outskirtsand VC base areas))
Each of these areas has different characteristics.
The outskirts are the buffer zone which link the rural areas with
the city. The workers were mostly concentrated there, and they inherited
the revolutionary tradition. The enemy's control in these areas is relatively
loose.
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 The'sutrounding rural areas cover the.largest area ((among.the three
cited areas)) and have a large population consisting of workers and farmers.
Most of the people live by farming. Thus, they have longed for. liberating
themselves (and disregarded enemy regulations and laws). They were previously
distributed land
If we resourcefully and properly implement appropriate operating
procedures and know how to closely coordinate the three-pronged attacks in
these surrounding rural areas, we will steadily strengthen our forces and hold
a'isuperior position. The foundation of our activities there is the people's
violence and secret guerrillas and fifth-columnists planted in enemy ranks.
In addition to our agents, more enemy troops will adopt a neutral attitude,
and we will gradually proselyte them to side with us.
These surrounding rural areas are the main objective areas, since
they have a population of 1,000,000 people.
The intermediary areas are close to liberated and base areas.. These
areas are small and thinly populated but of great importance since friendly
forces have'been concentrated there for operations. Therefore, the enemy has
conducted air and artillery strikes and levelled the the ground, creating
many difficulties for us in billeting and transportation. However, since
1970, the enemy activities have reduced.
((Page 4 of 0.T.))
To change the balance of forces ((between the RVNAF and the VC))
Coordinate mtlitary activities with political and military proselyting
activities and motivate a large number of people to participate in ((political))
movements: r
In general, our troops must have combat plans and methods prepared.
It is a requirement that, attacks should always be conducted in accordance
with the prescribed criteria and requirements.
Our troops must'be lightly equipped to facilitate their movement
(when dispersing or concentrating).
They must attack only targeted individuals but keep enemy personnel
subjected to proselyting.
The main purpose of military attacks is to support political movements
and military proselyting activities to motivate enemy troops to side with the people
and to rally politically non-aligned individuals.
I
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They must know how to conduct three-pronged attacks in close coordi-
nation Stith and under the leadership of Party committees.
It is necessary that we should take advantage of our ((favorable))
position in the battlefield in the rural areas ((Saigon)) to prepare a superior
posture in local areas ((meaning the intermediary areas)) where the people's
movement is widely developed and the mass of the people participating in this
movement is the main source of violence. However, we should not rely on the
cited advantages on the general battlefield and become inactive, since this
may result in critical losses.
In the immediate future, the enemy will suffer more failures and
withdraw to these areas to exercise his oppressive control over the people.
This is the main enemy-weakness.
((Page 5 of O.T.))
III. MISSIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT _IN. THE SURROUNDING RURAL AREAS
1. In these areas, we mutt urgently-aotivate the people to unite to
oppose the enemy conscription, troop :upgrading, and looting and demand freedom
to.engage in farm production, permission to return to their former villages,
and.their legitimate rights.
We must organize the people into semi-legal organizations and gradually
strengthen Party and Group organizations and all agencies.
Our Immediate requirement is to loosen the enemy's oppressive control.
We must rely on the people to destroy the enemy's oppressive control.
We must denounce tyrants and motivate the people to isolate politically
non-aligned persons,
We must also isolate tyrants' -families. In addition, we must use
the people's violence to deepen their dissension: between tyrants and use our
fifth-c.olumnists to kill them.
We must motivate the people to break the enemy's oppressive control,
point out enemy spies, and oppose enemy personnel who cause confusion among
the people.
We must categorize those who are tyrannical and non4yrannibal...among
the Puppet troops and Government. We must motivate the people to break the
'enemy's oppressive control to promote their prestige and lower the enemy' s.(presbige).
We must make them fully understand their role in performing this task so that
they.will try to carry it out regardless of ' enemy lava and regulations. We
must not let, the people carry out.these activities.by themselves ((without
our command)) nor use our agents-instead of the people.
((Page 6 of O.T.) )
2. We must support the people's struggles to control them.((the people)).
a. The people must have a high determination to struggle against the-enemy
in order to arouse public opinion. We must motivate the people to inc'ree.se
? their solidarity to effectively attack the enemy's psywar schemes.
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b. The people must gain control of their hamlets and maintain
public security.
c. The people must unite and support one another to oppose the
enemy laws and their oppressive control,
d. We must strive to suppress tyrants; establish political penetra-
tion bases in hamlets, villages and areas where enemy activities are limited;
and try to win over the ((RVN)). People's Self-Defense Force members. We must
also strive to improve our available underground agents and use our legal
agents to recruit ((underground)) personnel from among the people='fori.theRevolution.
2. We must activate "nucleus" cells and gradually transform them into
Party chapters. We must avoid forcing the people to join these organizations.
We must also establish Group chapter and popular organizations, etc.., ((sic)),
3, We must recruit new agents, especially youths, and gradually.admit
them into the ((Youth)) Group or Party and strengthen the aged members.
We must recruit agents from; among the paTticipaiits: bf'e ((thpi peo~1e's) )
movements with much attention paid to their social classes.
4. We must ensure the security :of our forces and conduct political
indoctrination for them. We must inform our personnel which categories
of civilian people are to be secretly or openly proselyted and make them
understand the principles of preserving secrecy.
((Page 7 of O.T.))
IV. GUIDELINES
1. The general guideline is that all cadre and agents ((in the surrounding
rural areas)), including semi-legal forces must operate under a covert status;
and the covert forces will assume important tasks.
2. We must strengthen their self-sufficient spirit. They must rely on
the people to conduct their activities and persistently motivate them to ((carry
out revolutionary activities)) without relying on our forces and remaining
inactive.
We must use the people to assassinate tyrants with the coordination of
our forces. We must deepen the: .enemk*'.! dissensions and confuse and intimidate
enemy personnel. In order to implement resolutions from higher echelons, we
must work out a plan for implementing them based on the situation of the local
inhabitants instead of the general situation.
3. Implementation of guidelines
Our three-pronged attack movements have been participated in by a large
number of the people who have displayed powerful armed violence. Therefore, we
must persistently ((motivate team to initiate struggles opposing)) the enemy's
major policies such as relocation of the people, conscription, troop upgrading,
stripping the people or their property, and terrorist and suppressive acts, ,,8---1%
as' those adopted in hamlets and sub-hamlets.
Hamlets and sub-hamlets are areas where the enemy vulnerabilities are
exposed; thus, we must separate or isolate ((enemy personnel)) there through
the people's movement in order to break the enemy control and rally non-aligned
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persons to our side. We should then incite the people to initiate semi-legal
struggles to break the enemy rules while his troops are dispersing to other
places. In general, leaders should know how to take advantage of opportunities,
((Page 8 of O.T.))
4. Slogans ((for political struggles)) must reflect the people's ((as-
pirations)) in each hamlet and sub-hamlet. We must seize opportunities ((to
motivate)) the people to initiate struggles in accordance with their capabilities
and the balance of forces ((between the enemy and friendly sides)). We must
rely on the people Mn conducting political struggles)), since a broad
participation of the people ensures good results.
Before initiating struggles to oppose the enemy policies, we must know
which enemy personnel directly exercise. oppressive control over the people
(and carefully investigate them). We must fully understand all enemy'. schemes
and his capabilities of implementing them.
We must persistently provide leadership for the people's struggle
against the enemy in accordance with their capabilities.
Armed force elements ]Rust support;:.(political and- ]Rilitarry- proselyting'. activities ).
This means that they have to create conditions for motivating the people to
initiate political struggles and participate in military proselyting activities.
Therefore, ((armed force elements)) must suppress tyrants or conduct deep
thrusts into enemy controlled areas to kill tyrants, if conditions permit. They
should not occupy objectives for a long time except main objectives, since
this is unfavorable. They should only occupy objectives in order to motivate
the people. They must conduct attacks by flexibly adopting three-pronged attack
tactics and other combat techniques and tactics. During an activity phase,
they must attack prescribed objectives only and motivate ((enemy troops)) to
stage military revolts and ((the people)) to rise up against the enemy. Our
Local Force units must be lightly equipped and determined to attack the enemy.
They must carefully organize their attacks and deploy their troops to minimize
casualties, and use all the facilities available in the local area (such as
manpower and captured enemy weapons to equip their troops). They must be totally
self-sufficient.
We must assign our secret agents to participate in the people's movements
to recruit personnel (for our branches and agencies) and strengthen our Group and
other organizations. We must provide ideological guidance for our personnel,
strengthen their convictionyand make them fully understand the people's viewpoint.
((Page 9 of O.T.))
5. We should widely develop the people's struggles to create ((political))
repercussions and carefully preserve secrecy for our activities. We should
motivate the people to conduct political struggles by themselves. Our agents
should trust and maintain close contact with the people, especially those
operating under legal and semi=legal..sb&tus. If Party or GFoupiahemberst'andlagents
fail to contact the people, their operation will Pe much more difficult.
Specific missions
(1) The requirement is to motivate the people to hate the enemy and
initrate struggles to resistor completely break the enemy's oppressive control.
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sc,hew- Qa.v arcwaaa. ac.~ va awpLCIeI1.1ng L[[eme
Motivate the people to hate the US and Puppet ((Governments)).
Motivate them to carry out military proselyting, political, and
security tasks; assassinate tyrants;and join self-defense forces to oppose the
enemy's conscription. They must also be motivated to join popular organizations
to participate in struggles and farm production activities to contribute their
manpower and material resources (to the Revolution). Motivate a large number
of people to regiment themselves into organizations.
Measures: Cadre of all branches and agencies must participate
in the motivation of the people and use motivated people to motivate others
through semi-legal organizations. They must have a uniform plan for
implementation of this task.
((Page 10 of O.T.))
6. Branches and agencies should coordinate with one another in
motivating the people. The motivation should be based on the legitimate
rights and interests of local inhabitants and the general guidelines for legal,
semi-legal, and covert activities. Semi-legal activities must be considered:
as primary ones. They must keep abreast of the performance of political
motivation of each cadre in each hamlet and assess the results achieved by the
people in political ((struggles)) to gain experiences.
Political struggles: To successfully motivate the people to
initiate political struggles, we must hold on to local areas to lead them and
listen to their discussions and what they oppose. We must try to intensively
indoctrinate the people and motivate them to participate in political struggles.
Through these struggles, we will select qualified persons to train and place them
"nucleus" cells or into the ((Youth)) Group or the Party. By doing so, we
can admit all of them into the Party.
We are required to select appropriate slogans for political struggles
and gradually develop them.
We must use the peopleu S violence to dispute the energy and,forcei
the latter to give up his plan which is opposed by the people.
Economic struggles mus: be conducted against the enemy.
To successfully conduct struggles, we must ensure solidarity;
work out plans for initiating struggles and countermeasures, and profit from
experiences after each struggle.
Main objectives must be presented for each struggle.
To ensure the success of each struggle, we must strengthen the
people's revolutionary awareness and improve the leadership ca?abilities
((of our cadre)) who lead struggles.
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((Page 11 of O.T.))
iv. MILITARY FIELD:
Ideological concept: Box should we conduct armed activities? We
should conduct both political and military activities (three pronged
attacks launched from mountainous and lowland areas)). The three pronged
attacks ((political, military and military proselyting)) must be considered
equally important.
The armed activities are indispensable in the bordering areas. They
should be constantly stepped up to develop the revolutionary movement in
coordination with military proselying &ctivities. In conducting armed
activities, we should lure the enemy troops away from his bases to destroy
them and eleminate or disrupt them in order to establish the Farmers ''Workers and Soldiers' Alliances.
2. We must successfully categorise the enemy and concentrate our forces
to fight the enemy or split up his forces to decrease his potential. While
fighting, we must conduct military proselyting. There must be close
coordination between military, political, and military proselyting activities.
The attacks must' be' against the proper objectivres7and the combat efficiency
must be high. This vill intensify the political and military struggle
movements. On the contrary, only when we perform the political and military
tasks can we develop the armed forces. This requires good leadership. The
Party Committee must exercise efficient leadership over three-pronged
attacks.
3. In the areas having enemy storage facilities and key agencies, the
primary mission of our forces operating there is to destroy the above
facilities and agencies. Thera- should create caditions to accomplish this
mission. Friendly forces who operate in these areas must improve their combat
techniques and tactical skills, develop the tapper for^ce,and increase
camouflage and diversionary tactics. Attacking elements sleculd be small but their
combat efficiency should be high ((i.e~, they must exert strong efforts to fight
and avoid causing losses to the people)).
E(Pege 12 of O.T.))
4. The people must be used A"n attacking, destroying or disrupting
objectives which are within their capabilities. By so doing, we will be able to
develop our basic strong position, assess the people's force and reserve our
forces to fight in other areas.
We must employ the people or secret self-defense forces to destroy
enemy posts and deepen the dissension among enemy ranks.
5. Forces operating in these areas must bravely fight and try to avoid
casualties. The revolutionary movement must be developed through combat. They
must coordinate with the people's political struggle movement. Secret self-
defense forces and penetration agents should be developed.
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6. Activities of friendly forces operating in these areas must be
intensified. Members of these forces must try to equip themselves with
captured enemy equipment and weapons obtained through military proselyting
activities. This is the principle of the Revolution and our self-sufficiency
policy. We must promote our cadre?s and personnel?s spirit of self-help for
self-improvement, We must not rely on our higher echelons to procure
equipment and ammunition because this will force us into a state of attrition
and depletion and undermine our personnel?a political and ideological
awareness. We must now orientate them toward the self-sufficiency principle
which is the tradition.of. our. Army and Party headquarters,
Assistance in manpower) finance arA economy from higher echelons . is
valuable, However, the self-sufficiency principle must be considered the basic
one for the development of forces,
((Page 13 of O.T.))
V. SECURITY TASK
The enemy?s oppressive forces in the.bordering areas are the security and
Chi&u Hai forces; therefore. our security task ((in these areas)) is very
important. To meet the requirements of loosening the oppressive enemy control,
our immediate task-is to increase the security activities and widely motivate
the people to struggle for. thwarting. his schemes of sowing dissension among our
ranks, detecting our underground agents and purging our internal organizations.
((We must)): Motivate the people to carry out the security maintenance
task, eliminate contradictions and strengthen among theme
Clearly evaluate the enemy situation and classify tyrants into specific
categories in order to eliminate them, To succeed in this task9 we must
rely. on the help, of the local inhabitants.who will cling to the enemy to
investigate his situation by ppresxing him and denouncing his crimes.
The organization of secret security agents must be whepped up to increase.
the protection of the Party?s and people?e organizations. W.% must perform it in
coordination with various agencies, units and Party chapters and heighten our
sense of caution. The formation of security v;arit and consolidation of the
security Party chapters must be made on that basis.
We must try to provide good indoctrination for Party members,, agents and
the people.
VI. RALLYING'THE PEOPLE
What'should we do to rally the people?
We must widely rally the people to change the balance of forces in hamlets.
If possible, we should operate legally. Otherwise-v we will operate secretly,
((Page 14 of O,T,))
We have been required to raise?the people?s movement by grouping-receptive
civilians. However, the number of receptive civilians has been small. The
liberation associations have been activated on a large-scale basisybut they
have not been as effective as the semi-legal organizations were.
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The civilian proselyting branches,, people's associations and overt forces.
such as security., military proselyting,, and armed forces must intensify legal
and semi-legal activities.
We must rely on semi-legal or secret organizations to recruit agents from
the people and sympathizers. At presents, the people have organized themselves
into small groups. We must strengthen these groups cr have our agents
infiltrate them in compliance with the Revolution's policies. We should not
force the dlanging of these groups into legal organizations. Instead,, we should
provide them guidance to strengthen solidarity and mutual support.
These groups have not been very helpful during the initial phase~so we
must try to gradually improve them.
We must., by all means., introduce our cadre into enemy organizations to
guide their members to strengthen their sense of solidarity and mutual support
and show them the enemy's demagogic schemes and bribing practices.
We must consider semi-legal organizations important; because we can use
them to intensify our activities. The semi-legal organizations must then be
transformed into associations (such as liberation associations) which will
guide other organizations. The recruitment of key agents for these
organizations is very urgentbecause as soon as the political solution is
reached' we must have our forces among the people's organizations at every
echelon. The liberation associations must be small and active. They must be
broken down into small cells to facilitate their activities. In addition, we
must organize the ((soldiers')) mothers' associations to motivate the people
to provide us with economic and financial help to support the Army. The activities
of this organization must be secret. The rear service and reconnaissance
elements must be separated from semi legs. organizations.
The secret organizations must be neat and compact. The activation of
Party chapters must be expedited in areas where they were previously non-
existent to avoid having cadre attend the Party caucusses of other Party chapters.
((Page 15 of O.T.))
There must be one civilian proselyting cadre ((in each Party chapter)).
((Party chapters)) must provide guidance for subordinate organizations.
Elements and branches must additionally recruit members from the people and
train them in both legal and semi-legal activities.
((Page 16 of O.T.))
((Proper countermeasures must be taken)) in case ((secret)) organizations
are discovered or the ((revolutionary)) movement is misled or oppressed by
the enemy, etc ... ((sic)).
Development of security forces
Party chapters ((of security forces)) operate on the compartmentalization
principle and are under the command of the secretary of their chapter Party
committee. We must increase the effectiveness of Party chapters by improving
the leadership of each Party member.
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The struggle against enemy policemen, spies, anti-revolutionaries, and
Puppet administrative personnel in cities and towns is very complicated.
For that reason, the secretaries of chapter Party committees must exercise
effective leadership over the struggle. To be active in the struggle, we'must
master the enemy situation,, work out plans to constantly atta& the enemy, consoli-
date our organizations to render them strong, and provide additional.; training for
Party members so that they can effectively lead the people in the struggle
under any circumstances. (They must fully understand the enemy situation,
our requirements, Party guidelines, and struggle measures.)
Conclusion
In thA course of the Revolution to libsrate the people, policemen,
spies, anti-revolutionaries and Puppet administrative personnel are main
objectives that we must eliminate. Having been defeated in the military
field, the US imperialists will increase the number of policemen, spies,
reactionaries,and'administrative personnel to suppress the Revolution and
urban revolutionary movements. For that reason, all the urban Party chapters
must be aware of this to effectively lead the struggle to victory.
((Page 17 of O.T.))
19 Aug 72
Party Chapter Task
We must strongly develop the Party to attain four goals ((unspecified))
in the future. We must particularly strength&n local Party chapters because
our control of the local inhabitants is still loose, many of our Party
members are still imprisoned, and the number of our agents is still too small.
Some Party chapters were not flexible in carrying out activities others
did not know how to perform political tasks (motivation of the people )3 and other
displayed negative attitudes and were shirking duty for fear of being
discovered.
Command cadre did not pay much attention t: recruiting youths and teenagers
in various hamlets, especially in main hamlets that the enemy has not yet paid
attention to.
At present, additional agents have nor. teen recruited or their
capabilities are still poor. We must immediately train key and nucleus cadre
to enable them to successfully carry out the Party and Group development task.
We must focus attention on training those agents who have not yet been
discovered. In case we want to recruit new agents, we must select those who
have good relations with the people and were active in various struggles of
the people conducted in villages.and hamlets. Particular attention should be paid
to.recruiting those who have lived for a long time in these areas and thosr
belonging to the proletarian class, such as the workers, farmers, and youths.
That is the organizational policy.
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CDDC Doc Log No. 10-1137-72
Newly-recruited agents must have experience to effectively provide
leadership for the people (on the Revolution's policy and guidelines). We must
exert every effort to steadily activate Party chapters and nucleus cells in
various hamlets, especially in main hamlets. Our organizations in these areas
must be simple and effective. If there are other people's organizations, we
must contact them to widen our relations among the people. Our legal and semi-legal
agencies must stay close to the people to gain their sympathy and confidence.
We must:
1. Try to perfect the Party chapter (i.e. to consolidate the Party).
2. Clearly determine the missions of the covert and overt Party chapters
and end the supply of information for overt Party chapters.
3. Make all Party chapters analyze the situation in a specific manner.
4. Categorize enemy tyrants and ringleaders.
((Page 18 of O.T.))
Comprehend the contradictions between the enemy and people, especially
the principal ones, and use appropriate slogans to struggle.
Requirements: Party chapters must understand their missionz.
The Party chapters must make plans, lead the people to struggle, assess
the general situation and the people's situation, understand their viewpoint,
prescribe activity plans, control the implementation of tasks, and draw experiences
for our cadre and agents to learn.
The Party chapters must recruit agents and Party and Group members through
the development of the revolutionary movement and rally the people to admit them
to our legal and semi-legal organizations.
We must prescribe effective countermeasures to avoid being discovered
by the enemy. Following are some suggestions:
We must adopt the method of compartmentalization between two cells or
two agents. Only the assignee should know the assigned task. Do not let agents
.form broad relations with cadre. Propaganda sessions should be conducted
overtly or semi-legally. Agents who were discovered or arrested by the eneaW
must be withdrawn ((to VC controlled areas or transferred to other areas
((meaning areas bordering Saigon)) to receive indoctrination. We must increase
our agents' caution to keep secret our activities. We must also train them
on our operational procedures and indoctrinate Party and Group members, agents,
and non-Party members (who are the decisive force) to learn our way of operation.
The -Party members in each local area must gain experience from the
people in order to be able to lead the people ((to struggle)).
Ideological leadership task
We must provide leadership for the improvement of our cadre's ideology, so
that whether a political solution is found or not, they will persistently stay close
to the people- and recruit agents from among the people to enhance the movement.
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Cadre must realize that though being defeated, the enemy is still
able to cause many difficulties.
They must clearly realize our immediate requirements, foresee the
future, and assess the enemy and friendly situation)so as to have a good leadership
policy.
((Page 19 of O.T.))
Thoi was put on the retired list by the enemy, LB ((sic)) village
(this must be rechecked).
Enemy plan: The enemy had planned to capture and send the relatives
of the zealous revolutionary families to an intelligence training course in
order to meet their immediate and future requirements.
((Page 20 of G.T., contains information of no intelligence value.) )
END OF TRANSIATION ---------------------------
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/07: CIA-RDP03-00975R000100020002-5