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February 23, 1976
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 A 10- PAGE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT More From the Report on the CIA That They Still Don't Want You to Read HOW K1$$INGERTHE WHITE HOUSE,. AND THE CIA OBSTRUCTED. THE INVESTIGATION The Unpublished First Section of the Pike Papers INFORMATION DELAYED REFUSING TO TESTIFY THE SECRECY DILEMMA We were given heavily ` . The authority invoked by `Classified information pre- ... "sanitized" pieces of paper. the Secretary of State was sents a classic paradox: "Sanitized" was merely a neither "classification," nor without it, government some- euphemism for blank sheets "executive privilege," but a times cannot function; with of paper .. new doctrine that can best be it, government sometimes ' Page 61 characterized as "secretarial cannot function. privilege" Page 66 . . Page 62 INFORMATION DENIED ... The cut-off from informa- tion struck at the heart of Committee operations. One month out of our five-month investigative period was lost while the issue was negotiated...' Page 61 OVER-CLASSIFICATION 'Overuse of classification is inevitable when ... some 15,466 persons can classify information.' Page 68 ATTACKING THE FLANKS On September 24, 1975.. . the Deputy Secretary of State raised for the first time an innuendo that the Committee's action resembled McCarthyism.' Page 63 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 telligence agencies that are to be controlled by Con- gressional lawmaking are, today, beyond the law- maker's scrutiny. These secret agencies have interests that inherently conflict with the open accountability of a political body, and there are many tools and tactics to block and deceive conventional Congressional checks. Added to this are the unique attributes of intelligence -notably, "national security,"' in its cloak of secrecy and mystery-to intimidate Congress and erode fragile support for sensitive inquiries. Wise and effective legislation cannot proceed in the absence of information respecting conditions to be af- fected or changed.2 Nevertheless, under present cir- cumstances, inquiry into intelligence activities faces serious and fundamental shortcomings. Even limited success in exercising future oversight requires a rethinking of the powers, procedures, and duties of the overseers. This Committee's path and policies, its pluses and minuses, may at least indicate where to begin. Access to -Information The key to exercising oversight is knowledge. In the case of intelligence agencies, this translates into a need for access to information often held by the agencies themselves, about events in distant places. It is an uncertain approach to gathering facts, given the best of circumstances. The best of circumstances thereby become a minimum condition. The Select Committee's most important work may well have been its test of those circumstances, testing perhaps for the first time what happens when Con- gress unilaterally decides what it wants to know and how it wants to know it. There were numerous public expressions by intelli- gences agencies and the Executive that full coopera- tion would be accorded? The credibility of such as- surances was important, since almost all the necessary materials were classified and controlled by the execu- tive branch. Despite these public representations, in practice most document access was preceded by lengthy negotiations. Almost without exception, these negotiations yielded something less than complete or timely access! In short, the words were always words of coopera- tion: the reality was delay, refusal, missing informa- tion. asserted privileges, and on and on.5 The Committee began by asserting that Congress alone must decide who, acting in its behalf, has a right to know secret information. This led to a rejec- tion of Executive "clearances"6 or the "compartments- tion"' of our staff. The Committee refused, as a mat- ter of policy, to sign agreements. It refused to allow intelligence officials to read and review our investiga- tors' notes. and avoided canned briefings in favor of primary source material. The Committee maintained that Congress has a right to all information short of direct communications with the President. Our ability to abide by these policies has been a mixed record. On the plus side, an aggressive pursuit of facts and a willingness to back up this pursuit with subpoenas produced some unprecedented results. As an example, never before had either the Executive or Congress put together a ten-year review of covert action projects. By subpoena-which, unfortunately, had to be taken to the brink of contempt enforcement-the staff of the Committee analyzed all official covert action approv- als since 1965. and reported its results to the Commit. tee in a closed hearing' That presentation was one of the more interesting and accurate pictures of U.S. covert policies yet assembled, and was of no small value to our findings. Other examples appear through- out the remainder of this report. Nonetheless, if that is the positive side. it was off- set by the extraordinary efforts that were required. even in a climate favorable to reviewing past Execu- tive conduct, to identify and obtain documents. It is a commentary in itself that subpoenas were necessary. T c-- &-inct climmitt"d Oversight Experience EDITOR'S NOTE Last week, The Village voice printed almost in full the text of the second of three sections of the report on U.S. secret agencies, dated January 19, 1976, prepared by the House Select Com- mittee on Intelligence, chaired by Congressman Otis Pike of New York. That second section contains the investigative record of the Com- mittee. As noted in our introduction, we could not publish the third section of the report-a section on recommendations-because the Com- mittee had not written it. And we did not choose to publish the first section because it dealt not with the Committee's findings but rather with its frustrations as an investigative unit. Herewith we are publishing the text of that first section because of the perspective it provides for understanding the reaction of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the White House. the secret agencies, and the Pike Committee itself to publication of the report and to the fact that it appeared exclusively in the Voice. By far, the greatest outrage has been expressed not toward those whose mismanagement, cynicism, and downright lawlessness have made a scandal and a disaster of our intelligence operations, but toward those in the Congress and the media who, uncovered and reported the facts. The first Sec- tion of the Pike Papers helps explain this in- verted response. It tells of repeated efforts by, above all, Mr. Kissinger and by the White House, the CIA. Senator Henry Jackson, and others to contain, obstruct, delay, and if possible derail the Select Committee's investigation. It also tells some of the effects of these efforts. In the end, the obstructionists did not succeed. But the turmoil itself and piecemeal leaks tend to focus attention on the clash of interests rather than the substance of the Committee's findings and still threaten to dilute its cumulative impact. In the following text, space limitations require us to delete some non-substantive references from the footnotes. Therefore, footnotes are not num- bered consecutively; but the numbering follows the report's throughout. It is a further commentary that much of the time subpoenas were not enough, and only a determined threat of contempt proceedings brought grudging results. Footnotes: tit is interesting to note that, despite volumes of literature, public utterance, and court cases on the subject, there are no clear definitions of what national security is. E.q., Note 87 Harv. L. Rev. 976 (1974); Becker, The Supreme Court's Recent "National Se- curity" Decisions: Which Interests Are Being Pro- tected? 40 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1972). '-Justice Van Devanter, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that the Congressional "power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is essential and appropriate as an auxiliary to the legislative func- tion." 'NcGrain v. Daugherty (1972). Early in the history of our republic. the power was accompanied by "instructions to inquire into the con- dition of the various executive departments, and the ability and integrity with which thehave been con- ducted." 13 Cong. Deb. 1057, 1836). 'In a letter to the Chairman dated October 14, 1975. Secretary of State Kissinger stated: "I have no desire to keep anything from the Select Committee with regard to the Cyprus crisis or any other subject." Letter to Chairman Pike. from Dr. Kissinger. State Dept.. Oct. 14. 1975. In a second letter to the Chairman. dated Novem- ber 3, 1975, Dr. Kissinger again pledged his coopera- tion: "Let me reiterate that my intention is not to withhold any information of use to the Committee .. . I remain as determined as ever to do everything possi- ble to assist the Committee in its difficult and impor- tant task." Letter to Chairman Pike. from Dr. Kis- singer, State Dept., Nov. 3, 1975. At a news conference on June 10, 1975, President etouse select Committees these [Rockefeller Commis- sion] materials, together with other related materials in the executive branch." He went on to say: "So theres not going to be any possibility of any cover-up because we're giving them the material that the Rock- efeller Commission developed in their hearings, plus any other material that is available in the executive branch." (Emphasis added.) President's News Con- ference, Wash. D.C., June 10, 1975. 4The following statement by the Chairman, on No- vember T4, 1975, with reference to a subpoena of State Department documents, is typical: "Chairman PIKE. That troubles me. Mr. McClory. The fact is that three days after the subpoena was due, we have nothing. You have had phone calls. Mr Donner and Mr. Field have had phone calls. The President has not asserted executive privilege, but he hasn't done it." The Committee also discovered what Chairman Pike described as the "dribble treatment," where one or two documents were delivered each day over the course of several weeks. This was a particularly subtle impediment, as it gave the executive branch an op- portunity to deny that it was withholding information, while at the same time delaying the Committee's work. In the domestic intelligence investigation, Drug En- forcement Administration documents, which had been requested for over three months, were opened for Committee "inspection" 48 hours before a hearing on DEA intelligence. Even then, a subpoena had been necessary to obtain information. The staff was not given access to the 17 so-called Kissinger wiretap ma- terials until 24 hours before Dr. Kissinger appeared before the Committee; and that took place only after lengthy negotiations. (Justice Department memoranda relating to the 17 wiretaps are printed as pp. IX of the Comm. Hearings, Part 3.) 'The Chairman's comments on September 29, 1975, in a discussion of proposed agreements with the Ex- ecutive, illustrate the point: "Chairman PIKE. . You thought we had an agreement with the President two weeks ago-or a week and a half ago-and we adopted your proposals in order to get that agreement. "Having adopted your proposals, they said, 'Well, that is the first bite, now we will come back for some more.' They have now come back for some more. "You want us to adopt these proposals. You keep seeing huge cooperation just around the corner and it is not there, and it has not been there." At a Committee meeting early in September, the Chairman described the Committee's experience thus far with executive branch cooperation: "Here is what we run into ... Nothing is ever re- fused-things just are not delivered. They very care- fully do not refuse, but the language is always the lan- guage of cooperation-the fact is the fact of non-pro- duction...... A month later, the degree of cooperation had not noticeably improved. As the Chairman stated: . I think we all know what is going on here. You asked that we wait another week-and we can wait for another week. You say that we ought to be con- cerned with the official statements and, as I have in- dicated from the day I got on the Committee. the offi- cial statements always promise cooperation. There has never been an official statement which says. 'In no way are you going to get this information.' But the fact of the matter is that we don't get the informa- tion." 'The Committee did accept the assistance of the FBI in conducting background investigations of its staff prior to hiring. All decisions. however, concern- ing the members of the Committee's staff and their work were made by the Committee. The Director of Central Intelligence requested that the Committee require its staff to sign secrecy oaths comparable to those which the CIA requires of its own employees. The Committee refused. However. each member of the staff was obliged by the Commit- tee to sign an "Employee Agreement." 7"Compartmentation" is a system employed by the intelligence agencies to restrict the distribution of in- formation even among officials witft security clear- Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 ------- ------- - - - - - - I antes The iu,uficat.on fo -ompartmcntati>n is Je- Footnotes: scribed in the rollowiii vc c pus r tr eito to the I "On August 5, 1975, the Committee received Chairman from CIA I) irt ,o Colby on tel 28 "~. testimony from Dr. Albert C. Hail, Assistant Secre- "National Security Council Intelligence Directive tary of Defense (Intelligence)- No. i 117 Feb. 19721 rnstru-fs the Di ectw' f Crr'-al prat ,gence to cIevewp and review security mind- formal request that you bring this niece. Hof paper .-rds and practices as !hey relate w the iotec.ion of P creating the National Security Agency with you and tntelligence and of intelligence sources and methods you t ll h from unauthorized disciosure.' Since the National Se- curity Act did not provide for an authority corre- sponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area, the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. Intelligence Board are responsible for: The super- vision of the dissemination of security intelligence ma- terial.' The Director of Central intelligence, acting with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence Board, has promulgated a number of directives, regulations, and security manuals, related to the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and meth- ods." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby. CIA, July 28, 1975. "This report resulted from a subpoena of documents in possession of the ''Forty Committee," which is a National Security Council subcommittee that approves covert Acton. On November 14. by a vote of If) to 2, the Com- mittee approved a resolution citing Dr. Kissinger in contempt of Congress for his failure to comply with the Forty Committee subpoena. The report accom- panying the resolution (94-693) was filed December 8. On December 10, after negotiations with White House officials, the Chairman informed the House that substantial compliance had been obtained, and the Committee's report was recommitted. 1. Delay The record of subpoenas is worth reviewing. It began on August 5, 1975, when an Assistant Secretary of Defense was asked to appear as a witness and bring with him the document by which the Na- tional Security Agency (NSA) was set up. It was a simple and logical request. The Defense Department controls NSA: the Comittee was holding hearings on intelligence budgets; NSA has the biggest budget; and the Committee wanted to see the authority by which NSA operates. The official did not bring the document. He did not have "clearance" For this elementary piece of information, the Select Committee was forced to resort to the first of its many subpoenas. It is worth noting that the sub- poena was promptly honored, which raises the ques- tion why the document was not delivered in the first place. By late .August, the Committee was preparing for hearings to review what kind of intelligence our mon- ey buys. Four events were chosen for hearings: the 1973 Mid-East war, the 1974 Cyprus coup, the 1974 Portuguese coup, and the 1968 let offensive in Viet- nam. During August and early September there were repeated requests for documents and interviews.13 In some cases, we were given heavily "sanitized" pieces of paper. "Sanitized" was merely a euphemism for blank sheets of paper with a few scattered words left in. often illegible, sometimes misleading, and usu- ally inconclusive.i4 In some cases, notably as to the, 1974 coup in Portugal. there was an absolute refusal to provide anything, until early October. As a last ditch effort, with hearings approaching, the Committee turned once again to its subpoena power. On September 10. 1975, it subpoenaed materials from the three major intelligence agencies and the National Security Council." What were the materials that forced the Committee to resort to the force of law? Were they the names of agents? No. Were they descriptions of secret intelli- gence techniques? No. They were, simply, copies of intelligence publications that had been circulated in the executive branch during the week preceeding the events that we were examining,16 documents circu- lated literally to hundreds, if not thousands, of people. Were they turned over lay the date specified in the subpoena? Not completely e us t at you want us to have everything we need but you didn't bring it. Why? "Dr. Hall. We have to get clearance for releasin "NSC Items Not F.a..t,.ited-Cvrrt:r and Slid-Fart fi War a 'nothing was furnished, unless NSC maintains that CIA and DCI 2.c.l um :ransmiued U.S. agencies. b. Nothing furnished." this material to you, sir. 9 "Chairman PIKE. Here we are representing the legislative branch of Government, asked to appropri- ate hundreds of millions of dollars to a certain agency and we are having difficulty finding the statutory a - thority for that agency even to exist. Now, isn't thuat ridiculous?" "Letters were sent to CIA on Aug. 18, 1975; Aug. 19, 1975; Aug. 27. 1975; and Sept. 5, 1975. State Department requests were sent on Aug. 19, 1975; Sept. 8, 1975; and again on Sept. 8, 1975. Re- quests were forwarded to the Defense Department on Auo 15. 1975:Aug. 19, 1015, Sept. 8, 1975; again on Sept 8 10,5: and Sept. e, 1975. 14Tite last two pages of one set of documents were typical deletions. The first page was apparently a cable. It was blank, except for the following across the top: 3/ND/DOLL-VNM/T-0144-6SG TRANS- House Select Committee Chairman Otis Pike: He got the "dribble treatment"-one or two documents a day. LATED DECRYPT VNJAC/VN NR I Y 301300G FM' iJB TO CO INFO BBM STOP CNMB 30119 5610M Tol: 30JA68/1012Z 300" The second page of the cable was even less infor- mative. It was completely blank, except for a 'Top Secret" Stamp. "The subpoenas were directed to the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the National Security Council. 16The subpoena to the Defense Intelligence Agen- cy on the subject of the Mid-East war illustrates the types of documents called for- "I. For the period of September 25, 1973, through October 6, 1973, on a daily basis, or as frequently as same were issued, the original documents as follows: all Defense Intelligence Agency estimates. Current Defense Intelligence Summaries, situation Reports. and any and all cables emanating from the Defense Attache Office in Tel Aviv. National Military Intelli- gence Center daily briefings...." 17A staff summary, prepared on September 12. 1975, indicated the following non-compliance: "DIA Items Not Furnished-Cyprus and Mid-East War 2. Cut-off This problem was soon dwarfed by a new tactic- the cut-off. On September 12, 1975, the President, or someone using his name, cut off the Committee from all classi- fied information. As if that were not enough, his ac- tion was accompanied by a demand that we immedi- ately turn over all classified materials from our own internal files.=1 Th reason' I he Congress, through this C n mince, had p?tsscd ,udomcnt, after Icns:hy dclib.'ri; on of 'he merits, on whether four words "classified" by the Executive branch could be told to the American pea ple.22 a The Executive, by its legally questionable reaction 23 ad now set aside any immediate subpoena problems, and the public hearing problems as well. As background, a hearing on September 11, 1975, had reviewed intelligence performance with respect to the Mid-East war in 1973. The result was shocking. In the words of a CIA document, "the principle con- clusions concerning the imminence of hostilities reached and reiterated by those responsible for in- telligence analysis were--quite simply, obviously, and starkly-wrong. "24 That same document had verbatim quotes ftotp two intelligence bulletins that were moderately favorable and from five bulletins demonstrating that intelligence estimates were embarrassingly wrong. The two favor- able quotes were declassified and read into the tort ord.25 The five embarrassing quotes, containing the sam. type of Information, were not declassifed'by CIA. The Committee objected .26 The CIA returned that afternoon to report that, after all, the five quotes -[d be d-t ossified.'-7 How- ever, in an apparent need not to appear arbitrary in their earlier decision. they insisted that some 13 words still remain classified. The Committee debated those 13 words for over four hours in a closed session. The CIA Special Counsel was present and in telephone contact with CIA Director Colby; the head of the State Depart- ment's Intelligence and Research was there; the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency was there; and a high official of the National Security Agency was there. No agency was without representation, and all had a chance to speak. Nine words were mutually agreed to remain classified 23 but four words were not. The four remaining words could not reveal any secret "sources and methods." which is the basis of official classifications,29 because the information they contained could have come from any number of sources. In addition, the intelligence was so old by the time it was reported that it could not reveal how rapidly our intelligence techniques operated 3a The Committee satisfied itself on these and other points before taking some half dozen roilcall votes on the matter. It is possible that never before had so much ex- pertise and thought gone into a declassification de- cision. For this, the Committee was accused of being rresponsible.17 To protect national security, the "President" invoked a cut-off, perhaps before the President ever heard of what was going on. The Committee later learned that in a biography of Dr. Kissinger a year earlier, the subject to which the four words referred had been spelled out in great de- tail. So much for the validity of the classification argument. No "high State Department official" had been cut off from information or forced to turn over i his files as a result of that earlier publication. So much for protecting against irresponsibility. Police guarding Committee offices were instructed to prevent any takeover of files by the Executive. and nothing more was heard of that. Nevertheless, the cut-off from information struck at the heart of Committee operations. One month out of our live-month investigative period was lost while the issue was negotiated. With little choice. the Com- mittee agreed that for purposes of getting the investi- gation under way again. future disputes would he re- DIA Intelligence Summaries for July 14. DIA Intelligence Bulletin for July 13. Iuly 14, and July 20. The three intelligence agencies supplied some of c. DIA Daily Current Intelligence Briefings for their publications.17 Dr. Kissinger, as Assistant to the July 13, Jul, 14, and July 20. President for National Security Affairs, refused to d. DIA Daily Intelligence Bulletins for September turn over a single piece of paper from reports pro- 29. September 30. October 6. vided to the National Security Council during the e. DIA Intelligence Summary for September 30. weeks in question.ts "NSA Items Not Furnished-Cyprus By the time hearings on intelligence results began a. SiGSUM's for July 13. lulu 14, Iuly 19. July 20. in mid-September, only two agencies had substantially h. "Wrap-tip messages" for lulu 13, July 14. July complied with our subpoenas.19 More than a month 15, July 16. July 17." omm ee wou would pass before a good faith effort at compliance "The September 12. 1975. compliance slmmarv have no further problem with access to information." was forthcoming ii-'m the National Security Council for NSC reads as foilovv,: ,k.,, tie .a..., ,r,.- r-?-'ltittee Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 terred to the Prestdcnt.34 This was agreed to on the assurance of the President that the C itt ld Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 ------ --- - r I was cut off was also the day hearings were scheduled I "We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Mr. LEE. The same way, Mr. Chairman, that for m. ?he lu a C .r.. L. Hr t a ! t r~:. yr b 1 tcii ' ~: nde, -Trains t I' e '; ~i_T h tr. ~, th,;,.- een 1 t o ,s .ter, on he S: ?cpat mc,.[ s l ancci ng ~f inteliqIcnco, mWdra,o future although ttre risk Ulf ,rc.t:zc(t r nng ~-Cuairntata PIKE. Chat i exactly what is wrong, and of Dr. Kissinge-s role therein-16 Those hear- has increased slt htlv.... 4 October 1973 (emphasis g dlr. Lee, co. decades other committees of Congress ings had to he cancelled. However, the Committee in original). hay: IOne thC;;- job, nd an 1 tc lived it in located a State Department witness who was to tests- "There are reports that Syria is preparing for an the executive branch. You tell us that Congress has ty about Cyprus. even in the absence of classified evr attack on Israel but conclusive evidence is, lacking. been advised of this. What does that mean? it means dente from the Executive--his name was Thomas in our view, the political climate in the Arb states the execuuce branch comes up and whispers in one 1- tton. the Committee was interested in what kind of intelligence had been supplied to Boyatt regarding the 1974 coup against Archbishop Makarios and the con- sequent Turkish invasion. _ More important, the Committee wanted to examine how that intelligence, as well as Mr. Boyatt's analysis of it, was handled by the decisionmakers at State. Mr. Boyatt had, in fact, advised one of our staff members that he vigorously criticized the handling of intelli- gence at the time of the Cyprus crisis. This criticism was embodied in a written report which was sent through the State Department's "dissent channels."37 [Page 25 of the Draft Final Report not available- editor's note.] Footnotes: 21Rex E. Loe. Assistant Attorney General. Civil Division, delivered the order: . [T]he President's responsibities for the na- tional security and foreign relations of the United States leave him no alternative but to request the immediate return of all classified materials heretofore provided by any department or agency of the execu- tive Branch and direct all departments to decline to provide the Select Committee with classified materi- als, including testimony and interviews which disclose such materials, until the Committee satisfactorily al- ters its position." , 22When Mr,Jex Lee appeared before the Commit- tee to annotiftce the President's cut-off of information it became evident that the executive branch had not given the matter equally careful consideration. 'Chairman PIKE. Mr. Lee, you say it revealed certain foreign communications activities of the United States. Is that your language? 'Mr. Lee. That is what 1. am advised, Mr. Chairman. 'Chairman PIKE. Did you look at the language of what the Committee released? "Mr. LEE. I did not. "Chairman PIKE. You are sitting here making a statement, saying that we have released language. re- lating to the communications activities of the U.S. Government, and you did not even look at the lan- guage we released." 23ln his appearance before the Committee, the Assistant Attorney General asserted that the dispo- sition of security information is solely within the pro- rogative of the executive branch: "Chairman. PIKE. You say the legislative branch of Government had no right whatsoever to make any- thing public that the executive branch of Government does not want public. Is that your position? "Mr. LEE. That is our position as far as classified information is concerned. "Chairman PIKE. So what you say is that in this great democracy, one branch of Government, and one branch ... alone may decide what is secret, and one branch of Government ... alone may decide what is not secret." In support of his position, Mr. Lee did not assert that the Congress or the Committee was bound, as a matter of law, by Executive Order 11652, which established the current classification system, nor did he offer any contrary interpretation of Section 6(a) of H. Res. 591, which explicitly authorized the Com- mittee to release such information as it deemed advis- able. 24This quotation is taken from the summary con- clusion of a post-mortem prepared by the intelligence community itself. The principle conclusions of the post-mortem began as follows: "I. There was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on October 6. Those elements of the intelligence com- munity responsible for the production of finished in- telligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its im- minence. "The information provided by those parts of the community responsible for intelligence collection was sufficient to prompt such a warning." The Perform- ance of the Intelligence Community Before the Arab- Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post- Mortem Report. Director of Central Intelligence December 1973). 25The two verbatim quotes which were voluntarily declassified by the CIA were: raelis on September 13-cannot. of course, be ex- cluded." INR Memorandum to the Secretary, 30 Sep- tember 1973 (emphasis in original). 26The first of five quotes, which was later released, is as follows: "Syria-Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and Egyptian military readiness are considered to be coin- cidental and not designed to lead to major hostilities. DIA Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1973. The text was the subject of an extensive discussion among the Chairman and representatives of the CIA: "Chairman PIKE. Mr. Parmenter, before we go into questioning, would you tell me why you have omitted from your sanitized statement here the actual pre- dictions. as contained in the report from which you read, i. e., the DIA Intelligence Summary Statement of 3 October 1973? L w t t l k h h an you o oo at w at t e original report says and tell me why we should not, here in open session, hear what the DIA actually said on October 3, 1973. "Mr. PARMENTER. There are sources and meth- ods here that we will be- happy to discuss in execu- tive session, "Chairman PIKE. Sources and methods in that statement? "Mr. PARMENTER. Yes, sir. "Chairman PIKE. I find that incredible.. How does that differ, from the one you read on the preceding page (INR Memorandum. to the Secretary) as far as sources and methodsare.concerned? .. - All I am asking you is, could you "tell us why the reading of this plain, blank conclusion by the DiA as to the like- lihood of the outbreak of war, would reveal a source or a method? Mr. ROGOVIN. I will assume that the reaso4 for the deletion was the manner in which the informa- tion was secured- , ' "e "Chairman PIKE. It doesn't say how the informa- tion is secured. This is a conclusion. "Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find, as I look at what has been deleted and what has been omitted and what has. been retained and read, differs not as to sources and methods, not as to the necessity of protecting the sensitivity of stuff, but whether it is in fact rather self-serving...," Sept. 11, 1975- 27AI1 five quotes are reprinted in the Mid-East War Post-Mortem in an appendix to this report. The first two quotes are typical: "Syria-Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and Egyptian military readiness are considered to be co- incidental and not designed to lead to major hostili- ties." DIA Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1973.4 "Egypt-The exercise and alert activities in Egypt may be on a somewhat larger scale and more realistic than previous exercises, but .they do not appear to be preparing for a military offensive against Israel. Cen- tral Intelligence Bulletin, 5 October 1973." Post- Mortem, DCI, 6 (December 1975). Of the nine words which the Committee agreed not to release, few of them would have revealed, directly, any sensitive intelligence sources or methods. instead, in most cases, they constituted personal characterizations, the publication of which might have been embarrassing to the United States or to individual foreign officials. - 29"Sec. 7. In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 102(d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first session) that the Director of Central Intelligence shall he re- sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and meth- ods from unauthorized disclosure . . 50 U.S.C. ? 403 11973). 301n the closed session. Mr. Rogovin, Special Coun- sel to the CIA, stated: ". . . [T]he experts feel very confident this is the bottom line that can be made public. These are references to real time reporting ." Comm. Execs. Sess., Sept. 11. 1975.... 31Mr. Lee referred to what he characterized as the traditional procedures by which the Congress has re- ceived and treated classified information. a characteri- zation which elicited the following colloquy: "Chairman PIKE. If it is your position that we may never disclose information, how can we carry out i our, responsibilities? pressman s car, and that is exactly what you want to continue, and that is exactly what I think has led us into the mess we are in." "Text of letter from Mr. William Colby, Director of Central intelligence, to the Chairman, dated Sep- tember 30, 1975: "With the approval of the President, I am forward- ing herewith the classified material, additional to the unclassified material forwarded with my letter of 29 September 1975, which is responsive to your subpoena of September 12, 1975. This is forwarded on loan with the understanding that there will be no public dis- closure of this classified material (nor of testimony, depositions or interviews concerning it) without a reasonable opportunity for us to consult with respect to it. In the event of disagreement, the matter will be referred to the President. If the President then certi- fies in writing that the disclosure of the material would be detrimental to the national security of the United States, the matter will not be disclosed by the Com- mittee, except that the Committe would reserve its right to submit the matter to judicial determination." 3tOn September 26, 1975, Mr. McClory described the President's position as follows: "We have assurance, in my opinion, of getting everything we need, and I would hope we would find we were getting everything we need." 76Mr.William Hyland, Director of Intelligence.'and Research. Department of State, was scheduled to be the key witness on September 11, 1975. It was unfor, tunate that the cut-off and later restrictions on testi- mony from Foreign SeAice officers,. prevented the Committee from a full investigatit5n of- the Cyprus crisis. There is a closely held State Department report identifying the people who killed thk,American Ain bassador, Rodger Davies, during that crisis, and a public protest has perhaps not been raised because these same murderers are now officials in the Cyprus government. Ouestions related to that intelligence re- port should, and must, be cleared up. 37"The 'Dissent Channel; through which this mem- orandum was submitted, provides those officers of the Department of State who disagree with established policy, or who have new policies to recommend, a means for communicating their views to the highest levels of the Department." Letter to Chairman Pike from Dr. Kissinger, Dept. of State, Oct. 14, 1975. 3. Silenced Witnesses In response, a new tactic was fashioned-the silenced witness. On September 22, 1975, Mr. Boyatt was ordered not to tell the Committee "information which would disclose options considered by or recommended, to more senior officers in the Department."38 The order was added on to the existing ban on classified infor, mation. That was not the end. Anything Mr. Boyatt did say would have to be in the presence of State Department monitors, by order of the Secretary. It is worth pointing out that this prohibition ex- tended to more than Mr. Boyatt's options or advice. Any information that would disclose those options was also banned. An attempted interview by the staff, with monitors, demonstrated that this covered almost everything the man ever did or said 4? The State Department's order was issued in spite of two United States laws which protect and guarantee the right of a federal employee to provide informa- tion to Congress. One statute says that the right of a federal employee "to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a Committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied."41 The second law, which directly bears on the Boyatt situation, was specifically designed to encourage candid testimony of employees from federal agencies, including the Department of State 42 The authority invoked by the Secretary of State was neither "classification," nor "executive privilege," but a new doctrine that can best be characterized as "secretarial privilege."43 The Secretary of State was demanding special treatment. If this Committee could not have received testimony from CIA officers or FBI agents about ad- vice or options they presented to senior officials, it would have had no choice but to shut down.S4 Over- sight would be dead. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 I ligence agencies had either not heard of "secretarial privilege " t t ..d .e. e staple cme' p Un October 2, 1077. the Committee voted to :risis On the basis of a single CIA report Proof issue a subpoena for Mr Bovatt's Cvprus critique Athens. the analysts, notwithstanding their earlier I Dr Kissinger responded on October 14. 1975. -cfar. concern. conveyed the imoression to the polieymakers ring to the subpoena as a "request." It was denied. that the world had been granted a reprieve." CIA even uwugn it was not to produce a document d6 Not only were we told about the report, we were the hands of those who have possession of documents. Therefore, the Committee, more than one month after issuing its subpoena, accepted from Mt. Boyatt no testimony and no document. but something less. We were given Mr. Boyatt's memo after it had been mixed into a number of other paragraphs drafted else- where in the State Department-ostensibly to protect Mr. Boyatt. It ended up very much like the proverbial "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."17 This time the euphemism was "an amalgam."49 Footnotes: 35This order was embodied in a September 22, 1975, memorandum from Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Undersecretary of State for Management, to William G. Hyland, the Department's Director of Intelligence and Research. This directive stated that "the following condition; will pertain to sworn inter- views by the Pike Committee staff: "The Department of State insists that a State De- partment representative be present during the inter- views. Should the interviewees wish to he represented by their own legal counsel. the State Department representative will be in addition to that private legal counsel. "The interviewees are to decline, by order of the President, to discuss classified material. "The interviewees are to decline, by order of the Secretary of State. to give information which would disclose options considered by or recommended to more senior officers in the Department of State." When Mr. Eagleburger appeared before the Com- mittee on September 25, he stated that the orders contained in his memorandum of September 22 were issued at the verbal direction of the Secretary of State. 40This was clearly indicated by the following ex- change among Mr. Field, on behalf of the Committee, Mr. Boyatt, and Mr. Hitchcock, the Department's monitor: "MR. FIELD. Mr. Boyatt, would you please de- scribe for us in detail what was done in the State Department not with respect to classified intelligence reports or information, but . . . knowledge of any of these events, who was involved. and what they were doing? Would you please describe that for us in some detail? "MR. BOYATT. I would like to ask Mr. Hitch- cock's advice. "MR. HITCHCOCK. I regret but it appears to me that this comes to the problem of the description of the decision-making process which my instructions seem to indicate is proscribed. "MR. FIELD. In other words, it is your position that who was doing what in the State Department has something to do with decision-making? "Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes. "MR. FIELD. We can't discuss this activity? We can't discuss where he went to. what he did, who he told, what that person told him in response? We can't discuss as I understand it, whether or not he is aware of any moves made by the Secretary of State towards Turkey, towards Cyprus, either-preceding or during this period." ""The right of employees, individually or collec- tively to petition Congress or a Member of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be in- terfered with or denied." 5 U.S.C. ? 7102 (1973). 42"Upon the request of a committee of either House of Congress, a joint committee of Congress. or a member of such committee, any officer or employee of the Department of State, the United States informa- tion Agency, the Agency for International Develop- ment, the United States Arms Control and Disarma- ment Agency, or any other department, agency, or independent establishment of the United States Gov- ernment primarily concerned with matters relating to foreign countries or multilateral organizations. may express his views and opinions, and make recom- mendations he considers appropriate, if the request of the committee or member of the committee relates to a subject which is within the jurisdiction of that committee." 2 U.S.C. ? 194a (1973). 43Chairman Pike. questioning Dr. Kissinger in an open hearing on Oct. 31, 1975. stated, "I feel that you are alleging a privilege which has heretofore been reserved only to Presidents." Dr. Kissinger responded , p . y or n rectly, by the State De- I have deliberately not asked the President to exercise partment, it helped erode support within and outside ''The Committee Counsel, on Nov. b, 1975, noted that. "MR. DONNER ... A subpoena is not an in. vitation to negotiate. A subpoena is a command by a duly authorized body of government to deliver infor- mation." 47Winston S. Churchill, radio broadcast. 45On November 4, the Committee, by a vote of 8 to 5. agreed to the following resolution: "Resolved by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives that an amalgama- tion of Department of State documents to include in its entirety the papers described as the Dissent Mem- orandum prepared by Thomas Boyatt while Director of Cypriot Affairs in the Department, fulfills the re- opinion, the action of an amalgam became feasible I bu, not cc iris Comrnict,e. a. An Attack Averted If no "flank" attack was launched by the FBI to discredit the Committee, it may have been because On October 9. 1975. Mr. Martin Kaiser, a manu- facturer of wiretap equipment, testified before the Committee. He indicated that the FBI bought his equipment through a middleman. U.S. Recording, who added a 10 percent markup. There was no justi- fication for the markup, and it later developed that the president of U.S. Recording and a top FBI official were close friends. The Committee began an investigation of U.S. Re- cording and its FBI friends. The Justice Department and FBI later began their own probe of the same matter. On December 23, 1975, two and one-half months after Mr. Kaiser testified, he was subjected to a six- hour interview by two FBI agents. The agents were allegedly carrying out an internal FBI investigation regarding the agency's contractual dealings with U.S. Recording Company. Mr. Kaiser called the Committee to reiav his con- cern, and offered to give a statement under oath as to the conduct of the FBI agents. In a Committee deposition of December 30, 1975, Kaiser claimed that the FBI agents were more con- cerned with discrediting the Committee's inquiry and personnel than conducting their investigation- of U.S. Recording. Ultimately, the agents had elicited from him a statement, written by an FBI agent, which in some insignificant details recanted portions of his testimony, Mr. Kaiser then repudiated that written statement, which he had signed while agents atoodr over him and thrust it in front of him. Taking the initiative, the Committee, on December. 31,-1975, released a copy of the written statement, a full copy of Mr. Kaiser's December 30, 1975, depo- sition, and the text of a letter to the Attorney Gen- eral demanding a full explanation of the entire inci- dent.56 This was done to head off any FBI "leak" of the statement its agents had taken while Kaiser was under some duress. Footnotes: "Mr. Eagleburger's statement delivered to th . e Senator at a hearing with helpmeet Roy Cohn. Committee offices on September 24, 1975, read: quirement of the subpoena issued by the Committee on the 2nd day of October, 1975. "Provided the amalgamation is accompanied by an affidavit signed by a person mutually acceptable to the Department of State and the Committee as represented by the Chairman and the ranking min- ority member, attesting that the aforementioned Boy- att memorandum is contained unabridged in the am- algamation: "The. adoption of this resolution shall in no way be considered as a precedent affecting the right of this Committee with respect to access to Executive Branch testimony or documents." 4. Flank Attack On September 24, 1975, two days after written instructions to Mr. Boyatt were issued, the Deputy Secretary of State raised for the first time an innuendo that the Committee's action resembled McCarthy- ism49 The Committee's initial reaction was to dismiss any such inference as a temporary lapse into poor taste. Unfortunately, it was not a temporary lapse. The next day, on September 25. 1975, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger appeared before the Committee to explain the Boyatt order. His statement again re- ferred to State Department employees' problems with Congress in past times-a clear reference to the McCarthy period of the 1950's, as his subsequent testimony made clear.SO On October 14, 1957, Dr. Kissinger's written response to the subpoena of Boyatt's intelligence critique again raised a reference to McCarthvism.51 The implication was baseless 52 as both Mr. Eagle- burger and Dr. Kissinger admitted under questioning.53 Facts seemed to make no difference. Within days of the innuendo being raised by Dr. Kissinger and his reply, newspaper columns and editorials were re- porting their charges of McCarthvism.54 To the extent that such media activity may have been ins ired directl i di "Mr. Chairman, this is far from a hypothetical issue. To cite but a single example, the Foreign Service and the Department of State were torn apart in the late 1940's and early 1950's over an issue that raised some of the same concerns that are before. us today-the ability of Foreign Service Officers to give to the Secretary and their other superiors their can- did advice, secure in the knowledge that this advice will remain confidential. The events of those years not only injured individuals, but also did significant damage to the process by which foreign policy is made. Who can be certain how many recommenda- tions during the years that followed were colored by memories of those experiences?" 50"I must say again, as I said in the statement today, the issue for me right now is an issue of prin- ciple. It is the question of our duty to protect junior and middle-grade officers of the Department in the conduct-of their duties within the 7epartment . ""While I know that the Select Committee has no intention of embarrassing or exploiting junior, and middle-grade officers of the Department, there have been other times and other committees-and there may be again-where positions taken by Foreign Service Officers were exposed to ex post facto public examination and recrimination." Letter to Chairman Pike from Dr. Kissinger. Oct. 14, 1975. 52The plain facts are that Senator McCarthy de- stroyed the careers of State Department employees on the basis of their beliefs and politics. This Com- mittee never sought the political views of any federal employee. Senator McCarthy operated without evi- dence. This Committee sought only evidence. Senator McCarthy forced people to testify. Mr. Boyatt wanted to testify. McCarthyism grew out of a lack of char- acter and integrity, and from a climate of hysteria. Restrictive rules are no answer to such problems. 53"MR. HAYES. [O]ne of the things that has deeply offended me ... has been the implication, the very clear implication, that your position of protect- ing middle and lower level Foreign Service officers is a position of protecting them from McCarthyism. "SECRETARY KISSINGER. With respect to the charge of McCarthyism, I want to make clear that I do not accuse this committee of engaging in McCarthy- ism and I know indeed that the Chairman has a Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9 64 record in this regard, and from the eonvierions of many ,n Ihr rnemne to !iia ,ml twit'', .r i'f~. I io?r hat rhi 1 to he ilx cn of t nm s "MR HAYES I Jon t think here h been c one m tams that you ran ne or tnat vtr Leigh can sae. ,vherc this Commie has e,,:r taken , upon itself in the tradition of the McCarthvs to. in ~. ls~ena'. cm a :rqc ~r",r~rinn- EACLEBURGER. Sir. II,ms. there is no implication in my statement that this Committee is f h I r pe ormmg tote way described the Department went through in the late '40's and early 'S0's. That is not, sir, my point." Sept. 25, 1975. 54The New York Times editorial of October 19. 1975, was entitled, "Neo-McCarthyism'?" "in view of the facts, the Intelligence Committee's insistence that it has the right to reach into the interior of the State Department to subpoena the dissenting memoranda of junior and middle-rank of- ficials-and to summon them to testify on policy issues-is clearly contrary to the national interest..-." The Washington Post editorial of October 6, 1975, entitled "Mr. Pike's Committee" had this to say: "The analogy with McCarthyism evoked by the State Department is a relevant one, even though it appears that in this case the committee of Congress wishing o lucstion Mr. B:va,t sppereud} is inclined to praise him for his views, not persecute him--and to use his testimony to fault Secretary Kissinger. Certainly Mr. Kissinger should be faulted for his Cyprus policy.. , ." One of the most disturbing aspects of the inci- dent-quite aside from the propriety of interrogating a Committee witness about the Committee-was that the interview was replete with FBI suggestions of pre- judice on the part of the Committee Counsel. Vigor was apparently seen as prejudice, and by two agents who had never met the Committee personnel they were denigrating. 5. Deletions in early November, about the same time the Boyatt problems were being resolved, the Committee moved on from the subjects of money and what our money buys. The third topic of our hearings was risks, and how well those risks are controlled. Seven new subpoenas were issued. Four were for materials pertaining to subjects of prior hearings- They were honored.57 The remaining three were di- rected to Dr. Kissinger. for materials pertaining to upcoming hearings. Not surprisingly, those subpoenas went unanswered." Once again, some background is helpful. Two of the three subpoenas were for covert action recommendations made by non-CIA officials, since the CIA had alteady opened up the covert ac- tion files to us. The third subpoena was for intelli- gence records on Soviet compliance with strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT). When considering risks, covert actions rank as per- haps the highest risk operations in the government, short of war. The law allows CIA "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence af- fecting the National Security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."60 This is the legal authority for covert action. A subcommittee of the National Security Council, presently called the Party Committee, has been assigned the task of di- recting these actions. By tracing money, the Committee came across mil- lions of rounds of ammunition and weapons being purchased in the early 1970's. The purchases were destined for a questionable military venture in a far- of war that most Americans had probably never heard of, much less felt they had any national inter- est in. The CIA's military escapade was had enough, but. on examining documents, :he Committee discovered that the Forty Committee appeared not to have met or voted on the operation. In fact, internal documents showed that CIA and the State Department had turned the project down three times in the previous two years. It turned out that during a trip overseas, Presi- dent Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had met alone with the head of i foreign government [the Shah of Iran- editor's nntel At that man's request. the Administra- tion had invclvcd CIA in an internal war in the head of state' neighboring country [the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq-editor's mote]. John Connally. on the verge I of heading Democrats for Nixon." was sent back to I the foreign leader, apparently to bring him the good news of final apnrosal. \ Month artcr na nir.' ',,r t ~ad ,ilre,iJV c'tin. t'~i'ty L,ilnill't'ec Ineiliti ~crc' -~:l[ a memo by Dr Kis n er infc g the'? rr....t.,- I Fonn,otes: ,eparam matter, this Committee v t r,ici by `utt ,.r CIA Director dichaid Helens of i decision to trd rtake a covert action project in Chtl Mr. Helms .emu it led nut he ;Ad! ollice anti rota by Presi- dent Nixon with Dr. Kissinger and Mr John Mhchcll pt C1-\ relcrvations He was also.) told "not to iniainm the )trier members of the Forty Committee. '64 A pattern was emerging. Not all covert actions were generated by the CIA. In particular, paramilitary operations of the worst type seemed to come from outside the CIA. Some projects came from the President. Some projects came from his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and some had their beginning in the Department of State. Forty Committee records were subpoenaed to see if the pattern was valid.66 The subpoena was limited to the official document by which a covert action was approved. These records were often no more than one paragraph long. What arrived in response to our subpoenas showed nothing-because it was niastly deletions. he deletions came in all shapes and forms. Typ- ically, there would he one line left on a page, ray Secretary Kiser: He -wins "alleging a privilege Imrctotase reserved only to presidents." ing, "A CIA project was telephonically approved," or, "The Committee voted to approve a CIA paper entitled [title deleted]." Ofen, if there had been numerous items considered at a meeting, the deletions themselves had been cut and pasted together. For ex- ample, item 'eight might follow item one, giving the impression that only two items had been considered that day.67 Sometimes there would be only one word left on a page-"Chile"-nothing else, anywhere: but it was still classified top secret. The information, needless to say, was worthless69 Wholesale deletions were encountered in the Com- mittee's investigation of domestic covert activities as well. COINTELPRO, the FBI'S program for disruption of the "New Left," like nearly all FBI actions, was extremely well documented, The Committee requested the appropriate documents in July69 What it re- ceived were summaries so heavily excised as to be unusable. One memorandum, for example, referring only generically to the "New Left." contained the sub- heading, "Recommended Procedure," on one page, and "Results" on the next. The pages were otherwise blank. Another document with the same type generic reference, "Black Extremist Organization," was 'ike- wise excised in its entirety. The Committee protested. Negotiations followed.70 Finally. in mid-October, -an agreement was reached whereby less excised memos were made available to Committee staff, at FBI headquarters. The Committee persisted, selecting a representative number of mem- oranda to be delivered to its own offices. After some delay, they were delivered. still excised. Requests for the documents pertaining to FBI na- tional security wiretaps led to a similar experience. One set of documents was delivered. excised hev,md nse. Negotiations took place for Almost ,i month. finally a ,ceund ct de,-iiment. a:,s a o i,lau. nu. .'n. is till sti lent:t _t ni lr,'. I r h 4 s a .t c f't Iden f. ~ .na Sr A" , ' ,r III ni ; I ,, '5 sarllv Council Intelligence Committee -is Workim, Group and its Economic Intelligence Subcommittee; To she Assistant to the President for Nanoniii .>e..l .la ,oi is illnLuC )I it ileeiItiY ,i the \1 h' slim Spe.~al Action Gritty ,cm is .g ,Ile Mideast War, the Cyprus crisis, and the Portugal coup; 3) To the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, for all intelligence reports furnished to the National Security Council between October 5 and October 28, 1973. relating to the Mideast war; 4) To the Director of Central Intelligence, for all written requests and memoranda of requests from the CIA to the internal Revenue Service since July 1, 1961, for tax information or official action by IRS. 58These subpoenas were not complied with: I) To the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for all Forty Committee records of decisions taken since January 20, 1965, reflecting approval of covert action projects; 2 "To the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for documents relating to the Soviet Union's adherence to the provisions of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972 and the Vladivostok agreement of 1974; and 3) To the Secretary of State for all State Depart- ment documents recommending covert actions to the National Security Council since January 20, 1961. 60The National Security Act of 1947 states- " (d) Powers and Duties. "For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council- "5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." 50 U.S.S. 403(d) (1973)- 64'MR. FIELD. In the case of the Chile operation, could you describe very briefly how that was directed'? "MR. HELMS. Well, there was a part- "MR. FIELD. How you came to be told- "MR. HELMS. There was some activity undertaken at the President's direction in Chile by his saving to me that he wanted this effort made and that I was not to inform the other members of the Forty Com- t mittee. "MR. FIELD. In other words, in the case of the Chilean operation, were you called to the Oval Office? "Mr. HELMS. I was in the Oval Office. "Mr. FIELD, You were called into the *Oval Office and who was present? "MR. HELMS. The Attorney General and Dr. Kissinger." Exec, Sess., Oct. 23, 1975. 66"CHAiRMAN PIKE, The question then becomes -and Mr. Field stated this yesterday-are those op- erations which are generally within the CIA. and in the normal course of business, normally more respon- sible? Do they normally get our nation into less diffi- culties than those which somebody outside of the intelligence operation department tells them to do?" "CHAIRMAN PIKE. Well, here we are seeking to look at the genesis of all oversight and the degree of control and the degree of responsibility by which these operations get launched. "You and 1, and Mr. Dellums, and Mr. Treen, as members of the Armed Services Committee, for years i heard the magic word, "The Forty Committee." It has seemed to us as we get deeper and deeper into this that the Forty Committee really has not been all that relevant in the decision-making process in the oversight process. The Forty Committee is always held forth as being that body which exercises judicial restraint, perhaps- in authorizing these various oper- ations. It has seemed to me and I think most of the members of this committee that the activities of the Forty Committee have been relatively negligible in authorizing these operations. "We are trying to get the information to see whether anybody ever really argues about these things. to sec whether anvbodv s,otes no on these things. to see whether the Forty Committee is a reality or a rubber stamp.-" 5T'MR. FIELD. I think this is the best example of the kind of deletions. The items skip from item I to item 4. Items 2 and 3 are clearly cut and pasted out of the document. It then skips from 4 to 7. In other words, here is a document that could conceivable be 'svo or three or four pages long It gives you the feel ing :hat cots say 'occn a Icasonablc amount it n `'rmaiion. nut to fact ill [le!,-is iii, tote i, Incredibly, the President's letter was clasaific "secret." The secret stamp was unnecessary, becau- there were no facts at all about the covert projec in his letter. The types of projects at issuexrowere m even mentioned. The letter was simply a :rhetoric pronouncement of he*- important confidentiaality i and bow telling the American people what their go erntpent is doing in these matters would harm o1 best interests. - It should be noted that one of the items that legedly would harm this nation's security if mat public had already been made public-by D Kissinger.iss 123A typical example was the CIA refusal, . first, to declassify part of the 1973 Mid-East W.. Post-Mortem, That position produced the followin exchange with the CIA Special Counsel: "Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find; as I look - what has been deleted and' what has beep omitte and what has been retained and read, differs as sources or methods, not as to the necessity of'prgitec: ing the sensitivity of stuff but whether it is in fat rather self-serving, or whether. it is in fact rather dam aging." i24This estimate, was provided to the Committee b' the interagency Classification Review Committee which was established by President Nixon in Exec" live Order 11652, which also established the security classification system now in force.... 7261n the event of disagreement, the matter will bt referred to the President. If the President then certi fies in writing that the disclosure of the materia would be detrimental to the national security of thi United States, the matter will not be disclosed by th, Committee, except that the Committee would reserve its right to submit the matter to judicial determina lion." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, Cl.4 Sept. 30, 1975. 12sThe votes were 10-2, 10-2, and 10-2. 12OThe shortest statement waS two pages; the long est was 14 pages. "'Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, we have several dif ficulties with this report. We looked through it. W, tried to identify what things might be released anal what things might not. There are a few odd sentences that might be released." i3a"Mr. NELSON. . . I consulted with the Di rector. It is his position that he would object to tht declassification of either of these papers as I de scribed them to him over the phone." 134"Tokyo-U.S. assistance prevented a takeover h,. Soviet-backed elements in Angola in July, a senior official aboard U.S. Secretary of State Henry A Kissinger's plane said en route to Tokyo yesterday. Washington Post. A-17, Dec. 8, 1975. This was the first administration acknowledgement of U.S. involvement in Angola. "Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's admission that the United States is trying to be helpful to some neighbors of strife-tom Angola is a surprise once because Kissinger has openly acknowledged it. Jeremiah O'Leary. "U.S. Admits Indirect Aid t, Angola," Washington Star, A-4. Dec. 10. 1975. - Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9