HOW KISSINGER, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE CIA OBSTRUCTED THE INVESTIGATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03-01541R000200420003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 23, 1976
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9
A 10- PAGE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT
More From the Report on the CIA That They
Still Don't Want You to Read
HOW K1$$INGERTHE
WHITE HOUSE,. AND
THE CIA OBSTRUCTED.
THE INVESTIGATION
The Unpublished First Section of the Pike Papers
INFORMATION DELAYED REFUSING TO TESTIFY THE SECRECY DILEMMA
We were given heavily
`
. The authority invoked by
`Classified information pre-
...
"sanitized" pieces of paper.
the Secretary of State was
sents a classic paradox:
"Sanitized" was merely a
neither "classification," nor
without it, government some-
euphemism for blank sheets
"executive privilege," but a
times cannot function; with
of paper ..
new doctrine that can best be
it, government sometimes
'
Page 61
characterized as "secretarial
cannot function.
privilege"
Page 66
. . Page 62
INFORMATION DENIED
... The cut-off from informa-
tion struck at the heart of
Committee operations. One
month out of our five-month
investigative period was lost
while the issue was
negotiated...'
Page 61
OVER-CLASSIFICATION
'Overuse of classification is
inevitable when ... some
15,466 persons can
classify information.'
Page 68
ATTACKING THE FLANKS
On September 24, 1975.. .
the Deputy Secretary of State
raised for the first time an
innuendo that the
Committee's action
resembled McCarthyism.'
Page 63
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telligence agencies that are
to be controlled by Con-
gressional lawmaking are, today, beyond the law-
maker's scrutiny.
These secret agencies have interests that inherently
conflict with the open accountability of a political
body, and there are many tools and tactics to block
and deceive conventional Congressional checks.
Added to this are the unique attributes of intelligence
-notably, "national security,"' in its cloak of secrecy
and mystery-to intimidate Congress and erode fragile
support for sensitive inquiries.
Wise and effective legislation cannot proceed in the
absence of information respecting conditions to be af-
fected or changed.2 Nevertheless, under present cir-
cumstances, inquiry into intelligence activities faces
serious and fundamental shortcomings.
Even limited success in exercising future oversight
requires a rethinking of the powers, procedures, and
duties of the overseers. This Committee's path and
policies, its pluses and minuses, may at least indicate
where to begin.
Access to
-Information
The key to exercising oversight is knowledge. In the
case of intelligence agencies, this translates into a need
for access to information often held by the agencies
themselves, about events in distant places.
It is an uncertain approach to gathering facts, given
the best of circumstances. The best of circumstances
thereby become a minimum condition.
The Select Committee's most important work may
well have been its test of those circumstances, testing
perhaps for the first time what happens when Con-
gress unilaterally decides what it wants to know and
how it wants to know it.
There were numerous public expressions by intelli-
gences agencies and the Executive that full coopera-
tion would be accorded? The credibility of such as-
surances was important, since almost all the necessary
materials were classified and controlled by the execu-
tive branch. Despite these public representations, in
practice most document access was preceded by
lengthy negotiations. Almost without exception, these
negotiations yielded something less than complete or
timely access!
In short, the words were always words of coopera-
tion: the reality was delay, refusal, missing informa-
tion. asserted privileges, and on and on.5
The Committee began by asserting that Congress
alone must decide who, acting in its behalf, has a
right to know secret information. This led to a rejec-
tion of Executive "clearances"6 or the "compartments-
tion"' of our staff. The Committee refused, as a mat-
ter of policy, to sign agreements. It refused to allow
intelligence officials to read and review our investiga-
tors' notes. and avoided canned briefings in favor of
primary source material. The Committee maintained
that Congress has a right to all information short of
direct communications with the President.
Our ability to abide by these policies has been a
mixed record.
On the plus side, an aggressive pursuit of facts and
a willingness to back up this pursuit with subpoenas
produced some unprecedented results. As an example,
never before had either the Executive or Congress put
together a ten-year review of covert action projects.
By subpoena-which, unfortunately, had to be taken
to the brink of contempt enforcement-the staff of the
Committee analyzed all official covert action approv-
als since 1965. and reported its results to the Commit.
tee in a closed hearing' That presentation was one of
the more interesting and accurate pictures of U.S.
covert policies yet assembled, and was of no small
value to our findings. Other examples appear through-
out the remainder of this report.
Nonetheless, if that is the positive side. it was off-
set by the extraordinary efforts that were required.
even in a climate favorable to reviewing past Execu-
tive conduct, to identify and obtain documents.
It is a commentary in itself that subpoenas were
necessary.
T c-- &-inct climmitt"d
Oversight Experience
EDITOR'S NOTE
Last week, The Village voice printed almost
in full the text of the second of three sections of
the report on U.S. secret agencies, dated January
19, 1976, prepared by the House Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, chaired by Congressman
Otis Pike of New York. That second section
contains the investigative record of the Com-
mittee. As noted in our introduction, we could
not publish the third section of the report-a
section on recommendations-because the Com-
mittee had not written it. And we did not choose
to publish the first section because it dealt not
with the Committee's findings but rather with its
frustrations as an investigative unit.
Herewith we are publishing the text of that
first section because of the perspective it provides
for understanding the reaction of Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger, the White House. the
secret agencies, and the Pike Committee itself
to publication of the report and to the fact that
it appeared exclusively in the Voice. By far, the
greatest outrage has been expressed not toward
those whose mismanagement, cynicism, and
downright lawlessness have made a scandal and
a disaster of our intelligence operations, but
toward those in the Congress and the media who,
uncovered and reported the facts. The first Sec-
tion of the Pike Papers helps explain this in-
verted response. It tells of repeated efforts by,
above all, Mr. Kissinger and by the White House,
the CIA. Senator Henry Jackson, and others to
contain, obstruct, delay, and if possible derail
the Select Committee's investigation. It also tells
some of the effects of these efforts.
In the end, the obstructionists did not succeed.
But the turmoil itself and piecemeal leaks tend
to focus attention on the clash of interests rather
than the substance of the Committee's findings
and still threaten to dilute its cumulative impact.
In the following text, space limitations require
us to delete some non-substantive references from
the footnotes. Therefore, footnotes are not num-
bered consecutively; but the numbering follows
the report's throughout.
It is a further commentary that much of the time
subpoenas were not enough, and only a determined
threat of contempt proceedings brought grudging
results.
Footnotes:
tit is interesting to note that, despite volumes of
literature, public utterance, and court cases on the
subject, there are no clear definitions of what national
security is. E.q., Note 87 Harv. L. Rev. 976 (1974);
Becker, The Supreme Court's Recent "National Se-
curity" Decisions: Which Interests Are Being Pro-
tected? 40 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1972).
'-Justice Van Devanter, speaking for a unanimous
Supreme Court, wrote that the Congressional "power
of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is essential
and appropriate as an auxiliary to the legislative func-
tion." 'NcGrain v. Daugherty (1972).
Early in the history of our republic. the power was
accompanied by "instructions to inquire into the con-
dition of the various executive departments, and the
ability and integrity with which thehave been con-
ducted." 13 Cong. Deb. 1057, 1836).
'In a letter to the Chairman dated October 14,
1975. Secretary of State Kissinger stated: "I have no
desire to keep anything from the Select Committee
with regard to the Cyprus crisis or any other subject."
Letter to Chairman Pike. from Dr. Kissinger. State
Dept.. Oct. 14. 1975.
In a second letter to the Chairman. dated Novem-
ber 3, 1975, Dr. Kissinger again pledged his coopera-
tion: "Let me reiterate that my intention is not to
withhold any information of use to the Committee .. .
I remain as determined as ever to do everything possi-
ble to assist the Committee in its difficult and impor-
tant task." Letter to Chairman Pike. from Dr. Kis-
singer, State Dept., Nov. 3, 1975.
At a news conference on June 10, 1975, President
etouse select Committees these [Rockefeller Commis-
sion] materials, together with other related materials
in the executive branch." He went on to say: "So
theres not going to be any possibility of any cover-up
because we're giving them the material that the Rock-
efeller Commission developed in their hearings, plus
any other material that is available in the executive
branch." (Emphasis added.) President's News Con-
ference, Wash. D.C., June 10, 1975.
4The following statement by the Chairman, on No-
vember T4, 1975, with reference to a subpoena of
State Department documents, is typical:
"Chairman PIKE. That troubles me. Mr. McClory.
The fact is that three days after the subpoena was
due, we have nothing. You have had phone calls. Mr
Donner and Mr. Field have had phone calls. The
President has not asserted executive privilege, but he
hasn't done it."
The Committee also discovered what Chairman
Pike described as the "dribble treatment," where one
or two documents were delivered each day over the
course of several weeks. This was a particularly subtle
impediment, as it gave the executive branch an op-
portunity to deny that it was withholding information,
while at the same time delaying the Committee's
work.
In the domestic intelligence investigation, Drug En-
forcement Administration documents, which had been
requested for over three months, were opened for
Committee "inspection" 48 hours before a hearing on
DEA intelligence. Even then, a subpoena had been
necessary to obtain information. The staff was not
given access to the 17 so-called Kissinger wiretap ma-
terials until 24 hours before Dr. Kissinger appeared
before the Committee; and that took place only after
lengthy negotiations. (Justice Department memoranda
relating to the 17 wiretaps are printed as pp. IX of
the Comm. Hearings, Part 3.)
'The Chairman's comments on September 29, 1975,
in a discussion of proposed agreements with the Ex-
ecutive, illustrate the point:
"Chairman PIKE. . You thought we had an
agreement with the President two weeks ago-or a
week and a half ago-and we adopted your proposals
in order to get that agreement.
"Having adopted your proposals, they said, 'Well,
that is the first bite, now we will come back for some
more.' They have now come back for some more.
"You want us to adopt these proposals. You keep
seeing huge cooperation just around the corner and it
is not there, and it has not been there."
At a Committee meeting early in September, the
Chairman described the Committee's experience thus
far with executive branch cooperation:
"Here is what we run into ... Nothing is ever re-
fused-things just are not delivered. They very care-
fully do not refuse, but the language is always the lan-
guage of cooperation-the fact is the fact of non-pro-
duction......
A month later, the degree of cooperation had not
noticeably improved. As the Chairman stated:
. I think we all know what is going on here. You
asked that we wait another week-and we can wait
for another week. You say that we ought to be con-
cerned with the official statements and, as I have in-
dicated from the day I got on the Committee. the offi-
cial statements always promise cooperation. There has
never been an official statement which says. 'In no
way are you going to get this information.' But the
fact of the matter is that we don't get the informa-
tion."
'The Committee did accept the assistance of the
FBI in conducting background investigations of its
staff prior to hiring. All decisions. however, concern-
ing the members of the Committee's staff and their
work were made by the Committee.
The Director of Central Intelligence requested that
the Committee require its staff to sign secrecy oaths
comparable to those which the CIA requires of its
own employees. The Committee refused. However.
each member of the staff was obliged by the Commit-
tee to sign an "Employee Agreement."
7"Compartmentation" is a system employed by the
intelligence agencies to restrict the distribution of in-
formation even among officials witft security clear-
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------- - - - - - -
I antes The iu,uficat.on fo -ompartmcntati>n is Je- Footnotes:
scribed in the rollowiii vc c pus r tr eito to the I "On August 5, 1975, the Committee received
Chairman from CIA I) irt ,o Colby on tel 28 "~. testimony from Dr. Albert C. Hail, Assistant Secre-
"National Security Council Intelligence Directive tary of Defense (Intelligence)-
No. i 117 Feb. 19721 rnstru-fs the Di ectw' f Crr'-al
prat ,gence to cIevewp and review security mind- formal request that you bring this niece. Hof paper
.-rds and practices as !hey relate w the iotec.ion of
P creating the National Security Agency with you and
tntelligence and of intelligence sources and methods
you t
ll
h
from unauthorized disciosure.' Since the National Se-
curity Act did not provide for an authority corre-
sponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area,
the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S.
Intelligence Board are responsible for: The super-
vision of the dissemination of security intelligence ma-
terial.' The Director of Central intelligence, acting
with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence Board, has
promulgated a number of directives, regulations, and
security manuals, related to the protection of foreign
intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and meth-
ods." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby. CIA,
July 28, 1975.
"This report resulted from a subpoena of documents
in possession of the ''Forty Committee," which is a
National Security Council subcommittee that approves
covert Acton.
On November 14. by a vote of If) to 2, the Com-
mittee approved a resolution citing Dr. Kissinger in
contempt of Congress for his failure to comply with
the Forty Committee subpoena. The report accom-
panying the resolution (94-693) was filed December
8. On December 10, after negotiations with White
House officials, the Chairman informed the House
that substantial compliance had been obtained, and
the Committee's report was recommitted.
1. Delay
The record of subpoenas is worth reviewing.
It began on August 5, 1975, when an Assistant
Secretary of Defense was asked to appear as a witness
and bring with him the document by which the Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA) was set up. It was a
simple and logical request. The Defense Department
controls NSA: the Comittee was holding hearings
on intelligence budgets; NSA has the biggest budget;
and the Committee wanted to see the authority by
which NSA operates.
The official did not bring the document. He did not
have "clearance" to.io
For this elementary piece of information, the Select
Committee was forced to resort to the first of its
many subpoenas. It is worth noting that the sub-
poena was promptly honored, which raises the ques-
tion why the document was not delivered in the first
place.
By late .August, the Committee was preparing for
hearings to review what kind of intelligence our mon-
ey buys. Four events were chosen for hearings: the
1973 Mid-East war, the 1974 Cyprus coup, the 1974
Portuguese coup, and the 1968 let offensive in Viet-
nam. During August and early September there were
repeated requests for documents and interviews.13
In some cases, we were given heavily "sanitized"
pieces of paper. "Sanitized" was merely a euphemism
for blank sheets of paper with a few scattered words
left in. often illegible, sometimes misleading, and usu-
ally inconclusive.i4 In some cases, notably as to the,
1974 coup in Portugal. there was an absolute refusal
to provide anything, until early October.
As a last ditch effort, with hearings approaching, the
Committee turned once again to its subpoena power.
On September 10. 1975, it subpoenaed materials from
the three major intelligence agencies and the National
Security Council."
What were the materials that forced the Committee
to resort to the force of law? Were they the names of
agents? No. Were they descriptions of secret intelli-
gence techniques? No. They were, simply, copies of
intelligence publications that had been circulated in
the executive branch during the week preceeding the
events that we were examining,16 documents circu-
lated literally to hundreds, if not thousands, of people.
Were they turned over lay the date specified in the
subpoena? Not completely
e
us t
at you want us to have everything we
need but you didn't bring it. Why?
"Dr. Hall. We have to get clearance for releasin
"NSC Items Not F.a..t,.ited-Cvrrt:r and Slid-Fart fi
War
a 'nothing was furnished, unless NSC maintains
that CIA and DCI 2.c.l um :ransmiued
U.S. agencies.
b. Nothing furnished."
this material to you, sir. 9
"Chairman PIKE. Here we are representing the
legislative branch of Government, asked to appropri-
ate hundreds of millions of dollars to a certain agency
and we are having difficulty finding the statutory a -
thority for that agency even to exist. Now, isn't thuat
ridiculous?"
"Letters were sent to CIA on Aug. 18, 1975;
Aug. 19, 1975; Aug. 27. 1975; and Sept. 5, 1975.
State Department requests were sent on Aug. 19,
1975; Sept. 8, 1975; and again on Sept. 8, 1975. Re-
quests were forwarded to the Defense Department on
Auo 15. 1975:Aug. 19, 1015, Sept. 8, 1975; again on
Sept 8 10,5: and Sept. e, 1975.
14Tite last two pages of one set of documents were
typical deletions. The first page was apparently a
cable. It was blank, except for the following across
the top: 3/ND/DOLL-VNM/T-0144-6SG TRANS-
House Select Committee Chairman Otis Pike: He got
the "dribble treatment"-one or two documents a day.
LATED DECRYPT VNJAC/VN NR I Y 301300G
FM' iJB TO CO INFO BBM STOP CNMB 30119
5610M Tol: 30JA68/1012Z 300"
The second page of the cable was even less infor-
mative. It was completely blank, except for a 'Top
Secret" Stamp.
"The subpoenas were directed to the National
Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the Director of Central Intelligence, and the National
Security Council.
16The subpoena to the Defense Intelligence Agen-
cy on the subject of the Mid-East war illustrates the
types of documents called for-
"I. For the period of September 25, 1973, through
October 6, 1973, on a daily basis, or as frequently as
same were issued, the original documents as follows:
all Defense Intelligence Agency estimates. Current
Defense Intelligence Summaries, situation Reports.
and any and all cables emanating from the Defense
Attache Office in Tel Aviv. National Military Intelli-
gence Center daily briefings...."
17A staff summary, prepared on September 12.
1975, indicated the following non-compliance:
"DIA Items Not Furnished-Cyprus and Mid-East
War
2. Cut-off
This problem was soon dwarfed by a new tactic-
the cut-off.
On September 12, 1975, the President, or someone
using his name, cut off the Committee from all classi-
fied information. As if that were not enough, his ac-
tion was accompanied by a demand that we immedi-
ately turn over all classified materials from our own
internal files.=1
Th reason' I he Congress, through this C n mince,
had p?tsscd ,udomcnt, after Icns:hy dclib.'ri; on of
'he merits, on whether four words "classified" by the
Executive branch could be told to the American pea
ple.22
a The Executive, by its legally questionable reaction 23
ad now set aside any immediate subpoena problems,
and the public hearing problems as well.
As background, a hearing on September 11, 1975,
had reviewed intelligence performance with respect
to the Mid-East war in 1973. The result was shocking.
In the words of a CIA document, "the principle con-
clusions concerning the imminence of hostilities
reached and reiterated by those responsible for in-
telligence analysis were--quite simply, obviously, and
starkly-wrong. "24
That same document had verbatim quotes ftotp two
intelligence bulletins that were moderately favorable
and from five bulletins demonstrating that intelligence
estimates were embarrassingly wrong. The two favor-
able quotes were declassified and read into the tort
ord.25 The five embarrassing quotes, containing the
sam. type of Information, were not declassifed'by
CIA.
The Committee objected .26 The CIA returned that afternoon to report that,
after all, the five quotes -[d be d-t ossified.'-7 How-
ever, in an apparent need not to appear arbitrary in
their earlier decision. they insisted that some 13 words
still remain classified.
The Committee debated those 13 words for over
four hours in a closed session. The CIA Special
Counsel was present and in telephone contact with
CIA Director Colby; the head of the State Depart-
ment's Intelligence and Research was there; the head
of the Defense Intelligence Agency was there; and a
high official of the National Security Agency was
there. No agency was without representation, and all
had a chance to speak. Nine words were mutually
agreed to remain classified 23 but four words were not.
The four remaining words could not reveal any
secret "sources and methods." which is the basis of
official classifications,29 because the information they
contained could have come from any number of
sources. In addition, the intelligence was so old by
the time it was reported that it could not reveal how
rapidly our intelligence techniques operated 3a The
Committee satisfied itself on these and other points
before taking some half dozen roilcall votes on the
matter.
It is possible that never before had so much ex-
pertise and thought gone into a declassification de-
cision. For this, the Committee was accused of being
rresponsible.17 To protect national security, the
"President" invoked a cut-off, perhaps before the
President ever heard of what was going on.
The Committee later learned that in a biography of
Dr. Kissinger a year earlier, the subject to which the
four words referred had been spelled out in great de-
tail. So much for the validity of the classification
argument. No "high State Department official" had
been cut off from information or forced to turn over i
his files as a result of that earlier publication. So
much for protecting against irresponsibility.
Police guarding Committee offices were instructed
to prevent any takeover of files by the Executive. and
nothing more was heard of that.
Nevertheless, the cut-off from information struck
at the heart of Committee operations. One month out
of our live-month investigative period was lost while
the issue was negotiated. With little choice. the Com-
mittee agreed that for purposes of getting the investi-
gation under way again. future disputes would he re-
DIA Intelligence Summaries for July 14.
DIA Intelligence Bulletin for July 13. Iuly 14,
and July 20.
The three intelligence agencies supplied some of c. DIA Daily Current Intelligence Briefings for
their publications.17 Dr. Kissinger, as Assistant to the July 13, Jul, 14, and July 20.
President for National Security Affairs, refused to d. DIA Daily Intelligence Bulletins for September
turn over a single piece of paper from reports pro- 29. September 30. October 6.
vided to the National Security Council during the e. DIA Intelligence Summary for September 30.
weeks in question.ts "NSA Items Not Furnished-Cyprus
By the time hearings on intelligence results began a. SiGSUM's for July 13. lulu 14, Iuly 19. July 20.
in mid-September, only two agencies had substantially h. "Wrap-tip messages" for lulu 13, July 14. July
complied with our subpoenas.19 More than a month 15, July 16. July 17."
omm
ee wou
would pass before a good faith effort at compliance "The September 12. 1975. compliance slmmarv have no further problem with access to information."
was forthcoming ii-'m the National Security Council for NSC reads as foilovv,: ,k.,, tie .a..., ,r,.- r-?-'ltittee
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terred to the Prestdcnt.34 This was agreed to on the
assurance of the President that the C
itt
ld
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r I was cut off was also the day hearings were scheduled I "We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Mr. LEE. The same way, Mr. Chairman, that for
m. ?he lu a C .r.. L. Hr t a ! t r~:. yr b 1 tcii ' ~: nde, -Trains t I' e '; ~i_T h tr.
~, th,;,.- een 1 t o ,s .ter,
on he S: ?cpat mc,.[ s l ancci ng ~f inteliqIcnco, mWdra,o future although ttre risk Ulf ,rc.t:zc(t r nng ~-Cuairntata PIKE. Chat i exactly what is wrong,
and of Dr. Kissinge-s role therein-16 Those hear- has increased slt htlv.... 4 October 1973 (emphasis g dlr. Lee, co. decades other committees of Congress
ings had to he cancelled. However, the Committee in original). hay: IOne thC;;- job, nd an 1 tc lived it in
located a State Department witness who was to tests- "There are reports that Syria is preparing for an the executive branch. You tell us that Congress has
ty about Cyprus. even in the absence of classified evr attack on Israel but conclusive evidence is, lacking. been advised of this. What does that mean? it means
dente from the Executive--his name was Thomas in our view, the political climate in the Arb states
the execuuce branch comes up and whispers in one
1-
tton. the Committee was interested in what kind of
intelligence had been supplied to Boyatt regarding the
1974 coup against Archbishop Makarios and the con-
sequent Turkish invasion. _
More important, the Committee wanted to examine
how that intelligence, as well as Mr. Boyatt's analysis
of it, was handled by the decisionmakers at State. Mr.
Boyatt had, in fact, advised one of our staff members
that he vigorously criticized the handling of intelli-
gence at the time of the Cyprus crisis. This criticism
was embodied in a written report which was sent
through the State Department's "dissent channels."37
[Page 25 of the Draft Final Report not available-
editor's note.]
Footnotes:
21Rex E. Loe. Assistant Attorney General. Civil
Division, delivered the order:
. [T]he President's responsibities for the na-
tional security and foreign relations of the United
States leave him no alternative but to request the
immediate return of all classified materials heretofore
provided by any department or agency of the execu-
tive Branch and direct all departments to decline to
provide the Select Committee with classified materi-
als, including testimony and interviews which disclose
such materials, until the Committee satisfactorily al-
ters its position." ,
22When Mr,Jex Lee appeared before the Commit-
tee to annotiftce the President's cut-off of information
it became evident that the executive branch had not
given the matter equally careful consideration.
'Chairman PIKE. Mr. Lee, you say it revealed
certain foreign communications activities of the
United States. Is that your language?
'Mr. Lee. That is what 1. am advised, Mr. Chairman.
'Chairman PIKE. Did you look at the language of
what the Committee released?
"Mr. LEE. I did not.
"Chairman PIKE. You are sitting here making a
statement, saying that we have released language. re-
lating to the communications activities of the U.S.
Government, and you did not even look at the lan-
guage we released."
23ln his appearance before the Committee, the
Assistant Attorney General asserted that the dispo-
sition of security information is solely within the pro-
rogative of the executive branch:
"Chairman. PIKE. You say the legislative branch
of Government had no right whatsoever to make any-
thing public that the executive branch of Government
does not want public. Is that your position?
"Mr. LEE. That is our position as far as classified
information is concerned.
"Chairman PIKE. So what you say is that in this
great democracy, one branch of Government, and one
branch ... alone may decide what is secret, and one
branch of Government ... alone may decide what
is not secret."
In support of his position, Mr. Lee did not assert
that the Congress or the Committee was bound, as a
matter of law, by Executive Order 11652, which
established the current classification system, nor did
he offer any contrary interpretation of Section 6(a) of
H. Res. 591, which explicitly authorized the Com-
mittee to release such information as it deemed advis-
able.
24This quotation is taken from the summary con-
clusion of a post-mortem prepared by the intelligence
community itself. The principle conclusions of the
post-mortem began as follows:
"I. There was an intelligence failure in the weeks
preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on
October 6. Those elements of the intelligence com-
munity responsible for the production of finished in-
telligence did not perceive the growing possibility
of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its im-
minence.
"The information provided by those parts of the
community responsible for intelligence collection was
sufficient to prompt such a warning." The Perform-
ance of the Intelligence Community Before the Arab-
Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-
Mortem Report. Director of Central Intelligence
December 1973).
25The two verbatim quotes which were voluntarily
declassified by the CIA were:
raelis on September 13-cannot. of course, be ex-
cluded." INR Memorandum to the Secretary, 30 Sep-
tember 1973 (emphasis in original).
26The first of five quotes, which was later released,
is as follows:
"Syria-Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and
Egyptian military readiness are considered to be coin-
cidental and not designed to lead to major hostilities.
DIA Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1973.
The text was the subject of an extensive discussion
among the Chairman and representatives of the CIA:
"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Parmenter, before we go into
questioning, would you tell me why you have omitted
from your sanitized statement here the actual pre-
dictions. as contained in the report from which you
read, i. e., the DIA Intelligence Summary Statement
of 3 October 1973? L w
t
t
l
k
h
h
an
you
o
oo
at w
at t
e
original report says and tell me why we should not,
here in open session, hear what the DIA actually said
on October 3, 1973.
"Mr. PARMENTER. There are sources and meth-
ods here that we will be- happy to discuss in execu-
tive session,
"Chairman PIKE. Sources and methods in that
statement?
"Mr. PARMENTER. Yes, sir.
"Chairman PIKE. I find that incredible.. How does
that differ, from the one you read on the preceding
page (INR Memorandum. to the Secretary) as far as
sources and methodsare.concerned? .. - All I am
asking you is, could you "tell us why the reading of
this plain, blank conclusion by the DiA as to the like-
lihood of the outbreak of war, would reveal a source
or a method?
Mr. ROGOVIN. I will assume that the reaso4 for
the deletion was the manner in which the informa-
tion was secured- , ' "e
"Chairman PIKE. It doesn't say how the informa-
tion is secured. This is a conclusion.
"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find, as I look at
what has been deleted and what has been omitted
and what has. been retained and read, differs not as
to sources and methods, not as to the necessity of
protecting the sensitivity of stuff, but whether it is
in fact rather self-serving...," Sept. 11, 1975-
27AI1 five quotes are reprinted in the Mid-East War
Post-Mortem in an appendix to this report. The first
two quotes are typical:
"Syria-Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and
Egyptian military readiness are considered to be co-
incidental and not designed to lead to major hostili-
ties." DIA Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1973.4
"Egypt-The exercise and alert activities in Egypt
may be on a somewhat larger scale and more realistic
than previous exercises, but .they do not appear to be
preparing for a military offensive against Israel. Cen-
tral Intelligence Bulletin, 5 October 1973." Post-
Mortem, DCI, 6 (December 1975).
Of the nine words which the Committee agreed
not to release, few of them would have revealed,
directly, any sensitive intelligence sources or methods.
instead, in most cases, they constituted personal
characterizations, the publication of which might
have been embarrassing to the United States or to
individual foreign officials. -
29"Sec. 7. In the interests of the security of the
foreign intelligence activities of the United States and
in order further to implement the proviso of section
102(d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947
(Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first session)
that the Director of Central Intelligence shall he re-
sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and meth-
ods from unauthorized disclosure . . 50 U.S.C.
? 403 11973).
301n the closed session. Mr. Rogovin, Special Coun-
sel to the CIA, stated: ". . . [T]he experts feel very
confident this is the bottom line that can be made
public. These are references to real time reporting
." Comm. Execs. Sess., Sept. 11. 1975....
31Mr. Lee referred to what he characterized as the
traditional procedures by which the Congress has re-
ceived and treated classified information. a characteri-
zation which elicited the following colloquy:
"Chairman PIKE. If it is your position that we
may never disclose information, how can we carry out i
our, responsibilities?
pressman s car, and that is exactly what you want to
continue, and that is exactly what I think has led us
into the mess we are in."
"Text of letter from Mr. William Colby, Director
of Central intelligence, to the Chairman, dated Sep-
tember 30, 1975:
"With the approval of the President, I am forward-
ing herewith the classified material, additional to the
unclassified material forwarded with my letter of 29
September 1975, which is responsive to your subpoena
of September 12, 1975. This is forwarded on loan with
the understanding that there will be no public dis-
closure of this classified material (nor of testimony,
depositions or interviews concerning it) without a
reasonable opportunity for us to consult with respect
to it. In the event of disagreement, the matter will be
referred to the President. If the President then certi-
fies in writing that the disclosure of the material would
be detrimental to the national security of the United
States, the matter will not be disclosed by the Com-
mittee, except that the Committe would reserve its
right to submit the matter to judicial determination."
3tOn September 26, 1975, Mr. McClory described
the President's position as follows:
"We have assurance, in my opinion, of getting
everything we need, and I would hope we would find
we were getting everything we need."
76Mr.William Hyland, Director of Intelligence.'and
Research. Department of State, was scheduled to be
the key witness on September 11, 1975. It was unfor,
tunate that the cut-off and later restrictions on testi-
mony from Foreign SeAice officers,. prevented the
Committee from a full investigatit5n of- the Cyprus
crisis. There is a closely held State Department report
identifying the people who killed thk,American Ain
bassador, Rodger Davies, during that crisis, and a
public protest has perhaps not been raised because
these same murderers are now officials in the Cyprus
government. Ouestions related to that intelligence re-
port should, and must, be cleared up.
37"The 'Dissent Channel; through which this mem-
orandum was submitted, provides those officers of the
Department of State who disagree with established
policy, or who have new policies to recommend, a
means for communicating their views to the highest
levels of the Department." Letter to Chairman Pike
from Dr. Kissinger, Dept. of State, Oct. 14, 1975.
3. Silenced Witnesses
In response, a new tactic was fashioned-the
silenced witness.
On September 22, 1975, Mr. Boyatt was ordered
not to tell the Committee "information which would
disclose options considered by or recommended, to
more senior officers in the Department."38 The order
was added on to the existing ban on classified infor,
mation.
That was not the end. Anything Mr. Boyatt did say
would have to be in the presence of State Department
monitors, by order of the Secretary.
It is worth pointing out that this prohibition ex-
tended to more than Mr. Boyatt's options or advice.
Any information that would disclose those options
was also banned. An attempted interview by the staff,
with monitors, demonstrated that this covered almost
everything the man ever did or said 4?
The State Department's order was issued in spite of
two United States laws which protect and guarantee
the right of a federal employee to provide informa-
tion to Congress.
One statute says that the right of a federal employee
"to furnish information to either House of Congress,
or to a Committee or Member thereof, may not be
interfered with or denied."41 The second law, which
directly bears on the Boyatt situation, was specifically
designed to encourage candid testimony of employees
from federal agencies, including the Department of
State 42
The authority invoked by the Secretary of State
was neither "classification," nor "executive privilege,"
but a new doctrine that can best be characterized as
"secretarial privilege."43
The Secretary of State was demanding special
treatment. If this Committee could not have received
testimony from CIA officers or FBI agents about ad-
vice or options they presented to senior officials, it
would have had no choice but to shut down.S4 Over-
sight would be dead.
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I ligence agencies had either not heard of "secretarial privilege "
t t ..d .e. e staple cme' p
Un October 2, 1077. the Committee voted to :risis On the basis of a single CIA report Proof
issue a subpoena for Mr Bovatt's Cvprus critique Athens. the analysts, notwithstanding their earlier
I Dr Kissinger responded on October 14. 1975. -cfar. concern. conveyed the imoression to the polieymakers
ring to the subpoena as a "request." It was denied. that the world had been granted a reprieve." CIA
even uwugn it was not
to produce a document d6
Not only were we told about the report, we were
the hands of those who have possession of documents.
Therefore, the Committee, more than one month
after issuing its subpoena, accepted from Mt. Boyatt
no testimony and no document. but something less.
We were given Mr. Boyatt's memo after it had been
mixed into a number of other paragraphs drafted else-
where in the State Department-ostensibly to protect
Mr. Boyatt. It ended up very much like the proverbial
"riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."17
This time the euphemism was "an amalgam."49
Footnotes:
35This order was embodied in a September 22,
1975, memorandum from Lawrence S. Eagleburger,
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Management, to
William G. Hyland, the Department's Director of
Intelligence and Research. This directive stated that
"the following condition; will pertain to sworn inter-
views by the Pike Committee staff:
"The Department of State insists that a State De-
partment representative be present during the inter-
views. Should the interviewees wish to he represented
by their own legal counsel. the State Department
representative will be in addition to that private legal
counsel.
"The interviewees are to decline, by order of the
President, to discuss classified material.
"The interviewees are to decline, by order of the
Secretary of State. to give information which would
disclose options considered by or recommended to
more senior officers in the Department of State."
When Mr. Eagleburger appeared before the Com-
mittee on September 25, he stated that the orders
contained in his memorandum of September 22 were
issued at the verbal direction of the Secretary of
State.
40This was clearly indicated by the following ex-
change among Mr. Field, on behalf of the Committee,
Mr. Boyatt, and Mr. Hitchcock, the Department's
monitor:
"MR. FIELD. Mr. Boyatt, would you please de-
scribe for us in detail what was done in the State
Department not with respect to classified intelligence
reports or information, but . . . knowledge of any of
these events, who was involved. and what they were
doing? Would you please describe that for us in
some detail?
"MR. BOYATT. I would like to ask Mr. Hitch-
cock's advice.
"MR. HITCHCOCK. I regret but it appears to me
that this comes to the problem of the description of
the decision-making process which my instructions
seem to indicate is proscribed.
"MR. FIELD. In other words, it is your position
that who was doing what in the State Department
has something to do with decision-making?
"Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes.
"MR. FIELD. We can't discuss this activity? We
can't discuss where he went to. what he did, who
he told, what that person told him in response? We
can't discuss as I understand it, whether or not he
is aware of any moves made by the Secretary of State
towards Turkey, towards Cyprus, either-preceding or
during this period."
""The right of employees, individually or collec-
tively to petition Congress or a Member of Congress,
or to furnish information to either House of Congress,
or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be in-
terfered with or denied." 5 U.S.C. ? 7102 (1973).
42"Upon the request of a committee of either
House of Congress, a joint committee of Congress. or
a member of such committee, any officer or employee
of the Department of State, the United States informa-
tion Agency, the Agency for International Develop-
ment, the United States Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, or any other department, agency, or
independent establishment of the United States Gov-
ernment primarily concerned with matters relating
to foreign countries or multilateral organizations. may
express his views and opinions, and make recom-
mendations he considers appropriate, if the request
of the committee or member of the committee relates
to a subject which is within the jurisdiction of that
committee." 2 U.S.C. ? 194a (1973).
43Chairman Pike. questioning Dr. Kissinger in an
open hearing on Oct. 31, 1975. stated, "I feel that you
are alleging a privilege which has heretofore been
reserved only to Presidents." Dr. Kissinger responded
,
p
.
y or
n
rectly, by the State De-
I have deliberately not asked the President to exercise partment, it helped erode support within and outside
''The Committee Counsel, on Nov. b, 1975, noted
that. "MR. DONNER ... A subpoena is not an in.
vitation to negotiate. A subpoena is a command by a
duly authorized body of government to deliver infor-
mation."
47Winston S. Churchill, radio broadcast.
45On November 4, the Committee, by a vote of 8
to 5. agreed to the following resolution:
"Resolved by the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives that an amalgama-
tion of Department of State documents to include in
its entirety the papers described as the Dissent Mem-
orandum prepared by Thomas Boyatt while Director
of Cypriot Affairs in the Department, fulfills the re-
opinion, the action of an amalgam became feasible I
bu, not cc iris Comrnict,e.
a. An Attack Averted
If no "flank" attack was launched by the FBI
to discredit the Committee, it may have been because
On October 9. 1975. Mr. Martin Kaiser, a manu-
facturer of wiretap equipment, testified before the
Committee. He indicated that the FBI bought his
equipment through a middleman. U.S. Recording,
who added a 10 percent markup. There was no justi-
fication for the markup, and it later developed that
the president of U.S. Recording and a top FBI official
were close friends.
The Committee began an investigation of U.S. Re-
cording and its FBI friends. The Justice Department
and FBI later began their own probe of the same
matter.
On December 23, 1975, two and one-half months
after Mr. Kaiser testified, he was subjected to a six-
hour interview by two FBI agents. The agents were
allegedly carrying out an internal FBI investigation
regarding the agency's contractual dealings with U.S.
Recording Company.
Mr. Kaiser called the Committee to reiav his con-
cern, and offered to give a statement under oath as to
the conduct of the FBI agents.
In a Committee deposition of December 30, 1975,
Kaiser claimed that the FBI agents were more con-
cerned with discrediting the Committee's inquiry
and personnel than conducting their investigation- of
U.S. Recording. Ultimately, the agents had elicited
from him a statement, written by an FBI agent, which
in some insignificant details recanted portions of his
testimony, Mr. Kaiser then repudiated that written
statement, which he had signed while agents atoodr
over him and thrust it in front of him.
Taking the initiative, the Committee, on December.
31,-1975, released a copy of the written statement, a
full copy of Mr. Kaiser's December 30, 1975, depo-
sition, and the text of a letter to the Attorney Gen-
eral demanding a full explanation of the entire inci-
dent.56 This was done to head off any FBI "leak" of
the statement its agents had taken while Kaiser was
under some duress.
Footnotes:
"Mr. Eagleburger's statement
delivered to th
.
e
Senator at a hearing with helpmeet Roy Cohn. Committee offices on September 24, 1975, read:
quirement of the subpoena issued by the Committee
on the 2nd day of October, 1975.
"Provided the amalgamation is accompanied by
an affidavit signed by a person mutually acceptable
to the Department of State and the Committee as
represented by the Chairman and the ranking min-
ority member, attesting that the aforementioned Boy-
att memorandum is contained unabridged in the am-
algamation:
"The. adoption of this resolution shall in no way
be considered as a precedent affecting the right of
this Committee with respect to access to Executive
Branch testimony or documents."
4. Flank Attack
On September 24, 1975, two days after written
instructions to Mr. Boyatt were issued, the Deputy
Secretary of State raised for the first time an innuendo
that the Committee's action resembled McCarthy-
ism49 The Committee's initial reaction was to dismiss
any such inference as a temporary lapse into poor
taste.
Unfortunately, it was not a temporary lapse.
The next day, on September 25. 1975, Deputy
Secretary Eagleburger appeared before the Committee
to explain the Boyatt order. His statement again re-
ferred to State Department employees' problems with
Congress in past times-a clear reference to the
McCarthy period of the 1950's, as his subsequent
testimony made clear.SO On October 14, 1957, Dr.
Kissinger's written response to the subpoena of
Boyatt's intelligence critique again raised a reference
to McCarthvism.51
The implication was baseless 52 as both Mr. Eagle-
burger and Dr. Kissinger admitted under questioning.53
Facts seemed to make no difference. Within days
of the innuendo being raised by Dr. Kissinger and his
reply, newspaper columns and editorials were re-
porting their charges of McCarthvism.54
To the extent that such media activity may have
been ins
ired
directl
i
di
"Mr. Chairman, this is far from a hypothetical
issue. To cite but a single example, the Foreign
Service and the Department of State were torn apart
in the late 1940's and early 1950's over an issue that
raised some of the same concerns that are before. us
today-the ability of Foreign Service Officers to give
to the Secretary and their other superiors their can-
did advice, secure in the knowledge that this advice
will remain confidential. The events of those years
not only injured individuals, but also did significant
damage to the process by which foreign policy is
made. Who can be certain how many recommenda-
tions during the years that followed were colored by
memories of those experiences?"
50"I must say again, as I said in the statement
today, the issue for me right now is an issue of prin-
ciple. It is the question of our duty to protect junior
and middle-grade officers of the Department in the
conduct-of their duties within the 7epartment .
""While I know that the Select Committee has
no intention of embarrassing or exploiting junior, and
middle-grade officers of the Department, there have
been other times and other committees-and there
may be again-where positions taken by Foreign
Service Officers were exposed to ex post facto public
examination and recrimination." Letter to Chairman
Pike from Dr. Kissinger. Oct. 14, 1975.
52The plain facts are that Senator McCarthy de-
stroyed the careers of State Department employees
on the basis of their beliefs and politics. This Com-
mittee never sought the political views of any federal
employee. Senator McCarthy operated without evi-
dence. This Committee sought only evidence. Senator
McCarthy forced people to testify. Mr. Boyatt wanted
to testify. McCarthyism grew out of a lack of char-
acter and integrity, and from a climate of hysteria.
Restrictive rules are no answer to such problems.
53"MR. HAYES. [O]ne of the things that has
deeply offended me ... has been the implication, the
very clear implication, that your position of protect-
ing middle and lower level Foreign Service officers
is a position of protecting them from McCarthyism.
"SECRETARY KISSINGER. With respect to the
charge of McCarthyism, I want to make clear that I
do not accuse this committee of engaging in McCarthy-
ism and I know indeed that the Chairman has a
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64 record in this regard, and from the eonvierions of
many ,n Ihr rnemne to !iia ,ml twit'', .r i'f~. I io?r
hat rhi 1 to he ilx cn of t nm s "MR HAYES I Jon t think here h been
c one m tams that you ran ne or tnat vtr Leigh can
sae. ,vherc this Commie has e,,:r taken , upon
itself in the tradition of the McCarthvs to. in
~. ls~ena'. cm a :rqc ~r",r~rinn-
EACLEBURGER. Sir. II,ms. there is no
implication in my statement that this Committee is
f h
I
r
pe ormmg tote way
described the Department
went through in the late '40's and early 'S0's. That
is not, sir, my point." Sept. 25, 1975.
54The New York Times editorial of October 19.
1975, was entitled, "Neo-McCarthyism'?"
"in view of the facts, the Intelligence Committee's
insistence that it has the right to reach into the
interior of the State Department to subpoena the
dissenting memoranda of junior and middle-rank of-
ficials-and to summon them to testify on policy
issues-is clearly contrary to the national interest..-."
The Washington Post editorial of October 6, 1975,
entitled "Mr. Pike's Committee" had this to say:
"The analogy with McCarthyism evoked by the
State Department is a relevant one, even though it
appears that in this case the committee of Congress
wishing o lucstion Mr. B:va,t sppereud} is inclined
to praise him for his views, not persecute him--and
to use his testimony to fault Secretary Kissinger.
Certainly Mr. Kissinger should be faulted for his
Cyprus policy.. , ."
One of the most disturbing aspects of the inci-
dent-quite aside from the propriety of interrogating
a Committee witness about the Committee-was that
the interview was replete with FBI suggestions of pre-
judice on the part of the Committee Counsel. Vigor
was apparently seen as prejudice, and by two agents
who had never met the Committee personnel they
were denigrating.
5. Deletions
in early November, about the same time the Boyatt
problems were being resolved, the Committee moved
on from the subjects of money and what our money
buys. The third topic of our hearings was risks, and
how well those risks are controlled.
Seven new subpoenas were issued. Four were for
materials pertaining to subjects of prior hearings-
They were honored.57 The remaining three were di-
rected to Dr. Kissinger. for materials pertaining to
upcoming hearings. Not surprisingly, those subpoenas
went unanswered."
Once again, some background is helpful.
Two of the three subpoenas were for covert
action recommendations made by non-CIA officials,
since the CIA had alteady opened up the covert ac-
tion files to us. The third subpoena was for intelli-
gence records on Soviet compliance with strategic
arms limitation agreement (SALT).
When considering risks, covert actions rank as per-
haps the highest risk operations in the government,
short of war. The law allows CIA "to perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence af-
fecting the National Security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct."60 This is the
legal authority for covert action. A subcommittee of
the National Security Council, presently called the
Party Committee, has been assigned the task of di-
recting these actions.
By tracing money, the Committee came across mil-
lions of rounds of ammunition and weapons being
purchased in the early 1970's. The purchases were
destined for a questionable military venture in a far-
of war that most Americans had probably never
heard of, much less felt they had any national inter-
est in.
The CIA's military escapade was had enough, but.
on examining documents, :he Committee discovered
that the Forty Committee appeared not to have met or
voted on the operation. In fact, internal documents
showed that CIA and the State Department had
turned the project down three times in the previous
two years.
It turned out that during a trip overseas, Presi-
dent Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had met alone with the
head of i foreign government [the Shah of Iran-
editor's nntel At that man's request. the Administra-
tion had invclvcd CIA in an internal war in the head
of state' neighboring country [the Kurdish rebellion
in Iraq-editor's mote]. John Connally. on the verge
I of heading Democrats for Nixon." was sent back to I
the foreign leader, apparently to bring him the good
news of final apnrosal.
\ Month artcr na nir.' ',,r t ~ad
,ilre,iJV c'tin. t'~i'ty L,ilnill't'ec Ineiliti ~crc' -~:l[
a memo by Dr Kis n er infc g the'? rr....t.,- I Fonn,otes:
,eparam matter, this Committee v t r,ici by
`utt ,.r CIA Director dichaid Helens of i decision to
trd rtake a covert action project in Chtl Mr. Helms
.emu it led nut he ;Ad! ollice anti rota by Presi-
dent Nixon with Dr. Kissinger and Mr John Mhchcll
pt C1-\ relcrvations He was also.) told "not to iniainm
the )trier members of the Forty Committee. '64
A pattern was emerging.
Not all covert actions were generated by the CIA.
In particular, paramilitary operations of the worst
type seemed to come from outside the CIA. Some
projects came from the President. Some projects came
from his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and
some had their beginning in the Department of
State.
Forty Committee records were subpoenaed to see
if the pattern was valid.66 The subpoena was limited
to the official document by which a covert action was
approved. These records were often no more than
one paragraph long.
What arrived in response to our subpoenas showed
nothing-because it was niastly deletions.
he deletions came in all shapes and forms. Typ-
ically, there would he one line left on a page, ray
Secretary Kiser: He -wins "alleging a privilege
Imrctotase reserved only to presidents."
ing, "A CIA project was telephonically approved,"
or, "The Committee voted to approve a CIA paper
entitled [title deleted]." Ofen, if there had been
numerous items considered at a meeting, the deletions
themselves had been cut and pasted together. For ex-
ample, item 'eight might follow item one, giving the
impression that only two items had been considered
that day.67 Sometimes there would be only one word
left on a page-"Chile"-nothing else, anywhere: but
it was still classified top secret. The information,
needless to say, was worthless69
Wholesale deletions were encountered in the Com-
mittee's investigation of domestic covert activities as
well.
COINTELPRO, the FBI'S program for disruption
of the "New Left," like nearly all FBI actions, was
extremely well documented, The Committee requested
the appropriate documents in July69 What it re-
ceived were summaries so heavily excised as to be
unusable.
One memorandum, for example, referring only
generically to the "New Left." contained the sub-
heading, "Recommended Procedure," on one page,
and "Results" on the next. The pages were otherwise
blank. Another document with the same type generic
reference, "Black Extremist Organization," was 'ike-
wise excised in its entirety.
The Committee protested. Negotiations followed.70
Finally. in mid-October, -an agreement was reached
whereby less excised memos were made available to
Committee staff, at FBI headquarters. The Committee
persisted, selecting a representative number of mem-
oranda to be delivered to its own offices. After some
delay, they were delivered. still excised.
Requests for the documents pertaining to FBI na-
tional security wiretaps led to a similar experience.
One set of documents was delivered. excised hev,md
nse. Negotiations took place for Almost ,i month.
finally a ,ceund ct de,-iiment. a:,s a o i,lau. nu.
.'n. is till sti lent:t _t ni lr,'.
I r h 4 s a .t c f't Iden f. ~ .na
Sr A" , ' ,r III ni ; I ,, '5
sarllv Council Intelligence Committee -is Workim,
Group and its Economic Intelligence Subcommittee;
To she Assistant to the President for Nanoniii
.>e..l .la ,oi is illnLuC )I it ileeiItiY ,i
the \1 h' slim Spe.~al Action Gritty ,cm is .g ,Ile
Mideast War, the Cyprus crisis, and the Portugal
coup;
3) To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, for all intelligence reports furnished
to the National Security Council between October 5
and October 28, 1973. relating to the Mideast war;
4) To the Director of Central Intelligence, for all
written requests and memoranda of requests from
the CIA to the internal Revenue Service since July 1,
1961, for tax information or official action by IRS.
58These subpoenas were not complied with:
I) To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs for all Forty Committee records of
decisions taken since January 20, 1965, reflecting
approval of covert action projects;
2 "To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs for documents relating to the Soviet
Union's adherence to the provisions of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972 and the Vladivostok
agreement of 1974; and
3) To the Secretary of State for all State Depart-
ment documents recommending covert actions to the
National Security Council since January 20, 1961.
60The National Security Act of 1947 states-
" (d) Powers and Duties.
"For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and
agencies in the interest of national security, it shall
be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the
National Security Council-
"5) to perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the National Security Council may from time to
time direct." 50 U.S.S. 403(d) (1973)-
64'MR. FIELD. In the case of the Chile operation,
could you describe very briefly how that was directed'?
"MR. HELMS. Well, there was a part-
"MR. FIELD. How you came to be told-
"MR. HELMS. There was some activity undertaken
at the President's direction in Chile by his saving to
me that he wanted this effort made and that I was
not to inform the other members of the Forty Com- t
mittee.
"MR. FIELD. In other words, in the case of the
Chilean operation, were you called to the Oval Office?
"Mr. HELMS. I was in the Oval Office.
"Mr. FIELD, You were called into the *Oval Office
and who was present?
"MR. HELMS. The Attorney General and Dr.
Kissinger." Exec, Sess., Oct. 23, 1975.
66"CHAiRMAN PIKE, The question then becomes
-and Mr. Field stated this yesterday-are those op-
erations which are generally within the CIA. and in
the normal course of business, normally more respon-
sible? Do they normally get our nation into less diffi-
culties than those which somebody outside of the
intelligence operation department tells them to do?"
"CHAIRMAN PIKE. Well, here we are seeking to
look at the genesis of all oversight and the degree of
control and the degree of responsibility by which
these operations get launched.
"You and 1, and Mr. Dellums, and Mr. Treen, as
members of the Armed Services Committee, for years i
heard the magic word, "The Forty Committee." It
has seemed to us as we get deeper and deeper into
this that the Forty Committee really has not been all
that relevant in the decision-making process in the
oversight process. The Forty Committee is always
held forth as being that body which exercises judicial
restraint, perhaps- in authorizing these various oper-
ations. It has seemed to me and I think most of the
members of this committee that the activities of the
Forty Committee have been relatively negligible in
authorizing these operations.
"We are trying to get the information to see
whether anybody ever really argues about these
things. to sec whether anvbodv s,otes no on these
things. to see whether the Forty Committee is a
reality or a rubber stamp.-"
5T'MR. FIELD. I think this is the best example of
the kind of deletions. The items skip from item I to
item 4. Items 2 and 3 are clearly cut and pasted out
of the document. It then skips from 4 to 7. In other
words, here is a document that could conceivable be
'svo or three or four pages long It gives you the feel
ing :hat cots say 'occn a Icasonablc amount it n
`'rmaiion. nut to fact ill [le!,-is iii, tote i,
Incredibly, the President's letter was clasaific
"secret." The secret stamp was unnecessary, becau-
there were no facts at all about the covert projec
in his letter. The types of projects at issuexrowere m
even mentioned. The letter was simply a :rhetoric
pronouncement of he*- important confidentiaality i
and bow telling the American people what their go
erntpent is doing in these matters would harm o1
best interests. -
It should be noted that one of the items that
legedly would harm this nation's security if mat
public had already been made public-by D
Kissinger.iss
123A typical example was the CIA refusal, .
first, to declassify part of the 1973 Mid-East W..
Post-Mortem, That position produced the followin
exchange with the CIA Special Counsel:
"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find; as I look -
what has been deleted and' what has beep omitte
and what has been retained and read, differs as
sources or methods, not as to the necessity of'prgitec:
ing the sensitivity of stuff but whether it is in fat
rather self-serving, or whether. it is in fact rather dam
aging."
i24This estimate, was provided to the Committee b'
the interagency Classification Review Committee
which was established by President Nixon in Exec"
live Order 11652, which also established the security
classification system now in force....
7261n the event of disagreement, the matter will bt
referred to the President. If the President then certi
fies in writing that the disclosure of the materia
would be detrimental to the national security of thi
United States, the matter will not be disclosed by th,
Committee, except that the Committee would reserve
its right to submit the matter to judicial determina
lion." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, Cl.4
Sept. 30, 1975.
12sThe votes were 10-2, 10-2, and 10-2.
12OThe shortest statement waS two pages; the long
est was 14 pages.
"'Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, we have several dif
ficulties with this report. We looked through it. W,
tried to identify what things might be released anal
what things might not. There are a few odd sentences
that might be released."
i3a"Mr. NELSON. . . I consulted with the Di
rector. It is his position that he would object to tht
declassification of either of these papers as I de
scribed them to him over the phone."
134"Tokyo-U.S. assistance prevented a takeover h,.
Soviet-backed elements in Angola in July, a senior
official aboard U.S. Secretary of State Henry A
Kissinger's plane said en route to Tokyo yesterday.
Washington Post. A-17, Dec. 8, 1975.
This was the first administration acknowledgement
of U.S. involvement in Angola.
"Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's admission
that the United States is trying to be helpful to some
neighbors of strife-tom Angola is a surprise once
because Kissinger has openly acknowledged it.
Jeremiah O'Leary. "U.S. Admits Indirect Aid t,
Angola," Washington Star, A-4. Dec. 10. 1975. -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/20: CIA-RDP03-01541 R000200420003-9