POLITICS IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO AND THE CZECH CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03-02194R000200760001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
POLITICS IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO
AND THE CZECH CRISIS
(Reference Title: CAESAR XXXIII)
RSS No. 0032/68
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POLICY DIFFERENCES IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO
AND THE CZECH CRISIS
MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS
This is a speculative essay on differences over
policies and priorities in the Soviet Politburo as they
emerged prior to and during the Soviet invasion of Czech-
oslovakia in August 1968. The essay focuses primarily
on the conflicting policy tendencies within the Soviet
leadership as symbolized by Kosygin and by Brezhnev.
Other personalities, of course, are involved and in the
long run may prove equally or more important. However,
in recent and current policy debates in the Soviet Union
the tendency toward orthodoxy, dogmatism, and conservat-
ism as represented by Brezhnev and the more moderate
stance in foreign and domestic policy as represented by
Kosygin appear to be the main lines along which differ-
ences and disputes among the Soviet leaders take shape.
The somewhat controversial thesis of this essay is that
the Czech crisis did not precipitate differences among
the Soviet leaders but rather that the crisis was part
of a continuing dispute among Soviet leaders over the
"soft" versus the "hard" line issue in domestic, bloc
and international affairs.
Chief, DDI Special Research Staff
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The post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership reached a
turning point when it launched the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia on August 20th. By all normal expectations it
should by now have irrevocably passed that point. Yet
in the immediate aftermath of the invasion the Soviet
"collective leadership" tarried, hesitating to carry the
military action to its logical conclusion, namely, the
total destruction of the Dubcek liberal Communist regime.
In the face of the unity of the initial Czechoslovak'
resistance the Kremlin backtracked for the time being.
The Dubcek regime won a reprieve and the Soviets at least
temporarily eschewed the imposition of direct military
rule. In effect, the Kremlin returned to the pre-inva-
sion strategy of trying to bend the Czechoslovak leader-
ship to its will with the massive added advantage of the
leverage provided by the occupation army.
The seesawing in Soviet tactics has almost certainly
been tied to shifts in Politburo alignments as well as
to the Czechoslovak resistance. The failure of the ef-
fort at Cierna to curb the Czechoslovak liberalization
evidently was exploited by the promoters of direct inter-
vention to demand a go-ahead with invasion plans. Yet
the embarrassing failure of the venture to produce immedi-
ate results in the form of a compliant collaborationist
government in Prague gave some breathing space to counsels
of restraint in the Politburo. After the invasion, the
Soviet toleration, for the moment, of the reelection by
the Czechoslovak party of an overwhelmingly liberal leader-
ship headed by Dubcek with only a thin sprinkling of con-
servatives clearly suggested that a moderating, temporiz-
ing influence was still at work within the Soviet leader-
ship. In the ensuing weeks, the clash of alternately
menacing and conciliatory notes in the Soviet press and
in Soviet dealings with the Czechs seemed more like tell-
tales of disarray within the Soviet ruling group than the
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masterful execution of a carrot and stick policy. It
was not until early October that Brezhnev was able to
bring to bear upon Dubcek sufficiently harsh pressures
to bring major Czechoslovak concessions in the direction
desired by the invasion's sponsors.
The strip-and-go pattern of Soviet policy
has been a mirror of the unstable balance
of forces that has existed in the Politburo "collective"
since Khrushchev's fall. From this standpoint the inva-
sion came as a culminating move in a growing conflict
among those forces,
25X1
25X1
The Czech crisis brought to a head an underlying
conflict in the Soviet "collective leadership" between
moderates who wanted to follow broadly the path of reform
at home and accommodation abroad and conservatives bent
on erasing the legacy of Khrushchevism and restoring ideo-
logical and political orthodoxy to Soviet policy. Before
the invasion a senior Yugoslav editor dramatized but did
not exaggerate the stakes in the Czech crisis when he
said: "We feel strongly about Czechoslovakia because
theirs is our fight, too. If they lose, then we and other
Communist parties could also lose our struggle against
our own,dogmatic forces and we would all go back to a
kind of Stalinism." The comment is by no means irrelevant
to the Soviet leadership although the factional balance
in therSoviet party over the past several years had tended
to favor the conservatives, which is the reverse of what the
situation has been in Yugoslavia and recently in Czechoslovakia.
The Kremlin decision to invade Czechoslovakia must
be counted a severe, if not culminating, defeat for the
more moderate Soviet leaders. All those projects in Soviet
policy holding out the prospect of limited detente with
the United States and the Western powers have now fallen
under a cloud. President Johnson's postponement of talks
with Kosygin on nuclear arms limitation underscored the
downturn in the fortunes of the moderates. Ironically,
Kosygin had completed arrangements with Washington on the
talks the day before Soviet troops crossed the Czechoslovak
borders. Yet the unexpected results of the invasion for
Soviet policy-makers and their subsequent hesitation to
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crush the Dubcek regime outright after the failure of
the first attempt to do so leaves room for doubt as to
the ultimate outcome of the invasion on the internal
politics of the Soviet leadership. Of course, the very
momentum of the resort to main force in Czechoslovakia
weighs heavily against a reversal in policy and places
the more moderate wing of the Soviet top echelon at a
disadvantage in the internal political struggle.
In the period since Khrushchev's fall, conserva-
tive forces in the Soviet party have held the edge in
inner-party politics and a turn toward ideological and
political orthodoxy increasingly showed in the cards.
The pressure from such forces gained in strength and
despite vigorous and steady resistance the moderate wing
of the leading group has been forced into a slow but
steady retreat on a whole spectrum of issues ranging from
the Stalin question to defense spending. However, the
sudden and total downfall of the orthodox Novotny regime
and the unexpectedly rapid liberalization under Dubcek
posed a threat to what had been a gradual restoration
of orthodoxy in Soviet politics. The danger that the
Czech liberalization, if permitted to survive, would in
time infect Soviet politics was undoubtedly considered
acute by Soviet conservatives. They saw in it a deep
menace to the gains they had made in political struggle
within the Soviet leadership since Khrushchev's fall.
As a result the issues that had already been producing
divisions within the "collective leadership" were aggra-
vated.
Two developments, in particular, since early spring
this year registered the aggravation of the conflict in
the leading group, In February and March there were signs
of a sharpening of the clash between Brezhnev and Kosygin
whose positions over time have mirrored respectively the
divisions between the conservative and moderate wings of
the leading group. Secondly, the confrontation between
Brezhnev and Kosygin was followed by an increasingly
noticeable divergence in the lines of movement in Soviet
,policy. As summer came, Soviet policy alternately turned
its face in opposing directions.
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On the one side, there were the series of moves
which culminated at the end of June in the signing of
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the Politburo
decision to enter high-level talks with the United States
on nuclear arms limitation. These initiatives and the
justifications offered on their behalf by Soviet spokes-
men were in close accord with positions Kosygin had pre-
viously taken. On the other hand, there was the steady
expansion, under Brezhnev's evident personal guidance,
of the drive against the Czechoslovak liberalization and
the associated propaganda campaign playing on the theme
of an intensifying ideological and class struggle between
the Soviet and Western camps. As the crisis with the
Czechoslovaks grew the counter-pulls within the Soviet
leadership between conflict and accommodation abroad with
the United States and the West, between rigidity and re-
laxation inside the Soviet and East European orbit became
more manifest. All the major issues dividing the dogmatic-
orthodox from the moderate-reformist wings of the leader-
ship in the post-Khrushchev period tended to converge.
The altercation between Brezhnev and Kosygin--re-
vealed in their respective speeches to local party or-
ganizations in February and March--touched on a secondary
issue but nonetheless an issue clearly tied to the deeper
difference of outlook that has been manifested between
the two Soviet executives since early in their incumbency.
In his speech on March 28, Brezhnev took a cut at Kosy-
gin for the latter's praise the month before of Western
science and technology, in general, and of American achieve-
ments in production organization, in particular. Kosygin
had warned that it would be "shortsighted" not to utilize
foreign accomplishments in these spheres. In a riposte,
Brezhnev berated "some workers" for overrating capitalist
and depreciating Soviet achievements. Brezhnev complained
that Soviet spokesmen should be "paying more attention"
to showing the flaws of capitalism and the "upheaval" it
is undergoing--a theme which the party leader has increas-
ingly played upon as the basis for Soviet leadership of
the class struggle against imperialism.
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The exchange pointed to the more fundamental issue
of how the Western world should be viewed and, by impli-
cation, the broad policy line that should be pursued to-
ward that world. The difference over Western achievements
was also in tune with other specific differences between
the two men. For example, where Brezhnev has stressed
the prospect of protracted struggle with the West, Kosygin
has stressed the possibilities of developing good economic
relations with the West; where Brezhnev has promoted a
high rate of military spending, Kosygin has argued for
holding the line in favor of the civilian economy. In
brief, Brezhnev's specific policy positions have been
generally consistent with his over-all conservative view-
point which, while eschewing Chinese-style militancy,
stresses the need to maintain a sharp linb of demarcation
between the Communist and "imperialist" camps. Kosygin's
have accorded with his generally moderate stance opening
the prospect of accommodations with the West over the
long term and profitable relations with it for the sake
of Soviet internal growth and development.
The same Brezhnev speech in March also contained
signs of strain in the relationship between the party
apparatchiki on the one hand and the economic managers
under Kosygin on the other. Brezhnev aimed a thrust at
the latter, warning of punishments if executives abused
the greater autonomy they were enjoying. Brezhnev's stress
on control from the center and an unusually emphatic re-
assertion of party supremacy in all spheres of national
development obviously constricted any notion of a special
or quasi-independent preserve of policy for Kosygin and
his managers. Brezhnev's focus on the theme of party
supremacy was also to become a dominant element in the
subsequent development of the Soviet attack on Czechoslovak
internal reforms. In the March speech Brezhnev stressed
the principle of party supremacy by repeating the refrain,
"Only the party can..." He said:
Only the party, armed with frontline theory,
with Marxism-Leninism, can find the correct
solution to these problems [i.e.?, building
communism at home and promoting socialism
abroad] and can determine the principal, most
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urgent directions of the country's economic
and social development. Only the party....
can impart to all work in the construction
of communism a purposeful, scientifically
based, and planned character. Only the
party can unite the forces of the people
--the working class, the peasants and the
intelligentsia--for the successful solution
of both economic and political problems.
One of the points hidden in Brezhnev's emphasis
on party primacy was bared in a Kommunist article in early
May. It charged that "some economic leaders" took a
narrow "administrative-managerial" view of their activity
without regard for political considerations and disdained
general interests. The article was alluding to disregard
among managers of the prerogatives of party organs at
various levels and was touching the same sore point Brezh-
nev exposed in his warning against indiscipline and dis-
regard of state interests. The article's complaints about
the ideological failings of the managers harmonized with
Brezhnev's argument at a party conference in February
that the "ruble"--a reference to the emphasis on the "pro-
fit" motive in Kosygin's economic reform--was not the only
incentive, but that it needed to be combined with ideolo-
gical stimuli and Communist consciousness.
In any case, the intensity of the clash between
the two top leaders was indicated by the relative open-
ness of Brezhnev's criticism of Kosygin on the score of
underrating Soviet accomplishments. While the differences
between the two had been apparent before in differing
emphases and divergent formulations in their speeches,
as well as recurring signs of personal friction behind
the scenes, rarely had either pointed a finger at the
other so unmistakably in a public utterance.
In March President Johnson's limitation of the
bombing of North Vietnam opening the way to the Paris talks,
on the one side, and the rapidly widening scope of
the Czechoslovak liberalization on the other evidently
produced discordant movements in the Politburo. President
Johnson's actions apparently gave Kosygin a handle for
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moving debate on the question of negotiating with the
United States on nuclear arms limitation toward a resolu-
tion. At the same time, the pace of the Czech develop-
ments evidently prompted Brezhnev to accelerate efforts
--undoubtedly urged on by alarms sounded by conservative
elements in the leading group--to develop a strategy of
counter-action against the Czechoslovak liberalization.
At the April plenum of the Central Committee he unveiled
plans for an "offensive" against "imperialist" ideological
and political subversion at home and abroad. As events
have turned out the Czech liberal communist regime was
the ultimate target of the offensive. In brief, the
nuclear arms and the Czechoslovak issues became count-
erpoints in a broader leadership conflict.
The Politburo's decision--announced in late June--
to enter talks with the United States on nuclear arms
limitation including the ABM issue came against a back-
ground bearing all the signs of long and involved contro-
versy within the leading group. The eighteen-month Soviet
delay in accepting the idea of talks indicate that the
decision was hard to come by. There had been immediate
and specific evidence of controversy after the initial
U.S. proposal to discuss missile limitation in January
1967. For example, in February a Pravda article (inac-
curately paraphrasing a Kosygin statement) indicated that
the Soviet Union was willing to discuss the question,
but the article was subsequently discredited by a Soviet
spokesman. In March 1967 the President revealed that
he had received a letter from Kosygin affirming Soviet
willingness to discuss the issue, but the letter was never
confirmed by the Soviets.
The advocates of entering talks must have advanced
hard-headed and persuasive arguments in order to tip the
balance in the Politburo in their favor. While the pros-
pect of a settlement of the Vietnam war undoubtedly af-
fected the debate, the U.S. decision in June to go ahead
with the Sentinel ABM probably helped clinch arguments
in favor of talks. The argument probably played on the
fear the USSR might prove the loser in a full-scale
nuclear race and on the hope that a tactical advantage
might be won if the U.S. were to delay ABM development
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during talks. Perhaps very important was the spectre of
severe disruption of the Soviet economy such a race could
produce. However, the decision to enter talks as well
as the concurrent decisions to sign the nuclear non-pro-
liferation treaty, continue cultural exchanges and open
air links with New York were not so important in them-
selves but rather in the broader implications they raised
for general policy.
Brezhnev for one made it clear that he placed a
restrictive interpretation on the scope and purposes of
the decisions on the treaty and nuclear talks. At the
April plenum Brezhnev had already tied Soviet agreement
to the non-proliferation treaty strictly to the military-
strategic benefits it secured for the USSR without sug-
gesting that it enhanced coexistence with the West. A
Pravda commentator echoed this attitude in a 6 July inter-
view with a Japanese newsman, rejecting the idea of any
connection between "U.S.-Soviet coexistence" and the non-
proliferation treaty or nuclear disarmament talks. Further,
in his 8 July speech to the military graduates, Brezhnev
implied that the non-proliferation treaty was a conces-
sion wrung unwillingly from the imperialist powers by the
militant struggle of "peace-loving" forces.
In comparison, Gromyko's report at the Supreme
Soviet announcing Soviet readiness to enter nuclear arms
limitation talks placed the decision in a broad and opti-
mistic political perspective. That perspective, in short,
stood in contrast to the darker prospect of danger and
conflict set out in the conservative line that had been
dominant in other major regime statements. Gromyko, a
dutiful and deferential official, was undoubtedly the
mouthpiece for views emanating from the highest level.
On major points his Supreme Soviet report accorded with
positions Kosygin had previously taken but almost neces-
sarily must have represented more than the latter's views
alone. The most likely assumption is that the report was
not given without prior consultation in the Politburo and
reflected the view of at least a temporary majority of
that body.
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The Gromyko report-was keyed to a characterization
of the present "stage" of international developments that
contrasted with the pessimistic view Brezhnev had consist-
ently asserted. Despite the "motley character" and "com-
plexity" of contemporary events, the "main" conclusion
to be drawn regarding the present "stage," Gromyko stated,
was that the rate of collapse of the system of imperial-
ism--with its attendant phenomena of aggressive wars and
"unbridled" arms races, etc.--was developing rapidly.
The Brezhnev formulation--which has been a standard line
in most party documents--offers a less reassuring prospect.
The present "stage", in this view, involves a protracted,
dangerous conflict with imperialism characterized by
sharpened international tensions and "complications."
The underlying cause of the condition, according to this
analysis, is the development of the "general crisis of
capitalism" which produces increasing "imperialist" ag-
gressiveness in world affairs. The Gromyko formulation
suggested a long-term trend of declining danger of serious
conflict in international affairs.
Similar cleavage between Brezhnev and Kosygin on
world prospects had emerged as far back as mid-1966.
Brezhnev had warned in a speech that despite the gradual
change of the balance of forces in favor of socialism,
"this general tendency in world development must not hide
from us the danger with which the present international
situation is fraught." Shortly thereafter, Kosygin had
challenged the Brezhnev view by simply turning the coin
around. He warned, in turn, against "shutting oneself
up in present-day events" when making policy. Rather,
present tensions, he aruged, must be kept in the perspective
of the broad trend favoring the forces of peace and security.
In support of the brighter view of affairs, the
Gromyko report pictured a steady decline in the influence
of traditional military strength in world politics--a
trend which, he said, was the "essence" of the "new"
phenomena of the present stage. Ironically Gromyko cited
Brezhnev's report last November on the 50th anniversary
of the Bolshevik revolution to support the latter point.
Nonetheless, Gromyko's argument hardly squared with Brezh-
nev's resounding reaffirmation soon after in an 8 July
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speech of the central importance of military power. "As
long as imperialism exists and threatens the use of force,"
Brezhnev argued, the imperative to face "great material
expenditures" in increasing military strength remains.
Though the Soviet Union would, he added, continue to sup-
port limitation of the arms race, it must keep its powder
dry in readiness for "any serious turn in events." The
tone and thrust of Brezhnev's argument ran counter to
Gromyko's, and his warning of a serious turn was confirmed
by the subsequent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Gromyko had declared that the military power of imperial-
ism is already successfully "contained" by Soviet might.
This assertion was a complement of a Kosygin statement
earlier in the year that the imperialists are "convinced"
that the USSR was not vulnerable to military pressure as
part of an explanation of why imperialism is allegedly
stepping up "ideological" sabotage in the Soviet world.
In connection with the theme of the lessing of
the influence of military power in world politics, Gromyko
depreciated the importance of large U.S. military budgets.
To measure a nation's strength in world affairs by the
"quantitative" yardstick was faulty, Gromyko asserted,
since by its measure American influence should have in-
creased rather than declined. Brezhnev on .O July, how-
ever, reasserted the importance of the yardstick. He
voiced extreme alarm at the size of the upcoming U.S.
military budget--which he exaggerated by citing a pre-
liminary estimate--and professed to see a design in high
Washington circles to work for strategic superiority over
the USSR and to pursue a more aggressive policy. Brezh-
nev's expression of concern contrasted with Gromyko's
reassuring assessment that Soviet might "is by no means
lesser than" that of imperialism (read United States).
Kosygin was also visibly upset by the size of the U.S.
arms budget in his talk with British labor leader qrosland
on 6 June, but his main concern, as in previous years,
evidently was the impact of an arms race on the Soviet
economy and on the Soviet allocation of resources, not
the danger of the U.S. gaining strategic superiority.
Further, Brezhnev's warning against "shutting our eyes"
to the fact that the "hawks" maintain their positions in
Washington (despite public opposition to U.S. war policies)
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was a counterpoint to statements in the Gromyko report.
Gromyko said that top American political figures like
Rockefeller and George Ball were recognizing the limits
of the influence of American military power in world af-
fairs. Similarly, Kosygin had in the past pointed to
the presence of moderate political forces in Washington.
The general theses of the Gromyko report were
closely tied to its justifications for the pursuit of a
disarmament policy, and, specifically, the decision to
engage in talks on nuclear arms limitation with the
United States. The report was cast in distinctly argu-
mentative terms and answered specific objections against
following a pro-disarmament policy--another indication
that the report was drafted against a background of
sharp debate. The report contained an attack on uniden-
tified "bourgeois leaders" who saw a "tragic contradic-
tion in the epoch" and who concluded that the arms race
is a "fatal inevitability." Such a view describes the
orthodox Communist thesis equally well and Gromyko con-
firmed this by denouncing Communist "theoreticians" who
call the idea of disarmament an "illusion." While such
attacks obviously apply, but are not necessarily limited,
to the Chinese and others outside'the USSR, Gromyko at
this point phrased his case on the value of talks in a
manner which suggested that he was mirroring an argument
addressed to doubters in the Soviet leadership itself.
On the one hand, he agreed, "experience" shows the "im-
possibility" of counting on capitalist powers agreeing
to solutions of pressing international problems, especi-
ally disarmament, without constant exposure of militarist
policies. On the other, he added, "experience also shows"
that consistent and persistent pursuit of a disarmament
policy made it possible to achieve "certain results" even
if it did not lead "all at once to concrete agreements."
The latter point fits in well with Kosygin's theme of
steady progress in the disarmament field step-by-step
at the signing of the non-proliferation treaty.
Kosygin's brief remarks at the signing of the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty shortly after the Supreme
Soviet session reinforced the Gromyko report's defense
of an active disarmament policy. Kosygin pictured a
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steady step-by-step progress in the disarmament field
reaching back to the Khrushchev era. He cited the test-
ban treaty, the culmination of Khrushchev's detente ef-
forts after the Cuban crisis, as the starting point of
the record of progress. He spoke optimistically of the
prospects of reducing international tension and saw in
the non-proliferation treaty a confirmation of the capacity
of states to find "mutually acceptable solutions" to the
"complicated" international problems of the day. Kosygin
even continued to preserve his accent on the positive as
the crisis over Czechoslovakia escalated in mid-July.
In Sweden on 12 July he went well beyond the call of
diplomatic duty in developing the idea that the world is
becoming a single entity in the spheres of trade, economics,
science and technology. While noting that the "imperial-
ists" still engage in attempts to aggravate tensions--at-
tempts which "naturally" will be rebuffed, Kosygin assert-
ed that an "objective appraisal" of the world situation
made it "impossible not to note the positive processes."
The "positive" trend, according to the Soviet Premier,
was that all states both East and West, were interdepend-
ent and could not develop individually without "extensive"
economic, scientific and technological collaboration.
Kosygin's "one-world" theme clashed with the rapid inten-
sification at that juncture of Moscow's hard-line propa-
ganda against the Czechoslovak liberalization and the
insistence on Stalin's rigid "two-camp" depiction of the
world. Kosygin's theme uneasily co-existed with Brezh-
nev's picture of a world riven by crises and class war.
Brezhnev's political maneuvers following on the
heels of the signature of the non-proliferation treaty
and the decision to enter nuclear talks bore all the
markings of a concentrated effort to head off the alter-
native line of general policy that had broken the surface
in the Gromyko and Kosygin statements. His speeches in
early July--some of the specific points of which have al-
ready been cited--squelched any idea that the way was
being opened toward a more peaceful relationship with the
Western powers and the United States in particular. These
speeches were distinguished by unusually harsh anti-West-
ern vituperation and were replete with the coldest of
cold-war ttemes. His leading role in escalating the
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attack against the liberal Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia
to at least the point of direct intervention in July and
August had the :obvious advantage of putting massive pres-
sure on moderates in the leading group to acquiesce in
the hardline he had pushed with increasing vigor since
the early spring.
At the same time, aware of the dangers of failure
in the Czech venture, Brezhnev engaged in a feverish ef-
fort to lessen his personal vulnerability. He not only
obtained the formal and public sanction of the Central
Committee but of the Politburo itself for his actions.
If he fails, any failures of the policy could be treated
as "collective" responsibility; any successes Brezhnev
could claim for himself as an initiator and leader of
the venture. Brezhnev's difficulty in gaining genuine
unity behind his leadership in the very heat of the Czech
crisis was indicated in a Pravda article a week and a
half before the invasion. The article (9 August) by
Rodionov--a figure with a history of involvement in high-
level intrigues--stressed the inviolability of "democratic
centralism" in party politics and warned of the dangers
of factionalism. His general comments on the pernicious
effects on the execution of the official party line if
some "pull" in one direction and others in another seemed
as immediately applicable to the Soviet leadership as to
other parties in the Communist world in the recent period.
Rodionov pointedly recommended Brezhnev's speech of 28
March as a sound directive on the principles of party
solidarity. It was this speech--cited earlier--which
contained a conspicuous thrust at Kosygin's views and
set forth many of the basic lines Brezhnev has since
relentlessly advanced.
On the whole, it seems unlikely that the Politburo
majority that backed the decision on arms talks represented
the same alignment of forces that pushed through the deci-
sion to invade Czechoslovakia. Both actions, 25X1
were the products of shifts in the balance within 2bX1
the leading group: in the first, a moderate grouping win-
ning an advantage; in the second, a hard-line faction
gaining the upper hand. Obviously there must have been
"swing votes" in both cases. Kosygin and Brezhnev have
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mirrored in their statements and actions the clash of
the opposing tendencies. It has been Kosygin who most
consistently among the leaders kept alive an alternative
to the creeping conservative tide in party politi44 since
Khrushchev's fall. Brezhnev, on the other, has striven
to weld a conservatively-oriented coalition as the base
of support for his leadership. He has sought`--_to avoid
alienating party conservatives and strong elements in the
Soviet military as Khrushchev had done.
Brezhnev, nonetheless, has had to fight on two
fronts in the leadership struggle. Brezhnev has so far
contained but has not been able to drive from the field
powerful potential challengers from both the militant-
conservative and moderate groupings. (The outcome of the
Czechoslovak affair will most likely decide this matter
in one way or another.)
On the one side he has treated Kosygin, a leader
without a personal base of power in the party apparatus,
as a serious rival evidently because the latter has actual
or potential allies with bases in the party. To suggest
one possibility, it is worth recalling in this connection
that Brezhnev's first major battle was with Podgornyy who
shared with him the status of co-heir apparent in the
Secretariat in Khrushchev's last year. Shortly after Khru-
shchev's fall Podgornyy associated himself with a moderate
political line seemingly in tandem with Kosygin who was
sponsoring a military budget cut and a policy of "mutual
example" with the United States. With support from con-
servatives, most likely including Suslov, Brezhnev defeated
Podgornyy and in the process sent Mikoyan--a consistent
supporter of reform under Khrushchev--into retirement.
He nudged Podgornyy out of the Secretariat and into the
prestigious but less politically potent Presidency of the
Supreme Soviet, replacing Mikoyan. Brezhnev's success
reduced but did not destroy the threat from Podgornyy.
Despite the seemingly close relations between the two
since 1966, Brezhnev cannot be sure of Podgornyy's unwaver-
ing support in a leadership showdown.
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On the second front, Brezhnev has been menaced by
a militant faction dissatisfied with his leadership which
says, in effect, that a new leader is needed to carry
through a hard-line with greater determination and less
circumspection. In 1965 Shelepin sought to lead this
grouping and mounted an abortive challenge to Brezhnev's
position. And last year Brezhnev once more had to cope
with another chaltlenge from the militants which was in-
itiated by the then Moscow party chief, Yegorychev,and
was apparently based on a complaint against the party
secretary's caution in handling the Middle East crisis.
While there seems to be little reason to doubt that
Brezhnev has been the main author of the broad aggressive
strategy pursued against the Czechoslovak liberalization
during the past summer, he is perhaps vulnerable once
more to the charge of ineffective leadership in a crisis
from party militants. Not only, their argument probably
goes, did the decision to invade remain a cliff-hanger
for month-after-month despite all the sound and fury and
the build-up of political-military pressure, but the in-
vasion when it did come was not carried through to its
logical conclusion quickly and efficiently and exposed
Soviet policy to greater difficulties and embarrassment
than was necessary.
From the moderates, on the other hand, comes the
alternative argument that the invasion of Czechoslovakia
has damaged rather than aided Soviet interests And that
restraint would have been the better policy and remains
the better policy in handling the Czechoslovaks even after
the invasion. Such opposing pressures probably explain
in part Moscow's alternately conciliatory and menacing
gestures since the invasion.
In sum, each wing of the Soviet ruling group so
far had tended to inhibit the consistent implementation
of the designs of the other. Brezhnev has sought to be
the spokesman for the conservative trend in the party
since Khrushchev's fall but, buffetted by the cross-cur-
rents, has so far been unable to win the day decisively
for his own leadership. The invasion of Czechoslovakia
and its aftermath--whether Brezhnev had been a direct ad-
vocate of that action,or, as one report has it, had re-
sisted but then yielded to militant demands to invade--is
inevitably aggravating the long-existing strains within
the Soviet ruing group and is likely eventually to produce
a change in the political complexion of the Politburo.
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