POLICIES AND PERSONALITIES IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03-02194R000200780001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POLICIES AND PERSONALITIES IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO
Secret
12
19 September 1968
No. 1573/68
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
19 September 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Policies and Personalities in the Soviet Politburo
Summary
For four years the Soviet collective leader-
ship has evaded or postponed most of the really
tough policy decisions, partly by design and partly
because of the indecisive nature of the collective
"personality." The invasion of Czechoslovakia
almost certainly will exacerbate long-accumulating
personal antagonisms and unsolved problems and put
a severe strain on the regime's internal stability.
The strenuous effort to involve all Politburo mem-
bers in the decision to invade and in the subsequent
"negotiations" with the Czechoslovak leadership
suggests a recognition of the potential divisiveness
of the issue and an attempt by the architects of
invasion to create at least a unity of responsi-
bility.
Factors favoring change, in any case, were
present prior to the invasion. A significant num-
ber of the Politburo members, including Brezhnev,
have made their careers in the Ukraine and have
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the office of Economic Research,
the Office of Strategic Research, and the Office of
National Estimates.
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maintained meaningful political ties. Cutting
across these regional connections, however, are con-
siderations of age differences and shared outlooks
in the approach to key policy problems. In recent
years a gap has begun to open in the upper echelons
of the hierarchy between the "juniors," with their
unfulfilled ambitions, and the "seniors," who more
and more have taken decisions on their own. Kosygin
apart, most of the "seniors" have also presented an
image of thoroughly conventional Soviet Communists,
while the "juniors" have in common a generally more
pragmatic approach to problems confronting the USSR.
Despite these cross-currents, the collective
has survived since Khrushchev's ouster without major
changes in its composition or manner of operation.
No single leader has had the combination of desire
and political strength to dominate. Brezhnev appar-
ently has been willing to work within the system of
shared power, carefully treating his associates with
tact. Kosygin and Suslov play indispensable roles
but have remained aloof from party organizational
work and thus represent no direct threat to Brezhnev's
pre-eminent position. Podgorny is hampered from
bidding for the top party post by his assignment to
the largely ceremonial post of president
Shelepin--the one young leader who
seemed to possess the qualifications for the job--
has been politically isolated since his apparent bid
to topple the old guard in 1965. In addition, con-
tinuity and orthodoxy have been favored by the mix
of vested interests represented on the Politburo.
There are, however, some small signs of flu-
idity on personal relationships among the policy-
makers in the aftermath of the intervention. If a
shift in political alignments has occurred or is
developing, the first major shakeup in the collec-
tive could occur as domestic problems, and partic-
ularly the touchy issue of allocations, come to a
head.
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It was inevitable that rumors concerning the
impact of Czechoslovakia on the Soviet leadership
would appear soon after the invasion, given the
magnitude of the act and the widely held view that
the unity of the leadership is not such as to en-
able it to withstand serious contention. Before
long these rumors, together with various other
portents, will become the stuff of Kremlinological
conjecture that invariably flourishes when solid
information is lacking. What emerges from this
process will not be wholly reliable; neither should
it be entirely discounted, if, as we believe, the
tensions generated by the Czechoslovak issue are
likely to linger and to exacerbate other conflicts
that have accumulated during the four years of col-
lective leadership.
While there is now no firm basis for forecast-
ing the outcome of this political contest, when and
in what form it will erupt, and who the winners and
losers might be, there is little doubt that a contest
is in progress. We think it possible, moreover, to
identify, at least in a rough way, the framework of
political relationships within which the contest will
be conducted, the names of some of the chief contes-
tants, and the political instruments that will figure
in the action. This is what will be attempted in
the paragraphs which follow.
The Political Framework
1. The 11-man Soviet Politburo is composed
of overlapping and sometimes shifting cliques based
on regional associations, age, and shared outlooks
in the approach to key policy problems. Since the
replacement of Khrushchev, this group has given
the USSR a generally safe and thoroughly undynamic
leadership. Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
it had, partly by design and partly because of the
nature of the collective "personality," managed to
evade or postpone most important decisions affect-
ing both domestic and foreign policy. The reward
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for this has been a high degree of internal stabil-
ity within the collective; the cost has been an
accumulation of personal antagonisms and unsolved
problems, which the Czechoslovak issue seems cer-
tain to exacerbate. Even though the fabric of
unity may have sufficient strength to see the col-
lective through the immediate aftermath of Czecho-
slovakia, it has probably been permanently weakened
by that event. Factors favoring change were, in
any event, already present.
2. One fairly central element for the past
three years has been the "Ukrainian group," headed
by Brezhnev and including Podgorny, Kirilenko,
Polyansky, and Shelest. (See Appendix for list of
Politburo members). Although several of these men
are in fact Great Russian by birth, all made their
earlier careers in the Ukraine and have maintained
meaningful political ties both among themselves
and with that republic's organization. A similar
"geographic" tie may exist between Suslov, who
under Stalin had at one point the duty of over-
seeing the incorporation of the Baltic countries
into the USSR, and late-comer to the Politburo
(1966) Arvid Pelshe, a colorless Latvian party
functionary. Pelshe began his rise in the Latvian
party during Suslov's pro-consulship of that area
and owe his
present high position to Suslov's patronage.
3. There are no visible alignments based on
geographic ties in the careers of the other im-
portant members of the Politburo. Kosygin is from
Leningrad but has no visible power base there;
Mazurov is a Belorussian by birth and largely made
his career in that republic. Shelepin is a Great
Russian who has made his way up the ladder through
several central institutions rather than via pro-
vincial posts, and Voronov is a Russian who has
served and established influence primarily in the
Russian Republic.
4. As time has passed in the post-Stalin
era, a gap has begun to open up in the upper eche-
lons of the hierarchy between the "seniors"--all
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over 60--and the "juniors" in their early 50's
who have been consulted less and less and on oc-
casion have voiced resentment. The decline in the
political fortunes of Shelepin, the most visible
of these "juniors," has dramatized the gap. The
potential divisiveness of this difference in age
is heightened by the fact that many of the
"juniors" have in common not only unfulfilled am-
bition, but also an approach to the problems con-
fronting the USSR which tends to be more pragmatic
than doctrinaire. Kosygin apart, most of the
"seniors" now present an image of thoroughly con-
ventional Soviet Communists. Their view of the
world and their political vocabulary--formed dur-
ing the Stalin years--have preserved heavy traces
of the "siege" mentality of those years. "im-
perialist encirclement" and the contagion of for-
eign ideas are for them real dangers, only slightly
mitigated by the fact that the Soviet Union has
greatly reduced its international isolation.
Safety lies in defense of the established ways--
primacy of the party and strict protection of
State doctrine. Rejuvenation of the domestic
economy is secondary when the "siege" instinct
takes hold, to the demands of heavy industry and
defense. Preservation of the system and the sur-
vival of the ruling group are paramount needs,
and unorthodoxy, which might be tolerable in less
dangerous times, is taken to be heresy.
5. There is bound to be some oversimplifica-
tion in any such broad outline. There are naturally
varying degrees of conformity to this pattern with-
in the senior group, and the attitudes of indi-
viduals on particular issues is certain to alter
with time, place, and the nature of the issue.
Brezhnev himself, during his years under Khrushchev,
stood out as something of a moderate by contrast
to the more hard-line Kozlov, now dead, and he
still seems more comfortable politically when on
the "middle ground," even while his attitude is
predominantly conservative. Podgorny has at times
expressed support for economic decentralization,
and Soviet intellectuals once considered him mildly
sympathetic. Since 1966, however, he has followed
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Brezhnev's lead closely, and he
played a very hard-line role in
the Czechoslovak crisis. To a lesser degree, the
same thing is true of Kirilenko, who in the 1964-5
shakedown period showed an awareness of economic
considerations which declined as Brezhnev's posi-
tion became more conservative. Suslov, though
ideologist-in-chief, has, on occasion, revealed
himself to have somewhat more political flexibility
than his reputation would suggest. Shelest, as
regional party boss of the Ukraine, has presided
over a limited "Ukrainization" of the economic and
cultural life of the republic, but there is little
evidence that he is sympathetic to other forms of
change. Thus, the elder group, as a whole,
radiates a strongly orthodox image.
6. Kosygin and the "juniors"--Mazurov,
Polyansky, Shelepin, and Voronov--appear to share
a generally more pragmatic approach, perhaps not
entirely accidentally, since they hold or have
held positions in the state apparatus responsible
for the execution of policy. For them, probably
the danger of contamination by the West is weighed
against what can be achieved by a degree of coop-
eration--both in terms of relaxed budgetary pres-
sures and access to technological expertise.
Domestically, party primacy is one thing, but
economic efficiency and technological sophistication
may be a slightly different thing. Although
Polyansky and Shelepin are ardent Soviet nationa-
lists, with a tinge of chauvinism and anti-Ameri-
canism about-them, even they seem to believe that
new methods of running the Soviet Union are needed
and that more weight must be given to the "experts"
whose contribution lies in technical knowledge,
not Marxist-Leninist fervor. Polyansky, despite
his Ukrainian background, fits this technocratic
pattern more than the old orthodoxy, as do Mazurov
and Shelepin. Voronov, slightly older than the
others, makes few speeches and rarely figures in
any reports on the attitudes of the leaders.
Nevertheless, there have been scattered hints that
in the right political climate he would be ready
to join in a search for "new methods of administra-
tion.!'
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7. Despite these cross-currents, the collec-
tive has survived for four years without major
changes in its composition or in the way in which
it functions. This is due partly to political
accident: no single leader has had the combination
of desire and political strength necessary for
domination. The younger members with ambition and
vigor have, in turn, been kept in the background.
8. Brezhnev has managed to place a number of
his associates in key party and government posts
at lower levels, but he has apparently been will-
ing to work within the system of shared power and
has been careful to treat his associates with tact
and to heed the views of others. Kosygin has
proved a competent premier and is widely respected
in both government and party circles for this com-
petence, but he does not seem to have either the
background in party work or the desire to step
into the top party position. Suslov, too, plays
an indispensable role in his own way and has con-
siderable influence, particularly on matters of
Communist faith and moral,, but has seemed to re-
main largely aloof from party organizational work.
Podgorny may harbor ambitions, but he is hampered
by his assignment to the largely ceremonial post
of president
9. Among the younger members of the Polit-
buro, the one man who seemed to have the necessary
combination of opportunity, ambition, and leader-
ship qualifications--Shelepin--apparently did make
a bid to topple the old guard in 1965. His failure
left him politically isolated, and several of his
highly placed protege's have since been removed
from their positions. Polyansky is ambitious but
thus far has apparently remained loyal to Brezhnev.
Mazurov has proved his abilities in both party and
government, but with his exclusively Belorussian
roots, he has little independent political strength.
Voronov, despite his long tenure in the top leader-
ship, remains a relatively shadowy figure.
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Interest Groups
10. The current composition of the Politburo
closely reflects the power relationships among the
major interest groups in the country. The party
apparatus, government bureaucracy, agricultural
interests, and the military-defense industry com-
plex all seem to have men on the Politburo whom
they can count on to be attentive to their con-
cerns. This factor has favored both continuity
and orthodoxy. When imposed on a mixture of ortho-
dox and pragmatic outlooks, it has meant also con-
sensus politics. The 1965 economic reform, which
attempted simultaneously to recentralize and to
decentralize- decision-making in the economy, re-
presented the interests of both the orthodox and
the pragmatists, and the effect on the economy has
been minimal. Until mid-August the leadership's
handling of the Czechoslovak problem revealed the
same conflicting elements--threats on a rising
scale punctuated by personal meetings which tended
to defuse the threats..
11. The final decision to intervene mili-
tarily was reached only after prolonged debate. The
moving force seems to have been the Ukrainian group--
Brezhnev, Podgorny, Shelest, and probably Kirilenko
and Polyansky--whose concern was reportedly magni-
fied by the fear of Soviet regional party officials
that the infection of liberalization from Eastern
Europe threatened their control at home.
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12. The military's orientation is uncerta
in,
Both Brezhnev and Shelepin are alleged to draw
port from undefined elements of the military.
sup-
One
of the anomalies of the Czechoslovak crisis was
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personally had opposed military intervention bu
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"the military" had pushed for it.
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13. The Central Committee itself, whose 346
full and candidate members represent the most im-
portant elements of Soviet society, embodies a "na-
tional will" of sorts. This body will have to ratify
any important changes in the leadership. Khrushchev's
antagonists failed to gain its approval when they
tried to oust him in 1957, but another group obtained
it in 1964. The present Central Committee, elected
in 1966, does not belong to any one man but rather
reflects in its membership the degree to which power
has been shared, in varying degrees, among the various
members of the collective leadership. Regional party
officials make up approximately 35 percent of its
membership. Intellectuals of any sort, and particu-
larly those with any degree of creativity or sympathy
for liberal causes, are woefully underrepresented.
The military-industrial complex has been allocated
approximately 15 percent of the seats; enterprise man-
agers, economists, and government officials engaged
in the nondefense sectors hold a considerably smaller
number of seats, Most of the national minorities are
underrepresented; only the Ukraine, Belorussia, and
Kazakhstan enjoy what might be termed proportional
representation. The ages and career interests of the
members of the present Central Committee suggest that
on the whole their views are close to those of the
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"seniors" on the Politburo. They are probably con-
servative in matters of national security and re-
sistant to change, but they would be vulnerable to
manipulation on allocations questions that directly
affect their own vested interests.
Fodder for Future Conflicts
14. If a shift in political alignments did
occur under the pressure of the decision on Czecho-
slovakia, the first fissures in the collective lead-
ership could well appear when it again turns its at-
tention to outstanding problems at home, in partic-
ular the contentious issue of allocations, now further
complicated by the unforeseen expenses of the invasion
and its aftermath. Last year, before the Czechoslo-
vak problem began to dominate the leaders' time and
energy, the most conspicuous source of contention
within the leadership was the question of capital
investments in agriculture. Polyansky, with a strong
vested interest in promoting increased investment in
this sector, protested publicly against pressure for
a cutback in these allocations. When reduced invest-
ment goals for agriculture were announced last fall,
Polyansky again broke ranks and published an unprec-
edented major defense of the original goals in the
Central Committee journal, Kommunist.
15. In the aftermath of the invasion, there
are some small signs of a recasting of the balance
within the Politburo. A strenuous effort was made
to involve all the members of the Politburo, not only
in the decision to invade, but in the week of "nego-
tiation" with the Czechoslovak leadership which fol-
lowed. Despite this effort to achieve collectivity,
that Shelepin, for one, still has
reservations on broad questions of policy and may be
trying to break out of his political isolation. At
the same time an offsetting portent was the appearance
this week, in a popular weekly magazine, of an article
urging journalists and historians to write about the
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exploits of the 18th Army in the Great Patriotic
War, with particular reference to the important role
played by "Col. Brezhnev." This article is a sharp
break with the pattern of minimal personal publicity
for individual leaders that has been established
since Khrushchev's ouster- It may be intended to
underline Brezhnev's ties to and support from the
military, but it may also indicate that his sup-
porters are sufficiently uneasy to resort once again
to the dangerous game of the "cult of personality."
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Politburo Members
Leonid Brezhnev: age 61, General Secretary of CPSU
Central Committee. Russian by birth, but began
his career in and retains an identification
with Dnepropetrovsk in the Ukraine. Orthodox
in outlook; his political priorities are pro-
tection of the supremacy of the party, tighten-
ing the ties of the socialist camp, protection
of defense goals through allocations to heavy
industry, with agricultural allocations ranking
second.
Aleksey Kosygin: age 64, Chairman of USSR Council
of Ministers. Russian, born in Leningrad but
has worked in the center in the state apparatus
since 1939. Pragmatic with a strong interest
in a balanced economy, especially interested in
increased attention to consumer goods and "ra-
tionalization" of economic planning methods.
Nikolay Podgorny: age 65, Chairman of Presidium
USSR Supreme Soviet. Ukrainian by birth and
career, with identifiable ties to Kharkov in
the Ukraine. Under Khrushchev, identified with
relatively liberal views, but since early 1966
has moved steadily toward orthodoxy in support
of Brezhnev.
Mikhail Suslov: age 65, Secretary of CPSU Central
Committee with informal ranking of second-in-
command, high priest in doctrinal matters with
special interest in the cohesion of interna-
tional Communism. Orthodox in outlook, opposed
to "revisionism" in any field. Has shown an
acute sensitivity to shifting political tides
evidenced by his 20-year record on the Secre-
tariat.
Andrey Kirilenko: age 62, Secretary of CPSU Central
Committee. Ukrainian by birth and in career,
having followed Brezhnev up the ladder from
Dnepropetrovsk. Alternates with Suslov in dep-
utizing for Brezhnev when the latter is out of
town.
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Kirill Mazurov: age 54, First Deputy Chairman of
USSR Council of Ministers. Belorussian by birth
and career, retains ties through his former dep-
uty, Petr Masherov, who succeeded him as head
of the Belorussian party organization. Pragmatic
in outlook, responsible for industry as First
Deputy Premier, but also interested in agricul-
ture through the rural reconstruction plan being
strongly pushed by the Belorussian party organi-
zation. Was a strong proponent of the ration-
alization aspects of the economic reform. Al-
ternates with Polyansky in deputizing for Kosygin.
Arvid Pelshe: age 69, Chairman of Party Control Com-
mission. Latvian by birth and career, may have
career ties to Suslov. Orthodox in outlook,
Dmitry Polyansky: age 50, First Deputy Chairman of
USSR Council of Ministers. Ukrainian by birth,
career ties to the Crimea and thus far a loyal
member of the Ukrainian group in the Politburo.
Has served in both party and state positions. As
First Deputy Premier is responsible for agricul-
tural production, and is a zealous champion of
investment in the agricultural production base.
Aleksandr Shelepin: age 50, Chairman of All-Union
Central Council of Trade Unions. Russian, made
his career in the Komsomol, then as head of the
KGB. Has ties with individuals in party and
state positions through career associations, but
does not have any particular geographic base.
May also draw support from within the military.
Petr Shelest: age 60, Ukrainian by birth and career,
still based in Kiev, First Secretary of Ukrainian
Central Committee. Reportedly owes his rise to
Khrushchev rather than to either Brezhnev or
Podgorny, orthodox in outlook.
Gennady Voronov: age 58, Russian by birth and career.
Chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers. Ambigu-
ous figure, tending toward pragmatism in outlook.
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