BRAZIL S ELECTIONS: A POLITICAL TEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03T02547R000100570001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Directorate of Secret
Intclligcnce
Brazil's Elections:
A Political Test
An Intelligence Memorandum
DIA review
completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
ALA 82-10147
November 1982
COPY 260
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Division, ALA
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief, South America
Intelligence Council.
This paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Secret
ALA 82-10147
November 1982
Brazil's Elections:
A Political Test
Office of African and Latin American
25X1
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A Political Test
Summary The 15 November national elections for all major offices except the
Information available presidency represent a major test for political liberalization-abertura-in
as of 26 October 1982 Brazil. The contest will indicate clearly whether the country is moving
was used in this report. 25X1
toward restoration of civilian government or facing a prolongation of
military rule. Available evidence~
points to a substantial
decline in the present administration's political strength. We project about
a 45-percent share of the total vote going to the government party. This 25X1
would, under present laws, place its control of the 1985 presidential
selection process in jeopardy. 25X1
President Figueiredo and the military appear prepared to deal with such an
outcome without resort to extralegal measures. We believe that they have
come to a grudging recognition that efforts to manipulate electoral rules to
the government party's advantage have fallen short of ensuring the desired
results. Recent administration actions indicate that
government leaders are now focusing on a fallback strategy for 1983-84. It
centers on retaining sufficient control over the political process probably
through further rules changes or accommodations with political leaders25X1
to ensure that an acceptable regime-backed presidential candidate is
chosen in 1985. In our view, this remains the critical concern of the regime.
25X1
We believe that during the next two to three years, moderate opposition
leaders probably will be inclined to accept compromises with Figueiredo on
major policy questions. Their disparate makeup and disunity will impede
cohesive political opposition. Their goal will likely be to avoid undermining
abertura and jeopardizing their own prospects for eventual control over the
government. 25X1
Secret
ALA 82-10147
November 1982
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Am-
Frenchy~
Gulana/
(Fr.(
B r a z i l
sago
T, ti caca
Chile
Argentina
BRASILIA*
0 500
kilometers
Rio de Janeiro
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritetwe.
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Brazil's Elections:
A Political Test
Introduction The nationwide elections of 15 November, the most important political
event in Brazil since the March 1964 revolution brought the military to
power, will shape the immediate future of abertura, the gradual and
controlled process of political liberalization in train since the mid-1970s.
The outcome of the elections and the regime's reactions to it also will
provide significant indicators of the longer term issue at stake in the
presidential succession in 1985 and beyond: whether the regime, and
especially the military, will accept the eventual transfer of power to a
civilian opposition not identified with the conservative principles of the
1964 revolution. 25X1
The Political Opening
Because of the pivotal importance of the November elections, this paper
looks at the abertura process and evaluates the regime's efforts to regulate
that process. It also projects the likely election outcome and the govern-
ment's response to it. 25X1
The Basis for Change
Abertura was set in motion in the mid-1970s but received its major impulse
under President Joao Figueiredo, the fifth army general to rule since 1964.
Figueiredo has made it a central political plank of his administration since
he assumed office in 1979. In numerous public statements, administrative
actions, and legislative initiatives, Figueiredo has consistently supported
liberalization. His steadfast commitment to holding the November 1982
elections on schedule has helped foster a widespread impression that the
liberalization process had acquired a life of its own even if its pace was still
subject to the military's discretion. 25X1
Two major factors have contributed to the military's support for Figueire-
do's willingness to put his administration to test with the voters. First,
many officers have become increasingly receptive to the idea of returning
to a more purely military role, particularly as they sensed growing public
apprehension over their ability to govern a complex and rapidly moderniz-
ing state. This was particularly evident with regard to economic policymak-
ing in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s, when the effects of in-
ternational oil crises and high interest rates made it increasingly difficult to
sustain rapid growth and to manage the country's massive foreign debt.
as the military's sense of frustration grew, so
did their wish to transfer to civilians full responsibility for managing the
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economy. They also seek to avoid the blame for the generally perceived
government failure, as reflected in numerous recent public opinion polls, to
improve living standards significantly since 1964 for the majority of
Brazilians. Second, ranking 25X1
military officers have increasingly realized that their credibility has
suffered in recent years and that, should they seek to perpetuate themselves
in power, intensified popular hostility could undermine military unity.F___1 25X1
According to the US Embassy and defense attache, most military officers
now publicly acknowledge that they must ultimately return to the bar-
racks, get out of the political line of fire, and allow "acceptable" civilians
once again to run the country. Although there always has been a hardline
group within the military that has strongly opposed restoring power to
civilians, in recent
years its numbers have dwindled. They also report that it is, nonetheless, a
still influential minority.
Timing
US Embassy and press reporting make clear that regime spokesmen have
deliberately avoided a precise definition of abertura and the timetable for
its implementation. This reflects a widely held view within the military,
that the manner and pace for
eventually relinquishing control are to be determined exclusively by the
high command and the president. The military insists that the changeover
should be carefully managed in order to avoid damage to the armed forces'
image as saviors of the nation from chaos in 1964. Moreover, senior
officers have stated that even
after leaving the government the military will continue closely to monitor
the civilian political process.
Figueiredo appears to take the views of the high command into account in
shaping his policies. Despite his emergence as a forceful chief executive
with considerable authority, Fi ueiredo consults regularly with senior
officers. he considers himself a
president who governs in consultation with and ultimately subject to the
general oversight of the military leadership.
Because the pace and nature of the return to civilian rule are the military's
chief concerns, Figueiredo has taken a number of steps during his
administration to guide-and, most recently, to slow-the process. These
efforts have made the process and pace of abertura the dramatic focus of
the election contest and the overriding issue for all political actors.
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The Evolving Political Parties
Political Scene In 1979 the executive mandated a political reorganization to replace a two-
party system. Ostensibly, this was done as part of abertura to demonstrate
the regime's willingness to permit a wider spectrum of parties to function.
We agree with the US Embassy, however, that the primary motivation was
concern over the post-1964 growth in voter appeal of the single opposition
party, which by the late 1970s threatened to eclipse the government party
in elected representation. 25X1
By reorganizing the ruling government party into the Social Democratic
Party (PDS) and encouraging the creation of several other parties, the
administration openly acknowledged that it hoped to dilute the opposition
vote. This, it hoped, would enable the PDS to maintain its current
majorities in Congress-a comfortable margin in the Senate and a narrow
lead in the Chamber of Deputies 25X1
By 1981, although five opposition parties had met formal registration
requirements, none approached the national organizational strength of the
PDS, and all lacked a solid ideological basis beyond a general opposition to
the regime. The two largest, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic
Movement (PMDB) and the Popular Party (PP), were created by older
political figures who had consistently opposed close ties with the regime.
Two of the other three parties-all much smaller-are more or less
personalistic vehicles for pre-1964 politicians. The remaining party, the
Labor Party (PT), is built around an aspiring and charismatic young lah,;~" ,
Despite these difficulties, however, several factors have been operating in
the opposition parties' favor. In a country with 54 million voters, the bulk
of whom fall in the 18- to 35-age group, the elections clearly will be
determined largely by those with no previous electoral experience. Indeed,
public opinion polls have shown that this younger age group harbors
particularly strong dissatisfaction with the government and believes that
civilians can govern better than the military. Polling indicates that this has
translated into rapid growth for opposition parties, especially in the large
urban centers and the more developed states, if not the country at large.
25X1
More important, the initial failure of the opposition groups to promote any
kind of cohesion among them was overcome in early 1982 in a backlash
against Figueiredo's modifications of the electoral law. The two largest
opposition parties merged, retaining the name of the larger PMDB. The
resulting party is now as strong-in terms of our projections of national
voter support-as the PDS. 25X1
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Interest Groups
Almost all important special interests favor reestablishment of a more
open, civilian, political system in Brazil. Certainly the Church, organized
labor, and the media have long publicly opposed the military regime, and
all welcomed Figueiredo's early endorsement of liberalization. Moreover,
they have strongly criticized efforts to blunt or slow the process. As the
elections have drawn closer, Church activism, particularly among the poor,
has come to be regarded by the military as an increasingly serious
challenge, According to the US
Embassy, there is increased unrest among organized labor, although its
support for specific political parties and leaders is not yet significant.
Finally, most news media actively support opposition candidates and
criticize the Figueiredo regime.
Other interest groups are not as influential. There is strong individual
support for abertura within the business community and the bureaucracy,
according to US Embassy sources, but antiregime sentiment is not
widespread in either group. University students and Communist and
radical leftist groups are, of course, vociferous critics of the regime, but
their political influence relative to the regime continues to be, in our view,
limited.
No one of these individual interest groups has substantial leverage on the
regime, yet all generally consciously avoid needless provocation so as not to
provide a pretext either for derailing abertura or for government repression
of leftist organizations. Nevertheless, according to the US Embassy, their
collective influence is being taken into account by the government as it
weighs the electoral prospects of the PDS and conducts its preelection
political maneuvers.
Figueiredo's Electoral 25X1
Gimmickry
Figueiredo surprised the nation with sweeping electoral law modifica-
tions forced through the Congress-that were designed to increase the
likelihood of government victories in this November's elections, as well as
to stack the presidential electoral college in preparation for that contest in
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1985. The key measure called for straight ticket voting by party for all of-
fices, which the government thought would be in its favor because of its
generally strong local organizations. 25X1
While the immediate effect of Figueiredo's maneuver was to tarnish his
credibility as defender of abertura, a more serious consequence was the
rapid formation of political battle lines and a sudden escalation of election
campaign rhetoric and recrimination. Media commentary and statements
by politicians indicate that Figueiredo's action deepened their cynicism
regarding politics and the sincerity of his-and the military's-intention to
return to a genuinely open political system. Moreover, the opposition, as
noted, was impelled by Figueiredo's moves to overcome its divisions and to
form the strong PMDB party. 25X1
legislature a series of constitutional changes designed further to increase
the PDS percentage of presidential electoral college votes and otherwise
shore up the regime's political position after the elections.' In particular,
the administration was intent on forestalling opposition-led congressional
efforts to convoke a constituent assembly in order to remove the authoritar-
ian features put into the Constitution since 1964, or to provide for direct
presidential elections in 1985. 25X1
made by the opposition. In late June the executive forced through the
In recent months the administration has taken new steps to offset the major
gains 25X1
Other Election Issues Even though there is open and general public unhappiness with the state of
the economy and Brasilia is struggling to avoid a financing crisis, these
concerns have not become burning campaign issues?The current recession
has clearly been detrimental to the government's electoral prospects, but
US Embassy reporting and media commentaries all indicate that economic
and social themes do not loom as large as political issues-particularly
abertura-in the voters' minds. 25X1
25X1
25X1
In recent months, nonetheless, calls for social justice and for improved
economic well-being have been voiced not only by the opposition but also
by PDS representatives. In addition, the government has endeavored to
' The numerous electoral modifications introduced by Figueiredo raise the possibility of an
alltime high number of nullified ballots that could force rescheduling elections in several
areas. The government will probably turn this to advantage, but widespread rescheduling
might begin to radicalize the opposition.
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buttress PDS fortunes through such traditional devices as pork-barrel
spending and expanded social programs. The opposition, aided by the
media, has responded with attacks on this misuse of the taxpayers' money
at a time of economic austerity.
Likely Election
Outcomes
and Adaptations
A modest but clear-cut victory by the government would exceed its
expectations and enable it to maintain control without problems. Far more
likely, however, according to US
Embassy reporting, the opposition will win a majority of the national vote.
Individual state and congressional results will be uneven but on the whole
will contain clear opposition gains. We believe the administration expects
such an electoral outcome and is prepared to deal with it within legal
bounds.
Coping With Opposition Gains
If, as we expect, the
opposition polls a majority of the national vote, this should translate into
strong majorities in the Chamber of Deputies and state legislatures in
several key states. Our analysis indicates the government still stands a
reasonable chance of holding onto a majority of the 23 gubernatorial posts,
but it will probably lose in Sao Paulo and Rio and other major urban
centers responsible for 85 percent of Brazil's national output
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Even though this result would be a mixture of victory and defeat for both
sides, it would probably leave the administration in clear control of slightly
less than half of the prospective presidential electoral college in 1985.
Military hardliners will probably urge Figueiredo to set aside or otherwise
modify this electoral outcome. We believe, however, that the regime will
not take this step, at least in part because Figueiredo and other key
officials-including a number of military leaders-have publicly commit-
ted themselves to honoring the results, and have drawn a distinction 25X1
between themselves and other Latin American military regimes.
We believe that the government will perceive sufficient room for accommo-
dation and maneuver with the national legislature despite an opposition
majority in the lower house. Additional pressure on key governors and local
leaders would be employed, in our view, to keep the states in line. For ex-
ample, the military appears 25X1
willing to tolerate a victory even in the case of Leone] Brizola-leftist
brother-in-law of President Goulart whom the military ousted in 1964-
who now leads in the polls for the key Rio gubernatorial race. Senior
military officers have told the US defense attache that Brizola's need to
obtain financial assistance for Rio from Brasilia should prevent him from
becoming a major disruptive element. 25X1
The Risk of an Opposition Sweep
In the event of a massive opposition victory-which we believe unlikely
Figueiredo would, in our view, come under pressure from within the regime
not just to tinker with but to nullify the results. We doubt, however, that
any sector of the regime besides diehard hardliners is prepared to risk this
course of action 25X1
A dramatic reversal of direction after almost four years of commitment to
abertura would, we believe, precipitate a major political crisis. The
administration and most of the body politic would be dramatically
polarized, and divisions could occur within the military. There might arise
a real prospect for violent confrontations between the regime and the
political opposition, convinced it never would be permitted to displace the
military by ballot. 25X1
We believe, therefore, that Figueiredo and the high command would avoid
any quick recourse to authoritarian controls. Instead, they would utilize
existing executive authority vis-a-vis the Congress and the states and some
intimidating tactics-such as threats to cut funding and harassment by the
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security services-to avoid opposition control over the presidential succes-
sion in 1985. At the same time, they would still publicly support an
eventual, phased transfer of power from military to civilian hands
Central to this scenario is the judgment that this strategy would be
supported by the moderate majority of the armed forces. Also intrinsic to
our judgment is its acceptance-albeit with vigorous criticism-by an
opposition victorious at the polls but not yet cohesive enough to obstruct
administration manipulation.
Should this judgment prove incorrect and the views of the moderate
majority not prevail-which, as noted, we believe to be unlikely-there
would be a serious split within the military and ensuing political turmoil.
The hardliners would seek to outmaneuver the moderates, including the
high command, whose basic objective is to return ultimately to the
barracks. Such a split could threaten the viability of the Figueiredo regime
itself. Outside the government, virtually all sectors would press vigorously
for continued progress toward liberalization.
Implications for the How well Brazil addresses basic political issues in the next two to three
United States years will have significant implications for its international image. Unless
the Figueiredo government sets aside the election results, there will be a
general perception in Brazil that the country has achieved greater political
maturity. This outcome will have favorable connotations for Brazil interna-
tionally, particularly in South America, where Figueiredo's abertura
policies have been observed closely.
These questions of confidence and stature carry over into the relationship
with the United States. We believe that Brazil's sense of growing political
maturity and prospects for greater international prestige should contribute
over time to a somewhat more relaxed attitude toward the bilateral
relationship. In fact, relations with the United States have improved
significantly since their low point in the late 1970s, even though important
areas of disagreement persist, particularly in the economic arena.
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Major opposition gains on 15 November, however, could make bilateral
relations more difficult. The opposition could call for more nationalistic
and populist positions on economic issues. Even heightened internal debate
could result in government posturing on international economic issues-
such as global negotiations, developed country trade protectionism, and
high interest rates-to appease domestic critics. This would, in turn,
complicate relations with the international banking community and with
the United States~Thus, banks would probably be increasingly leery about
expanding their loan portfolios to Brazil, foreign investors would become
more hesitant, and discussions of numerous bilateral economic issues with
the US-for instance, on countervailing duties and graduation would
become more contentious 25X1
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