THE BURMESE COMMUNIST PARTY: A POWER IN THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03T02547R000100840001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Directorate of Secret
'`~, Intelligence -. I
 Approved For Release 2007/05/02 : CIA-RDP03TO2547R000100840001-9
Approved For Release 2007/05/02 : CIA-RDP03T02547R000100840001-9
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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Burmese Communist Party:
A Power in the
Golden Triangle
lido motion asuiluhle us of I .loin, /Q,5'
has het , n us e51 in the preparation of tl]is reh5Nt
This paper has been prepared b.
Office of fast :Asian :Anal}sis. Con1111Cnts and queries
are v%elcome and may be addressed to the Chief.
Southeast :Asia I)ivision, O[A,
hhis paper has been coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations and the National Intelligence
Council
Secret
Jim, 14s
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A Power in the
Golden Triangle
The Burmese Communist Party:
Today's Burmese Communist Party is unique among Southeast :Asian
Communist insurgencies.' It was formed entirely by the Chinese after then
President Ne Win began to destroy the original Communist Party in
central Burma. A large part of its early membership was Chinese either
army troops or ethnic groups living inside China. Since [tic reduction of
Chinese support in the mid-I970s, it has depended almost entirely on illicit
drug trade to finance its operations 25
supported antinarcotics programs in the region
Despite likely challenges from rival "liberation" groups and potential
strains from within over the huge amounts of revenue generated by the sale
of opium. we believe the party will continue its steady c~~pansion. More-
over, the party's size, strength, and the remote location ~.)f' its base of
operations will present nearly insurmountable problems for the . S-
Secret
FA X_'-loo's
June' 14X_'
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Figure I
Golden Triangle: Opium Producing Areas and Burmese Communist Parts (B('P) I)eploN meat
Intense poppy cultivation
Less intense poppy cultivation
i % Area of BCP bases
Area of heavy BCP activity
? - Recent penetrations
a
RAN(SOON
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The Burmese Communist Party:
A Power in the
Golden Triangle (u)
Rebirth of the Party While the bulk of the original Burmese Communist Party was being
destroyed by the Burmese Army in the early 1970s, a newly formed party
command was beginning to expand along the Chinese border. Established
by the Chinese after the break in Burmese-Chinese relations in 1907, the
new command consisted primarily of minority groups living in the border
area and several hundred Chinese troops.
allow the Chinese troops to withdraw
( hinese
assistance, the party leadership orgaiii/ed the command into a six-brigade
conventional military force and established administrative control over
much of the remote territory in northeastern Burma. It also established a
presence in central Shan State, and small groups set up :hop in haehin
State and in western Burma. By 1975 the party had grow n large enough to
We believe the party's military arm now consists of 1 2,000 to 14,000
troops- still drawn largely from minority groups and has the potenti,rl
for substantial further growth. Party leaders acknowledge that they lave
been unable to attract support from the ethnic Burmans, who make up
about three-fourths of the country's population. Nevertheless, the h million
minority inhabitants of Burma. who resent ethnic Burman control of the
overnmcnt, constitute a sizable recruiting base for the Conununists.
arms, food, and other goods the Communists xyillingly provide.
Ionic \~ ho
support the Communists are seeking autonomy: others situp y ~varnt the
The Move Into As the Chinese began to cut back their aid to Southeast -\sian insurgencies
Narcotics in the mid- I970s, the Burmese Communist Party was forced to look for ad-
ditional means of support
jade smuggli..g and increased tax collections from hill
tribes are two examples but the most important source of funds has been
opium. By the mid-to-late 1970s, the party had started o encourage and
in some cases demand - poppy cultivation in areas under its domination.
25
25
25~
25
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The party also established links to other Burmese liberation and trafficking
organizations lit has provided
arms to ethnic groups such as the Pa-o Shan State Nationalities Liberation
Group and the Kachin Independence Army in exchange for agreements to
conduct joint operations- -operations that have helped the party expand
control over its opium-producing regions. The Shan United Army (SUA),
the Golden Triangle's largest drug trafficking organization, purchases the
bulk of the party's opium, processes it in refineries along the Thai-Burmese
border, and sells it on the international market
border is heavy. he party is
conscripting villagers to construct a new cross-border road to case the
revenues by taxing the shipment and sale of opium, and it controls the
trade by establishing and managing cooperative stores. In an attempt both
to increase the poppyfields under its control and to curry favor among
opium farmers, the party also provides protection for a price- against
Rangoon's attempts at opium eradication.
The Burmese Communists still receive most of their arms and ammunition
from the Chinese, and trade in foodstuffs and consumer goods across the
Today, through production in its own base area, purchases from allied
groups, and regulation of opium caravans, the party exercises control over
more than two-thirds of the o ium flowing 'olden Triangle.
the party collects
delivery of military supplies
the Chinese prove e sanctuary and training for the party's
Chinese for arms and ammunition.
Ithe operations help pay for Chinese aid.
he Burmese Communists purchase consum-
er goods and industrial diamonds in Thailand and trade them to the
several hundred Burmese Commu-
nists operate in Laos in support of Chinese-backed resistance groups;
The Chinese also benefit from the relationship
Burma," is located on Chinese territory.
troops in China, and the party's radio station, the "Voice of the People of
Increased Military The party has been slowly expanding its territorial control through
Activity guerrilla operations and occasional large, set-piece battles a ainst the
Burmese Army.
the oca press indicates that the 1981-82 dry season brought
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Secret
Figure 2 Figure 3
Burmese Communist Parts Control Southeast Asia's Role in N1 orld Opium
(her Opium I loww Production and Uislrihulion
Directs carav Iii
to Thai border
Pr r;des ccd_
~~tcctii)il II,
piuIII Ii
tic 1, opium to
It Ml,king group1 .1) 1
hrn.uc merchants
S lfIICS 0th Um
,It warehouses.
marketing point,
\1 urld Ilrruin Kcaching
I nilcd Mole. in I9511
4 Metric Ion."
I.uldcu I rianrrly It:,'h
I lpium I'nulurliun I'I\I
h;ll \I ctrir loos
rm;i R to
Itu
ILLEGIB
Purchases crop
tram farmers
some major successes for the Burmese Communist Parts. Late List vc:u- the
party set up a regional command in Kasah State with an e'c tovv:ud
establishing a new smuggling route to the Thai border. More inlport:rnt, it
has moved troops into the Pegu mountain range in central Burma. This lat-
est move is a double threat to the government it Communist presence
there threatens communication between Rangoon and northern Burnra
and. because it is the first Communist movement into the Pegu; since the
elimination of the White Flags in 1975, it will be a major propaganda
victory for the party.
Communists, and logistics in the border area are poor. 25X
I Ithe use over the past few sears of plas.ic antipersonnel 25X
lan mines by insurgent groups has greatly increased government casualtics
Major government counterinsurgency campaigns in the past have checked
Communist advances, but operations this Nair have been ineffective.
the insurgents have ample 2E
warning of government operations because of the Army's poor conlnlunica-
tions security: the Army frequently is unable to engage the Communists at
all. Moreover, the governments weapons are inferior to those of the
and dampened Army morale. 2
ivcs farm~~,.
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Potential Challenges The move into the narcotics business has not been without problems, some
to the Party of which may affect party discipline.1
long-term goal of overthrowing the government in Rangoon.
enormous personal gain may eventually undermine the party's unity and its
party officials are allowed to sell narcotics for personal
profit as long as they pay the required taxes. But the potential for
Rivalry among insurgent groups will grow as the party
ex ands.
the party
wants to increase its involvement in trafficking-now handled primarily by
the SUA. Attempts to take over some of the SUA's operations will not only
result in military clashes but may lead to the defect; n of party
such as the deputy commander with SUA ties.
differences exist
We expect to see strains within the organization when the party's aging po-
litical leadership is replaced. Although we believe the bulk of the party and
its leadership remain firmly pro-Chinese, the defection in 1980 of a Central
Committee member over the party's China policy indicates that some
Implications of In our view, the party should be able to contend with defections from its
Continued Growth ranks and clashes with rival groups because of its strong military organiza-
of the Party tion, its control over Burma's most productive poppyfields, and the
weaknesses of the Burmese Army. As the party continues to grow, it will be
a serious problem for the government. Rangoon will be forced to commit
even greater resources to combat the insurgency resources that arc badly
needed for economic development. Moreover, economic projects designed
to wean the hill tribes away from opium production offer substantially
lower profits for farmers and thus are unlikely to produce results.
I Ithe government has allocated funds for
the purchase of new weapons, but this will have little impact on the
counterinsurgency campaign as long as there are no fundamental improve-
ments in the Burmese Army's intelligence, communications security, and
logistic systems.
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Even though we believe the party cannot now overthrow the government,
growing casualties and a seemingly endless campaign are already causing
strains within the Army and the leadership.1
I I
some officers are complaining that their troops are
reluctant to fight and that there is growing sentiment for a negotiated
solution. But, as during the last two attempts at negotiations, we believe
Burmese Party Chairman Ne Win, who despite his retirement from the
presidency, still makes all major policy decisions, is unlikely to make the
compromises necessary to achieve a truce.
Thai officials also express concern about the party's growth. Although the
Thai have mounted a successful campaign against Thailand's Com mmunist
Party, these officials are worried that the two parties might cooperate in
funneling Chinese aid to That insurgents. The movement of the Burmese
Communists toward the Thai border and the occasional contacts betvk cen
the two parties will heighten Bangkok's concern. We believe that coopera-
tion between the two parties is a real possibility, but its impact over the
short term will be negligible because of the weakened Thai Communist
Party's inability to absorb increased aid even if China provided it.
The US-supported antinarcotics programs in the region will be hindered as
the party increases its control over opium production and attempts to
develop its own trafficking apparatus. Over time, Washington probably
will be asked by the Burmese for additional support in the form of aircraft,
communication equipment, and perhaps weapons, as well as increased
funds for poppy eradication and substitution programs. But the party's
remote location, its powerful military arm, and its continuing close ties to
China will make it virtually impossible to eliminate it from the narcotics
trade
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Appendix
Chronology of the Burmese
Communist Party
1939 Foundedin Rangoon.
Joins the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, a naticnalist coalition
first resisting Japanese occupation, then seeking independence from Great
Britain.
1946 Splits into two factions, the Red Flags and the White Flags. Both groups
are expelled from the AFPFL.
Burma achieves independence from Great Britain.
The overseas branch of the party is formed in Beijing.
Burmese President Ne Win calls for negotiations with all insurgent groups,
including the party, but talks break down after four months.
Burma and China withdraw their ambassadors following anti-Chinese riots
in Rangoon.
The Burmese Army overruns the headquarters of the White Flags in
central Burma. China forms the party's Northeast Command along its
border with Burma.
1970 The Red Flags, located in western Burma, are eliminated by the Burmese
Army.
1970-73 The Northeast Command expands its area of control to encompass much ol'
the northeastern portion of Shan State east of the Salwecn River.
Burma and China renew full diplomatic relations. The "Voice of the
People of Burma," the party's radio station, is established in China.
1975 The remnants of the White Flags are destroyed by the Burmese Army.
1980 Ne Win travels to China to discuss Chinese support to the party. lie agrees
to negotiate with the insurgents.
1981 Negotiations between the government and the party break down after four
months.
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