CHINA REPORT POLITICAL SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 101
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 11, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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JPRS L/9786,
11 June 1981
China Report
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(F.000< 3/81.)
4f.
IFBISI
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JPRS L/9786
11 June 1981
CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 3/81)
CONTENTS
Science, Technology Stressed in Military Command Schools
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 18'Aug 79) ..................................... 1
Ji'nan Unit Forms Complete Set of Training Programs
(Wang Lifeng, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 15 A%ig 79) ................ 3
Air Force Units Test Training Reform
(Du Yuging; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 17 Aug 79) .......................... 6
Articles on Meeting Demands of Modern Naval Warfare
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 19 Aug 79) ..................................... 8
'Enlightening Exercise', by Yu Lansheng
Shortcomings in Training Examined, by Chen Shungen
Port, Coastal Training, by Yang Liren
Problems Affecting Training Reviewed, by Yu Guangxin
Second Artillery Leaders Study for Modernization
(Chen Jinsong; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 28 Aug 79) ....................... 13
Airborne Division Trains New Fighters in Separate Regiment
(Li Yungi, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 30 Aug 79) ................... 15
Air'Regiment Improves Training by Studying Enemy Aircraft
(Jin Zhifu; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 31 Aug 79) ..................... ... 19
Tank.Regiment Decides Man, Not Equipment, Is Key to Victory
(Ping Mingqing; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 31 Aug 79) ...................... 21
Party Members Spur Training in Guided Missile Regiment
(Jiang Huazhou, Guo Qingsheng; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 1 Jul 80) ........ 24
- a - (III - CC - 80 FOLIO]
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Cadres Must Study Warfare in Military Academies
(Fang Hang; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 3 Jul 80) ........................... 26
Leaders Asked To Put Themselves in Subordinates' Shoes
(Zhong Jie, Xian De; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 3 Jul 80) .................. 29
Naval Academy Makes Major Effort To Improve Teaching Content
(He Wei, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 4 Jul 80) ...................... 31
Division Practices Closing Gap in Line Made by Atomic Weapons
(Chen Xiangmin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 4 Jul 80) ....................... 33
Military Research Must Not Be Oversimplified
(Jiang Fangran; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 4 Jul 80) ....................... 35
Troops Must Be Well Educated in Revolutionary Outlook on Life
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 5 Jul 80) ...................................... 37
Younger Officers Supervise Training in Guangxi Border Division
(Su Jing, Wu Shibin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 5 Jul 80) .................. 41
Naval Base Surveys Island-Dotted Operational Sea Area
(Huang Yaonian; JIEFANGJUN BAO,5 Jul 80) ....................... 43
Wargame Exercises Sharpen Shenyang Commanders' Skills
(Yuan Zhanxian, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 6 Jul 80) ................ 44
Division Practices Strategic Mobility on Changjiang River
(Yu Jianhua, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 8 Jul 80) .................. 46
Satchel Charges Can Be Effective Against Tanks
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 8 Jul 80) ...................................... 48
Antiaircraft Division Mechanizes Food Preparation
(Wei Xuding, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) .................. 52
Troops Guard Vital Stretch of Vietnam Border Railroad
(Zhou Nanyou, Wu Jinhua; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 .Jul 80) .............. 56
Division of Shenyang Units Benefits From Night Training
(Chen Xiangmin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) ....................... 58
Fleet Detachment Practices Night Landing Operations
(Xu Nengrong, Zhang Ming; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) ............. 59
Army.Sets Quality Standards for Night Training
(Hong Wei, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) .................... 60
Work on Probationary Party Members Tightened
(Liang Huarong, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Jul 80) ............... 61
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Teaching Reformed at Infantry School of Fuzhou Units
(Yi Caizi, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 80) .................... 63
Artillery School, Regiment Help Each Other in Training
(JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 80) ..................................... 65
All Party Members Must Set Good Examples for Masses
(Ji Nan; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10.Jul 80) .............................. 67
Citizens Exhorted To Become Involved in Country's Affairs
(Wang Yihua; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 10 Jul 80) ......................... 70
'Three Don't Policy' Does Not Preclude Ideological, Political Work
(Hai Xiao, Wang Fa'an; JIEFANGJUNBAO, 10 Jul 80) ............... 72
Further Exploitation of Strategic Nonferrous Metals Urged
(Yu Zhijie; JIEFANGJUN BA09-10 Jul 80 ..........a .............
Witness Report on Operations of Jamming Radar Station
(Wang Changyan, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 6 Feb 81) ............... 79
How To Fight an Enemy With Superior Weapons
(Huang Peiyi; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 6 Feb 81) ......................... 81
PLA Ideological Problem Arising From Policy Change
(Writing Group of the Propaganda Section of the Political
Department of PTA Beijing Units; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 7 Feb 81).... 83
PLA Regiment Carries Out Political Education
(Jun Zheng; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 20 Feb 81) ........................... 87
Strategic Policy of Positive Defense Analyzed
(Hao Junjie; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 20 Feb 81) ......................... 89
Counterattack With Small Detachments Suggested
(Xiong Zhishan; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 20 Feb 81) ...................... 93
Deception Is Regarded as Best Tactic
(Huang Peiyi; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 20 Feb 81) ........................ 95
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SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY STRESSED IN MILITARY COMMAND SCHOOLS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 18 Aug 79 p 1
[Article: "Strive to Cultivate Commanders Who Meet the Requirements of Modern
Warfare"]
[Text] In order to strengthen the teaching in military academies and schools of
modern science and technology, and to cultivate more commanders who meet the re-
quirements of modern warfare, the General Staff Department recently held a meeting
on the teaching and research of modern military science and technology in all PLA
academies and schools. The meeting was attended by leading cadres and instructors
from 43 command academies and schools. The meeting made a preliminary investiga-
tion of the way education is being carried out on modern military science and tech-
nology in the academies and schools, in order to make a good beginning in spreading
the study of modern military science and technology throughout the PLA.
During the period of the meeting, the personnel at the meeting spent 21 days' time
on studying the topics of nuclear weapons, guided missiles, artificial satellites,
lasers, night vision techniques, electronic warfare, military systems engineering,
operations research, electronic computers, and command automation. Everybody unan-
imously reported that the study had broadened their horizons and increased their
knowledge and that big results had been gained, so that when they return to their
organizations they will have a clearer idea of how to teach.
The comrades at the meeting held that the developments of science and technology
are being widely applied on the battlefield, and that it can be affirmed that the
size and scope of a future war will be unprecedentedly large, the conditions on the
battlefield will be more complex and will change even more. All these things, they
said, will impose even higher demands on organizational command. If a commander
does not have a fixed amount of knowledge about modern science and technology and
does not have the capacity for organizational command in conducting operations un-
der modern conditions, then it will be difficult for him to master warfare and he
will not be able to win a victory. Therefore, to cultivate a large batch of com-
manders and technically talented persons who possess knowledge about military
science, who are able to master and use modern weapons and equipment, and who are
able to skillfully organize and command forces in modern warfare, is a strategic
measure for raising the modernization level of our armed forces and is also an ur-
gent, arduous task for the command academies and schools must truly realize the
importance of launching education on military science and technology,
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conscientiously put it on the daily agenda, and plan, arrange, and take measures for
it. They must adopt measures to improve the organizational leadership and teaching
capability of the leading cadres and instructors of these academies and schools.
They must vigorously organize manpower and material to get a grip as quickly as
possible on the teaching of military science and technology.
The meeting also studied the problems of the content, time, teaching structure, and
teaching guarantees for the teaching of modern military science and technology in
the armed forces' academies and schools, for which it put forward some opinions and
suggestions. The meeting held: The content and time for teaching science and tech-
nology should be put into a teaching outline, and the content must be differentiated
based on the different training targets; in the command academies and schools, the
study of cultural education and of science and technology should be integrated,
with the latter being paramount; if ordinary structures cannot specially arrange to
take responsibility for the teaching of science and technology, the responsibility
for the teaching of various topics can be separately borne by the teaching and re-
search sections concerned, but the academies and schools that are cultivating cad-
res at the division level and above can, after permission is granted, set up struc-
tures for teaching science and technology; and with the regard to the problem of
teaching guarantees, besides the solutions devised by the academies and schools at
various levels, the General Staff Department will provide a unified solution of
the problem of new-type weaponry and equipment, teaching films, and jointly using
models and wall charts. The departments concerned will conscientiously study and
solve the above problems.
During the meeting, He Zhengwen, deputy chief of staff [of the PLA General Staff
Department] and Tao Hanzhang [7118 3352 4545], deputy director of the Military
Academy, gave speeches.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 15 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Wang Lifeng [3769 4539 1496], Wang Xiaoling [3769 2556 3781], Guan Jinwu
[7070 6210 2976], and Gu Guangcheng [0657 0342 2052]: "To Carry Out Training Ef-
fectively It Is Necessary To Formulate a Complete Set of Programs"]
[Text] Not long ago, a General Staff work team and leading comrades of the Ji'nan
Units led responsible persons of units concerned to a certain unit to observe part
of a complete set of training programs on the topics of the "three attacks and
three defenses." They held that this approach was correct and feasible and that it
was an effective way to improve training quality.
Why Do We Want Complete Sets?
Party committees at all levels in this unit have all along been fairly attentive
to military training. Last year, in line with the spirit stressed by the military
Comimssion [of the CCP Central Committee] of "giving prominence to training in the
three attacks" and "strengthening training in the "three defenses," the committees
arranged the training content, stipulated the time for completion of the training,
and vigorously imposed demands on the training. Who would have thought that, when
examined at yearend, most of the companies had just gone through the motions of
training in the "three attacks and three defenses" and that some of them had even
not completed the training in the prescribed time. What was the problem: Four
leading comrades assigned by the party committees led a work team to carry out in-
vestigation and research in the unit. A great number of facts showed that the
cadres and fighters of the companies wanted to be trained effectively in the "three
attacks and three defenses," and only owing to the fact that some of the training
contents and methods did not meet the requirements of modern warfare, and that for
some training contents the upper levels did not have enough time to put forward
specific methods for organizational implementation so that there was a shortage in
instructional written materials, equipment, and personnel, the companies did things
haphazardly and the "three attacks and three defenses' training could not be car-
ried out properly. At the beginning of this year, when the unit's party committee
was studying how to shift.the focus of its work so that education and training
would be at the center, it got in touch with reality and conscientiously discussed
the problems existing in the unit's "three attacks and three defenses" training.
The members of the committee unanimously held that training in the unit and educa-
tion in a school were the same, i.e., there must be a complete set of training
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programs for the contents of instruction, the methods of implementation, the sup-
ply of equipment, the ranks of instructors, and the standards of examination, and
that only if each is linked to the other can the training be done rapidly and with
high quality. Everybody decided to start by formulating a complete set of training
programs and thus effectively carry out training in the "three attacks and throe
defenses."
How Does One Form a Complete Set?
How was a complete set to be formulated? First of all, the party committee organ-
ized leading cadres at all levels to engage in study so that all of them became
clear about the importance of effectively carrying out "three attacks and three de-
fenses" training, and about the task of and demand for formulating a complete set
of training programs; following this, the committee formed joint work teams that
separately went to three companies, where one training topic was assigned to one
squad or platoon, which acted as an experimental point for the topic. For example,
in attacking tanks, what training contents and skills does a fighter need to study
and master? How many classes should these contents be divided into? How much time
is needed for each class? Who is qualified to teach each class? What standards
should be attained? After this research, teaching plans were written and put into
practice. During the practice, the leaders and the masses linked up with each other
in both doing the work and appraising it through discussion. After finding methods,
the squad or platoon became a demonstration unit and demonstrated the instruction
throughout the company, allowing all members of the company to appraise the instruc-
tion through discussion. Then it was again enriched and revised, and finally ex-
amined and revised by the joint work team. Of the prototypes produced by this ex-
perimental point training, 22 were formed into a complete set. Afterward, an
on-the-spot meeting was held at which the cadres and backbone elements observed a
training demonstration of the complete set of programs, so that the results of the
experience gained at these points were brought to their attention.
Through this work, enthusiasm was aroused throughout the unit for the complete set
of training programs for the "three attacks and three defenses." And once the
masses got moving, many problems that they had previously thought hard to solve
were keenly welcomed and solved.
Were there no teaching materials? Everybody was bold in practice, "you compile one
set, I will write several articles," and very quickly 29 sets were compiled and a
total of over 1,700 copies were distributed to the squads.
Was there a shortage of instructors? The leaders at all levels did not rely upon
others but set to work themselves. They conducted 49 training classes for 1,921
cadres and teaching backbone elements.
Were there no equipment or sites? The party committee allocated funds and materi-
als. After it distributed 450 pieces of 10 kinds of antitank equipment, everybody
set to work, using indigenous methods in place of foreign ones, to level hilltops
and fill in ditches, and in less than half a year had solved this problem.
Originally, because some of the topics in the "three attacks and three defenses"
training did not have specific standards, some comrades felt that the "standards
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were soft" and no one could tell whether the training was good or not. In line
with the demands of actual warfare, everybody set standards one by one, so that the
next training session would have goals and the upper level had a basis for its
examinations.
Now the training programs for the "three attacks and three defenses" topics form
a complete set, and all training detachments basically have reached a point at
which there are teaching materials to learn from, instructors to teach, models to
view, equipment and sites for training, and standards for making appraisals.
The Advantages of a Complete Set of Training Programs
More than half a year of practice has proven that there are many advantages in a
complete set of training programs, and of them three are most obvious:
1. It is systematic and regular. Originally, because this or that was lacking,
and there was no complete set, and there was not well-planned arrangements and
strict demands on the leadership, the next training session had nothing to follow
and each person was forced to go his own way and everyone was "fighting as a guer-
rilla." The result was that the training plan was constantly changing and the
essential movements were of a wide variety. Now, the key elements in training--
teaching materials, equipment, sites, and standards--are unified, and the entire
training is conducted like it would be in a regular school, i.e., it is planned, it
is in proportion, and it progresses in an orderly fashion.
2. Training quality is assured. Because the training content, methods, and mater-
ials approximate actual warfare, the antiaircraft training is not abstract and the
antitank training is substantive, so that the "three defenses" are not just paper
exercises. This has changed the "soft standards" that some comrades saw in the
"three attacks and three defenses" into hard standards. Wen Zhaoyue [3306 0340
1971], commander of the 7th Company of a certain regiment, gave me a statistic:
Last year, the days kept in reserve and the after-class time were devoted to train-
ing in firing, throwing hand grenades, and operating instruments. This year, be-
cause the cadres had scope and the fighters had time for training, 90 percent and
more of the comrades conscientiously trained in the "three attacks and three de-
fenses" during the days kept in reserve and the after-class time, and thus the
quality of the training improved markedly. For example, in mine-laying training,
the company, on average, exceeded the regular standard of excellence by 57 seconds.
3. The longstanding situation in which at the squad level and below the training
topics were shifted about has been. done away with, and the tactical and technical
levels have been raised from top to bottom. Previously, the cadres at all levels
spent their time training individual soldiers and squads, and from the beginning
of each year they put off their own training, which did not suit the requirements
of combat preparedness. This year, after the training programs were formed into a
complete set, there were people to teach all the classes and all levels were as-
signed to teach, so that the leaders at all levels were released for their own
training and they had the energy and time to give combined arms training to cadres,
headquarters, and those at the battalion level and above.
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AIR FORCE UNITS TEST TRAINING REFORM
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 17 Aug 79 p 1
[Article by Du Yuqing [2659 5940 7230]: "Meet the Demands of Modern Warfare,
Firmly Grasp Flight Training Reform"]
[Excerpts] The Air Force recently held a training reform on-the-spot meeting at a
certain air division, at which the experiences of 17 experimental-point units were
popularized and the problem of how to further carry out well training reform was
studied.
In the past, Air Force flight training basically continued to use the set of methods
devised by the Soviet Union in the 1950's. Following the development of the situa-
tion and the improvement of weapons and equipment, some training contents and train-
ing methods no longer met the demands of modern warfare and urgently needed to be
reformed. The Air Force party committee has paid full attention to this problem.
At the beginning of the year, the committee, relating to actual conditions in the
Air Force, put forward tentative plans for the training reform and decided on ex-
perimental-point units for the reform. The principal responsible comrades of the
Air Force personally examined and approved the training reform plan, regularly un-
derstood its implementation, and timely discovered and solved problems in the
reform.
Each experimental-point unit, proceeding from the requirements of actual warfare,
carried out training in daylight under low-visibility weather conditions, in night-
time under complex weather conditions, in landing with two engines, in landing
without lights, and in operations with a tactical background, as well as training
in the "four fast's" (fast takeoff, fast muster for flight, fast contact with and
attack on the enemy, and fast return to base), so that the flyers and flying cadres
are able to operate under all sorts fo complex conditions, to attack accurately,
to understand tactics, and to exercise command, thereby improving the units' fight-
ing capacity.(2) We must carry out the reform based on present conditions, putting
the focus on the tactical and technical levels of flyers. We must, through con-
scientious research on the performance and principal tactical measures of enemy
aircraft, conduct training with simulated enemy aircraft against a tactical back-
ground, summing up a set of methods that overcome the enemy's weak points with our
strong points, so as to raise everybody's confidence in an operational skills for
defeating the enemy.
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Training reform is also a profound ideological revolution. Each unit paid full
attention to doing good ideological work during the reform. The units principally
solved problems in three aspects: One was to solve the problem of the idea of being
afraid to take risks. Some comrades had set training reform against flying safety,
worrying that the carrying out of the reform would cause plane crashes. After the
leaders of each experimental point unit clearly stated the advantageous conditions
and goals of the training reform, everybody realized that the goal of the reform
is to make the training better conform to objective laws and better meet the re-
quirements of actual warfare. If the reform is carried out well, the training will
be more scientifically organized, the technical and tactical levels of the flyers
will be raised, and thus safety will be reliably insured. At the same time, the
leaders educated everybody to understand that the reform probes and blazes new
trails so that there is a possibility of new problems arising. This is not strange:
in science, for any invention or progress a certain price must be paid. Our re-
sponsibility is to see that each training item is done as carefully and as well as
is possible and to try to reduce unnecessary losses. The second problem to solve
was the idea of passively waiting. They educated everybody to rely on the equip-
ment and facilities on hand, to learn assiduously and study with great effort, and
to enthusiastically carry out and support the training reform. The third problem
to be solved was the idea of fearing hardship and fatigue. Each experimental
point unit made a point of educating everybody to establish the idea of hard mil-
itary training. The goal of the reform is to amek the training better conform to
the demands of actual warfare. The requirements of actual warfare mean great dif-
ficulty and require great strength, and we must firmly complete our missions.
Owing to the fact that the party committees at all levels strengthened their ideo-
logical leadership over training reform, the cadres and fighters maintained a
vigorous fighting morale.
After over 7 months of practice, the Air Force training reform has already dis-
played its superiority: flying time has greatly increased, and flying is not de-
layed by weather; the time for second takeoffs is shortened; prominence is given
to tactical training, so that the flyers and flying cadres are able, under all
sorts of complex conditions, "to operate, attack accurately, understand tactics,
and exercise command" and the fighting:capacity of the units has been markedly
improved; the time that the ground crew is on the airfield is shortened, which has
lightened the labor strength needed; aircraft utilization rate and aircraft main-
tenance have been improved, so that the number of aircraft sorties has increased
by 60 percent and the aircraft maintenance capacity has been approximately doubled;
and the political education of flying and ground personnel, the study of occupa-
tional techniques, and the time for CC:P and CYL activity has been better insured
than in the past. The cadres and fighters reported: "This reform of the training
is in the right direction, its approach is feasible, its effect is marked, and it
is a model for combat preparedness."
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ARTICLES ON MEETING DEMANDS OF MODERN NAVAL WARFARE
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2
'Enlightening Exercise'
[Article by Yu Lansheng [0151 5663 3932] of the North [China] Sea Fleet Headquar-
ters: "Looking at the Weak Points in Training From the Angle of an 'Enlightened
Exercise'']
[Text] Recently our unit organized an exercise at sea, one part of which was
electronic jamming, which partially reflected electronic jamming in naval warfare
under modern conditions. Because the body of cadres have basically not been
trained in electronic jamming during peacetime, the commanders and radar personnel
on the warships were at a loss under conditions of a radar blackout. The comrades
said that this operation at sea under modern conditions was an "enlightening
exercise."
Thus "enlightening exercise" enlightened the comrades of our organization to con-
sider the following questions: What are the new features of naval warfare under
modern conditions? Do the units pay full attention to these new features? On what
level is the training now? Analyzing these questions, we could not but see that,
with regard to the new features? of naval warfare, the greater part of the units are
still in the state of being enlightened and some are even still in the state of
ignorance. This problem should draw a high degree of attention at all levels.
In modern warfare, in addition to electronic jamming, a guided missile attack is an
important feature. Attacks by various types of guided missiles have already become
the main patterns of attacks by Soviet warships and warplanes. How to defend
against or evade guided missile attacks and how to lower the probability of guided
missile hits have become a new topic for our operations at sea and a key point of
our training. However, in the current anti-guided missile training, many units
have not touched upon this problem, and some of them even think there is no way at
all to defend against guided missiles with the equipment on hand,; and, because of
this, defense against guided missiles has become a weak point, even a gap, in
training.
A modern navy is the epitome of the three service arms: in the air there are
torpedo-carrying aircraft, on the sea there are all types of warships and under the
sea there are submarines, and coastal defence has coast-to-ship guided missiles,
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making modern naval warfare three-dimensional. Therefore, raising the capacity
for coordinated operations will unite and combine the service arms so that a "fist"
can be formed in operations at sea. In the past several years, the basic training
of units has been greatly strengthened, but the training at sea in tactical coord-
ination has remained at a low level, and there have been many preset and map school
assignments but few live exercises. Even if there are some exercises at sea, the
movements were coordinated at rigidly set times and places so that the exercises
were carried out according to a fixed pattern. This was very far from meeting the
demands of modern naval warfare. Defense against atomic warfare and chemical war-
fare is also one of our weak links in training. Therefore, if we want to make our
training meet the demands of modern naval warfare, turning weak points in the
training into strong points, we must change the guiding ideology behind the train-
ing, and from top to bottom strengthen research on the new features of modern naval
warfare. If we do this we will not lose out in a future war.
This "enlightened exercise" also forced us to seek methods based on the equipment
on hand and to answer new questions posed by modern naval warfare. Practice proved
that only by being bold in practice and daring to innovate can training focusing on
the new features be carried out well. For example, when beginning to train in
resisting electronic jamming, the units had no way to set about this task. After
searching, many units have summed up many good methods, e.g., the radar uses methods
of irregular fanned-out searches and concealed tracking, shortening the time for
sending out search waves and reducing the opportunities for enemy reconnaissance
to discover the radar, etc. All these methods are fairly effective. In fact, in a
modern local war, like the October 1973 Middle East Naval war, owing to a solid
foundation of peacetime training, The Israeli Navy's guided missile ships in two
battles successfully evaded the attacks by guided missiles launched by Egyptian
and Syrian guided missile ships and with small-caliber fast-firing cannot shot the
guided missiles out of the sky. The Egyptian and Syrian guided missile ships
lacked the ability to conceal themselves from attack and had not been trained in
resisting electronic jamming, so that during these battles they suffered heavy
losses. From this we can see that the idea that nothing can be done with the equip-
ment on hand is harmful. We must bestir ourselves, establish confidence, and vigor-
ously study the new features of modern naval warfare, search for new ways to reform
training, and improve our training.
Shortcomings in Training Examined
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Chen Shungen [3088 7311 2704] of the Naval Political Department: "Where
Is the Pace of Training Reform Slow?"]
I once covered a story on two headquarters organizations, where, discussing train-
ing reform, I encountered two different situations. One situation was that the
discussions were convincing and the questions dealt with causes. Originally the
commander of this unit was not very anxious about the unit's training quality. He
made training the central work and went all out in studying the unit's training
problems, and also personally led the naval formations in many exercises at sea.
From the map training assignments of the headquarters organization to attack
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training at sea, he worked with the organization and trained with the unit. For
the new problems of resisting electronic jamming and anti-guided missile warfare,
he sought some ways of coping with the Soviet Navy's special mixed formations.
However, in the other headquarters organization, when talking about training re-
form, many comrades shook their heads and said that it was "hard to do." Where
was the difficulty? The difficulty was that those who held primary responsibility
in the headquarters organization did not put their main effort into grasping train-
ing. They did not take part in any of the unit's several exercises at sea but put
their deputies in charge of these exercises. In the exercises many problems ap-
peared, which the commander did not pay attention to, and the organization and unit
became very worried. This illustrates a problem: if some of those who hold pri-
mary responsibility in the administration of the armed forces make an effort to
grasp training and some do not, there will be great differences in the quality of
training in units. In some units of the navy, much is said about training reform
and little is done, and this is the problem.
If those who hold primary responsibility in the administration of the armed forces
do not grasp training, this will cause many difficulties in the carrying out of
training reform by organizations and units. Generally speaking, some major reforms
can be effected just at the nod of the head by one holding primary responsibility.
However, owing to the fact that those holding primary responsibility do not con-
cretely grasp training, in a given unit's training, with regard to existing prob-
lems, tendencies that need to be corrected, new situations that arise, major re-
forms, and strategic and tactical research, they don't know what is going on and
do not put forward good positions on the reform, and the opinions put forward about
the reform by the units are like stones dropping into the sea, i.e., they disap-
pear forever. And for some things about which the situation has changed, they
issue repeated injunctions for the unit to train in these things, which causes the
unit's training to cover old ground and makes it difficult for enthusiasm to be
aroused for training reform in the unit and organization.
To stress the grasping of training by those holding responsibility in the adminis-
tration of the armed forces is especially important for the technical arms.of the
navy.
Naval warfare under modern conditions involves scientific knowledge concerning
electronics, navigation, optics, guided missiles, and meteorology, and imposes
higher demands on naval commanders at all levels then on those in other branches
of the armed forces. However, we cannot but see that the foundation of some com-
manders is not very solid, and there is not much remaining from what they had
learned in the past. Some cadres have taken part in naval warfare, but the scale
of warfare at that time was small and the enemy's weapons were backward. But our
future adversary is the modernized fleet of a superpower with respect to which our
experience is insufficient. The new conditions of modernized naval warfare urgent-
ly require that the principal commanders at each level personally grasp training
and relearn things, study the equipment functions and the operational methods of
both the enemy and ourselves, continually recognize the new features of modern
naval warfare, and in peacetime leadership training obtain the right to speak at
and in wartime command obtain the capacity to engage in modernized naval warfare.
The quicker these ideas and actions are passed along, the quicker will be the pace
of training reform in the units.
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Port, Coastal Training
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Yang Liren [2799 4409 0088], chief of staff of a certain mosquito
boat detachment: "A Training Slogan That Should Be Restored"]
Early in the initial period of the building of the navy, the training slogan "ardu-
ous training in ports and along coasts means precision training at sea" was raised,
and many warship units set up port and coast training sections in order to lay a
solid foundation for training at sea. However, in the past several years this
traditional effective training method has been discarded. After the "gang of four"
was smashed, every unit stressed hard training at sea. Obviously, this was good,
but there appeared another phenomenon, viz, the units' time and frequency in the
pursuit see training made them neglect arduous training in ports and along the
coast. Of the many port and coast training sections, some became shorthanded and
merely decorative. Thus, the warships at sea went around in circles and the train-
ing was not very effective.
Practice proves that arduous port and coast training not only provides the founda-
tion for training at sea but also is a fairly big topic for studying and tackling
difficulties. Our detachment has a mosquito boat battalion [dadui 1129 7130] that,
with regard to the training topic of attacking radar, could never solve problems in
this regard owing to its limited time at sea. Last year a port and coast radar
teaching and training section was set up, which brought together many outstanding
radarmen who simulated a guided missile attack at sea. Thus, the difficulties in
this topic were overcome.
By advocating "arduous training in ports and along coasts means precision training
at sea," fuel will be saved and the wear and tear on instruments and main engines
will be reduced, thus being advantageous for the maintenance of the navy's combat
effectiveness.
At present, the port and coast training sections of foreign navies have been de-
veloped to a relatively modernized level. We should make a point of assimilating
the advanced methods of foreign armed forces, and, along with innovations in naval
equipment, gradually set up some "training centers" and training points" to improve
the equipment used in automated and simulated training, and thereby enhance the
role of the training sections.
Problems Affecting Training Reviewed
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 19 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Yu Guangxin [0060 1639 2450], deputy section head in the political
department of a certain fleet: "Temporary Shortage of Technical Mainstays Affects
Training Quality"]
Naval warship units commonly encounter a problem in training: the temporary short-
age of technical mainstays, the insufficient number of training instructors, and
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the low level of cadres assigned to provide instruction seriously affects the im-
provement of training quality. The reasons for the temporary shortage of technical
mainstays, besides being the disruption and destruction of Lin Biao and the "gang
of four," are problems in our work. One problem is carelessness in selecting and
promoting technical mainstays; the second problem is that technical mainstays are
handled recklessly, with some units not treasuring technical mainstays who have
genuine talent and rashly demobilizing or specializing them or changing their oc-
cupations; and the third problem is that the technical cadres have no outlet, with
some technical cadres who have been in their posts for a long time, owing to the
remuneration for their posts being lower than that of administrative workers who
had joined up at the same time as they did, commonly not keeping their minds on
technical work, so that the leadership has to transfer them to another post. All
of this has created a weakness in the technical ranks.
The navy is a highly technical branch of the armed forces. In order to conform to
this feature, foreign navies pay full attention to fostering and accumulating tech-
nically talented persons. For this reason, the Soviet armed forces put into effect
the warrant officer system. Warrant officers are not military officers, but they
enjoy a status and material remuneration close to those of military officers, and
they are usually assigned to such posts as chiefs of noncommissioned officers,
team leaders in ordnance, torpedo, or electromechanical departments, and radar
team leaders. The French Navy also pays full attention to keeping technically
talented persons, and their time in such posts as chief of noncommissioned officers
or department heads can be longer than that of a ship captain and their remunera-
tion is comparatively high.
The training departments of many units have put forward the idea that improving
unit training quality is not only a question of reforming the training content and
methods but also a question of how the leadership and political departments at all
levels handle technical cadres. The solution of the problem of insufficient tech-
nical strength in a given unit should be listed as an important item on the daily
agenda. The promotion, transfer, and handling of technical mainstays must proceed
from what is of benefit to the unit's training and operations, must be done through
long-range plans and strict checkups, so that the unit from beginning to end will
maintain a technical contingent equal to any task. Looking at the actual situation,
there are in the cadre establishment, system, and treatment now in effect many dif-
ficulties for keeping technical cadres, and their treatment is ripe for necessary
reforms. For example, couldn't technical cadres not be restricted by their posts
and their grades and their remuneration be increased and improved according to
their length of service? Can't the service age of technical cadres on warships be
taken into consideration and restrictions on this age be appropriately relaxed?
The navy and the army are different; to train a technical commander requires a
fairly long time. The maximum service age of a destroyer captain or a submarine
captain is 40, but this is precisely the period when they are most technically
skilled and most highly experienced. Obviously, a reform of the cadre system will
have a bearing on the overall situation and needs to be comprehensively considered
by the Military Commission [of the CCP Central Committee], but all levels should
pay full attention to the problem of how to maintain technical strength.
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.SECOND ARTILLERY LEADERS STUDY FOR MODERNIZATION
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 28 Aug 79 p 1
[Article by staff reporter Chen Jinsong [7115 6855 2646]: "Leading Cadres of 2d
Artillery Resolutely Study Modern Military Knowledge"]
[Text] The leading cadres of the 2d Artillery, who are resolutely studying modern
military science and technology and the specialized knowledge pertaining to their
service arm, in a little over a year have obtained marked results.
Since March of last year, the leading cadres of the 2d Artillery have set aside
half a day's time every week for studying modern military science and technology
including specialized knowledge pertaining to their service arm, and have set up a
name and attendance system. On the study day, normally no meetings are arranged,
no appointments for talks are made, and no documents are read, so that they can con-
centrate on study.
For over 1 year, the leading comrades of the 2d Artillery invited leaders and sci-
entists and technical personnel of the professional departments of the organization
and research institutes to lecture on the function, features, structure, and diffi-
culties in training of several pieces of weaponry and equipment of this service
arm and on general management knowledge, as well as specialized basic knowledge
such as military meteorology, earth cartography, and data computation. They were
briefed on the present state of development of foreign armies' weapons and equip-
ment, and, relating this to the reality of the units, studied the application in
their service arm of Comrade Mao Zedong's strategic and tactical thought. Many
leading comrades left their own units and went to training grounds, where they ob-
served equipment and drills, held symposiums, and modestly requested instruction
from basic-level cadres and fighters. In the past several months they also, side
by side with cadres at and above the organizational department head level, studied
modern scientific and technological knowledge pertaining to electronic calculators,
automated command, electronic warfare, infrared rays, and lasers. In every class
session, two persons with primary responsibility in military administration re-
mained laymen and arrived on time to attend the class. After class, some leading
comrades went to the training departments to get reprints of the lecture course
materials, and, relating to the features of their service arm, further studied and
digested what they had learned. They said: We older comrades shoulder a very
heavy burden on the march toward the modernization of national defense. If our
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minds are not regularly stocked with some new things, we will not be able to keep
up. The masses responded: "The senior officers have set a good example for us.
We youths must even more wholeheartedly and intensively study for modernization."
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AIRBORNE DIVISION TRAINS NEW FIGHTERS IN SEPARATE REGIMENT
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 30 Aug 79 p 1
[Article by Li Yunqi [2621 0061 6386] et al: "A Certain Airborne Division Achieves
Initial Success in Trial Setup of Regiment for Training New Soldiers"]
[Text] The specific method is: Take a given regiment, retain its
original organizational system, cadres, and squad leaders, and send
its veteran cadres, as an organization, to another infantry regi-
ment. Take the new soldiers in other regiments and concentrate
them in the given regiment for training, and then after a period
of 1 year has passed since the new fighters had entered the ranks,
send them back to their original units.
A certain airborne division, starting in March of this year, started an experimental
point for carrying out a reform of its training system, and has already obtained in-
itial success. The division leadership took the new fighters in the infantry regi-
ments of the division and concentrated them in an organizational system regiment
for training, while another infantry regiment concentrated its energy on training
veteran fighters, thereby solving the problem of training new and veteran soldiers
by "cooking them in one pot" and "cutting with one stroke of the knife," and ac-
celerating the pace of training.
This division's reform of its training system was arranged by the higher level,
and the specific method is: A regiment retains its organizational system and all
the cadres, squad leaders, cooks, and the four kinds of personnel in company head-
quarters (clerical and ordnance personnel, communications personnel, medical per-
sonnel, and supply personnel) of the regiment, and the regiment's veteran fighters
are put, as an organizational unit, into another infantry regiment (in this way,
if war should break out, they can rapidly return to the parent organization), and
the new soldiers of the other regiments are concentrated in the one regiment for
training. One year after the new soddiers had enlisted, they are returned to their
original unit. Over 5 months of practice has proved that this reform has many
merits.
It is of advantage in increasing the degree of difficulty in training veteran
fighters. In the past, when new and veteran fighters were mixed together and the
time and content of their training was the same, "the new soldiers got more than
they could handle and the veteran soldiers didn't get enough to satisfy them."
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Year after year, the unit's training was stuck at the level of "firing by the
numbers and tactics being confined to the squad." This year, after the new and
veteran fighters began to be trained separately, the veteran fighters did not
start from the point at which new fighters began training, and difficulties in
technical and tactical training were added. Once firing began they carried out
applied training, and, proceeding from the requirements of actual warfare, prac-
ticed individual gun battle fire at night. Every veteran fighter trained in firing
the four kinds of weapons of a company. During the firing, they changed the "three
fixed" (fixed distance, fixed rear sight, and fixed aiming point) to the "three
nonfixed"--(self-estimation of distance, self-setting of the rear sight and self-
firing of the aiming point)--simulating their actions under conditions of the
"three defenses." Their training focuses on attacking tanks. They train in attack-
ing tanks with the five weapons commonly used by infantry, including rocket launch-
ers, mines, and bangalore torpedoes. The artillerymen and rocket launcher soldiers
set a standard of hitting the target with their first round, and the first-round
hit rate has reached 80 percent and above, with the highest being 96 percent. They
also have assimilated the experiences of the war of self-defensive counterattack
against Vietnam, training in burying and removing mines and in learning how to
read and use maps, in using natural objects to distinguish directions, and in mov-
ing accordingly to the azimuth. Parachute training now covers low-attitude and
formation jumps. Tactical training starts with company-level topics. At the end
of July, the tactical topics of company and battalion attacking and defending had
been completed, and company-level tactics had been reformed so that the tactic of
making attacks on infantry primary was changed to the tactic of making attacks on
groups of tanks primary. Before the end of October, the tactical training topics
had been completed and the divisional airborne tactical training exercise had been
carried out. The fast rate of progress and the good quality of this training had
not been seen in the division's training records for many years. The officers and
men said: This time the problem of giving the veteran soldiers enough training to
satisfy them was solved.
It is advantageous for strengthening the basic training of new fighters. In former
years, when the new and veteran soldiers were mixed together, the cadres and main-
stays could not put all their energy into training new soldiers, and they also
could not hold up the rate of progress for the new fighters. This was detrimental
to the basic training of the new fighters. Now that the regiment for training new
soldiers has been formed, from squad leader to regimental commander, from company
to organization, the key points stand out and the guiding ideology is clear-cut,
so that they concentrate their energy on getting a good grip on the basic training
of new soldiers. Moreover, owing to the fact that the troops are of the same kind,
that the training topics are of the same kind, that the training time and safe-
guards are of the same kind, it is easy to unify the teaching methods, to unify
examinations and checkups, and to organize revolutionary competitions. For every
new training topic, the regiment brings its cadres and mainstays together for group
training in teaching methods so as to improve the cadres' ability to be teachers.
Up to the first 10 days of August, 9 of these group training sessions had been
held, with a total attendance of 580. After the training in every topic is com-
pleted, according to the standards for examinations and checkups, those who meet
the demands advance to the next topic, step by Step laying a firm foundation in
basic training and thus universally improving the quality of the training topics.
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The rate of excellents in practicing light weapon firing was raised by 20 percent
over that of last year; the training in attacking tanks and in the "three defenses"
increased in difficulty; in parachute training, every new fighter completed 12 jump
missions, from unarmed to full pack, from daytime to nighttime, from high altitude
to low altitude, from familiar level terrain to unfamiliar complex terrain, and
from single aircraft jumps to formation jumps. The frequency and difficulty of the
training exceeded those of former years.
It is advantageous for giving prominence to the key point---cadre training. Al-
though this division in the past frequently shouted that cadre training was the
key point, owing to the fact that the troop training was "tactics at the squad
level," the cadres' capacity for organizational command could not be improved.
This year, after the reform of the training system, tactical training was carried
out from the company straight up to the division, and in this way commanders at
each level had the opportunity to temper themselves in the tactics of organization-
al command at their own level. Now, cadres at the battalion level and below learn
tactical organizational command at their own levels, and the company and platoon
cadres also learn how to command at the next higher level and their test results,
on average, have been good or better. At the same time, after the new and veteran
soldiers were trained separately, the cadres did not need to consider training
both of them as they did in former years and the time for their own training was
insured. Since the beginning of this year, the division has conducted every month
a training session for senior officers of the division and its regiments and for
the divisional headquarters, and the regiments have a training session every month
for cadres at the battalion level and below, each session lasting 7 days, each ses-
sion lasting 5 to 7 days, thereby strengthening the study of enemy armies and the
mastery of the knowledge pertaining to the service arms of our army. The senior
officers of the division and its regiments now have a good idea of the main estab-
lishment and operational features of enemy units at the division level and below,
and the cadres at battalion level and below have a good idea of the main estab-
lishment and operational features of the enemy units at battalion level and below.
Cadres at all levels have a good idea of the establishment equipment, and princi-
ples of using the service arms under their command, viz, communications, antichem-
ical warfare, engineer, and artillery. Staff officers and cadres at battalion level
and below have learned how to use the two radio communications instruments--the
walky-talky and the transmitter-receiver--and have become proficient in the skills
of reading and using maps and of advancing according to the azimuth. He Guanglei
[0149 0342 4320], 1st Battalion commander, and Yang Zhaoli [2799 0340 0448], deputy
commander of the 3d Company, of a certain regiment both said with deep understand-
ing: Having been trained this way, if once we have an airborne combat mission, we
will be more realistic in commanding our units in combat.
After this airborne division reformed its training system, some problems arose,
e.g., how the basic-level cadres of the new soldier training regiment are to be
selected, etc, that are awaiting study and solution in later practice.
Scientific Training Reform
Special Project 20 Aug 79 p 1
[Editor's postscript: "Training Reform Can Become More of a "Scientific Experiment']
17
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[Text] The first edition of this paper on 21 March published as its lead item a
set of proposals for reforming training. Today, we happily see that a certain
airborne division has already experimented with this problem by setting up a trial-
poing new soldier training regiment. Although this method awaits further tests in
practice, it is, in the final analysis, a gratifying step forward for a solution of
this problem. Training new and veteran soldiers together, like "cooking in one
pot," was felt to be a longstanding, big, and difficult problem. To reform the
training system by providing separate training for new and veteran soldiers was an
idea that had long been discussed informally. Why was the solution of this prob-
lem so slow in coming? One important reason was that this solution remained at
the level of meetings and was verbalized but not put into practice.
Some comrades, once they heard talk about changing the training system, shut their
eyes and thought that this reform would not be feasible and that reform was diffi-
cult to do, "study, study and again speak," and so in a twinkling 3 or 5 years, 10
or 8 years passed. Now, in training, some proposals and plans for solving this
longstanding, big, and difficult problem are stuck at this point. The enthusiasm
of the great numbers of officers and men for reforming training is very high, their
demands are very urgent, and they have proposed many suggestions and plans. How
should we deal with these opinions of the masses? The best support for the enthus-
iasm and creativity of the masses is to do things as this certain division (air-
borne) did. After receiving approval from the higher authorities, within the
scope of its powers, it made some "scientific experiments" in a planned way.
Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth. In the last analysis, what opin-
ions are good? What methods are feasible? How can training be advantageous to
raising the fighting capacity of units? The answer is: by not being hindered in
practice from distinguishing right from wrong, making tests and correcting errors,
seeking solutions, and afterward accepting or rejecting suggestions and then spread-
spreading the accepted suggestions over a whole area from one point. In this way
the enthusiasm of the leadership and the enthusiasm of the masses will be combined,
the revolutionary spirit and the scientific attitude will be combined, and we will
be able to quicken the pace of training reform, so that the training will soon be
put on the right track.
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AIR REGIMENT IMPROVES TRAINING BY STUDYING ENEMY AIRCRAFT
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Aug 79 p 1
[Article by Jin Zhifu [6855 1807 4395]: "Become Familiar With Enemy Aircraft Per-
formance, Rigorously Train in Aerial Combat Skills"]
[Text] A certain regiment of the [PLA] Air Force has earnestly studied enemy air-
craft, thus strengthening its training focus and obtaining good results in training.
At the beginning of this year, this regiment switched to tactical training. At the
beginning, owing to the fact that its study of enemy aircraft was insufficient it
only thought of making more flights, which divorced tactical training from the de-
mands of actual warfare. For example, the tail cannon on an enemy bomber is strong
in firepower and long in firing range, but some flyers still chose the method of
hot pursuit for attacking the bomber. This made the regimental party committee
think: if we want good tactical training, we must earnestly study enemy aircraft;
otherwise, the training will be like "a blind man riding a blind horse," effort
will be wasted and the training will not be useful in actual warfare. Therefore,
in tactical training, they organized the unit to earnestly launch activities of
studying enemy aircraft. In the regiment time was focused, and they asked depart-
ments concerned at higher levels and comrades who had taken part in air force tac-
tical training to come to the unit and brief it on the enemy's battle array, the
performance of his main long-range bombers, the performance of his guided missiles,
the performance of his main fighter planes, and his tactical methods. They hung on
walls all sorts of wall charts pertaining to enemy aircraft for the comrades to
refer to during their study, and also in timely fashion transmitted to the flyers
materials on the enemy's situation issued by higher levels. During the study, when
a question was encountered that could not be made clear, they conscientiously or-
ganized everyone for a discussion until the question was understood. When the fly-
ers were studying the tactical features of enemy missile-carrying aircraft, the com-
mittee focused the study on the features of the guided missile's movement in flight
under specific conditions, e.g., the speed of the guided missile when fired from
the aircraft is slow at first and fast later, gradually picking up speed; the en-
emy guided missiles are adapted for operating at a fixed distance and not for close
combat; the target hit rate for the guided missiles is high at a high altitude and
low at a low altitude; the guided missiles on enemy aircraft are guided by radar,
and a target higher than the enemy aircraft is easily hit while a target lower
than the enemy aircraft, because surface interference to its radar is great, cannot
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be easily hit, etc. On the basis of a detailed study of these features, they
studied the tactical measures we should adopt, viz, close combat, flying at low
altitudes, and flying lower than the enemy aircraft in order to deal with them.
The flyers reacted by saying: This kind of training has a definite object in view
so that there are definite tactics in mind to use and not use.
After realizing the enemy's strong points and weak points, there appeared in this
regiment this situation: a certain type of enemy aircraft is fast, can decelerate
well, and turns quickly; a certain type of our aircraft can circle well. During a
training drill, our plane always circled the enemy plane, getting on its tail so
that it could not turn and shake off our plane and was docilely hit. The regimental
party committee analytically studied this situation and came to the conclusion that
in this peacetime training only the enemy's weak points were selected for our attack
and this did not provide the training required by actual warfare. Therefore, the
committee adopted the method of lecturing on specific examples of battles and dis-
cussing the understanding gained by experience, leading everyone to a clear recog-
nition of the enemy's cunning and the complexity of a future war. They maintained
the scientific attitude of seeking truth from tacts, by both considering our strong
points and the enemy's weak points, and also by paying full attention to the enemy
aircrafts' strong points and our aircrafts' weak points. Once, our plane got on
the tail of an "enemy plane" and was getting ready to attack when suddenly the
"enemy plane" made a quick turn and slipped away. Owing to the fact that our
plane's radius of turn was large it was suddenly rushing toward the "enemy plane's"
front and had lost the initiative. Focusing on the weak points of our equipment,
the flyers here, through their study, have come up with some methods for solving
this problem, have rigourously trained in tactical techniques, and have improved
their fighting capacity.
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TANK REGIMENT DECIDES MAN, NOT EQUIPMENT, IS KEY TO VICTORY
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Aug 79 p 2
[Article by Ping, Mingqing [7458 2494 7230]: "Make Full Use of Existing Equipment
To Acquire by Training Modern Combat Skills"]
[Text] "Is it that the existing equipment does not suit people's military level,
or is it that people's military level does not suit the existing equipment?" The
officers and men of a certain tank regiment of the Beijing Units through discussion
came to this conclusion: people's military level does not suit the existing equip-
ment. On the basis, of a unified understanding, they vigorously took measures to
raise the unit's military level and fully brought into play the combat power of
the existing equipment. Recently, the higher authorities held an on-the-spot meet-
ing to introduce their experience.
In the past, some comrades, thinking that our tanks were not as good as the ad-
vanced tanks of some developed countries, did not put sufficient effort into study-
ing and mastering the existing equipment. Focusing on this mood, the regimental
party committee educated everybody to become clear about two questions: First,
even if our existing equipment is not as good as that of some developed. countries,
viewing the situation as a whole, our armed forces have developed into a combined
arms forces of all branches, and we also have a considerable number of aircraft,
tanks, and guided missiles. Historical experience has confirmed that if only we
bring into full play people's subjective initiative and display the power of ex-
isting equipment to the maximum we can with inferior equipment vanquish an enemy
with superior equipment. Second, although some of our existing equipment is not
completely suited to modern warfare, even more important than this is that our
technical and tactical levels and our command capabilities are not completely
suited to the existing equipment. For example, the tanks we are equipped with can
climb slopes up to 30 degrees, but some tank drivers do not even try to drive
their tanks up slopes of 25 degrees; the stabilizer on our tanks performs well but
many gunners have a very low hit rate when firing from a moving tank; and some
comrades have still not mastered driving with the aid of night-vision instruments,
communicating by countering radio jamming, and firing antiaircraft machineguns.
Through analysis, everybody saw that even though our tanks are not very advanced,
there are much knowledge and many techniques that we have still not become profi-
cient in and mastered, and that we must expend a great deal of effort, under com-
plex conditions, to drive tanks, fire their machineguns and cannons accurately,
and keep their communications functioning.
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In order to resolve this contradiction, viz, people's military level not being suit-
able for the existing equipment, they adopted the following measures in training:
1. They made the training more difficult so that the proper role of the existing
equipment was brought into full play. Formerly, when this regiment was training in
tank driving in mountainous terrain, it only stressed safety and did not dare to
make the training more difficult in line with the tank's performance ability, so
that the majority of the drivers had never driven their tanks over a slope of 25
degrees or higher. Contrasting the experience in the war of self-defensive counter-
attack against Vietnam, when certain tank detachments climbed steep slopes of 30
degrees or more to catch the enemy unawares and wipe him out, the officers and men
of this regiment deeply felt that the driver training in the past could not bring
into play the tank's proper ability to perform and did not provide the genuine
skills required by actual warfare. Therefore, based on the tank's performance
capability, they crash-built a training ground for tank driving in mountainous
terrain with a maximum upward slope of 30 degrees and a maximum downward slope of
35 degrees and more, in order to provide a good site for insuring that driving
techniques are improved.
During the training, some dirvers did not dare to drive their tanks over this kind
of strategic and difficult mountainous terrain. Dong Xizhen [5576 6932 3791],
deputy political commissar of the regiment, volunteered to give everybody a demon-
stration of this difficult task and explain its essentials. When deputy political
commissar Dong had driven a tank up to the summit, the misgivings in the minds of
the cadres and fighters were removed. Seeing the deficiencies in their own tech-
niques, they put more effort into their training. Now most of the drivers have
mastered fairly well the techniques of driving tanks in strategic and difficult
mountainous terrain.
2. Using existing equipment, they mastered the skills of operating advanced de-
vices. In the past, this regiment, from top to bottom, did not dare to use some
fairly modernized equipment on the tank and some equipment was always "forbidden."
For example, a tank's stabilizer is a modernized important component part of its
cannon control system. When the cannon is fired while the tank is moving, it auto-
matically maintains a selected firing angle for the cannon and is more convenient
and accurate than a hand-held sighting device. However, in the past several years,
most of the companies have not been trained to operate the stabilizer. In addi-
tion to practicing with it in tanks, each battalion and company repaired and removed
from storage in warehouses moving frameworks for stabilizers and organized drills
simulating riding in a tank, thereby continually raising the firing hit rate of
gunners in moving tanks. At the same time, they tightly grasped training in driv-
ing tanks with the aid of the infrared ray night-vision instrument and mastered
fairly well the laws and characteristics of making observations with night-vision
instruments; they found out how to calculate the distance to a target by use of
the sighting lens calibrated in mils, and raised the first-round hit rate from the
original 30 percent to 69 percent. Thus, the proper role of the existing equipment
was given play.
3. They reformed tactical training so that it reflected the tank's mobility and
flexibility in combat. They resolutely changed the past simplified tactical
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training ground for tank detachments so that it could simulate the developing proc-
ess of a battle. During the tactical training, they practiced with unplanned
forms, crossing untraversed places, and carried out unplanned intense activity.
When organizing the comprehensive training for tank platoons moving in a fixed
direction against a tactical background, from the choice of ground and the enemy's
situation and setup to the organization and practice of battle exercises, they
broke with the old ways of the past in order to seek an approximation of actual
warfare. In order to reflect the features of modern warfare, viz, its large ele-
ment of surprise and the short time in which to prepare for combat, when practicing
this training topic, the platoon leader would not see the terrain beforehand, the
gunners would not have fired over the ground beforehand, and the drivers would not
have seen the line of march beforehand. At the beginning there is an emergency
muster, and, with only using sandtable assignments, they are given one simple
briefing on the enemy's situation, the mission, and the line of march, and the
principal conditions are observed, judged, directed and fought out while on the
march so as to give full play to the commanders' subjective initiative and to the
tank's mobility and flexibility.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 1 Jul 80 p 1
[Article by Jiang Huazhou [1203 0553 6999] and Guo Qingsheng [6751 1987 3932]:
"Party Members of a Certain Guided Missile Regiment Greet '1 July' With outstanding
Achievements" in "Displaying the Exemplary Vanguard Role of a Communist Party
Member"]
[Text] Since the beginning of May, a certain regiment of a guided missile unit has
organized its party members to launch competitive activities of "comparing enthusi-
asm, technique, and contributions in greeting '1 July' [the anniversary of the
founding of the CCP] with outstanding achievements," thereby further displaying
the exemplary role of the party members.
In this regiment, the average training examination mark of party members was 92,
and in the speciality of launching guided missiles, 85 percent of the party members
were classes as "live wires," thereby spurring on the unit's education and training
and the completion of tasks. At the beginning of May, the regimental party commit-
tee appealed to the regiment's party members to greet "1 July" with outstanding
achievements, convened a mobilization and oath-taking rally for competition in
"striving for excellence," and formulated competition items and standards for units
and individuals. During competition, a great number of party members, with a keen
enterprising spirit and sense of honor, striving to be first, aimed high and re-
ported victories bought with hard work. A total of 22 party members who took part
in the specialized training of the 2d Launch Battalion studied hard and assiduous-
ly. Each of them skillfully mastered his own speciality, with the result that they
obtained, on average, the good mark of 93 in the regiment-wide uniform examina-
tions. In order to improve his ability to fix breakdowns, Jiang Yuejin [5592 6460
6651], a technician and Communist Party member, set aside a little time each day
to draw electrical circuits in his mind so that he thoroughly memorized the opera-
tional principles/chart for the three large instruments that control a guided mis-
sile. In May the 5th Transport and Repair Company received the task of being the
regiment's "service center" for working on machinery parts. Time was tight, and
the work was new and fairly difficult. Tan Jongjiang [6223 3163 3068], deputy
secretary of the party branch and company commander, led a work team, with party
members as its backbone elements, to work without letup day and night in their
worksheds, and in 7 days and 7 nights completed the task ahead of schedule. In 2
months, the company completed the task of repairing and processing over 3,200
parts of machines and vehicles. Compared with the past, one person did the work
of two.
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In the "striving for excellence" competition, the cadres and party members marched
in the forefront with daring and energy. Regimental commander Liu Zongshun [0491
1350 5293] was a veteran comrade of over 30 years of service. In May he gave up
a chance for recuperation and held a work team to stay at the 6th Battalion in
order to gain firsthand experience, which brought new improvements to the battal-
ion's work. Deputy regimental commander Ge Dongsheng [5514 2639 0581], a young
cadre, in leading the training, emancipated his mind, was bold in making inquiries
and resolved many difficulties. The unit conducted operational training by simulat-
ing the accident of a leak in the main fuel valve during a missile launch. Deputy
regimental commander Ge led comrades of the technical section in examining blue-
prints, looking over materials, and attacking the difficulties involved one by one.
Chen Guangjun [7115 1639 0193], commander of the 4th Battalion, during the stage
of basic-level training, personally answered, one by one, 32 review questions as-
signed by the regiment. During the day he taught lessons and in the evening he
patiently gave individual supplemental instruction to the fighters, which led the
battalion to obtain first place in the regiment-wide examinations.
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CADRES MUST STUDY WARFARE IN MILITARY ACADEMIES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 Jul. 80 p 3
[Article by Fang Hang [2455 5300]: "'Learning War From War' and 'Learning War
From Schools"']
[Text] Forty years ago, Comrade Mao Zedong, when summing up the experience of the
second revolutionary civil war, unequivocally put forward the slogan "Learn war
from war." This slogan of Chairman Mao Zedong's reflected the objective reality
at the time and was absolutely correct. Encouraged by this slogan, countless cat-
tle herders and peasants who had never attended school and frail scholars who, al-
though they had attended school, knew nothing about military affairs were tempered
on the battlefield and became outstanding military commanders; CCP "clodhoppers"
who had not been schooled defeated great numbers of graduates of the Japanese and
KMT officer schools and army universities. A long period of testing in the prac-
tice of warfare proves that this slogan is an objective truth.
Now, our army has been shifted from a war environment to a peace environment for
nearly 30 years. How should we regard this slogan of Comrade Mao Zedong,'s? Must
we take learning war from war to be the only or the principal path for raising the
troops' tactical and technological levels and the cadres' command capabilities,
and repudiate or ignore other paths? Obviously, we cannot do this. When Comrade
Mao Zedong raised this slogan, our party had not yet seized state power, the party
leadership's revolutionary armed forces were for a long period of time in a war
environment, battles were frequent, and there was great mobility. Not only were
there no conditions for running a large group of military academies, but also it
was very difficult to conduct regular military training. Just as Chairman Mao
said in "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains"; "The average soldier needs 6
months' or a year's training before he can fight, but our soldiers, though re-
cruited only yesterday, have to fight today with practically no training to speak
of." The history of proletarian revolutions proves that, in order for armed revo-
lution to oppose armed counterrevolution, the unarmed revolutionary people must
often "raise a bamboo pole to serve as a standard for revolt" and cannot, in a
calm and unhurried fashion, learn military affairs before engaging in armed strug-
gle. "Often it is not a case of first learning and then doing, but a case of do-
ing and then learning"--this proposition was determined by objective conditions in
a revolution. After the entire country was liberated, conditions completely
changed. We had our own state power and turned to peaceful construction, and the
entire armed forces set up all sorts of military academies. Under these
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conditions, not to conduct peacetime training well and not to make learning war
from schools the principal method would obviously be a departure from today's real-
ity. Any theory whatsoever emerges under specific historical conditions, and for
its scope of applicability, one cannot ignore changes in historical conditions and
apply it mechanically; if we were to cling to this theory as rigidly as before,
not train and learn war from schools, then there would be no way to raise the
troops' tactical and technological levels and the commanders' command capabilities,
and we would not be in a position to improve the troops' military qualities.
As a matter of fact, even in a war environment, we cannot slacken the necessary mil-
itary training of the troops, and, when conditions make it feasible, our cadres
must pursue advanced studies in military academies, which will help them to system-
atically sum up their war experiences and to improve their military theory and com-
mand capabilities. Many high-level commanders in our army have pursued advanced
studies in schools and first began to learn war from schools. Comrade Zhu De
attended military lectures in Yunnan, Comrade Peng Dehuai attended the Hunan Mil-
itary School, comrades Liu Bocheng and Nie Rongzhen studied military affairs in
the Soviet Union, and Comrade Xu Xiangqian attended the Whampoa Military Academy.
In the initial period of our army in the Jinggang Mountains, even if conditions
were extremely difficult, our army paid a great deal of attention to setting up
academies, and Comrade Mao Zedong trained lower ranking officers to be a body of
instructors in order to train cadres and raise their military level. When the Red
Army on its Long March victoriously reached northern Shaanxi, he opened the Red
Army University, the name of which was later changed to the Chinese People's Anti-
Japanese Military and Political University. Comrade Mao Zedong personally gave
lessons there, and every base set up branches of the university. Many commanders
who matured in war studied at these schools. Some high-level cadres of our army
before joining up had a very low educational level and were completely ignorant of
military affairs, but afterward they were able to master military theory, and this
was an important reason for their brilliant command capabilities. We must also
see that in the past the warfare our army was engaged in was done by one service
arm. A fighter only had to understand how to fire, charge with the bayonet, and
throw hand grenades before he went into battle. Our army's equipment was infer-
ior; and not all of the enemy's equipment was advanced. The demands made on the
commander's command capabilities were also comparatively simple. Over the past 30
years, military science and technology have developed swiftly, there have been big
changes in strategy and tactics, and the surprise factor in warfare'has increased.
The scale and forms of combat are also different from those of the past. Our
future target of operations is not only highly modernized in technology and equip-
ment but also possesses comparatively high military qualities. To be a commander
in a future war, one must be good at mastering and controlling modern weapons and
equipment, be familiar with the knowledge of how to use each armed branch and ser-
vice arm, and master the command techniques for combined arms military operations.
All of these things are brand-new subjects for the great number of our cadres, and
also cannot be all learned during a short period of warfare. As early as the in-
itial period of World War II, Comrade Stalin pointed out: Military schools must
extensively apply the experience of modern warfare in training command cadres in
new techniques. Every major country in the contemporary world considers military
academies the cradle for commanders in modern warfare, considers the good running
of military academies an investment in winning a future war, and give priority to
them in armed forces instruction. In a future war, we must defeat a modernized
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enemy. If in peacetime we do not tightly grasp the military training of the troops,
do not train cadres in military academies, do not send a large group of outstanding
cadres to school for advanced studies, and wait until after war breaks out and then
make up lost lessons on the battlefield, then we will not only pay a considerable
price but also suffer a setback in the war. This has been proved by practice in
countless wars.
Learning war from war and learning war from schools--the two methods are consistent
with each other. In learning war from war, most of what is obtained is perceptual
knowledge that has specific limitations and must be raised to the level of ration-
al lknowledge. The military theory, tactics, and techniques studied in our mili-
tary academies all stem from war and are the systematic summation of war experi-
ences. They break through the individual's limitations, have theoretical forms
and are improvements. Comrade Mao Zedong has said: "Experience is necessary for
a cadre, ... but modestly taking in other people's experience is also necessary.
If one on each and every occasion waits for one's own experience, or else clings
to one's own views and rejects those of others, this is sheer narrow empiricism.
In our wars we suffered many losses from this." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong,"
vol 1, p 197) Only when an individual's direct experience is integrated with the
indirect experience of other people and foreign lands can he avoid one-sidedness
and have comparatively complete knowledge. We often use the phrase "has found a
hundred battles" to describe a person's combat experience. For one person, it is
not easy to "have fought a hundred battles." However, we must not say that in. the
entire history of war, in the history of modern war, a "hundred battles" are too
few. War is a changing process, and its theory also develops. No matter how much
rich experience any one person has, he cannot set limits to truth and needs to
learn from the experience of other people and foreign lands. The basic principle
is that a person with experience in warfare also needs to pursue advanced studies
in school.
In short, under new historical conditions, we certainly must run the academies
well. The great number of our army's cadres must study in schools to raise their
tactical and technological levels, to improve their educational capabilities for
command and control, in order to meet the requirements of a future war.
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LEADERS ASKED TO PUT THEMSELVES IN SUBORDINATES' SHOES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 3 Jul. 80 p 3
[Article by Zhong Jie [6988 3381] and Xian De [6343 1795] in the "Random Talks on
Work Methods" column: "If I Were a Subordinate..."]
[Text] A comrade who for a long time had worked in a leading organization, when
hearing at a report meeting his subordinates talk of disasters and pile up their
opinions, began to take exception and thought that they lacked the overall point
of view. Afterward, when he left his organization to work in a unit, he got a
taste of the suffering of these "disasters," all day long being tied to a confer-
ence table or being unable to extricate himself from piles of documents, and his
view changed. A proverb says: "Those who ride horses don't understand those who
go on foot." It looks as if the bureaucratic work style of certain higher author-
ities is largely related to the fact they usually do not dismount from their
"horses" and "go on foot"--learning through their own personal experience about
the working and living conditions of their subordinates. One effective method for
washing away the dirt of bureaucratism is to change places and put oneself in some-
body else's position so that one will think more about one's subordinates.
Comrade Liu Shaoqi earlier on raised this question. At the beginning of the 1960's,
bureaucratism, formalism, and red tape grew in some of our units, so that the lower
levels were constantly coping with them. Focusing on this situation, Comrade
Shaoqi, while inspecting the Guangzhou Units in 1964, made this suggestion to all
those attending a symposium of leading cadres: You "divisional political commis-
sars and directors of divisional political departments should act as company polit-
ical instructors for several months, ... a divisional political commissar will see
how many forms for statistical tables and reports come down from upper levels by
filling them in himself. Each one of them must be filled in. It will not be per-
mitted to not fill in every one, and if a form is not filled in he will be
'spanked.' He will then know that this matter is not easy, and not just know how
to issue forms for statistical tables and reports without knowing the difficulties
of filling them in." This suggestion of Comrade Shaogi's for curing those who
suffer from bureaucratism is a good prescription.
The source of knowledge is practice. People in practice, owing to the fact that
the conditions in their positions and environments are different, have different
feelings about, attitudes toward, and methods of dealing with problems. As the
saying goes: "If you don't manage household affairs, you don't know how expensive
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daily necessities are." There is a definite reason for leaders holding one meet-
ing after another and issuing this or that kind of document, statistical tables
and reports as if this were "work." They little imagine that, in this way, the
lower levels are made to suffer. Just think, with everybody floating on the sur-
face or being soaked in meetings, how can they build up the units? That the harm
in this way of doing things stems from the leaders' positions is often not easy to
discover. If the position is changed and the leader becomes the led, and for a
month takes part in 10-odd days of meetings and fills in several tens of statistical
tables and reports, then he will have a different impression of things. At the
least, the abovementioned comrade will not persistently put the blame on his sub-
ordinates. Some service trades in the localities are now launching "if I were a
subordinate" activities, as are some news publishing units. This makes people
think: Couldn't this activity be introduced into leadership work, letting our
leading cadres take part in the "if I were a subordinate" activity, so that they
could think of how to do good leadership work from the angle of those they lead?
When we prepare to get some things we need and things we don't need from our sub-
ordinates, if we think "if I were a subordinate," then we will comprehend the suf-
fering brought by a "boom in red tape" and, thus, consciously reduce the number of
documents.
When we prepare to use the subterfuge of being engaged in "research, research," and
kick the "ball" back, if we think "if I were a subordinate," then it will be as if
we were seeing the worried looks of our subordinates who are running busily back
and forth to deal with a matter, and, thus, we will "show mercy to those under our
feet" by making a prompt decision that will solve the problem.
When we prepare to make a long empty speech composed of a torrent of words, if we
think "if I were a subordinate," then we will comprehend why the lower levels have
the mood of "fearing neither heaven nor earth, and only fearing a long talk given
by a leader," and thus will consciously "keep it short when we have something to
say, and let it go when we have nothing to say."
If everybody does things this way, bureaucratism and red tape will gradually be
reduced and the efficiency of work will. continually be improved, so why not go
ahead with it?
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 4 Jul 80 p 2
(Article by He Wei [0149 0251], Zhao Changchun [6392 7022 2504], Li Xing [2621 1630]
and Chen Shungen [3088 7311 2704]: "Using the Results of Military Academic Research
To Enrich Teaching Materials"]
[Text] All military teaching and research sections of the naval academy, proceed-
ing from the reality of our armed forces, having an eye on future developments and
on reforming the teaching content, have made courses in electronic warfare and
guided missile warfare the key courses. By the end of May, over 10 research results
had been written into the teaching materials.
The outstanding problem in the naval academy's teaching is that its teaching mater-
ials are out of date, and many of them being products of the 1950's. Therefore,
the broad masses of instructors relied on their own strength and, while being busy
in teaching courses, after over 2 years of arduous effort wrote between 10 and 20
new teaching materials, including problems concerning the initial stage of naval
warfare, new tactics for torpedo-carrying aircraft to break through defenses, and
attack procedures by combined arms military forces at sea, that enriched the teach-
ing content and have been welcomed by students at the academy and by unit
commanders.
There are three distinct features in the naval academy's innovated teaching con-
tent. First, the academy broke with the past method of "making small repairs and
patching up," and made a big effort in academic research and worked hard to renew
the teaching content. A certain type of torpedo-carrying aircraft was a piece of
equipment made in the 1950's. Today, when there has been a big development in the
enemy's ship-to-air guided missiles, how could this aircraft of ours break through
enemy warship defenses? The original teaching materials only discussed principles
in this regard, and after the students heard them their thirst for knowledge re-
mained unquenched. With the support of many comrades of the air arm teaching and
research section, instructor Zhao Jixin (6392 4949 9515] consulted close to 2 mil-
lion words of reference materials concerning the ground-to-air and air-to-air
guided missiles of various countries, spending on this research 11 month's time,
and finally found a weak point in ground-to-air guided missiles. Grasping this
chink in the enemy's tactical use of guided missiles, he brought forth from his re-
search a new tactic for our aircraft to break through defenses. For this students
praised him.
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Second, the academy took combat regulations as its basis but did not allow itself
to be completely fettered by them, daring, according to the requirements of actual
warfare, to study new situations and solve new problems. For example, in a certain
combat regulation, the calculation of the hit probability rate of ship-to-ship
guided missiles was a product of the end of the 1950's and did not reflect current
reality. The instructors freed themselves from this fetter and in half a year's
time produced by research a comparatively scientific method of making this calcula-
tion, and also wrote the results of their research into the teaching materials for
wide adoption by units.
Third, the academy both based itself upon the present and fixed its eyes on future
developments, introducing Chinese and foreign advanced military science into the
realm of tactics so as to lay a good foundation for training qualified commanders
suited for future wars. With regard to headquarters work, the academy carried out
a conflict simulation between two sides based on a map of calculated manpower,, and
also started a new course topic on electronic computer simulation of tactical con-
flict, feeding several hundred operational plans that the enemy could adopt into a
computer, and let the students and the machine "battle" against each other, thereby
solving the problem of improving the students' capacity for coordinated operations
under conditions other than actual combat.
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DIVISION PRACTICES CLOSING GAP IN LINE MADE BY ATOMIC WEAPONS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 4 Jul 80 p 3
[Article in "Training Notes" column by Chen Xiangmin [7115 0686 3046]: "Seal the
Opening"]
[Text] Following a deafening explosion, two mushroom cloud's gradually rose in the
air. In the "red force's" defensive position there immediately appeared a "gap" of
about 2 kilometers in frontage and about 5 kilometers in depth. In a moment, amid
a cloud of dust, a concentrated mass of "blue force" tanks swarmed like a flood
toward this "atomic breach." At nearly the same moment, powerful artillery fire
from the "red force" raked the enemy concentration. This fierce fight between a
force ripping open a gap and another force trying to seal the gap was a scene dur-
ing a field exercise conducted by a certain division of the Shenyang Units in order
to study positional defense under conditions of atomic warfare.
Blocking the Opening--Sealing the Opening
After half an hour of a fierce firefight, the "blue forcei tank group still occupied
the "atomic breach" and was continuing to develop in depth. The "red force" had
sustained heavy casualties and had been forced to withdraw into its defense works
... ... [ellipses as published]
Looking at this made me think of a problem. During the conventional wars of the
past, our army was able to occupy a breach in our line before the enemy could, and
by the method of "blocking up" could repulse over 10 enemy assaults in succession,
thereby insuring that the enemy would not break through the breach. Today, when the
enemy employs an atomic breakthrough, the gap ripped open is very big and the mo-
torized assault that the enemy relies on is very fast. Our army's capacity for mo-
bility is low, and the units concealed in deep or covered areas have great diffi-
culty, under conditions of atomic warfare, in occupying the breach in our line
before the enemy does and thereby blocking the enemy's assaults. Blocking the
opening should be changed to sealing the opening.
Everybody Must "Stitch Up" the "Tear"
The sealing and countersealing "battle" was truly fierce. The "red force" artil-
lery pieces carried out fierce blocking fire; the attack planes carried out plung
ing fire and the bombers busily dropped. bombs; the rocket and mine-laying vehicles
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rapidly laid mine clusters, and the infantry following the tanks boldly and power-
fully lept forward... ... [ellipses as published]
I set aside my binoculars and commented to a comrade beside me: In the past we
dependent on an infantry detachment to block the breach in our line, but now the
"blue force's" two tactical atomic bombs have ripped open a breach many times larger
than the breaches of the past, and the attacking enemy is a torrent of steel armor
supported by the artillery and air arms. The "red force" cannot depend on some
infantry to seal up this opening alone.
Expressing these views, I thought of the dispute between two views centering on how
to seal up an "atomic breach" that occurred before the exercise. One view held that
after the enemy had carried out an atomic attack, the infantry concelaed in the de-
fense works in the breach who had not been killed or wounded only needed 7 or 8
minutes to leap into position and seal up the opening in front of the breach. The
other view stated: The "blue force" has a strong capability for coordinated opera-
tions. The small number of infantry that we maintain in the forward position can-
not seal up an opening of this size. The correct method is to depend on the entire
strength of all our service arms to seal up the opening behind the "atomic breach."
With each party sticking to its own opinion, the practice of today's drill rendered
a judgment--"when everybody adds fuel the flames rise high," i.e., everybody must
"stitch up" the tear."
Artillery Played the Leading Role
During this coordinated operation to seal up an "atomic breach," our artillery
rendered the chief service. According to what the comrades said, the artillery
played the leading role in this drama. When I drove a vehicle to the command post
of a certain artillery regiment in order to find out about their experience, the
commander told me: "We realize one point, viz, skip the books."
Originally, according to teaching materials, when artillery was carrying out block-
ing fire against enemy tanks, it should stop firing when the enemy tanks got to
within 1,000 meters of our defensive forward positions. From practice the artil-
lery regiment discovered that this did not suit reality very well, because at this
range the antitank weapons of our infantry in the defense position cannot reach the
enemy or display their maximum power, and it is easy for a firepower gap to be
created. From the enemy's point of view, his tanks at this stage of their movement
are precisely at a point when their cannon fire is most effective. When sealing
up the "atomic breach" this time, the artillery regiment decided that when the
enemy tanks had reached 600 or 400 meters from our defensive forward positions it
would carry out its last blocking fire. Practice proved that this change, besides
enabling the artillery to score hits on the enemy tanks, also enveloped the enemy
tanks in smoke so that it was hard for the enemy to see us while we could see them,
thus creating advantageous conditions for annihilating the enemy.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 4 Jul. 80 p 3
[Article by Jiang Fangran [1203 2397 3544]: "'Military Affairs' Cannot Be 'Over-
simplified in Discussion"']
[Text] Everybody is fairly familiar with the armchair strategist Zhao Kuo, and
knows that he was a military bookworm and an embodiment of those people who do not
know how to meet an emergency. According to the "Historical Records," Zhao Kuo
"talked about military affairs and said there was nothing in the world he could not
do," so that even his father, Zhao She, could not defeat him in theoretical prob-
lems. But Zhao She never held Zhao Kuo in high regard. Kuo's mother was unclear
about Zhao She's reason for this and asked him about it. Zhao She said: "War is
a deathtrap and Kuo oversimplifies it in discussion." Zhao She was a famous gen-
eral of the state of Zhao and had led the army that crushed the Qin army at Eyu.
Having abundant experience in war, he realistically understood its difficulties
and dangers. He knew full well what consequences would be produced by oversimpli-
fying the discussion of military affairs, so he predicted "It is assumed that Zhao
will not make Kuo a general, for if it does then the one who will destroy the Zhao
army will be Kuo." The result was as his father had anticipated. This Zhao Kuo,
who oversimplified military affairs, later led troops in battle against the state
of Qin. Owing to the fact that he treated complex battle conditions lightly, on
the battlefield he fell into the trap set by the Qin general, Bai Qi, and his "
"food supply line was cut and his army split in two" by the Qin army. After over
40 days of hunger, he died in a hail of arrows and the several hundred thousand-
strong Zhao army that he had commanded was slaughtered by the Qin army. In his-
tory, Zhao Kuo is not the only person who was disastrously defeated because of
oversimplifying military affairs. King Fu Jian of the Early Qin dynasty, before
attacking the Eastern Jin dynasty, was warned by a subordinate: The adversary
"occupies the natural barriers of the Changjiang River and can make use of his
people," while in Qin the "soldiers are exhausted after many battles and the people
fear the enemy" and you cannot easily go on the attack. Fu Jian recklessly said:
My million-strong army will attack Jin like a strong wind sweeps before it the au-
tumn leaves. Owing to Fu Jian's underestimation of the enemy, 70 to 80 percent of
his huge army of 900,000 men were killed. The mica-ornamented carriage he was
riding in was lost and he fled in panic back to Changan.
The lessons of the ancients are valuable reference lessons for us. Military strug-
gle and the use of military forces in war is a science. If any person whomsoever
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does not take a conscientious attitude toward it, but takes war to be a trifling
matter and looks upon it as something easy to do, then it will be hard for him to
avoid suffering the merciless punishment of war--disastrous defeat, and even the
complete destruction of his army.
It is very beneficial for us to understand this point. Our army is now enthusias-
tically launching, from top to bottom, academic research on military affairs, and
in particular the military command personnel and training personnel discuss mili-
tary affairs all the time. When studying the enemy's and our own situation, they
are considering hard, strict, and most difficult things, but they still "oversimp-
lify the discussion!" This problem has definitely not been completely solved.
With regard to a future war, do we study how to fight a three-dimensional, nuclear
war or only prepare to fight a conventional war on the ground? Some comrades
stress the latter and not the former; when envisaging the enemy, should we see that
he is really a "true tiger" or "iron tiger" who has first-rate weapons and equip-
ment, very strong fighting capacity, and skill in commanding combined arms opera-
tions, or is really a "paper tiger" who is isolated, whose equipment is not strong,
whose fighting capacity is low, and whose command is clumsy? Some comrades discard
the former view and take up the latter one. Again, some comrades, when studying
certain methods of fighting only abstractly and in terms of principles discuss how
to fight, taking all conditions to be perfect, and do not carefully consider and
calculate specific, particular difficulties and whether the operation is feasible
given the tactical and technical performance of various weapons; some comrades
consider as already solved problems on which tests are being made or on which the
results of tests are still a matter for controversy, consider weapons with which
only one individual unit is equiped to be weapons that the entire army can be
equipped with, and say that difficulties which actually have not been resolved are
problems that are being solved, etc. All this shows that it is extremely necessary
not to "oversimplify the discussion" of "military affairs" and that attention
should be drawn to this point.
Obviously, when I say here that "military affairs" cannot be "oversimplified in
discussion," I certainly do not want people to deliberately exaggerate the diffi-
culties and complexity of war, but I am advocating an atmosphere of study in which
war, the enemy, and oneself are looked upon as they really are, and that one face
up to reality and tackle problems with originality. There is this sentence in
"Sunzi's Art of War": "War is a matter of vital importance to the state, the
province of life or death, the road to survival or ruin." All comrades engaged in
military research should treat war with caution, and they certainly cannot treat
it lightly.
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TROOPS MUST BE WELL EDUCATED IN REVOLUTIONARY OUTLOOK ON LIFE
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Jul 80 p 1
[Commentary: "Strengthen Leadership, Do Not Just Go Through the Motions"]
[Text] Education on the revolutionary outlook on life has already begun on a wide
scale in every unit of the army. The important problem at present is to strengthen
leadership and not to just go through the motions, truly promoting this education
in a thorough way and obtaining results.
How can we insure that this education is not just going through the motions?
The key is leadership. The leaders of many units fully understand the importance
and urgency of education on the revolutionary outlook on life. They personally
take command and pitch in this work, going deep to investigate and study, finding
out the troops' ideas, staying at lower levels and making them experimental points,
summing up and popularizing the experiences of advanced units and solving in a
timely fashion the problems encountered by the basic-level units in this education.
Many leading comrades also personally take over classes and expound the basic prin-
ciples of this outlook on life to the cadres and fighters, join with the figh ers
in informal group discussions, solve difficult problems that arise among the mas-
ses and study with the basic-level cadres methods to improve this education. In
these units, the education is done in a solid fashion and has obtained big results,
and the general mood and spirit of the troops are changing. Leaders of some units
also grasp education on this outlook on life, but the measures they take are not
vigorous enough. They stop after they have made ordinary arrangements and appeals,
so the results are comparatively ordinary. There are also leaders of a small num-
ber of units who have an insufficient understanding of the importance of this
education, do not conscientiously study and analyze the thinking of their troops,
do not concentrate their efforts on helping the basic-level cadres to improve the
methods of this education, do not truly resolve the contradiction between work and
study, and do not timely adjust the contradiction when politics and education
"clash," so that time for this education is not insured, and the personnel do not
thoroughly carry it out and actually just go through the motions. The abovemen-
tioned situation shows that the key to whether education on this outlook on life is
carried out well is leadership. Only if the leaders really regard this education
seriously and energetically set about grasping it can it be carried out well;
otherwise, if the leaders do not regard it seriously, do not grasp it tightly or
neglect to grasp it at all, then it will be easy to let things slide and just go
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through the motions. Whether we can truly carry out well education on the revolu-
tionary outlook on life has a bearing on the progress in maturation of a great
number of young cadres and fighters, on building the thinking and work style of
the troops and on whether their fighting capacity can be heightened. Leaders at
every level must be determined and must make great efforts to grasp this education
thoroughly and to obtain results.
They must continue to grasp well education on "fostering proletarian ideology and
eliminating bourgeois ideology," and overcome the influence of feudal thinking,
overcome ultra-individualism, anarchism, bourgeois liberalism and other nonprole-
tarian ideologies. They must correctly and painstakingly analyze the state of the
troops' thinking and make a point of drawing clear demarcation lines. They must
expound policies and they must not oversimplify. This is the problem that must be
mastered in leadership.
The education certainly must "loose some arrows," and the "arrows" cannot be "air
to air." The purpose in carrying out education on this outlook on life is to help
the cadres and fighters to correctly solve some philosophic problems of life, such
as why people live and how they should live. However, the outlook on life is al-
ways concretely reflected in people's statements and actions when doing things.
Different units and various personnel under all sorts of different conditions will
have different problems. When a unit is specifically conducting education on a
certain special topic, it must center it on the overall goal and focus on universal
trends. It must also start from the unit's reality, and with a specific focus,
through solving the unit's current problems, make clear the basic principles of
this outlook on life. To be separated from a unit's reality and abstractly lecture
on the outlook on life easily turns into an "air-to-air" situation. That is to
say, the situation in each unit is different, and the education should have differ-
ent focii,and different objects of education should have different emphases. The
same focii for education on ideals and future prospects cannot be the same for a
special technology detachment as it is for an ordinary combat company. The situa-
tion in this company and in another one are also not the same, and the education
also cannot be of one form. With regard to cadres and fighters, veteran soldiers
and recruits, and soldiers from the cities and from the rural areas, their exper-
ience is different, the problems they face are different, their way of thinking
about and looking at problems are different, and so there must be differences in
the education. The key points in each emphasis must be prominent and suit the
different objects so that problems will be solved by suiting the remedy to the
case. If there are no points of emphasis, there will be no focus. If one does
not proceed from the unit's reality and, with regard to the arrangements made by
the higher authorities for the content of this education, rigidly move, shift and
follow these arrangements, "indiscriminately cooking in one pot" the objects of
the education, then the result will be that the remedy will not suit the case and
answers will not be given to the questions raised by actual life. The result of
all this can only be that the education will turn back on itself and that problems
will turn back on themselves and not be solved.
The instruction in this education must be given carefully; it cannot just repeat
what the books say. The establishment of the revolutionary outlook on life is
"capital construction" for the thinking of young cadres and so the people responsi-
ble for this education must certainly give instruction carefully. This education
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must be likened to a construction project, in which, first of all, there must be
conscientious examination and careful design. In conducting this education, we
certainly must go deep into reality, find out the way the objects of this education
think in their hearts, and see, in the final analysis, where the "nub" of their
thinking lies, and afterwards conscientiously study methods to carry out this
education. Many young cadres and fighters don't understand very well many basic
principles concerning this outlook on life, and so it is necessary to inculcate
them with some fundamental theory and knowledge. However, the main principles must
be expounded so that everybody will like to listen to them, and the inculcation of
these principles must be done with particularly careful methods; forcible inculca-
tion will not do. This demands that the educators themselves, first of all, thor-
oughly understand the principles; they must not hastily start work without this
understanding. In teaching, lectures must be given on these principles, as far as
possible using vivid examples to illustrate the philosophy of life, applying the
principles to affairs, going from the near to the far and from the shallow to the
deep, providing inspiration and guidance and making the education interesting and
absorbing. In addition to conducting classes, the instructors must adapt the
teaching to the traits of youth and carefully organize all sorts of lively, rich,
varied and healthful activities, such as telling stories of the revolution, read-
ing ideologically self-cultivating books, making film reviews and learning from
heroic model personages, to draw everybody into thinking about the meaning of life,
engaging in discussions on all sorts of special topics, inquiring into the purpose
of life, tempering their revolutionary will, and cultivating beautiful sentiments,
thereby allowing the masses to educate themselves. The simplification of educa-
tion--thinking that education is equivalent to teaching classes, that teaching
classes is equivalent to reciting texts, not looking at the object of the educa-
tion, repeating what the book says, and expounding the text in a stereotypical
fashion--is an unsuitable method and should not be used.
Integrate intensive education with regular education. Owing to the fact that for
many years there has not been a systematic carrying out of education on this out-
look on life and that we are now beginning to supply these classes as a supplement,
with a relative concentration of time and personnel, it is necessary to carry out
the education in a planned and systematic manner. However, it is a long-term task
in political and ideological work to do this and to resist the corrosive influences
of the bourgeoisie, the feudal and other exploitative classes. It is a lifetime
matter for any one person to establish firmly and securely the communist outlook
on life, and one is never too old to learn and reform. This problem cannot be
solved by attending one or two classes. Therefore, we certainly cannot be satis-
fied and say that with one period of concentrated education the time for this
education is finished and the education on this outlook on life is finished. We
should make the education on this outlook on life penetrate every aspect of polit-
ical and ideological work, and in peacetime cultivate it and make it a regular
feature. This education must be integrated with education on the party's line and
its general and specific policies, with education on the work "General Political
Knowledge," and with the activities to learn from heroic models like Lei Feng, Lu
Shicai and others so that everybody, by understanding the fundamental viewpoints
of Marxism and with knowledge of the party's line and its current policies, will
further solve the problems of the individual's outlook on life, and, by studying
the maturation process of advanced personages, take the path and follow the
methods of being a revolutionary. Leading cadres at all levels should set the
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example, playing the leading role in studying and implementing "Some Guiding Prin-
ciples for Inner-Party Political Life" and in discussing the revised draft of the
party's constitution, and, by their own actual behavior, influence and spur on
the young cadres and fighters to conscientiously use the fundamental principles
of the communist outlook on life to study and handle well all sorts of problems
that they themselves encounter, starting with themselves, starting now and starting
bit by bit, to establish step by step the revolutionary outlook on life.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Jul 80 p 1
(Article by Su Jing [5685 7231] and Wu Shibin [0702 0013 2430]: "A Certain Guangxi
Border Defense Division Liberates Its Thinking, Young Officers Shoulder the Heavy
Burdens of Training"]
[Text] A certain Guangxi border defense division has liberated its thinking and
has freely and boldly let nine young divisional regimental officers "sing the lead-
ing role" in organizing military training. In the June comprehensive examination
throughout the division, the scores in every training subject were the highest in
history.
These young officers were all promoted one after another to their present ranks
during the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, and their average
age is 34.8 years. How could their intelligence and wisdom be fully displayed?
The party committees of the division and its regiments let them mount the stage and
"sing the leading role" and temper themselves by maturing through practice. The
veteran comrades who in the past had been assigned to supervise training one by one
took the initiative to act as their "staff officers" and "advisers," supporting
them in boldly setting about this work.
The support of the veteran comrades greatly inspired these young officers. Wu
Wenbing [0702 2492 3521], 35, commander of an artillery regiment, became acquainted
with the training conditions in all companies of his regiment and with the good
conditions of the artillery pieces. Then, based on the problems that existed, he
brought these problems to the attention of the cadres and fighters and asked them
to think of ways of reforming the content and methods of the training. In the
first half of this year, the regiment completed its training mission a month ahead
of schedule. Seven of these nine young officers in the division had some experi-
ence in probing into and finding out about the reforming of training content and
methods, and they made a contribution to troop training. These young officers re-
spect the veteran comrades and humbly listen to their opinions, and continually
enhance their own ability. Li Shengping [2621 516B 1627], chief of staff of a
certain regiment, after completing each training topic, on his own initiative
listened attentively to the opinions of the "old generals" in the regiment, so
that as soon as one "battle" was accomplished, it was summed up and another step
forward could be taken. He did a solid job of training, working steadily and mak-
ing good progress, for which a divisional notice of commendation was circulated.
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In the half year, this group of young officers have rapidly matured at their indi-
vidual posts, and marked changes have begun to take place in military training
throughout the division. As of 20 June, they had completed the training mission
for the first half of the year 23 days ahead of schedule. On examination, the com-
panies who were trained received a general appraisal of excellent in their first
and second sessions of live-ammunition firing practice. The upper-level organiza-
tion held three on-the-spot meetings of artillery and infantry soldiers at which
it fully disseminated these training experiences.
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NAVAL BASE SURVEYS ISLAND-DOTTED OPERATIONAL SEA AREA
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Jul 80 p 2
[Article by Huang Yaonian [7806 1031 1628]: "Leaders of a Certain Naval Base
Survey and Become Familiar With an Operational Sea Area"]
[Text] From 28 May to 4 June, the principal leading comrades of a certain naval
base, at the head of some organizational cadres, in a naval ship went to an oper-
ational sea area, where they surveyed and became familiar with 36 islands, 19 sea
routes, and over 50 harbors and anchorages. Each person put in order a copy of
operational worthy materials, and changed the "lifeless sea chart" hanging on the
wall into a "living sea chart" in their minds.
The comrades of the base were extremely conscientious in their on-the-spot survey
and did not let a single island or reef escape their notice. On the fringe of one
cluster of islands was an islet rising about 20 meters above the water. In order
to gain a clear understanding of the islet, political commissar Liu [0491] humbly
requested instruction from a master navigator, inquiring in detail about the is-
let's position, area, and military value, and did not stop his inquiries until he
was perfectly clear on these points. They paid particular attention to islands
and harbors that possessed important operational value.. A certain island is a
forward-position stronghold and its strategic position is extremely important.
Commanded Liu [0491] and the other comrades changed from the ship to a small boat
and went to the island. There they requested instruction from the comrades of the
army garrison force and called on local fishermen so that they became perfectly
clear about the island's docking facilities, harbors, and river branches.
Comrades of every professional department taking part in the survey, besides be-
coming familiar with this operational sea area, focused on the requirements of
their respective departments work. Comrades of headquarters laid emphasis on be-
coming clear about which harbors ships could lay at anchor in, which harbors could
berth which types of ships, etc. The logistics and the equipment-technical depart-
ments conscientiously studied how to insure naval operations. Sun Houkun [1327
0624 0981], deputy head of the ship repair deparmment, during the survey made notes
on over 20 civilian shipyards in the islands. He also drew a sketch map of their
positions and equipment and put all his materials in order so that, when preparing
against war, naval ships at sea could be repaired close by and the power of a
people's war would be fully brought into play.
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WARGAME EXERCISES SHARPEN SHENYANG COMMANDERS' SKILLS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 6 Jul 80 p 1
(Article by staff correspondent Yuan Zhanxian [5913 0594 0341] and Gan Yongping
[3927 3057 1627] and by staff reporter Li Kun [2621 0981]: "Commanding Officers
Forced To Pit Their Command Skills Against Each Other"]
[Text] From 23 to 27 June, in a certain mountainous district, veteran regimental
commander Dong Cai [5576 2088] and young regimental commander Zhenfeng [5514 2182
1496], who joined the army in the 1960''s, at the head of their respective regi-
ment's staff personnel, carried out a military exercise in which "red" and "blue"
forces were pitted against each other, from the sand table to the field, and which
closely simulated actual warfare. This was the fourth exercise of a similar nature
carried out by a certain division of the Shenyang Units since the beginning of this
year.
Look: these two new and veteran commanders who engaged in battle, regardless of
whether meeting in combat in sandtable exercises or attacking and defending in
field combat, followed developments in the situation that were hard to predict,
thought hard about strategems, and each one used "unexpected tricky moves" and
sharply contended with each other. Whoever discovered some traces of the other
side would vigorously press forward steadily, but the side which had suffered a
setback would not give the slightest indication of weakness and would try in every
possible way to regain the initiative. Over 100 comrades at the army and division
level who are leaders or commanding officers in combat training, and who had come
to observe and study this exercise, unanimously held that a commander without true
command ability could not carry out this kind of unplanned confrontational exer-
cise. In the past, this division, with regard to the key problem of cadre train-
ing, although thinking of some methods, all along had insufficient ideas about its
solution. In particular, the improvement in training a commanding officer's ca-
pacity to command at his level was never stressed, which resulted in the command
capacity of some senior officers not being up to standard and being fairly far from
the actual requirements ofcommand at their levels. Therefore, the phenomenon oc-
curred of "the staff officers grading the training exercises and the senior officer
just initialing their documents." How could we as rapidly as possible improve the
commanding officer's command ability at his own level? The leadership of the
division organized headquarters comrades to look through many written materials.
They discovered that many foreign armies lay great stress on training that pits
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commanding officers against each other. The leadership then organized the senior
officers and the headquarters of several regiments to carry out a confrontational
drill. Even it this experience was insufficient, it effectively tested and tem-
pered the commanding officers' capability for command and promoted their initiative
for strengthening their own training. The regimental commanders who had taken part
in the confrontational exercise all felt: Carrying out confrontational exercises
in which commanding officers at the same level are organized to "wrestle" with each
other forces them to compare in the field their ideas, intelligence, and capacity
for command. If in ordinary times, we do not work hard to improve our command
level, then we will not pass the test when we engage in a confrontational exercise.
This year, the division made the confrontational training of regimental senior
officers and headquarters the focal point of its cadre training. The leadership
organization of the Shenyang Units gave this training much attention, and timely
sent a work team to the division to. plant an "experimental plot" and to provide con-
crete help and guidance. The commanding officers became keyed up, and a pressing,
situation was immediately created. Dong Cai, veteran commander of a certain regi-
ment, after this training topic was assigned, who had always felt he had a good
idea of how things stood, took his bedroll to his office. On the four walls of his
office he pasted charts and diagrams showing the establishment, equipment, and
capabilities of all weapons of our army and the enemy army. When he had time he
studied them, imposing on himself the task of memorizing each day some relevant data
concerning foreign armies. In order to clarify a certain command problem, he often
bent over his desk and studied until deep into the night. Ge Zhenfeng, the young
commander of a certain regiment, although becoming a regiment commander in 1978, he
had previously spent many years in staff work for training and had several times
taken part in organizing big training exercises, and had once led a whole. regiment
on a training exercise, but he still approached the task gingerly. With regard to
the division's decision to carry out a confrontational exercise, Ge Zhenfeng felt
more under pressure than he ever had before. In order to increase his analytic and
judgmental capacity, he started work early and knocked off late, using all the time
that could be used to read some military research materials on our army and foreign
armies, to repeatedly improve his knowledge of an enemy regiment's tactical thought
and operational principles and to study systematic materials and some publications
on the Egyptian-Israeli wars. In particular, he took notes on matters concerning
the analyses and judgments of commanders, and in the period of a little over 3
months had written over 20,000 Chinese characters of study notes.
The command ability of all commanders who took part in the confrontational exer-
cises, after "wrestling" with their opponents, no matter whether they were new or
veteran, had attended academies or not, markedly increased. In their own words,
this "bout of wrestling" was better than 10 "fights on paper."
In the last third of June, the leadership organizations of the Shenyang Units held
an on-the-spot meeting at this division in which it called on all senior officers
and headquarters of the units to immediately launch confrontational training.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 8 Jul 80 p 1
[Article by Yu Jianhua [0151 1696 5978], Chen Qingfa [7115 1987 4099], Liu Shengfu
[0491 4141 4395], and Dai Hui'an [2071 1920 1344]: "A Certain Division Carries
Out an Experimental Transport Drill on the Changjiang River"]
[Text] Editor's note: A certain division has carried out strategic bat-
tle mobility transport drill on the Changjiang River, thereby
filling a gap in our military training and indicating that this
unit's training level is being developed in breadth and depth.
It appears that this "gap" exists in varying degrees in each ser-
vice arm and each unit. In the original training topics that can
be just touched upon, owing to a lack of practice, this topic has
been a gap for a long time; in the training topics that need to
be popularized, owing to the topic having been confined to only a
small number of experimental points, it was also a gap for the
greater part of the units. All these units are waiting for our
makeup lessons. Military training is a kind of scientific exper-
iment. We should bear in mind the continual developmental changes
in weapons and equipment and in modes of operation, focus on the
new topics that these changes present to us, continually experi-
ment and probe, and discover and open up new areas in training.
On 20 June, a flotilla formed of several tens of 10,000-ton class ships, fully
loaded with infantry, artillery, vehicles, tanks, and horses, sailed through tower-
ing columns of water straight down the Sanmen Gorge. A certain division's water
transport experimental drill was just here being intensively carried out.
How to use large rivers to carry out strategic battle mobility and transport com-
bined arms forces-this is still a gap in our army's training. In 1975, the divi-
sion put forward a plan for waterway transport training, but it was never put into
practice. This year, it again put forward this training plan, and the general
headquarters listed it as a key item in this year's training.
This drill occurred right in the middle of the flood season. The water mark was
changing rapidly and there were many dangerous conditions on the river; the refer-
ence materials and data required were lacking; the division had no idea at all of
how to conduct a series of training measures that would insure coordination; the
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object of the transport was a complete combined arms force of "vehicles, horses, and
artillery," and the ships used were leased locally and many of the local cadres,
technicians, and workers were to assist in the training, and also the drill would
be carried out with tactical conditions in the background. These conditions posed
great difficulties in organization and command and in all kinds of safeguarding
work.
Confronted with this brand new topic and enormous task, the leadership organizatio.-ns
of the division appealed to the troops: Emancipate your :winds, be bold in making
innovations, and pool the wisdom and efforts of everyone in order to fill this
training gap and accelerate your contributions to preparing well to counter an ag-
gressive war. They formed a joint loading command post with representatives of the
port offices and the (? Changjiang River Navigation Corps) [Chang Hang Jun 7022
514A 65112, and together reconnoitered the navigation route. They also organized
cadres at platoon and above levels to learn about water transport from local com-
rades, to gain an understanding of the functions: of all kinds of ships, and to be-
come familiar with docking conditions. The officers and men, under a high tempera-
ture of over 40 degrees [centigrade] and in complete battle dress, tried to gain
experience in water transport. They trained in daytime in loading and unloading,
and also at nighttime without illumination; they trained on fixed docks and also on
temporarily erected docks; they trained in transporting across water under normal
conditions and also under conditions of an enemy air raid, atomic attack, chemical
warfare attack, and a mine blockade. In this way, they tentatively found out the
relevant data and work sequences needed in organizing and commanding a combined
arms force for strategic battle mobility on an inland river, probed into questions
of mutual coordination and combat safeguards in transporting across water infantry,
artillery, and tanks as well as engineer, signal, antichemical warfare and other
special detachments; accumulated experience, during the hottest part of the year,
in transporting a long distance across water personnel and horses, providing life
safeguards such as food, acconodation, heat protection, and sickness prevention
and carrying out administrative management; researched the political and ideologi-
cal work for troops while being transported a long distance across water; and
summed up the experiences in, when using local ships for transporting troops under
tense conditions, military-civilian cooperation.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
SATCHEL CHARGES CAN BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TANKS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 8 Jul 80 p 2
[Article in "How To Highlight Training in the 'Three Attacks and Three Defenses"'
column: "A Few Words in Fairness to the Use of Satchel Charges in Attacking Tanks"]
[Text] Editor's note: In the final analysis, can satchel charges be used
in attacking tanks? The answer to this question can neither be a
simple affirmation nor a simple negation. With regard to the
training topic of attacking tanks with satchel charges, it is un-
necessary to spend a great deal of time in large-scale and special
training, but to look upon the topic as not being of the slightest
usefulness and to not give it any consideration is not necessarily
correct. The correct attitude is to employ the dialectical method
and impartially evaluate the function of satchel charges, thereby
putting this training topic in a satisfactory position. This col-
umn is publishing two articles that present some views on this
topic and welcomes everybody's continued presentation of their
opinions.
[Subarticle by the 7th Company of a certain regiment of the Ji'nan Units: "An
Indispensable Supplementary Method"]
Our company is an advance detachment of infantry in training in attacking tanks.
Since the beginning of last year, the company has thrown satchel charges at real
tanks no less than 300 to 400 times. Here, thinking of our training practice, we
would like to say a few words in fairness to satchel-charge attacks on tanks.
In the beginning, our understanding as a group was not very clear-cut: with a
tank's high speed, fierce firepower and thick armor so that when it comes it is
like a great host, if satchel charges are exploded, they are inadequate at a dis-
tance and one cannot be sure of getting close, so that to train with satchel
charges is a waste of effort. For this reason, we launched a discussion. We
raised these questions: "If it were not for steamed dumplings, would you want to
eat steamed bread?" "If there were no tractors, could you discard pickaxes?"
Everybody drew up the balance sheet on the basis of the company's four kinds of
weapons for attacking tanks--rocket launchers, bangalore torpedoes, mines, and
satchel charges--and, naturally, calculated that the rocket launcher is the most
advanced weapon. With the company having these several weapons, we should think
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of other methods of attacking tanks. According to comrades of the military train-
ing department, their experiments on the efficacy of satchel charges in attacking
tanks had proved that a fixed amount of satchel charges thrown at certain places
on a tank can have a definite effect. For example, they can cut tank treads, de-
molish a tank engine, damage a tank's gun turret and the joints on its body, etc.
Even if the explosive does not destroy, it can shock or stun those inside, or at
least slow the movement of the tank. Through the discussion they came to the con-
clusion: "Having many skills does not inhibit the individual," and that having
one more hand is always stronger than having one less hanc'. In coming days in
dealing with enemy tanks, the rocket launcher is the principal weapon and the
satchel charge and bangalore torpedo are the supplementary weapons. This is al-
ways better than to come under an attack and look on helplessly.
According to a proverb, a foot has its shortness and an inch has its length. Com-
paring a tank with a satchel charge, each has its long points and short points. In
training in dealing with tanks, we often discover that although they have many
strong points they also have not a few weak points, and they certainly do not have
unlimited supernatural power and cannot be vanquished. For example: 1. Tanks are
somewhat fast, but this speed is restricted by the type of terrain and road, and
they move slowly at times. 2. Although a tank's firepower is strong, it has many
blind angles of observation that hamper its firing, and there are times when it is
helpless. 3. A tank's front and two sides are strongly protected, but the armor
of its engine's ventilating ducts is thin, the tank's gun turret and body are not
firmly joined, and the tank's tread is exposed--all these things can easily be
damaged by an explosion.
In comparison with the tank's abovementioned "weaknesses amid strengths," the
"satchel charge" has many "strengths amid weaknesses." First, the demolitioner is
not restricted by the type of terrain or road, and can, with mobile and flexible
tactics, get close to and blow up the tank; second, the demolitioner presents a
small target and thus can easily take cover, and he has a wide field of vision for
observation; and third, he can use all sorts of measures to slow the tank's speed,
disrupt a formation of tanks, and create an advantageous opportunity for throwing
his satchel charge. In addition to setting up positions with pits and wooden
stakes, we often construct a net-shaped position. Practice has proved that after
a tank enters a net-shaped position, its speed is immediately slowed, and, the
tankers, besides raising the hatch and throwing handgrenades at or crushing the
infantry in the position, have no other "tricks"; we can then, by making use of
the trenches, from all quarters and under cover, close in on the enemy and throw
satchel charges.
If training in the skill of satchel-charge attacks on tanks is done well, it will
be useful in war;on the contrary, if the training is not done well, losses will be
sustained. Therefore, peacetime training must certainly approximate real warfare
and we cannot by any means deceive ourselves about this. At the beginning we re-
peatedly trained in attacking stationary models of tanks. After training to a
point at which "each satchel charge hit the target," we trained in attacking real
tanks. When all the trainees saw this tall and big armored weapon coming up with
its clanking noise, they were a little tense, and many comrades did not throw
their satchel charges accurately. What were we to do? Our solution was more
training. All the trainees, for 3 hot summer days, crawled, climbed, rolled, and
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attacked, repeatedly practicing advancing in a crouched position, quickly stopping
and drawing fire, rapidly throwing stachel charges, quickly withdrawing, and lying
down and taking cover, thereby acquiring masterly Skill through intensive training.
When examined by the upper levels, the cadres and soldiers of the company, in
throwing satchel charges at three moving tanks, attained an accuracy rate of 80
percent. At the same time, based on the shape of each vital part of a tank, we
also improved the forms of the satchel charges, making seven kinds of satchel
charges including those in the form of two linked poles, the form of a ship's
deck, and the form of the Chinese character 'man' [ren 0086], and thus increasing
the power of satchel charges in attacking tanks.
[Subarticle by the advance antitank squad of a certain regiment: "Don't Under-
estimate Its Power, Don't Deny Its Weak Points"]
Since the beginning of last year, our squad has been the regiment's advance squad
in the mission of training in satchel-charge attacks on tanks. With real tanks as
the target, each squad member has thrown satchel charges not less than 400 times.
We think that the power of a satchel charge cannot be underestimated, but that its
weak points are obvious, and we should speak clearly on this issue in the spirit
of seeking truth from facts.
If a tank moves fast, a satchel charge cannot hit it. In the first stage of our
training, a tank was driven at its first and second levels of speed, and we, in
general, were able to hit it. When the tank increased to the fourth level of
speed, we, jumping up from our original distance, could not even tough it: as the
tank rushed past, the satchel charges were thrown too late. Subsequently, we
changed our tactics, advancing our jumpoff time so as to get a good lead time for
throwing the satchel charges. Who would have thought that the tank would move as
if it were a bullet, so that the satchel charges when thrown did not roll in front
of the tank but were knocked upside down. Still not admitting defeat, we had six
comrades whose technical expertise was fairly good carry out "bombing in waves."
The result was that when the tank circled them several times, the six comrades only
scored one hit with a satchel charge. Having lost this game, we understood: With
regard to a tank being driven at high speed over open terrain, satchel charge at-
tacks on tanks are fundamentally ineffective. In this kind of situation, we cer-
tainly cannot act recklessly but must think of ways to slow the tank's speed before
attacking.
When there are many tanks, satchel charge demolitioners cannot be relied upon. With
a periscope, all comrades of our squad can clearly see a target over 20 meters away,
but the tank's machinegun and cannon can also score hits. According to foreign
military briefing materials, when Soviet tanks mass for advance, the distance be-
tween them is usually from 50 to 100 meters, and in battle formation this distance
is usually 70 to 150 meters. They can cover each other in turn and form a criss-
cross network of fire. Under these conditions, a tank's blind angle is not a blind
angle for another tank. Our satchel charge demolitioners when exploding their
satchel charge are subject to surprise fire attacks from one or more tanks, and
even from one or more directions. If you cannot get close to a tank, there is the
possibility of being killed or wounded by fire from the tanks. During our training,
we frequently asked the tankers for their comment and appraisal. They told us that
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it was, no good to use the same method of attack on a group of tanks that we used
on a single tank, but that we must first attack the tank formation, or choose ad-
vantageous terrain or opportunities before we attacked.
Moreover, in various countries of the world, tank-manufacturing technology is de-
veloping fast. Some advanced tanks have composite armor and their tracks are pro-
tected, so that an ordinary satchel charge cannot do significant damage. During
our training, we realized: It is not very difficult to throw a satchel charge
weighing 6 kilograms or less, but if this weight is increased a little then it
becomes very difficult. However, we know that it usually takes an explosive charge
weighing 8 kilograms to pierce 60-mm armor, and that the two sides of the T-62
tank, which is what Soviet units are universally equipped with, is 70 to 120 mm
thick; the new T-72 tank's armor is even thicker. This makes it difficult to carry
out satchel-charge attacks on these tanks, because if the charge is small the blast
will not do sufficient damage, while if the charge is large it cannot be thrown.
If we cannot destroy the tank by the blast and only rely on the blast to inflict
casualties on enemy personnel by its shock effect, then obviously its effect is
diminished. Based on our adversary's equipment, we must carry out innovations and
make improvements on satchel charges so that they will better meet the requirements
of a future war.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2
[Article by staff correspondents Wei Xuding [5898 2485 1353], Xing Laizhao [6717
0171 6856], and Li Peijin [2621 1014 6855] and staff reporters Sun Li [1327 4539],
Mao Wenrong [3029 2429 2051], and Hong Zhonglin [6575 0022 2651]: "Let the 'Com-
mander of the Vanguard Unit' Truly Be in the Vanguard"]
[Text] "Food and fodder should go ahead of troops and horses"--this was the wise
remark of an experienced person early in the pregunpowder era. However, owing to
the fact that our backward mess methods did not keep pace with the development of
weapons and equipment, the "commander of the vanguard unit" often could not be in
the vanguard, and the provisions for field mess work did not meet the requirements
of modern combat and training. A certain antiaircraft artillery division of the
Beijing Units worked hard to mechanize its mess work in order to take the path to-
ward resolving this contradiction (for details see the 25 June edition of this
newspaper). On 21 June, we again paid a call on the party committee members of
the antiaircraft artillery division and asked them to brief us on some ways of
thinking about and understanding from experience of mechanizing mes work.--
The Suffering Caused by the Dereliction of Duty by the "Commander of the Vanguard
Unit"
Question: Why did you, the divisional party committee, think of mechanizing mess
work?
Answer: We were "driven to join the Liangshan Mountain rebels," i.e., forced to
do something desperate. Since our division was formed it has carried out many mo-
bile operational missions. In mountain and forest regions, the unit's position
would shift 3 or 4 times in 1 day, and, with their pots, bowls, ladles, and basins
in a big heap, the mess personnel were always so busy that they couldn't sit down.
If they ran into stormy days and nights, their bodies were covered with mud and
water and their faces with ashes. As a consequence, the food was not cooked and
the troops had to shift their positions on empty stomachs. The difficulties in
cooking food by burying pots on the vast Gobi Desert sands need not be raised.
The mess personnel angrily said: "There is something strange about the sand in
the northwest: a cooking pit is covered over faster than it can be dug and iron
spades just rub against a smooth surface. Therefore, we must tighten our belts."
During a severe winter north of the Great Wall, the frozen layer of earth can be as
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thick as 90 centimeters. A pickaxe blow leaves white imprints, and sometimes for
a whole day a cooking pit cannot be scratched out of the ground. Even if it is.
finally dug, when a fire is lit the frozen earth melts and the cooking pit col-
lapses. These "sufferings" make us feel deeply that the old method of cooking
food by burying pots cannot be continued. We have been put on notice by the ad-
vanced battlefield cooking methods of some countries, and this makes us deter-
mined to mechanize food preparation.
Question: How could you think of doing this yourselves w14-hout waiting for the
upper levels to distribute the necessary equipment?
Answer: In the beginning, everybody was not in complete accord on whether we
should start this work ourselves. Afterward, we were in accord: If we want to do
this, we must immediately get to work on it and we cannot wait. Our country is
large, its population is huge and its foundation is poor. If everybody were to sit
and wait for "food that is prepared by others," how many years or months would we
have to wait? Modernization is a matter for the entire party, entire country, and
entire army, and only if we start to work from top to bottom can the pace of mod-
ernization be quickened. Facts before our eyes teach us that if we had sat and
waited with folded arms, it is highly possible that we would have nothing now. We.
did not passively sit and wait, and now the entire division is basically mechaniz-
ing food preparation. Practice has made us realize that modernization will not
come if we wait until the equipment is distributed to us, and even less if we just
wish it, but only if we set to work.
From Where Did They Summon the "God of Wealth"?
Question: The mechanization of food preparation requires money and materials.
This is a practical difficulty. How did you resolve it?
Answer: A materialist is one who is particular about conditions and who speaks in
terms of conditions. To innovate requires the expenditure of some money. For our
mechanization of food preparation, the upper level gave us some money and truly
supported us in a big way, but the major part of the outlay was borne by ourselves.
Question: Where did this money come from?
Answer: We carried on the old traditional method of our party and our army:
broadening the sources of income and reducing expenditures. In these past years,
we all along grasped agriculture and sideline production and would not let go of
it. From the beginning in 1977, we further mechanized agricultural and sideline
production so that there were few soldiers engaged in this production, its cost
was low, and its output high. We also made great efforts to handle well the pig
raising, vegetable planting, and small workshop operations of companies, and this
gradually enriched the unit. In this way, with the unit prospering and its re-
sources becoming substantial, we had the possibility of taking money from this
production income for food preparation mechanization. If the unit was so poor
that it had to beg and could only give consideration to filling the troops' bellies,
how could it give consideration to mechanization of food preparation?
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In making innovations, we must both spend money and pay attention to practicing
thrift, so that in the days of prosperity provisions are made for the days of
poverty. In making the innovations, we did things simply and thriftily, did the
job with local methods, repaired and utilized old or discarded things, and as far
as possible did a lot with little money. Local salvage stations became our "Mater-
ials storehouse." For example, a certain regiment bought a steel plate, for which
it paid 7 or 8 yuan, to replace the outer casing of the distributor box on its
bread oven; and the head of this regiment's logistics department rushed to the
salvage station and bought an item being sold at a reduced price of 4 fen per jin,
only spending a total of 1 jiao 4 fen.
More Participation by a Batch of "Self-Taught Experts"
Question: Obviously it will not do for you not to have the technical personnel to
operate your advanced cooking instruments. Where did you obtain these technical
personnel?
Answer: We mainly depended on some "self-taught experts" in the repair department.
It is said that mechanization of food preparation is a matter for which the mil-
itary supply department is responsible. But more than half the people in this
department are former mess personnel and mess officers, and they really don't know
much about machinery. Our method was to break through the boundaries between mil-
itary occupations, and to transfer from the ordnance repair side "crack troops and
good generals to join in the battle." At the beginning, some comrades of the re-
pair department felt that their function was to repair vehicles and artillery
pieces and that to deal with this "plaything" all the time was to "ignore one's
proper occupation." We pointed out to these comrades that the purpose of repairing
vehicles and artillery pieces was to prepare against war and that was also the pur-
pose of mechanizing food preparation, insuring that the troops would be strong and
win victories, so how could they say that this was not their "proper occupation."
While solving this problem of understanding, we also got a tight grip on mechaniz-
ing the repair and maintenance of vehicles and artillery pieces. For example, in
the past, 3 or 4 days were required to perform second-level maintenance on one type
of foreign tractor trucks, but now only 6-8 hours are sufficient. In the past, 4
days' time was needed to change the grease on a type of small antiaircraft gun, and
now only 4 hours are needed. Not only is the speed fast but the quality is up to
standard. This greatly increased our maintenance capacity, so that repair person-
nel were released to make innovations on cooking instruments, and neither the re-
form of cooking instruments nor the repair of ordnance equipment suffered.
What Is Important Is That "Rear Services Not Be in the Rear"
Question: Why was your mechanization of food preparation able to spring up so
rapidly everywhere?
Answer: one basic reason that this work was able to spread fairly rapidly through-
out the division was that the party committee put rear services work in the proper
position so that "rear services were not in the rear." We thought that in modern
warfare it is hard to move even an inch without rear services. In practice, we
continually drew benefit from rear services. And speaking of food, we grasped'
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agricultural and sideline production, reformed cooking instruments, improved the
troops' life, strengthened the fighters' physiques, and directly promoted educa-
tion and training. Here is one very obvious example. In the past, when mess work
was not done well, it weakened the physiques of the cadres and fighters so that
whereas originally a little over 20 persons could pull an artillery piece up a
slope, a little over 40 persons could not pull it up. The situation is different
now. With the improvement in mess work, the strength of the troops is adequate and
their morale is high. The political cadres have reported that, with better living
conditions, political work is half again as good as it was. Therefore, in a cer-
tain sense, by grasping rear services we grasp political work and combat effective-
ness. Rear services work has a place on our party's daily agenda, and there is
time set aside for it and people put in charge of it. Division commander Deng
Guozhong [6772 0948 1813] has always grasped the rear services very tightly, and
if he does not see results he does not let go; he has in succession stayed at two
regiments as his selected grassroots points in order to grasp the mechanization of
food preparation. Political commissar Wang Maolu [3769 3148 3873] is fully in-
volved in rear services construction. Once he led a work team to the grassroots
point of a certain regiment, and, by taking as his point of departure the grasping
of ideology and the grasping of an organized group, rectified the rear services
ranks in a down-to-earth manner, which caused the regiment's rear services to make
rapid progress and to become a model for the whole division.
With regard to leadership methods, we paid attention to using the experience of
selected units to promote work in the entire area, and popularized this model.
Every year we organize 3 or 4 big inspections of rear services work, organize mu-
tual inspection and learning from each other, exchange experiences, and organize
exhibits of achievements, thereby creating a situation in which people try to over-
take each other in friendly emulation and in which the work is done faster, so that
if you don't have learning you are forced to learn and if you are not moving you
are forced to move.
Finally, the comrades of the party committee of this antiaircraft artillery divi-
sion unanimously indicated that although the mechanization of food preparation had
obtained specific results, this was only a beginning. The mechanization of food
preparation must further develop in the direction of miniaturization, portability,
multipurpose use, and the linking up of parts to form a whole. At the same time,
we must also get a good grip on the, modernization and gearing up for combat of
other rear services occupations, so that rear services work will truly be able,
under any conditions, to be set in motion, win initial successes, provide supplies,
and send relief.
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PVn Vi'P ll..at1L UOG Vl11L,1
TROOPS GUARD VITAL STRETCH OF VIETNAM BORDER RAILROAD
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2
[Article by Zhou Nanyou [0719 0589 0645] and Wu Jinhua [0702 6855 5478]: "Speed
Along, Frontier Defense Train"]
[Text] In the motherland's southwestern outpost on our side of the Vietnam border
in the Bazi River zone, each day a train loaded with construction goods and mater-
ials, its iron wheels rolling and its steam whistle blowing, speeds past the eyes
and gun muzzles of the Vietnamese army, rushing toward strategically important
Hekou. Every time the people of Hekou unload the train's goods and materials
transported from all parts of the motherland, how can they not praise the officers
and men of the Yunnan border defense units who have the mission of protecting by
arms the railroad line?
Yunnan's Kunming-Hekou railroad line goes from the Bazi River to the Hekou railway
station, following all the way the river marking the border between China and Viet-
nam--below the Nanxi River bed, an over 10-kilometer railway section is separated
from Vietnam only by water, and at its closest point the distance does not reach
100 meters. The section is completely exposed to the eyes of the Vietnamese army.
The Vietnamese army continually creates incidents on our border, frequently firing
rifles and cannons, blowing up our railroad, and making surprise attacks on the
train. Once the train had no choice but to stop running along this stretch of the
railroad, and the normal production and life of the masses of people in the border
area were seriously threatened. In order to defend the motherland's honor and to
insure the supply of goods and materials needed for the life of the border inhab-
itants in the Hekou area, this stretch of railroad absolutely must be kept open
to traffic.
Such being the case, the burden of defending the railroad's security falls on the
shoulders of the heroic border defense units. They resolutely smash with their
iron fists the savage arrogance of the Vietnamese army. Not long after the work
of repairing the railroad began, one day the Vietnamese army dispatched four spe-
cial agents to try to slip across the Vietnam border and destroy the railroad that
we were just then repairing. After the 5th Company discovered this, they immedi-
ately moved to our side of the border river. As the Vietnamese soldiers crossed
the river and came ashore, our cadres and fighters shouted: "(Luo song kong ye)
(Vietnamese for: Lay down your arms and we'll spare your lives)!" The Vietnamese
soldiers opened fire and stubbornly resisted. Our border defense fighters, filled
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with rage, counterattacked and killed one and wounded two of the Vietnamese sol-
diers. The other one, seeing that the situation was, far from good, turned and ran
in a bid to slip away by swimming, and he feld into our 7th Company's defense area.
Squad leader Li Fawen [2621 3127 2429] of the 7th Company, who was then on point
duty, quickly seized a machinegun from a new fighter's hands and shot dead this
scoundrel engaged in a Vietnam border provocation.
This small victory dealt a blow to the rampant arrogance of the aggressors, but
they refused to give up their evil designs. From August t.. last year, after the
Kun(ming)-He(kou) railroad line had been formally opened to traffic, every time t},e
train passed, the Vietnamese soldiers would get into position and pull back their
rifle bolts with a clicking sound. Their commanding officer would stick his head
out from his shelter in search of an opportunity to stage a provocation. But, see-
ing our border defense fighters carrying loaded rifles and standing in combat
readiness along the railroad line, the Vietnamese did not dare to act recklessly.
Although the time taken by each train in passing over.this stretch of railroad was
very short, the border defense fighters guarding the stretch had to stand guard,
patrol, and entrench day and night. When the train was about to pass, all of them
would be sent out to provide armed protection, and the cadres and soldiers had to
be on duty over 10 hours every day.
This zone is in the curved-shape tropical climate zone, and every summer the out-
side temperature is usually above 50 degrees [centigrade]; in the patches of cogon-
grass, ants, mosquitoes, and leeches form in throngs. Nobody knows the amount of
suffering that the cadres and soldiers endure to guard the people's train from be-
ing blocked! After a considerable period of time here, some comrades have ringworm
on their bodies, and some even develop ulcers on parts of their skin, but they
never say a word about their sufferings. Li Xianwen [2621 7341 2429], a fighter of
the 5th Company, developed a skin ulcer in his hip region so that he could not
bring his feet together and could walk only with extreme difficulty. The comrades-
in-arms in his squad and the company commander on several occasions tried to per-
suade him to stay in the barracks and rest. His answer was in the affirmative, but
when the company's entrenching party set out, he quietly followed in the rear.
Once, Kui Zhaosheng [1145 3564 3932], a deputy squad leader of the 6th Company, led
three fighters to a certain place where they entrenched themselves. At 8 o'clock
that night, a Vietnamese soldier stealthily crossed the border river in an attempt
to infiltrate across our border and carry out a harassing attack and cause destruc-
tion. After the enemy had clambered ashore, he hid behind a large tree from where
he could observe anything stirring around him. Just then, new fighter Huang Zhishu
[7806 2655 2855], who was sharp-eyed and quick-moving, raised his rifle and pulled
the trigger. Simultaneously with the report of the rifle, the Vietnamese soldier
tumbled into the river.
... ... [ellipses as published]
The steam whistle blows and the wheels roll; the people's train rushes forward ...
... [ellipses as published]
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DIVISION OF SHENYANG UNITS BENEFITS FROM NIGHT TRAINING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2
[Article by Chen Xiangmin [7115 0686 3046]: "Putting Into Practice a Night Train-
ing System Leads to Outstanding Successes"]
[Text] A certain division of the Shenyang Units has put into effect a week-long
night training system which unites the night training of the organization and its
detachments [fendui 0433 7130] and which has produced marked results.
In the past, the quality of the division's night training was comparatively low.
In order to change this state of affairs, the division's leadership conscientiously.
heeded the opinions of the lower levels and decided to put into practice a system
of week-long night training. Every month, after the daytime training topics are
completed, each regiment arranges in a unified fashion a week's night training and
completes 7 nights of training. In this way, the daytime and nighttime training
topics are organically integrated and the night training of the organization and
its detachments is unified. Since this training began 4 months ago, the night
training week system has been maintained, the participation rate has reached over
87 percent, and the results of tests in each regiment have all been markedly
successful.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2
[Article by staff correspondent Xu Nengrong [1776 5174 2837] and staff special cor-
respondent Zhang Ming [1728 7686]: "Breakthroughs Beginning To Be Made in Diffi-
culties Connected With Night Landing Training"]
[Text] A certain landing ship detachment of the East [China] Sea Fleet, from the
first 10 days in May until the middle 3.0 days of June, engaged in night landing
training, and began to make breakthroughs in long-existing difficulties in fleet
training.
Night landing training is a weak link. Some warship captains, when encountering
ships passing through their navigational sea lanes at night, are forced to drop
anchor and wait for the dawn, not daring to again sail forward. But, during a fu-
ture war against aggression, military personnel, tanks, and vehicles must be swift-
ly and in a concealed manner transported to frontline islands, and this frequently
will involve nighttime navigation and landing. Therefore, this detachment made
night training a key topic for breakthroughs, and first of all drew from each ship
its captain or first mate and brought them together in one group for training in
nighttime landing operations. After this period of training, the captains or first
mates all had mastered the positions of sea lanes, islands, and reefs and the navi-
gational objectives and sea patterns, had learned about radar-guided navigation,
and had exercised their capacity for night landing operations. They went back and
forth along these sea lanes 16 times and made 26 night landings, covering a range
of over 1,000 nautical miles. All of them completed their missions in fairly good
fashion.
After the warship captain training class was over, the unit launched night train-
ing. The detachment dispatched three landing ships to carry out 20 days of night
navigation training in dangerous sea lanes, thereby changing the past state of af-
fairs in which they could not sail independently at night in unfamiliar sea areas
and raising to a new level the training of the entire detachment.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
ARMY SETS QUALITY STANDARDS FOR NIGHT TRAINING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul 80 p 2
(Article by Hong Wei [3163 1218], Yun Feng [0061 1496], and Nan Hai [0589 3189]:
"A Certain Army Links Up the Parts of Night Training To Form a Whole]
[Text] On the night of 18 June, in a quiet and secluded valley deep in the reces-
ses of Yan Mountain, the "bang, bang, bang" of rifles shattered the still night sky.
It was here that the quality standards on-the-spot meeting of nighttime basic train-
ing by a certain army of the Beijing Units was being held.
This army began to formulate its quality standards for nighttime basic training at
the beginning of April this year. Before this year's nighttime training began,
the leadership comrades of this army analyzed the previous night training. They
saw that one important reason for the fact that for a long time there had not been
a breakthrough in night training was that in the night training topics there was
not the comparatively clear-cut quality standards that there were for daytime tech-
niques and tactics, so that inspections of the results of the unit's training were
not good and it was highly necessary to formulate a standard for assessing the
quality of night training in order to raise the level of this training. In order
to make the assessment standard match the unit's reality, the leadership comrades
went to the 1st Company of a certain regiment, a company that was fairly good in
night training, and practiced with the cadres and fighters there. After 9 succes-
sive revisions, they formulated assessment standards for 15 training topics, and
thus linked up the parts of the nighttime training content to form a whole.
This army has compiled a book made up of its outline, teaching plan, and assessment
standard for night basic training and has issued it to all infantry detachments
[bubing fendui 2975 0365 0433 7130]. In the second half of the year, the army will
again organize a checkup before all the infantry detachments begin their training
in accord with these standards.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Jul. 80 p 3
[Article by Liang Huarong [2733 5478 2837], Zhang (?Lu)mei [1728 7216 2734], and
Zheng (?Wen)hua [6774 4489 5478]: "Promoting to Full Party Member Strictly Accord-
ing to Party Member Standards"]
[Text] The party committee of a certain division of the Guangxi border defense
units has strengthened the ideological education of, and has done well the work of
promoting to full members strictly according to the standards for party members,
those probationary party members who were enrolled during the war of self-defensive
counterattack. This has made this batch of probationary party members be able to
correctly look upon their past glory, to establish the idea throughout their lives
of struggling for the cause of communism, and to work hard to become qualified
party members.
Last year, during and after the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam,
this division enrolled a batch of probationary party members. In April of this
year, one after another, these probationary party members entered the period of
becoming full members. In order to do well the work of promoting these comrades to
full party members, Wang Chengben [3769 2052 2609], secretary of the division's
party committee, led a work team to the companies to carry out investigation and
research. From their investigation and research they saw that the behavior of the
great majority of the comrades in this batch of probationary party members had been
good, and many of these comrades had again been awarded for rendering meritorious
service. However, there were also some comrades who had developed feelings of ar-
rogance in claiming credit for themselves, thinking that they had fought in the war
and shed their blood and had rendered meritorious service, and that being a party
member was not something they had to run after. Therefore, they became lax about
ideological reform and were unable to put the strict demands upon themselves that
the standards of a communist party member require. And there were others who did
not keep their minds on border defense, holding the idea of "not making a mistake
and waiting for 1 year, after which I will become a full member and be demobilized,"
and their work became commonplace and their role as models was not strong. The
division's party committee analyzed the cause for the emergence of this problem
as mainly being the lack of a profound understanding of the nature of the party
and the standards for party members. Therefore, they decided to use the opportunity
of promoting them to full members to provide a supplementary lesson in this regard.
Separately, they went to eight companies and made them their educational
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experimental points and conducted rotational training classes, focusing on the
ideological problems and blurred understanding of the probationary party members.
They organized them to study the party's basic knowledge and to study the revised
draft of the party constitution, "Some Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Politi-
cal Life" and Comrade Liu Shaoqi's "How To Be a Good Communist." They also guided
them in launching the "three discussions and three checkups" activity: discussing
the party's nature, mission, and program, and checking up on whether they them-
selves are ideologically prepared to struggle for communism throughout their lives;
discussing the eight obligations that party members must carry out and checking up
on which of these obligations they have themselves carried out and which they have
not; discussing the deeds of proletarian revolutionaries of the older generation
and of model communist party members such as Jiao Yulu, Lei Feng, and Lu Shicai,
and checking up on the disparities between these people and themselves. Everybody
was greatly moved by this education. Many comrades said: Being a qualified party
member is not easy, and we cannot lower the standards of party members.
On the basis of this ideological education, the division's party committee one by
one tested and judged the probationary party members who had arrived at the time
for becoming full party members, promoting to full party member each one who was
qualified. For comrades who temporarily failed to meet the qualifications for be-
coming a full party member, they extended the probationary period and also did good
ideological work for them. One platoon leader was proposed for party membership
after the war. He thought he had already attained his desire and that he would be
leaving his border defense post a little early, and so he did not keep his mind on
his work. Based on his behavior during his probationary period, the party branch
decided to extend his probationary period for half a year. At first, he could not
figure out the reason for this, but after studying in a rotational training class
and having many heart-to-heart chats with the leaders, he understood that there was
a specific disparity between himself and the conduct demanded of a party member and
that the party branch's extension of his probationary period was.correct. He de-
cided to henceforth temper himself continually and strive to become a qualified
party member. From then on, he inspired revolutionary enthusiasm, and, no matter
whether it was military training or patrol duty and combat preparedness work, he
zealously led the platoon to complete its missions. The comrades said: "Our
platoon leader is just like a party member!"
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 2
[Article by Yi Caizi [2496 4857 6327], Sun Qingru [1327 3237 0302], and Chen Shijin
[7115 0013 68551: "School Director Wang Linde Vigorously Carries Out Teaching
Reform"]
[Text] Wang Linde [3769 2651 1795], director of the Infantry School of the Fuzhou
Units, has vigorously carried out teaching reform based on the characteristics of
modern warfare. Everybody has praised him: "The old school is not bound by old
conventions, and the one with old experience also pays attention to new
developments."
Wang Linde has held leadership posts at the army, division, and regiment level. He
also has done leadership work in schools for over 10 years and has considerably
rich experience in combat, training, and teaching. In order to obtain the right to
speak about reforming leadership teaching, he was not satisfied just to look at
data and listen to reports but regularly went to offices and made deep investiga-
tions of reality. At the end of December of last year, when he was making an in-
vestigation of Class No 12, the class was studying the subject of platoon attacks.
Director Wang proposed to the training department that, on the basis of the orig-
inally formulated training plan, practice with live ammunition and live soldiers be
added to the curriculum, and that, besides a platoon's own weapons, it be rein-
forced with an 82-mm recoiless rifle and a heavy machinegun, and also have tank and
engineer support. He inspired all of them to develop their insight and be con-
scious of this problem, viz., although, under present conditions, a reinforced
platoon does not have so many service arm weapons as this and the students being
trained today are platoon leaders, they could be company or battalion commanders
tomorrow; moreover, weapons and equipment are always undergoing continual innova-
tion, and the fact that they are not available today does not mean that they will
not be available tomorrow. To reinforce the school's existing equipment with some
weapons of other service arms and let these basic-level commanders tentatively try
to find out a few skills in.commanding combined arms operations will be of advan-
tage to them after they graduate when they are organizing their units for combined
arms training. The instructors unanimously recognized that they should work as one
to complete the reinforced platoon attack exercises of several classes of students.
The students happily said: The exercises this time broadened our horizon by giv-
ing us a little taste of combined arms training.
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Although school director Wang is very busy, he pays a great deal of attention to
studying knowledge pertaining to modern warfare and the advancec experiences of
foreign armies, continually bringing up to himself topics for teaching reform.
After reading books, periodicals, and articles which have any bearing whatsoever
on military technology and foreign military data, he carefully turns what he has
read over in his mind and ponders it for a time, thinking about what instructional
significance it has for the reform of the school's teaching. Recently, after read-
ing articles and materials on the "tactical airlift by helicopters of a Soviet mo-
torized infantry battalion," he turned the following thought over and over in his
mind: With the developing trend by the Soviet and American armed forces to switch
from surface mobility to air mobility by helicopter, what tactical measures in our
positional defense should be changed? He brought this question to the tactics
teaching and research section, and requested that it, focusing on changes in for-
eign military weapons and equipment, inquire into what methods we should take to
counter them.
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ARTILLERY SCHOOL, REGIMENT HELP EACH OTHER IN TRAINING
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 2
[Article: "Artillery School and Local Artillery Regiment Engage in Mutual Assis-
tance and Learning"]
[Text] An artillery school has concluded a teaching contract with .a local artil-
lery regiment under which this year it will train for the regiment nearly 100 of
its cadres and key members, and, taking the regiment as its "experimental plot,"
will use the new experience and results in the unit's training to guide the reform
of its teaching.
At the beginning of this year, Zhou [0719], head of the artillery school's train-
ing department, taking with him four comrades from his office, held research con-
sultations with leading comrades of the local artillery regiment. They concluded
a teaching contract under which it was determined that the artillery school would
conduct a course of lectures and make academic reports on military affairs rele-
vant to the unit, and would notify the artillery regiment of these activities so
that it could participate, and also train, in batches, the regiment's cadres;
the artillery regiment will act as an "'experimental plot" for the artillery
school, positively helping the school to improve its teaching.
In April, Man Yi [3341 3015], political commissar of the artillery regiment, led
29 command cadres at the regiment, battalion, and company levels and staff per-
sonnel to the artillery school for training in commanding firing by battalions
and groups. The artillery school selected as their instructors for this kind of
firing persons with over 20 years of teaching experience. From drawing board
school assignments and preparatory elements to the laws of firing, from the car-
rying out of individual missions to the coordination with infantry and tanks, the
instructors carefully explained and gave guidance on and demonstrated the school
assignments. They made just as strict demands on the artillery regiment's cadres
,,as they did on their formal students, issuing to them the same teaching apparatuses
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and setting and checking for them the same school assignments. After 20 days of
training, all the cadres had markedly improved in theoretical and actual school
assignments, and scored average marks of good or above on their tests.
In May the artillery regiment gathered together 17 battle-position cadres and in-
structors of the regiment's rotational training unit for training at the artillery
school in battle-position duties, with emphasis on the five major elements that af-
fect firing precision, including gun correction, aiming operations, and battle posi-
tion placement, in order to raise the battle position commanders' technical level
and their command capability. In order to solve the problem for the cadres of
synthesizing school assignments and training, the artillery school rendered posi-
tive help to the artillery regiment in fitting out an electrified firing classroom
by providing to the cadres for training purposes 12 new-type firing control instru-
ments. The artillery school has now trained cadres for the artillery regiment in
4 school terms, and cadres throughout the regiment have all received one session
of rotational training.
The artillery has also positively supported the artillery school's teaching. For
every live-ammunition firing exercise and every upper-level test, it notifies the
school in good time so that it can observe and provide guidance. In the past, the
school made curved-fire guns the primary topic and its research on hitting mixing
tanks with directly aimed guns was insufficient, so the regiment, on its own in-
itiative, offered its experience in this respect. Recently, the regiment received
the mission of demonstrating to the school's graduates 10 special kinds of firing,
including timed-fire calibrated firing, flare firing, and ricochet firing.
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rvx UrrllaAL USA: UINLY
ALL PARTY MEMBERS MUST SET GOOD EXAMPLES FOR MASSES
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 3
[Article by Ji Nan [4764 2809]: "Party Leadership and the Exemplary Role of Party
Members"]
[Text] In upholding and improving party leadership, there are many problems to
solve, among which it the important problem of fully bringing into play the van-
guard exemplary role of Communist Party members. This is a basic condition for our
party achieving political leadership over the broad masses.
For the party to exercise its leadership, first of all it must formulate a correct
line and policies and clearly point out to the masses the objective of struggle.
However, having a correct line certainly does not mean it can be accepted by the
broad masses and be thoroughly implemented. At this time, it is just as Comrade
Mao Zedong pointed out: "The proletariat, in particular its vanguard--the commun-
ist Party--should muster up its boundless enthusiasm and loyalty, and become models
of realizing these concrete objectives." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong," vol 1,
p 242) If there are no vanguard exemplary actions by party members, then the car-
rying out of the party's line and policies is often just empty talk.
The broad masses usually do not know about a party by its slogans but mainly by the
actual behavior of the great numbers of its members, and on this they decide their
own attitude toward the party. The CCP has become the core of leadership for the
people of all nationalities in the country, and it was precisely the exemplary
behavior of the great numbers of our party members, in advancing wave upon wave and
struggling courageously, that attained this. Our party's older generation of pro-
letarian revolutionaries spared no effort and fought all their lives for the Chinese
people's interests. The broad masses of people, from this kind of exemplary behav-
ior by the party members, gradually came to know our party, to give it their whole-
hearted support, and to conscientiously accept its leadership. However, there is
no need to be reticent about the fact that, owing to the destruction caused by Lin
Biao and the "gang of four," there exists within the party some unhealthy tenden-
cies and that the vanguard exemplary role of some party members has been weakened.
This has led some of the masses to have misgivings about the party and has hindered
their firm faith in the party. This is a topic on which it is very worthwhile for
every one of our party members to examine his or her conscience.
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- . _a1A1&%11ttL vaE V1' LY
At present, some comrades, when the question of strengthening their leadership role
is raised, more often than not think of issuing directives and making demands as if
party leadership just meant ordering people about. In fact, this is a complete and
deliberate misinterpretation. Stalin said: "Leadership--this does not amount to
writing resolutions and issuing directives." ("Complete Works of Stalin," vol 11,
p 52) Lenin and Stalin on many occasions referred to leading the masses with the
exemplary role of party members as being the basic law of leadership. Comrade Mao
Zedong once said: What is called the party's leadership is not making slogans and
shouting them all day long, and it is also not arrogantly wanting other people to
obey us, but it is, with the party's correct policies and our own exemplary work,
to persuade and educate the masses so that they will be willing to accept our sug-
gestions and act together with us.
Our party represents the interests of all nationalities in our country, therefore,
the party's leadership of the masses, in the final analysis, starting with the
awareness of the masses, consciously struggles for their interests and does not
drive them into blindly following theone in power. For over 50 years, our party
has never advocated ordering the masses to do this or that. Its basic method is:
on the one hand, to patiently carry out propaganda among the masses in order to
mobilize them; on the other hand, through the influence of the leading role and
exemplary behavior of party members, to spur the masses to advance. Practice
proves: a fine example has boundless power, and the exemplary role of party mem-
bers is the most authoritative leadership. With regard to a Communist Party mem-
ber, especially a comrade who holds a leadership post, if he does not play his
exemplary role, then no one will listen to what he says or to the appeals he makes.
At present, in some units not a few documents are issued and not a few appeals, so
why is the masses' enthusiasm not aroused? One reason is that in these units the
exemplary role of party members is not brought into full play, even to the extent
of not being brought into play at all.
There are other comrades who think that the exemplary role of party members needs
to be brought into play on questions of major policies and that in life it is of
"no importance" if they seek a few special privileges. This view is mistaken. A
Communist Party member's exemplary role should be reflected in every aspect. Party
members not only should set examples in carrying out the party's line and its gen-
eral and specific policies, but also should set examples in learning, abiding by
discipline and law, and uniting internally, and this means that they should, in
the aspect of lifestyle, be models for the masses. Many proletarian revolutionar-
ies of the older generation acted in this way and thus were held in high esteem by
the masses of people. On the contrary, if a Communist Party member cannot be a
good model in his life, he also cannot be a good leader of the masses. If there
are many shortcomings in your life that everybody talks about, how can the masses
completely accept you?
Some comrades think that playing an exemplary role and strengthening party leader-
ship is a matter for the higher-ups and that an ordinary party member does not
play much role in it. This viewpoint is also somewhat one-sided. The posts of
leading cadres are high and their responsibilities are great, and their exemplary
role is truly more influential. But, playing the Communist Party member's exem-
plary role is a common demand on every Communist Party member. Every party member
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lives among the masses, and all of his actions affect the masses. The size of his
role is not completely decided by the height of his post. Lei Feng and Lu Shicai
were both ordinary party members, but their exemplary behavior played an enormous
role in raising the party's prestige and strengthening the party's leadership. If
the tens of millions of party members play the vanguard exemplary role to the same
high degree as did Lei Fang and Lu Shicai, there will be an enormous force for
leading the people of the whole country to advance. We certainly must do as Lenin
said: "Try hard to enhance the title and role of a party member, enhance them again
and again." ("Complete Works of Lenin," vol 6, p 458)
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CITIZENS EXHORTED TO BECOME INVOLVED IN COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 3
[Article by Wang Yihua [3769 5030 54787: "Those Not in the Position Should Also
Get Involved"]
[Text] "Those not in the position should not get involved" is a lesson from
antiquity.
But even in ancient times many things showed its inadequacy as a lesson. Many
people are familiar with "Cao Gui's Debate" in the "Zuo Zhuan." Cao Gui, a close-
cropped commoner who was "not in the position," disregarding advice "to be con-
cerned about food and let other things go," took the initiative to propose a scheme
to his monarch during the battle to counterattack the invading army of Qi, with the
result that a great victory was won. Again, during the last years of the Eastern
Han dynasty when rival warlords were contending for power, Zhuge Liang, who still
lived in a thatched cottage and obviously was not in "the position," clearly saw
the overall situation and devised a scheme for dealing with the general trends in
the three divisions of China. Thus, he was able to help Liu Bei to capture the
western Shu state [present-day Sichuan]. Further, during the last years of the
Yuan dynasty, the scholar Zhu Sheng, who had taken refuge deep in the mountains
and also was "not in the position," was sought out by Ming Taizu [Zhu Yuanzhang,
founding emperor of the Ming Dynasty] and asked about a general program for China.
His reply was: "Build high altars, store large amounts of foodgrain, and postpone
proclaiming yourself emperor," pointing out to Zhu Yuanzhang the correct strategic
policy. If Zhu Sheng had scrupulously abided by the lesson of antiquity that
"those not in the position should not get involved" and did not involve himself in
the slightest with worldly affairs, it is to be feared that when Zhu Yuanzhang
asked him for a general program, Zhu Sheng would only have stared at him
dumbfounded)
It looks as if we should replace "those not in the position should not get in-
volved" with "those not in the position should also get involved." This is es-
pecially important in our socialist era. This is because our socialist cause is
the common cause of hundreds of millions of people, and is definitely not just the
cause of certain leaders who are "in the position." And to be citizens of the
socialist state--the masters of our society--is to be in an even more sacred and
lofty "position." And, being in this position," to "get involved," masterminding
schemes for the socialist cause and taking part in the management of the state,
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has naturally become our right and duty. In our era, "making the world one's own
responsibility" is not like it was in the old era, when only a small number of
heroes and worthies shouldered this responsibility, but is the responsibility of
all the people. According to recent newspaper reports, Liang Jiale (2733 0857
2867], of the power supply equipment repair and assembly plant under the Tianjin
Electrical Power Bureau, although an ordinary worker "not in the position,"
actively "got involved," with the attitude of a master, by writing a letter to
TIANJIN RIBAO, entitled "If I Am the People's Representative..." in which he put
forward a series of sharp criticisms and suggestions on municipal management and
construction. After publication of the letter, it drew the close attention of the
leading comrades of the departments concerned in Tianjin municipality and led to
the solution of many "old, big, and difficult" problems. This spirit of Liang
Jiale's, during our country's construction of the four modernizations, is extrF.ord-
inarily valuable and should be carried forward. At present, there are still some
people who, looking at the country's difficulties and the many problems that need
to be solved, take the attitude of "those who are not in the position should not
get involved" and remain unconcerned, and are even full of grievances and express
themselves with freezing irony and biting satire, as if they were not PRC citizens
and had no obligation at all to "get involved." This kind of feeling should be
corrected as, otherwise, they will not be in the "position" of masters in our
society.
"Those not in the position should also get involved," and naturally the leaders
"in the position" should even more "get involved." It will not do to not have two-
way cooperation. If there were the involvement of Liang Jiale but no positive
action by the leaders of the departments concerned in Tianjin municipality, then,
involvement or no, the problems would have remained. Our leading cadres seek
talent with eagerness and they should widely adopt the good ideas put forward by
those not in the position and make every effort to put the ideas into practice.
If "those not in the position also get involved" becomes a common practice among
the masses, our country will certainly become even more dynamic and prosperous.
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'THREE DON'T POLICY' DOES NOT PRECLUDE IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL WORK
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 3
[Article by Hai Xiao [3189 0876] and Wang Fa'an [3969 3127 1344]: "The 'Three-
Don't Policy' Is Not Liberalism"]
[Text] The "three-don't policy" and liberalism are two fundamentally different
things. But, in actual work, a small number of comrades have mixed them up. For
example, when we stress "don't label people, don't cudgel people, and don't seize
on people's mistakes or shortcomings," they adopt a liberal attitude with regard
to certain mistaken ideas and unhealthy tendencies, viz., don't resist, don't
educate, and don't guide. This is an expression of lax ideological and political
work and should be corrected.
Why has this phenomenon appeared? The main causes are a lack of the correct under-
standing of the "three-don't policy" and a failure to understand the relationship
between the "three-don't policy" and the strengthening of ideological and political
work.
The "three-don't policy" was put forward by Comrade Mao Zedong in 1962 in his
speech at the enlarged central work conference (7,000-person conference). Its goal
was to implement the principle of democratic centralism, to develop democracy in-
side and outside the party, and to create a good democratic atmosphere. In order
to resolve all kinds of ideological differences among the people, one can only
adopt the method of democracy, the method of discussion, and the method of persua-
sion and education in line with the formula "unity--criticism--unity" and convince
people by reasoning; and one cannot adopt the simple brutal method of seizing on
people's shortcomings or mistakes, cudgeling people, and labeling people, and over-
whelm people with one's power. This proposition has been repeatedly proved in our
party's history. But, during the period that Lin Biao and the "gang of four" were
running rampant, labeling people, cudgeling people, and seizing on people's short-
comings or mistakes were unprecedently rife and seriously damaged the party's and
state's normal political life. Today, our party Central Committee has reaffirmed
that we must strictly carry out the "three-don't policy" of not seizing on people's
mistakes or shortcomings, not labeling people, and not cudgeling people. This is
an important measure for eliminating the influence of Lin Biao and the "gang of
four," for restoring and perfecting democratic life inside and outside our party,
and for upholding democratic centralism. Some comrades set the carrying out of the
"three-don't policy" in opposition to the strengthening of ideological and
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political work, and think that if we stress the "three-don't policy" that they
can slacken ideological and political work, or think that if we stress the
strengthening of ideological work they can indiscriminately label people, indis-
criminately cudgel people, and indiscriminately seize on people's shortcomings or
mistakes. These two views are obviously incorrect.
The purpose of implementing the "three-don't policy" is to use correct methods in
place of incorrect methods, i.e., to use democratic methods to put into practice
the method of seeking truth from fact in place of simple brutal methods in order tc
solve ideological problems among the people. Without the slightest doubt, this
will restore the good traditions of our party's and our army's ideological and
political work, and will strengthen this work and cause it to be done better; it
certainly will not abolish or weaken this work. In our party's ideological and
political work, we depend on truth to obtain the masses' support, on laying out
facts and expounding principles to convince people by reasoning. The basic method
is to convince people by reasoning, and we do not depend on forcing people to sub-
mit. Labeling people, cudgeling people, and seizing on people's shortcomings or
mistakes is totally incompatible with the fine traditions of our party's ideologi-
cal and political work. To implement the "three-don't policy" will not only not
weaken or abolish ideological and political work, but, on the contrary, it is pre-
cisely under the guidance of this correct policy that this work will be put on the
right track. Only if we conscientiously implement the "three-don't policy" and
eliminate the vile influences of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" can we truly do
good ideological and political work. Some comrades have very little understanding
of our army's fine traditions in ideological and political work, and during the 10
years of great turmoil, they looked upon the ultraleft line of Lin Biao and the
"gang of four" as the party's ideological and political work. Therefore, when they
hear of implementing the "three-don't policy" they take it to mean that they do not
have to grasp, and grasp well, ideological and political work; when they hear that
ideological and political work must still be strengthened, they take it to mean
that they can disobey and not implement the "three-don't policy." These are both
gross misunderstandings and show that ideologically they have not made a clear
distinction between the fine traditions of our party's ideological and political
work and the line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four."
To implement, the "three-don't policy" is definitely not to abolish active ideolog-
ical struggle. To put politics in command and let ideology take the lead is an
important principle. Today, when the emphasis of our work has shifted, ideological
and political work must be suited to the new tasks of the new era, insuring that
the party's line and its general and specific policies are implemented, insuring
that there is a correct political orientation, and insuring that each task is suc-
cessfully completed. To this end, we must carry out education on the four basic
principles, the party's line and its general and specific policies, the revolu-
tionary outlook on life, the basic theories of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought,
and general political knowledge. We must also resist the influence of all kinds
of "left" or right mistaken ideological trends, resist the corrosive influence of
the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all exploiting classes, and carry out active
ideological struggle in order to consolidate and expand the proletarian ideological
position and to shrink the marketplace for all sorts of unhealthy trends and evil
practices. The purpose of implementing the "three-don't policy" is to correctly
carry out ideological struggle, to guard against mixing up the two kinds of
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contradictions, and to guard against using simple and brutal methods in dealing
with ideological problems of all kinds. The purpose is definitely not to take a
laissez-faire attitude toward mistaken ideological behavior and to abandon active
ideological struggle. Different ideological contradictions occur constantly. If
we were to abandon positive ideological struggle and let mistaken ideologies and
tendencies develop, then the healthy body of the party would be corroded and the
cause of socialism would be damaged.
Criticism and self-criticism is one of our party's three great work styles. It is
like a person washing his face every day or a room being swept regularly. If there
were no criticism and self-criticism, we would be tainted with political dust.
But, for a long time, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" went all out for "overthrow-
ing everything," using the vile methods of seizing on shortcomings or mistakes,
cudgeling, and labeling in place of regular criticism and self-criticism within the
party and among the people. Influenced by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," some
people never engaged in self-criticism and would not permit others to criticize
them in the slightest degree; and they especially seized on others' shortcomings
and mistakes, seized on trifles, grabbed them and would not let go, exaggerated
them, and put people in a deathtrap. With this kind of vile atmosphere in vogue
for a time, the result was that everybody did not dare to engage in criticism or
self-criticism, and the party's good work style of criticism and self-criticism
was discredited. We should now thoroughly dispel this unhealthy atmosphere. It
must be understood that to implement the "three-don't policy" certainly does not
mean that we do not want criticism and self-criticism. On the contrary, only by
conscientiously implementing the "three-don't policy," and, in dealing with ideo-
logical problems, not seizing on shortcomings or mistakes, not cudgeling, and not
labeling, can healthy criticism and self-criticism be developed on a foundation
of awareness. And only through comradely criticism and self-criticism aimed at
helping those criticized and proceeding from the desire for unity can we effective-
ly resolve all sorts of ideological contradictions, employ the correct ideology to
overcome mistaken ideologies, correct shortcomings, make full use of results, re-
sist unhealthy trends and foster healthy trends, and with one heart and mind
unitedly give impetus to the advance of our cause.
Making concrete analyses of concrete things is the spirit of Marxism. To solve
ideological problems, it is necessary to learn how to make scientific analyses.
Why do some comrades, in dealing with ideological problems sometimes take a simple
brutal attitude and sometimes take a liberal attitude? One important reason is
that they have separated themselves from making concrete analyses by seeking truth
from facts. In the past, Lin Biao and the "gang of four," stemming from their goal
of usurping the party and seizing power, went all out for "line analysis," saying
that "class struggle is everywhere" and "everything is related to the program and
line." They said all problems in work and problems of understanding were problems
of class struggle and problems of line struggle. They said problems among the
people were problems between the enemy and ourselves. This kind of idealist meta-
physics has nothing at all in common with Marxism's scientific analysis. Some of
our comrades were influenced and became habituated to this metaphysical method and
became fond of going to extremes. In dealing with ideological problems, the taking
of a simple brutal attitude and the taking of a liberal attitude are two extremes.
In reality, the phenomena in the ideological realm are complex. Only if we are
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good at making concrete analyses of concrete problems will we be able to distin-
guish what phenomena are correct and what phenomena are mistaken, what phenomena
are ordinary problems of ideological understanding or ordinary problems in work,
and what phenomena are problems of line or general and specific policies, or prob-
lems of class struggle, will we be able, based on the different natures of the prob-
lems and on their reasons for emerging, to adopt different methods, handle problems
with discrimination, correctly solve problems, and attain the goal of clarifying
thinking and uniting the comrades.
In the new historical period, in order to promote the stable and united political
situation, to promote the construction of the four modernizations, and to improve
our army's combat effectiveness, we must, from beginning to end, uphold the "three-
don't policy," vigorously strengthen ideological and political work, and display
the powerful might of political work.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 10 Jul 80 p 4
[Article by Yu Zhijie [0205 1807 2638], engineer of the Earth Minerals Department
[Dikuang Si 0966 4349 0674] of the Ministry of Geology: "Our Country Possesses
Rich Strategic Natural Resources--Nonferrous Metals"]
[Text] "Grasp the steel rifle and insure national defense"--this soldier's stanza
vividly testifies to the close relationship between steel-and national defense.
But a soldier with a steel rifle needs bullets, and bullet jackets cannot be man-
ufactured without copper, bullet noses cannot be manufactured without lead. Thus
we can also see the close relationship between copper and lead and national de-
fense. People call steel, iron, etc, ferrous metals and copper, lead, etc, non-
ferrous metals. Both kinds of metals are important strategic materials.
Nonferrous metals comprise a large family of several tens of metals: copper, lead,
zinc, aluminum, tin, magnesium, tungsten, molybdenum, nickel, titanium, cobalt,
antimony, gold, silver, platinum, etc. They are multihued, bright and colorful.
Each has its strong points, and they have many uses. Copper, as a good conductor
of electricity, is a material that is indispensable for communications equipment.
Aluminum, magnesium, and titanium, by virtue of their light weight, are necessary
for the manufacture of aircraft, bullets, and artificial satellites. Uranium,
which is radioactive, is the principal source of energy for atomic bombs and nuclear
submarines. In iron and steel production, only if many small parts of certain non-
ferrous metals are added to the production process can the steel products greatly
increase their strength and their wear-resisting, corrosion-resisting properties,
and thereby even better serve economic construction, national defense construction,
and the people's life.
Owing to the special importance of nonferrous metals to national defense construc-
tion and national economy, all countries in the world pay the fullest attention to
the development of the nonferrous metals industry. Particularly over the past 10-
odd years, the amount of nonferrous metals required by advanced countries has
rapidly increased, and thus the search for and exploitation of the natural re-
sources of nonferrous metals has been greatly accelerated. The general trend of
development is that the more technology progresses, the greater the amount of non-
ferrous metals that is required. Some people assert categorically that the metal-
lurgical industry of the future will be in the nonferrous metals era. The super-
powers, for their arms expansion and war preparations, have already formulated
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plans for amassing strategic reserves of nonferrous metals under conditions of
both conventional warfare and nuclear warfare. Out country is one of the richest
countries in the world in nonferrous metals resources. Its proven deposits of
tungsten, tin, antimony, zinc, vanadium, titanium, and lithium are the greatest
in the world; its proven deposits of copper, lead, aluminum, molybdenum, nickel,
mercury, etc, are in the front rank of the world. Rich nonferrous metal deposits
are found everywhere in the motherland, north and south of the Changjiang River,
inside and outside the Great Wall. In particular, the ores in common use--copper,
ead, and zinc--are distributed in every province (autonomous region) throughout
the country. As for the ore that is used in the greatest quantity--aluminum--
there are producing areas in about 10 provinces (autonomous regions) in north,
central-south, southwest, and east China. In the southern part of our country,
all the river drainage areas and the mountain range zones truly deserve to be
called treasures. For example, one-third of the country's copper deposits are
located along both banks of the middle and lower reaches of the Changjiang River,
and 80 percent of the country's tungsten ore is concentrated in the Nanling moun-
tain range area. The great scope of our country's nonferrous metals ore is rarely
seen anywhere in the world. For example, the [character illegible] jihua iron
mine's associated titanium deposit exceeds the sum total of any one country's titan-
ium deposits; in Hunan, the tungsten ore of Shizhuyuan and the antimony ore of
Xiguang Mountain are unmatched in the world; in Gansu, the vulcanized copper and
nickel of the Jianchuan nickel mine occupies second place in the world; Jiangxi's
Dexing copper and Xizang's Yulong copper are both especially large deposits, of
which there are not many in the world.
As early as over 6,000 years ago, our country could smelt brass. Our country's
longstanding history of nonferrous metals exploitation made an important contribu-
tion to the development of world civilization. Today, our country is still an im-
portant nonferrous metals-producing country in the world. Yunnan's Gejiu, called
the "tin-capital," is a world-famous tin-producing area; Dayu in southern Jiangxi
is the largest tungsten-rpoducing area in the world; Hunan's Xikuang mountain is
the world's largest antimony-producing area; the cinnibar (from which mercury is
extracted) in Tongren Prefacture of eastern Guizhou enjoys a high reputation in the
world; the lead and zinc of Shuikou Mountain in Hunan, the bauxite (the raw mater-
ial from which aluminum is refined) of Shandong and Hunan, etc, are well known at
home and abroad. Our country has not only built a group of extremely large-scale
mining enterprises, but also has, in places like Shenyang and Shanghai where elec-
tric power is abundant and there is a fairly good technological base, newly built
or exapnded many metallurgical enterprises, thereby greatly developing and improv-
ing the quantity, variety, and quality of our country's nonferrous metal products.
Our country can now smelt all the other 60 nonferrous metals discovered in the
world, and some of them, besides satisfying the amount required domestically, can
be exported in large quantities.
Along with the quickening pace of the construction of the four modernizations, our
country's required amount of nonferrous metals has increased on a great scale.
This poses an even more glorious but arduous task upon geological work on nonfer-
rous metals and upon the metallurgical industry. At present, the growth rate of
proven mineral deposits cannot meet the demand of the fast-developing construction
of the four modernizations, and the production level of the nonferrous
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metallurgical industry is comparatively low. In the period of national economic
readjustment, by tapping latent potentialities and other measures, these weak
links will be strengthened and our country's nonferrous metals resources will be
better exploited and utilized.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 6 Feb 81 p 3
[Newsletter by Wang Changyan [3769 7022 3508], Song Fanwu [1345 0416 2976] and Qu
Jucheng (2575 5112 2052]: "Silent Air Defense Combat--A Sketch of a Combat Exer-
cise by a Ground-to-Air Electronic Jamming Unit"]
[Text] In the morning gloom, we drive to a certain locality to observe a combat
exercise conducted by a special anti-air force unit--a ground-to-air electronic
jamming unit. This is a new branch of the armed forces. Knowing nothing about its
combat life and its tactics, we are eager to meet it.
When we walk into the field command post, the exercise already began. The air
warning radar station reports that four groups of "enemy" bombers; totaling more
than 30 aircraft, are detected at a distance of 200 kilometers, flying from differ-
ent angles toward our target or protection. The commander immediately gives order,
"All jamming detachments, "class 1,' quick!"
Looking away from the command post, all we can see are the rolling dark clouds.
The visibility is poor. In the grassy wilderness quite far from the command post,
the various jamming stations quickly complete their preparations. The jamming an-
tennae are turning incessantly. Quietness rules the combat field.
Suddenly, an urgent report is received by the command post from the warning radar
station: "Our radar is discovered by the 'enemy' bombers. Their electronic jam-
ming aircraft have started jamming operations against our radar. Our counter-
measures ineffective, targets lost." Obviously, by playing this trick the 'enemy'
aircraft attempt to take the initiative to use their electronic jamming planes to
provide cover tor their attack.
Anticipating this trick by the "enemy," the commander immediately orders No. 1
hidden radar, situated at another direction, to activate its equipment to take over
the work of the jamming radar station. In the meantime, he orders the radar sta-
tion being jammed to continue its operations to confuse the "enemy" and cover up
the operations of the No: i hidden radar. Witnessing this drastic change and
the utilization of both the truth and falsehood at the same time, we recall a re-
mark by Sun Zi, "In combat, the side upholding the truth will win by surprise; the
side which is good at surprising is able to last as long as heaven and earth and
remain as inexhaustible as a big river,."
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Departing from the command post, we come to the site of No. 081 counter-measure
station. All the comrades of the station are busy at work under a station master.
Based on the distant information provided by the command post, they are carefully
scanning the skies in search of targets. The station master says: "Reconnaissance
and anti-reconnaissance constitute the vanguard battle fought with electronics.
At present, all the enemy bombers are equipped with electronic detection devices,
enabling them to carry out reconnaissance against ground targets. For this reason,
to fulfill our aim of concealing ourselves in approaching the enemy and applying
our counter-measure to prepare for a surprise attack, my electronic counter-measure
detachment as a unit of an attacking nature must avoid early discovery by the enemy,
must keep our high power transmitters under strict control, and must carry out
scanning operations in a concealed manner and tracking operations with low power
transmitters."
At this junction, we can see the counter-measure operators are adroitly turning
their wheels with hands scanning back and forth, watching closely for each and ev-
ery tiny change on the fluorescent screen. Suddenly, a flickering wave appears on
the screen. No. 1 operator reports: "Bearing, 240 degrees, elevation angle 5 de-
grees, distance 120 kilometers, enemy aircraft discovered." "Good, track them
carefully," the station master orders, and immediately reports to the command post.
As the cunning "enemy aircraft" attempt to carry out a surprise attack at low level,
we counter with tracking them without their knowledge. The law of adjusting one's
action according to changing circumstances is applied wonderfully well in this
particular jamming and counter-jamming warfare.
The "enemy aircraft" are approaching. 100 kilometers, 90 kilometers... A voice
is heard from a transmitter in the "enemy aircraft" formation, "Attention, approach-
ing target, everything normal, keep our distances, be ready for action."
At this junction, the commander of the jamming unit resolutely issues an order for
"attack," "No. 081 radar, open overwhelming transmitter!" "No. 081 radar under-
stands," is the reply.
"Clack," a high tension switch is thrown on, and a red light blinks. A powerful
electromagnetic wave shoots skyward at the rate of 300,000 kilometers a second to-
ward the "enemy aircraft." Following the order of the commander, the other sta-
tions also switch on their equipment. Bundles of powerful electromagnetic pulses
form so many electronic jamming barriers. Under the powerful jamming of these
pulses, the fluorescent screens in the aircraft are turned into masses of clouds,
covering up all the land targets. All the pilots might as well be blindfolded.
What can be heard from the transmitters of "enemy aircraft" are the shouting
voices: "This is 01. Bad jamming" "This is 02, Terrible jamming. Counter-
measures ineffective." All the "enemy aircraft" are so incapacitated that they
turn tail to return home.
At the end of the combat exercise, the commander of the jamming unit says: "What
are in our hands are not guided missiles or anti-aircraft guns, and we cannot
shoot down the enemy aircraft with a big bang. Nevertheless, this non-explosive
combat means occupies an important position in modern air defense."
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HOW TO FIGHT AN ENEMY WITH SUPERIOR WEAPONS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 6 Feb 81 p 3
[Article by Huang Peiyi [7806 1014 5030] of Nanjing Senior Army School: "The
Magic Means to Diminish Enemy Superiority in Equipment"]
[Text] In a future anti-aggression war, it is undeniable that the enemy will enjoy
superiority in weapons and equipment, at least at the start. Nevertheless, the
actual effectiveness of a weapon or a piece of equipment does not solely lie in its
performance.
Due to many influencing factors, a rifle may hit bull's eye one after the other in
the hands of one, but far off the mark in the hands of another.
On a battlefield, there are more factors influencing the effectiveness of weapons,
such as the nature of the war, the manner of combat, the tactics, and the will
power as well as the confidence, courage, commanding ability, mastery in the use
of weapons, and ability to take advantage of weather and topographical conditions
of the combatants concerned. Although the Soviet forces which invaded Afghanistan
have used the most advanced conventional weapons, yet by taking best advantage of
the topographical conditions the Afghan guerrillas are often able to have the ag-
gressor's modern tanks and helicopters cornered and destroyed through the applica-
tion of many crafty tricks. On the other hand, the native rifles, native cannons,
swords and arrows can serve as the most deadly weapons.
From this it can be seen that the quality of a weapon is not necessarily in direct
proportion to its effectiveness. Under certain circumstances, a superior weapon
may lose its superiority, while an inferior weapon may change its inferiority. In
our study of the ways and means to win battles with inferior weapons against super-
ior weapons, we should pay attention to the ways and means to take full advantage
of and bring about such circumstances.
Advanced tactics and outstanding commanding ability are effective means to dimin-
ish the superiority of enemy weapons.
For instance, through the application of deception, skillful tricks and lightning
action, it is often possible to surprise the enemy, sinking him into chaos, making
it impossible for him to use his weapons effectively.
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For another instance, if the enemy can be forced to combat us under unfavorable
conditions, the superiority of his weapons will be greatly diminished. Tanks and
armored cars find complex topography their most deadly enemy, and so will aircraft
find bad weather conditions. Although admittedly we are at great disadvantage in
fighting at a distance against an enemy equipped with such advanced weapons, yet
the situation may reverse itself in close-quarter combat.
For still another instance, through application of the trick of "pulling the fire-
wood from under the pot" such as destroying the oil, food, and ammunition supply of
the enemy, we can reduce the enemy war machines into a heap of idle iron.
In a modern war, particularlyduring the initial period, it is of unneglectable im-
portance to take full advantage of defense works and favorable topography to fight
a defensive battle. (Klausevetz) said: "As a form of combat, defense is better
than offense," and "If one fights against an army unit, it is easier to engage it
in defense than offense." This is because the defenders can hide themselves behind
defense works, wait in readiness, and open fire first, thereby making it easier to
bring the superiority of their weapons into full play as compared to the attackers.
Actual experience in World War II shows that a tank hidden in defense works is able
to destroy two to three enemy tanks of the same category. Instances of this type
are many.
One of the most fundamental experiences in past wars, is to apply advanced tactics
and outstanding commanding ability to diminish the superiority of enemy weapons
and finally defeat the enemy. In his battlefield life over 20 decades, Napoleon
frequently defeated his superior enemies with inferior force, relying mostly on
his advanced skirmish tactics and his outstanding commanding ability, not on super-
ior weapons, to claim hegemony in Europe. In the 15 years when France was under
the rule of Napoleon, there was little or no improvement in the French armament,
and French weapons were always inferior. In many major battles, the French sol-
diers used only the old-fashioned flint-igniting rifles. There was no noticeable
improvement in French cannons either in regard to their caliber or range. Only
many years after the death of Napoleon did France adopt rifling cannons. Although
ours is no longer the Napoleon era, yet even the highly industrialized United
States, in the face of the superior conventional weapons of the Soviet armed for-
ces, is known to have issued the following instructions: "Only with superior tac-
tics, strict training and outstanding command can we win superiority in certain
important respects."
The revolutionary war history of our army in the past several decades is a history
of defeating superior enemies through the adoption of advanced strategy and tactics
and the development of outstanding commanding ability. In future anti-aggression
wars, this excellent tradition of our army will continue to play a most important
and realistic role. Although it is impossible for us to radically change our in-
terior armament in a short period of time, it is absolutely possible for us to de-
velop and bring about an advanced tactics in keeping with the special characteris-
tics of today's warfare, and raise the commanding ability of our cadres at the
various levels through strict and hard training. In this way, we shall be able to
bring the effectiveness of our weapons into full play and diminish the effective-
ness of enemy weapons to the maximum extent, thus reversing our inferiority to su-
periority, and the enemy's superiority to inferiority, enabling us to seize the
initiative in combat and defeat the enemy in battles.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 7 Feb 81 p 3
[Article by the Writing Group of the Propaganda Section of the Political Department
of PLA Beijing Units: "Strengthen Education on the Line, Principles and Policies
of the Party During the Period of Big Change"]
[Text] After the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, on the basis of
the actual situation in China the Party Central Committee set a majestic goal for
the socialist modernization of the country and adopted a new line and a set of new
principles and policies, marking a great historical change in our country. In
this great change, what should we do to reorient the ideology of our cadres and
fighters of the PLA according to this change, and direct them to firmly carry out
the Party principles and policies? We are faced with a most important task:
strengthen ideological and political work and pay attention to the education of
PLA members on the line, principles and policies of the Party.
A period of big change is often accompanied by a period of active thinking. During
this big change, to meet the needs of the new situation in a realistic manner and
turn chaos to order, our Party has adopted a string of new political, economic and
cultural policies. Some of these policies are what prevailed prior to the "great
cultural revolution," some are somewhat modified, and others are completely new.
As the line, principles and policies of the Party involve the vital interests of
everyone, their change must have provoked the people into thinking. In the past
two years, there has been some change in thinking among PLA members, showing that
their thinking has changed in close accordance with changes in policy and system,
such changes as shifting the focus of work to economic construction, adopting a
new policy to invigorate the economy, readjusting the national economy to a fur-
ther extent, reforming the system of leadership of the Party and the state, discon-
tinuing the system of promoting cadres directly from the fighters, and imposing
strict control over the admittance of new Party members. All these changes have
aroused all sorts of reactions in the minds of the cadres and fighters. Some peo-
ple say that it is a matter of course that during a period of quick change and
active thinking, numerous ideological problems and rapid changes in thought will
occur. To handle this situation, it is necessary to do a good job in education
concerning the line, principles and policies of the party and provide ideological
guidance with much foresight. It is true we have many political tasks and there
are many things to be done in political education, but we must attach first im-
portance to education concerning the line, principles and policies of the Party.
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rvn vill91M LML LOG VPILI
Following the continual development of events, and the continual adoption of new
policies and measures, this education should be carried out according to the ideo-
logical reactions of the masses. Only in this way can we carry out our ideological
and political work actively instead of passively, and focus our attention on the
main problem.
Is it true that, as held by some comrades, a person's attitude toward the line,
principles and policies of the Party is so abstract and beyond comprehension that
education to change it is a matter of little consequence? No, a person's political
stand can always be detected from his words and deeds and from his conduct in daily
life and in his work. This is not something beyond one's ability to comprehend.
When the adoption of a new policy is reported, how do you judge it? Is the new
policy good or bad? Do you stand for it or against it? Do you want to ignore it
or seriously study it to master its spirit? After hearing the report on it, do you
want to push it to the back burner, or readjust your work and conduct accordingly?
There is nothing wrong and actually it is quite common for one to, at one time,
misinterpret, challenge and criticize a new measure. The problem lies in whether
you express your views concerning it through proper channels and whether you con-
tinue to study it and humbly observe its application to reality, or elect to crit-
icize it wantonly in an irregular manner without giving any consideration to the
places and listeners concerned. Upon hearing someone who comes forward with such
criticism in an irresponsible manner in violation of the discipline, do you react
by ignoring it and echoing some of the wrong views without knowing if they are
correct, or rather take action to stop such irresponsible criticism and courageous-
ly refute the erroneous views? Facts show that our stand toward the line, prin-
ciples and policies of the Party is a thing directly affecting whether or not
they are correctly understood and resolutely carried out. This is a very serious
and important issue reflecting whether one's political stand is in harmony with the
Party Central Committee. Although the Leftist practice of frequently elevating a
view or an act of a person to the level of principle and line, so that the person
could be intimidated by the political label coming to him is a practice deserving
our criticism, yet we must not turn a blind eye to the political stand of others,
thus ignoring our most important responsibility in the ideological and political
work of the Party, even to the extent of taking no action against the adoption of
liberalism toward the line, principles and policies of the Party.
What is the significance of the mastery of the party line, principles and policies
toward army building? This is an important question which must be clarified.
Some comrades hold that many of the principles and policies adopted by the Party
since the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Committee are in relation to the economy and
construction, and have little to do with the PLA, as they involve only matters to
be taken care of by local authorities. It is true that military work and economic
work are two different things, and it is impossible to require our cadres and
fighters to master the economic policy of the Party as thoroughly as the personnel
in the economic field. Nevertheless, insofar as the PLA constitutes a part of the
society, economic construction has a direct bearing on national defense construc-
tion, and our cadres and fighters come from different localities and maintain close
relations with these localities,--particularly in the case of basic-level cadres
below the battalion level and the fighters whose hearts rest with their families
in their native villages which are directly affected by the change of the economic
policy of the party--any ideological disturbance among the cadres and fighters
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arising from their failure to correctly comprehend the economic policy of the
Party will adversely affect their training and control in the PLA. From this it
can be seen that education in the PLA on the principles and policies of the Party
is as indispensable to army building as the training and control of troops. We
must not say that there is no criterion to judge the degree of success in education
concerning the line, principles and policies of the Party, and that such education
is a "soft target." In reality, it is a "solid target." Viewing this education
from the angle of putting politics in command and attaching first importance to
ideology, we can actually say that it is a target of primary importance.
Although the broad masses of our cadres and fighters are in enthusiastic support of
and willing to share the same fate with the Party and socialism, it should be seen
that many of our comrades are so deeply influenced by the Leftist ideology in the
past many years that it is impossible for them to completely change their way of
thinking. These comrades are so used to consider problems from the Leftist view-
point that they cannot understand and even have misgivings about the prevailing
policy of the Party. Some of them are worried about the Party from a Party member
viewpoint, and for this reason they make no effort to hide their views. In such
cases, if we do a good job in education concerning the line, principles and pol-
icies of the Party and provide timely guidance to these comrades, it is not dif-
ficult to correct their miscomprehension. In fact, by conducting education con
cerning the line, principles and policies of the Party, many PLA units have
succeeded in emancipating the minds of an overwhelming majority of the comrades,
enabling them to know the truth and catch up with the march of times. On the other
hand, if we fail to carry out such education in good time, and if some of the com-
rades are so simple-minded, so stubborn in their thinking, and so cornered in their
views that they are unable to unshackle themselves from, their ideological confine-
ment, it is possible for them to deteriorate from misinterpreting the Party policy
to harboring doubt about socialism and the leadership of the Party, thus turning
a mere question of miscomprehension into a question of political stand, causing
them to develop a feeling of antagonism toward the Party. This is a problem of
principle involving whether or not we can lead the PLA properly, whether or not
we can stabilize our armed forces, and whether or not our Party can assume abso-
lute leadership over the PLA. It is utterly wrong to take the view that "it does
not matter" and "it is not a big deal" for PLA members to hold views at variance
with the Party policy.
The key to the work of strengthening education concerning the line, principles and
policy of the Party lies in leadership. It is of first importance for the leading
cadres to adjust their thinking and working method according to the tide of his-
tory and to the "change." Some cadres tend to wish that everything would remain
so peaceful and quiet. They complain about the quick changes, about the big
change in propaganda through mass media, about the failure of the higher author-
ities to forewarn them about certain changes, and about the difficulty encountered
in ideological work, but never about their own failure in adjusting their way of
thinking according to the changing events. We are now in the midst of a period of
big change. To meet the demands of the objective development of events and the
earnest aspirations of the broad masses of the people, the Party has reiterated
its new political line, ideological line and organizational line, and a string of
new principles and policies. In view of the damages done by the Lin Biao and
Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique in the past 10 years and done by the Leftist
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ideology over a long period of time, causing so many problems and so much diffi-
culty to us, how can we refuse to take action to reverse the situation and bring
about a reform? Only through reform can we realize our hope and make progress.
For this reason, a correct attitude lies not in complaining about the change, but
rather in adjusting ourselves according to the change. This change requires that
we conduct our ideological education with greater results. To accomplish this goal,
we should adopt a form of education and a work method which are more inspiring,
more appealing and more realistic, so as to enable the line, principles and policies
of the Party to win greater and more popular support. To meet the requirements of
this change, we leading cadres should, first of all, to master the line, principles
and policies of the Party ourselves, and not be satisfied with the mere promulga-
tion of documents and the style of merely going through the motion. The Party
committees should free themselves from the shackle of daily routine and concentrate
their efforts on intensively popularizing the line, principles and policies of the
Party. This is a new assignment to improve the leadership of the Party under new
conditions. It should particularly be seen that the reason the Party, the state
and the PLA adopt many reforms and important measures during the period of big
change is to eliminate bureaucratism, prerogatives, and irregularity in our work.
The success in this task has a direct bearing on the ideology, work style and per-
sonal interests of us leading cadres. We should carry forward our revolutionary
spirit and our hard struggle style of work without giving any thought about our
personal gains and losses, but be ready to sacrifice our own personal interests to
turn ourselves into promoters rather than obstacles of the reform. By readjusting
our attitude, our ideology and our leading methods according to the march of times,
we shall most assuredly be able to improve our education concerning the line,
principles and policies of the Party, and direct the PLA to contribute to the work
of promoting and protecting the four modernizations.
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PLA REGIMENT CARRIES OUT POLITICAL EDUCATION
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 1
[Newsletter by Jun Zheng [0971 6774]: "A Regiment Does Good Job in Basic-level
Political Education"]
[Text] At a PLA political work conference, a delegate of a certain regiment of
the PLA Wuhan units spoke on the experience of that regiment in carrying out basic-
level political education. His speech was much appreciated by the participants in
the conference.
In the past few years, the Party and the PLA have carried out reforms on many sys-
tems. Such reforms have made certain impacts in the minds of some of the cadres
and fighters of that regiment. The Party Committee of the regiment has tried its
utmost to reorient the ideology of the cadres and fighters to keep in harmony with
the line, principles and policies of the Party Central Committee, in the spirit of
holding itself responsible to the Party for army building. Since 1980, members of
the Party committee of the regiment have done the following in the field of educa-
tion: directing the cadres and fighters to correctly comprehend the line, princi-
ples and policies adopted by the Party since the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP
Central Committee and to correct their misunderstanding and biased views; direct-
ing the cadres and fighters to adhere to a high moral standard, keep their revo-
lutionary color, and combat bourgeois decadent ideology; and directing the cadres
and fighters to subordinate their personal interests to the interests of the rev-
olution and oppose extreme individualism. During a certain period in the past,
influenced by certain bad tendencies in the society, some comrades have started to
pursue certain unhealthy interests. Some cadres were afraid to do anything about
it for fear of criticism by others. In view of this situation, the Party Commit-
tee clearly pointed out that no matter what the criticism from others, one should
stand firm and carry out education beneficial to army building. The Party commit-
tee then directed members of the regiment to study Comrade Mao Zedon's report at
the Second Plenum of the 7th CCP Committee, and review the outstanding traditions
of hard struggle of the army, with good results. When Ma Guomin [7456 0948 3046],
a demolition hero of the regiment, received love letters from young women of many
localities, he kept his high revolutionary moral standard and continued his
friendship with his first sweetheart whom he came to know before he won the hero
title. The Party Committee of the regiment praised Ma Guomin for his conduct for
the education of others.
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The leading cadres of the regiment continued the practice of plunging deeply into
the masses to study their trend of thought, personally assisting in solving prob-
lems for the troubled comrades. Tan Pingbang [6007 1627 6721], commissar of the
regiment, knew the members of the regiment so well that he was able to identify
each member with regard to which company he belonged and what problems he had. A
fighter of the Second Artillery Company of the regiment was criticized for discip-
line violation, and he was so angry that he adopted a wrong attitude. A leading
cadre of the regiment made efforts to educate him on many occasions, and he finally
raised his political consciousness and corrected his attitude. Since 1979, through
painstaking efforts the Party committee reformed 35 backward fighters of the regi-
ment without any political mishaps.
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Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 3
[Article by Hao Junjie [6787 0193 2638], Division Commander: "Experience in the
10-Year Civil War and the New Historical Conditions--On My Comprehension of the
Strategic Policy of Positive Defense"]
[Text] One is invariably reminded of the experience of the 10-year civil war when
talking about the strategy of positive defense. In summing up the experience in
that period, Comrade Mao Zedong once defined and differentiated the concepts of
positive and negative defense on the basis of objective reality and military prin-
ciples, laying the corner-stone for the adoption by our army of the positive de-
fense strategic policy and providing the basis for us to analyze the guideline in
our strategy. However, ever since Lin Biao and the "gang of four" advanced modern
superstition by deifying Comrade Mao Zedong, his concept, definition and principle
of positive defense have become the "watershed" and "touchstone" for us to differ-
entiate the two military lines, and the absolute criterion to define and examine a
strategic and tactic means. No matter what are the actual conditions, all positive
defenses must be totally in conformity with the experience of the civil war in that
10 years, be it with regard to the construction of defense works or the application
of tactical principles. Otherwise, it would be considered as negative and wrong.
This way of thinking has impeded the development of military ideology over a period
of time. Today, it is necessary for us to deepen our comprehension about positive
defense strategic policy through analyzing our historical experiences.
To study the guiding rules in war, it is important to note their development and
characteristics. Comrade Mao Zedong very carefully analyzed the characteristics
of the Chinese revolution during the 10 years of civil war, as follows: First,
China was a big semicolonial country whose political and economic development was
uneven and which underwent a revolution from 1924 to 1927. Second, the enemy was
strong. Third, the Red Army was weak. Fourth, there was the Communist Party lead-
ership and the land revolution. These objective conditions, some favorable and
some unfavorable, dictated that the Red Army might be able to grow and defeat its
enemy but could not do so quickly, and that if things went wrong it might face de-
feat. Under such harsh and trying class struggle conditions, the crucial point of
the fate of the Red Army lay in its ability to break the enemy "encirclement and
suppression." The main problem in doing so was to preserve its strength, wait for
the best opportunity to break the enemy, defeat the enemy and develop its own
force. This situation dictated the adoption of positive defense in battle,
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centering on guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare fought in guerrilla style: "you
fight your battle, and I fight mine," "fight when I am winning, retreat when I am
losing," and "all 'retreats' aim at 'to fight another day."' It also dictated that
the policy of positive defense was fighting a defensive war strategically but an
offensive war tactically, and a protracted war strategically but a quick-decision
war tactically, and luring in the enemy to wipe out his units with superior force
one by one. These were the precious experiences of the Red Army gained through
bloodshed in the 10-year civil war. These experiences fully demonstrated their
power and value in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and in the War
of Liberation. Undoubtedly, they still remain the text-book instructions for our
commanders and fighters to carry on, study and use as reference today.
"Like other laws, the law of military operations is an objective truth reflected in
our mind." In studying the science of military affairs, we cannot do without sum-
ming up, studying, and referring to the practice and experience of the battles
fought "yesterday." The most important thing is to notice the change and develop-
ment of events. A radical change has taken place between the yesterday of the
1930s and today of the 1980s. During the 10-year Civil War, the Red Army fought to
break the "encirclement and suppression" in order to gain growth and development
of itself and its revolutionary bases. The war to be fought today and tomorrow is
to defend the sovereign territory, independence and dignity of our country and
nation. The strategies and tactics of positive defense based on these two differ-
ent concepts cannot be the same. Besides, following the quick advancement of mod-
ern sciences and technology in the past half century, new generations of weapons
and equipment have developed for armed forces, and both the enemy and ourselves
have changed a great deal from their old selves of the 1930s. This tremendous
change in technology must give rise to changes and even revolutions in combating
methods. From this it can be imagined that the frame of positive defense of the
olden days has been broken by its new contents today. It is obviously impossible
to apply the old experience gained in the 10-year Civil War to the new historical
conditions without modifications. We can by no means interpret Comrade Mao
Zedong's positive defense concept in a stand-still and mechanical manner. For in-
stance, we must re-interpret and re-comprehend the meaning of luring in the enemy,
a controversial problem in early wars. Generally speaking, luring in the enemy
was an important tactic in positive defense for a weaker army to defeat a stronger
army. In the past, we generally considered the tactic of luring in the enemy as
an integral part of positive defense, as if there could be no positive defense
without first luring in the enemy. In reality, however, the main point of luring
in the enemy is to lure the enemy with some sweets to a battlefield more advanta-
geous to us for wiping him out. "Before taking something, one must yield some-
thing," as a saying has it. In future wars, however, the goals of the enemy would
invariably be areas of critical political or economic value to us, such as key
points in topography or large and medium-size cities serving as political and
economic centers or strategic positions. We must not use them as "sweets" to lure
in the enemy. In preparing our battlegrounds today, we have not considered to set
our battleline at the border, but have established a defense line at strategic
positions with favorable topography at certain depth on the way of the main attack
of the enemy. This principle of preparing ourselves to combat at key positions is
embraced in the luring in the enemy tactic. In view of the fact that North China,
Northeast China and Northwest China are all noted for their rough topography,
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a vas ,a' a' a\.afaj LflJ& . I1L l
making them easier to defend than to invade, and that our strategic inland areas
are on the plain, making them easier to invade than to defend, if we again apply
our old method of luring in the enemy by "reducing the size of the mess hall os-
tensibly but increasing the strength of our forces secretly," and go so far as to
abandon our good battlegrounds which we have prepared for over 20 years in favor
of our inland soft belly, we would be helping the enemy to fulfill his strategic
attempt.
With the progress of history, we may have to change many o- the things which we
promoted in the 10-year Civil War. Conversely, some of the tactics which we op-
posed may today be worthy of our recomprehension and adoption. In the past, the
Red Army fought battles without any battle lines, made mobile attacks in the main,
and refrained from defensive battles in fixed positions. It was not because we
had any preference about mobile warfare, but simply because under the objective
conditions we had no better method to defeat the enemy. In fighting anti-aggres-
sion wars in the future, however, during the initial period we must adopt the
"fortress tactics" which we had opposed in the past, in order to defend our stra-
tegic points such as cities'and important military targets in the same way as
Stalingrad was defended, so that we can take advantage of our defense works to
deal with the enemy. This is the concrete application of the positive defense con-
cept under new historical conditions.
In reality, the strategic policy of positive defense was different in content at
different war times in the past. In the first campaign against "encirclement and
suppression," the policy was "luring in the enemy with open arms." In the third
campaign against "encirclement and suppression," it was "avoiding the brunt of en-
emy attack to hit his weak points." During the War of Resistance Against Japanese
Aggression, the national strategic policy was "fighting a protracted war" while
the strategic policy of the Eighth Route Army was "fighting a guerrilla warfare
without giving up mobile warfare under favorable conditions" or, to put it another
way, "fighting a mountainous guerrilla warfare independently." In 1939, the stra-
tegic policy of the New Fourth Army as advanced by Comrade Zhou Enlai was, "con-
solidating our position in the south, combating the enemy in the east, and develop-
ing our territory in the north." In 1942, the strategic policy advanced by Comrade
Chen Yi was, "fighting a guerrilla warfare in unity and independently." During the
War of Liberation, we adopted the strategic policy of concentrating our main ef-
forts to wipe out the effectives of the Guomindang without paying too much atten-
tion to the preservation of our territory. During the first phase of the Resist-
America Aid-Korea War, our strategic policy was "fighting mainly a mobile warfare
in coordination with some positional warfare and guerrilla warfare behind enemy
lines," and during the second phase of that war, the phase of strategic defense,
we changed our strategic policy to "protracted warfare with positive defense."
From this it can be seen that the positive defense we refer to is not a fixed
style.
A war is the supreme method to settle political, economic and military contradic-
tions between the enemy and ourselves. As these contradictions would continually
change, so would the methods to settle them. Summing up the experiences of the
10-year Civil War, Comrade Mao Zedong emphatically said: with regard to the guer-
rilla nature of the Red Army, "it would surely become a shameful thing to be aban-
doned in the future." He also said, "with the change of technical and
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organizational conditions, the Red Army would enter a new stage in its growth, its
combat orientation and battle lines would be relatively fixed, and it would be en-
gaged more in positional warfare..." The great arena of future wars will provide
a wide universe for us to gallop our horses, and countless "virgin lands" for us
to explore. For this reason, to fully carry out the strategic policy of positive
defense, it is necessary not only to study history and use past experiences as
reference, but also to study reality and develop new theories, principles and con-
cepts of positive defense.
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COUNTERATTACK WITH SMALL DETACHMENTS SUGGESTED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 3
[Article by Xiong Zhishan [3574 1807 6365] of Shijiazhuang Senior Army School:
"It Is Best to Use Small Detachments To Carry Out Counterattacks"]
[Text] "Of the 114 counterattacks conducted in 70 defensive battles in the Resist-
America Aid-Korea war, only nine were carried out with troops of more than four
companies, and the other 105 counterattacks were carried out by detachments smaller
than a battalion." This was the simple statement in the book "A Study of Problems
Encountered in the Positional Offensive and Defensive Battles of Our Army." This
statement shows that in defensive battles, it is best to carry out counterattacks
with small detachments. Under current conditions where our army is still interior
in its technical equipment, in a defensive battle fought by a regiment (or a bat-
talion), it is all the more necessary to study the characteristics and functions
of counterattacks with small detachments.
1. If the enemy enjoys superior fire power, to carry out a counterattack with a
selected small detachment will make it possible to fulfill the goal of the counter-
attack more easily, because as the target is small, so will be the casualty. For
instance, at the Jixiongshan defensive battle, a certain regiment of the Chinese
People's Volunteers (CPV) carried out eight counterattacks, of which six were con-
ducted by selected small detachments (the biggest of which was composed of six
squads), winning relatively large victories at low cost. In the two counterattacks
conducted with larger detachments (one composed of two companies and the other six
companies), although we did succeed in wiping out some of the enemy troops which
had penetrated our positions, we paid with more casualties from enemy fire because
of the larger targets formed by larger numbers of troops who moved slowly.
In modern defensive battles, the enemy will enjoy even more superior fire power in
his attacks. For instance, a motorized infantry division will have a standard
number of 638 tanks and artillery pieces with a basic amount of 1,354.5 tons of
ammunition. A division on the main line of attack will be complemented with 6-8
atom bombs, too. On the main line of attack, each one kilometer of battle front
will be bombarded by from 150 to 200 artillery pieces, firing at the rate of 20,000
shells per 30 minutes, or 30-50 percent heavier than the bombardment of Shanggan-
ling by the U.S. forces in the Korean War. To carry out a counterattack against
such an attack with such superior fire power, it is all the more necessary to keep
the counterattack force small to reduce casualty and to win bigger victory at
smaller cost.
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a Va\ V.1.\..l!'.L VVLi Vf\IIJl
Generally speaking, a counterattack should be conducted with a concentrated force
to enjoy a superiority in force at the point of counterattack. Some comrade may
ask, "would it be possible to gain such superiority in a counterattack with a small
detachment?" Yes, it is possible, if we make efforts to do so. On an occasion
when enemy troops in relatively large numbers penetrated our forward positions at
several points at the same time, to enable a small detachment to enjoy superiority
in force at a given point, members of our detachment in the forward positions
should take advantage of their defense works to open fire. In the meantime, mem-
bers of the obstruction detachment should quickly lay mines with rockets, open anti-
tank trenches, activate controlled mines and take other actions to cut the enemy
mass into small pieces, so that they can be gulped up one by one by the small mo-
bile detachment, thus wiping out all the penetrated enemy force.
2. It is easier for a small detachment to conceal itself and take the best oppor-
tunity to take action. Judging by our combat experience gained at the Resist-
America Aid-Korea War, the smaller the counterattack force, the easier it is to
conduct counterattacks at daytime. In the case of the 114 counterattacks stated in
the aforementioned book, 75 percent of the counterattacks were carried out in day-
time. Because of the application of night vision equipment, night counterattacks
should be carried out with the same care with regard to taking cover and keeping a
high speed in action. In view of the fact that a small detachment is small as a
target, fast in its movement, easy to take cover in approaching the enemy, and
capable of seizing the best opportunity for action both in daytime and at night, it
is best suited for use in modern defensive battles.
To enable a small detachment to take advantage of the best opportunities in action,
it is necessary to prepare it with many alternatives with regard to the direction
and method of counterattack. In the course of action, the detachment must be reso-
lute in carrying out the counterattack. In the light of our available equipment
and current tactics, it is suitable for a regiment or a battalion in a defensive
position to use small detachments for launching counterattacks when the detachments
in forward positions are unable to beat back the enemy attack.
3. After success in the counterattack, it is easy for a small detachment to quick-
ly withdraw or take cover to protect itself at its new position. Our combat exper-
ience at the Resist-America Aid-Korea War showed that after we succeeded in our
counterattack, the enemy would often reply with artillery or air force fire. For
instance, in its counterattack at an unnamed height northwest of Height 60.1 while
defending the Huachuan area, although the first battalion of a certain regiment of
the CPV wiped out more than 100 enemy troops and took more than 50 U.S. soldiers
prisoner, its slow move in withdrawing enabled the enemy to inflict heavy causal-
ties on us with gun fire and recapture his fallen position.
In modern defensive warfare, counterattacks will be met with even more prompt, more
accurate and more ferocious enemy gun fire. For this reason, a small detachment
should be faster and more courageous in its action, such as withdrawing from oc-
cupied territory or taking cover to protect itself in its new position. The slight-
est faltering may cause it to lose everything it has gained.
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DECEPTION IS REGARDED AS BEST TACTIC
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 20 Feb 81 p 3
[Article by Huang Peiyi (7806 1014 5030): "The Best Tactic Is to Apply Deception"]
[Text] All famous militarists are noted for their good tactics. Although each
tactics is different from the other, they have one thing in common: the applica-
tion of deception to confuse and defeat the enemy.
The following are the reasons why the militarists at home and abroad, in olden
times as well as today, took delight in the application of deception to win their
battles:
1. Deception can fool the enemy, cause him to disperse his forces and diminish his
superiority in force. Sun Zi said: "When the enemy can be observed by us, but not
us by the enemy, then we can fight in greater concentration." Liu Bowen said: "In
fighting an enemy, if his force is greater, then we should establish illusory for-
ces to reduce his superiority." Both remarks talked about the application of de-
ception to distract the enemy. Napoleon was noted for his ability to use a small
force to distract. the enemy, making it possible for him to use concentrated force
against enemy's dispersed force.
2. Deception makes it possible to launch surprise attacks.. (Klausevetz) said:
"Only a person who can divert the attention of his opponent can launch a surprise
attack." To divert the attention of an opponent, one must be good at deception.
Chinese ancient works on tactics had the following to say: "make believe you can-
not do what you can," "make believe you will not use what you will," "make believe
you have to reach far to get something nearby," "make believe you can reach what
is beyond your reach," "make believe you have what you don't have," and "make
believe you don't have what you have." All these aim at concealing your capacity.
They are effective means to launch surprise attacks.
As "deception" is so important, almost all books of value on military affairs take
"deception" as a wonderful tactics. In war, there is a wide field for deceptive
action, and both sides would try its best to "make believe" and "deceive." It is
often the side which can apply deception better can fool the enemy and not be
fooled, can take the initiative in combat, overrun enemy positions, defend his own
positions securely, and turn danger into safety. As a legend has it, Zhuge Wuhou
deceived Sima Yi into withdrawing his troops from an "open city." On the other
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hand, a commander who does not know how to apply deception is often fooled by the
enemy, so much so that he cannot use his superior force effectively. From this it
can be seen that deception is a most important factor for winning the initiative in
battlefields, and the ability to apply deception is an important yardstick to meas-
ure the ability of a commander to apply tactics.
It must be pointed out that following the continual application of advanced scien-
ces and technology to military operations, it has become more and more easy to
identify deceptions, and the commanders are required to improve their ability to
do so. This makes it necessary to advance the art of deception to higher levels.
During World War II, on the African battlefield the British forces were fooled by
Rommel who made believe that he had a fleet of forward marching tanks by installing
propellers on trucks to blow up the sand, and on the Soviet battlefield, the German
forces were fooled by the Soviet troops who used wooden tanks equipped with roaring
noise-makers. These means of deception may be easily found out in future wars, so
great efforts should be made to improve the make-believe measures so that they can
-stand the enemy reconnaissance and scrutination with the most advanced scientific
equipment. On the other hand, one must not give too much credit to the ability of
enemy spying devices, feeling that insofar as the enemy has an espionage satellite
overhead, he must have learned every move we have made. But in reality, all the
data collected by a spying device must still be studied by men, and all combat ar-
rangements must still be made subjectively by the commandants concerned. All
these take time to accomplish. If only we can use our head to come forward with
more deceptive tricks, we would still be able to fool the enemy. This was proven
by the fact that during the fourth mid-east War, the Egyptian force was able to
secretly concentrate large numbers of men and large quantity of equipment right
under the watchful eyes of the Israeli troops and the U.S. espionage satellite to
launch a surprise attack.
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