CA PAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04M01816R000501660001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOP SECRET
.SUBJECT
: CA. Papers
1. Attached are papers that bear in one way or another on
the question of CA. They are:
a. 14 November 1945 minutes of meeting of the
Secretaries of State, War and Navy, at which they first
received the so-called "Lovett Report, " on intelligence.
Of interest to the question of "CA" is the reference in
paragraph f of Annex I is the phrase that the CIA would
perform such other functions and duties, etc. There are
some who now assert that this got into the National Security
Act of 1947 at the last minute due to Congressional confusion;
whatever it means it clearly was there from the beginning.
In the context of the present concern the very next paragraph
is of interest; I wonder why it was dropped?
b. A 16 May 1975 memo 'by Walter Pforzheimer that
cites early references to CA, in connection with the 1949
Act.
c. Next is an article taken from Studies in Intelligence --
the fall 1973 edition -- by Benjamin F. Onate
Truman's "article" is cited by opponents
d. An interesting PM paper of 13 December 1963,
covered by a 10 January 1964 memo by Walt Elder showing
McCone approval.
e. A fascinating 6 April 1962 OGC opinion on CA,
entitled CIA Support of Cold-War Activities. As you know,
NSM (?) 40 changed the purpose from "Cold War" to general
support of national policy. If you are not familiar with this
I will provide a copy of a summary (not necessarily definitive)
in an IG Survey Report circa 1970.
This document may be
downgrac.cd to
when enclosure is detached. TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRE I
2. The thought of a paper that combines legislative review
and summary, political requirement, and congressional 'budgetary
support might be interesting. I am sorry that I cannot at present
lay my hands on the paper written 'by someone who was with OGC
a year or so ago, but it is a very thought-provoking line of reason-
ing, offered in terms of the 'basic nature of the president as a
national leader.
3. We may find time to do something on this, but for the
moment we are too swamped down here to do more than eye the
problem with regret.
S. D. Breckinridge
Attachments a/s
TOR SECRET
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sr
4re
6 April 1962
MEMORANDUM FAR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: .CIA Support of Cold-War Activities
1. This memorancum is for information only.
2. Whcn the. Central Intelligence Agency was created by
statute, tnc National Security Act of 1947, the _nt,::nt of
Congress was to create a centralized machinery to coordinate
all intelligence activities, to produce the intelligence
estimates required for top policy planning., and to conduct
certain intelligence activities. There was no mention in the
statute or the legislative history behind it.of colt-war
activities, and at that time the wartime clandestine, activitii_,s
of the Office of Strategic Services, such as
guerrilla, political activit
y PrOPa~a.nda,
Consequently, when Secretary of and
DefenselForrestalbaskec;linanaed.
1947 if CIA could undertake to combat the.worldw dpi communi:;t
menace with covert operations, it was recognizes that even
though-there was some relation to intelligence in some such
activities a charter in this field could not be construed
from the language of the statute and would have to be carries
on under general Presidential authority and the approval of
funds by .the Congress.
3.. National Security Council Directive 10/2 (NSC 10/2)
gave the necessary policy direction, plac
for covert operations on CIA, and Congres p responsibility
NSC 10/2 has been refined and amender, and
s the chartercisunow?
reflected in NSC 5412/2, but throughout Congress has roviuc-
the funds necessary to carry on clandestine cold-war action.`
The chart::r is very broadly espr,. ssed ana incluca: s
rr
political action, economic warfare, resistance and guerilla
activities, etc., which are cetermineo to be nceceC:~tocount,z?
the communist threat and orient the
to the United States. The onl?, PzOples of the free worlc
not conduct activities :.nvolvin?- lar;aectconflict by l that CIA vied ccogni military.forces or cover anc; dcceptiou for militaryoperations
zcu
and that the activities for which CIA is responsible are
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can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for.them.
unauthorizc:d4persons and that if uncovered the U. S. Government
covert. Covert activities ar.- defined as activities within
the charter act forth in NEC. 3412/2 so planned and eaccutra
that any U. S. responsibility. for then is not t vid-ont to
4. NSC 5412/2 places responsibility on CIA to seer that
in which intc1ligei:c.e is not required to play a part, although
normally intelligence either enters into their support or is
a by-proauct, or both. How::ver, under this charter, in
determinir,? whether CIA should uncertake to carry out a
specific activity, it is not necessary to find an intelligcncv
target involved. It is enough if it is covert under the
definition and has policy approval as being consistent with
American foreign policy anti overt operations and is c:esignec
to combat co=unism outside the United states.
such activities ar. carri-_.d out ano plact. s responsibility on
the Director to see: that the appropriate.csepartm-Lnts anc
agencies are properly infornec and that the activities arc
consistent with national policy and with overt op=-rations.
Thus, CIS? Is responsible for a broad spectruis of z ctivitics
properly persons knowing both the capabilities and limitations,
of clandestine action oust be studying anc devising how such
actions can' be undertaken effectively. Both in devzlopiug
ideas or plans for action, it is lncusbent on the Agency to.
obtain necessary policy approval, and for this purpose these
matters should be explored with proper officials in other
departments and agencies, particularly in the Departments,
of State and Defense, so the determination can be mate as
to, whether any ono proposal should go, to the Special Grou?-'
or higher .tor policy cetwrtnination.
6. In this function, the staffs and offices of CIA are
at present not inhibited by any limitations other than those
broadly set forth in NBC :412/2. Except as to total amounts
available, the appropriazion oi' funds is not a limiting factor
as the Appropriations Subcom-.:iittee for CIA have approv.:c: the
requesters funds through idle %..ars for the g?-~neral purpose of
combatting communism and. r our charter without setting spL.: i : {c
5. Since it is responsible for having such activities
,carried out, CIA must necessarily bL responsible for planning.
Occasionally, suggestions for action will come from outs -cc
sourcca, but to uapand.entirely on such requir:.ments woulc
I'be an evasion of the Agency's responsibilities. Also, the
average person, both in Govern:acnt and outside, is thinking
along normal lines and to ccvelop claiic stine colt!-war activities
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;r
limitatlous of.courses of action. Consequently, under present
guidelines, the CII personnel concerned are and should be
developing cold-war activities of every nature without the,
necessity of dep::ndiug on iutellig::nce implications for their
furtherance and are then promoting conduct of these aetiviti,?s
with the other departments and ag-~ncies concerned in order
to develop a position on which policy direction can be given.
7. Inasmuch as CIA is enjoined to conduct covert
operations by Directive of the National Security Council,
.it cannot unilaterally limit its responsibility in this fi+:lr_
or construe the Directive to mean only those operations for
which intclligence colloctiou has a primary target. Any such
modification has already been made. On 23 Jun- lW we were;
notified that the National Security Action Merslorardum No. 17
had been approved by the President. This proviCc(c that wh'r;;
a paramilitary operation "is to be wholly covert or disavowablE;,
it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the
normal capabilitiLs of the Agency. Any large paramilitary
.operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant
numbers of militarily trained personnel, amounts of military
equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks and/or'
military experience; of a kind and level peculiar to the
Armed Services is properly the primary responsibility of the
Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role."
This, for tht first digit, directs Defense to develop assets
for covert parauilitaq action. However, thisstill leaves the
full scope of covert activities outsice of the paramilitary
the responsibility of CIA.
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25X1
25X1
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 t
?IVIEMORANDUM FOI. THE RECORD
W. EIdar
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recom*nendations in tht- attached paper.
On 9 January
19 _, Mr. McCone approved the
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UNCLASSIFIED
Ghostwriters in the
woodpile
WHAT DID TRUMAN SAY ABOUT. CIA?
Benjamin F. Onate
. On 22 December 1963 the Washington Post and numerous other newspapers
published an article syndicated by the North American Newspaper Alliance
(NANA), and signed by the late former President Harry S Truman, which
concluded with the following paragraphs:
For some time I have been disturbed by the way CIA has been diverted from its
original assignment. It has become an operational arm and at times a policy-making,
arm of the Government. This has led to trouble and may have compounded our
difficulties in several explosive areas.
I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into
peacetime cloak and dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassments
that I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet
intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role that. it is
being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue-and a
subject for Cold War enemy propaganda.
With all the nonsense put out by Communist propaganda about "Yankee im-
perialism," "exploitive capitalism," "war-mongering," "monopolists" in their name-
calling assault on the West, the last thing we needed was for the CIA to be seized
upon as something akin to a subverting influence in the affairs of other people. . . .
But there are now some searching questions that need to be answered. I, therefore,
would like to see the CIA be restored to its original assignment as the intelligence
arm of the President, and whatever else it can properly perform in that special field-
and that its operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere.
We have grown up as a nation, respected for our free institutions and for our
ability to maintain a free and open society. There is something about the way the
CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historical position, and
I feel that we need to correct it.
The starter's flag had been dropped, and the contestants raced into the
field. Senator .Eugene McCarthy (D., Minn.), appeared in the Saturday Eve-
ning Post with an article entitled: "The CIA is Getting Out of Hand." Richard
Starnes used the alleged Truman article as the peg for a column in the Wash-
ington Star headlined "HARRY S FIRES TELLING BROADSIDE AT CIA."
Dozens of editorials along the same line sprouted in such papers as the New
York Post, the Tarrytown, N.Y., News, the Berkshire Eagle of Pittsfield, Mass.,
The Charlotte News in North Carolina, the Pittsburgh Press, the Cleveland Press
and News and the Columbus Citizen-Journal in Ohio, the Milwaukee Journal,
the Kansas City Times, and the Sacramento Bee and Santa Monica Evening
Outlook in California. It was open season on CIA over the 1963 year-end holi-
days, and for more than nine years since then the article in question has been
stock-in-trade for writers of books and articles attacking CIA, most recently
L. Fletcher Prouty in his The Secret Team: The CIA and its Allies in Control
of the United States and the World.
The CIA rocked back on its heels for a while, stunned that the source for
these attacks should be President Truman, the Enacting Father of the Agency,
and the man who had put CIA into the field of "such other functions and duties"
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by covert action assignments in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. In June of 1948, in
fact, Truman himself had led the National Security Council to authorize. the
creation of a new office within CIA to carry out cover operations directed against
secret Communist subversion, (the Office of Policy Coordination).
Had Truman written the statement? It developed that he had not, but as
the Germans say, "Lies have long legs," and by the time a denial could have
been obtained, the impact of the original statement was so widespread that
a denial never would have caught up with it.
Nevertheless, as long as the statement continues to pop up in fantasies like
Prouty's, it appears to serve some purpose to get the facts into the record.
Allen Dulles, by this time in retirement, drafted a three-page letter to the
former President at Independence, Mo., noting more in sorrow-than in anger the
views recited in the NANA article, and reminding.him that while Truman had
indeed stressed the role of CIA as the President's intelligence arm, he had also
by his own action first put CIA into the covert operations field.
The draft, found in Dulles' papers, does not show whether or not it was
sent. On 17 April 1964, however, Dulles was in Kansas City for a speaking engage-
ment, and made an appointment to see Truman that afternoon.
In a memorandum of 21 April 1964 for the General Counsel of CIA, Dulles
subsequently reported-
I then reviewed with Mr. Truman the part he had had in supplementing the
overt Truman Doctrine affecting Greece and Turkey with the procedures largely
implemented by CIA to meet the creeping subversion of Communism, which could
not be met by open intervention, military aid, under the Truman plan. I reviewed
the various covert steps which had been taken under his authority in suppressing
the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, of the problems we had faced during the Italian
elections in 1948, and outlined in some detail ... the organization of the Free Europe
Committee and Radio Free Europe, keeping hope alive in the Satellite countries, etc.
Mr. Truman followed all this with keen interest, interjected reminiscences of his
own, recalled vividly the whole Italian election problem, as well as the Huk situation.
I then showed him the article in the Washington Post of December 22, 1983, which
I suggested seemed to me to be a misrepresentation of his position. I pointed out the
number of National Security Actions (Action #4 and Action 10-2) which he had
taken which dealt with covert operations by the CIA. He studied attentively the
Post story and seemed quite astounded at it. In fact, he said that this was all wrong.
He then said that he felt it had made a very unfortunate impression. [Emphasis
added]. . .
At no time did Mr. Truman express other than complete agreement with the
viewpoint I expressed, and several times he said he would see what he could do
about it, to leave it in his hands. He obviously was highly disturbed at the Washington
Post article...
I cannot predict what will come of all this. It is even possible; maybe probable,
that he will do nothing when he thinks it over. He may, of course, consult with those,
whoever they are, who induced him to make the original statement.
Even in retirement, Dulles was still proving himself a prescient estimator.
There is no record that Truman took any further action on the matter. But the
final piece in the puzzle fell into place six weeks later when Lt. Gen. Marshall S.
(Pat) Carter, then the DDCI, was at the Truman Library in Independence for
oue of the regular briefings arranged for the former President by President
Johnson.
10
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Truman and CIA UNCLASSIFIED
Prior to their meeting with Truman, General Carter and his Executive
Assistant, Enno H. Knoche (now head of FBIS), were chatting briefly with
David Noyes. Noyes had been a White House assistant while Truman was Presi-
dent, and continued to serve him in various capacities in retirement. Accord-
ing to a memorandum based on Knoche's notes on the meetings, "Noyes evidently
drafts Mr. Truman's statements and articles, and admitted quite freely the au-
thorship of the Truman article on CIA which was published on 22 December
1963.... It is highly doubtful whether President Truman ever saw the article
prior to its publication, as he was already beginning to age considerably at
that time."
During the actual briefing of Truman, Knoche recalls, "Carter did get into
this subject, at least slightly. He referred in general to recent criticism of the
Agency and its operations, and reminded Truman that it.was he himself who
had authorized most of the early clandestine operations in response to such
challenges as Italy and Greece. Truman broke in on the General's statement
to say yes, he knew all that, it was important work, and he would order it to
be done again under the same circumstances. He went on to add, however, that
he had set up the CIA to pull together basic information required by the presi-
dency, but which had been denied to him by State and Pentagon handling
procedures. He said this was the main purpose." General Carter dropped the
subject at that point, and went on with the briefing.
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ACTION
INFO.
ACTION
INFO.
1 DCi
1
11
LC
2 CDC!
2
IG
L 3 S..~C
13
Compt
t 4 DDS&T
14
Asst/DCI
5 { DDI
115
AO/DCI
.6 &S
16
Ex/Sec
7 DD:)
17
8 D CIC
18
9 D. DCI/N!O
19
10 GC
20
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 Approved For Release 2008/08/21 : CIA-RDP04MO1816R000501660001-2 ' Exe ut'Ve sL
1. In 1948, the Congress considered legislation which was to become the
CIA Act of 1949. This legislation originally passed the Senate in 1948 and as
approved by the House Armed Services Committee. However, time did not permit its
passage in the House in 1948, and the whole matter went over to 1949.
2. On 8 April 1948, the Director testified before the House Armed Services
Committee in support of the legislation.' A detailed brief, which is largely
'technical, was prepared for his use and became a part of his statement.
3. Section 3 of the CIA Act of 1949 (as in 1948)' authorizes CIA to exercise
certain authorities contained in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. One
such section provides that purchases and contracts for supplies and services
may be negotiated by the Agency head without advertising if the public exigency
will not admit of the delay incident to advertising. Several examples were
given in support of this request. The first one listed is:
16r 1975
INSPECTOR GENERAL
MIBIORAN UM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
76 F6 / ~?Y
SUBJECT : Early Mention of CIA Covert Action Activities to e Congress
individual specialists and professional services in connection with research
4. Another subsection of Section 3 of the CIA Act of 1949 provides that
purchases and contracts for supplies and services may be negotiated by the Agency
head without advertising for personal or professional services. In his 1948
justification for this section, the Director said:
"This section is needed by the Agency to allow for the employment of
into various types of special intelligence equipment, such as
machine records, communications and explosives. ..: As an
additional example, one can point to contracts which the OSS made
during the war with a few firms to develop certain types of
explosives, fuses and limpets for agent weapons. This was not
the type of material which could be developed in normal ordnance
channels. Explosive pencils, suppository capsules, trick
concealed weapons, explosive plastics, the Fairbairn knmfe,?.the'
baseball grenade, special silencers, Old Black Joe which was an
explosive developed.to be used with coal, barometric switch
detonators and similar gadgets make up the movie version of
intelligence gadgets Which must be developed under this section
[of the Act]."
5. Again under Section 3'of the Act, which calls for personal service contracts
with people and educational institutions, the Director said:
"This authority is requested in order that the facilities of
certain educational institutions may be utilized in the prepa-
ration of basic unclassified research with respect to foreign
countries and areas. Such subjects as transportation systems..."
Walter Pforzheimer
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`?- y [Senator Schweiker's 'pet' subject." ]
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