THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE HISTORICAL SERIES NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER VOLUME ONE ANTECEDENTS AND EARLY YEARS, 1952-56

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00184R000400070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 248
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA HISTORICAL STAFF
The Directorate of Intelligence
Historical Series
NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
VOLUME ONE ANTECEDENTS AND EARLY YEARS, 1952-56
Secret
NPIC-2
December 1972
Copy 2 of 3
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(When Filled in)
is
CIA HISTORICAL PROGRAM
Custodial Log
TITLE
DIRECTORATE
O/DDI
NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION
CENTER
COMPONENT
NPIC
Antecedents and Early Years, 1952-56
PROJECT NO. if draft
VOLUME NO.
1 I
PUBLICATION NO. (if published)
NPIC-2
LOCATION Building and room)
H s
COPY NO. 2 OF 3
ACCESS RECORD
NAME
COMPONENT
DATE OUT
DATE BACK
0 1~7? I
a ,, ;
73
FORM 3434
9-71
OAOUP I
Qo.o.o nor ? c
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CIA Internal Use Only
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THE DDI HISTORICAL SERIES
NPIC-2
NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER
VOLUME ONE ANTECEDENTS AND EARLY YEARS, 1952-56
by
December 1972
Arthur C. Lundahl
Director
National Photographi.
Interpretation Center
HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Foreword
The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)
was established in January 1961 under the Director of Central
Intelligence to provide efficient and timely exploitation of
photography as a source of foreign intelligence in response to
the needs of national security. Though the Center is jointly
manned by personnel from several departments and agencies rep-
resented on the United states intelligence Board, it is the lineal
descendent of three successive photo intelligence organizations
established and nurtured by CIA. They are, in order of founding,
the Photo Intelligence Division (D/GP) , Project ETAt7PCHAT (HM),,
and the Photo Intelligence Center (PIC).
This history is the first of several volumes planned to
trace the evolution of photo interpretation in the national
center and in predecessor organizations. It is the story of
D/GP, an obscure division founded on the assumption that oenpetent
photo interpreters exploiting high-quality, up-to-date photography
of strategic targets with the aid of all-source collateral infor-
mation could produce definitively important information concerning
the capability and, to some extent, the immediate intentions of
potential enemies of the United States to initiate military action
against this country and its allies. It traces the trials and
frustrations of the early years, during which repeated attsi is
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to find the right combination of intelligence problems and
photography yielded many pedestrian accacplishn ents but only
rare startling successes. It closes with the dramatic develop-
ment by the Agency of an extraordinary collection vehicle, the
U-2, which projected the struggling division into a key role in
planning and preparing for the collection, processing, and
exploitation of the anticipated photography.
Much of the continuity in this narrative and virtually all
the dates cane fran documents current at the tine the events were
taking place. Most important in providing this framework of facts
are monthly reports of the division and documents relating to
specific actions, operations, and events. On the other hand,
recollections of the participants in the drama, recorded on mag-
netic tape, are the source of many of the embellishments that
give life and human interest to what would otherwise be a lifeless
chronicle on a clinical examination of the facts. Copies of most
sources cited in this volume are filed in the NpIC Historical
Collection and can be consulted in the NPIC library.
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Contents
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I. A Growing Awareness (1950-1952) . . . . . . . . 1
II. Establishment of Formal Photo Intelligence
Activity (1952-1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. The Die Is Cast . . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? 9
B. Concept of Operation and Products . . . . . 12
C. Jobs and People . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 15
D. Requirements and Photography . . . . . . . 19
E. Activities and Products . . . . . . . . . . 27
F. Early Problems and Acomiplishnnts . . . . 40
III. Photo Interpretation Finds Its Identity in CIA
(1953-1955) . ? . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . 47
A. The Division Takes Shape . . . . . . . . . 51
B. Photo Interpretation Support Services . . . 60
1. Support to Agency Carvponents . ? . ? . 61
2. Other Projects . . ? . . . . . . . . . 81
C. Liaison with the Military Services . . . . 86
D. Equipment and Interpretation Techniques . . 97
E. D/GP Inaugurates Formal Reporting . . . . . 104
F. The Onset of U-2 Support . . . . . . . . . 108
G. Outlook in Mid-1955. . . . . . . . . . . . 119
IV. A Star is Born (1955-1956) ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? 125
A. Precursors of the U-2 Project ? ? ? . ? . . 126
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B. Develognent of a New organization . . . . . 131
C. Teachers and Students . ... . . . . . . . . 148
D. Publications in Transition . . . . . . . . 154
E. Photo Interpretation Projects . . . . . . . 159
F. Preparations for Exploiting U-2 Materials . 171
G. U-2's Over Eastern Europe . . . . . . . . . 194
Appendixes
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A. List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
B. Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
C. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC IN'I'ERPRETATIGN CEVI'ER
ANTECEDENTS AND EARLY YEARS
I. A Growing Awareness (1950-1952)
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At the opening of the second half of the twentieth century,
the fledgling CIA was struggling to assimilate and apply lessons
learned from World War II. The impressive aoccmplishments of
photographic intelligence during that conflict coupled with the
rapid advances in other applications of science to the collection
and processing of information presaged profound changes in
intelligence operations. Though score of the basic concepts were
far from new, the technological explosion generated by. crash
efforts to apply scientific knowledge to the collection and
evaluation of information about the enemy was soon to produce
systems so sophisticated and so prolific as substantially to
emancipate policy makers and operations personnel from their
former dependence on the shadowy figure of the classical spy.
Indeed, traditional methods of obtaining information about
the Ccmminist enemy were rapidly becoming less productive than
ever. The descent of the Iron Curtain on overt reporting, including
the official release of economic data, sharply curtailed previous
sources of information on countries within the Soviet orbit.
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Moreover, limitations on travel behind the Iron Curtain reduced
still further the low potential of human source collection. At
the same time, the outbreak of the Cold War and inauguration of a
new and more sophisticated arms race dramatized the need for more
and better intelligence, not less. At this critical juncture,
photography became the beneficiary of heightened interest as
a possible source of strategic information.
Following World War II, technical survey teams sponsored by
US Forces had been sent to Germany and Japan to assist in
estimating the effectiveness of photo intelligence during the
war. The resulting studies, published as part of the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey reports, concluded that between 80 and 90
percent of all military intelligence information came from aerial
photography, and that it was about 85 percent accurate. The fact
that there were in the Agency many who had been in intelligence.
during World War II ensured that the potential utility of aerial
reconnaissance and photo interpretation for filling some of the
growing gaps in intelligence would not be overlooked.
The relationship between evolving Agency plans and organ-
ization and the experiences of World War II was evident in the
functions that were adopted as well as in the continuity of
personnel. With the introduction of oamunications intelligence
in the Agency, the General Division, Plans and Policy Staff, Office
of Reports and Estimates (ORE), became the nucleus for its
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exploitation. One of the men engaged in this work was Frederick
A. Voigt. During World War II, Voigt had been an Army officer
in G-2 and had worked with CaAZIT materials. Among his contacts
wa a fellow officer in G-2, who, as a photo
interpreter, had earned some distinction as the head of a small
unit assembled late in the war for the joint exploitation of
reconnaissance photography and cmrunications intercepts.
The possibility of undertaking all-source exploitation in
one area was often discussed in the General Division, ORE, by
and Policy Staff. 1 Recalling
Voigt~
and the success of his
unit in G-2, Voigt advocated the joint exploitation of photography
and C1viIDTr as part of the all-source effort. Though the general
lack. of current aerial photography of denied areas tempered
enthusiasm for the proposal, the idea got a favorable hearing.
In due course, Voigt was authorized to contact then a
teacher at the Fountain Valley School near Colorado Springs,
Colorado, and invite his interest in submitting a proposal for
establishing a photo interpretation unit in the Agency.
the Chief, Plans
agreed. The result was a 10-page proposal dated
8 August 1950 and entitled, The Operation of High LeveZ Photo
Interpretation. 1 F-I re=mar ed establishment of a photo
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interpretation* unit utilizing all-source materials, including
Ca1INT, and having close working relations with both analysts
and collectors. To accomplish the job, he proposed that staffing
consist of nine interpreters, three liaison officers (with
experience as interpreters), two draftsmen, one map and photo
librarian, and three clericals.
envisaged the hiring of highly experienced photo 25X1
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interpreters having a solid intelligence background in certain
specialized fields, such as industry, shipping, aircraft, guided
missiles, and radar. He stressed the need for constant and free
interchange of information between PI specialists and their
analytical counterparts. He also called for close and confidential
working relationships between the PI unit and reconnaissance
planners. In all these respects, his concept was decisively
different from the method of operation then current in US military
photo interpretation units, whose interest was oriented primarily
toward banbing targets and whose interpreters were discouraged
from using collateral information. thus, perceived clearly 25X1
the peculiar needs of a photo interpretation effort integrated with
the production of strategic intelligence for use by policy makers
and planners at the highest levels of government. His initial
*photo interpretation is more familiarly known as PI, and the
interpreters who practice it are comronly called PI's. Moreover,
in the use of this designation no consistent distinction is made
between "interpretation" and "intelligence."
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proposal, made somewhat in the dark, was a most appropriate one,
and was destined to ensure that when the breakthrough came in
strategic aerial reconnaissance a cadre of trained interpreters
would be available in the right place and at the right time
to exploit the photography.
The seed which sowed took a long time to sprout, and
the appearance of the first spindly growth took even longer.
During the remainder of 1950 and early 1951, the Agency in general,
and ORE in particular, was in a state of flux. On 7 October 1950,
Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith assumed the duties of Director
of Central Intelligence and William H. Jackson was designated Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, thus providing the Agency with
a strong management team. moreover, in the fall of 1950, ORE was
reorganized. Within the. next few months, several new entities
were created, including the Office of Research and Reports (ORR).
Soon thereafter, CCI, with its cadre of analysts having a prime
interest in COMINT, was formed in part from ORR. These were days
when reorganization and reassignment of personnel were pressing
problems. There was little interest and less opportunity to
wrestle with the establishment of new functions and problems of
staffing than. However, in spite of delays and cou etition with
ongoing problems, proposal was not dead. In June 1951,
Voigt was delegated to tel that things were beginning to
move, and to invite him to travel to Washington at goverment
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expense to talk "turkey." 1 A month later came to 25X1
Washington, at which time he apparently made formal application
for employment as a part-time PI consultant.
More months passed while was being investigated and 25X1
cleared. The definitive break came in March 1952. On the
twentieth of that month Robert Amory, Jr., who had become
Assistant Director, Research and Reports, just three days
earlier, sent a memo to the DCI seeking approval for hiring
as a consultant and for bringing him on board on 26 25X1
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March for an initial two weeks. Approval was granted. 1
Thus, the action which had been initiated by those concerned
primarily with OQMINI, but who had subsequently left ORR in the
spinoff of OCI, now shifted to others in ORR whose chief
substantive concerns were economic and geographic intelligence.
Though the new organizational relationships were potentially
excellent, particularly with the geographers who were no strangers
to photo interpretation, the shift oectrplicated and delayed full
attainment of objective of integrating the exploitation 25X1
of photography and COMM. Nevertheless, action was at last
under way.
The results of survey were contained in a memorandum 25X1
dated 11 April 1952. 1 in it, he concluded that there was a
large potential "demand" in CIA for photo intelligence, and that
it could not be met with the photo interpretation reports and
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limited PI services available from the military. advocated 25X1
the hiring of a small number of photo interpreters, three at the
beginning, who would work directly with analysts at their desks.
lie characterized this relationship as the "team" approach. He
also recamended that ORR have on its staff, at the outset, a
skilled photo intelligence officer who could advise analysts on
the use of photography and train them to do simple interpretation
tasks themselves. For this position, ifiedly
recommended
who had served with
him in World War II.
April 1952 report differed fran his initial
proposal of August 1950 primarily in that it was much less
expansive. For one thing, it was based on a current, first-
hand survey of the status of photo interpretation inside and
outside the Agency. It is not apparent, however, how he
reconciled his exceedingly low-profile proposal with what he
characterized as the "large demand" for photo intelligence.
In just a few months the Agency was to demonstrate a willingness
to approve a much larger caanitment than recommended. 25X1
Though he did not change his philosophy and, indeed, stressed
his belief that the Agency requirement was for photo intelligence
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rather than photo interpretation,* his proposal now was
for one photo intelligence officer, who would occupy a senior
position, and a complementary group of photo interpreters.
Likewise, instead of speaking confidently of a unit cccrposed of
photo intelligence officers, using all-source materials, he was
now expressing the hope that the initial three photo interpreters
might serve as a "pilot operation to work out the techniques
of coordinating intelligence on an all-source basis." Very
likely the latter change reflected the divorce from ORR of
the functions which became OCI, including those related to the
handling of Ca4W. Fortunately, the pendulum was due to swing
back toward Brown's 1950 concept within the next several months.
made quite an issue of this point. In his 1952 proposal,
p
minim of information from other sources. He defined photo
intelligence reports as those combining the results of skilled
photo interpretation, usually in conference at the working level,
with all other available pertinent information about the subject
under study.
he defined photo interpretation reports as those resulting
rimarily from a careful study of photography and having a
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II. Establishment of Formal Photo Interpretation Activity
(1952-1953)
Action following ---]proposal of 11 April 1952 was
relatively fast. In a maw to Robert Amory, Jr., the AD/RR,
dated 7 May 1952, Otto Guthe, Chief, Geographic Division, ORR,
in effect endorsed the proposal and suggested that the
Agency PI facility be established as the Photo Intelligence
Branch within the Geographic Division. 1 By 26 June 1952,
Amory was able to say that the DCI had already approved in
principle the proposal for creation of a Photo Intelligence
Division, with provision for staffing it over and above the
proposed ORR Table of Organization sulzditted for fiscal 1953. f
Guthe's proposed branch was, thus, well on the way to founding
as a division. Doubtlessly, this change was related to the
impending reorganization in ORR, which included creation of
the Geographic Research Area out of the former Geographic
Division and elevation of the former branches to the status of
divisions.
A. The Die is Cast.
The formal proposal for establishing the division was made
in a staff study signed by Amory and forwarded to the Project
STAT
STAT
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Review Carmittee on 17 July 1952. 1 This study was prepared
in the Geographic Division, ORR, by James A. Branmell, with
the assistance of 2/ It recarmended
approval of an allotment of
from vouchered funds and
an increase of 12 persons in the Table of organization and
personnel ceiling for ORR for fiscal 1953 to provide for
establishing a Photo Intelligence Division (D/GP) in the
Geographic Research Area, ORR.
The Office of the Photo intelligence Division Chief was
to consist of three persons, and there were to be two five-man
branches, one the Industrial and the other the Geographic
(Figure 1).* The latter was intended particularly to support
work in the Geographic Division of ORR and to serve the needs
of the DDP; the former,. to support the. Ecoiunic Research Area,
25X1
25X1
ORR. Most of the funds requested,
were ear-
marked for personal services. Onl
y
was allocated for the
25X1
purchase of equipment. The remaining
was intended to
25X1
reimburse the military for an estimated four projects to be
done in accordance with Agency specifications.
entered on duty 1 July 1952 as a
25X1
GS-13 Intelligence Officer assigned to the Office of the
Assistant Director in ORR. With the establishment of the Photo
Intelligence Division, slot was added to the 12 new
25X1
ones bringing the T/O of the division up to 13. On 26 October
1952, he was formally reassigned to the new division. 10
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In justifying placement of the new centralized PI facility
in the Geographic. Research Area (GRA), the study cited the broad
support provided by divisions in the GRA, the need of the PI's
for cartographic and graphic support, and the close ties of the
GRA with other parts of ORR and the DDP. The plan also called
for provision of 610 square feet of floor space in Building 11,
where the Geography and Cartography Divisions were housed.
On 25 July 1952, the Project Review Catmittee approved the
re=wended allocation of funds and increase in the ORR T/0. 11
Ten days later, on 4 August, a project brief based on the 17 July
staff study was signed by the DCI, General Walter Bedell Smith,
with the concurrence of Allen W. Dulles as Chairman, Project
Review Cciinittee. This brief also stated that beginning in
fiscal 1954, the first full year of operation, the annual cost
of the new activity would
With the formal approval of. the proposal, one step
remained -- to carry out the plan. Once again Amory demonstrated
both his strong interest in establishing the photo intelligence
function and the speed with which he could act. On 4 August,
the same day the project was approved by the DCI, Amory sent
a no to the Deputy Director (Administration), Walter R. Wolf,
submitting the proposed Table of Organization for the Photo
Intelligence Division, requesting that it be considered along
with the overall ORR T/O, then under study, and that the office
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T/O be increased by 12 positions. L2/ Administrative work
in response to this proposal took nearly three months to complete,
however. On 2 November 1952 the CIA Photo Intelligence Division
was formally established. L3/
B. Concept of Operation and Products.
The method of operation and resulting products were also
specified in some detail. 14 The new division was to be staffed
with PI specialists in each of several topical fields of
part-;cular concern to CIA, and these specialists were to maintain
continuing liaison with their counterparts in the military. It
was initially envisaged that these Agency PI's would utilize all-
source materials and work shoulder-to-shoulder with economic
and other analysts in bringing their kn wledge of available
photography and how to analyze it to bear on the solution of
specific intelligence problems. The fact that only one photo
intelligence officer was on duty for the first several months
and that the PI's were separated physically from other analysts
seriously hampered full implementation of this working arrangement.
Indeed, the initial concept of shoulder-to-shoulder work was
never fully realized.
The resulting products were expected to be working papers
consisting of sketches, tabulations, and typescript to be used
by other analysts in planning and executing operations or in the
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production of finished intelligence. There were no initial
plans to produce formal photo intelligence reports, as such,
for wide dissemination within CIA and throughout the Intelligence
Community. This carefully circumscribed view of PI products
and their use was faithfully reflected in practice for more
than the first year of operation.
Consistent with its concept of a high-level photo
intelligence operation, the staff study included one exceedingly
ambitious proposal which matured very slowly. It announced
that the Photo Intelligence Division would develop a mechanism,
probably an interagency committee, to formulate intelligence
requirements for aerial reconnaissance missions and to foster
maximum use of photo interpretation facilities to meet national
intelligence requirements. obviously, this was the expression
of a desire to bring photo reconnaissance and photo interpretation
efforts to bear on the solution of national intelligence
problems rather than merely to locate, identify, and describe
potential bombing targets. The foresight thus displayed, as
well as the difficulty of attaining the desired goal, was
demonstrated by the fact that such a comprehensive approach to
the joint management of national collection and exploitation
assets was realized only with the establishment of the
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (CCMn=)
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a USIB subcommittee, 15 years later.*
In still another way the initial concept and plan for a
photo intelligence division in CIA set it apart from and above
similar organizations in existence at that time. Consistently,
the proposed division was called the Photo Intelligence Division,
and the products were named photo intelligence. Moreover, the
PI's were designated Intelligence Officer (Photo Analysis), not
interpreters. On the one hand, this emphasized that they would
work with all-source materials, and on the other that they would
do analysis, not merely interpretation. Thus, Agency PI's
would not simply identify facilities and their component parts,
but, working with functional analysts, they would explain what
went on in the facilities, how the component parts functioned
with respect to each other, pinpoint the bottlenecks or critical
control points, and the like. These distinctions in the naming
and job titles were intended to convey what Agency planners
believed to be the critical difference between photo intelligence,
which was to be pursued in CIA, and photo interpretation, which
was to be done elsewhere. This was a titular distinction that
was to endure for nearly ten years, until the establishment of
*Though the Cannittee on overhead Reconnaissance (COMDR) and its
predecessor the Ad Hoc Requirements Cami.ttee (ARC) achieved a notable
degree of coordination and control in the levying of national
collection requirements, it remained for the COMIRE C to undertake
the difficult task of exercising some control in the allocation of
limited resources available to exploit that photography.
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a separate national center and other considerations resulted in
a tactical retreat, at least as far as terminology was concerned,
in naming the National Photographic Interpretation Center.
C. Jobs and People.
The first attest at staffing the new function was deceptively
easy. The ease with which this initial step was ac=t lisped
was no measure, however, of the difficulties to follow. To get
just one PI adviser from a Colorado museum apparently
excited no one. To camience the building of a new division was
clearly another matter, one not to be accomplished without all
interested elements, inside and outside the Agency, getting a
piece of the action.
Bureaucracy wasn't the only impediment. The scarcity of
qualified PI's and an initial miscalculation in the grade scale
seriously hampered recruitment, particularly to fill those
positions below GS-12. The Agency was seeking not merely skilled
interpreters, but those expert in at least one of several technical
specialties, such as guided missiles, radar, aircraft, naval
shipbuilding, and the like, or in earth sciences, such as geology
or geography. Ivbreover, it was intended that the Agency PI would
be no mere technician; in addition to his substantive specialty,
each was expected to have some knowledge of related intelligence
problems and of how his specialized knowledge could contribute
to their solution.
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This was a large order. Most PI's skilled in the desired
topical specialties were either in military service as a consequence
of the Korean war, or working as civilians for the military. By
March 1953, with only four PI's cleared and on board, steps were
taken to raise the lower end of the grade scale. On the third
of that month
Chief
, Administrative Staff, ORR,
25X1
sent a memo to
Chief
, Classification and Wage
25X1
idmini.stration Division, requesting a general raising of working
level grades in the photo intelligence Division to a minimm
of GS-12.
In his covering memo, justified the proposed change
on the grounds that the Agency needed "experts" who could
instruct ORR analysts in the use of photography as well as
conduct extensive liaison with other government agencies. L-9/
Besides, he added, the higher grades were needed to make ORR
competitive with other government agencies in a scarce labor
market. That the latter was the more important reason is
suggested not only by the slow pace of recruitment, but also
by a statement in the March 1953 monthly report for the
Geographic Research Area which coat~lained that delay in the
entrance on duty of the division chief, who had been named
several months earlier, was seriously affecting progress in
the classification of positions intended to permit the hiring
of "capable persons demanding more salary than is permissible
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recounted in the next chapter. In the meantime,
under the present T/0." 16/ The decision on this inportant point
was clearly going to await arrival of the division chief. This
was to be Arthur C. Lundahl, whose appointment and arrival are
who was officially serving as Acting Chief, Industrial Branch, L7/
was functioning as the de facto division chief in the absence
of the designated head, whose release by the Navy was still
ping..
In spite of difficulties, however, some qualified persons
were brought on board before the arrival of the division chief
on 11 May 1953. an Agency employee since 1947,
had the distinction of being the second person to join the
division. Though not an experienced PI, he reported for
duty in December 1952 following an 11-week course in photo-
grammetry at The Ohio state University. The third person on
the payroll was
who also entered on duty
in December, before he was cleared. He was sent to the
Georgetown University Institute of Linguistics for three
months, and did not become a functioning member of the division
until March 1953 was a formes Naval officer who had
served with Lundahl at Navy PIC during the Korean War. Through
his researching of photos, he had become acquainted with
head of the CIA Graphics Register and a former
Naval officer himself. Knowing that was due to be
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25X1
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discharged from the Navy, had alerted him to the
opportunity opening up in the Agency and helped him to arrange
an interview.
In January 1953
joined the division. During World
War II, she had been a photo interpretation officer in the
US Army. Inasmuch as was.not an experienced PI and
was not yet cleared, became the second
working PI in photo Intelligence Division. Prior to the
arrival of Lundahl there were just two other PI's in D/GP.
Both entered on duty in D/GP on the same day, 9 April 1953.
Ones
served with Lundahl at Navy PIC during
the Korean War and came to the Agency through his contacts
The other,
in the Graphics Register.
was a civilian photo interpreter with
the US Air Force who had resigned, taken a trip to Canada, and
then Dome to the Agency upon his return to the US. Like
he had entered on duty in the Agency without being fully cleared
and had spent more than two months at the Library of Congress
doing unclassified reading and research before becoming a
productive member of the division.
Of the original six,
remained with the organization and moved up in the hierarchy
as the division grew. The other three werc gone by May 1955.
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25X1
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geodesy at The Ohio State University, after which he moved
elsewhere in the Geographic Research Area to work in that field.
The other two resigned from the Agency. Before leaving, however,
left in the summer of 1953 to pursue advanced studies in 25X1
was able to arrange social contacts between her 25X1
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new division chief and Robert Amory, Jr., who had become the DDI,
thus expanding the channel for direct communications and
fostering the strong bond of friendship that developed between
then. She also proved to be especially able in providing
staff support, as needed, to the office of the division chief.
D. Requirements and Photography.
Requirements for photo intelligence or photo interpretation
and photo collection are inseparable, but their relationships
in 1952 were very different from those following the advent of
the U-2. During the early years it was primarily a question of
gearing requirements to the exploitation of existing photography.
Aerial coverage of the Soviet and Chinese interiors was limited
and largely of World War II vintage. For European Russia,' there
was much excellent World War II German photography, known to
postwar American interpreters as GX. There were lesser amounts
of poorer Japanese photography of comparable age covering eastern
Asia. Known as JX, most of it was difficult or impossible to
obtain in Washington. Though none of this coverage was of current
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intelligence value, it was of considerable utility in strategic
studies. Fran it much useful information could be gleaned
concerning immobile, slowly changing cultural features, such
as settlement patterns or established industrial plants, and
features of the physical environment.
Even as early as 1952 there was more recent aerial
photography of parts of the Soviet Bloc as well as highly
selective current coverage of border areas of high interest.
There were, of course, literally tons of photography of Korea,
but it was of limited importance from a strategic point of view.
In addition, there were selective clandestine collection efforts,
both in the air and on the ground. Without exception, those
who surveyed existing needs and available photography concluded
that enough suitable photography was already available to
justify the establishment of a photo intelligence capability
in CIA.
Within the Geographic Research Area itself there were
many unsatisfied demands for photo intelligence which lay
beyond the capability of most geographers or cartographers
to produce for themselves. In addition, the GRA served a
broad spectrum of customers, not only within but outside the
Agency, including the military services. There was, for
example, the analysis of safe areas within the USSR for DDP,
detailed area studies for the Strategic Air Command (SAC),
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escape and evasion studies for the joint services, border
studies in support of infiltration operations, studies in
support of comprehensive clandestine operations in the Far
East, and urban analyses for DDP. In one or another of these
types of studies, photo-derived information was needed on
topography, roads, railroads, rivers, bridges, settlements,
areas of concealment, key industries, security measures,
military installations, ocrinunications facilities, and the
like. Existing maps also needed correction and amplification,
and, to the extent that recent photo coverage was available,
frequently needed to be updated to guard against the possibility
of disastrous miscalculations.
The new photo Intelligence Division also had something to
offer analysts in the Emnemic Research Area, though at the
beginning many of them were skeptical about the utility of
available aerial photography of the USSR because of its age.
Excellent IX photography could yield much information on the
layouts of Soviet industrial plants, their siting, the
existence of room for expansion, physical relationships of
their component parts, and the flow of materials through
production. At the very least, it afforded the economic
analyst a grasp of the physical reality of installations not
available from a study of production statistics, as well as a
rough and ready means for speculating informatively about the.
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credibility of information from other sources.
Though requirements of the Office of Scientific Intelligence
(OSI) were not as susceptible to being defined in terms of
information potentially available from World War II photography
as were many of those from ORR, they did exist. Wherever
research and development activity was known or suspected in
an area covered by photography of suitable date, there was
need for photo intelligence support. As early as July 1952,
OSI had continuing requirements for intelligence utilizing
aerial photo coverage of guided missile and radar sites. 13
Moreover, that office anticipated requirements for a more exhaustive
analysis of high-priority installations reported in insufficient
detail in military photo interpretation reports.
To a greater degree than any other office, OCI needed
current photo coverage to make photo intelligence useful in
its reporting. Furthermore, the very fact that the greatest
interest of this office usually centered in trouble spots
around the periphery of the Soviet Union or elsewhere in the
world, and that such spots were relatively accessible to aerial
reconnaissance, ensured the existence of requirements from OCI.
The mechanics of levying requirements were relatively
simple at first. With only one interpreter on board for
much of the time, he was both the screen through which
requirements passed and the means by which they were answered.
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To provide the needed guidance in accepting them and help in
setting priorities, he had the assistance of the GRA Project
Review Committee.*
According to the philosophy laid down at the founding
of the division, as soon as any ORR analyst or his supervisor
became aware of the potential need for photo interpretation
support, he would call for and obtain the services of a photo
interpreter. In consultation with the analyst, the PI would
determine the pertinent photo coverage, if any, suited to solution
of the problem. Upon obtaining the desired photography, the
PI would sit down with the analyst again, and, working together,
they would define the nature and scope of pi support required.
This somewhat idealized approach was typical of the way
most requirements were generated in the early period,-particularly
when was the only PI. Indeed, there was, at the
outset, no other viable approach. In most instances, he alone
knew what photography was available, whether or not it was potentially
suited to answering the requirement, where and how to obtain it,
and haw to counsel the analyst in modifying and firming up the
request once the photography was in hand. At first,
*The GRA Project Review Committee at this time was.corrposed of
the Chief, GRA, who served as Chairman; the chiefs of the four
divisions con rising GRA; the Assistant to the Chief of the
Cartography Division; and the Assistant to the Chief of the
Geography Division.
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had the benefit of close supervision by.Guthe as Chief,
Geographic Research Area, out of whose office he worked as
a photo intelligence adviser. He also had the assistance
of~ who spent several weeks as consultant helping to
launch the new activity. The GRA July 1952 monthly report
said ten "desk-side" consultations were held with substantive
analysts, and that they resulted in six projects. L9/ Succeeding
monthly reports mentioned similar consultations, many of which
also resulted in the levying of requirements for PI support.
Though the foregoing approach to the development and
levying of requirements was the rule during the early period
of operations, there were exceptions, particularly as additional
PI's arrived on duty and as analysts became more familiar with
photography as a source.of intelligence information. *As time
pas,
tended more and more to serve as a kind of
broker, receiving or shaping up the requirements and delegating
more of the actual interpretation work to the growing number
of PI's in the division. Even this change, however, was one that
brought the mode of operation closer to the method proposed by
in his 11 April 1952 memo to Amory. In other instances,
particularly where PI support was needed by members of the
Geography or Cartography divisions for projects on which they
were working, a direct approach from analyst to PI was sometimes
used. Requests fran-the DDP posed special problems. Not only
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were their representatives anxious to discuss their needs
with as few persons as possible, but they were frequently
evasive about the precise scope of their requirements. The
latter policy led to a considerable waste of scarce PI talent;
the former usually cast firmly in the role of go-
between.
Toward the close of the pre-Lundahl period, a new type
of requirement appeared. The D/GP monthly report for April
1953 revealed for the first time that PI's were working on
self-initiated projects. LO/ Two such were identified. One
dealt with explosives industries and the other with ammmition
industries in parts of European Russia. These projects were
said to have been undertaken in anticipation of requests and
as a basic approach to the production of photo intelligence
concerning these industries. This change in defining work to
be done represented, in some degree, a declaration of independence
for the PI's. It demonstrated the growing confidence of the
PI's in their ability to anticipate what photo intelligence
information economic analysts would be needing and to determine
the most advantageous time for its production. Indeed, in
future years, as widespread coverage of denied areas became
available, this ability to anticipate needs in all areas of
intelligence interest became a way of life for the PI's.
Philosophically, it marked a small but significant movement away
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from the extremely close working relationships envisaged
between PI Is and analysts, a relationship which was one of the
distinctive differences between the work of photo intelligence
officers and photo interpreters. There was no indication,
however, that the direction of this movement was a matter of
concern to either party.
In these early days, Agency PI's were heavily dependent
on the military services, particularly the Air Force, for the
aerial photography they needed. This called for the establishment
of good working relations and frequent contacts between Agency
PI's and those in the military. Though this community of
interest was helpful in encouraging the liaison desired between
Agency photo intelligence officers and military interpreters,
it had its drawbacks. For one thing, it argued for the necessity
of keeping at least the main working quarters for Agency PI's
outside the Special Center created for the handling of COMINI.
This contributed significantly to the delay in progress toward
the production of all-source photo intelligence in CIA.
Actual procurement of photography, both aerial and ground,
was chiefly through the Graphics Register Division or the
Industrial Register, both of which were components of the
Office of Collection and Dissemination. In the case of the
Industrial Register, GX and similar photography as well as town
plans based on such photography were filed in plant dossiers..
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Use of these files, particularly by ORR analysts, stimulated
requirements for PI assistance and inquires about collection
capabilities.
in the early 1950's, interpretation was done, with few
exceptions, from photographic prints. Since most of the
negative materials were held by the military, the task before
and his staff in the Graphics Register was to
procure prints from those who held the negatives. In spite of
an obviously high degree of good will by all concerned, there
were many problems, particularly at first. Most serious was
the time lapse between arrival of an urgent requirement and
receipt by the PI of the photographic prints needed to answer
it. By March 1953, this time span had been greatly reduced
through the efforts of of the Graphics Register . 25X1
and the cooperation of the US Air Force. Agency photo analysts
were granted clearances to work in the Aeronautical Chart and
Information Center (ACIC) photo collections. They were also
permitted to borrow (C prints for exploitation while retention
copies were being reproduced.' In spite of problems in
procuring photography, however, there is no record of any
request for PI support having been turned away for this reason.
E. Activities and Products.
Fran the beginning, the Photo Intelligence Division was,
2
5X1
in some degree, a victim of its own success. survey,
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in March and April 1952, had whetted the interest of many
analysts and their supervisors in obtaining photo intelligence
support. This interest was further developed after the
arrival of by his consultations with analysts. It
wasn't as though the latter were ignorant of the existence of
aerial photography or the fact that it was highly useful in
mapping and certain military applications. Until now, however,
they had lacked the technical background needed to relate its
potential to their own problems. The success with which this
was done, even on a pilot basis, all but overwhelmed the
capability of the embryonic division to provide the desired
answers. It also substantially converted the photo intelligence
adviser into a working PI, short-circuiting the orderly planning
and development of work in the division.
The interpretation of photographs and the production of
photo intelligence, thus, became single most important
activity. At first, there were three main types of requesters:
the economic analysts in ORR, analysts in the DDP, and geographers
within the GRA itself. The latter provided many services to others,
so that PI support given them might, for example, be for a DDP
project. The job confronting the sole PI was, therefore, one of
keeping several different custceeiers happy by doing something for
each, with due regard for priorities and realistic deadlines.
This was not an easy task.
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Most pressing and Host difficult in these early days were
border studies done for the DDP in support of infiltration
operations. Such projects, in which D/GP became involved
through requests for support from the Geography Division, were
usually done on an "urgent" priority. Where ancle photography
was available, they involved nuch detailed and painstaking
photo interpretation. The immediate objective in undertaking
PI support of these projects was to evaluate the best available
maps and to provide information concerning the physical and
cultural landscape using photography, primarily World War II
German coverage. The resulting products were index plots
constructed on map overlays and accompanied by notes describing
significant differences between information portrayed on the
map sheets and on the photos. A set of-photos, on which the
political boundary and other notations were marked in grease
pencil, was also sent to the requester. Close collaboration,
as in locating the political boundary on the photographs, was
exercised between D/GP and the Geography Division. The PI
contribution formed an appendix to the parent study prepared
by the geographers. 22
The first border study to be undertaken was one on the
border of the Karelo-Finnish SSR. Photo interpretation support
on this project was substantially completed by the end of
December 1952, but the report itself was not issued by the
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Geography Division until March 1953. 23 Problems
encountered in doing the work resulted not only fran lack
of previous experience by all concerned in this application
of photo interpretation, but also from the reluctance of
DDP to pinpoint the specific areas of interest. Moreover,
the scope of the work was increased beyond initial estimates
when photography revealed that existing maps were so inaccurate
as to require carpilation of a sketch map based on the
photography. L4/
Photo intelligence support of the Karelo-Finnish border
study did more than just provide information needed to satisfy
an operational requirement. It demonstrated the potential of
aerial photography as a source of reliable detail available
nowhere else. As a result, the DDP expanded its requirements
for photo intelligence support. In December 1952, the Geography
Division submitted a draft of another border study, the Polish-
Belorussian SSR, to the DDP for criticism. In response, the
DDP requested additional detail which could only be obtained
from photography. L5/ Result: the establishment of another PI
Inject by D/GP in support of work being done in the Geography
Division for the DDP.
The sense of urgency which the DDP was able to carnauiicate
concerning its requirements was reflected in the generally
expeditious handling accorded its projects. Thus, of nine
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projects initiated in the photo intelligence Division between
July 1952 and April 1953 in direct support of DDP, eight
had been conTpleted by the end of the period (Figure 2). Moreover,
both DDP projects initiated in April 1953 were finished in
the same month. Of the four projects initiated in D/GP over
the same ten-month period to provide PI support on border studies
being done in the Geography Division for the DDP, two were
oe?npleted within that period. If the latter performance seemed
sluggish by comparison, it should be r eyed that the nature
and scope of photo interpretation required on these projects
was such that it extended over several months, precluding rapid
completion of the work. Another indicator of the concerted
effort applied to DDP projects was the fact that 65 per cent
of D/GP project time in April 1953 was devoted to the answering
of requirements levied directly upon the division by that
directorate. An additional seven per cent of the D/GP project
time was devoted to work in support of Geography Division projects
being done for the DDP.
By comparison, in April 1953 D/GP devoted only six per cent
of its project time in direct support of the ORR Industrial
Division, though an additional 20 per cent was spent on self-
initiated projects established to produce photo intelligence
D/GP considered basic to ORR work on the USSR animniti.on and
explosives industries. The inferior competitive position of
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arrived. Four of the six projects initiated in July 1952
as a result of his conferences with analysts were for the
ORR Industrial Division, and one of them, dealing with the
Kazan Airframe Plant, had been ccupleted in a day. 26 Than
the honeymoon ended. Though a layout and analysis of the
PI support.
This support had commenced with a bang when
the ORR Industrial Division in obtaining PI support was also
reflected in the fact that only three of 16 projects, less than
20 per cent of the total, levied by that division on D/GP
during the first ten months of operation were completed by
the end of April 1953. The reason was obvious. These were
chiefly plant studies utilizing GX photography approximately
ten years old. it would, indeed, have been difficult to argue
persuasively for the urgent need to produce plant layouts and
statistics on floor space for the explosives industry in
competition with DDP requirements for area analyses in support
of currently planned operations. Even so, to ORR analysts
and their supervisors the poor competitive position earned
by their projects must have seemed ironic. In justifying
establishmEent of the Photo Intelligence Division, major
emphasis had been placed on the need of economic analysts for
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Gorlovka machinery Building Plant "Kirov"* were delivered
to the industrial Division during September, most of the PI
project time in that month was spent on the 1(arelo-Finnish
border study. 27 Moreover, work on the latter project dragged
on into October, November, and December. 28 Work on low
priority projects virtually ceased, though consultations with
ORR economic analysts continued at a reduced pace and one
urgent requirement was answered. 29
With the advent of the new year and arrival on board of
the first of several additional experienced PI's there was
improvement in the scheduling of work on Industrial Division
requirements. In January, the study on Soviet explosives plants,
which had lain dormant, was reactivated. 30 By May, it was
estimated that work on it was 70 per cent complete and that work
on the companion study on USSR military depots reported to be
loading ammunition was half done. In the course of their work
on the explosives plants project, PI's discovered that there were
numerous name duplications and that many plants believed to
have been manufacturing explosives were actually making other
products. 31 In addition, the tempo of PI consultations with
economic analysts was increased, and the D/GP monthly report
*The Gorlovka plant study was done for an ORR report on the Soviet
mining machinery industry. A PI layout of the Gorlovka Plant
may be found in pit--21,, published in 1953.
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expressed interest in the expenditure of further effort to
explore the needs of ORR components for intelligence support. L2/
in spite of manpower limitations, several additional
types of projects were undertaken in response to requirements
from other sources. At least four were for OSI. Indeed, the
first project of record as well as the first recorded as having
been completed was one done for OSI. L3/ Among the other three
OSI projects was one requesting descriptions from World War II
German photography of the neighborhoods in Moscow where certain
research facilities reportedly engaged in experimental biological
research were located. An urgently requested first-phase effort
on this investigation was initiated and c mpleted in February
1953, with an oral response to the requester. As if to demon-
strate that the PI division played no favorites in allocating
scarce manpower, the second phase, which was estimated to
require but 12 hours of PI work, was still not completed on
1 May. 141
At this point in the evolution of aerial reconnaissance,
there was much interest in long-focal-length can-eras for the
collection of oblique photography of denied areas from offshore
stations. The Photo Intelligence Division recognized the
need to develop photogrammetric and mapping techniques for
utilizing such photography to prepare sketch maps for intelligence
purposes. Accordingly, a self-initiated project intended to
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accomplish this was established using "one-hundred-inch"
photography of a strategic area along the Bering Sea. The
assigned photo analyst was who had recently
returned from training in photograumetry at The Ohio State
University. In the absence of ground control as well as
of precise information concerning the location of the
aircraft, the depression of the camera, and its altitude
for each exposure, the problems involved were formidable.
who still functioned as PI consultant,
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spent a week in Washington in March 1953 determining what
flight and camera information was essential to the solution
ofE::~lem and where it could be obtained. 35 By
the first of May, 366 of an estimated 600-700 man hours had
been expended on this project, L6/ but it was obviously a
long way from a successful conclusion. It was, in fact,
never cc?zpleted.
Though more time was spent on projects than on any other
activity,* the philosophy according to which the division was
supposed to operate called for much liaison, coordinating, and
planning. For example, regularly attended meetings
of the Graphics Research Coordinating Countittee, a group
cozzprised of representatives of all major intelligence organizations
*In April 1953, projects accounted for 77 per cent of the man hours
worked. 37
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involved in the collection, filing, and exploitation of
photography. This eoimittee was concerned not only with
such things as the latest finds of photography having high
intelligence interest and the means for obtaining them, but
also with new reconnaissance systems and targets of potential
interest.
The eiYiaryonic photo Intelligence Division also became
involved, albeit somewhat obliquely, in an historic failure.
In the sunnier of 1952, the US Air Force embarked on an ambitious
study called Project HOPE CHEST. The objectives of the study
were to determine a wide range of national intelligence require-
ments as well as the resources needed to collect the information.
During the nonth of August, James A. Bra=ell, the Deputy Chief,
Geographic Research Area, at the request of H. Marshall Chadwell,
an initial meeting with OSI representatives and
Assistant Director of Scientific Intelligence, participated in
of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Development,
USAF, concerning the extent to which CIA should participate
informally in a series of HOPE CHEST working group meetings. 38
A month later an announcement containing a list of the working
groups, called panels, listed 14, one of which was further.
subdivided into eight "task forces." CIA was represented on two
of the panels. was listed as a member of the "Special
Reconnaissance" panel and
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is
alternate) as a number of the panel on "Indirectly Controlled
Sources." 39
The October 1952 monthly report for the Geographic
Research Area noted that conferences had been held with
representatives from CIA and the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Development, USAF, in order to determine ". ?
concrete criteria for the formulation of CIA requirements that
could be met through improved air photographic reconnaissance." 40
The same report added that pursuant to these discussions a
survey and drafting of "segments of the report" were being
undertaken by
the PI consultant. . 25X1
A month later, in November 1952, the report, which was
prepared largely by under the direction of Guthe, was 25X1
transmitted in the form.of a memo over the signature of James
0. Reber, as Assistant Director, Intelligence Coordination,
to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, Headquarters, USAF.
This memorandum distinguished between "technical intelligence
photography" needed for precise analysis and mensuration, "analytic
photography" needed for describing installations and providing
plant layouts and building dimensions, and "search photography"
for identifying targets of interest and determining the need
for more detailed coverage. These distinctions, later narrowed
to two categories, foreshadowed the development of search and
spotting overhead collection systems.
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project HDPE CHEST soon proved to be too diffuse in
both scope and number of personnel involved to be manageable
or productive. By the =mner of 1953, Guthe, then the AD/RR,
was complaining that he had heard nothing of the project since
the 12 February 1953 meeting of the intelligence Advisory
Ca nnittee. 42 Lundahl recalls the compilation of CIA
:requirements, cone by was a huge document
lacking in discrimination and unadaptable to machine processing. 43
Indeed, the high expectations for HOPE CHEST were never realized.
Among miscellaneous duties performed by uring
these first ten months were administrative tasks, such as
preparation of D/GP monthly reports, orientation and supervision
of PI recruits when they entered on duty, preparation of training
lectures, and the interviewing of geographic attaches and visiting
foreign experts in the field of photo interpretation and
photogramnetry. one such visitor,
was interviews
b~
in October 1952.
Among subjects discussed were technical developments in photo
intelligence
and the great advances made by the USSR in the use
of aerial photography for mapping and interpretation.
Training was a function of fundamental importance in the
new division. From the beginning, it had been assumed that
economic and other substantive analysts would aeccuplish many
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routine photo interpretation tasks themselves, leaving only
the more difficult ones to specialists in interpretation. The
success of this plan depended on the effectiveness with which
the PI specialists could train other analysts in the rudiments of
interpretation. Though such extensive training was impossible
during the first year because of understaffing in the new
division, no time was lost in preparing for and offering some
sketchy pi orientation to other analysts. As early as August
1952, Guthe proposed ORR internal training in map intelligence
and geography, in which one of the six sessions would deal with
the use of aerial photographs in intelligence. 45 By-October
1952, was giving an "orientation talk" of 30 minutes
duration on the use of air photos in intelligence as part of
the training course for new ORR personnel. This presentation
was repeated at least twice during the next six months.
Not all training in which D/GP personnel participated was
given internally. In addition to training in geodesy
and photogrammetry at The Ohio State University Institute of
Geodesy, Photogrammetry, and Cartography and his subsequent
attendance in a PI course at the US Department of Agriculture
Graduate School, new division employees were scheduled for
the Agency orientation course as soon as possible after
arrival on duty. Competition between such training and work
loads was pointed up, however, when escaped such
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training and a waiver was requested for Lundahl when he at
last entered on duty. 46
Tmugh the foregoing survey of projects and other
activities is by no means complete, it gives a representative
sampling of the broad scope of activities in which muss of
the division became involved from the outset, the heavy workload,
the slow pace of recruitment, and an indication of some of the
obvious problems and shortconungs of the new division. One
final step remains, namely, to assess the accomplishments of
the new division during its ten months of operation prior to
the arrival of its designated leader.
F. Early Problems and Accanplish ents.
On the eve of Lundahl's arrival in May 1953, the operation
of the Photo Intelligence Division displayed distinct limitations
as well as score solid progress. The initial proposal for founding
the division sewed modest enough, but problems of implementing
it were such as to tax the ingenuity and Patience of those
responsible for staffing and managing the operation. For six
months, but one PI was cleared and on duty, and it was only in
the two months preceding Lundahl's entry on duty that the
beneficial effects of the recruitment effort were beginning to
be felt. At the close of the pre-Lundahl era, the six job
incumbents constituted a sort of task force, each member of which
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undertook whatever type of project had to be done regardless
of the position he occupied on the T/0. Though this was a
necessary practical solution to problems created by the mounting
number of requirements and lack of proper staffing, as a
continuing practice it was contrary to the stated need to
foster specialization in each of several designated fields.
Moreover, the division was still operating without a formal,
approved statement of mission and functions, except for the
objectives included in the staff study recommending its
establishment. Obviously, the delay in bringing the division
chief on board was proving costly in terms of planning and
management. There was an urgent need to chart the course of
future development for the division as well as to augment
and marshal its resources to aoccYmplish'the stated objectives.
Space was also being a problem. Though it was realized
from the beginning that new quarters would have to be found
as soon as the division began to approach full strength, the
slow rate of growth during the early months en ouraged postponement
of the eventual solution. Early in 1953, the division monthly
report claimed that the space in Building 11 was no longer
adequate for efficient operations. It called for new quarters
"near the analysts." 47 Presumably this meant the economic
analysts; the PI's were already in the same building as the
geographers. By late February, the problem had moved up one
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echelon. The new chief, Geographic Research, James A.
Bramwell, noted that prospects of getting the expected space
in "M" building were gloomy, and warned that the assignment
of additional personnel to the already cramped quarters in
Building 11 would delay establishment of an adequate support
program for the economic analysts. 48 A month later he
pointed to the embarrassment and difficulty the new division
chief would experience by being placed in inadequate quarters
away from his operating branches. 49 Clearly, the provision
of functionally suitable space for the Photo Intelligence
Division was another of the immediate problems to be faced by
Lundahl upon his arrival.
Fquipment used by Agency PI's at this point in history
was not yet significantly different froth that employed elsewhere.
The initial budget had allocated only $700 for the purchase of
equipment. The chief working tool was still the folding pocket
stereoscope, though funds had been earmarked for purchase of
a bench stereoscope and an Abrams Sketctnmaster. Neither bad
been procured, however, by the time Lundahl arrived. In fairness
to this approach, it should be realized that there was nothing
unique about the scale or resolution of the photography being used
in CIA, and that neither the photo coverage nor the intelligence
problems to whose solution it could be addressed demanded a
high degree of sophistication in techniques of interpretation.
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Nor was there time, in these early days, to lavish on the
interpretation of minutiae or to dream of new exploitation
systems. Though neither um-ediate need nor opportunity called
for inauguration of a research and development program at this
time, it was an obvious future requirement if the Agency were
to assume leadership in the development of a photo intelligence
capability geared to the production of increasingly detailed
and critical information for use by strategic planners and
policy makers at the highest levels in government. Moreover,
in view of the significance of lead time in such development,
this was another problem to which Lundahl would have to direct
his attention with same sense of urgency.
Since service to other analysts and the evolutionary
developa,ent of photo interpretation programs to support them
was the prime objective of the operation, this was the area
in which greatest progress was made. The most striking success
was probably achieved in support of the DDP. The greatest
deficiency was the slow progress in developing a program for
realizing the potential for providing all-source pi support to
ecoranic analysts in the ORR Industrial Division. As late as
April 1953, at least four of the six PI's in the division still
lacked an SI clearance. 50 Moreover, the exigencies involved
in work on higher priority projects were seriously compromising
work on those initiated in response to requirements from the
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Industrial Division.
Though relatively good service was provided in response to
the limiter] requests for support from OSI, the whole gamut of
exciting and exotic developments in Soviet missilery, aircraft,
atomic weapons, biological and chemical warfare, and the like
seemed to stand just beyond the reach of the photo interpreters.
This was a sleeping giant that could be awakened by the first
reconnaissance aircraft penetrating his dcaain. And this was
the type of photographic input most likely to precipitate a
crash effort to develop new and more exacting exploitation
systems and techniques. There was one other sleeper. The
low level of support provided to OCI in the first ten months
was hardly a fair measure of the potential demand. AU that
was needed to trigger virtual production pancienx~ni um was some
photogenic world crisis. Thus, the new division chief would be
confronted with the joint tasks of providing responsive answers
to all requirements, whatever their priority, while at the
same time developing adequate photo intelligence programs to
maximize contributions of photography to the solution of all
kinds of intelligence problems, not just a fortunate few.
in spite of uneven progress in the develognent of photo
intelligence programs to support economic and other analysts,
the division had held firmly to the goal of establishing a
photo intelligence organization dedicated to the use of all-
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source materials in the exploitation of photography. This
was the concept initially introduced by
subscribed to by it was also the approach advocated 25X1
by Lundahl when he arrived and the one brought to fulfillment
in later years under his persuasive leadership. Though it may
not have been an obvious accomplishment during these early and
trying months, this unwavering adherence to the concept of
photo intelligence based on the use of all-source materials
may well have been the most significant achievement during
the pre-Lundahl period.
If the job which faced Lundahl seemed discouraging because
of its complexity and the mounting urgency of all its constituent
parts, there was one reason for optimism. He and the cause of
photo intelligence had staunch supportets in 8tanmel1; Guthe,
and Amory, and the latter two had recently been moved into
positions that ensured their continued strong support no
matter what opposition developed.
With the appointment of Amory as Assistant DDI on 23
February 1953, Guthe became the AD/RR. In his previous position
as Chief, Geographic Research, Guthe had been responsible for
supervising the development of the PI function and for staffing
up and overseeing management of the division. In this capacity,
he had first-hand knowledge of divisional problems, and he had,
over the months, been justifying proposals for their solution.
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to his superior, the AD/RR. Now he occupied that position
himself. Men his successor, Braxr l1, reiterated the same
claims and reminded him that sons of these problems had been
around nearly a year, he would get a favorable response.
The situation with regard to Angry was even more important.
Not only did he, as Assistant DDI and, beginning 1 May 1953, DDI,
occupy a more influential position, but he was also an extremely
dynamic person. From the beginning of his short term as AD/RR,
Amory had pleaded the cause of photo intelligence before his
superior and, through his, before the highest councils in the
Agency. Now he was one of the Deputy Directors. Like Guthe,
he could hardly repudiate his previous stand, and there was
no indication that he had any desire or intention to do so.
As DDI he retained his strong enthusiasm and support for photo
intelligence.
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III. Photo interpretation Finds Its Identity in CIA
(1953-1955)
The man selected to head the Photo Intelligence Division
was Arthur C. Lundahl (Figure 3). In education, training,
experience, and personality, Lundahl was ideal for the job.
Imaginative, outgoing, perceptive, with a broad grasp of the
technology of photography and photographic interpretation
as well as an extraordinary gift for reporting its current
achievements and pleading the inevitable course of its future
development, Lundahl was a perfect example of the right man
in the right place at the right time. His academic credentials
were in good order: a bachelor's and a taster's degree in
geology fran the University of Chicago, and work towards a
PhD nearly completed. During World War II he had served with
the US Navy as a photo interpretation officer. when the Agency
discovered him and decided to hire him he was employed by the
US Navy Photographic Interpretation Center, where he was the
second ranking civilian with the title of Assistant Chief
Engineer. There was just one problem; the Navy was reluctant
to lose him.
Even before the formal establishment of the division,
plans for naming its head seemed well advanced. The July 1952
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1952, Guthe provided background information to
GRA monthly report revealed "a definite indication" that the
position of chief of the new division could be filled by an
"exceptionally competent person" early in 1953. 51 By August,
action was reported to have been taken to secure the division
chief on an eight-month reimbursable loan from the Navy, with
the option of having him transferred near the end of the period. L2/
By September it was apparent that negotiations were not going
well. The GRA monthly report blamed difficulties on "low level
action" by the Personnel Division, and, with a show of confidence,
said that steps were under tray to request loan of the individual
"through high-level channels." L3/ In a memo dated 3 September
of the ORR administrative Staff, concerning Lundahl and some
of the circumstances surrounding his selection. 54 The
information was intended for transmittal to the Director of
Personnel, presumably for "high level" action. Though these
sources fail to explain how the new chief was selected, Lundahl
and Guthe both recall many circumstances concerning the negotia-
To the best of Guthe's recollection, he first identified
Lundahl as the most qualified candidate for the position. Guthe's
acquaintance with Lundahl dated back several years. He had known
Lundahl through the latter's work in the American Society of
Photogrammetry and their joint work in connection with the
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meting in Washington in the summar of 1952 of the international
Geographical Union. Fie had also been associated with Lundahl
on the Cceannittee on Geographical Exploration (1947-48) and on
the Camittee on Geophysics and Geography (1948) of the Research
and Development Board at the Pentagon. On these coaamittees,
Guthe came to know Lundahl and respect him for his grasp of
technical matters. As a result of the favorable impressions
gained through these professional contacts, Guthe came to regard
Lundahl as the foremost exponent of aerial photography and its
exploitation in the United States.
There was one other incident, a quasi-social contact,
that also made an impression on Guthe. At a banquet in
connection with the annual meeting of the American Society
of Photogrammetry in Washington, Guthe sat with Lundahl and
Lundahl's wife, Mary, at a table arranged by Arthur Caesar,
American representative of Wild, the Swiss instrument manufac-
turing company. Guthe not only found Lundahl's cczrany_on that
occasion as pleasant as their working relations, but he was
also very much taken with Mrs. Lundahl's charm. This was
another favorable impression in Guthe's mind as he considered
Lundahl for the new position.
Guthe is reasonably certain that he discussed the vacancy
and sought to determine the degree of Lundahl's interest in it
before he recoaan nded him to Amory. This initial contact took
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place at Guthe's residence one Saturday afternoon in the
soar of 1952 in response to an unprecedented telephone call
from Guthe to Lundahl inviting him to come over and have a
drink. At that time, Guthe guardedly outlined plans for the
new division, stressed the fact that the Agency was interested
in developing a photo intelligence capability involving the
use of all-source materials, as opposed to photo reading or
barebones photo interpretation, and inquired of Lundahl whether
or not he would be interested in being chief of the division.
'T'hough Lundahl expressed interest, he asked for a week to
think it over and to discuss the future implications of such
a move with his wife. On further reflection, Lundahl found
the proposal challenging, his wife fine in her desire to
remain in the Washington. area, and the prospect of escaping
from the frustrations of military-civilian power plays in
the Navy inviting. He accepted the position. Upon receiving
a favorable reaction from Lundahl, Guthe sought and obtained
confiriration of his proposal from Amory. In this action he
the Agency's PI consultant,
and Guthe's deputy.
Negotiations dragged on, first with no success in setting
a transfer date and later with successive postponements of the
prospective date of arrival. Finally, on 11 May 1953 Arthur C.
Lundahl reported on duty as Chief,. Photo intelligence Division.
had the support of
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As if to remind him that his was not the only recruitment
problem, he found no secretary in the division.
who had recently returned from an overseas position,
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was assigned as the division secretary effective two weeks later,
on 25 May. During the long months between the selection of
Lundahl and the time when the Navy reluctantly released him,
Guthe is firm in his recollection that neither he nor the
Agency ever wavered in their determination to wait for the
man they had selected.
A. The Division Takes Shape.
When Arthur C. Lundahl arrived he quickly established
himself in the Agency as a man on the nave. He immediately
engaged in a busy schedule of orientation, administration, and
substantive work in his Division and for other parts of the
Agency. He also moved aggressively to develop further the
existing liaison channels with the military services and to
dovetail Agency PI operations with those of the Department
of Defense. As if this weren't enough to exhaust his enthusiasm
and energy, he brought with him numerous related professional
activities and commitments. Among these, the most demanding was
his position as First Vice President of the American Society of
Photogranmetry, a post that ensured his becoming President a
year later.
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In a figurative sense also, Arthur C. Lundahl was a
non on the move -- upward. There were few indeed, in those
early days, who, upon being exposed to the Lundahl charisma,
expected him to remain the chief of a 13-man division. He
was obviously destined for bigger things. Just what those
bigger things might be wouldn't yield to even the most
informed speculation of the time. Meanwhile, there was work,
mach work, to be done in D/GP before either the new chief
or his organization could capitalize on any unexpected
opportunity.
The first problem solved was that of space. On 30 June
1953, the Photo Intelligence Division moved into Roan 1337 M
building, 55 ending a long and sometimes frustrating delay
in finding a home for the activity. This move not only
provided more adequate working space, but also placed the
division closer to iirportant centers of activity, the offices
of the DDI, the AD/RR, and the Chief, GRA, as well as the ORR
economic analysts. Though the importance of proximity to
the latter was a debatable point, it had been sized ever
since the inception of photo interpretation in the Agency and
therefore had finally become, in the minds of many, a prere-
quisite to providing adequate support for analysts in the
Economic Research Area.
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seven professionals.* In March 1954,
If solution of all outstanding D/GP problems were as easy
as this one, the shaping up of the division might have achieved
much greater initial success, and it certainly would have been
accomplished irore quickly. As it turned out, progress on most
other fronts was slow and grudging, with the result that the
division tended to worry through its day-to-day crises by
reacting to external circumstances rather than being able to
take the initiative in determining its own course of development.
The Host serious problem was the failure to bring the
division up to authorized strength at a time when requests for
support were mounting rapidly. The first monthly report following
Lundahl's arrival called attention to a dramatic increase in
short-deadline requests for support. L6/ It pointed out that
the volume of such requests not only exceeded the capability of the
division's on-board strength, but that a full complement of PI's
would only reduce the potential strain from overwork, not solve
the problem.
in spite of this situation, only one additional photo
analyst entered on duty between May 1953 and March 1954, leaving
the on-board strength, including the division chief, still just
entered on duty in June 1953. 57/ His entry
was balanced by the departure in the same month of 25X1
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both of whom later occupied key positions in the
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organization, entered on duty, although the latter was
previously assigned unclassified work at the Library of
Congress pending his full clearance. 58 This net gain of
two experienced, senior persons was countered in part by the
resignation of in June 1954. The four vacancies
remained unfilled until the fall of that year when three PI's
entered on duty.* There were no further changes in number of
photo interpreters until the spring of 1955 when the resigna-
tion of one PI was balanced by the arrival of another.** Thus,
at the end of June 1955, one slot on the August 1952 T/O was
still vacant.
The immediate result of this understaffing in the face of
a chronic backlog of work was a liberal'use of overtime. The
latter was, incidentally, to become a way of life in D/GP and
its successor organizations, including NPIC, at one and the same
time ostensibly constituting prima facie evidence of the critical
need for photo intelligence and a larger staff to produce it, and
a measure of the. great dedication of its employees.
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Among the factors contributing to the slow growth of
the staff was the caution and care exercised by D/GP in the
selection of recruits to fill positions. On 20 October 1953,
two representatives of the Wage and Classification Division
conferred with the Chief, Geographic Research Area and the
Deputy Chief, D/GP, concerning draft job descriptions that
had been prepared by the division.* It was agreed that it
would be pointless to set qualification standards for positions
so high as to preclude filling the jobs. 61 Nevertheless, the
exercise of reasonable discrimination by the division was a
sound policy. in a new operation, and especially one which had
such a sizable potential for growth, many of those hired during
the early phases of staffing would very likely occupy key
positions in the future,.larger organization. This did, indeed,
prove to be the case in D/GP.
The question of D/GP grades was also resolved at this
20 October 1953 meeting. agreed, after
sore negotiation, to settle for one GS-14 chief, and one GS-13,
two GS-12, and one GS-11 Intelligence Officer (Photo Analysis)
in each branch. This constituted some inprovement over the
original grade structure of one each GS-14, GS-13, GS-12, GS-11,
and GS-09 in each branch, which the division and ORR claimed
*The Deputy Chief, D/GP, handled this important mattes because the
Chief was on vacation.
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had severely hampered recruitment. On the other hand, it
was considerably less than the changes proposed by Brammll
and which called for one GS-14, two GS-13's, and
two GS-12's in each branch. Presumably, the Wage and Classi-
fication Division representatives insisted that the recruitment
problem was as much, if not nrore, a matter of unrealistically
high job qualification standards as it was of position grades.
During the summer and fall of 1953 a cut by Congress in
the FY 1954 budget was followed by a freeze in ORR positions to
essentially the on-board strength. L2/ As might be expected,
this freeze weighed more heavily on a ccaponent like D/GP, with
only 60 per cent of its T/O filled, than it did on one substan-
tially up to authorized strength. A slight thaw later that
summer released two of the five vacant D/GP slots for FY 55 so
as to permit bringing the division up to what was described
as "minims anticipated strength." 63 It was apparently against
these positions that
were brought on board
25X1
late in FY 54.
Noting the slow rate of staffing, the slight hope of
increasing the division T/0, and the practical limitations on
use of overtime, Lundahl proposed and Brammell endorsed the
assignment of two military officers to D/GP. L4/ Their justi-
fication pointed out that Photo Intelligence Division responsi-
bilities were such as to make the use of military personnel
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attractive. Among activities in which the latter would be
peculiarly useful were the procurement of certain types of
closely held photography acquired by the services, the
meshing of CIA and military PI efforts, the analysis, including
mensuration, of military installations, and the development of
new exploitation equipment and techniques. The timing of this
proposal, in August 1953, suggests that it was not unrelated to
the job freeze and consequent decline in recruitment activity
during that summer and fall. As a partial solution to the
detrimental effects of the FY 54 job freeze, however, the proposal
proved to be little more than an earnest gesture. The first
military officer assigned to D/GP did not arrive until nearly
two years later.
During these early. years, Lundahl'and, when he entered
on duty were the persons within the organization most
responsible for identifying prospective recruits and for inter-
esting them in joining D/GP. Both Lundahl and traveled
widely and had extensive contacts in professional circles and
throughout the intelligence Conmunity. Among potential recruits
with a college education, there was a marked preference for
those who had an earth sciences background. These were fields
in which the objects of study were more or less related to
those being interpreted in D/GP. They were also fields in
which teachers and researchers had made use of aerial photography
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probed aggressively and incisively into its milieu. He zeroed
in on what he considered to be two problems. One was the
placement of the Photo Intelligence Division within ORR and
its implications for D/GP operations. The other was the
second hat Lundahl was wearing as Adviser to the Director of
Naval Photography.
The latter arrangement was one in whic1took phi- 25X1
cular interest, and one about. whose advantage to the Agency he
expressed serious doubt. 65 Though he'grilled Lundahl about.
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encumbering a 13-man T/0, was but a minor component,
in varying degrees. Aside from candidates possessing a
college degree with a major in scare aspect of earth science,
there was a very special interest in recruits who were working
Pi's, primarily those in or cloyed by the military services
and civilian agencies of the federal government. In some instances,
these persons did not have college degrees, but their demon-
strated ability coupled with the confidence resulting from
personal knowledge of their capability made them attractive
candidates.
On 16 December 1953, of the Office of the 25X1
Inspector General made his first visit to D/GP and talked with
Lundahl. This was part of the larger survey of ORR which took
place in late 1953 and early 1954. In spite of the fact that
D/GP, with only six professionals and one sub-professional
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this job and its relation to his CIA duties, the issue was
not raised in the section of the formal IG report dealing with'
the Photo Intelligence Division. 66/
This title had, in fact, been arranged for Lundahl with
the approval and assistance of interested Agency administrators
and with the cooperation of the US Navy. L7/ Before coming to
CIA, Lundahl had been extremely busy in a wide range of
professional activities. in addition to being first in the
succession to the presidency of the American Society of
Photogranmetry, as noted above, he had attended meetings of
and presented papers before many other organizations, not
only in this country, but also including the international
Society of Photogrammetry. These peregrinations had brought
him in contact with thousands of scientists and technical people,
including many foreigners. Through his previous ten years in
various capacities with the US Navy, that was the organization
with which he was associated in the minds of most of these
people. Though his new title of Adviser to the Director of
Naval Photography obligated him to be available to the CNO for
up to four hours per week, the utility of this bona fide job,
complete with secretarial coverage and a telephone number in the
Pentagon, would be hard to overestimate, at least until such
time as he could gradually disengage from some of his long-term
ccetmitments. In the meantime, it provided his with an official
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cover for his continuing professional activities.
The position of D/GP as part of the ORR organization was,
on the other hand, raised in the IG's report. L8/ it noted that,
in providing guidance for collection objectives in behalf of
CIA, the division had extensive responsibilities outside the
confines of ORR. It reccr~r4ended that the management Improvement
Staff study D/GP responsibilities and services with the purpose
of determining whether all or part of them should be transferred
to another component of the Agency.
B. Photo interpretation Support Services.
The introduction of the products of photo analysis into
intelligence production had already begun. Under Lundahl's
leadership the to of this speeded up and the orientation
became more technical. There soon came to be greater emphasis
on collection systems, including cameras, films, and platforms.
Mensuration was pressed more aggressively and more technical
camera data was incorporated into feedback. At the same time,
there was no letup in the emphasis on photo interpretation.
Lur ahl's interest in things technical was reflected in
the photo analysis field by increased efforts to develop new
and more sophisticated viewing equipment and improved exploita-
tion procedures. Further efforts were made to provide the
photo analyst with collateral, including COMIM information
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and targeting materials. The range of photographic materials
available, access to collections of intelligence photography,
and speed of procurement were all increased. In addition, the
form and scope of product dissemination were improved and
formal PI reports were initiated. Finally, the division
expanded the scope of its services and influence even beyond
the confines of its parent agency, e.g., support services to
1. Support to Agency Components.
The ground on which the new services were built was the
support which and his handful of colleagues had been
providing to other oomponents of the Agency.
Existing support for DDP, which had already developed
more fully than that for other areas, was broadened to include
technical services in support of collection efforts, particu-
larly of ground photography. In part, this was .a reflection
of Lundahl's recent preoccupation with such matters at the US
Navy Photographic Interpretation Center, where he had prepared
a manual dealing with the subject. It was also in response to
a program then underway in the DDP's Technical Services Staff
(TSS) to increase the effectiveness of clandestine photographic
collection.
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A series of conferences with TSS representatives that
Lundahl began during his first week of service in the division
culiminated in a request for preparation by D/GP of a manual
for ground photography oriented to specific CIA needs. The
difficulty of meeting such an ambitious requirement was recog-
nized by the Chief, TSS, in his request for 25X1
the manual, when he indicated that preparation of the manual
would have to be consistent, ". . of course, with existing
priorities within the Photographic Interpretation sic Division." 69
In reality, the satisfaction of this request finally required the
letting of a contract to Photogrammetry, Inc., whose work was
carried on under the guidance of NPIC some years later. The
resulting report, published by the Center, was issued in April
1965. 70
The DDP did not, however, have to wait nearly 12 years
to get currently needed information and guidance. Recognizing
the difficulty of providing the uninterrupted effort needed
to produce such a comprehensive and definitive work, Guthe
accepted the requirement for the manual but proposed that D/GP
provide interim spot guidance, as required, to meet urgent and
immediate needs. 71 This arrangement served as a basis for
numerous briefings as well as repeated consultations carried
on between DDP personnel and D/GP representatives throughout
this and subsequent periods.
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one especially interesting project urxlertaken for DDP
early in the Lundahl era was the preparation of specifications
for a photographic processing and projection kit for intelligence
operations. L2/ Initiated at the suggestion of Lundahl in
July 1953, 73 this project led to an incentive award for
the Chief, D/GP, nine nontns later. L4/
Another facet of the interim support provided DDP was
the participation by D/GP personnel -- at first by Lundahl
himself -- in DDP training programs. Later, in April 1954,
as other competing demands made it difficult for 1)/GP to
provide routine photo intelligence orientation briefings, a
new project was established in response to a request from
DDP to prepare an introductory text on the subject of photo
75
intelligence for use in its training program. _f For the
first three months, the project forged ahead encouragingly
in spite of low priority to a point where it was about 60
percent completed. Following the seasonal suit r slump due
to vacations, the project was side-tracked due to higher
priority demands related to the Formosa Strait crisis and
AQUATONE, the U-2 project. In one last effort to get the
job done before the arrival of U-2 photography, this project
was finally completed with the issuance of Introduction to
Photographic Intelligence in March 1956. L6/
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ORR economic analysts and their supervisors were also
exposed almost immediately to the fresh ideas of the new PI
chief. Several new projects were generated as a result of
his suggestions and responses to some of the requirements so
generated followed within the month. Analytical efforts on
older projects were redoubled to bring then to a successful
conclusion. In many ways, the situation was reminiscent of the
first few months after the establishment of the division a
year earlier. As then, the initial flurry of activity
subsided somewhat in subsequent months, and response time
lengthened.
The joint effects of understaffing and the job freeze
were felt in the matter of supplying support services. Under
the circumstances, the animated efforts by the division to
develop a full range of services for all Agency components
having a potential need for photo intelligence created a
situation where speedy responses could be provided only to the
highest priority requests. As the work load grew this meant
that, in the case of ORR for example, only studies having
current intelligence interest could be accomplished in as
little time as a few weeks. Thus, excellent service was
provided on projects related to the Formosa Strait crisis in
the spring and summer of 1955, and, even in competition with
them, on a few projects dealing with the production of military
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aircraft, tanks, and suiarines in the USSR and the Satellites
(Figure 4). Work done jointly by ORR and OSI on missiles was
another type of project on which expeditious support could
be expected. Other ORR projects, however, lagged.
whatever the merits of the case, this selective response
to urgent appeals for support and for exploitation of exotic
targets was slowly but. surely undermining the development of
adequate PI support for more basic industrial studies. Con-
sidering the initial emphasis on the latter type of study in
justifying the establishment of the Photo Intelligence Division,
it seemed necessary to recognize the problem and to make an
attempt, however abortive, to redress the imbalance.
Fran the outset, the philosophy of the founders of the
division had been to train other analysts to do a wide range
of common photo interpretation tasks, which would hopefully
constitute a large part of the PI work needed to satisfy their
requirements. Tacitly, this approach assumed three things: one,
that the ability to do research and to write was by far the
most important part of the job; two, that photo interpretation
tasks could, on the whole, be characterized as "photo reading";
and three, that most other analysts had both the interest and
aptitude to do photo reading. Though the presumed validity of
the last two assumptions was eventually proven wrong, the outcome
was by no means clear at this time.
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In the meantime, in the fall of 1953, one interim token
effort was made to teach 30 analysts from ORR/F.>:ZA and two
from DDP how to do photo interpretation. The course was
entitled "Interpretation of Photography for Intelligence
Purposes," and consisted of 15 hours of instruction spread
over seven class periods, one each week, beginning on 9
November. Since the 32 students were too nunarous to accomro-
date in a single class, they were divided into two sections.
Topics covered included: basic interpretation techniques;
electric power and steam; coke, iron, and steel; non-ferrous
metals and assembly; petroleum; and chemical explosives. Most
of the teaching was done by 25X1
but Lundahl opened and closed the course and taught 25X1
the section on basic interpretation techniques. 77 '
Though the course was well received, and a second running
was scheduled to begin early in the new year, the next offering
was deferred 18 months. The postponement was caused, at least
at first, by a lack of suitable classroan space. Some delay
was, however, not unwelcane in the division. For one thing, a
number of problems had been identified during the first running
of the course and preparations for applying solutions to them
would take several weeks. Then, too, the time spent in organizing
and teaching the initial course had had a serious adverse effect
on production. L8/
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One of the biggest problems was the need for more time
for the course. During the first running, training packets
consisting of GX photography had been given to the students
so that they could practice interpretation and report on the
various types of facilities such as iron and steel plants,
petroleum refineries, and the like, which had been studied
in class. Though this work was optional, those students
who utilized the packets demonstrated clearly the advantages
to be gained from doing so. It was decided, therefore, to
include such work, with even more photography, as an integral
part of future class work. Extending the period of instruction
would provide opportunity for such exercises.
Sane augmentation of other instructional aids also seemed
desirable. 79 The good intentions of the division and of the
entire Geographic Area in preparing for an early resumption of
the course were demonstrated by the promptness with which they
proceeded to prepare these aids. Following completion of this
first course, the Cartography Division was reported to be
producing several wall-size training aids, 80 and a training
manual, prepared by D/GP, was finished and reproduced in April
1954. 81
Evaluation of student performance was another area in which
improvement was needed. The severe time constraints imposed by
the brevity of the course, coupled with responsibilities toward
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on-going work in their awn offices, conspired to divert the
energy and application of several students from work in the course,
introducing circumstances in extenuation of their performance.
The instructors, for their part, found available testing
materials inadequate as a basis for measuring student achieve-
ment. As a result, most quizzes were graded in class by the
students themselves and used to diagnose and correct deficien-
cies on the spot. only one brief quiz in each section was
used to provide some crude evaluation of individual performance.
No grades were issued in the first course. Special mention was
made, however, of selected students who excelled in some aspect
of the work. 82 it seemed desirable that in future offerings
of the course more adequate plans for testing should be worked
out and proper materials. provided. L3/
in addition to assisting the economic analysts of ORR with
photo interpretation reports and training programs, D/GP became
involved with the Economic Research Area in another large
project. In July 1953, the Planning and Review Staff, ERA,
levied a requirement on D/GP to prepare a coordinated ORR
requirement for additional photographic collection over China.
The resulting project, known as PERISCOPE, involved, first of
all, a determination of available existing coverage to use as
a basis for identifying what additional collection should be
attempted. 84
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Despite the logic and obvious prudence of such an
approach, this was not the customary course followed by the
military services in planning their photographic missions. L5/
The reason became obvious before many weeks had passed, when
the division discovered the magnitude of the task. Nowhere was
there a single, much less up-to-date, source of information
on existing photo coverage of China. Fragmentary information
on photography taken by the US Navy and Air Force, by Japan,
and by Nationalist China had to be ferreted out and laboriously
caviled against requirements before current collection needs
could be stated. This proved to be a costly and slow process,
especially when undertaken in competition with other division
eonrnitinents. Although much work was acccnplished, the job was
never fully earpleted. It was closed out with the issuance of
a partial report in March 1956. This report consisted of a
single-page memorandum for the record identifying the project
and indicating that overlays had been prepared to show mach of
the available aerial photography of China.
As a working tool, however, the substantial information
collated and plotted on the overlays proved to be highly useful
on many occasions in fulfilling crash requirements, particularly
during the Fornosa Strait crisis. In a more philosophical way,
the project dramatized the need for a central organization,
whose functions would include the keeping of such records. 87
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This evident need was to appear as one of the several
"suggested idealizations" in a paper prepared by Lundahl
the next spring advocating a restructured US Photographic
Intelligence System. LS/ As a mattes of policy, it was also
reflected in the practice, established by D/GP successor
organizations as soon as they became the prime repositories
of photography, of compiling and publishing information on
coverage of photography under their control.
Support for ORR's Geographic Research Area, of which the
division was actually a part, formed an important part of D/GP's
work from the beginning until early 1955, when it declined
markedly in the face of higher priorities. Until the decline
set in, working contacts between D/GP and the Geography Division
(D/GG) -- both of which were under the' management of the same
Area chief -- were close and frequent. moreover, projects
established in response to D/GG requirements fared very well in
canipetition with others for scarce PI resources. The most
urgent projects, like those for other carponents, were custo-
marily done within a month or less. Routine projects for
D/GG were usually completed within a few months, a performance,
on balance, more favorable than that achieved on con-parable
ORR/ERA projects. The fact that progress on these projects
was monitored by the GRA Project Review Committee, which
reported to the Chief, GRA, was doubtlessly influential, but.
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the close working relationships and contacts developed as a
matter of course between persons working in the same Area were
also a factor.
Con-pared with the types of projects undertaken in support
of other Agency corn onents, those for D/GG were the most varied.
They ranged from soave that were purely geographic in the broadest
sense to specialized installation studies such as cable crossings
and dockyards. They reached consumers either as raw material
incorporated into reports prepared by D/GG or as independent
sections of D/GG reports. The consumers who ultimately received
the reports were equally diverse and included not maxely Agency
carponents, but those outside, such as the Strategic Air Cc rand,
for whom evasion and escape studies were done, and the Office of
Naval Intelligence, which was the requester of four reports on
cable crossings. The division also provided technical support
for two projects related to contract work sponsored by D/GG
at The Ohio State University. One resulted in a publication
entitled "Technical Index for Ohio State University Contract
Study." The OSU study consisted of a list of references to
Soviet photogranuetric publications. 89 The other project
simply involved a review of the publications issued by OSU
as a result of the CIA contract. The Agency had sought, through
contract work, to tap the expertise of scientists in the Mapping
and Charting Research Laboratory of The Ohio State University
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Research Foundation to assist in answering OSI requirements
related to guided missiles. 90 In addition, Lundahl served
as technical adviser to the Chief, Geographic Research, on
a wide range of matters concerning photo reconnaissance and
interpretation.
Support to OSI was not a major factor in D/GP production
during the first two years of the Lundahl regime, but it did
experience a steady growth. Basically, the modest level of
this activity reflected the paucity of good, up-to-date over-
head coverage of Soviet R&D installations and hardware.
In the period from 1953 to 1955 there was a series of
projects, totaling about a dozen, on installations suspected
of conducting experimental work on biological agents for use
in warfare. One or two. similar studies dealt with nuclear
energy production. Response time on a large majority of
these projects was only one or two months, far shorter than
that typical of most ORR projects. These categories of OSI
projects obviously benefited from high City interest in
biological and nuclear warfare. Moreover, the jobs themselves
were generally straightforward and simple, and customarily
required no unusual effort to procure materials or accomplish
the interpretation. Indeed, in most instances, OSI provided
the ground photography to be used.
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Work for OSI on missile projects was a different
proposition. Photo coverage was virtually nonexistent and the
desired intelligence elusive. Though several atterrpts were
made to identify missile-related installations or activities
on photography and to tie them in with other sources of
intelligence, such as defector reports, the results were
generally disappointing. In the spring of 1955, a concerted
effort in this field was launched jointly by OSI and ORR*.
The attention of D/GP was at first directed to the missile
sites around Moscow and to suspected missile-associated activity
on Sakhalin Island,. but the actual breakthrough on guided
missile intelligence did not coma until a later date.
Lundahl's interest in things technical opened up other
areas of cooperation with OSi, particularly in the field of
advanced reconnaissance systems. In April 1954, he and
were briefed by
0
of CSI on the interests
and activities of that office in connection with US Air Force
was the D/GP representative, but his attendance did not
cone nce until the third meeting, in April 1955.
with heavy representation from OSIand one or more represents
n
Chief, Guided Missiles Division, OSI, the coordinator of
intelligence production, requirement-so, and other activities
pertaining to guided missiles. In the reantine a series of
informal meetings, held once a month in OSI, had been initiated,
a DDT Notice dated 25 April 1955, Amory named
*I
25X1
25X1
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reconnaissance photography. 91/ This briefing was followed
closely by the establishment of a D/GP project to provide
backing for Strong in his negotiations with Duncan Z1acDonald
of the Boston University Optical Research Laboratory in
support of the Air Force's research. L2/ A follow-on project
of much larger scope, evaluating those phases of the Air Force's
project GRAYBC* having to do with photo exploitation, was
undertaken by D/GP. it was completed with the issuance Of
a report in February 1955. 93
Development of a productive support program for OCI
was extremely slaw, largely because of lack of suitable
photography covering items of current intelligence interest.
Though the relationships between photographic intelligence
on the one hand, and current intelligence and Ca= on the
other, had been pointed out from the beginning, there had been
a singular lack of success in developing a coanfortable and
rmitually profitable relationship. This was true in spite of
considerable interest and honest attempts in both D/GP and
OCI to develop such PI support. Frederick Voigt of OCI, it
will be recalled, had been instrumental in arranging for the
initial proposal to establish the Photo Intelligence Division.
*This was the project which in January and February 1956 yielded
balloon photography, called CZS= IX, that covered portions of
Eurasia, primarily the Soviet Bloc.
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between Lundahl and two OCI representatives, Voigt and
cnications intelligence in World War II and was well aware
of the potential of combining them.
Despite these early ties and a meeting in August 1953
the first PI, had worked with both photography and
to consider how photo intelligence might serve OCI
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needs, there were no practical results. 94 on 28 January
1954, the AD/CI expressed the opinion that better use could
be made of photo intelligence in OCI, and he authorized Voigt
to prepare new proposals for achieving that end. 15/
Voigt had a conference with Lundahl and and
obtained their agreement to almost all his proposals. Included
were training OCI personnel in the PI course, briefing OCI
division and branch chiefs, and a weekly meeting of D/GP and
OCI personnel to exchange information and identify any
possible areas offering opportunity and need for PI support. 96
Five months later, however, limited support to OCI
apparently was still a matter of concern to the Chief,
GRA, for Lundahl directed a memorandum to him on the subject.
Lundahl explained that in the weekly meetings D/GP was keeping
OCI informed of current developments and that key personnel in
that office had been briefed on the nature and functions of the
division. He also offered to brief OCI personnel on the back-
ground of Soviet work in photo interpretation and on recent
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It started quietly enough, in October 1954, when
Soviet interest in aerial photography of the United States. 97
He added, however, that D/GP offerings in current intelligence
rust necessarily be few. The chief reason was lack of suitable
up-to-date photography.
One solution to this perennial problem was faintly sketched
in the spring of 1954. In April, D/GP made a mosaic of the
Dien Bien Phu area for OCI and provided 11 supporting consulta-
tions. L8/ The action was hectic, but it was brief -- too
brief to have any lasting effect on division support of OCI.
The situation in the next crisis was entirely different.
2.5X1
Chief of the OCI Requirements Branch, requested D/GP 25X1
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to provide information on the major roads in Southeast China
to assist OCI in an assessment of the current capacity of main
supply routes leading to the Amoy, Foochow, and Wenchow areas
of mainland China, opposite the Nationalist held offshore islands,
the Tachens, Matsu, and Quemoy. Though exploratory discussion
with0 of D/GP revealed that the project would. constitute 25X1
a major effort for the PI division, expressed the hope 25X1
that work might be caipleted by 15 November. 99
In the next three and one-half months, at one time or
another, the division used eight different photo interpreters
who logged a total of nearly 400 man-hours on the project. 100
Nevertheless, the job was still not Complete at the end of January 1955.
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Meanwhile, Chinese Cam-unist pressure on the offshore
islands held by the Chinese Nationalists increased. On
18 January 1955, Chinese Communist troops transported in motorized
junks captured the Nationalist held island of Yikiang, eight
miles ncrtli of the Tachen Islands. A day later, more than 200
Chinese Caren mist planes boubed the Tachens, and Chinese Co*nu-
nist ground forces on Yikiang shelled nearby Pishan Island
heavily. These incidents, coupled with the reiteration by
Chou En-lai on 24 January of Camunist intentions to conquer
Forrmsa, led to a whole series of reactions by the US government,
including the special message sent to Congress by President
Eisenhower requesting emergency authorizations to use US
armed forces to protect Formosa and the Pescadores Islands.
Reverberations from these events were felt all the way
down to D/GP. On 18 February 1955, a conference was held
involy' of the ORR Planning and Review Staff 25X1
and Eramnell arrj
of the Geographic Research 25X1
Area to discuss the placing of a new priority on the work
originally undertaken for OCI in response to the requirement
levied by
the previous October. Now, however, the
requirement had been modified to include such information as
would also be needed by ORR for its contribution to NIE 100-4-55,
Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the
Offshore lalands and Taiwan Through 2955, and Communist and
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Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan. 10
The problem had, thus, expanded to include estimative as well
as current intelligence implications, but this was a unique
experience for D/GP at this early date.
This conference led to a crash effort by D/GP, during
which every PI in the division worked on the project and,
together, brought the total man hours expended on the project
to over 400 in February alone. 102 The information needed
for the NIE was produced on time, and the results of the study
were also published in a division report issued on 28 February
1955. 103 Included, was information on the road network leading
into the Southeast China coastal area -- the width, type of
surface, drainage, maximum, grades, strength of bridges, and
other characteristics of individual roads constituting the
network. The appearance of this report just after the United
States Congress had passed a joint resolution authorizing the
military defense of the Formosa Strait made it a landmark contri-
bution.
Nine additional projects in support of OCI were undertaken
between October 1954 and the end of February 1955, and six of
them were completed. 104 Most were concerned with Cormunist
Chinese facilities, chiefly transportation routes and airfields,
and the status of activity on and near the offshore islands. Each
of the six completed was, however, a relatively simple task that
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constituted no major effort.
For the next four months beginning in March 1955, more
D/GAP manpower was devoted to support for OCI and, to a lesser
extent, ORR in connection with the Formosa Strait situation
and related activities on the China mainland than to any
other work. 105/ Reflecting the accessibility of the area
to reconnaissance, and hence the availability of up-to-date
photography, D/GP issued 36 PI memoranda in response to OCI
requirements alone, 106 nearly one-third of all D/GP formal
publications up to that date. Numerous briefings were also
provided, sometimes on a daily basis, on the latest findings
from photography. 107 Thus, at least one answer to the long
standing question of how to use photography in support of
current intelligence was.-finally found, tracks to the acquisition
of much current photography in response to the threatening
military situation.
D/GP support to the Industrial Register (IR) of the.
Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) is of special
interest for two reasons. First, it illustrates the aggressive-
ness and success with which IR was able to preempt a small part
of the scarce PI resources, and second, it constituted an early
and mutually profitable working together of photo interpreters
and Agency collateral support personnel, many of whom later
joined the PI's in Project umum T, the CIA Photographic
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Intelligence Center, and the National Photographic Interpre-
tation Center. Indeed, some of these persons became key
individuals in the later organizations.
Projects in support of the industrial Register involved
an analysis of collateral reports and recent ground photography
and, where appropriate, comparison with World War II coverage
of the same installation. Layouts were prepared and recommend-
ations made for the preparation of improved collection require-
ments for ground photography. Without exception, the four pro-
jects formally established in support of ZR between 1953 and
1955 were completed in the month in which they were cmu enced --
a record unsurpassed by any other Agency component or requester
below the deputy-director level and a testimony to the eloquence
of the requesters in justifying the urgency of their need.
The first of the four projects for ZR was established in
February 1954. It was a pilot study to develop productive
working relationships between ZR and D/GP personnel as well
as to produce a layout of the Kolpino (USSR) Engineering
Plant. Work consisted of an analysis of ground reports and
recent ground photography along with exploitation of World
War II aerial coverage. 108 Three months later, in May 1954,
IR placed a request for PI support in locating oil pipelines
and pumping stations in Albania. 109
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IR representative in the meetings with D/GP and SAC was
No further formal requests for PI services were received
from.IR until February 1955, when two more were placed in
close succession. The first, done in support of IR for the
Strategic Air Cotmiand, led to the establishment of a continuing
project by D/GP to review special lists of priority targets
for which normal SAC search operations yielded no information. 110
The object was to try to fill the gaps with any available infor-
mation on photography or PI reports covering the targets. The
11 later head of the OCR Statistical Branch in
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HTAUTLIMAT and, still later, a senior manager in CIA/PIC and
NPIC. This project was also an example of growing D/GP contacts
outside CIA as well as a forerunner of the involvement of D/GP
in work on collection targets that was to become an integral
part of activity in successor organizations. The last of the
four projects was a request to confine the identity and location
of the Ulan Ude (USSR) power plant using ground photographs. 112
2. Other Projects.
Self-initiated projects continued to be a small but
significant factor in D/GP production during the first two
years following Inndahl's arrival. They consisted primarily
of things done as services of common concern for more than one
component or analyst. Never large in volume, they accounted for
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scarcely more than five per cent of the time that division
personnel spent on projects.
One such project, which yielded a hardy perennial among
types of publications issued by D/GP and its successor organi-
zations, was the mission scan. The resulting publication,
called the mission review report, or any of several different
equivalent names used at various times, consisted of a tabular
or semi tabular list of targets of potential intelligence
interest covered by a given mission, with appropriate identi-
fication data, and with or without a capsule description of
the salient information revealed by photography of the mission
in question. Photo reference information was also included.
The mission review report was intended not only as a convenient
record of targets covered by the mission, but also as a reference
to be used by analysts in levying requirements for photo intelli-
gence support.
The mission scan, initiated in a law-key manner at this
tine, was the expression of a profound conviction held by
Lundahl and one that had far-reaching future implications.
Until this time military photo interpretation organizations,
for lack of personnel and/or interest, had frequently filed
photography that had never been examined by anyone. it was
Lundahl's belief that all aerial photography collected for
intelligence should be searched for new targets of potential.
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significance. Though the critical importance of this
procedure was not demonstrated during these early days,
it was dramatically evident in later years, when coverage
over Sim-Soviet areas became available. Thus, the mission
scan became an important function of D/GP and all successor
organizations, including the national center.
A broadly similar type of publication was exaiplified
by a series of memoranda initiated in January 1954 and entitled
"Current U.S. Navy Aerial Photography". 113 In the previous
month, arrangements had been made with the Office of Naval
Intelligence to place D/GP personnel on the USN panel for the
review of incoming aerial photography. 114 This enabled Agency
PI's to scan newly received Navy missions in the light of
existing Agency requirements. The purpose of the memoranda
was to advise CIA analysts of the existence of the new coverage
of targets in which they had an interest and to serve as a
guide in levying specific requirements for photo intelligence
support. They were particularly significant in providing
timely support on itaus of highest priority interest, since
the arrangements made included permission, on a highly
selective basis, to borrow the original Navy prints. Normal
processing of the duplicate prints took about four weeks. 11
D/GP personnel got their first experience in active
support of a major operation in Project PU4PKIN. This project.
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set up in June 1954 in response to a request from the DDCI, 116
was intended for use by the DDP in backing the overthrow of
the pro-Comrnuiist Arbenz government of Guatemala by insurgents
from Honduras under Colonel Carlos Castillo Arenas. This was
the first crisis in which the Agency used current intelligence
derived from photography, or, as Lundahl put it, ". . photography
made yesterday, for answers needed tonight, for an operation
which is going to take place tomorrow." 117
The key to the success of this effort, aside from the
carefully nurtured capability built up in the previous year
or two within D/GP, was the availability of current photography.
This included covertly acquired aerial and ground photography
was handled by a small task force headed by 25X1
and includi.ng 118 25X1
One of the most troublesome problems in connection with
Project PUMPKIN was security. Information about the operation
was very tightly held. Exploitation of the photography, there-
fore, had to be compartmented in such a manner as to preclude
observation, casual or otherwise, by any but the D/GP task
force and the division chief and his deputy. This was physi-
cally impossible in the division's M Building quarters, which
lacked suitable space for sealing the task force off from
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of key installations and targets within Guatemala, flown to
Washington daily. Ecploitation of the photography in D/GP
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Area, or to DDP, would report to Lurx ahl or
other D/GP activities much less a barrier or any type of
controlled entrance. To solve the problem, Branffell arranged
to provide space for the task force behind the security
barrier in Building 11. Before the close of each day's work
and the transmittal of any products to the Chief, Geographic
on the status of the project and the results of work acconr
plished. 119
As soon as the photography arrived in Washington, it was
turned over to D/GP, where the task force would identify such
key targets as fuel storage installations, electric power
stations, connunications facilities, transportation routes,
bridges, and the like. These were annotated on the photos
and on maps, which were .then flown back to the operations
base. The next day those in D/GP witting of what was going
on could take grim satisfaction reading in the newspapers
about the radio tower that was destroyed, the power plant
that was disabled, or the key rail or highway bridges that
were blown up. Usually they were among targets pinpointed
and described the previous day by D/GP. 120
As a result of its participation in this operation, the
division was the object of many coimnendatory remarks. These
testimonials indicated that the descriptions provided by D/GP
were accurate, that annotations on the photos and maps were
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nicely keyed to operations, that locations given for targets
were precise, and that without the photographic intelligence
the operation would have been most difficult. 121 Not only did
the performance of the division earn favorable recognition at
the highest levels in the Agency for a job well done, but it
also gave same of its people a place, however briefly, in
C. Liaison with the military Services.
on the photo interpretation scene, D/GP was a johnny-
come-lately. Photo interpretation for intelligence had, by
default, been the private preserve of the military. It was
they who had staked their claims to the territory during and
after World War II, and it was they who would, therefore, be
sensitive to any encroachment by CIA. Moreover, in these
early years, D/GP was heavily dependent on the good will and
cooperation of military personnel for much of the needed
photography. Not incidentally, the virtual monopoly long
held by the military on photo interpretation for intelligence
purposes ensured that a large majority of those in D/GP had
a military background as well as close friends and former
associates in the DoD. Nevertheless, there seems to have
been a genuine desire to avoid duplication and to engage in
complementary activities that would produce a better and
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wider range of intelligence. The net result was frequent
and lively constructive interaction between D/GP personnel
and those in the DoD and, indeed, elsewhere in governanent.
Next-to project work, which accounted for approximately three-
fifths of available time, 122 liaison with other elements
in the government was, in all probability, the most time-
consuming function in D/GP.
Aside from the cat and mouse game of informally defining
supposedly unique areas of responsibility for various organi-
zations carpeting in the field of photo interpretation, rela-
tions between D/GP and the military services were generally
cordial, productive, and mutually advantageous. Though the
speedy procurement of photography, particularly of closely
held materials, such as.these within the SIIQSINT system*,
continued to be a problem for D/GP, many significant aocaPlish
meets resulted from the cooperative efforts of D/GP personnel
and their military counterparts. Most important, perhaps, was
work of the informal Joint Working Group on Intelligence
*SENSINT was a US Air Force control system devised for the
compartmented control on a must-know basis, of photography
and electronic intercepts acquired by covert manned over-
flight of the USSR and Satellites. Coverage was mainly
peripheral. Chief areas covered were the European Satellites
and the Soviet Arctic and Far East. The Air Force exercised
very tight control of SENSINT photography, to the point
where it raised questions concerning their good will in sharing
it with others.
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Ground Photography, later and more formally called the
Cannittee for Coordination and Standardization of Intelli-
gence Ground Photographic Procedures and Equipment, under
sponsorship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Less important,
but still noteworthy, was work done by D/GP and other Agency
representatives from the Graphics Register and OCD in the
Graphics Research Coordinating Group. In addition, the
continuing day-to-day liaison between D/GP and DoD personnel
at the working level in facilitating the routine flow of
aerial photography needed by CIA was as vital and productive
as were the periodic conferences between their supervisors
to solve the inevitable foul-ups.
During years of serving in various capacities as photo-
granmetrist and Assistant Chief Engineer at the US Navy Photo-
graphic Interpretation Center, Lundahl had attended meetings of
many task forces, panels, and committees dealing with photog-
raphy, photo interpretation, photograinnetry, or related research
and development in the fields of collection and exploitation sys-
tens and equipment. When he entered on duty in CIA he was well
informed on what was going on at the frontiers of development
in these fields, where it was being done, and who was associated
with it. Consequently, he was in a position to make effective
suggestions for overcoming the limited progress in the field of
photo intelligence since World War II.
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in October 1954, Lundahl visited the USAF Air Technical
Intelligence Center (ATIC) at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base in Dayton, Ohio. In the course of a discussion of US
capabilities in the collection and exploitation of photography,
he proposed a series of informal, regular meetings with
representatives from the Army, Air Force, Navy, CIA (including
DDP), and the FBI, to share information on new equipment and
techniques for collecting and exploiting photography. Later
on, State also sent a representative.
Since security constraints were a major concern in
implementing this suggestion, the key phrase used to identify
the resulting working group was "intelligence ground photo-
graphy". The title most contronly employed was Joint Committee
on Intelligence Ground Photography. Use of this name obviated
questions and challenges that could be expected were the
phrase "aerial photography," with its many closely held pro-
grams in being or under developTent, incorporated as part of
the title. 123 At the same time, anything related to intelli-
gence photography and equigrient, such as lenses, filters, films,
exploitation equipment, and mensuration devices, classified
no higher than
could be and was open for discussion. 124
Business of the cccnnittee was, therefore, not necessarily
confined to matters concerning ground photography.
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The first meeting following the proposal at Dayton was
held on 29 November 1954 at CIA headquarters, in Washington.
Lundahl served as chairman, a position he was to hold for
several years. another member of D/GP, was
named secretary, a position he, too, held for many years.
The response to the suggestion and invitation was enthusiastic,
and the meeting was a huge success. Among items discussed
were such things as photographic lenses and films, quiet
operating cameras for clandestine use, photographic techniques,
and development plans and problems associated with intelligence
ground photography. 125 This meeting was followed by many
others; by May 1955 four others had already been held, each
attended by approximately 20 persons.
The utility of these meetings and* the need for the
cam ittee were greatly enhanced by the demise earlier in
1954, of the DoD Research and Development Board (FOB) and
its tens of caunittees, including those in the fields of
photography and photogrammetry. Elimination of the RDB was
one of many changes made by Roger Kyes, the newly appointed
Undersecretary of Defense, to reduce the heavy R&D superstruc-
ture in the Pentagon. While the RDB existed, its encyclopedic
minutes were available for use by authorized officials seeking
information on research and contracts under way. With its
dissolution, each individual, to a considerable degree, had to
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ferret out such information concerning things in which
he had an interest. The Joint Comwittee on Intelligence
Ground photography, under Lundahl's leadership, stepped in
to fill a small part of the void, namely that dealing with
photography, photo interpretation, and photogranmetry. 126
Committee members discussed the interests of their respective
components, serving both as a source of information for others
and a collection device for those they represented. Once
again, as in the days of the RDB, an official seeking infor-
mation about developmental work under way on a specialized
type of film or, say, a new piece of equipment for rectifying
oblique photography, could find out what work another agency
was doing, identify the contract, and, if pertinent, find out
whether or not joint procurement was poissible. The committee
thus served not only as a clearinghouse for information, but
also as a channel for effecting significant government savings
in time and money. 127 The utility of the committee and the
good work accomplished under Lundahl's leadership were recog-
nized in early 1956 when the group was made one of the perma-
nent advisory committees to the Photography and survey section
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and more formally named the
Committee for Coordination and Standardization of Intelligenoe
Ground Photographic Procedures and Equipment. 128
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Representation of D/GP on the Graphics Research Coordi-
nating Group was accclished at a lower level than that on
the Joint Ccimittee on Intelligence Ground Photography. it
also predated the latter, going back virtually to the formation
of the division. Though had initially assumed the
task, when there was no other alternative, this responsibility
almost immediately devolved upon
on his arrival for
duty. 129 Not only did this relieve at a time
when he was still, in effect, acting as Chief pending the
arrival of Lundahl, but it was also a very suitable assignment,
since had served on the group as a Navy representative.
It likewise dovetailed neatly with past experience
and interest in researching holdings in the various photographic
libraries. The lower level of effort and representation de-
voted to this committee was, most of all, a reflection of the
fact that it was a committee chaired by the military services,
and that it dealt primarily with routine matters concerning
graphics collections, recent acquisitions of photography,
prospective new photographic inputs, and related collateral
materials.
Though it provided no forum or listening post where
valuable information could be exchanged concerning technical
breakthroughs on milliorr-dollar contracts for the develop rent
or manufacture of sophisticated equipment, this group was
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a valuable means for identifying and learning haw to acquire
photographic and collateral materials vitally needed by D/GP
in its daily work. As such, it was a very significant cog
in the liaison mechanism utilized by the CIA Photo Intelligence
Division in conducting its daily affairs with the Department
of Defense.
Throughout the two-year period from 1953 to 1955, D/GP
interpreters themselves repeatedly sought out photography
and information on photographic coverage not available through
normal channels such as the Graphics Register, the Industrial
Register, or the CIA Map Library. Thus, names of all D/GP
professionals were included in periodic requests for continuing
clearance and access to the various DaD collections of photo-
graphy in the Washington, D.C. area. 130 Access to these and
other files of material helped significantly in the continuing
struggle to identify and obtain either little known or closely
held materials at a time when procurement of suitable up-to-
date photography was still a major problem.
Researching photography was facilitated greatly by
agreements hammered out at higher levels. Lundahl, through
his numerous contacts with interpretation and intelligence
officers in the military services played a major role in
making these arrangements and in breaking the inevitable
bottlenecks. Soon after his arrival, he launched a con-
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AMS was received. D/GP had further arranged to receive
certed attempt to improve access by D/GP personnel to
service-held photography and to speed the flow of needed
material to Agency PI's.
Closer liaison was established with the USAF, Office
of Deputy for Targets, and similar arrangements were being
explored with other pertinent USAF components. The Photo
Records and Services Branch of the Any Map Service CAMS)
had likewise agreed to inform D/GP as soon as aerial photo-
graphy of certain areas of interest flown under contract to
and the Photo Records
40
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Branch, Deputy for Targets, USAF, had agreed to handle procure-
ment of limited amounts
photography to satisfy CIA
needs. 131 in working out the details of these agreements
Lundahl had frequent assistance from Stallings, who acted
in his stead when necessary, and Lenchert, who provided staff
support.
As time went by and new situations emerged, D/GP continued
to take aggressive action in procuring photography from the
military. In October 1954 brought to a successful
conclusion, through negotiations with representatives of the
USAF, Deputy chief of staff for Operations, Directorate of
Intelligence (AFOIN), the Office of Naval Intelligence, the
Graphics Register and the Liaison Division of OCD, arrangements
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for the receipt by D/GP, on a continuing basis, of copies
of optiunirn (best-quality coverage) stereo photography lists
maintained in DoD. 132 This represented the successful
conclusion of discussions cczarenced in August 1954 by 25X1
at a meeting of the Graphics Research Coordinating Group. 133
The Formosa Strait crisis, which reached a peak in the
late winter and spring of 1955, created new problems in the
acquisition and sharing of current photography of the area.
However, determination by both D/GP and the military services
to solve the problem constructively, coupled with the exercise
of patience and goodwill, averted any breach in continuing
cooperation.
Difficulties resulting fra?n the length of time required
for reproduction of photography 25X1
received in Washington began to show up as early as December
1954. An immediate conference, in which met with 25X1
representatives of the Collection Division, Reconnaissance
Branch, Photo Interpretation Section, AFOIN, and the Photo
Records and Services Division, ACIC, identified the deficiencies
and rectified most of them. 134 Further difficulties developed,
however, as the crisis deepened after the first of the year.
With several different intelligence agencies attempting to
answer crash requirements using the same photography, problems
arose involving the sharing of original materials and/or the
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users. During March 1955 alone, Lundahl,
expeditious reproduction and delivery of copies to potential
separately, net in a total of eight conferences with
0
40
Lundahl an~ met witY
representatives of OCI, OSI, DDP, the Navy, and the Air Force
on problems of photographic procurement. 135 In April 1955,
on several occasions discussed with Navy PIC and ONI representa-
tives the timely delivery of photography covering critical
overseas areas. 138
In spite of frustrations resulting from untoward events,
the most important thing, in and out of crisis situations, was
that supervisors and PI's in D/GP were able to establish and
keep open the sources and transmission channels for obtaining.
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The May 1955 D/GP monthly report noted that Lundahl and
confirm agreements reached between ONI, US Navy PIC, and the
Graphics Register for rapid delivery to D/GP of each Far
Eastern nine-by-nine-inch or nine-by-l8-inch aerial photograph.
forwarded by the CNO to the Naval Photographic Center for
reproduction. Furthermore, the CIA Photo Intelligence Division
was to be notified by telephone each time a package of prints
was available to be picked up by courier, 137 reflecting the
urgency with which these materials were needed.
Even these extraordinary measures were inadequate, however,
to ensure faultless and speedy delivery of photography to D/GP.
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the photography essential to do their work. Moreover, they
were able to do it without high-level intervention, which
might have been even less productive. Though the cost was
fairly high in terms of time and patience expended, the
results were remarkably successful in an environment that
could be characterized as one of latent mistrust and mis-
givings generated by the introduction of a "foreign body"
into the preexisting Intelligence Caminity photo interpre-
tation organism.
D. Equipment and Interpretation Techniques.
Changes in interpretation techniques during this period
were generally few and insignificant. The PI's still depended
primarily on the folding pocket stereoscope, the tube magnifier,
the PI scale, and the PI slide rule to acccuplish their daily
tasks (Figure 5). There was still no collateral support unit.
in the division; each PI.ordered and/or searched for his own
maps and documents. Though several interpreters were CCMINT
cleared, facilities for using such materials were extremely
awkward. For the most part, Pi's had to consult CCMA1r sources
in secure areas behind the barrier, note mentally for background
use any pertinent CQMINT information, and then return to their
desks to complete their analyses and write their reports. Moreover,
the number of requirements levied on the division by CCMINT-
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using analysts in OCI and ORR was small. Together, these
limiting factors inhibited substantial growth of an all-
source exploitation capability in D/GP.
Concern for this lag was reflected in the assignment
of still PI consultant to the Agency, to 25X1
make a study of the problem in November 1954. His report
noted that there was little effort on the part of CI'-
using analysts to employ photography as a correlative source
of information. He attributed this failure partly to a lack
of awareness by such analysts of the potential utility of
available photography in their studies. He also blamed the
failure on the cramped D/GP quarters in m building, the
existing heavy PI workload, and the location of D/GP outside
the barrier. hoped that the new quarters for D/GP 25X1
in Que building might help alleviate the difficulties, but
he conceded that it was impractical to move D/GP behind the
barrier because of its close association with other Agency
analysts and with military Pi's who were not COMINr cleared.
was a strong advocate of the. thesis that, in a 25X1
crisis situation, the admittedly limited Agency PI resources
would have to be directed almost exclusively to the coordi-
nated use of CCMI in conjunction with the interpretation of
photography. He stressed the need to develop such a capability,
at least on a pilot basis, before such time as a major inter
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national crisis might occur. 139
Acquisitions of new instruments and equip= t during
the first two years under Lundahl provided no dramatic'
departures in type or in number from what might be expected
in any comparable organization. This was not to say, however,
that D/GP was unaware of the long-range need for better and
more sophisticated equipment, or reluctant to make a start
in acquiring it. The procurement of such equipment as a
step in upgrading the capability of the division was high
on Lundahl's list of priorities. Yet early progress toward
this goal was somewhat difficult to justify in the light of
requirements levied on the division and the nature of the
photography being exploited. It was also discouraged by
the generally non-technical orientation of senior ORR managers
and the lack of an established office tradition for purchasing
expensive, sophisticated equipment. 140
Lundahl was successful in obtaining an "Old Delft"
scanning stereoscope, manufactured in the Netherlands. He
forwarded the requisition for its purchase on 26 May 1953,
exactly one week after his first "working" day in D/GP. 14
A subsequent justification for this viewer pointed to the
ability to scan nine-by`ni.ne-inch photos ompletely in both
x and y directions without moving the photography or the
instrument. Another attribute of the instrument that may
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have been of sane significance in winning approval for it,
in view of the high interest in training analysts to interpret
photography, was the possibility of joint viewing by two
persons for training or in conferences. The fact that the
cost was not quite a thousand dollars may also have helped,
in a negative way, by failing to invite exaggerated scrutiny
of the item.
Not so successful was Lundahl's attempt to augment
division capability for the preparation of accurate plots
and data concerning land relief in all areas of special
interest. To this end he attempted, at the same time, to
obtain a Zeiss Stereotop II for stereo observation and
plotting. 142 Possession of such an instrument would have
enabled the division to provide more timely and accurate
responses to requests by DDP and others about the topographic
configuration in areas of special interest as well as answers
to questions of defilading and enfilading.* The attempt to
procure the Stereotop, whose cost was fully three times that
of the old Delft, failed.
Two years later, Lundahl tried again. By this time the
choice of instrument had changed, and the request was to
*An enfilade is a condition of exposure -- e.g., of an agent -
to observation or fire from a given point of observation.
A defilade is a condition of protection or screening from
fire or observation from a given point.
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procure a Kelsh Plotter. 143 This decision clearly reflected
the influence of 0 who had become Lundahl's right-hand STAT
technical man and who had experience in using the Kelsh. This
attempt was no more successful than the first, however, and
D/GP obtained no plotter prior to the nave into the Steuart
building in 1956.
The failure of D/GP to obtain approval for the purchase
of stereo plotting equiprent was due at least in part to the
GRA policy of not wanting to begin development of a contour-
map compilation capability. Such a develozt was regarded
as duplicative of AMS and ACIC capabilities, which were readily
accessible to GRA. Furthermore, the GRA view was that such a
capability belonged in the Cartography Division, where it
would have involved a substantial increase in the T/O and the
inauguration of an extensive training program. This was a
commitment with which GRA management did not wish to become
involved at this time.
The interest of D/GP and, perhaps even more to the point,
the interest of senior ORR managers in basic PI training for
other intelligence analysts was reflected in a purchase by D/GP
of a Jackson Stereoscopic Projector with a floating mark.
Procurement was reccmmended in March 1954. a4/ On 28 February
1955, Lundahl announced at the Geographic Research Area staff
meeting that D/GP had received this piece of equipment, and
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that it was available for use in briefings. 145 Thus, the
projector was obtained in time for the new course in basic
photo interpretation for intelligence analysts given by D/GP
many times over, beginning in July 1955. Once again, however,
the division had to reach out beyond the boundaries of the
United States to get the equipment needed. The Jackson
projector was of Canadian manufacture. The ability of the
division to search out and identify unique pieces of foreign
manufactured equipment such as this was a demonstration of
the utility of cultivating Lundahl's wide-ranging interests
and contacts.
The failure of the Photo Intelligence Division to obtain
more sophisticated equipment at the outset caused no serious
crisis. Most obvious was the lack of success in procuring
equipment for mensuration and for the preparation of more
precise maps. Even so, the division was able to prepare
rough sketch maps in place of accurate plots. It was, more-
over, possible, at the sacrifice of some accuracy, to provide
ballpark figures in place of precise measurements. On rare
occasions, the division was able to farm out a job to the
Engineer Research and Development Laboratories at Fort Belvoir
or to the Army Map Service, security permitting. The jobs
that the division was asked to do and the photography with
which the division had to work were very forgiving of such
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improvisations. This was not to be true, however, in later
In spite of little tangible change in D/GP equipment
during Lundahl 's first two years, the stage was being set
to take advantage of future developments. Lundahl had brought
with him a strong interest in technical development. Even
though this was not immediately translated into an abundance
of sophisticated equipment, he was aggressively following
developments in the state of the art and work being done on
new exploitation systems and devices through such contacts
as those in the Joint Committee on Intelligence Ground Photo-
graphy. As time went by, he was also learning about new
collection systems and co?nponents, such as cameras used in
Project GRAYBACK*, through his associations with 25X1
of OSI and, toward the end of the period, a much 25X1
wider range of equipment through his participation as a key
figure in the AQL TONE Project. He had brought 25X1
a budding young photogramnetrist, from Navy PIC to D/GP,
and he had secured a strong technical man from ERDL in the
person of All these things gave assurance that, 25X1
when the need was more urgent, D/GP would be in a position
*This was the Air Force balloon project known earlier as GOPHM
and GRINDSON, later as OPEN HEARTH and GEM=.
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to move swiftly and surely to cope with the greatly increased
technical demands of a new era.
G? Inaugurates Formal Reporting.
E. D/
The initial plan to issue no formal PI publications did
not last long after the arrival of Lundahl. Indeed, such a
policy was untenable once the division got fairly well established
and cammnced producing more than a trickle of information. From
the point of view of D/GP and ORR management, justification of
the PI activity would, sooner or later, require more tangible
evidence and production statistics than could be mustered with-
0
out formal reporting. From the customer point of view, there
was growing need to have more authoritative information, which
could be used to establish authenticity and to cite in publica-
tions as references. There was also the desire to have some-
thing less transient than working papers for reference purposes. 146
In August 1953, less than three months after he entered on
duty, Lundahl recommended the establishment of two series of PI
publications, one the Photographic Intelligence Report, the
other the Photographic Intelligence Memorandum. He proposed that
one type of report be designated for standard distribution only. 147
This distinction was obviously intended to provide a mans for
publishing certain sensitive PI information, for example, that
relating to DDP operations. Memoranda would also fall in either
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of two subtypes, those in response to internal requests
and those answering requests from outside CIA.
Following staffing out of the recommendation in Brammell's
office, a memo, spelling out the same proposal in somewhat
better context, was prepared for Guthe to send to the Assistant
Director for Intelligence Coordination. This memo noted that
the proposed series conformed to existing specifications for
intelligence publications approved by the DDI, and that action
had been taken to ensure that there was no danger of duplication
or confusion with publications of the Graphics Register. 148
The memorandum was dated 5 October 1953, suggesting not
only strong interest and quick approval by but also
the absence of significant opposition by higher authority or
other oo?ponents with wham the proposal was coordinated. The
first formal photo intelligence publication, GP/I-1, Rwnanian/
Ukrainian-Moldavian Border Study, was dated 9 November 1953. 149
Like most early D/GP publications, this one was prepared in
typescript in response to an internal CIA (DDP) request.
For the first few years most formal PI publications issued
were memoranda rather than reports. Typically, they were no
more than a few pages in length; the text of score merely identified
the requester and noted that the requirement had been fulfilled.
Graphics were generally annotated photographs, with or without
acetate overlays. Maps were sometimes included, and, rarely,.
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utilitarian perspective drawings were prepared. For the
most part, an office typewriter was the chief machine used
for reproducing text, with copies other than the original
consisting of carbons. Graphics accompanying such reports
were usually prepared in only one copy, for the requester.
In the case of publications having a wider appeal, such
as those of the mission coverage type, reproduction was in
purple ditto. When multiple copies of graphics other than
photos were required, reproduction was most camwxUy by ozalid.
Generally speaking, problems of reproduction involving the
facility were minimal, in view of the
small scope of D/GP production. It was recognized by Lundahl
and others, however, that this could become the Achilles heel
of the CIA PI production operation. Indeed, one problem had
already cropped up, and two other potentially serious ones
had been identified by the'spring of 1955.
The much augmented volume of D/GP publications in the
late winter and spring of 1955, and the urgency with which
they were needed, created a glut of high-priority reproduction
seriously oarpromising its
ability to render prompt service to other parts of the GRA.
in absence, mentioned this problem at the GRA staff
meeting on 20 June 1955, Lundahl responded that the Office of.
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who was temporarily acting as Chief, GRA,
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Logistics was planning to get in touch with Branmell to
obtain official confirmation that the recent high level of
D/GP work would continue. ILO/ obviously,, Logistics hoped
to establish a continuing need beyond the Peak activity
associated with the Formosa strait crisis before undertaking
any long term augmentation of their capability. At a time
when Lundahl, at least, was beginning to think about how to
prepare for the reproduction of large volumes of extremely
high priority information from U-2 photography, the precarious-
ness of having to depend on someone else for reproduction of
such materials could hardly have been lost upon him. Fortunate-
ly, the sensitivity of U-2 materials would provide a persuasive
argument for setting up a self-contained operation.
On 2 June 1955, representatives bf the Office of Logistics
net with _ and Lundahl to discuss certain potential
reproduction problems involving D/GP. First and foremost was
the concern about what would happen if the arrangement made
with the Navy for furnishing large numbers of photographic
prints to D/GP should break down. The other major problem
concerned the provision of adequate reproduction support in
the event of relocation outside the metropolitan Washington
area during an emergency.
In the first case, the office of Logistics expressed a
definite preference for having the Navy continue to supply
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prints to D/GP. Agreement was reached, however, to augment
OL's capability to respond to limited short-deadline requests
by D/GP for photo reproduction. 151 In the second instance,
Logistics pointed out that a detailed plan had been prepared,
providing for all aspects of such support to Agency oacrponents,
but that it was being held in abeyance somewhere in the DDS.
In both cases, the logistics representatives gave assurance of
their desire and ability, with some advance warning, to provide
any additional essential services, but they stressed the need
for adequate written justification. 152
F. The Onset of U-2 Support.
By 1954, gaps in US intelligence which precluded adequate
knowledge of Soviet capabilities and intentions with.respect
to the possible launching of nuclear attack on this Country
were generating strong pressure to find some ream to fill the
gaps. Though aerial photography ranked high on the list of
prospects, enthusiasm for the use of this promising sensor were
tempered by consideration of the possible consequences of a
shootdown of an American military aircraft deep within Soviet
airspace. At this critical juncture, intensive work being done
on the problem began to point to a possible solution.
The first inkling came in a report dated 30 September 1954
and issued by the Special Study Group of the Hoover Commission
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investigating the covert activities of CIA. This group,
under the chairmanship of General James H. Doolittle, urged
the use of all possible techniques to increase the capability
to gather intelligence information by means of high altitude
photo reconnaissance. As if to emphasize the overriding need
for such a capability, the report added that no price paid
would be too high. !L3/
The specifics of how to develop the capability were the
result of work done by a sub-group of the "Surprise Attack
Conrittee" of the Office of Defense Mobilization. On 5 November
1954 Chairman of the "Project 3" Technological
Capabilities Panel* wrote a letter to Allen W. Dulles proposing
that CIA, with the "assistance" of the Air Force, undertake a
program of photo reconnaissance over the USSR. The proposal
accompanying the letter stated that there was available a "jet
powered" glider that could fly at an altitude of 70,000 feet.
Unarmed and weighing in at a mere 15,000 pounds, this aircraft
was so obviously devoid of military usefulness as to minimize
the level of reaction to be expected should it be intercepted
by the Russians. According to the proposal, a single mission
by this aircraft in clear weather could provide photographic
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coverage of a strip of territory 200 miles wide and 2500 miles
long. 154
During the next two weeks, the Agency and the Air Force
held discussions concerning the feasibility of the proposal.
On 19 November 1954, Dulles and Cabell attended a luncheon
meeting in the office of Harold E. Talbott, Secretary of the
Air Force, to hamper out a coordinated proposal for sulzmission
to the President of the united states.* It was agreed that
the proposal was a.practical one, that steps should be under-
taken to contract for the equipment needed, that the project
should be a joint CIA-Air Force undertaking, and that CIA
unvouchered channels should be used for procurement. 155
Dulles next turned to the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
On 23 November 1954, he -obtained from that committee a metro
for President Eisenhower supporting the proposed reconnaissance
program. 156
The proposal was presented to the President at the White
House on the next day, 24 November.** A mom for the record, in
*Present: Dulles, Cabell, Talbott, Trevor Gardner (Assistant
to the Secretary for R&D), Fred Ayres, Jr., (Assistant to the
Secretary for Intelligence), Lieutenant General Donald Putt
(Deputy Chief of Staff , Development) , and Clarence L. (N.-ally)
Johnson of Lockheed, the designer of the CL-282 (Air Force
designation: U-2).
**Those present: President Eisenhower, Allen Dulles, John Foster
Dulles, Charles E. Wilson, and Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster.
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the hand of Lieutenant General Cabell, noted that the Presi-
dent approved the proposal, subject to a reservation by the
Secretary of Defense providing for a final review of responsi-
bilities for managing the project just before it became opera-
tional. In the meantime, plans and procurement of equipment
would proceed as initially proposed. 157 Though the decision
as to who, CIA or the Air Force, would ultimately exercise
control was, thus, undecided, the project had gotten the
starting flag and, at least for the time being, CIA was in
the driver's seat.*
Lundahl was first made aware of the U-2 project on
Monday, 13 December 1954. On that day, he received a call
to report to the DCI. Upon arriving, he was ushered into
Dulles' office, where, for the first time, he net Richard M.
Bissell, an economist with a PhD from Yale University, who
was attached to the Office of the Director as Special Assistant
for Planning and Coordination (SA/PC). 158 Though the DDCI,
Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell, had been made responsible
to the Director for overseeing work on the project, Bissell
was the man designated to set up the organization and manage
the operation. At this December meeting in the Director's
*A much fuller treatment of the history of the U-2 program,
including copies of key documents, can be found in the excellent
history of OSA
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office, Lundahl was given a complete briefing on AQUATONE,
the code name applied to the U-2 program. He was also told
he was relieved of his regular duties and directed to cc?rnit
himself full-time to support of Project AQUATONE. Among other
things, he was to study contract specifications, visit instru-
ment and equipment manufacturers, talk with designers and
contractors, and, more generally, to take whatever steps might
be needed to ensure that the exploitation potential of the
resulting photography would be commensurate with the perfor-
mance of the remarkable airplane which would penetrate far
beyond unfriendly boundaries and permit exposure of the film
at unprecedented altitudes.
This created some problems for Lundahl. For one thing,
none of the three supervisors above him'-- Guthe, and
Amory -- was cleared for the project. Nor were any of them
to be cleared for another several months. Moreover, it was
unrealistic to expect Lundahl to disassociate himself completely
from ongoing D/GP work, though he did turn the day-to-day manage-
ment of the division over to
who thereby became 25X1
entrenched as deputy division chief. Lundahl made every effort
to keep in touch with work in D/GP and with staff affairs in
the Geographic Research Area when he was in town, but he spent
considerable time traveling all over the United States doing
the job Dulles had given him to do. The word was out to
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provide whatever support was required for the extremely
iwortant project being undertaken for the DCI by the Special
Assistant for Planning and Coordination. 159
Almost irrr diately, others in D/GP besides Lundahl
became involved in the project. By early 1955, two additional
also cleared, ostensibly to support EQUINE, a sub-project under
AQUATOIE. ILO/ Though EQUINE was established to formulate
photo intelligence collection requirements for the U-2, 25X1
members of D/GP,
quickly became involved in broad-gauge support for 25X1
task force, 161 replacing
AQUATONE itself. On 18 January 1955, they moved to separate
quarters on the third floor of the dilapidated former Briggs
School building at 2210 E Street, N.W. Here they could work
on sensitive tasks well removed from persons whose background
might otherwise lead to inconveniently well informed speculation.,
In April 1955 was detailed to work on this 25X1
who asked to return to his 25X1
former assignment because of a personality clash with
joined the group as
an illustrator. 162
A few weeks later,
had majored in geography both as an undergraduate
was a former SAC officer who had also majored in geography as
an undergraduate at the University of Wisconsin, and had been.
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and graduate student at the University of Pittsburgh.
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25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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a PI, editor, and supervisor during his two years of military
service. had been employed by the OCR Machine
25X1
D1Vlsion as a arditi.5urs.~ cu-
graduated fran the Missouri School of Mines as a Civil
Engineer and had further training in photo interpretation as
well as extensive experience in it and related aspects of
engineering, had come to D/GP frown the E gineer Research
and Development laboratories, at Fort Belvoir, where he
worked as a project engineer on the development of precise
globes and spherical maps. He was the technical man, and,
at GS-12, the leader of the unit. A perfectionist and a
driver who possessed scarcely any detectable capacity to
work harmoniously with people got the job done at 25X1
the expense of alienating nearly everyone who worked under
him. Though this created serious problems in the unit and
repeatedly caused persons in it to seer a transfer
was virtually indispensable at this juncture, and was retained
for a few years as a supervisor precisely because of his
indispensability.
This small,, carefully ccarpartmented task force handled
a variety of projects. One example, PATHFINDER II, was under-
taken and cemrpleted in January 1955. 163 A first phase,
PATf7INDER i, had been aceoanplished as a "crash" project in
November, a month before even Lundahl was cleared for AQLAT=. 164
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Both phases involved plotting on maps the radius of "bomber"
operations from various US Air Force bases. 165 In the case
of PATIiFINIDER II, the bases were Clark, Kadena, Yokota, Shemya,
Nome, Thule, Dhahran, Wiesbaden, Adana, and Wheelus. As more
and more people became aware of unexplained activities in
support of the high priority DCI project, this was the kind
of job that couldn't be exposed to casual observation. As
it was, elaborate care was taken to requisition additional
maps that had no conceivable connection with the areas of
primary concern so as to reduce the chance of successful
speculation. 166
As weeks and months went by
became involved in the search for or development of equipment
needed to process and exploit U-2 photography. As early as
the spring of 1955, they made exploratory trips to ACIC in
St. Louis, to Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, and
to Eastman Kodak in Rochester. Items being considered included
equipment being developed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
for automatic processing of aerial film, a project made feasible
by the development at Eastman of a new film, SO-1121. Automatic
processing of previously available film exposed under widely
varying atmospheric and weather conditions did not yield nega-
tives of acceptable quality .
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At VWight-Patterson, also examined the
reconoscope, a device for viewing film in the form of posi-
tive transparencies. 167 At that time, PI's, including
those in D/GP, worked primarily from prints. Since the
reconoscope reversed the image on the negative electronically
it was in no way a forerunner of microstereoscopes and other
direct viewing equipment used by PI's at a later date for the
exploitation of positive transparencies. Nevertheless, the
concept of examining transparencies rather than prints was
suggestive of changes in exploitation procedures that would
come soon after the exploitation of U-2 photography commenced-
Another type of equipment that was introduced to the
task force was the Minicard system, initially conceived under
CIA auspices at Yale University and later developed by Eastman.
Chief of the OSI Nuclear Energy Division, had
nei nor other witting persons in D/GP had any 25X1
firm opinions on the subject; they had, in fact, just been
introduced to the system a few months earlier. Even so,
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already been working with and others at Eastman,
and they had convinced him that Minicard was the key to auto-
mation in processing photo intelligence. Bissell had also
became interested, and felt that acceptance by the Agency and
the Air Force of the Minicard system for information retrieval
was strong evidence of its value. At this early date, however,
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was obviously less bullish about the broad-gauge
utility of the system than Miller, and he cited some very
pertinent reservations, whica later proved to be correct. 168
The task force under thus, addressed its
efforts to the examination of a whole range of equipment of
potential utility in all phases of production, from the
processing of the exposed film to the storage and retrieval
of information in published reports.
Another important job tackled by the task force was
comprehensive planning of the space, functions, and organi-
zation required to provide a centralized, self-contained
facility for the processing of photo orders, for the exploita-
tion of the film, and for the publication and dissemination
of photo intelligence products. As early as 20 June 1955,
forwarded to Lundahl a proposal covering all aspects
of such a facility. 169/ Though it did not presume to be the
final word, it was a very comprehensive beginning, and, as
such, represented a substantial amount of effort.
This early planning was important because the progress
toward the development of the unprecedented new collection
system was unrelenting; it was absolutely essential that
detailed thinking about inputs, space, functions, procedures,
personnel, and the like, be accorr lisped at the earliest
possible date. There would be no time to halt development
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of the collection system or efforts to develop or procure
exploitation equipment while planners proposed, coordinated,
argued, refined, and agreed upon all the fine details of the
PI system. The camponent parts of the program were being
born in pell mall fashion to meet a deadline -- hopefully, soon
enough to provide a year or so of overhead reconnaissance before
the soviets should have developed effective detection and counter-
measures. Getting the complete system shaped up required much
cut-and-try, much interaction between innovative hardware and
plans for using it, and the devising of modifications and cant-
prcznises to assure a fine dovetailing in the final, working
system.
Numerous details involving the interface between the
collectors and the exploiters of the photography and users of
the resulting photo intelligence had to be worked out, too.
Though the time was too early and the task force too ill-equipped
to do any detailed or definitive work about targets, collection
priorities, flight lines, photo plots, and other mission-related
coordination and support, it was apparent that the expertise
of the photo interpreters would be called upon to some degree
in dealing with all such problems. This, too, was a fact
recognized by Lundahl and the task force, and they proceeded to
think through and to get down on paper their plans for partici-
pation in all these areas.
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Thus, during the late winter and spring of 1955, the
small D/GP task force supporting AQUATONE was already engaged
in a whole host of vital activities intended to ensure that
the surprises and mistakes to be discovered as preparations
came down the hone stretch would be as few as possible. The
broad scope and the extraordinary productiveness of this small
group was, at one and the same time, a testimony to the enthusiam
and leadership displayed by Lundah]. and the technical competence
and hard-nosed drive of That the troops didn't buckle 25X1
under the strain was a tribute to their appreciation of the
effort with which they were associated and their dedication to
the job.
G. Outlook in Mid-1955-
After two years under Lundahl,. photo intelligence in
CIA could be characterized as a mildly successful operation
about to be projected by external forces into a role of
critical significance, nationally and internationally. At
the sane tine, it would move behind a shroud of secrecy so
heavy and, ultimately, so successful as to rival that of any
intelligence operation in the Western World. In mid-1955,
however, only the chief and a few heavily committed associates
among the division's personnel were aware of this prospect.
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By the end of June 1955, the Photo Intelligence Division
was, thus, approaching an abrupt change in its character, its
size, its composition, its method of operation, and the loca-
tion of its place of business. The change was to be revolu-
tionary. In such a situation, past performance would be less
important than future potential. Nevertheless, D/GP would have
to provide the cadre of experienced people on which the success
of the new venture would depend. In this sense, at least, the
accomplishments of D/GP and the state of its development at
the end of June 1955 were matters of great concern.
The most important question, that of leadership, had
been decisively settled. Lundahl was the choice. Higher
authority was obviously satisfied with his personal, profes-
sional, and managerial qualifications. He had commenced his
Agency career on a note of strong confidence. Guthe had se-
lected his to head the Photo Intelligence Division virtually
as soon as it was established, and had never wavered in his
decision through the long months of negotiation leading up
to Lundahl 's release by the Navy. had recommended
his for promotion to GS-15 after only five months on the job.
His subsequent performance seen-ad to confirm the wisdom of
those earlier judgments. if the work of the infant PI division
was seldom glamorous enough to bring the chief into close
working relations with senior Agency managers, the few opportu-
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pities he did have gave him and the division favorable exposure.
Lundahl had a gift for connzunicating animatedly and successfully
with those above his rank and beyond his division and office,
both inside and outside the Agency.
Of nearly equal importance was the question of adequate
staff for the division. The onboard personnel had established
a solid record of accomplishment, but ever since its inception
the Photo Intelligence Division had operated with fewer than
the authorized number of people and without enough personnel to
net the quantity of requirements levied on it. Overtime had
became a way of life, at least periodically, and the division
had to work selectively on those projects deemed to be most
urgent. Such a situation suggested the need for Wore adequate
staffing. Yet, considering the slow pace of previous recruitment
and the inertia typical of any bureaucracy, some crisis or
anticipated crisis was needed to justify a proposal for expansion.
The Formosa Strait crisis and the prospect of the U-2 turned the
trick.
On 13 May 1955 the AD/RR forwarded to the DDS a staff
?
study prepared in
office proposing a reorganization
of D/GP and an increase in its T/0 from 13 to 44 persons. 170
With some forethought as to where the additional slots and
funds might came from, the proposal provided for an increase
in the ORR T/0 from 859 to 890 persons and a con ensurate
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increase in 01 (personal services) funds, to cover the
additional salaries.
In justifying the increase, the staff study mentioned
the deleterious effect of so much crash work on long range
planning to meet expanding Agency needs for photo intelligence.
It clained that five Pi's were working at least part time on
a special project of highest priority for the DCI, and said
that the numbs needed for this would soon rise to 20. These
were points that could scarcely fail to convince those responsi-
ble for the success of the U-2 program. The staff study also
exploited constructively the situation created by the crash
effort D/GP devoted to reporting on the Formosa Strait crisis.
It called attention to the fact that whereas D/GP support for
current intelligence was. then exceeding 50 per cent of the
division capability, that for the ORR Economic and Geographic
Areas combined was down to approximately 12 per cent, DDP was
down to 10 per cent, and OSI requirements were being handled
only on a delayed response basis. Backed with such statistics,
the proposal was successful. On 1 July 1955, the expanded T/O
was approved by the DDS, with minor changes in the requested
jobs and grade levels and in the names of two of the new
branches. 171
Several other administrative problems were also tackled
about this time. One was the division of responsibilities
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between D/GP and the Graphics Register. The issue had been
raised in January 1955 in the report of the survey of services
and facilities of the Photo Intelligence Division conducted
by the Management Staff, DDA, at the request of the AD/RR as
a follow-up to the IG's earlier recation. As a result,
Bramwell drafted a proposed regulation on the subject of D/GP
responsibilities. Coordination of this regulation with other
coaiiponents was to continue for months. The most thorny questions
were the differences of opinion between D/GP and the Graphics
Register over (a) which conconent was responsible for what
type of liaison with the military services in coordinating
collection requirements and in obtaining certain types of
photography for exploitation, and (b), whether D/GP was, in
fact, engaged in producing photo intelligence at all. 172 By
the fall of 1955, D/GP was well on its way to nnich bigger
things and further efforts to reach an acct rirodation with the
Graphics Register ceased. The proposed regulation was never
issued. Wnat might otherwise have been an important struggle
for power was rendered irrelevant by the advent of an entirely
new and exclusive source of photography over which the Graphics
Register would have no control.
In April 1955, D/GP moved from Roan 1337 M Building
to space in Roam 1009, 1134, and 1142 Que Building. 173 The
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it -- was more space. Since the original rove to M Building
about two years earlier, the on-board strength of the division
had nearly doubled and several additional recruits were scheduled
to report for duty by midsummer 1955. Though it was already
clear that if the U-2 program were successful still another
cove would have to take place during the next year, the build-
up in personnel precluded the possibility of waiting. Moreover,
with only 12 people involved and a minimum of equipment, all
of which was easily portable, the move within the M. and Que
Building canplex was neither difficult nor costly.
Meanwhile, D/GP's support for the Guatemala operation
had been highly successful and much appreciated. After many
abortive attempts to provide support for OCI, the division
came through impressively during the Foiiosa Strait crisis.
Nevertheless, the most important work, in teens of future
development, was the support the division and its chief were
providing for Project AQTJATONE. Once briefed into it, the
DDI, Amory, came to rely on Lundahl to keep him up to date on
the details of this project and to provide guidance in the
more technical aspects of the undertaking. 174 The ccnmuni-
cation patterns set in this way endured, and the team of Lundahl
and Amory reappeared often in events involving D/GP and its
successor organizations over the next several years.
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IV. A Star is Born (1955-1956)
HmLiTOW (HM) was the name given the task force
whose responsibility it was to exploit AQUATaE photography.
The history of the Photo Intelligence Division in the mid-
to-late 1950's was very substantially that of H. Lest
there be confusion about the relationship of I?AUMMT to
contemporaneous CIA coanponents, it should be understood that
HM was not regarded as a "permanent" organizational entity.
Rather it was a group of persons, initially nearly 150 in
number, assembled frown ORR and OCR to work together under
one management on the exploitation of U-2 photography. It
was, in effect, the exploitative arm of the A WIONE project.
At the time HM was constituted, no one could say just how
long the collective effort under AQJATOIE would continue or
how long the capability represented by Hwould be needed.
If one were to reckon the date of conception of HTAU-
TO,T (HTA) frown the time when those on the small task force
were detached from their regular duties and moved to 2210 E
Street in January 1955, and the date of birth as the removal
to the Steuart Building in July 1956, then the period of
gestation was close to 18 months. It is with the last year
of this period, from July 1955 to July 1956, that we are now
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concerned -- how the organization evolved and grew, how the
new recruits were phased in and employed, what provision was
made for financing the operation, what noteworthy substantive
and other accomplishments were achieved, and, more generally,
the trials and the successes in getting ready for one of the
most challenging and exciting undertakings in the annals of
American intelligence.
A. Precursors of the U-2 Project.
The U-2 system was not conceived on the spur of the
msnent. Several studies of military intelligence problems
during the early 1950's set the stage. Most important with
respect to D/GP participation in Project AQUATONE was the report
of the BEACON HILL Study Group, but work done under Project HOPE
CHEST was of sane significance in stimulating earlier thinking
about strategic targets for coverage by overhead photography.
Both were initiated under Air Force auspices, but involved at
least limited participation by representatives from other
organizations in the Intelligence Cammity, including CIA.
The BEACON HILL Study Group was established as a result
of a proposal, in May 1951, by the US Air Force Deputy Chief
of Staff, Development, to the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology to undertake a study of Air Force intelligence
and reconnaissance problems. Two months later, in July 1951,
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this proposal was incorporated as a part of MIT's Project
LINCOLN. Plans were made, however, to locate the BEACON HILL
group in quarters separate from Project Lfl COIN and to provide
special security safeguards.
The BEACON IiILL Study Group consisted of a Central Study
Group of 15 members and 10 consultants. Five Air Force liaison
officers were also assigned to the group. In addition, there
was a small administrative staff. A total'of 39 "visitors,"
each a specialist in some subject being discussed by the group,
attended pertinent meetings.
It is interesting, in passing, to note the galaxy of
scientific talent engaged in the BACON HILL study. Since the
contractor was Project LINCOLN of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, a majority. of those on the Central Study Group
hailed from Boston or southern New England. Among those most
closely associated at a later date with the U-2 project were:
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organizational work proceeded at a slow pace, but
things moved rapidly once work commenced. Between 7 January
and 15 February 1952, the group attended Air Force and other
briefings in Washington and at Air Force installations else-
where in the U.S. Following these briefings, the group de-
fined three areas in which they believed they could contribute,
namely, intelligence objectives, sensors, and data handling.
Panels were constituted to study each of these areas.
By the middle of April 1952, substantial agreement had
been reached, and the major conclusions formulated. The EE1CON
HILL Report was issued on 15 June 1952, with a letter of trans-
mittal to the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, dated 2 June 1952.
The letter of transmittal pointed out that the study reflected
two points of view. On the one hand, the group tried to view
in broad perspective the problems of orientation, emphasis, and
priority with respect to the overall job of Air Force intelli-
gence. On the other hand, the group addressed its effort to
technical problems involved in the collection, reduction, and
utilization of intelligence data. 175
Recognizing the need to develop a highly sophisticated
photo reconnaissance system for peering inside the Soviet Union,
while at the same time overcoming operational and maintenance
problems inherent in the use of routinely trained military
personnel, the BEACON HILL report proposed separation of these
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"specialized" systems and their maintenance from normal
tactical photo-reconnaissance tasks using standard equip-
ment. 176 it proposed extreme-altitude (at 70,000 feet!)
oblique photography of the Soviet Union. At the same time it
mentioned guardedly the possibility of pre-D-Day invasion of
Soviet air space, and recommended rapid develognent to the
point of feasibility trials of a number of the more pranising
vehicles, among than high-altitude balloons and aircraft. 177
in the same sense that the mention of high-altitude aircraft
presaged the U-2, the proposal to use balloons foreshadowed the
GE ETRIX program. In discussing prospective reconnaissance
vehicles, the report stressed the need for integrated design
of the whole system,. rather than the more camtion process of
accretion whereby independently conceived pieces of equipment
were stuffed into vehicles not specifically designed to accept
than. This systems approach was pursued, with some hindsight,
in the development of the U-2 reconnaissance system and was
reflected in the AQUXTONE assignment given Lundahl by Dulles
and, less directly, by the extensive operational and exploita-
tion planning and support in which the task force headed by
became engaged.
The SFACON HILL group, following its own precepts about
the systems approach, also directed its attention to data
handling. On the assumption that, even with greater use of
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information priorities, there was grave danger that new,
prolific collection systems would produce a volume of inputs
that would overwhelm existing capabilities to sort and
handle data, they proposed (a) microfilming all data inputs,
(b) indexing the material and recording the index codes
directly on the microfilm, and (c) using machines to search
and locate the desired information. 178
The greatest significance of TAPE CI= to D/GP in its
participation in AQUATONE and HTAUTCv T was in the field of
collection requirements. Following the initial D/GP contri-
bution to the Reber metro of 18 November 1952 giving a prelimi-
nary and very general statement of CIA photo reconnaissance
requirements, 179/ it served as a vehicle and, as AQUATONE
was undertaken and then brought to near operational status, a
convenient cover for shaping up initial collection requirements.
In this connection, it is of interest that in 1952 the BEACON
fIILL Study Group had advocated controlled search of the Soviet
Union as opposed to randam coverage. In spite of some early
proposals to the contrary, 180 fit was decided before the U-2
became operational that it would be targeted primarily against
highest-priority installations. Coverage of installations of
lesser importance would be a bonus, depending on their location
near primary targets.
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B. Development of a New Organization.
The reorganization and expansion of D/GP which was
approved on 1 July 1955 was, in part, a hedge against probable
future developments. Though one of the arguments used in its
favor was the burgeoning demands being made on the division
to support project AQUATONE,* the magnitude of that effort
and the precise nature of the functions to be accomplished
were as yet unknown even to those most intimately concerned
with the planning. Indeed, the degree of ignorance was demon-
strated by the prediction, in justification of the proposed
reorganization, that "a most conservative estimate" of the
manpower needed to support AQUATONE was 20 persons. 181 In
a little more than six months, the number of authorized D/GP
employees earmarked for this purpose would approximately
quadruple.
The chief utility of the 44-man T/O, as it worked out,
was (a) to provide authorization for bringing additional PI's
on board in an orderly fashion, in view of the difficulty of
finding them and the long delay occasioned by security investi-
*For communicating with those not cleared for AQUATONE, the
project established in D/GP to provide support of all types
to the U-2 program was known as EQUIU AL. This was the
name used in such things as administrative papers and D/GP
monthly reports to refer to AQLNTONE support.
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gations and other processing, and (b) to define and establish'
the organizational elaborations needed for the future. In the
latter connection, the expanded division provided not two, but
four branches. It also provided a new support staff (Figure 6).
Two of the three new canponents would provide formally
for specialized functions heretofore performed by the PI's
either as an adjunct to their work or undertaken, in special
circumstances, on an ad hoc basis by those best equipped and
most interested in doing the job. Previously the tasks of
coordinating collection requirements for the division and of
handling the many facets of photo coverage information and
procurement frequently had been undertaken b~= At
this juncture, a Support Staff, with the position of Chief
pegged at GS-13, was established, with three other photo
intelligence officers and a clerk-typist to round out the
complement of personnel. This staff, of which was
named Acting Chief, greatly eased the pressure on the office
of the Division Chief in these functional areas and also
reduced the diversion of PI effort to related non-substantive
Similarly, difficult mensuration problems and other
tasks encompassed by the broader name of photogrammetry had
often been undertaken bbl
who, like) had occupied
a position on the Geographic Branch T/0. Simple mensuration
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i
0
tasks were performed by the PI's themselves, though as new,
less experienced hands reported for duty, this was done at
some cost in efficiency. With the reorganization of the
division, the opportunity was at hand to establish an inde-
pendent branch staffed with specialists, who would develop a
strong capability in this highly technical field of photographic
exploitation and free the PI's to devote their energies to the
more qualitative interpretations which they were best equipped
to handle. The newly established Technical Intelligence Branch
was headed by~ as Acting Chief. He occupied a GS-14 slot,
and, at full strength, would have five additional photo intelli-
gence officers working under his direction.
The third new component, the Special Projects Branch, was
primarily a promise for the future, when *the division or its
successor organization would hopefully be receiving large
amounts of high-resolution, current coverage of some of the
Most sought-after Soviet targets. When inputs from such missions
should arrive, the pressure would be intense to learn the quality
of the photographs, the scope of coverage actually achieved, and
what was revealed about primary targets for which the missions
were flown. Moreover, CIA would not be the only interested
consumer. These targets would be agreed upon by all interested
participants in the Intelligence Community, but, for the first
time, CIA would control the film. If the Agency failed to
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provide the Community with the initial, inenediate summation
of?important results, the Air Force, in all probability, would
fill the void by producing such reports from their copy of
the mission photography.
in the meantime, until the U-2 became operational, the
Special Projects Branch would produce photographic intelligence
reports, mennranda, and data in support of "high priority
current requirements," and develop a program for the exploita-
tion of "current photography in support of Agency and national
indicator programs." Ostensibly it would relieve scene of the
pressure on the Geographic and Industrial branches in any
future situations like the Formosa Strait crisis and permit
correction of the imbalance that had resulted in the dramatic
decline in support of DDP, ORR, and OSI during that crisis.
In any event, it would also be responsible for providing
support to Project AQUNTONE, whose demands for scarce PI
resources were beginning to annoy
was named Acting Chief of the Special Projects Branch, occupy-
ing a GS-14 slot. At full strength, the branch would have five
additional photo intelligence officers. 182
One by-product of the reorganization was the identification
of key managers and supervisors, at the branch level and above,
who would be responsible for the functioning and success of
D/GP as it faced the transition leading to the exploitation
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? of U-2 photography. Lundahl would continue to lead the divi-
25X1
sion and
serve as his deputy.
would st
ill be chie
fs of their PI branches, bu~
25X1
join them as chief of a third PI branch.
would head the 25X1
new branch providing photogrammetric support to the interpre-
tation branches, and
0
?
would head the staff handling
requirements, production control, and procurement of needed
photography. alone among senior members of the divi-
sion failed at this time to get a key post, but he was soon
assigned to the division office to serve as a special assis-
tant. Of these senior people in key positions, only two,
were not former Navy PIC employees.
Thus, in the months ahead, as Lundahl became involved in
critical decisions and challenging tasks, he would have the
satisfaction of having familiar and trusted associates by
his side.
August 1955 brought a cut in CIA's FY 56 operating bud-
get, which resulted in the imposition by the DDI of a 5.3 per-
cent cut in the personnel ceilings for all offices, including
ORR. At the same time, he eliminated all new positions requested
for FY 57 and any positions above the newly established ceiling,
with the exception of the 31 positions recently approved for
D/GP. The DDI further specified that of these the 20 new
positions earmarked for support to the "DCI-Bissell project"
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could not be used for any other purpose and should be filled
as rapidly as possible. He authorized Guthe to distribute
at his discretion the remaining 11 of the 31 positions, 183
but Guthe chose to freeze them, precluding their use by any
other GRA division. 184 Thus, D/GP, which again found itself
with numerous unfilled slots -- albeit newly approved ones in the face of a job freeze, was spared repetition of the
ill effects suffered in a somewhat similar situation two
years earlier. Clearly the chief factor responsible for
the difference was critical concern for the success of Project
AQUAMONE.
New arrivals in the division spurted in July and August
1955, when one clerical employee and four professionals, in-
cluding a military officer, entered on duty.
25X1
25X1
a Navy Lieutenant Co=, ander at the time, reported.
for duty in D/GP on 5 July 1955, 185/ the first military
liaison officer assigned to the division. Unfortunately for
the ongoing D/GP operation, quickly became involved
in support of AQUATONE collection planning and operations,
and was essentially lost to the division. 186 Before the
break in service was oomplete, however, was able to
obtain a Navy plane in September 1955 to fly photographic
coverage of the area around Langley, Virginia, and other
areas, such as the "Winkler Tract" in Alexandria, Virginia. IL
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This was in support of Project PURPOSE, established in response
to a requirement from the DDS to procure and interpret photo-
graphy and lay mosaics of certain sites being considered for
the construction of the new CIA headquarters building. 188
Two other professionals entered on duty in July and one
in August.* Though no other professionals arrived until De-
cember 1955, when two more arrived,** D/GP was in a strong
growth phase. Between the end of June and the end of December
the division had acquired six more professionals and one cleri-
cal, an increase of more than 50 percent in on-duty strength
during the six month period. ivioreover, the pace of new arri-
vals was about to increase still more during the next six
months.
In spite of the use of Project AQ6g1TONE to justify the
44-man T/O, and in spite of its utility in establishing some
of the key functions needed later for exploitation of U-2
photography, the reorganization approved on 1 July 1955 could
never nave been intended as a definitive solution to the pro-
blem of staffing up for exploitation of U-2 materials. During
25X1
the 28th. 189/ Nearly a month later, on 25 August,
25X1
transferred to D GP fran elsewhere in ORR. 190
25X1
**On 6 December 1955,
transferred from the Carto-
25X1
graphy Division and on 16 December tered on
duty. 191
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the sir of 1955, the small task force headed by
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expenditures of approximately
produced the first formal proposal for what was initially called
a "central interpretation unit" to exploit AQJATOIE materials.
The form of the proposal was exactly at might be expected from
a driving perfectionist like with an engineering back-
ground. It included, in the most painstaking detail imaginable,
a listing of all jobs on the proposed T/0, a complete statement
of functions and capabilities down to branch level, and an ex-
haustive accounting of the expected cost. It had one basic
fault, however; the proposal was too expansive. It provided
for a total of 227 positions by 1 October 1956 and for FY 56
was earmarked for technical equipment, chiefly Minicard, an
automated, miniaturized storage and retrieval system. Inasmuch
as neither the success nor the duration of the collection pro-
gram could be predicted at this early date, it was hardly real-
istic to expect such a proposal to be forwarded to higher autho-
rity without considerable revision. Moreover, even assuming
success of the project, the volume and rate of inputs were not
yet known, nor had the number and type of services to be pro-
vided others in the Intelligence Connnriity been decided. Indeed,
even if such a proposal were to be accepted in its original
form, past experience proved that it would be virtually impossible
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to recruit, select, and get on board in the time available
so large a number of people, or to obtain, on short notice,
complex equipment not yet out of the prototype stage. On
the other hand, the proposal did anticipate essentially all
the functions later performed by HTAU701AT.
The coordinated proposal for the central interpretation
unit finally emerged as Project HTAtTCNAT.* Dated 2 December
1955 and bearing Amory's signature, it proposed establishment
of an office of Statistical Research,** to consist essentially
of an expanded photo interpretation unit with its director
reporting to the DDI, and a collocated OCR group, to be known
as the OCR Information Register, under the administrative
the HTAUTO OAT as well as CIA TALENT Security Officer, was
that he prefixed the name AUTQMAT with his own initials.
(Though the name AUTQ IT was the one used in the initial
proposal, HI'AUI%IAT will be the form used henceforth in this
history.)
**The misleading name proposed for the expanded D/GP organi-
zation was intended to provide cover for the operation and
to discourage association of what was going on in HMUICIMAT
with photography. In the planning stages, AUMMNT was simi-
larly used to refer to the photography expected from Project
AQUATOIE. 193
consonants. Lundahl's good-natured plaint to
name, which commenced with a vowel, to be prefixed by two
*According to Lundahl, it was he who chose the name AUTOIAT
for the new organization. With considerable foresight, he
envisaged the operation as the 11orn and Hardart of the Intelli-
gence Community, with its doors never tightly closed and with
customers going in and out, day and night. By the time secu-
rity approved it, however, the name had been transformed to
HrAUTaMT. Ostensibly, specifications called for the original
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control of the Director, OCR.* Together, these would consti-
tute Project HTAUT AT. The Office of Statistical Research
would be staffed by 92 persons, mostly photo interpreters,
organized, save for the addition of an Administrative Staff,
in the same major components as the 44 man T/0, except that
each of the operating branches would now be called a division.
The OCR Information Register would consist of 53 positions
in three branches, Support, Technical, and Information. Thirty-
three of the 145 positions in HTA would be transferred from
the ORR T/O,** and the remaining 112 would be in addition to
the current ceiling authorized for the DDI.
It was expected that the financial requirements for the
proposed operation would be approximately for the
remainder of FY 56. Of this total, about was for
personal services and the rest mostly for equipment. The
DDI indicated that he was prepared to absorb the above amount
in the FY 56 allocation to the DDI area. 194/
Approval of the augmented PI capability envisaged in the
foregoing proposal, with one major and a few minor changes,
*This proposal was drafted byl I of OCR.
**The difference between the 33 positions and the existing 44-man
D/GP T/O represented the 11 positions whose disposition the DDI
left in the hands of Guthe, who chose to freeze than in the D/GP
T/O.
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was obtained on 21 January 1956 (Figure 7). The major change
involved rejection of the proposal to elevate the division to
office level. D/GP it would remain, at least for the present,
and the proposed operating divisions would still be branches. 195
Several circumstances doubtlessly contributed to the scaling
down of the proposed hierarchical position of the PI cm1ponent.
Most obvious was uncertainty as to the initial success or ulti-
mate duration of the U-2 program. Another was the doubtful
wisdom of vaulting a highly promising but shall operation,
consisting of only 14 Agency photo interpreters at the time
of the proposal, to office status before it had even attained
the normal size of other GRA divisions. Moreover, the problem
of thus removing D/GP fran under control of two echelons of
management and declaring it the organizational equal of ORR
and other offices would, under the circumstances, have been
a challenging coup to execute. in spite of the revisions,
however, the proposal succeeded in dramatizing the importance
and promise of the new operation and, perhaps most of all,
the high degree of confidence that Amory placed in the value
of photo interpretation in general, and in Lundahl and his
staff in particular.
Though the exact date when U-2 operational photography
might arrive was, to say the least, uncertain, there was one
thing about which there was no room for doubt. The pace of
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recruitment and of new arrivals would have to be increased
if D/GP were to be ready to cope with the complex tasks
involved in handling, processing and exploiting U-2 materials.
Fortunately, the pace did quicken.
Although there were only 17 professionals in D/GP on
31 December 1955, including one military liaison offices, the
number increased to 41, including
56. 196 A new military liaison officer,
by the end of FY
joined the organization during this time and
played an important role in research and development during
the FTA and PIC years. *
25X1
25X1
Incidental
ly, as preparatio
ns for e
xp
loitation of AQUATONE
0
materials became
more critical, t
he small
D
/GP task force, con-
sisting of
which supported 25X1
25X1
AQUATONE, was di
ssolved, and
turned to
25X1
full-time work i
n preparation for
Ii'TA. 19
7
Even
who had been on the AQUATONE T/O, became deeply involved in
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planning for utilization of space in the Steuart building and
transferred to the D/GP table of organization.* 198
The PI element was not alone in having its proposed
hierarchical position scaled downward. The proposed OCR
Information Register, with its three branches, suffered a
similar fate. It emerged as the Statistical Branch, Special
Register, OCR, and its proposed three branches became sections. 199
To a much greater degree than in the PI element, however, grades
of key positions in the Statistical Branch were revised down-
ward. 200/ As in the case of the PI element, there was no
change in the proposed number of positions, 53. 201
Though personnel in the Statistical Branch remained under
the administrative control of OCR throughout F1TA years, it is
interesting to note something of the organization and' the people
involved because of their close working relations with HTA and
their operational identity with it. Indeed, it would be diffi-
cult to overemphasize the importance of the relationship or
the ramifications of its influence on the evolution of photo
interpretation in the Agency and, ultimately, in the Intelli-
gence Caimunity.
Most important, as far as HTA was concerned, was the
role played by the Information Section, headed by Dino Brugioni,
*Acquisition of space in the Steuart building is discussed on. Pages
173 and 174.
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in making possible the development of an all-source photo
exploitation capability. Ever since the establishment of
D/GP, great emphasis had been placed on the need in the
Agency for photographic intelligence as opposed to photo-
graphic interpretation data. One of the cardinal points in
this connection had been the definitive importance ascribed
to CC1INT as a collateral source of information for photo
interpreters. Until HTA, however, the attairi?rent of an all-
source capability had proven extremely elusive, and only
limited progress toward it had been realized.
In another major sense the Statistical Branch left its
mark on its host, which thenceforth would never be the same.
With the exception of editorial work, which was still only
a. gleam in the eye of D/GP, and graphics work, which existed
in only a rudimentary form,* the statistical Branch was
the vehicle for implementing the concept of specialized non-PI
support for photo interpreters and photogranmetrists. Not
only was this reflected in collateral support provided by the
*At this early date, there were no editors in D/GP, and the
only hint for the future was the inclusion of slots for two
GS-13 editors, one each in the Industrial and Geographic
divisions, in the 2 December 1955 proposal for FPTA. The
limited graphics capability existing in the division at
this time consisted of occasional jobs done by the Pi's
themselves -- or those among the PI's who were able to do
them. In the 2 December 1955 proposal, provision was made
for four draftsmen in the "Special Projects Division." 3L2/
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Information section, but it also appeared in the form of
the photo lab, of information storage and retrieval, and of
printing support, as well as in services provided for the
controlling and filing of film and the control and dissemi-
nation of PI documents.
Though only a beginning, the establishment of a large
organization to support the PI's was a step that had critical
long-range implications. It would be incorrect to assum
that this decision was based primarily on the assumption that
it was best to relieve the PI'S of as many non-interpretative
tasks as possible, even at the risk of ultimately causing them
to be far outnumbered by support personnel. Most basic of all
factors, and one over which D/GP managers had no control, was
the highly sensitive nature of U-2 materials and the rigid
compartzt ntation to which they were subjected. This alone
required separate control and storage of film, a separate photo-
graphic laboratory, and separate reproduction and dissemination
facilities.
Less important at the outset, but of increasing importance
as time went on, was the speed with which the operation was
overtaken by onrushing technological developments. At first
it was only Minicard, but before long it would be microstereo-
scopes, ccar arators, computers, and a whole host of sophisticated
equipment hardly appropriate for developing and/or servicing by
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photo interpreters. Whatever the personal preferences of
those responsible for the planning and functioning of D/GP,
whether they behaved as technical innovaters, prudent managers,
or only as harried taxpayers, they were locked into a system
that demanded a large measure of support for the photo analysts.
Their latitude of choice was decidedly limited, and by no means
admitted of substantially reducing support services by adminis-
trative fiat at such future time as they might be deemed to
have become too burdensome.
In calling the support element the Statistical Branch,
as opposed to D/GP, which would remain a division, as well as
in downgrading key positions in the Statistical Branch, another
precedent was set. Photo interpreters and those who supervised
them and managed the PI operation were clearly judged to merit
higher grades than their counterparts in supporting elements.
Insofar as this was a reflection of the prime importance of
photo interpretation in the organization, and, especially in
the early uncomplicated days, of the lesser skills involved in
the control and handling of film and documents, the distinction
was not only realistic but just. In the future, however, when
some support functions would become quite sophisticated and
involve the develop Tent of skills and expertise roughtly equal
to or even exceeding those of the photo interpreter, the dis-
tinction would prove troublesome. Most difficult of all would
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Included were such stalwarts a~
be the problem of utilizing fairly, and with best advantage
to the organization as a whole, the talents of first-rate
managers developed in support areas who were stigmatized by
the imprint of the support component with which they were
associated. Although this problem was neither as critical
nor as seemingly insoluble as that of keeping a tight rein
on support services, it was to be many years before a non-PI
advanced to occupy a key position in a PI element.
Staffing up the Statistical Branch seemed to present
relatively little difficulty, though a few of the more tech-
nically demanding positions, such as in the photo lab and in
Minicard, created minor problems. The quality, capability,
and dedication of key people assigned to the Statistical Branch
was noteworthy. For this, Lundahl gave great credit to Dr.
James M. Andrews, Chief, Office of Central Reference, who,
according to the former, quickly recognized the overriding
importance of the U-2 program and inueddiately decided to assign
some of his best people to support D/GP in Project HTA1flOAT. 203
G who
who was Chief, Technical Section and doubled as deputy branch
chief during the early months of HM; and Dino A. Brugioni, who
was Chief, Information Section,
served as Chief, Statistical Branch; 204
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C. Teachers and Students.
During FY 56, training involving D/GP personnel consisted
primarily of two types, narcely, training in photo interpretation
given by experienced D/GP photo analysts and routine orientation
given by OTR to the rapidly mounting number of PI recruits.*
Though the division in principle did not abandon the provision
of other training, such as advanced exploitation techniques,
languages, supervision and the like, the pressure of project
work plus the final push to get the organization, the people,
and the new quarters ready for receipt of U-2 materials pre-
cluded all but the most urgent ancillary activities.
The series of photo interpretation courses offered by
D/GP was, by far, the most time consuming and significant as-
pect of division training during this period. Ever since the
founding of D/GP, one of the important assumptions had been
that economic analysts and, insofar as possible, those from
other offices would be trained to do much of the routine photo
interpretation needed in the accomplishment of their daily
tasks. Though one course for analysts had been given in the
fall of 1953, further plans for offering others had been de-
ferred, primarily because of the pressure of other work. With
*The D/GP photo interpretation course was offered in coordina-
tion with the office of Training.
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the prospect of a huge influx of high resolution current
photography covering some of the highest priority Soviet
targets, as well as the predictable future preoccupation of
D/GP with the exploitation of U-2 materials, a new attempt
was made to get the long deferred PI course under way again.
Though the validity of some of the earlier assertions oon-
cerning the practicability of having intelligence analysts
do most of their own photo interpretation was, by now, highly
suspect, eight offerings of the course were made during FY
56 to a total of approximately 125 students. 205
The first offering of the new course, entitled the
"Industrial Photographic Intelligence Course," ran fran 12
July through 5 August 1955. It net on Tuesday and Thursday
mornings from 0845 to 1200 hours in Room 1128-32 M Building;
on Friday, 5 August, the class took an all-day field trip to
the Esso petroleum refinery in Baltimore. 2L6/ Total class
time, exclusive of a 15-minute coffee break each day, was,
thus, 32 hours. The student body comprised 12 from ORR and
6 from the OCD Industrial Register.
The title of the course and the composition of the class,
which, incidentally, had both and his Special Assistant
as auditors, 207/ reflected past commitments to train economic
analysts in the fundamentals of photo interpretation as well
as the preoccupation with serving, first of all, the needs of.
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the parent office, ORR. Chief of the D/GP
Industrial Branch, was in charge of organizing the course
and managing the first offering. Other D/GP Pi's assisted
by giving class presentations in their fields of special
corn etence. The choice ofwas certainly appropriate.
Most of the students were functional analysts whose chief
interests and responsibilities were in the industrial field.
Moreover, for years before coming to CIA had been
Chief of the Training Department at Navy PIC.
The announced purpose of the course was threefold:
(a) to teach functional analysts to do basic interpretation
of industrial installations imaged on photography; (b) to
dem nstrate the capabilities and limitations of photography
as a source of intelligence; and (c) to acquaint functional
analysts with the types of services available in the Photo
Intelligence Division. 208 These objectives continued with-
out change during the remainder of the pre-HM period.
Compared with the basic photo interpretation course
offered in the fall of 1953, this one provided 60 percent
more class time plus an 8-hour field trip at the end. The
latter, in one form or another, was to become an almost
standard feature of D/GP PI courses, since it afforded stu-
dents an opportunity to see first hand one or more types of
targets that they were learning to interpret on aerial photog-
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was given serious consideration. 211 in September
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raphy. Essentially all the additional class hours were
devoted to an elaboration of photographic services and PI
techniques far beyond those offered in the earlier course.
There were also same changes in the industries studied as
well as in the time allocated to industries ca=n to both
courses. Thus, aircraft and ships, and industrial plants
producing them, were added to the July 1955 course, and che-
mical explosives were dropped. There was also a 50 percent
increase in tine allocated to study of the coke, iron and
steel, and petroleum industries. In spite of the strong
reconma.ndation in 1953 that pore class time be spent inter-
preting photography, most of the increase in class time was
allocated to ancillary subjects, such as photo intelligence
services in CIA and DoD,,and to PI-related tasks, such as
map reading and the plotting of photo coverage. Doubtlessly
the course changes reflected the philosophy and past experience
of~ who had brought many teaching aids with him from
Navy PIC and could borrow additional needed materials from
his old associates. 209
Reactions from those attending the course were very
favorable, and interest in a oon~arable one geared to somewhat
different needs was reported from OSI and DDP. 210 Indeed,
the planning of a PI course for other than economic analysts
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who had briefly replaced
as the principal instructor
during the summer, was, in turn, expected to be replaced by
Walker so that could carenence developing a course on
"geographic" photo intelligence. 212 Pressure of regular work
in the division, however, made impracticable allocation of the
time necessary to offer the "geographic" course, and no such
course was offered at this time. The fact that the prospective
students would be drawn largely from outside ORR doubtlessly
also entered into the decision.
In spite of the earnest attempt to teach functional
analysts to do their own interpretation, there is no indication
that the course succeeded in any substantial measure in attain-
ing this objective. To dabble in the interpretation of excel-
lent, relatively large-scale coverage of targets of high in-
terest to the analyst was admittedly fascinating. When it
came to getting the answers to critically important questions
based on photography and to documenting them, fascination
apparently turned to uncertainty and, in many cases, boredom.
It was undeniably exciting, for example, to see what appeared
to be air frame components in a plant yard, but what were their
dimensions -- on oblique photography of only fair-to-good
quality? And could they be identified, from their dimensions
and the details of their configuration, with the Mod I or the
Mod II version of the aircraft? Or would the details, as
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revealed by analysis of the photography, suggest the first
evidence of the Mod III? Then, too, given repetitive coverage,
there was always the question of when they first appeared.
This obviously involved a search of past coverage and pains-
taking co-rrparison with the most recent photography. At some
point very early in the process, most functional analysts
apparently -- and with good reason - reached the conclusion
that either (a) they needed help, or (b) there were other
tasks much better suited to their talents, or (c) both.
If the course failed substantially to attain its chief
objective, it did succeed in the other two. Though fairly
superficial, the course was adequate to introduce functional
analysts to some of the more obvious capabilities and limita-
tiors of the photographic source. N.oreo'er, in these early
years, when few functional analysts had any familiarity with
the interpretation of photography - particularly aerial photog-
raphy - much less the more sophisticated techniques for
analyzing it, the importance of such an introduction to the
subject was probably greater than most persons realized. The
arrival of U-2 photography would project these same analysts
into a position of levying requirements for information and,
once they got it, of using it astutely. To do so without
creating chaos demanded some slight experience factor in
dealing with aerial photography. Then, too, photo analysts
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and functional analysts would have to work together produc-
tively. The reservoir of functional analysts who had taken
the PI Course promised some smoothing of problems at this
interface.
In the same measure, knowledge of the types of services
available from the Photo Intelligence Division also helped.
This was particularly true in approaching the solution of the
more difficult technical problems, such as those associated
with mensuration,. or the exploitation potential of photography
having varying degrees of obliquity or image degradation.
Though D/GP continued to offer the photo interpretation
course in one form or another for a few more years, these
eight offerings in FY 56 represented the high-water mark of
such activity by D/GP. The proposition that functional analysts
should learn to do most of the photo interpretation needed in
their daily work soon became a dead issue, except for occasional
resurrection by senior managers as a possible solution to coordi-
nation or staffing problems. As for the analysts, most of them
opted out.
D. Publications in Transition.
In July 1955, the Chief, Geographic
Area, initiated an examination of photo intelligence reporting
by D/GP to. develop recommendations that would result in ". .
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greater community utilization of the PI product by essentially
changing it from a custanmade job in answer to a specific
request to reports that are usable by other consumers as well." 213
The conflict of objectives implicit in this statement was, inci-
dentally, to be a recurring phenomenon in later years. The ten-
dency for photo interpreters to see only the need to communicate
with the requester, with whose interest and preferences they
were usually intimately acquainted through working-level contacts,
would by no means be solved once and for all at this time. Like-
wise, the temptation to use technical jargon in PI reporting
would triumph on many future occasions, though the struggle to
serve the generalist as well as the specialist would also con-
During the summer of 1955
assigned
bf ORR's Geography Division to survey D/GP publications 25X1
and to make suitable recommendations. 3L4/. The results of her
survey consisted of several pages of informal data and rec -
tions on a variety of subjects. 2L5/ Each of the
~Uggestions,
whether major or minor, was based on the existence of a problem
or a prevailing practice susceptible to improvement. in many
cases, what was called for was only a uniform application of
solutions or conventions already in use in the division, since
under prevailing practices each individual was either privileged
or obliged to exercise his own judgment in many matters relating
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to the preparation for publication of the results of his
analysis. This was not surprising, since the division had
neither editors nor approved style guidelines.
Among her specific points, questioned the con-
sistency in usage of the ubiquitous PI terms "possible" and
"probable" and attenated to relate them to other qualifiers.
IitrovemP.nt in this area was initially very limited, and it
was to be several years before preparation of a glossary of
PI terms, compiled by the National Photographic Interpretation
Center, would set the stage for the achievement of measurable
progress in the consistent use of such terms for hedging inter-
pretations.
One of the recoimendations was for the establishment of
two distinct publications formats, one for a "complete" GP/I
and the other for a one-page memo that simply reported receipt
of a requirement and its fulfillment. The latter type of
report was very common in the case of DDP projects, where the
detailed data and results went only in one original copy to
the requester. It was also common, for record purposes, in
reporting on highly classified or confidential jobs done for
other requesters. The "complete" GP/I, as defined by the terms
of reference in the recomt endations, comprised all other PI
reports.
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Another recommendation dealt with covers. Up to this
time, some GP/I's had covers, some did not. Moreover, there
were several varieties of covers, all hand-made as regards
titling and any other cover information. For the future,
uniform, front covers were suggested, together with two types
of back covers, one the conventional type, the other a folding
cover. The latter was intended to accommodate the incorporation
of large photographs in PI reports. In addition, the ntrbering
of individual copies was proposed, as well as the initiation
of distribution lists for each publication with a record of
which copy, by number, went to each recipient.
Among the more detailed recatrnandations were several
pertaining to graphics, especially in regard to the presenta-
bility and readability of annotated photographs. With guidance
from of the Cartography Division, the report
urged the cropping of photographs to eliminate areas of no
interest and enlargement of the rest; the use of ad-type paper*
for photographs blown up to dimensions exceeding those of the
report format, so as to permit folding; the use of stick-up**
*Ad-type photographic paper has a matte (dull) finish and can
be folded without damaging the image.
**Stick-up consists of lettering or symbols printed on trans-
parent material and backed by a beeswax adhesive that sticks
to the graphic after burnishing.
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rather than Leroy lettering* for neater annotations; and the
removal of legend boxes from the image area of the photograph.
Offset reproduction was also suggested for photographs. Detailed
carts were made on the presentation of the text. Most of
these dealt with consistency and the application of the rules
given in the GPO Style Manual.
Generally speaking, an examination of D/GP publications
subsequent to the
reco andations fails to reveal much
evidence that they had any iirurediate effect. Probably, the
basic similarity of requirements handled and PI reports pro-
duced prior to the activation of HTA eliminated any compelling
cause for change. Moreover, key personnel in the division al-
most certainly were far more urgently concerned over prepara-
tions for the receipt and exploitation of U-2 materials than
they were over improvement of existing publications. The
most significant contribution of the survey was its
critical assessment of D/GP publications just a few months
prior to the tine when the need-for publishing photo intelli-
gence from U-2 materials would make a fresh approach imperative.
*Leroy lettering is done with the aid of a template and specially
designed pen.
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E. P:ioto L7tcrpretation Projects.
The Photo Intelligence Division had served the Agency
well during the spring of 1955, and there was no subsequent
letdown. It was as though D/GP was at last carmancing to
small big business. The division chief was a dynamic and
persuasive leader. A cadre of experienced PI's had been
painstakingly assembled and well oriented in the work of the
division, and every man in D/GP was a believer in the power
of photo interpretation. Recent successes in support of current
intelligence in the Far East had by no mans exhausted that
vein of material. Guided missiles intelligence, which had
until now eluded the grasp of the PI's, was about to oome on
stream. Standing apart from and towering above the ongoing
project work was support. to Project A ATONE and plans for
the exploitation of U-2 photography. In the latter area, the
pace was increasing and work was entering more urgent and
exciting phases. Moreover, as the months went by, the cur-
tain was being carefully parted, slightly at first, to reveal
to division PI's scene glimpses of their challenging future.
Among the information disseminated by D/GP in the spring
of 1955 was a small item on possible railroad construction in
the Nan-ping area of China. A one-page photo intelligence
memorandum published in May cautiously reported evidence of
survey work and right-of-way clearing along the northeast
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about the interpretation, there was none in the mind of
bank of the Sha Chi (River). 3L6/ No such evidence was pre-
sent on the next earlier photography, dated December 1953.
On the basis of the pattern of earth scars, this PI memorandum
further suggested that, if a railroad were being constructed,
it might split southwest of Nan-ping, with one branch going to
Foochow and the other to Amoy. Though this initial mennrandtttn
was couched in terms that suggested considerable uncertainty
who made the discovery. The caution reflected in
0
the reporting was partly in deference to area analysts who
were not ready to accept an interpretation obvious to an
experienced PI, and partly a hedge by the division to elimi-
nate the slightest risk that an interpretation based on fairly
skimpy evidence might prove to be wrong. '217
and other division photo analysts continued to
watch developments for more than a year. Six weeks after the
original memorandum, another photo intelligence memorandum
reported that, on the basis of 8 June 1955 photography, the
railroad construction was confirmed. 28 This more extensive
aerial coverage revealed survey lines, right-of-way clearance,
and preliminary grading for a distance of 65 miles, nearly
twice that observed on the 28 April photography. It was
further suggested that the line might extend north to Kueichi,
on the Chekiang-Kiangsi rail line, though it was admitted that
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lack of photo coverage precluded confirmation of this specu-
lation.
These early reports begot further photo coverage of key
areas. D/GP continued to watch. In September, the division
reported evidence, on photography of 11 and 14 August, of 175
miles of survey and construction work, nearly tripling the
previous figure. A large part of this increase resulted from
new coverage north of Nan-ping, which confirmed the earlier
hypothesis that the new line would, indeed, join with the
Chekiang-Kiangsi rail line, thus creating a connection between
the latter rail line and Amoy via Nan-ping (Figure 8). Con-
struction on the segment north of Nan-ping, which was supported
by at least eight construction cantos, was more advanced than
elsewhere, and included what appeared to be tunneling at three
points. 219
The first evidence of construction on the predicted Nan-
ping -- Fu-chou rail line was reported by D/GP in April 1956. 220
A few weeks later another 9.5 miles of survey traces along the
course of this same rail line, as well as many details of right-
of-way and construction at the Amy end of the Ying-tan -- Amoy
rail line, were reported. 221 Photo coverage of 8 June 1956
showed rapid progress on all remaining incomplete sections of
the latter rail line. 222
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This analysis and reporting on railroad construction
in southern China, opposite the island of Formosa, was not
only a considerable substantive contribution but, even more,
it was a derronstration to all concerned of the value of an
imaginative and sustained effort directed by competent photo
analysts to the solution of an intelligence problem. The
initial evidence was only a fragment. Nevertheless, the
photo analyst not only identified it as something worth his
attention, but he also related it to a cultural feature,
railroad construction, with which he was familiar. Few per-
sons not versed in photo interpretation would have been able
to make such an association, however tentative. In this case,
the early hypothesis about the ultimate goals of those first
35 miles of survey lines and clearing proved to be a stunning
success.
The manner in which the story unfolded was also a lesson
in photo analysis techniques. Upon discovering the construc-
tion, the PI attempted to determine approximately when it
commenced. He did this by examining earlier photography of
the same area and establishing a "negation date," the date
of the most recent coverage which revealed no such activity.
Obviously, construction would have begun scare time between
the "negation date" and the date of the photography on which
it first appeared. The informed speculation of the photo
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analyst about the supposed destination of the apparent rail
line was productive in two ways: (a) it alerted the functional
analyst to the possible significance of the discovery; and
(b) it helped set in motion and direct further productive
collection efforts. Finally, the persistent attempt to dis-
cover the missing pieces and to monitor progress in construc-
tion work already observed demonstrated the ability of photo
analysts to search out the evidence and bring it to bear on
the solution to the emerging problem. Successes such as this
could not fail to attract attention and to convince other
intelligence officers that there was something more to photo
interpretation than the mere identification and positioning
of potential bombing targets.
The fall of 1955 also saw a breakthrough in the appli-
cation of photography to the production of intelligence on
Soviet guided missile installations. Heretofore, little
success had been realized in this aspect of photo intelli-
gence, primarily because of lack of suitable photographic
coverage. Projects identified as MAISAM and MNAM II had
been established in D/GP, the first in February 1954 and the
second in June 1954, to provide such support. The most sig-
nificant of the early accomplishments resulting from work on
these projects was a theoretical paper stating mini= scales
needed for (a) identification, and (b) technical description
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of components of a guided missile test range imaged on
photography of optimum quality. Bearing the title, Operation
CABBAGE PATCH (MANANA), this photo intelligence memorandum
was issued in August 1954. 223/
A year later, circumstances were changing rapidly. Ac-
quisition of photography covering certain of the defensive
missile sites west and southwest of Moscow, on air routes into
the city, provided D/GP the opportunity to show CIA and the
Intelligence Ca nnuLity what D/GP photo analysts could do. A
small team of PI's consisting of
Chief, Industrial 25X1
Branch and
to provide 25X1
mensuration support, tackled the problem. None was expert in
the interpretation of aerial photography of missile sites,
for there were as yet no experts in that field. Indeed, they
were starting almost from scratch. There were no PI keys to
the subject, no earlier landmark PI reports. 224/
Lacking specialized expertise or precedent, they had
one invaluable asset -- their determination to succeed. Fol-
lowing the well established D/GP policy of using all available
sources of information, the team made a trip to Dayton, Ohio,
to review what technical information was there on the guided
missile installations around Moscow. 225 In Washington, a
limited amount of collateral information, based primarily on
ground observations, was made available to the team by missile
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analysts and by OCR collateral researchers, 226/ with whom
division personnel were establishing ever closer working
relations.
The job was not an easy one. Most of the photographic
prints were from negatives copied from other prints. All
prints were enlargements, and on rrost.of them cropping had
eliminated the horizon trace. Even on those where the hori-
zon was present, quality was so poor as to preclude its accu-
rate determination. Focal.. length of the camera usedwas.un-
know, and the enlargement factor for the prints was uncertain.
Finally, not all prints covering the area surrounding the in-
stallations themselves were included in the photographic in-
puts available to D/GP.
The first photography was received in August 1955, and
the remainder trickled in intermittently as work progressed.
The report, entitled Missile Launching Sites in the Moscow
Area, 227/ was issued on'23 October 1955. Considering the
oa,:~arehensive nature of the job and the formidable interpre-
tation and mensuration problems involved, this must have set
a record for speed of publication for a PI report consisting
of 13 legal-size pages of text and six appendixes, including
maps, line drawings, and perspective sketches.*
*This report was published at the Top Secret level and con-
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The report pointed out (1) that the seven launch sites
covered by the photography fell on arcs of two concentric
circles centered approximately on the Kremlin and at distances
of approximately 30 and 50 statute miles from Moscow; (2) that
each launch complex consisted of a launch site, a Yo-Yo* bunker,
and a barracks area; (3) that the Yo-Yo bunker was always lo-
cated on the Moscow side of the launch site, and that an imagi-
nary line drawn along the center road of the launch site would
pass through the Yo-Yo and on through Moscow; and (4) that the
launch bays were always on the Moscow side of the transverse
roads serving the launch points. It pointed out that each
launch site probably had 60 launch points. The report further
predicted that, on the basis of spacing observed between the
four contiguous sites in the southern quadrant of the outer
ring and the three contiguous sites in the same quadrant of
the inner ring, there were approximately 60 missile sites
it was to be reproduced were cleared out, and 0 and 25X1
trolled within the.SEISINT system. ~ has vivid recol- 25X1
lections of the bizarre circumstances connected with repro-
duction of the report. Material for duplication was carried
to the reproduction facility in another 25X1
building under armed guard. All personnel in the area where
personally duplicated the materials. They then re- 25X1
turned, with their armed guard, to D/GP quarters in Que Building,
where they assembled copies of the publication. 228/
It is believed that the name Yo-Yo was first applied in D/GP. 229
According to recollection, the configuration of this 25X1
radar reminded division photo analysts of a Yo-Yo-
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deployed around Moscow, 24 sites on the inner ring and 30 on
the outer ring. 230
The impact of this prediction was electrifying. With
the prospect of something like 60 missile sites having 3600
launch points clustered around the Soviet capital, cheek by
jowl and in two rows, contingent plans for massed air attack,
even with high-flying jet bombers, had to be reconsidered.
This PI report, the most comprehensive and thought-provoking
to that date on the Moscow defense system, established the cre-
dentials of D/GP as a leading producer of photo intelligence
in the field of guided missiles.
Participation by the Photo Intelligence Division in
Project GERIX was another activity worthy of note during
this period. GETRIX was the name of an Air Force program
designed to collect aerial photography, primarily over the
Soviet Union and Communist China, by use of balloons. Huge
plastic balloons released in Scotland, Norway, Germany, and
Turkey 231/ were expected to transit the USSR and/or China
carried by prevailing westerly air currents in the upper
troposphere. Though they were instrumented to parachute their
loads to earth whenever they dropped below 30,000 feet, it
was believed that a majority of then would succeed in reaching
the Pacific, where they could be captured in the air, using
a line and hook with which each payload was equipped, or by
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retrieval from the ocean. long other instruments, the
balloons carried cameras* with a nominal focal length of
six inches. At an average expected altitude of 45,000
feet, the photography would have a scale of about 1:90,000.
Individual frames would measure 9 by 9 inches, a format
co-h= to many aerial ca ras of the day. 233
Designed primarily as a system to collect information
for targeting and the production of maps and charts, initial
exploitation was carried out at the Aeronautical
Chart and Information Center in St. Louis, Missouri. During
the previous several years, 'however, the Central intelligence
Agency had cooperated with the Air Force in bringing the
collection system to operational readiness.** Accordingly,
the Agency was invited to participate in exploitation of the
photography, an invitation that was accepted with alacrity. 2L5/
From the D/GP point of view, this would not only ensure access
to this new and exciting photography, but it would also provide
an opportunity for most, if not all, division PI's to try their
*As regards several features incorporated in the optical
design, these cameras were forerunners of the ones used several
years later in the al-4 system, 232 the first American satellite
photo reconnaissance system. Plans for retrieving parachuting
GE,i\ir.T payloads also foreshadowed recovery of the photographic
packages parachuted from satellites.
* DAD/Collection, Office of Scientific Intelli-
gence, was the author of an excellent sizrirary of Agency parti-
cipation in the development of the GE TRD system. 234
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hand at interpreting it. CIA proposed that one man be
assigned full time, beginning with the organizational phase
of the work, to provide continuity of CIA participation, and
that others be sent to St. Louis on a rotational basis, the
timing and n Taber to be determined by the success of the
collection effort and the duration and amount of the resulting
exploitation work. 236/
was the man chosen by D/GP for continuous
USAF', the Director of Project JACEPOT.* 237 All D/GP profes-
panied by~ who introduced
service. He arrived in St. Louis on 6 December 1955, acconr
sionals except
were included on the roster of those
available to participate, 239/ though only a few, most notably
sawn ch service on rotation.
D/GP PI's contributed to the three types of reports issued by
ACIC: an initial PI report (IPIR) primarily tailored to the
needs of SAC; a periodic report which suamarized information
contained in IPIR's for a given period and arranged it by
jet-navigation-chart areas; and a geographic position report
and other D/GP participants were assigned to
the photo interpretation unit, under
had been in St. Louis several weeks earlier
to be briefed on details of Project JACKPOT, the name given the
exploitation phase of GFNETRIX conducted at ACIC. 238
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intended to satisfy requirements for immediate location
data on coverage by each mission. 240 D/GP participants
worked shoulder-to-shoulder with Pi's from the military
services, but were free to forward directly any information
judged to be of particular interest to CIA. 241 Back in
Washington, D/GP issued memoranda consisting of mission-
coverage information keyed to maps of Asia and surrounding
areas for use by Agency analysts in levying requirements. 242
The brevity of the program, coupled with its distinctly
lime; ted success in covering installations of strategic interest with the exception of airfields -- led to the termination of
D/GP participation at St. Louis in just a few months.* GENETRDC
photography continued to be exploited within D/GP and the
later HTA, however. It was in this phase that some of the
most significant D/GP contributions were made. Probably the
most important of these, and certainly the one having the most
far-reaching influence as well as the most durable value, was
*The project ended early in 1956 following a blizzard of pro-
tests over the balloons from numerous nations in the Soviet
Bloc. US claims that the balloons were being employed in
meteorological research seemed disingenuous in the face of
the kind of hardware, including cameras with exposed film, that
dropped out of the skies all the way from Eastern Europe to
Japan. Newspapers and news magazines of the period carried
numerous items and interpretive reports on the US "meteorological
research" balloons and the barrage of complaints they evoked
from countries whose airspace they entered.
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a Photographic intelligence M ranr zn entitled, SpeeiaZ
Installation Near Krasnoyarsk, USSR (Dodonovo Complex). 243
Based primarily on G`r.rTRIX photography of 1 January
1956, this publication, the work of of the
industrial Division, reported in great detail the components
of a vast industrial c=plex that stretched for song 18 miles
along the Yenisey River, 28 Hiles northeast of Krasnoyarsk
(Figure 9). Though the function of the installation, which was
still in the process of developrant, was not specified, it was
suspected to be an atomic energy ccmplex. Even with the passing
of years, the function of the installation, now generally tagged
with the Basic Encyclopedia name "Dodonovo Atomic Lnergy Car 1ex"
is still a matter of dispute. moreover, in 1971, after some
100 photographic coverages, the 1956 G&4= photography is
still used by NPIC Pi's for base-line reporting, i.e., the
starting point from which the continuing changes and expansion
of the installation are determined. Indeed, sane Center Pi's
rate the interpretability of the GMETRIX photography better than
F. Preparations for Exploiting U-2 Materials.
During FY 1956, D/GP became increasingly O=mitted to
preparations for the exploitation of U-2 photography. This
involved much more than a new table of organization, additional
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PI's, and a proportional increase in space to house them.
The I-fl operation would be a whole new ball game. The photo-
graphy and products resulting from its exploitation would
be very closely held. In format, scale, and resolution, the
photography would be significantly different from that to
which D/GP photo analysts had become accustomed. Relations
between D/GP and other components in the Intelligence Ccrn-
munity would be expanded. Instead of deferentially seeking
out photography to use in answering Agency requirements,
D/GP had to prepare to become the prime recipient of the
hottest aerial coverage yet obtained and, under the guise
of taw,'Mnza, to do first-phase reporting for the entire
Intelligence Corrmunity.
The most basic change was in the sensitivity of the
material to be handled. Indeed, a whole new security system,
the TALENT system, was devised to ensure the desired degree
of compartmentation. All U-2 photography and the products
derived fran it, whether in D/GP or elsewhere in the Intel-
ligence Catmunity, would be handled within the TALENT control
system. 244/
The creation of the new security system had profound
ramifications for D/GP planners. Possession of a TALEDTT
clearance became a prerequisite for division employees and
all future recruits. Space was also a problem. The question.
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was not merely to find space for 145 people, but how to do
so without attracting undesirable attention fro n curious
observers. Once within suitable quarters, the division
faced the problem of providing secure handling for massive
quantities of highly visible graphic materials, particularly
photography. When the solution to that problem was found,
there was the painstaking drudgery of devising and writing
seemingly endless procedures for internal utilization as well
as for dissemination outside the building of everything fresh
incoming photography to outgoing intelligence products. *
Clearing division personnel, though a matter of internal
interest, was, of course, not the responsibility of the divi-
sion. The other matters involved D/GP more directly.
Space was found in the Steuart Motors building at 5th
St. and New York Ave., N.W. Here, on the upper floors of a
shabby edifice situated just three blocks from the Gospel
Mission, the operation was far removed frcen knowledgeable
intellectuals who might, without benefit of proper clearance,
come uncomfortably close to divining what was keeping so
many people busy around the clock. Moreover, the 55,000 square
*Of the many manuals and procedural papers prepared for internal
operations, copies of only a few are still extant. Two that are
still available serve as examples of these papers and, inciden-
tally, reveal the fine details of certain aspects of the pro-
jected HTA operation. 245/
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feet of floor space provided room for expansion for the
foreseeable future. Secure handling and storage of material
was facilitated by vaulting PI work areas. Though denizens
of the neighborhood were unlikely to speculate informatively
about the type of work going on in the upper floors of the
building, the windows there with ADT tape on them were
repeatedly the object of con-ment by local residents and
businessn-en.
The characteristics of the photography also differed
from those of materials with which D/GP photo analysts were
familiar. Photographic inputs were expected to be taken at
an altitude of approximately 70,000 feet with a lens having
a nominal focal length of two feet.* The resulting scale
on vertical exposures would, thus, be about 1:35,000. This
was, for the time, exceedingly arall-scale material from
which to attempt to extract technical details of military
installations and developments at Soviet R&D centers. There
was one mitigating circumstance. Even though the scale was
small, the ground resolution was expected to be high,
*This was the A-2 camera configuration which featured three
cameras in a fixed-fan mount. One camera was vertical, another
had 370 left tilt, and the third 370 right tilt. 246
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Trading off scale for .resolution introduced other
problems, however. Viewing equipment with improved magni-
fication and better optics than those afforded by the fold-
ing pocket stereoscope would ultimately be needed to study
the photography, whether as prints or transparencies. Repro-
duction of installations and objects of special interest for
reporting purposes, either as briefing boards or illustrations
in reports, would require the best obtainable enlargers and
printers. Metric analysis of this small-scale, high-resolu-
tion photography would not only require precise data on the
location and attitude of the collection platform in space at
the time of each photograph, but also new high-precision
instrntation to realize the potential of the photography
to the fullest extent possible. Moreover, new techniques
would have to be developed to do the mensuration, and, in
the process of developing them, many additional problems
would have to be solved.
Photography expected from U-2 cameras, exclusive of the
tracker, would have a 9 by 18 inch format.* Most aerial photog-
*Thee format of both the A-2 camera, and the B camera, which was not
scheduled for use during early phases of the U-2 program, was 9 by
18 inches. The tracker (charting) camera had a focal length of
three inches, utilized 70 millimeter film, and yielded an exposure
size of approximately 2-1/4 by 10 inches. 248/ Tracker photography,
which was extremely small scale, was used primarily for charting
the course of the mission rather than for intelligence purposes.
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raphy used by the division up to this time had been 9 by 9
inch. Thus each frame would be twice as long. This meant
that viewing equipment used in scanning the photography and
plotting the coverage of targets would need to cover a greater
area in order for pi's to ccn rehend the spatial relationships
of objects imaged on the photography. For viewing roll film,
primarily in the form of duplicate positive transparencies,
a technique that foresighted planners realized was almost
certain to be used in the not too distant future, larger
light tables would be required. Moreover, as prime recipient
of U-2 photography, h1A would be expected to provide to orga-
nizations in the Intelligence Ccxmramity, for their use in
levying requirements, plots of the.areas covered by each
mission and an index to targets judged to be of intelligence
interest. The latter indexes were known as mission review
reports.
Though preparations for and problems associated with
the exploitation of this radically new photography were un-
doubtedly of greatest personal interest to D/GP photo analysts,
a bigger problem for the division, at least in terms of money
and the need for decisions, was the procurement of equipment.
The hottest debate in this field was over Minicard.
Minicard was a system developed by Eastman Kodak to
combine many of the desirable features of both microfilm
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and punched cards. Each Minicard frame, or exposure, was
a small film chip measuring 32 by 16 millimeters and having
on it space for imaging whatever documentary or other material
was to be preserved, plus coded data that would permit manip-
ulation and retrieval of the chip from the file. Assu:ning
the feasibility and effective working of the retrieval aspect
of linicard -- an assumption that was open to some question
in view of the newness of the system -- no unsolvable problems
were involved in photographing in miniature and subsequently
enlarging documents consisting of line work or text. The
prospect of performing the same manipulation on U-2 photog-
raphy was a different proposition, however.
D/GP was extremely reluctant to adopt Minicard for the
storage and reproduction of U-2 photography to be used sub-
sequently by photo analysts and photogrammetrists. The primary
consideration was loss of quality. Quite apart from the prob-
lem of providing a lens suitable for copying photography, as
opposed to line work, there was the inescapable progressive
loss in definition that accompanied each successive generation
of material. There was also concern for the danger inherent in
allowing the whole IOTA operation, exploitation as well as docu-
ment storage and retrieval, to be completely dependent on an
as yet unproven system.
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After several months of strained consideration, Lundahl
recommended to Bissell, on the basis of a D/GP-OCR study,
that the Minicard system not be adopted, but rather that the
storage, retrieval, and duplication of film be done in the
conventional manner while development of Minicard was carried
forward as a parallel operation. 249/ Herbert Miller, who
served as an expediter for Bissell, was personally carrnitted
to the integration of all aspects of the HTA operation with
the Minicard system. Bissell ruled in favor of the Lundahl
reccsrmendation, much to the relief of D/GP planners.
Minicard was not a dead issue, however. Adoption of
the Lundahl recommendation led to the funding, on a more modest
scale, of a pilot system in Rochester. The cost of this develop-
mental work was borne in approximately equal amounts by Project
AQtTTONE and HTAUTCi T. 250/ Though joint work by Eastman and
HTA on use of Minicard for the storage and reproduction of U-2
photography continued for several years, and though HTA did
subsequently obtain Minicard equipment, it was applied primarily
to documents and photo mosaics for reference purposes.
Minicard procurement activity by Project AQt1ATONE personnel
in the summer of 1955 led, incidentally, to the briefing on a
limited basis'of the first OCR personnel made witting of Project
AQUATONE. On 26 August 1955, James A. Cunningham, Administrative
Officer for PCS/DCI, reported to Bissell that the Logistics
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underground had learned of visits by AQUATOIE personnel to
Eastman to see the Minicard. Cunningham informed Bissell that
Amory intended to propose briefing ho had been 25X1
working on procurement of the same system for OCR for over a
year, on AQL%MNE interest in Minicard so as to get the bene-
fit of his judgment. was given a limited AQUAMNE brief- 25X1
ing on 25 August 1955; this was soon followed by a second brief-
ing that included of OCR. 251 25X1
As if the whole host of technical problems related to
the exploitation of U-2 photography were not enough, the new
mission for H IA provided for the continuation of all previous
D/GP functions, plus the addition of in-portant responsibilities
for serving all those organizations and oc ponents in the Intelli-
gence Catnuinity authorized to receive TALE ?I' materials. 3L2/
Thus, H1A would be expected to coamuuaicate to the Cam unity the
results of its exploitation of U-2 photography and to engage in
national reporting. it would plot the photography and provide
mission plots for other users, thereby establishing a precedent
for providing support services to other PI organizations in the
Intelligence ConvirUty. It would be the chief repository of
U-2 photography, and would provide storage and retrieval facil-
ities not only for its own internal use but also as an adjunct
to service to be provided other users outside the Agency. It
would also prepare data on intelligence targets for acquisition
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of additional photographic coverage, and, in this way, play
a role in mission planning. Preparation for all these new
roles was a major activity during late 1955 and early 1956.
Two functions that were already becoming significant
features of D/GP operations were not covered, however, in the
2 December 1955 proposal to create HTAUI MAT. One was the
support being given Project AQUATONE, especially in the develop-
ment and testing phases of the program. This would taper off
substantially, but not end, once the program became operational.
The other was technical support to operations, such as evalu-
ation of film to identify imperfections and, working with
operational and contractor personnel, to explain and remedy
problems before additional missions were flown.
The extensive and,intensive preparations carried out by
D/GP during FY 56 in anticipation of its new responsibilities
fell unequally upon those in the division. Primarily, it was
a matter of clearances, though0 who had a legendary 25X1
capacity for work, never hesitated to take on any and all kinds
of tasks, either in support of AQUATONE or in planning for
IMAJIri1AT. The brunt of the work fell on the task force, but
other D/GP personnel were gradually introduced to plans for
HTAtTOMAT and geared into preparations for it.
In December 1955 Lundahl gave a limited briefing on
Project H'iUTOMAT to certain D/GP branch chiefs and staff
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such. Those briefed were
assistants who had had no previous official word on AQUATONE
or HTAUriOMAT. it is significant to note that he referred to
this as an "AUTOMAT" briefing, rather than one on AWTONE, as
The resume of the briefing which acccopanied the
S
these between 10 and 14 April 1956;
list of those cleared indicated that it consisted entirely of
information concerning the I-UAUTOZ,IAT organization whose creation
had been proposed by Amory on 2 December. 253 Clearly, it was
intended for administrative planning.
In.April 1956, Lundahl gave another briefing for D/GP
personnel, this one covering camera configurations and photog-
raphy. 2L4/ Among those briefed were the supervisory personnel
first introduced to HM in December plus several others, mostly
working PI's and photogramnetrists, a total of 14 persons. In
addition, three OCR personnel who were expected to occupy key
positions in. support of HTAUTCT were given a separate briefing
so as to equip OCR planners to anticipate problems that would
be faced by their personnel in connection with the HTA operation.
The briefing for the D/GP personnel came just as the first
domestic U-2 missions were being flown. There were eight of
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the U-2's covered installations as far east as Birmingham and
Nashville. 255 These were used to familiarize selected division
PI's with U-2 photography and with US industrial and military
analogues of high-priority Soviet installations. In exploiting
the 27,000 feet of film obtained from the domestic missions,
D/GP photo analysts had their first real crack at exploiting
U-2 photography.* They also logged 283 hours of overtime in
the process. 257
While most D/GP photo analysts were only slowly and
sparingly introduced to U-2 photography and operational plans
for HrAU'IU T, those in the task force under
deeply involved not only in support of AQUATONE but also in
planning for exploitation of the resulting photography. At a
time when full operational clearances in D/GP were few and
when the heavy cloak of secrecy surrounding the project demanded
explicit justification for the revelation of every small seg-
ment of new information to those not already witting, the path
of least resistance in getting a job done lay in the direction
of assigning it to those already cleared to do it. Indeed, there
evaluations 3L6/ of test photography in support of AQUATONE.
In no sense, however, could this be considered an indoctrination
of division PI's in the exploitation of U-2 materials.
*For several months the D/GP task force had done technical
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were many who felt that was not above using this
convenient circumstance to restrain further diffusion of
operational information in the division and to consolidate
his own position.
in the fall of 1955, the task force moved, along with
other AQUATONE personnel, from 2210 E Street to Wings A and C,
Quarters Eye. 3.L8/ There was no change in D/GP personnel at
who, since the approval of
the 44-man T/O, were, in effect, the D/GP Special Projects
Branch, .259 still had of the AQU a'OE project 25X1
working with them. They were, however, enlarging the scope of
their work as the success and momentum of the project increased.
Though heavily involved in Minicard during the fall of 1955,
they had a host of othez things to stimulate their interest and
test their endurance.
For example, there were trips 25X1
to confer with project contractors, consultants, and 25X1
operations personnel about the cameras and their functioning, or
the resulting product and its suitability for interpretation.
At the same time, there were problems to be handled concerning
coordination among Hycon, the camera manufacturer, Eastman, the
vendor and processor of the film, and operations personnel. 260
Task force personnel made numerous trips to Eastman Xodak
in Rochester to represent Bissell and Lundahl in discussions
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about many aspects of their joint participation in the pro-
ject. For instance, at a very early stage in the discussions,
of Eastman Kodak served notice on D/GP
representatives that one or more PI Is would be needed during
processing of mission inputs to edit the film and authorize
elimination from the duplication cycle of large quantities
of useless film, such as frames on which nothing but clouds
were imaged. 261 Then, too, there were questions to be.
settled about the handling and shipment of processed film and
photographic prints. 262 There was also an evaluation of the
operational status and current capability of the processing
facility for the Project Operations Officer. 2L3/
By winter and early spring, this type of activity was
beginning to reflect the,initial success of the test phase
and the accelerated preparations for operational readiness.
Procurement of viewing and rectification equipment began to
assume greater inportance'in thinking and planning, 264 though
little of it was actually available at the start of UM opera-
tions. Titling of the film became a high-priority concern 265
and led to no little friction between D/GP representatives and
f Eastman Kodak, a former Army Colonel with a
domineering mien and a proclivity for issuing commands and making
arbitrary decisions. 266 The high interest of the Photo Intelli-
gence Division in this matter stemmed, of course, from the need
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to provide photo data to exploitation personnel in a cat lete
and easily accessible form. There was also growing consideration
of the respective responsibilities and roles of Eastman and 1
in providing film and/or photographic prints to customers other
than major users who would receive the few ozrplete copies of
material from each mission. 3L7/ if MA were to assume responsi-
bility for filling requests for photography of selected instal-
lations, it would require extra funding for the purchase of
laboratory equipment.* It was apparent by late spring, despite
valiant efforts to have the photo lab ready for full production
by the opening of MUM=, that HrA would not immediately be
able to supply photographic prints to the Army and Navy. Accord-
ingly, temporary arrangements were made to have two additional
sets of prints for each mission produced -by Eastman for selective
use by the Army and Navy. 268
Early in 1956, the initial task force under was
augmented by the arrival first of Dino A. Brugioni, and then of
all from OCR. Their basic 25X1
task was to assemble a small working library of maps and collateral
*By early 1956, in all such matters affecting support services
to be provided under the aegis of the OCR Statistical Branch,
joined in the search for
equipment and in deliberations leading to decision making.
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an important characteristic of H TA.
With the phasing out of work on Project GTRIX,
material to support the PI's at such time as the U-2 would
become- operational and exploitation of the resulting photog-
raphy would commence. Very quickly, however, Brugioni also
began to provide close support to in the selection
of targets for missions, both domestic and foreign. This
introduction of collateral support personnel in mission
planning helped fill the very considerable intelligence gaps
in the background of the more technically oriented people in
the D/GP Special Projects Branch and in the AQUNP E project.
It was, indeed, the beginning of a relationship that became
returned from St. Louis and was assigned to the
Special Projects Branch,,where he became the unofficial deputy
25X1
25X1
Soon he was joined by score of the newer D/GP
recruits, including
The OCR contingent was augmented
by the transfer of
269 On or about 17
group, which had outgrown its working space, was moved to Wing
G, Quarters Eye. 270 This was their home until they joined
their fellow HTA workers in the Steuart building a few months
later.
April 1956, before the augmentation was complete, the
The amount of work accoirplished by the small group under.
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building was little short of astounding, in terms of both
scope of coverage and sheer volume. This group, aware of the
historical importance of the work in which they were engaged,
protected by a heavy security blanket, supervised by a driving
taslaraster, and insulated from bureaucratic wrangling and inces-
sant coordination, achieved a level of productivity seldom known
in larger organizations.
during the year prior to the trove into the Steuart
while
and his task force were laboring under the
gun of prospective U-2 inputs, Lundahl was doing the same in a
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different arena. Though he was in frequent contact wire
so as to keep cognizant of task force work, Lundahl was primarily
involved with a growing network of contacts with upper-echelon
managers in the Agency, as well as with AQUA2OIE participants
outside CIA. At first Lundahl's meetings were directed primarily
to planning, but as the project moved into the test phase and
produced its first live photography, the tempo of activity in
creased and the scope of the contacts widened.
In late September 1955, Lundahl was one of a group of key
Agency participants in AQUA= who went to inspect 25X1
the flight-test operation then underway and to familiarize t1r
selves with its problems and with the performance of the system.
The group, which also included the DDCI, Lieutenant General Cabell,
and Richard Bissell, the Special Assistant to the DCI for Planning
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and Coordination, who headed Project AQUAMNE, left Washington
by Agency plane on Sunday, 25 September, on a flight to San
and thence, via a Lockheed corpany aircraft
hhe next day Lundahl had his first glimpse
of the U-2. He saw it take off and land, talked to the pilots,
and examined the placement of the cameras in the plane. He
met Kelly Johnson of Lockheed, who designed the U-2. He also
met of Perkin Elmer, who was the chief photo
engineer on the project, and spent considerable time with him
in the field laboratory examining the photography, which Lundahl
pronounced good. The travelers returned to Washington at mid-
night on 28 September. The next afternoon there was a long
meeting in Cabell's office to assess the results of the trip
and to relate them to anticipated future developments. 27
By November, activity had picked up still further. On
Friday afternoon, 18 November, Lundahl and Angry went to the
office of the DCI, Allen Dulles, where they had a long and
involved discussion concerning the potential of U-2 photography,
the kinds of details that might be discerned, and.the volume of
the expected information. 272 This was the first time that
Lundahl had met with Dulles since he was briefed into the
AQUATONE system the previous December but, considering his
rank as a mere division chief, it was a rather good record
at that.
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November was also marked by conferences with
Administrative Assistant to the DDI, and others
concerning plans for the new central interpretation unit which
were subsequently to be translated into the proposal to create
HTAUIa4LT. There were questions of organizational structure,
of slots and grades, of funding, and of the relationship of
all these things to Project AQUATONE. 273 In view of the
heavy cost of some of the equipment, particularly Minicard,
needed by the new central interpretation unit, the possibility
of some joint funding by Project AQUATONE appeared very attrac-
tive.
Toward the close of the year, introduced
0
For several months previous,
25X1
25X1
Lundahl had been interested in finding a dynamic young man with
some familiarity with photo interpretation and good managerial
potential to serve as Executive officer in the new organization.
Though had no photo interpretation experience, he had many
other qualities that appealed to Lundahl. He was a strapping
young ex-Marine, with a good record in the Agency and at Dart-
mouth College, where he had worked in the Office of the Dean
of Men prior to coming to CIA. As a manager and administrator,
he was much stronger than
Furthermore, in the
hazardous environment typical of any new organization under-
going explosive growth in a competitive field, the
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political acumen needed for self-preservation and for helping
Lundahl guide the new organization._ who had been serving
as a Special Assistant in the Office of the Deputy Director
for Support since June 1955, ccomenced working with Lundahl
and D/GP in November 1955, 274 though he was not officially
transferred to the Photo Intelligence Division as Administrative
Officer until 12 August 1956. 275 The arrival of rounded
out the team of senior division managers primarily responsible
for conceiving, planning, and implementing changes that ultimately
resulted in the transformation of D/GP into a national PI center
staffed by more than a thousand CIA and DoD employees.
Lundahl and his assistants also began to conduct briefings
for representatives from the military services and to confer
with AQIJATG'-cleared military personnel.' One typical briefing
of Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives was held in the
DCI's conference room on 1 February 1956; it dealt with Avla W its organization, its staffing, and its new quarters in the
Steuart building. The persons in attendance were largely those
involved in the preparation of requirements for AQLbATOM col-
lection. 276 The military services were interested not only
from the point of view of participating in the preparation and
ordering of requirements, they were also interested in how they
would fare in sharing and exploiting U-2 photography in ca eti-
tion with CIA.
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The eventual outcome was that the Air Force decided to
remain aloof from HTAUTGIT and the Navy decided to participate
only on a decidedly limited basis. The Army, on the other hand,
chose to join HTA in force, sending both personnel and equipment,
nnich of which would be used jointly with that of the Agency. The
options chosen were not surprising. The Air Force, which had
lost the struggle to control the U-2 program several months after
its conception, had several photo interpretation organizations
and could afford the luxury of going its own way. The Navy had
fewer facilities and PI's, but these included an excellent organi-
zation in the U.S. Navy Photographic Interpretation Center. The
Army, which had established its photo interpretation facility
at Fort Holabird in Baltimore just a year earlier, regarded the
prospect of a cooperative effort most favorably. The resulting
joint operation, involving both Army and Navy, was the first step
in setting the stage for creation of the National Photographic
Interpretation Center four and a half years later.
Security provisions for protecting the expanding AQUATONE
activities were also shaping up. On 15 February 1956, Lundahl,
attended a meeting at which they were first
introduced, by
f the Office
of Security, to the codeword TALM. 277/ The informal but
nevertheless effective arrangements used up until then to guard
project materials and activities from unauthorized exposure would
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no longer be deemed acceptable in view of the forthcoming sharp
increase in the number of persons and volume of materials involved.
Though necessary because of the vastly increased opportunities for
accidental disclosure, the imposition of TAL I' controls inevi-
tably saddled all aspects of project work with a new bureaucracy
and a huge record-keeping operation.
Lundahl visited NSA on 15 March 1956. The relations between
CQimr, on the one hand, and AQL1TONL operations and the exploitation
of U-2 photography, on the other, were due to be extremely close.
They would, indeed, be vital to the success of U-2 missions as well
as to realization of the full potential of the photography. 28
This was but the catu encement of a long and increasingly close
relationship between NSA and HIA and its successors, a relationship
that was to prove mutually profitable beyond all early expectations.
Though the procurement of equipment had repeatedly required
Lundahl's attention during previous months, such demands became
especially heavy in April'1956. The time when U-2 photography
covering targets in denied areas would begin to arrive was getting
close. Whereas questions and problems up until then had primarily
involved decisions on the design of new equipment or the selection
of shelf items, together with the setting of target dates for
delivery, by April the questions began to revolve about what would
actually be available when the first operational inputs arrived,
whether or not it would suffice, and, if not, how to improvise
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until delivery was made. Moreover, these new and urgent concerns
were not confined to those in HTA. The military services, who
would also exploit U-2 photography to satisfy their own depart
mental needs, were equally anxious.
On 6 April 1956, Lundahl, made a trip to
Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska, to brief representa-
tives of SAC, the major expected user of U-2 photography outside
the Washington, D.C. area, on equipment on order or under develop-
ment. As a result, it appeared for a time that HTA procurement
for its own needs might be overwhelmed by the equipment demands
of this large and well-heeled competitor on the decidedly limited
production capacity of the manufacturers. However, Lundahl and
the Agency had the problem well under control and, in spite of
some jockeying with service elements for' delivery dates of indi-
vidual pieces of equipment, procurement proceeded in an orderly
manner. 279
By May it was apparent that receipt of U-2 photography would
not be long delayed and that one of the main questions, as far as
HM was concerned, was whether or not D/GP and OCR personnel and
their equipment would be in place in the Steuart building when
the first inputs arrived. In any event, it was already clear that
a small group of D/GP photo analysts would remain behind, to be
organized as a branch later called the central Branch after the
building in which they were housed. Though all veteran D/GP photo
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analysts in this branch would be TALENT and SI cleared, the space
occupied by the branch would not be secured for handling these
materials. The raison d'etre for this branch was to serve those
elements in the Agency, particularly DDP, not routinely involved
in work that required TALENT and COMINr clearances. It would also
provide a place where exploitation of photography covering the Far
East, most of which was classified no higher than SEICRET, could be
carried on without interfering with work in the Steuart building.
Finally, it could function as a convenient half-way house to the
Steuart building for new recruits who had their Agency TOP SECRET
clearance but had not yet been briefed into the COMIldT system --
a step that was sometimes delayed as much as a few weeks.
G. U-2's Over Eastern Europe.
The first U-2 mission was flown on 20 June 1956; it was
followed by two more on 2 July. These missions covered European
Satellites from Poland through the Balkan Peninsula. None pene-
trated Soviet air space. The first mission over the Soviet Union
was flown on 4 July 1956. It covered the Baltic States and the
extreme western part of Russia, including Leningrad. A day later
the first U-2 coverage of Moscow was obtained.
Between the flying of the mission and the interpretation of
the photography there was a lapse of a few to several days while
the film was flown to Rochester for processing. The first U-2 film
0
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was delivered to D/GP on 22 June. It was the original negative
and a duplicate positive from the tracker camera on the 20 June
mission over the Satellites. The prints for the 24-inch camera
from the same mission did not arrive until 29 June. The next
U-2 material delivered was the original negative and a duplicate
positive of the tracker film for both the 4 July and 5 July pene-
tration missions. These were logged into D/GP on Sunday, 8 July, 280
a day before the move into the Steuart building. 281 Thus, prep-
aration for Ii1'A and the move into the Steuart building were success-
fully accomplished before the receipt by HTA of the larger-scale
photography fran the first two missions flown over the USSR.
Meanwhile, Lundahl had been planning an ambitious trip abroad,
together with Their departure date was contingent, however, 25X1
on the arrival of the first U-2 film and ccletion of the move
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into the Steuart building. There were, nevertheless, compelling
reasons for Lundahl to get off to Europe as soon as practicable.
For one thing, the U-2's were flying out of a U.S. Air Force base
near Wiesbaden, Germany. The exposed film from the first flights
was flown to Rochester for processing and to Washington for exploi-
tation, but it was deemed necessary within the Agency to set up a
film processing and exploitation facility at the base, at least
on a standby basis. 282 It was felt that such a facility would
be needed to supply current intelligence should any international
crisis develop within flying range of Wiesbaden. Lundahl was
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scheduled to visit Wiesbaden to assist in planning for the
secure and satisfactory processing of valuable U-2 material
and because the exploitation operation would most likely have
to be staffed by HM personnel.
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The high point of Lundahl's trip would be the VIIIth Inter-
national Congress of Photogranmetry to be held in Stockholm. There
he would have an opportunity to renew acquaintances with many for-
eign photogrammetrists and photo interpreters and to learn first-
hand what foreigners were doing in these fields. At the exposition
of equipment displayed at the Congress, Lundahl and would be
able to see and manipulate the instruments, to ask questions, and
to gather pamphlets and brochures about the latest instrumentation
available, including that of European manufacturers. After the
congress, he, and especiallyplann1 to follow up these
contacts with visits to key European manufacturing establishments,
mapping agencies, and training schools.
The first week in July was particularly rushed. The first
U-2 flights were made and the first penetrations of the Soviet
Union were undertaken; plans for the move into the Steuart building
were in their final stage and the actual move was only a few days
away; and high level meetings were being held on requirements for
future U-2 missions. On Friday morning, 6 July, Lundahl gave
Amory a final briefing on the status of exploitation of the U-2
materials already on hand and on the latest plans for the move.
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By evening he had left behind the pressures of preparing for
the missions and exploiting and reporting the results, and taken
off for Europe with f DDP.
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I
Appendix A
List of Figures
Figure 1 Proposed Table of Organization, July 1952
Figure 2 Production Statistics, April 1953
Figure 3 Arthur Charles Lundahl, c. 1954
Figure 4 Vodochody Aircraft Plant, Czechoslovakia, 1952-1954
Figure 5 Folding Pocket Stereoscope, Tube Magnifier, PI Scale,
and PI Slide Rule, c. mid 1950's
Figure 6 Augmented Table of Organization Approved by the DDS
on 1 July 1955
Figure 7 Organization of HrAAVI,T Approved on 21 January
1956
Figure 8 Railroad Construction in Southeastern China, Simmer
of 1955
Figure 9 Layout of Dodonovo complex near Krasnoyarsk, USSR
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Proposed Table of Organization, July 1952. Note planned
phasing in the staffing. (This table was included as part
of Annex "C" to the 17 July 1952 staff study.)
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Production statistics for the Photo Intelligence Division for
April 1953, with a summary of the number of all projects
initiated up to that date. In effect, this constitutes an
accounting of division production at the close of the pre-
Lundahl period. (Included as Appendix A to the Photo
Intelligence Division contribution to the Progress Report
for Geographic Area, ORR, April 1953)
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PRODUCTION STATISTICS-APRIL 1953
REQUESTER
PREVIOUSLY APRIL
INITIATED COMPLETED INITIATED COMPLETED
TOTAL
INITIATED COMPLETED
ORR-Industrial
14
3
2
0
16
3
ORR-Geographic
4
2
0
0
4
2
OSI
3
2
2
1
5
3
OCI
1
1
0
0
1
1
DDP
7
6
2
2
9
8
Self-Initiated
3
0
2
0
5
0
32
14
8
3
40
17
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APPENDIX B - PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MAN-HOURS, APRIL
Projects 77 percent
Consultation and Coordination 3 percent
General Research 7 percent
Administration, Development and
Planning 13 percent
100 percent
ORR - Industrial 6 percent
ORR - Geographic 7 percent
OSI 2 percent
DDP 65 percent
Self-Initiated 20 percent
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Arthur Charles Lundahl, Chief of the Photo Intelligence
Division and leader of Agency and National photo interpre-
tation activities. Photograph c. 1954.
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FIGURE 4
Sketch of certain buildings in the Vodochody jet aircraft
plant, Czechoslovakia, as it appeared in GP/I-59, dated 18
February 1955. This perspective sketch was based entirely
on four series of ground photographs taken by military
attaches between 1952 and 1954. Incompleteness of the lay-
out resulted from lack of full coverage of the plant area.
Measurements were accurate only to plus or minus 10 percent
because of lack of technical data, such as type of camera,
focal length of the lens, and location of the camera stations.
Scale was approximated by using the wing span of a MIG-15
and the height of men imaged on the photography. Information
obtained from these poor quality ground photographs resulted,
nevertheless, in a 50 percent increase in the previously known
figure for floor space of this factory and in a consequent
increase in the estimated MIG production.
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VODOCHODY
JET AIRCRAFT PLANT
SKETCH COMPILED FROM
GROUND PHOTOGRAPHS DATING
FROM 1952 TO 1954
ALL DIMENSIONS APPROXIMATE
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S
Folding pocket stereoscope, tube magnifier, PI scale, and
PI slide rule, four basic pieces of PI equipment during
early D/GP years. The stereoscope provided magnification
and facilitated three-dimensional viewing of suitably
exposed pairs of photographs. The tube magnifier had
reticles inscribed on it for measuring distances. The PI
scale was graduated in thousandths of a foot so as to be
compatible with measurements of distances and altitudes,
both of which were usually expressed in feet. The PI slide
rule provided the interpreter with a nomographic device for
the speedy solution of simple photogrammetric problems.
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FIGURE 6
The augmented Table of Organization approved by the DDS on
1 July 1955.
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Table of Organization approved on 21 January 1956.
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FIGURE 8
Railroad construction in Fukien Province, China, as revealed
on photography of 11 and 14 August 1955. Note the developing
pattern of construction with relation to the Chekiang-Kiangsi
rail line and to the port city of Amoy. Note also the spur
to Nan-ping and its location with respect to Foochow. This
illustration, which appeared in GP/I-25, 21 September 1955,
is an example of a type of sketch map used to illustrate
reports on targets of current intelligence interest and
thereby speed up the production process.
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Layout and components of the several functional areas in the
Dodonovo Complex as interpreted from January 1956 GENETRIX
photography.
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V
SRC4LL INS-T- MM NN.l9N0uHS& U$A
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Appendix B
Chronology: 1950-1956
8 Aug Initial proposal made by
establish the photo interpretation function in
CIA.
11 Apr submits results of his survey of the reed for
photo intelligence in CIA; recommends hiring
25X1
25X1
25X1
enters on duty as an Intelligence Officer 25X1
slotted in the office of the Assistant Director, ORR.
17 Jul Robert Amory, Jr., the AD/RR, forwards a proposal to
the Project Review Ccamniittee for establishment of a
Photo Intelligence Division.
25 Jul Project Review Ccinittee, chaired by Allen W. Dulles,
approves proposal to establish the Photo intelligence
Division.
4 Aug Walter Bedell Smith, the DCI, approves establisbn nt
of the Photo Intelligence Division (D/GP).
2 Nov Formal establishment of the CIA Photo Intelligence
Division.
11 May Arthur C. Lundahl reports for duty in CIA as Chief,
Photo Intelligence Division.
30 Jun D/GP moves from Building 11 to Room 1337 M Building.
5 Oct Proposal for issuance of formal PI publications by
D/GP forwarded from Guthe to Assistant Director for
Intelligence Coordination.
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9 Nov GP/I-1, Rwnanian/Ukrainian-Moldavian Border Study,
the first formal PI publication issued by D/GP.
16 Dec commences first IG survey of D/GP. 25X1
June D/GP provides PI support for the operation to
overthrow the Commnzistdaeninated government in
Guatemala.
29 Nov CIA hosts first meeting of Ccgrmittee for Coordination
and Standardization of Intelligence Ground Photographic
Procedures and Equiprient.
13 Dec Iundah1 first introduced to Project AQUAZCt E, the
U-2 Project.
18 Jan Small task force under) established 25X1
at 2210 F. Street to support Project AQUATONE.
Feb-Jun Crash effort by D/GP in support of OCI and ORR work
on the Formosa Strait Crisis.
Apr D/GP moves from M Building to Roams 1009, 1134, and
1142 Que Building.
13 May proposal made to reorganize and increase the level
of staffing in the photo intelligence Division.
31 May Robert Amory, the DDI, briefed into Project AQUATONE.
1 Jul Reorganization and increase in level of staffing
approved.
Jul orders survey of D/GP publications. 25X1
5 Jul. the first military liaison officer 25X1
assigned to D/GP, enters on duty.
12 Jul D/GP resumes training of intelligence officers in
the art of photo interpretation.
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Sep-Oct Task force under moves from 2210 E Street
to Wings A and C, Quarters Eye.
28 Oct D/GP issues report entitled Missile Launching Sites
in the Moscow Area, predicting the deployment of
surface-to-air missile sites in two rings around
the Soviet capital.
Nov Otto E. Guthe, the AD/RR, briefed into Project
AQUATONE.
2 Dec Amory forwards proposal to establish HTA1iTCt'AT
to the DDS.
?
Feb
21 Jan Proposal for establishment of HTAUT1T approved,
with revisions.
First OCR personnel join the task force
in Quarters Eye.
Project A .
the Chief, GRA, briefed into
Apr D/GP photo interpreters introduced to U-2 photography
of US installations.
Apr
Apr Task force moves from Wings A and C
to Wing G, Quarters Eye.
20 Jun First U-2 photographic mission over the European
Satellites.
22 Jun D/GP receives first operational U-2 tracker photog-
raphy in Quarters Eye.
29 Jun D/GP receives first large-scale operational U-2
photography in Quarters Eye.
4 Jul First U-2 photographic mission over the Soviet Union.
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Appendix C
Source References*
1. Interview, Frederick A. Voigt with author, 24 Nov 69. TS
CODEWORD.
2.I IThe Operation of High LeveZ Photo
Interpretation, 8 Aug 50. TS CODEWORD.
3. Letter, Voigt too 26 June 51, sub: 0 Proposal
for Establishment of a Photo Interpretation Unit in CIA. U.
4. Mew, Amory for Smith 20 Mar 52, sub: Approval of Consultant
Action, TS CODEWORD.
No, Amory for Smith, 19 Mar 52, sub: Approval of Consultant
Action, Attachment .
5. Memo to Amory, 11 Apr 52, sub: Use of Photo Interpre-
tation and Photo Intelligence by CIA, TS
CODEWORD.
6. Memo, Guthe for Amory, 7 May 52, sub: Suggestion for Photo-
Intelligence Facility. S.
7. Memo, Amory fob---j 26 Jun 52, sub: Revision of Table of
Organization of Office of Research and Reports. S.
8. Memo, Amory for Project Review Con4nittee, 17 Jul 52, sub:
Staffing for Photo-Intelligence within ORR, ER 3-1091. S.
9. ORR. The Office of Research and Reports, Z9534~58
2nd draft), 1962, p. 124. S.
Progress Report for Geographic Area, ORR, (hereafter Progress
Report), Jul 52, p. 4. S.
10. CIA. Office of Personnel. Official Personnel File
(Available from CIA Records Center.)
*Unless indicated otherwise, all source references are available in
the NPIC Historical Collection housed in the NPIC Library.
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11. Record of Action, 25 Jul 52, sub: Staffing for Photo-
Intelligence within ORR, Recording Secretary, PRC. S.
12. Metro, Amory for 4 Aug 52, sub: Project Review Ccm-
mittee Record of Action, sub: Staffing for Photo Intelli-
gence within ORR, 25 Jul 52. S.
13. CIA, HS. Chronology Z946-65, Volume 1, 1946-55, Jun 70,
p. 51. S CIA Internal Use Only. (Available from CIA
Historical Staff.)
3 Mar 53, sub: T/O - Photo Intelli-
16. Progress Report, Mar 53, p. 6. S.
17. ORR. Office Notice R17-53, 23 Feb 53, sub: Designations of
op. cit., (8, above),, Annex "'B".
15. N rol
gence Division. S.
ORR Components and Respective Officer in Charge. S.
op. cit., (8, above), 1nnex "A", p. 2.
19. Progress Report, Jul 52, p. 8. S.
20. Progress Report, Apr 53, p. 10. S.
21. op. cit.,.(16, above), p. 9.
22. Project Proposal Meorand for Project Review
Ccanuittee, GRA, 13 May 53, sub: Polish-Lithuanian SSR Border
Study. S.
23. Progress Report,
Progress Report,
Progress Report,
24. Progress Report,
25. Progress Report,
26. Progress Report,
27. Progress Report,
Sep 52, p. 8. S.
Dec 52, p. 9. S.
Mar 53, p. 1. S.
Oct 52, p. 9. S.
Dec 52, p. 6. S.
Jul 52, p. 8. S.
Sep 52, p. 8. S.
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28.
Progress Report, Oct 52, p.'9.
Progress Report, Nov 52, p. 10.
Progress Report, Dec 52, p. 9.
S.
S.
S.
29.
Progress Report, Nov 52, p. 10.
S.
30.
Progress Report, Jan 53, p. 9.
S.
31.
Progress Report, Apr 53, p. 10.
Progress Report, May 53, p. 11.
S.
S.
32.
Progress Report, Mar 53, p. 9.
S.
33.
Loc. cit., (26, above).
34.
Progress Report, Feb 53, p. 12.
Project Review Memorandum,
f
or PRC, GRA, 13 May
53, sub: Location, Identification and Description of Specified
Installations, USSR, Engaged in Biological Research. S.
25X1
18 Mar 53, sub: Information to Aid
Project. S.
25X1
36. Project Proposal Memorandum
for Project Review
25X1
Ca-inittee, GRA, 13 May 53, sub: Photogrammetric Techniques
for Relief Sketch Maps fran oblique Photographs (Pilot Study).
S.
37.
Progress Report, Apr 53, Appendi
x A. S.
38.
Progress Report, Aug 52, p. 4.
S.
39.
Memo,
for All Panel
Members, 26 Sep 52, sub:
40.
Meeting of Intelligence Developm
HOPE CHEST). U.
Progress Report, Oct 52, p. 5.
ent Planning Team (Project
S.
41.
Memo, Reber for Deputy Chief of
Staff, Development, USAF,
42.
18 Nov 52, sub: Preliminary Stat
Reconnaissance Requirements for
Memo, Guthe for Amory, 27 Jul 53
ement of CIA Air Photo
Project HOPE CHEST. S.
, sub: Status of ORR Work
Relative to Project HOPE CHEST.
S.
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43. Interview, Arthur C. Lundahl with author, 1 Oct 70, pp. 4,5.
TS CODEWORD.
44. Loc. cit., (24, above).
45. Memo, Guthe for OAD/RR, 5 Aug 52, sub: Proposed ORR Internal
Training in Map Intelligence and Geography. S.
46. Men o,~for AD/RR, 29 Apr 53, sub: Request for Exemption
fran Basic Intelligence Training. S.
47. Progress Report, Jan 53, p. 10. S.
48. Progress Report, Feb 53, p. 7. S.
49. Progress Report, Mar 53, p. 7. S.
50. Memo, for Chief, AS/ORR, 23 Apr 53, sub: Justification
for SI Clearances. S.
51. Progress Report, Jul 52, p. 4. S.
52. Progress Report, Aug 52, p. 4. S.
53. Progress Report, Sep 52, p. 4. S.
54. Memo, Guthe f 3 Sep 52, sub: Item to Include in
a Memorandum to the Personnel Director, CIA. No classification
given.
55. Interview, Arthur C. Lundahl with author, 24 Sep 70. S.
56. Progress Report, May 53, p. 12. S.
57. Progress Report, Jun 53, p. 13. S.
58. Monthly Report for the Photo. Intelligence Division, (hereafter
Monthly Report), Mar 54, p. 3. S.
59. Monthly Report, Oct 54, p. 3. S.
Monthly Report, Dec 54, p. 3. S.
60. Minutes of the Geographic Research Area Staff Meeting, 23 May
55, p. 3. S.
Monthly Report, Jun 55, p. 4. S.
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61. Office of the Chief, Geographic Research Area, Daily Diary,
20 Oct 53, item 1. S.
62. Memo, Guthe for Acting Deputy Director/Intelligence, 10 Aug
53, sub: Organizational and Production Problems Resulting
from Personnel Ceiling of 890 for ORR. S.
63. Metro, Guthe for Chief, Administrative Staff, ORR, 31 Aug 53,
sub: Preliminary Personnel Figures for Supplemental Budget,
FY 1955. S.
64. Memo,~for Chief, Administrative Staff, ORR, 28 Aug 53,
sub: Requirement for Assignment of Military Billets for Two
Officer Personnel in the Geographic Area. S.
65. Loc. cit., (55, above).
66. CIA/IG. Survey of the Office of Research and Reports, 7 June
54. S EYES ONLY.
67. Metro, Lundahl fo1 _`, through Chief, GRA, 25X1
28 Aug 53, sub: Navy Covering Title for Mr. A.C. Lundahl. S.
68. Op. cit., (66, above), p. 21.
69. Meme~ for Guthe, 3 Jun 53, sub: Guidance in Requirements 25X1
for Ground photography. S.
70. CIA, NPIC. Collection and Field Mensuration Techniques for
Ground Photographers,.n.d., 260 pp.+ vii. C.
71. Meno, Guthe for0 30 Jun 53, sub: Request for Guidance 25X1
in Requirements for Ground Photography. S.
72. Project Proposal Memorandum, Lundahl for Project Review
Ccm nittee, Geographic Area, 6 Jul 53, sub: Photographic
Processing and Projection Kit (PPPK), Mark I, for intelli-
gence operations. S.
73. Meru 15 Jul 53, sub: Suggestion for 25X1
Photographic. Processing and Projection Kit (PPPK) for Intelli-
gene Operations. C.
74. Monthly Report, Apr 54, p. 1. S.
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75. Mono, Lundahl for Chief, Geographic Research, 1 May 54,
sub: Project Acceptance Memorandum for Period 15-30 April
1954, project 70.100. S.
76. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-167, 28 Mar 56, introduction to Photographic
Intelligence, 43 pp. S.
77. Merin for file, 8 Jan 54, sub: D/GP Basic Industrial Photo
Interpretation Course. Passim. S.
78. Progress Report, Nov 53, p. 7. S.
79. Loc. cit., (77, above).
80. Op. cit., (77, above), p. 5.
81. Op. cit., (74, above), p. 2.
82. Op. cit., (77, above), pp. 4,5.
83. Op. cit., (77, above), p. 1.
84. Project Proposal Memorandum, Lundahl for Project Review
Comnittee, Geographic Area, 22 Jul 53, sub: Aerial Photography
Requirements on China. S.
85. Memo for file, 8 Sep 53, sub: Reconnaissance Mission Requirements.
S.
Memo for Guthe, 11 Sep 53, sub: Reconnaissance Missions. 25X1
S.
86. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-168, 29 Mar 56, "Periscope." S.
87. Progress Report, Sep 53, p. 13. S.
88. Lundahl, A.C., General Considerations and Suggested Idealizations
of a U.S. Photographic Intelligence System, n.d., p. 3. S.
89. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-23, 17 Sep 54, Technical Index for Ohio State
University Contract Study, S.
Loc. cit., (74, above).
90. Progress Report, Nov 52, p. 5; Jan 53, p. 6; May 53, p. 6.; Jun
53, p. 6; Sep 53, p. 8. S.
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91. Op. cit., (74, above), p. 2.
92. Mena, Lundahl for Acting Chief, Geographic Research, 1 Jun
54, sub: Project Acceptance Memorandum for Period 15-31 May
1954, Project 70.111. S.
93?. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-54, Feb 55, "Grand Canyon II." S.
94. Progress Report, Aug 53, p. 14. S.
95. Calendar note, entry for 28 Jan 54. S.
96. Ibid.
Progress Report, Feb 54, p. 19. S.
97. Memo, Lundahl f 30 Jun 54, sub: OCI Briefings. S.
98. Loc. cit., (74, above).
99. Me=L---] for Lundahl, attn:l 112 Oct 54, sub: 25X1
Requirement for Photo Intelligence Research Project. S.
100. ORR, D/GP. Project Man-Hour Record. No classification given.
101. Mena, through AD/RR, 28 Feb-55, sub:
Photo-Intelligence Support for the Economic Research Area
and the Office of Current Intelligence. S.
102. Ibid.
Loc. cit., (100, above).
103. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-63, 28 Feb 55, Southeast China Transportation
Study. S NOFORN.
104. Monthly Report, Oct 54, p. 1. S.
Photo Intelligence Division, Status of Projects, 30 Nov 54, p.
1. S.
Photo Intelligence Division, Status of Projects, 31 Dec 54, pp. 1,2.
S.
Photo Intelligence Division, Status of Projects, 31 Jan 55, pp. 2,3.
S.
Photo Intelligence Division, Status of Projects, 28 Feb 55, pp. 1,2.
S.
105. Monthly Reports, Mar-Jun 55, p. 1. S.
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106. Photo Intelligence Division, Status of Projects, Mar, Apr
55, p. 1, and May 55, p. 2. S.
Minutes of the Geographic Research Area Staff Meeting, 23 May
55, p. 3. S.
107. Loc. cit., (105, above).
108. Metro, Lundahl for 15 Feb 54, sub: Project Acceptance 25X1
Mattorandum for the Period 1-15 February 1954. S.
109. Metro, Lundahl for 17 May 54, sub: Project Acceptance 25X1
Nerrorandtrn for Period 1-15 May 1954. S.
110. Project Initiation Marorandum, Lundahl f 2 Feb 55, 25X1
sub: Target Support for SAC. S.
111. Monthly Report, Feb 55, p. 2. S.
112. Project Initiation Memorandum, Lundahl fo 8 Feb 55, 25X1
sub: Ulan Ude Power Plant, USSR. S.
113. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-3, 22 Jan 54, Current U.S. Navy Aerial
Photography. S.
114. Progress Report, Dec 53, p. 13. S.
115. Op. cit., (113, above), p. 1. S.
116. Project Initiation Memory ~i Jun 54, _for Project Review 25X1
Cormlittee, Geographic
117. Op. cit., (43, above), p. 29. TS CODE RD.
118. Ibid., p. 30.
Metro, for Amory, n.d., sub: Camterx9ation of DDI 25X1
Personnel, DDP-1-1931-b. No classification given.
119. Op. cit., (43, above), p. 31.
120. Ibid.,-pp. 30, 31.
121. Ibid. p. 31.
Mettn, for Amory, n.d., sub: Cattmendation of DDI
Personnel DDP-1-1931-b. No classification given.
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122.
ORR, D/GP. The. Photographic intelligence Division of ORR,
29 Jul 54. S.
Op. cit., (111, above), p. 4.
Monthly Report, Apr 55, p. 1.
S.
123.
Interview, Arthur C. Lundahl with author, 15 Oct 70, pp. 3,4.
TS CODEtiJORD.
124.
Op. cit., (123, above), p. 4.
125.
Op. cit., (123, above), p. 1.
126.
Monthly Report, Nov 54, p. 2.
Monthly Report, Nov 54, p. 3.
S.
S.
127.
Op. cit., (123, above), p. 2.
128.
Progress Report, Jan 56, p. 2.
S.
129.
Interview,
, with author, 8 Jun 70. (No
written record.)
130.
Moro, Lundahl for Chief, St/I/RR, 28.May 54, sub: Request for
Clearance to Navy Photographic Interpretation Center. S.
Metro, for St/I/RR, Attn 3 Jun 54, sub:
Continuing Liaison Contact: Army Map Service. C.
Metro, Lundahl for Chief, St/I/RR, 2 Sep 54, sub : Request for
Continuing Clearance to Fidgts. USAF, Director of Intelligence,
DCS/O, Collection Operations Division, Reconnaissance Branch. S.
Menlo, Lundahl for Chief, St/I/RR, 16 Nov 54, sub: Request for
131.
Clearance to ONI. S.
Progress Report, Feb 54, p. 17.
S.
132.
Monthly Report, Oct 54, p. 2.
S.
133.
Monthly Report, Aug 54, p. 2.
S.
134.
Monthly Report, Dec 54, p. 2.
S.
135.
Monthly Report, mar 55, p. 2.
S.
136.
Monthly Report, Apr 55, p. 1.
S.
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137. Merro,~ for Coemtanding Officer, U.S. Naval Photo-
graphic Centex, 7 Apr 55, sub: Request for One Set of Aerial
Photographic Prints for Each Far Eastern Sortie Processed
for the U.S. Naval Photographic Interpretation Center. S.
138. Monthly Report, May 55, p. 2. S.
139. blettn,for Guthe, 12 Nov 54, sub: The Coordination of
Photo Intelligence and Comanications Intelligence,
TS CODEWORD.
140. Loc. cit., (43, above), pp. 37, 38.
141. Memo, Guthe for 20 Jun 53, sub: Justification for
Procurement of Old Delft Scanning Stereoscope. R.
142. Memo, Guthe fore 23 Jun 53, sub: Justification for
Procurement of Zeiss Stereotop II for Stereo Observation
and Plotting. R.
143. Mena, Lundahl for 12 May 55, sub: Justification
for Purchase of the Ke Stereoscopic Projection Plotter
with Variable Ratio Pantograph. OUO.
144. Metro, Lundahl for Chief, Purchase Order Branch, OL, 23 Mar
54, sub: Justification for Procurement of a Jackson Stereo-
scopic Projector and Floating Mark. U.
145. Minutes of the Geographic Research Area Staff Meeting,
28 Feb 55, p. 2. S.
146. Interview, Arthur C. Lundahl with author, 26 Oct 70, p. 22.
TS CODEWORD.
147. Memo, Lundahl for Guthe, 13 Aug 53, sub: Recommendation for
the Establishment of Report Series for the Photographic (sic)
Intelligence Division. S.
.148. Memo, Guthe for AD/IC, 5 Oct 53, sub: Proposed Photographic
Intelligence Publications. S.
149. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-1, 9 Nov 53, Rumanian/Ukrainian-Moldavian
Border Study. S. (Available from CIA Records Center.)
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150. Minutes of the Geographic Research Area Staff Meeting, 20
Jun 55. S.
151. Monthly Report, Jun 55, p. 2. S.
152. Memorandum for the record, 2 Jun 55, sub: Meeting to Discuss
Reproduction Problems. C.
153. CIA, DDS&T. DDS&T Historical Paper No. OSA-1 History of the
Office of Special Activities
1 Apr 69, vol. 1, p. 2. TS CODEWORD. (Available
through the OSA.Historical Officer.)
?
i
Annex 1 in the above OSA history by
154. Letter,l for Dulles, 5 Nov 54, sub: Letter of Transmittal
Accanpanying a Proposal Entitled, "A Unique Opportunity for
Comprehensive Intelligence," TS 115018-A. TS. (Included as
OSA history by
155. Memo for the record (by C.P. Cabell), 19 Nov 54, sub: Luncheon
Meeting in the Office of Secretary Talbott. Not classified.
(For copy in Cabell's handwriting, see Chapter II in the above
156. Op. cit., (153, above), Chapter II, p. 2.
ee Chapter II in the above OSA History
at the White House. Not classified. .(Ebr copy in Cabell's
157. Memo for the record (by C.P. Cabell), 24 Nov 54, sub: Meeting
158. Op. cit., (123, above), pp. 11, 12.
159. Op. cit., (43, above), p. 8.
160. Op. cit., .(123, above), p. 24.
161. Memo, Lundahl for Guthe, 19 Oct 55, sub: Request for Promotion
162. Interview,L
TS CODEWORD.
with author, 8 Oct 70, p. 1.
25X1
25X1
25X1
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25X1
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163. Monthly Report, Jan 55, p. 1. S.
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169. Memo for Lundahl, 20 Jun 55, sub: Requirements for 25X1
Utilization of Aerial Photography. U.
170. Mena, Guthe fo]~= 9 May 55, sub: Need for Increase in 25X1
T/O Strength and Ceiling for the Photo Intelligence Division,
Geographic Area Research and Reports. S.
Memo, Guthe for 13 May 55, sub: Memorandum of Trans- 25X1
mittal-Request for eorganization of the Photo Intelligence
Division, Geographic Area, Office of Research and Reports. S.
171. Office of Personnel,, 11 Jul 55, D/GP T/O (Tab run). C.
Memorandum for the Record , 16 Jun 55, sub: 25X1
Photo Intelligence Staff Study. S.
172. Working paper from D/GP chrono file, c. late July 1955 sub:
garding Hybrid PI Support Reg. as Proposed b 25X1
C. 25X1
164. Op. cit., (126, above), p. 1.
165. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-53, 19 Jan 55, sub: PATHFINDER II. S.
166. Op. cit., (43, above), p. 19.
167. Memo for Lundahl, 29 Apr 55, sub: Development of
Aerial Photographic Processing Equipment (and other items).
U.
168. Menu for the record, 27 Jun 55, sub: Meeting on Photo Processing
and Library Service. S.
173. Monthly Report, Apr 55, p. 1. S.
Interview, Arthur C. bmdahl with author, 2 Nov 70, p. 30.
TS CODE RD.
174. Op. cit., (146, above), pp. 14, 15.
175. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Project LINCOLN.
BEACON HILL REPORT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 15 June 1952,
Appendix A. S. (Available from Office of the Director, NPIC.)
176. Ibid., p. 5.
177. Ibid., pp. 8, 9.
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178. Ibid., p, 10.
179. Loc. cit., (41, above).
180. Op. cit., (175, above), p. 9.
181. Memo, Guthe for 11 May 55, sub: Need for Increase in
T/O Strength and Ceiling for the Photo Intelligence Division,
Geographic Area, Research and Reports, p. 2. S.
182. Ibid., Tab. C.
183. Meno, Guthe for Area Chiefs and OAD Staff Chiefs, 22 Aug
55, sub: Reduction in Personnel Ceiling for Fiscal Year 1956.
S.
184. Minutes of the Geographic Research Area Staff meeting, 19 Sep
55, p. 1. S.
185. Monthly Report, Jul 55, p. 5. S.
186. Op. cit., (43, above), pp. 16, 17.
187. Op. cit., (184, above), P. 4.
188. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-123, 22 Sep 55,
190.
191.
192.
ORR, D/GP. GP/I-137, 14 Nov 55,
Loc. cit., (185, above).
"PURPOSE". S.
"PURPOSE II". S.
Monthly Report, Aug 55, p. 4. CIA Internal Use Only.
Monthly Report, Dec 55, p. 3. CIA Internal Use Only.
ORR, D/GP. Central Interpretation ed Budget),
Personnel and Equipment, 26 Aug 55, TS.
193. Memo for Bissell, 1 Dec 55, sub: Cover Designation
in Use for Establishment of the New Office of Photo Intelligence
25X1
25X1
and material to be Received fran Project AQLIATONE TS. 25X1
194. Memo, Amory for 2 Dec 55, sub: Establishment of the 25X1
Office of Statistical Research, TS. 25X1
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195. Office of Personnel, PI Division T/O, n.d. S.
196. Monthly Reports, Jan-Jun 56. S. CIA Internal Use Only.
197. Mean, Lundahl for Bissell, 24 Apr 56, sub: Personnel Assignment.
?
198. Loc. cit., (162, above).
199. Moro for DDS, 16 Jan 58, sub: Reorganization of 25X1
Stati Branch, Special Register, Office of Central
Reference. S.
200. Ibid.
Op. cit., (194, above), pp. 17, 18.
201. Op. cit., (194, above), p. 18.
202. Op. cit., (194, above), p. 16.
203. Op. cit., (123, above), p. 19.
204. Information Section, SB/SR/CR. General Information and
Procedures Manual, Jan 57, Tab. B. S.
205. Monthly Report, Jul 55, p. 1. S.
Monthly Reports, Aug, Sep 55; Nov 55-Jun 56, p. 2. S. CIA
Internal Use Only.
Metro for Ch/AS/ORR for Guthe, sub: Activity Report, Administrative
Staff (Reports for Nov 55, Dec 55, Feb 56, Mar 56, Apr 56, and
May, Jun 56). S.
206. ORR. Office Notice R37-55, 1 Jul 55, sub: Industrial Photographic
Intelligence Course. S.
207. Monthly Report, Jul 55, p. 1. S.
208. Op. cit., (206, above), p. 2.
209. Interview, with author, 25 Jan 71, pp. 4, 5.
TS CODEWORD.
210. Op. cit., (190, above), P. 2.
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211. Op. cit., (206, above), p. 1.
212. Op. cit., (184, above), p. 3.
213. Progress Report, Jul 55, pp. 2, 3. S.
214. Op. cit., (190, above), p. 3.
215. Memo 30 Aug 55, sub: Use of Numerals.
No classification given.
MOM, 130 Aug 55, sub: Survey of Reports
for Deciding on Covers. No classification given.
Memo, , 30 Aug 55, sub: Title Page; General
Points Re Text; Graphics. No classification given.
Mena, 30 Aug 55, sub: Suggested Format for
"Complete" GP/I's; Suggested Format for Single-Sheet Type
GP/I's; Supplements; Files; General Comments. No classification
given.
216. _ORR, D/GP. GP/I-97, 16 May 55, Possible Railroad Construction
in the Nan-ping Area. S NOFORN.
217. Op. cit., (209, above), p. 8.
218.. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-113, 28 Jun 55, Railroad Construction in the
Nan-ping Area. S NOFORN.
219. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-125, 21 Sep 55, Fukien Province Railroad
Construction. S NOFORN.
220. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-176, 27 Apr 56, Southeast China Situation,
p. 2. S NOFORN Continued control.
221. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-181, 10 May 56, Southeast China Situation,
pp. 3, 4. S NOFORN Continued Control..
222. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-202, 25 Jul 56, Southeast China Situation,
p. 2. S NOFORN Continued Control.
223. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-22, Aug 1954, Operation. Cabbage Patch. S.
224. Op. cit., (209, above), p. 10.
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225. Memo, Lundahi for St/I/RR, 3 Oct 55, sub: Request for Approval
of Travel and 00 Clearance. S.
226. Op. cit., (209, above), pp. 11, 12, 19.
227. ORR, D/GP. CIA/RR PD-i (CST #84), 28 Oct 55, Missile Launching
Sites in the Moscow Area, Appendix C, p. 17. TS CODE110RD.
(Available from CIA Records Center.)
228. Op. cit., (209, above).
229. Op. cit., (209, above).
230. Op. cit., (227, above).
231. ORR, D/GP. Statistics on
(Conf) Photography, n.d.
S.
232. Interview, Arthur C. Li hi with author, 1 Jul 70, p. 7. TS.
233. Loc. cit., (231, above).
234. Metro, Strong for Amory, 15 Feb 56, sub: Project GE IRIX
and attachment entitled "Project G N91RIX: CIA
Connections with Project" TS.
235. Meld, Amory for Director of Intelligence, USAF, 8 Jun 55
sub: Participation in (Confidential) Project GRAYBACK
TS.
236. Memo, Guthe for Comnander, ACIC, St. Louis, Missouri, 29 Nov
55, sub: CIA Participation in Project (C) GEMTRIX. C.
237. Memo, for Lundahl, 12 Dec 55, sub: Trip Report to
the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center, St. Louis,
Missouri, Concerning Project JACKPOT. No classification
given.
Memo,
to Aeronautical Chart and
55, sub: Trip Report of
Information Centel IC in St. Louis, Missouri, with
Details Concerning Project JACKPOT. S.
239. Loc. cit., (236, above).
236 _
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240. Memo for Lundahl, 28 Feb 56, sub: Participation
in Project GEN'ITRIX. S.
241. Loc. cit., (237, above).
242. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-157, GP/I-161, GP/I-163, Feb-Apr 56, Genetrix
Photography. S CIA Internal Use Only Special Handling.
243. ORR, D/GP. GP/I-200, 26 Mar 57, Special Installation Near
Krasnoyarsk, USSR (Dodonovo Complex). S NOFORN CIA Internal
Use Only Continued Control.
244. CIA. The TALENT Control System Manual, 1956. S CODEWORD.
245. ORR, D/GP. Special Projects Branch Operating Manual, 9 May
56. S.
HTA, SB. Film Handling, 1 Jun 56. S.
246. Merv 18 Nov 55, sub: Aerial
Photographic Film Requirements, Training and Operational
Phases TS.
25X1
247. Memo for Deputy Director, NPIC, 15 Jul 68, sub: 25X1
Camera Technical Data . TS CODEW)RD.
248. Loc. cit., (246, above).
249. Op. cit., (123, above),-p. 15.
250. Memo, Bissell for
(SAPC 2428). S.
Memo
8 Nov 55, sub: Minicard Equipment 25X1
for Amory, 20 Oct 55, sub: Exploitation
of AQUATONE Intelligence Information, pp. 2, 3 (Draft). TS.
251. Memo, for Bissell, 7 Sep 55, sub: The
Extent of the Briefings of Messrs on
Project AQUATONE by Photo Intelligence Personnel (SAPC-1774).
252. Op. cit., (194, above), Tab B.
253. Memo, Lundahl for Bissell, 7 Dec 55, sub: Clearance of D/GP
Branch Chiefs and Staff Assistants to Project AUTONF-T (SAPC
2781). S.
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254. Memo, Lundahl for Bissell, 6 Apr 56, sub: Request for
Permission for Technical Briefings HT1YIOOAT Personnel re
Type and Quality of Materials. S.
255. Working Notes. Lundahl for briefing Amory, 18 Apr 56. No
classification given.
256. Metro, for Bissell, 14 Dec 55, sub: Preliminary
Evaluation o Sample Photography (SAP,. 2948). S.
Me,r,, 30 Mar 56, sub: Trip Report of the
14-17 March Visit to the Eastman Kodak Processing Plant by
(SAPC 4884). S.
257. Loc. cit., (255, above).
258. Memo (PCS/DCI) for the Record, 14 Sep 55, sub:
project AQt2ONE Move Fran 2210 E. St. to Quarters Eye,
(SAPC-1825). S.
259. op. cit., (171, above), p. 1.
260. Mew for Lundahl, 2 Aug 55, sub: Test Site Support.
No c
Memo Ifor the Record, 3 Apr 56, sub:
Report of Visit to Eastman Kodak (SAPC 4932). S.'
261. Mew for Lundahl, 9 Aug 55, sub: Trip
to Eastman Kodak, Rochester,, New York p. 3. TS.
262. Metro,
30 Aug 55, sub: Film Requirements,
(SAPC-1736). S.
263. Mena for Project Operations Officer, 20 Apr 56, sub:
Visit to the Eastman Kodak Processing Plant by
(10-17 April), SAPC 5582. S.
264. Memo for Bissell, 15 Dec 55, sub: Trip Report of
8 Dec 55 to Cambridge, Mass. S.
Memo, or Lundahl, 23 Apr 55, sub: Standard Width-
Aerial Film Projectors. S.
Memo, Lundahl for Bissell, 3 May 56, sub: 70 MM Film Viewing
Tables. S.
Mena, Lundahl for Bissell, 18 Jun 56, sub: Request for Feasi-
bility studies on Construction of Rectifiers for 70 MM Photog-
raphy and Long Focal Length Photography. S EYES Y.
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265. NemD,~ for Lundahl, 15 Mar 56, sub: Revision of
Titling System . TS.
Memo, Lundahl for Bissell 1 May 56, sub: Film Titling
Reconmendations . TS.
Memo, Lundahl for Bissell, 13 Jun 56, sub: Clarification of
Requirements for Titling, Spooling of Film and Packaging of
Prints (hTAOC-1). S EYES ONLY.
266. Memo, for Bissell, 5 Jun 56, sub: Trip to Eastman
Kodak June 1, 1956, p. 2. S.
267. Memo, for Bissell, 30 Jan 56, sub: Reproduction
Responsibilities of the DD/I Photo Intelligence Photographic
Laboratory (SAPC 3606). S.
Metro, Bissell for Lundahl, 3 Feb 56, sub: Reproduction
Responsibilities of the DD/I Photo Intelligence Photographic
Laboratory (SAPC 3575). S.
268. Memo, Lundahl for Bissell, 8 May 56, sub: Initial Requirement
for Additional Photographic Prints. S.
269. Interview, D.A. Brugioni with author, 2 Mar 1971, pp. 4, 7.
TS CODEWORD.
270. Maw, Lundahl for Chief, Space, Maintenance and Facilities
Branch, 13 Apr 56, sub: Request for Internal Move of E quip ent
in Quarters Eye. No classification given.
271. Interview, Arthur C. Lundahl with author, 2 Nov 70, pp. 10, 11.
TS CODEWORD.
272. Ibid., p. 20.
273. Ibid., p. 18.
274. Mem for Director of Personnel 20 Jun 56,
sub: Fitness Report for S.
275. DDS. Office of Personnel, 12 Aug 56, Notification of
Personnel Action. U. (Available in personnel file for
at CIA Records Center.)
276. Interview, Arthur C. Lundahl with author, 5 Nov 70, p. 7. TS
CODEWORD.
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277. Ibid., p. 9-
278. Ibid., p. 14.
279. Ibid., p. 17.
280. CIA, NPIC. Mission Folders for:
A 2003, 20 Jun 56 TS CODEWORD
AA 2009, 2 Jul 56 TS CODEWORD
A 2010, 2 Jul 56 TS CODEWORD
A 2013, 4 Jul 56 TS CCDEWORD
A 2014, 5 Jul 56 TS CCDEMRD
(Filed in Production Services Group, NPIC)
281. Memo, Lundahl for Director of Security, 20 Nov 56, sub:
(Cczmendation) , HTA-OC-17. C.
282. Interview, Arthur C. Lundahl with author, 12 Nov 70, p. 27.
TS CCDEWRD.
283. Mean. Guthe fo 14 Feb 56. sub: sed Foreign
Travel for Arthur C. Lundahl arxi (Draft) . S.
284. Loc. cit., (88, above).
Appointment calendar A.C. Lundahl, entry for 6 July 1956.
No classification given. (Available from office of the
Director, NPIC.)
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CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by DDI
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP04T00184R000400070001-5