MEXICO'S LEFTISH PARTIES IN RECENT MONTHS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100250001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100250001-5
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 January 1984
MEXICO'S LEFTIST PARTIES IN RECENT MONTHS
Summary
In the 18 months since publication of "The Opposition Left in
Mexico," leftist parties have failed to capitalize on discontent over
the nation's dismal economic situation. Leftist candidates have turned
in poor electoral showings, efforts to mobilize widespread anti-
austerity demonstrations have faltered, and sectarian squabbles have
undermined unity. Concern that falling standards of living will
increase popular dissension and foster support for radical solutions
nevertheless has prompted President de la Madrid to repress some leftist
activities. At present, however, a turn to armed action by leftist
parties is unlikely and they pose little immediate threat to the ruling
party's political hegemony.
Efforts to Broaden Appeal
Leftist moves to cultivate support among mass-based interest
groups are yielding disappointing harvests. Because middle class
intellectuals control leadership slots and chart the leftist
strategy, organizational efforts among labor and peasant groups
appear to lack focus and intensity. New inroads into organized
labor--a major objective since unions are a key pillar of the
This memorandum was requested by the Senior Staff Member of the National
Security Council. It was prepared by Middle America-
Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis and
coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of
Operations. Information available as of 13 January 1984 was used in
preparation of this report. Comments and questions are welcome and can be
F_ I
addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division,
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100250001-5
 SFCRRT
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100250001-5
ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)--are minimal.
Union officials have rejected.overtures of a Communist-labor
alliance and workers, despite declining wages, show few signs of
alienation from the system that has served them so well. Even
though sporadic work stoppages by Communist-dominated teacher's
unions have embarrassed the administration, independent unions
are not attracting new adherents and have not tried to confront
the government over its wage policy. Leftist tacticians have
been unable to parlay their myriad nominal alliances with small
peasant groups into nationwide backing. Similarly, toeholds in
slum-dweller organizations have not grown substantially. Even
the majority of the middle class remains convinced the left
offers little except rhetoric.
Electoral Performance
Underscoring its dearth of support among the political
mainstream, the left performed poorly in state and local
elections last year. Sharp criticism of de la Madrid's economic
policies
won the left media attention but its lack of
inancla resources and its serious organizational deficiencies
took their toll. Leftists finished a distant third to the center
right National Action Party in most races and tallied just a
handful of scattered victories in small rural towns. This
25X6
25X6
lackluster performance shows little likelihood of improving in
1984.,
Leftist Unity
Unity continues to elude the left. Tactical, ideological,
and personal differences plaguing the Unified Socialist Party
(PSUM) remain unresolved and are contributing to the left's poor
public image. Party dissidents--particularly those with pro-
Soviet leanings--appear on the verge of breaking away, irritated
with the leadership's reluctance to attack the government
harsh economic policies,
issi ent elements also resent 25X1
the reelection of Secretary General Pablo Gomez, whom they regard
as bureaucratic, despotic and out of touch with popular
concerns.
25X1
In addition, other major leftist opposition groups are not
only refusing to join the coalition but are pirating members from
it. Several small splinter groups maintain alliances of
convenience with the PSUM, but the important Mexican Workers
Party terminated merger talks last fall. Further underscoring
leftist disunity, the Unified Socialists and the Trotskyite
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100250001-5
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100250001-5 25X1
Revolutionary Worker's Part
25X1
25X1
PRT) field competing front
Prospects for Violence
National leftist leaders are no more prepared to endorse
militant solutions now than they have been in the past. They
realize that while the government is willing to overlook moral
and political support to Central American guerrillas--which
dovetails with official policy--it would react forcefully against
domestic insurgents.
Reflecting both the Communists' view that their
primary unction is to raise the political consciousness of the
people and their awareness of government sensitivities, protest
marches have concentrated on issues--primarily Washington's
Central American policy--where the governing elite and leftist
leaders are generally in tune.
3
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04TOO367R000100250001-5
 SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100250001-5
Outlook
Mexico has a long way to go to escape its economic doldrums,
and the opportunities for the left to broaden its popular appeal
will remain high. But such opportunities seem likely to be lost
since the left has yet to display the ability to resolve
crippling internal bickering. Moreover, de la Madrid's strong
performance during his first year in office and the PRI's
continued ability to adapt to changing circumstances suggest that
Mexico City will be able to handle any challenges likely to
arise.
4
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100250001-5
 gP.rRF.T
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100250001-5 25X1
SUBJECT: Mexico's Leftist Parties in Recent Months
Distribution:
Original - Requestor
1 - Executive Director
1 - NIO/LA
1 - N I C__/_AC
1 -
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - DDI/CPAS/ILS
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - ALA/MCD
1 - ALA/MC/CA
1 - ALA/MC/CC
1 - ALA/MC/R
4 - ALA/MC/MX
ALA/MC/MX~ I(17 January 1984)
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/02/17: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100250001-5