IMPACT OF A CUTOFF OF ASSISTANCE TO THE NICARAGUAN INSURGENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
17 April 1984
NICARAGUAN INSURGENTS
Summary
A cutoff of US assistance to the anti-Sandinista insurgents
in Nicaragua would be a major victory for the Sandinista regime.
We believe it would strengthen the Sandinistas domestically and
increase fears within the area over Nicaragua's aggressive
policies. In our opinion, it would also reinforce the traditional.
Latin American view that the US is an unreliable partner, a
perception that would have serious ramifications for US policy
throughout the region.
We estimate that a cutoff would effectively remove the
military threat posed by the major insurgent group in Nicaragua
within four to six weeks. The other two guerrilla organizations
probably would continue their military operations at reduced
levels.
A cutoff would also have a negative impact on Honduras, where
the military is currently uneasy following the recent removal of
Armed Forces Commander Alvarez. The Hondurans view the
This memorandum was requested by the Director of Central Intelligence.
It was prepared by the Central America Branch, ALA, with contributions from
the Office of European Analysis, Office of Soviet Analysis, and the Office of
African and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated by the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America and by the Directorate of Operations.
It contains information available as of 17 April 1984. Questions and comments
are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA,
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9 25X1
anti-Sandinistas as a buffer against Managua--in effect, their
ninaa
first line of defense--and any action perceived as qthen1
the Sandinista regime would increase military anxiety.
In El Salvador, a cutoff would lead the government and Army
to worry about the reliability of future US support to El
Salvador. The action would boost morale of the Salvadoran
guerrillas while simplifying the resuppy effort of Nicaragua and
Cuba. Assistance to the Salvadoran insurgents almost certainly
would increase and lead to greater guerrilla activity.
The cutoff would also enhance the Sandinistas' bargaining
position at the Contadora peace talks, thus dimming prospects of
meaningful security and other guarantees. Elsewhere in the
hemisphere, the reaction would vary from strong approval in Mexico
to concern in Brazil regardin the ability of the US to implement
a consistent foreign policy.
Outside of the region, most West European governments would
endorse the cutoff, with Socialist elements seeing in the action
some chance of weaning the Sandinistas from Moscow and Havana.
The Soviets would view the cutoff as a possible sign that
Washington would be less likely to use covert actions in the
future to counter Marxist regimes in the Third World. The pace of
Soviet military deliveries to Nicaragua probably would slow as
insurgent activities waned, but they would not be discontinued.
In the event of a cutoff of funds, we estimate the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force--the largest of the three insurgent
groups--would continue to pose a military threat for four to six
weeks. This assumes that they would be willing to continue their
operations, and that at the time of the cutoff they were fully
supplied with food, clothes, ammunition, and weapons.
-- The FDN has not vet established an effective overland
supply route, so it would be totally dependent on its own
airdrops after the aid ended. The lone aircraft being
used for resupply is owned by the FDN
2
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
25X1
still had supplies in Honduras at the time of a cutoff,
Tegucigalpa probably would not stop the insurgents from
moving them into Nicaragua.
-- The FDN has little or no capability of its own to obtain
new supplies from other sources, so any resupply would be
limited to whatever stocks remained on hand at the time of
cutoff.
ARDE, on the other hand, probably can hold out much longer
in sparsely populated southern and eastern Nicaragua. It has
large caches of arms, ammunition, and supplies inside the
country, engages in few pitched battles, and has an unknown
amount of support from other sources.
ARDE leader Pastora, a hero of the Sandinista revolution, has
publicly distanced himself from the US government. Because of
this, he might gain in legitimacy as a result of a cutoff and
might pick up additional manpower and other support from former
FDN cadre.
The two Miskito Indian guerrilla groups that operate in
indigenous territory in eastern Nicaragua probably could hold out
indefinitely. Neither group would be likely to give up the fight
completely. Without resupply of some type, however, their level
of activity would be severely curtailed. The Misura group does
have overland supply routes in the north, but it is dependent on
the FDN for supplies. In the south, the other Miskito group, the
Misurasata, depends on ARDE for supplies. ARDE probably would
provide suDDort at a reduced level if US assistance were cut
off.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS IN NICARAGUA
Managua's leaders would view a withdrawal of US support for
the anti-Sandinista insurgents as a major political victory. The
main impact of a cutoff, in our judgment, would be to remove what
the regime sees as a major obstacle to its consolidation of
control. No longer forced to channel its resources against the
insurgents, Managua presumably would increase assistance to the
Salvadoran guerrillas.
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RD P04T00367R000100300001-9
Economically, the result of a cutoff of support to the
insurgents would be a modest plus for the Sandinistas. The
Nicaraguan Army has taken first priority on food and clothing
supplies, and some of these items could be redistributed to the
public, thereby easing popular unhappiness over rationing. This
psychological benefit probably would dissipate fairly soon,
however, because the FSLN could no longer shift the blame for the
country's poor economic performance onto the insurgents.
Although some demobilized troops could return to jobs in
producing sectors and a few delayed development projects might
resume, we believe the overall economic gain would be small.
HEMISPHERIC REACTION 25X1
Central America
We believe the reaction would be uniformly negative
throughout Central America. Over the last two years, the general
perception of most governments has been one of a growing US
commitment to Central America--a view that was reinforced by the
US action in Grenada last year. Nevertheless, many leaders have
remained uneasy about the depth and duration of that
commitment. They have seen some issues--such as the semiannual
certification of human rights progress in El Salvador--as
foreshadowing a lack of US resolve. Their anxiety has been
increased by an inability to understand the political give and
take in Washington. A cutoff of US assistance to the
anti-Sandinistas would deepen these anxieties and reinforce
traditional views about US untrustworthiness.
Honduras
A cutoff of aid to the anti-Sandinistas would have grave
military, political, and, above all, psychological implications
for Tegucigalpa. It would come at a time of uneasiness within
the military establishment caused by the recent removal of Armed
Forces Commander Alvarez. The Suazo administration's strong
identification with US policy in the region leaves it vulnerable
to domestic political attacks and Nicaraguan aggression. Many
Hondurans view the anti-Sandinistas as a buffer force, the first
line of defense between the more powerful Sandinista military and
their own forces. Should the anti-Sandinistas disintegrate, the
Honduran perception of betrayal by the US would be strong and
long lasting. President Suazo's left-of-center opponents, who
have been critical of his close alliance with the US, would
intensify their attacks and press for a more benign policy toward
Managua. We believe, however, that Suazo and the high command
would demand large amounts of military and economic assistance;
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RD P04T00367R000100300001-9
they would also press for an increased US military presence and
more frequent joint exercises with US forces.
An immediate problem for Honduras would be coping with a
large number of new refugees if the insurgents in Nicaragua were
forced to withdraw. There are already some 50,000 refugees from
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala on Honduran territory. The
addition of some 9,000 anti-Sandinista insurgents would create a
very heavy burden for the Honduran government and international
organizations. In addition, we believe this influx of armed men,
who have little prospect for gainful employment, would lead to
lawlessness and banditry; security forces, already stretched thin
to patrol Honduras' borders, would have difficulty maintaining
order.
El Salvador
The Salvadoran high command would be alarmed by a cutoff of
US support to the anti-Sandinista insurgents. Tactically,
Salvadoran military leaders would anticipate--probably
correctly--an escalation in insurgent activity, as well as
increased resupply of the guerrillas from Nicaragua and Cuba.
They would also be worried that a cutoff might lead to reduced
cooperation on the part of the Honduran military, which over the
last two years has shown some willingness to participate in
blocking and other occasional operations against the
guerrillas.
The psychological ramifications probably would be greater.
Despite continuing US military assistance, the Salvadoran armed
forces have periodically vented suspicions that the US commitment
is tenuous--anxieties that in the past reportedly have resulted
in hoarding of supplies and an inclination to abandon offensive
actions and adopt a traditional defensive mode. These tendencies
would be reinforced by a cutoff. The reduction of US credibility
attendant to the cutoff might also complicate the task of US
advisers in the country.
On the domestic political front, a cutoff would give greater
credibility to extreme riqhtist political leaders who have long
questioned US resolve. While this would not in and of itself
alter the likelihood that the Christian Democrats will prevail in
the 6 May runoff election, growing anxieties on the part of the
right could lead to increased polarization and renewed tampering
with the military establishment.
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9 .
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
Guatemala
Government leaders would be likely to mute their public
displeasure over suspension of the program. They probably would
direct any public criticism at the US Congress, which they also
blame for a failure to restore military assistance to them. In
private, however, Chief of State Mejia and senior military
leaders would condemn the US as an unreliable ally. Termination
of the program would reinforce the Guatemalans' belief that their
counterinsurgency success has been achieved largely because they
do not rely on US strategy, equipment, or training, and are not
subject to political constraints imposed by Washington. We judge
that any improvement in bilateral relations with the Mejia
government would be made more difficult and that Guatemala's
reluctance to become involved in regional military
cooperation--particularly anything relating to problems between
Honduras and Nicaragua--would be strengthened.
Costa Rica
We believe a cutoff of assistance would undermine efforts by
President Monge to continue his tough stance against Nicaragua, a
policy that is already under fire from left-of-center elements in
his own ruling party. More conservative elements, meanwhile,
would intensify pressure on Monge to obtain reassurances from
Washington that it would protect Costa Rica-from Nicaraguan
aggression. Pastora's ARDE insurgents along the Costa
Rican-Nicaraguan border would feel growing pressure from the
Sandinista military, and some ARDE units might have to take
refuge in Costa Rica.
Panama
We believe most political and military leaders would react
negatively to an aid cutoff. Nevertheless, President
Illueca--whose strong leftist views sometimes place him at odds
with his military colleagues--probably would hail the decision.
Defense Forces Commander Noriega, who has been supportive of US
policy in Central America, almost certainly would question
Washington's commitment to the region.
Mexico
Because Mexican leaders oppose any outside military
intervention in Central America, they would react favorably to a
cutoff in US assistance to Nicaraguan insurgents. From the
Mexican perspective, such a move would serve their interests in
Contadora, ease mounting concern over the chances of US military
intervention in the region, and enhance President de la Madrid's
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
domestic and international prestige. Mexico City's deep
commitment to the survival of the Sandinista regime suggests that
de la Madrid is unlikely to abandon his political and diplomatic
support of Managua. A cutoff of aid, however, might cause Mexico
to press Managua to comply with recently stiffened terms for
petroleum deliveries.
South America
The reaction among South American governments to a cessation
of US support to anti-Sandinista insurgents would vary largely
along ideological lines.
-- Colombia's Betancur and Argentina's Alfonsin--both of whom
have demonstrated ,a strong interest in Central
America--would applaud such a move as likely to strengthen
the prospects for a Contadora-brokered regional peace
settlement.
-- In Venezuela, President Lusinchi would be more
equivocal. He acknowledges that US pressure has been
instrumental in wringing concession from the Sandinistas
and would recognize the dangers of such a cutoff to
achieving a balanced settlement in the region.
-- Brazil, which has less of a direct interest in Central
America, would praise the cessation as consistent with its
belief in non-intervention. Privately, however, the views
of Brazilian officials--like those of other moderate to
conservative leaders throughout South America--would he
tempered somewhat by a concern that a termination of US
support to the anti-Sandinistas would fuel Cuban and
Nicaraguan subversive efforts. Such a move would also
spawn new anxiety about the ability of the US to implement
a consistent foreign policy.
Impact on Contadora
Over the last few months, the Contadora peace negotiations
have been increasingly dominated by Nicaraguan propaganda and
firm Mexican diplomatic support for Managua. In contrast, the
other Central American nations are haggling and failing to come
up with proposals. Significantly, the recent debate in the UN
Security Council over the mining of Nicaragua's harbors was
accompanied by silence from three of the Contadora
nations--Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia--while Mexico, the
fourth Contadora country, endorsed the Sandinista resolution. We
believe Nicaragua viewed the US veto of the resolution as a
7
SECRET
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
 gF rpvrr
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
diplomatic victory which it will attempt to propagandize in an
effort to depict the US as the real aggressor in Central
America. A cutoff of US aid to the anti-Sandinista insurgents
would hand Nicaragua a victory and strengthen the Sandinista
regime. This, in turn, would increase further Managua's growing
effectiveness in dealing with the Contadora group.
Cuba, in dire need of a victory after a number of important
foreign policy setbacks in Africa and this hemisphere, would view
a halt to US aid for the anti-Sandinistas as a sign that the tide
was changing in Havana's favor. The use of US military power in
Grenada had caused Castro to adopt a much more cautious approach
in his foreign meddling. We believe Castro--sensing a major
opportunity created by the cessation of US funding--would urge
Managua to deliver a quick death blow to the insurgents; he might
offer more Cuban military personnel to help the Sandinistas. His
inclination to resolve Central America's problems through
negotiations--never very strong--would virtually evaporate,
although he probably would continue to pay lip service to the
need for peace talks to deflect criticism of Cuba's role in
supporting the Salvadoran insurgents. Moreover, he would expand
his propaganda effort on Central America and would point out to
Third World audiences that the US is an ally of dubious
loyalty.
The USSR would publicize an aid cutoff as a victory for
international opinion and a setback for the US Administration,
but it would stress a theme that the US will continue to seek
ways of thwarting national liberation movements.
The Soviets would be pleased with a cutoff because it might
reduce the possibility of a confrontation with the US in an area
distant from Soviet power. At the same time, it might reduce
pressure on Moscow to be seen publicly as doing something to
sustain a Marxist state--pressure that the Soviets have resisted
so far with some apparent discomfort. It might reduce somewhat
the Sandinistas' need--and the Soviets' expense--for military
supplies that the USSR has been sending primarily through Cuba
and Bulgaria. It also probably would make the Soviets believe
that there is a lessened future danger of Washington's using
covert means to try to counter Marxist regimes in the Third
8
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
 cFruFm
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9 25X1
World, and thus partially offset the Soviet unhappiness over
Grenada.
Moscow could be expected to continue military and economic
aid to Nicaragua despite a cutoff. The Soviets' long-term goal
is the consolidation of the Sandinista regime as an example for
other potentially Marxist countries in Latin America and as a
base for future Soviet and Cuban overt and covert operations.
The pace of Soviet military deliveries probably would slow
as insurgent activities waned. Nonetheless, Moscow probably
would continue some shipments--using intermediaries--in order to
complete military buildup plans that presumably exist in secret
agreements similar to those with the Bishop government in
Grenada.
The Soviets would hope that a decline of insurgent activity
would make Nicaragua better able to sustain itself economically,
thus reducing pressure for Moscow to send economic aid. The USSR
has in the past sought to avoid becoming responsible for
sustaining the Nicaraguan economy in the way that it sustains
Cuba, and we believe it will continue to do so. As they have
with recent petroleum shipments, the Soviets will nevertheless
remain ready to fill urgent needs on what they hope is only a
temporary basis.
Western Europe
A decision to cut off US assistance to Nicarguan insurgents
would please most West European governments and might slightly
improve Washington's flagging image among their publics.
Socialist governments and opposition parties have maintained for
some time that external pressure has impeded Nicaragua's proaress
toward democracy and has pushed the regime closer to the Soviet
Union and Cuba. While conservative leaders acknowledge
Washington's special interests in Central America and to some
extent sharp US perceptions of the Communist threat in the
region
Withdrawal of US support for the anti-Sandinista insurgents
might alleviate West European worries about alleged US
involvement in the mining of Nicaraguan ports and Washington's
refusal to recognize the World Court's jurisdiction on Central
America. It might also further weaken the West European peace
movement, which increasingly has criticized US behavior in
Central America to bolster its campaign against INF.
9
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9
25X1
SUBJECT:
Cutoff Of Assistance To The Nicaraguan
Impact Of A
,
Insurgents
DISTRIBUTION
Original -
Addressee
1 -
DDCI
1 -
SA/DCI/IA
1 -
Executive Director
1 - Executive Registry
1 -
DDI
1 -
ADDI
1 -
NIO/LA
1 - C/LA/CATF
1 -
1 - NIC/AG
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 -
1 - DDI/CPAs ILS
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
2 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA/RD
1 - C/SA/SW
1 - C/MX
1_ - C/CC
1 - C/RI
1 - FURA/EI/PS
1 - SOYA/CS
1 - C/MCD
1 - DC/MCD
1 - C/CA
1 - DC/CA
8 - Central America Branch
1 - Division Files
1 - CA Branch Files
DDI/ALA/MCD/CA/CA Branch: amp/
(17 April 1984)
10
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/11/23: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100300001-9