GUATEMALA: CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY AND US RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100320001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 MAY 1984
GUATEMALA: CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY AND US RELATIONS
Summary
Overall, Guatemala supports the broad objectives of US policy
in Central America. Chief of State Mejia and Foreign Minister
Andrade, however, are pursuing a number of specific policy goals
that are at variance with US interests and which reflect
Guatemalan nationalism, ethnocentric views of Guatemala's role in
the region, and growing resentment of Washington in the armed
forces. In our opinion, only a normalization of bilateral
relations with the US--to include a restoration of military
aid--could move Guatemala to a position substantially more
supportive of the particulars of US policy. Guatemalan leaders
are likely to continue to pursue closer ties to Mexico to effect
the repatriation of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico. In this
effort, we believe they will continue to adopt positions at
Contadora and on regional issues that may be closer to those of
Mexico than to those of Honduras, El Salvador, and the United
States.
Who Calls the Shots?
Chief of State Mejia and Foreign Minister Andrade, in our
opinion, are the primary architects of Guatemalan foreign policy,
This memorandum was prepared byl the Central America
Branch, ALA. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America, Directorate of Operations, and the Office of Central
Reference. It contains information available as of 14 May, 1984. Questions
and comments are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle
America-Caribbean Division, ALA,
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particularly regarding Central American issues and relations with
the United States. US Embassy reportinq indicates that a number
of other officials--military and civilian--have varying degrees
of influence, but none are consistently consulted on a broad
range of domestic, foreign, and national security issues.
The substance of Melia's foreign policy is conditioned by
his personal experiences and his perception of Guatemala's
domestic needs. A strong nationalist and staunch anti-Communist,
Mejia is a military man whose career has been largely devoted to
defeating Guatemala's 20-year-old Marxist-led insurgency. Mejia
is preoccupied with the guerrilla problem at home and apparently
has two primary foreign policy objectives: obtaining foreign
assistance to fight the insurgents, and simultaneously,
undermining their credibility by restoring legitimacy to the
Guatemalan government.
Mejia has delegated substantial authority to Foreign
Minister Andrade to design and implement strategies consistent
with his overall foreign policy goals. We believe, for example,
that Andrade has major influence over Guatemala's role in
Contadora--an area of little interest for Mejia--in bilateral
relations with Mexico, and in the Belize dispute. The Foreign
Minister also has substantial input into the conduct of
Guatemalan relations with the United States, although we do not
consider him the primary force. 25X1
Andrade's power stems from Mejia's confidence in him,
particularly for his ability to perceive longer term costs and
benefits that Mejia, keenly aware of his temporary caretaker
status, at times fails to consider. As a result, we believe that
Andrade can persuade Mejia to modify foreign policy positions.
Andrade was probably instrumental in convincing Mejia, for
example, that their active participation at Contadora would he
more helpful in ending Guatemala's regional isolation and in
improving its international image than would Mejia's initial
preference for reactivating the Central America Defense Council
(CONDECA), a regional military alliance. According to Embassy
reporting, Andrade covets power and delegates little or no
authority to his subordinates, particularly on major foreign
policy issues.
Andrade appears to be an elitist--even among Guatemala's
elite--and prefers to associate with those he considers the prime
movers on particular issues. At Contadora, for example, he
apparently believes that Guatemala should have, at a minimum,
influence commensurate to Mexico's and Andrade has developed
close rapport with Mexican Foreign Minister Sepulveda. We doubt,
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however, that Guatemalan positions at Contadora reflect any
influence of Sepulveda over Andrade. Rather, we judge that
Andrade's desire to associate with the Mexicans is allowed by
Mejia and the military in this case because they want Mexican
cooperation on the voluntary repatriation of Guatemalan refugees
from southern Mexico.
Andrade recognizes that political power in Guatemala rests
with Mejia and the military, and that ultimately he serves at
their behest. Knowing his influence is circumscribed by the
military, he does not interfere with military issues or other
domestic policies. He is not universally trusted by the senior
military officers, and we believe that some of the Foreign
Minister's statements, particularly those critical of the United
States, may be designed to demonstrate his nationalist
credentials and to ingratiate himself with the younger senior
officers. His public reproofs of Washington, however, also
express resentment of the United States Andrade knows is
widespread in the military.
. The senior field commanders who placed Mejia in
power--loosely called the Council of Commanders--wield
substantial power, but both the Council as a whole and its most
influential member, General Lobos, are much more involved in
domestic issues and internal security problems. No Council
member stands out as an important foreiqn policy voice, and in
general the commanders support Mejia's qoals of qarnering foreign
military and economic aid to bolster their counterinsurgency
capabilities and of restoring credibility to the qovernment. We
have no evidence that Mejia's foreiqn policy--including his
conduct of relations with the United States--is a divisive issue
among his senior commanders.
Guatemalan Views of Central America
The Mejia regime's goals of restoring domestic and
international legitimacy to the government and gaining material
assistance to aid Guatemala's war against the insurgents are
behind its desire to play a more active role in Central
America. Guatemalan policy in the region, however, is distinctly
colored by three strong perspectives on the current situation in
Central America, some of which are not shared by most of the
other nations of the area.
First, Guatemala believes that its size and population,
resource base, relative economic strength, geographic location,
counterinsurgency success, and historical role in the region
argue its adoption of a more assertive, leading regional role.
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Attempts by other countries to obtain Guatemalan backinq in
disputes with Nicaragua--particularly efforts by the United
States and Honduras--have strenqthened the national sense of
strategic importance. Moreover, public and private statements by
Mejia and Andrade over the past several months indicate that this
courting of Guatemala has led them to believe that they have
leverage with the United States and others.
Second, Guatemala does not see Nicaragua as a direct
military threat nor as a critical supporter--much less the
lifeline--of its domestic insurgents. Mejia has publicly accused
the Sandinistas of supporting the Guatemalan guerrillas, but
he views the guerrillas' use of
Mexican territory as a more important factor in their survival.
Moreover, the Guatemalans consider the spread of communism in the
region, represented by the Sandinistas, as a manifestation of the
larger East-West struggle of the superpowers that should be
primarily addressed by the United States. Thus, they believe 25X1
that policies designed to diminish the Nicaraguan threat more
directly benefit the United States and Guatemala's regional
neighbors.
Third, Guatemala believes Washington is calling the shots in
Central America. The Embassy says Mejia and Andrade frequently
intimate that "Core Four" unity at Contadora, the attempt to
revive the Central American Defense Council, the Regional
Militarv Training Center in Honduras, and the Granadero I
military exercises are all US-inspired and directed. Thus, they
want to deal directly with the United States on such initiatives,
not with their Central American neighbors--particularly
Honduras--who they believe have little to offer in return for
Guatemalan support.
Policy Approach to the Region
Guatemala's approach to Central America primarily reflects
its desire for a resumption of US military assistance, increased
economic aid, and a normalization of relations with Washington.
Given Mejia's preoccupation with the counterinsurgency effort, we
have little doubt that the Guatemalans view their relations with
the United States on a strictly quid pro quo basis.
The Mejia.government apparently believes that if the United
States wants Guatemalan participation and support strongly
enough, Washington will renew military aid. In our judgment,
Mejia and Andrade consistently withhold full cooperation with the
United States on Central American initiatives as part of a
strategy to exact concessions. They do not want to be so
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uncooperative, however, that the United States loses interest in
obtaining their support and, instead, moves to minimize
Guatemala's role and futher isolate it in the reqion. As a
result, Guatemala's policy appears inconsistent as the government
alternately assures US officials of its support for US
objectives, while adopting actual policy positions that at best
only half-heartedly support US goals.
We judge that the Guatemalans are likely to maintain their
aloofness to elicit tangible benefits from Washington in return
for their increased commitment. Meanwhile, they probably will
.pursue improved relations with other regional actors,
particularly Mexico, where Guatemalan efforts may be inimicable
to US interests.
Contadora
At Contadora, the Guatemalans are likely to continue their
inconsistent and equivocal support of "Core Four" unity. They
probably perceive few direct or immediate benefits from
unconditional endorsement of hardline positions opposing
Nicaragua in the talks. Conversely, Embassy reporting shows they
fear that a settlement imposing restrictions on Nicaragua's
military and political institutions could infringe on Guatemalan.
sovereignty by effecting similar constraints on its electoral
process, armed forces, and paramilitary civilian defense force
program. A more neutral posture in the Contadora proceedings
holds some potential train for Guatemala in terms of improving its
standing with an international community keenly focused on the
dynamics of the peace process.
The Mexican Angle
Mejia and Andrade also view moderation at Contadora as a
means of extracting concessions from Mexico on border issues.
The Guatemalans are especially interested in the voluntary
repatriation of some 40,000 Guatemalan refugees from Mexico. The
military hopes to house returnees in new "model villages" it is
constructing in the frontier area. In our opinion, the
Guatemalans believe that no other single development could match
the favorable domestic and international impact on their image
than the return of refugees who fled previous political
violence. The presence of the refugee camps in Mexico, according
to Mejia, are a continuous source of insurgent propaganda
concerning human rights abuses. For other observers, they
represent a vivid reminder of past brutal military repression in
Guatemala. In statements to US Embassy officials, both Meji.a and
Andrade have explicitly tied a Guatemalan posture at Contadora
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consistent with Mexico's to the Mexicans' willingness to assist
with a voluntary repatriation program, or at a minimum, their
willingness to move the camps away from the border area.
Mexican officials announced in early May that they intend to
relocate 2 refugee camps away from the border, possibly by late
May. The Mexicans indicated they hope to improve the security of
the refugees, an apparent reference to a recent attack on one
camp by unknown, but armed and uniformed men. According to US
Embassy officials in Mexico,-however, President de la Madrid made
the decision to move the camps before the latest incident.
Guatemalan and Mexican officials reportedly have been negotiating
a settlement of the refugee problem since at least February and,
Chief of State Mejia
told his senior commanders in April that he expected a solution
soon.
Regional Military Initiatives
The Guatemalans have not pursued multilateral military
cooperation with. their northern tier neighbors, El Salvador and
Honduras, for similar benefit-cost considerations. In our
opinion General Mejia's initial support for reviving the Central
America Defense Council (CONDECA) reflected his belief that it
could be an indirect conduit of US military equipment, provide a
market for Guatemalan-produced ammunition, and propel him into a
leadership role in Central America. Mejia's interest rapidly
lapsed when he realized that none of these benefits would
materialize. Conversely, the mutual defense pact posed the risk
of embroiling Guatemalan troops in potential Honduran-Nicaraguan
hostilities.
Mejia sees little direct benefit to Guatemalan participation
in the Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) or in joint
military exercises such as the current Granadero I maneuvers.
The Guatemalans continue to waver on the nature and extent of
their future involvement in such initiatives, probably as a ploy
to exact a quid pro quo for their cooperation. Although they
apparently would like to engage in these types of operations to
reduce their regional isolation, they view unrecompensed
participation as needlessly diverting precious resources from
counterinsurgency efforts at home. The presence of two
Guatemalan instructors at the RMTC and Mejia's reluctance to
definitively rule out participation in future joint operations
are designed to persuade the United States that greater
cooperation in regional initiatives would follow if Guatemala had
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The Importance of US Assistance
We judge that a renewal of US military aid and increased
economic assistance is the only likely incentive--short of a
Communist insurgent victory in El Salvador--capable of moving the
Guatemalans to a substantially more supportive position behind US
objectives in Central America. Even then, however, their strong
nationalism, ethnocentrism, and domestic policy focus will ensure
that they remain a less-than-pliant ally and wary of multilateral
approaches to regional problems. Moreover, their military
success against the guerrillas has come without US assistance.
As a result, there is resentment in the armed forces toward the
United States, particularly among younger officers who have not
undergone US training and have had little contact with their
military counterparts from the United States. Their growing "go
it alone" attitude is likely to impose limits on the extent of
future US-Guatemalan cooperation.
We believe the Guatemalans place as much symbolic importance
on the restoration of aid as they do on its tanqible impact on
their counterinsurgency program. Mejia views his two foremost
policy objectives--obtaining US material support and ending the
international opprobrium of Guatemala--as closely linked. The
removal of US restrictions on military aid to Guatemala, imposed-
because of human rights abuses, will continue to be viewed by any
Guatemalan government as a critical step toward improving its
image.
Coveting this symbolic support, Mejia and Andrade are likely
to insist on a restoration of military aid as the sine qua non of
improved bilateral relations and regional cooperation. As if to
assist US decisionmaking, they stress economic needs over
military and, according to US Embassy reporting, emphasize that
Guatemala's military equipment needs are few. Mejia has told US
officials that he wants helicopters for medevac purposes, spare
parts for inoperative aircraft, heavy construction equipment for
civic action projects, financial assistance for "model villages"
to house displaced persons and refugees, small patrol boats to
interdict arms, and technical and financial assistance with
elections.
The Guatemalans see their needs--and requests--as small, and
thus are frustrated by Washington's perceived myopia,
particularly in light of the large sums of military and economic
assistance provided to El Salvador and Honduras. Futhermore,
many high-level Guatemalan officials--particularly in the
military--believe that the country's record in improving human
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rights, moving toward elections, and success against the Marxist
guerrillas warrants the resumption of US aid. They believe they
have earned the acknowledgement of these accomplishments--taken
at some domestic political risk--that a flow of military
assistance would imply. In our opinion, Mejia and his senior
civilian and military advisers understand'the role of Congress in
the foreign aid appropriations process but, believing they have
done their part, now consider Congressional opposition a problem
for the Reagan Administration. Moreover, the Guatemalans
appreciate that many in the US government sympathize with them,
but they do not recognize that as equivalent--in symbolic
terms--to having the support of the US Government.
Prospects for Changes in Guatemalan Policy
We do not expect any substantial change soon in either
Guatemalan foreign policy in Central America or in relations with
the United States. We believe the policies Mejia and Andrade are
following are consistent with their goals of acquiring resources
to fight domestic insurgents and to increase the government's
legitimacy abroad. These objectives are widely accepted in the
officer corps, and Mejia's strategy to attain them has qenerated
little internal. criticism. Guatemalan policy in Central America,
in our opinion, is not dependent on the personal orientations of
the current policy architects but rather reflects broader
national values that have been conditioned over the last few
years by their counterinsurgency su me and the nation's
sense of international isolation.
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SUBJECT: GUATEMALA: Central American Policy and US Relations
Original - Ambassador Langhorne A. Motley
1 - Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
1 - Mr. Donald Gregg
I - Ambassador Shlaudeman
1 - General Paul Gorman
1 - Lt.,Gen. James A. Williams
_l - Mr. Nestor D. Sanchez
1 - Mr. Constantine Menges
1 - Mr. Hugh Montqomerv
1 - Dr. Darnell Whitt
1 - SA/DCI/IC
1 - NIO/LA
1 - DDO
1 - NIC/AG
1 -
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA/RD
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
? 1 - DDI/CPAS/ISS
1 - C/MCD
1 - DC/MCD
1 - C/CA
1 - ' C/CC
1 - C/RI
1 - C/MX
1 - MCD/Guatemala
1 - MCD Files
1 - CA Files
DDI/ALA/MCD/CA/ (14 May 1984)
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