TRENDS IN NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR SUBVERSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100400001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1.9 September 1984
TRENDS IN NICARAGUAN SUPPORT FOR SUBVERSION I 25X1
Summary
Nicaragua continues to. support insurgency and other forms of
subversion against non-Marxist governments in the region through
arms flows, training, communications support and advice.
Salvadoran guerrillas remain the primary recipient. Other groups,
especially Costa Rican and Honduran, have also benefitted.
point to a continuinq flow of
munitions and manpower from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran
guerrillas.
At times the quantity is considerable:
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This memorandum was requested by the Honorable Robert C.
McFarlane, Asssistant to the prP~siAnt for National Security
Affairs. It was prepared by
Middle America-Caribbean Division, Office of Atrican
and Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Information available as of 19
September 1984. Comments and questions are welcome and should be
addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division,
Copy C of
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-- In April [Cuba was
stepoing up deliveries of weapons and other military
supplies through Nicaragua to El Salvador in preparation
for the insurgents' fall offensive.
-- In June I I the
guerrillas had received a new otter from Nicaragua to
supply munitions and personnel needs when required.
We currently estimate that roughly three quarters of the
Salvadoran guerrilas' needs are met by external resupply, and
perhaps one third'or more of their small arms requirements are
infiltrated--in the latter case a substantial reduction from the
levels of earlier years due to large arms flows during that
period and guerrilla success in capturing arms in El Salvador.
Virtually the entire flow originates in or passes through
Nicaragua.
groups were still headauartered in Nicaraqua--includinq
the two largest, the ERP and the FPL.
Support for subversion in Central America continues t
receive high-level direction
-- Sandinista Directorate member Bavardo Arce has ultimate
authority for arranging arms shipments.
Salvadoran guerrilla
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-- A political section, coordinating aid requests from
foreiqn insurgent croups, consists of separate branches
for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and even Costa
Rica.
-- A special operations section, which carries out the
deliveries, has separate branches for land, air, and sea
transport.
A major new training facility for Salvadoran guerrillas has
been identified this summer on the Cosiauina Peninsula, across
the Gulf of Fonseca from Pl Salvador.
Santa Julia was intended for that purpose.
since April 1984
construction of 19 buildings has been completed or is
underway, as well as a small arms range, air obstacle
course, and a possible training site for the SA-7, the
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile of Soviet bloc
manufacture. This camp's use of natural concealment and
the nonmilitary layout of the buildings indicate the
installation is for unconventional warfare training.
-- Just southeast of the camp is a staging area (Potosi), a
known transshipment point for infiltrating men, arms, and
munitions into El Salvador.
the number of Salvadoran
guerrillas assembled in Nicaragua for trainina or stagina
purposes in 1984 may have increased over what we believe has been
the case since 1979.
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as of July 1.984 the FMLN had
about 4000 Salvadorans traininq in various Nicaraguan
camps. Though the numbers far exceed our earlier
estimates of several hundred Salvadoran insurgent
personnel in Nicaraqua-
Imay
reflect some accumulation Salvadoran manpower tor the
reported planned fall. offensive by the FMLN. It may also
indicate that the FMLN is usina Nicaragua. to conduct
training no longer possible to carry out in El. Salvador
due to Salvadoran army pressures.
So extensive has been the Nicaraguan support effort for
Salvadoran insurgents that in private conversations Nicaraguan
officials no longer conceal Managua's direct involvement, though
they do try to minimize the extent. For example:
-- In May 1984, during farewell conversations with the US
Ambassador to Managua, Interior Minister Borge said that
Salvadoran communications facilities in Nicaragua were no
longer essential to the FMLN, but it was impossible to
close them down unilaterally. Bayardo Arce said that
just as the US denied mining the ports, so Nicaragua
denied aiding the Salvadorans; both knew the truth.
Nicaraguan insurgent operations have occasionally impeded
Managua's support to the FMLN.
-- Facilities in Nicaragua were attacked last fall and early
this year. At least one transshipment point was badly
damaged.
The Nicaraguans are continuing to support other-Marxist
insurgencies, although at levels below the major Salvadoran
effort.
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-- In mid-1983 and mid-1.984 the Sandinistas infiltrated into
Honduras a total of 1.1.0-1.20 Honduran insurgents trained
in Nicaragua and Cuba. A combination of desertions and
effective counterinsuraencv action by Honduran security
forces thwarted both attempts with apparent ease.
insurgents have provided abundant
detail on eir training. One of the 25X1
Hondurans stated that Dart of his training 25X1
included serving with an international unit fighting
anti-Sandinistra forces in Nicaragua.
-- We believe that the Sandinistas, despite their recent
overtures for improved bilateral relations with Honduras,
continue to view their meddling operations as a possible
way to force short-term concessions from Tegucigalpa
while establishing a base for longer term subversion of
the government.
Sandinista sponsorship of destabilization in Costa Rica has
continued.
-- The Sandinistas have maintained close ties to Costa Rican
communists, several hundred of whom entered Nicaragua
late last year, were trained and equipped by the
Nicaraguans and as the Mora Canas Brigade fought anti-
Sandinista insurgents in southern Nicaragua until July
1.984.
-- The recall of these field experienced combatants to Costa.
Rica has added to the potential for political instability
in that country.
Elsewhere in the region there have been fraamentarv reports
of Nicaraguan mischief-making since the beginning of the year.
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SUBJECT: Trends in Nicaraguan Support for Subversion
Copy # 1 - Robert C. McFarlane
2 - DCI
3 - DDCI
4 - Executive Director
5 - SA/DCI
6 - DDI
7 - ADDI
8 - NIO/LA
9 - D/ALA
10 - NIC/AG
11 -
12 - C/DDI/PES
13, 14 - ALA/PS
15 - ALA/RD
16 - DDI/CPAS/ISS
17, 18, 19, 20 - CPAS/IMC/CB
21 - C/MCD
22 - DC/MCD
23 - C/CAS
24, 25, 26 - NU Desk Analysts
27 - MCD Files
28, 29 - CA Files
DDI/ALA/MCD/CAN (19 September 1984)
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