GRENADA: ELECTION PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 21, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
Central me igence Agency
21 November 1984
GRENADA: ELECTION PROSPECTS
Summary
As Grenada approaches its first national election in eight
years on 3 December, the campaign has boiled down to a contest
between a three-party centrist coalition called the New National
Party (NNP) and the rightwing Grenada United Labor Party (GULP)
of autocratic and corrupt former Prime Minister Eric Gairy. On
the basis of two public opinion polls, the NNP--led by 66-year
old Herbert Blaize--appears to have garnered sufficent popular
support to win the election. Gairy, nonetheless, has enough
loyal followers to enable his party to win at least a few
seats. We do not expect other centrist candidates to be a
factor. The left is represented by the Maurice Bishop Patriotic
Movement (MBPM), but it has little Popular support and is
The newly elected government will face several challenges in
the coming months. Most pressing will be the need to revitalize
the economy and to maintain the unity of the NNP coalition since
unlikely to win any seats.
This memorandum was requested by the Deputy-Assistant
Secretary of State for Caribbean Affairs. It was prepared by
r can an Latin American Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.. Information as of 20 November 1984
was used in the preparation of this paper. Comments and queries
are welcomed and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-
Middle America-Caribbean Division, Office of
Caribbean Division,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
we expect differences over power sharing to resurface after the
election. Moreover, the presence in Parliament of an opposition
represented by GULP members could further undermine the
effectiveness of the new government if Gairy follows his past
practice of using obstructionist tactics. Continued Cuban
guidance and funding will help the MBPM~
take advantage age ot any pox ion iscontent to cultivate
opposition to the new government. Should Gairy's party
unexpectedly win, we believe his tactics and objectives would
stir social unrest and political violence much the same as in his
previous terms.
Background
For the past 12 months, Grenadians have been trying to
maintain order, reestablish a political system, and lay the
groundwork to revitalize the economy, all of which collapsed in
the violent downfall of Maurice Bishop and his leftist regime in
October 1983. The population has been slow to recover from those
events and reconstruction has been faltering. Consequently, the
national election on 3 December will be a political watershed for
Grenada, marking a return to the parliamentary democratic system
that had been circumvented for almost 20 years, first by the
repressive administration of Eric Gairy and then by the leftist
regime of Maurice Bishop.
Election Preparations and Participants
The nine-member Advisory Council that has served as an
interim government in Grenada since November 1983 has followed a
deliberate pace in the implementation of a new electoral
system. The first stage of the electoral process began last
April with the enumeration of voters to update 1976 lists.
Completed in June, over 90 percent of the electorate--some 47,000
voters--were registered.
many of those refusing to participate were a tist
sympathizers. Despite the small size of Grenada's
legislature--only 15 seats are at stake--52 candidates will
compete in the 3 December election. Nomination day on 14
November marked the official opening of the 19-day campaign.
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
SECRET
After a year of vigorous political acivity by a variety of,
hopefuls, the NNP--a coalition of moderates--and Gairy's GULP--
the rightwing party that ruled Grenada foI over 20 years--have
emerged as the main contenders for power. The NNP is led by
Herbert Blaize of the Grenada National Party (GNP), and also
includes George Brizan's National Democratic Party (NDP), and
Francis Alexis' Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM). Because none
of the centrist parties appeared to have enough support on its
own to beat Gairy's GULP, the moderates came under pressure from
local businessmen and leaders of neighboring Caribbean
governments to form an electoral alliance to broaden their
appeal. Basic disagreements about power sharing led to the
failure of a coalition effort in May. Only when the Prime
Ministers of Barbados, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent intervened in
late August and lobbied directly with'Grenadian party leaders did
they succeed in fashioning an agreement. The NNP is.running on a
pro-US, liberal democratic platform and its slate of candidates
consists of eight members from the GNP, four from the NDP, and
three from the GDM.
Although Gairy has announced that he will not run in the
election, the US Embassy reports that he plans to have one of his
proxy candidates resign so that he can. win the seat in a by-
election. Reporting from the US Embassy and the results of
opinion surveys show that although many Grenadians despise the
former Prime Minister, Gairy can still count on loyal followers
among businessmen, the poor, the elderly, and especially in the
rural areas which were his party's traditional strength. The
GULP campaign got an early edge because of the months of moderate
squabbling and disorganization. Moreover, Gairy's organization
has conducted a relatively strong and well-organized effort.
The MBPM, formed in May, represents the less radical faction
of the New Jewel Movement (NJM), which ruled Grenada from its
1979 coup until the US-led military intervention in October
1 See Appendix A for a detailed description of these
parties.
3
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
1983.2 The MBPM's leaders--former government ministers Kendrick
Radix and George Louison--have focused on the memory of the
charismatic Bishop to rally support for their campaign. We
believe--based on US Embassy assessments
b-that most Bishop followers were
badly discredited following t e demise of the Bishop goverment
and that the MBPM has no significant popular support,
ew un followers and that many of these are personal friends
and family of Bishop and the seven other government leaders
killed last October. leftist supporters
are sitting the election out. Although it is unlikely to win any
seats, the MBPM nonetheless appears to view the election as an
opportunity to gain legitimacy, and the party is fielding 13
candidates.
Other participants in the election include five candidates
from Winston Whyte's Christian Democratic Labor Party (CDLP) and
four independent candidates. Whyte--a political detainee under
the Bishop regime--has only a limited base of support and
probably can only count on a small,number of votes in his
hometown. The four independent candidates are unlikely to be a
factor in the election outcome because they are relatively
Election Outlook
We believe--based on the results of public opinion polls
conducted in Grenada by a reputable Trinidadian firm--that
Grenadians are primarily concerned that the election produce a
government with strong and effective leadership, capable of
maintaining political stability.. In this context, the campaign
has revolved around personalities and party loyalties more than
2 The radical faction--reorganizing under the NJM banner--is
composed of those who support former deputy Prime Minster Bernard
Coard, facing trial for the murder of former Prime Minister
Bishop. The group's spokesman, former Central Committee member
Ian St. Bernard, has announced that the NJM will boycott the
election on grounds that Grenada is under foreign military
domination.
4
SECRET
25X1
25X1
2.5X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
SECRET
substantive issues. As a small island-state with a simple
society, the issues that concern the populace are fairly basic.
According to the poll conducted in October, Grenadians identified
high unemployment and political turmoil as the primary problems
they want the new government to solve. Respondents also
indicated that they are concerned about the island's deteriorated
infrastructure and the rising cost of living. The polling
organization concluded that victory at the polls depends on the
ability of the competing parties to persuade the public that they
can provide competent leadership to solve Grenada's problems.
NNP Strengths
The NNP seems to have focused more effectively on these
issues than its principal rival. Campaigning under the theme of
"peace, stability, and prosperity," the coalition has attempted
to emphasize its commitment to democratic government and to the
improvement of economic and social. conditions. Public rallies by
the NNP have also tried to highlight the leadership qualities of
the party's candidates and detail the party's programs for
economic recovery. The GULP, on the other hand generally has
emphasized Gairy's reputation for promoting the interest of the
"little man" and has claimed that a Gairy administration will
maintain close ties with the United States.
We believe--based on reporting from the
US Embassy,
and the poll results---that e
NNP will win a strong majority of the 15 seats at stake in the
election. The remainder, at least two seat and perhaps as many
as five, probably will go to Gairy's party. The results of the
polls--conducted in August and October--demonstrate that since
its inception, the NNP has significantly increased its popularity
and support. By mid-October, the NNP had gained a high level of
recognition among voters and was rated the leading party--with 48
percent support compared to GULP's 31 percent--among likely
voters. The polling organization found that candidates from the
MBPM and CDLP would get between 1-5 percent with the remainder of
the sample undecided. Blaize was the preferred leader among
those interviewed, receiving high marks for honesty, integrity,
compassion, and intelligence. The NNP was regarded as more
3 For a detailed projection of probable electoral results by
constituency, see Appendix B.
5
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
SECRET
likely to provide effective leadership and find solutions to
Grenada's. problems than was the GULP. The results of the poll
have been supported by reporting from the US Embassy
As the NNP's popularity has increased, Gairy's support seems
to have declined. The results of the August survey--when the NNP
was being formed--showed Gairy with about 44 percent of the
vote. Two months later, support for the GULP had dropped to 31
percent. US Embassy reporting indicates that before the NNP was
formed, many Grenadians had swung their support to'Gairy when it
looked as if the GULP might win the election because they feared
possible retribution for not backing the former Prime Minister.
According to US Embassy officials, many Grenadians do not want to
vote for a party that -is unlikely to win, and, as recent trends
become clearer to the pulace, support for ry is likely to
decrease further.
The polls found that about one-third of those likely to vote
had not yet decided which party to support. In our view, this
share is overstated. We believe--based on US Embassy reporting
and the poll findings--that many respondents may have been
reluctant to express anti-Gairy views or to reveal their
intentions because of general suspicions about the purpose of the
poll. In addition, according to the analysis of the polling
.organization, most would-be GULP voters have already committed
themselves, and thus Gairy's support is unlikely to increase
much. We judge, therefore, that most undecided voters represent
potential NNP supporters and that many of these will cast ballots
on election day. Moreover, if the trend of growing support for
the NNP continues until election day, the GULP will be hard
pressed to win more than one of two seats.
NNP Vulnerabilities
The recent momentum of the NNP and the strength of its
election mandate could yet be diminished by organizational and
financial problems in its campaign. The organizational problems
appear to stem from Blaize's weak leadership and the absence of a
single national-level manager to run the campaign. Reporting
from US Embassy officials indicates that Blaize insists on
maintaining unilateral control over the coalition but seems to be
running the campaign inefficiently. As a result, the campaign
lacks adequate publicity, cohesiveness, and a centralized
strategy. The strength of the coalition also is being undermined
by Blaize's apparent determination to gain a predominant position
6
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
SECRET
for his party. According to US Embassy reporting, Blaize has
refused to drop two loyal members of the GNP who are running on
the NNP slate, even though his coalition partners believe these
candidates cannot win. Embassy officials also comment that
Blaize's complacency about the NNP's election chances could hurt
the effectiveness of the campaign. So far, however, active
campaigning and cooperation among candidates from the NDP and GDM
have alleviated some organization and leadership problems.
The organizational problems are compounded by shortages of
campaign funds. US Embassy officials report that although NNP
rallies throughout the island have been well-attended, the
gatherings have been hampered by poor lighting, barely audible
sound systems, and the lack of campaign material. NNP leaders
have voiced concern to Embassy officials that the lack of funds
for field workers, transportation, and publicity may seriously
By contrast, Gairy was able to mobilize his party apparatus
fairly easily when he returned to Grenada last January, and his
candidates were out on the street campaigning shortly
thereafter. Because Gairy and the GULP ruled Grenada for over 20
years, they were well-known throughout the island and had an
organizational structure in place. Although Gairy has not held
any political rallies because he fears assasination, the GULP has
conducted a strong, well-organized door-to-door campaign.
According to US Embassy reporting, GULP politicking has been
successful, and Gairy has been able to rely on the loyalty of his
followers and the field work of party members to expand his
support base. US Embassy officials also report that early in his
campaign, Gairy extorted money and other support from many
Grenadian businessmen afraid of the consequences of not backin
the GULP leader should he win the election,
airy none a ess appears o ave
adequate ng rom friends in Grenada, Trinidad, and the
United States.
Post-Election Challenges and Prospects
Prospects for stability and a return to democratic rule in
Grenada will depend on the strength and unity of the newly
elected government. The recent opinion poll indicates that the
electorate has high expectations of the government to solve
pressing economic issues. In addition to the pressures of these
high expectations, the new leaders will face several stiff
7
SECRET
2.5X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
SECRET
challenges after assuming office--rebuilding the government
bureaucracy, restructuring the economy, overseeing the
establishment of a new police force, and bringing to justice the
19 radicals accused of murdering Bishop last year. Without
governmental cohesion and a strong electoral mandate, the
country's fragile economic and political recovery could stall.
The most difficult challenge facing the new government will
be revitalization of the economy. We believe that foreign
investment is essential to lay the groundwork for sustained
recovery since a large portion of domestic revenue is allocated
for other uses and the tiny private sector is too small to
provide much investment. Increased capital outlays, particularly
in tourism, agribusiness, and light manufacturing would spur
growth, expand the island's export earnings, and help reduce the
island's high unemployment. The improved political and economic
climate already has aroused foreign investor interest, but only
two of the 26 investment projects approved so far have been
implemented.
A major factor inhibiting a rapid inflow of investment is
Grenada's weak infrastructure. We believe that the electricity
supply, road and telecommunications networks, and the water and
sewage systems need to be significantly upgraded for Grenada to
compete effectively with larger Caribbean countries in attracting
foreign investment. Further improvements in Grenada's investment
code as well as cuts in business and trade taxes would also help
attract investment to the island. Much also remains to be done
to make the fledgling domestic business sector an engine of
growth, includi further divestiture of state firms and overall
fiscal reform.
In our judgment, the new Grenadian government is likely to
encounter several political problems in the coming months that
could seriously undermine its effectiveness. US Embassy
reporting indicates that basic disagreements persist within the
NNP on political strategy and power sharing. NDP and GDM members
have tended to give in to Blaize's arbitrary decisions to
preserve the coalition's fragile unity and expedite campaign
progress. These differences would likely resurface should the
NNP come to power.
Moreover, the NNP probably will encounter obstructionist
tactics from GULP members inside the Parliament and, perhaps, in
the streets because Gairy is likely to use his support base to
8
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
SECRET
encourage opposition to the new government. As he did in 1962--
when he lost the election to Blaize's GNP--we believe that Gairy
will continue to campaign beyond this year's election, seizing
opportunities to exploit unmet popular expectations. Because
Gairy retains sizable support in Grenada, he could cause problems
for the new government, which will be seeking a broad consensus
to implement much needed economic and political reforms.
Although an outright victory for Gairy's party is unlikely
in our view, the GULP could win a parliamentary majority if the
NNP coalition fell apart prior to election day. A Gairy
government would almost certainly mark a return to a repressive
and corrupt political system, an outcome which would discredit
the multinational intervention and severely undercut US
credibility in the region. We believe an immediate effect of
such an outcome could be the withdrawal of Caribbean participants
in the multinational peacekeeping force on the island. Gairy
almost certainly would resurrect some version of his infamous
"Mongoose Gang," a --group of thugs that served as his private army
Over the longer term, a victory by Gairy would provoke an
upsurge in social unrest and political violence in much the same
way as occurred during his earlier regime. Political instability
would likely be exacerbated by economic decline as foreign
investors and tourists looked for a more secure environment. At
a minimum, however, we believe that a Gairy victory would provide
Grenadian leftists a strong rallying point for generating renewed
Cuban Support for the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement
Opportunities for a leftist resurgence could also occur if
the NNP coalition wins but is unable to make progress in
resolving Grenada's problems. At this juncture, the MBPM's only
hope of regaining support appears to be linked to a failure of
the new government to meet popular expectations. Such an outcome
would provide an opportunity for the Cuban-backed MBPM to foment
unrest and cultivate support.
Cuban support for the MBPM has been underway since the
multinational intervention in Grenada last year.
9
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
0 SECRET
Havana also has continued to sponsor scholarships for
approximately 120 Grenadian students, who were sent to Cuba under
the Bishop regime.
10
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
vy ~ 25X1
Appendix A
The Major Contending Parties
The New National Party (NNP)
The Grenada National Party (GNP)
Involved in Grenadian politics since the 1950s as the
traditional opposition party to Eric Gairy's GULP, the GNP is the
most conservative of the political parties of the moderate
center. As chairman of the NNP, the 66 year old Herbert Blaize
would become Prime minister if the coalition wins the election.
Blaize is generally perceived as a man of integrity and
experience., according to US Embassy reporting, and is almost
assured of winning his traditional constitutency seat in
Carriacou. Although Blaize and his party bring the most
experience to the centrist alliance, US Embassy reporting
indicates that the GNP has a narrow support base--mostly among
the middle and upper classes. Moreover, some Grenadians have
criticized the viability of the party because of its past
uninspiring political performance and the frail health of
Blaize--who is crippled by arthritis. According to the US
Embassy, GNP leaders, in seeming'to overestimate their
popularity, have tended to be stubborn and self-righteous in
dealing with the NDP and the GDM.
The National Democratic Party (NDP)
Drawing support from the business community in the capital
of St. Georges, the NDP was formed in January 1984 hoping to
establish a broad base of support. The NDP seems to be the most
popular of the centrist parties, according to US Embassy'
reporting and several public opinion polls. The party is led by
42-year old George Brizan, a former teacher and government
education officer. According to US Embassy officials, Brizan is
liked by many of the students he has taught, has support in the
civil service, and has financial backing from members of the
business sector. According to the US Embassy, however, Brizan is
politically inexperienced and has been accused of weakness by
some Grenadian political observers who say that he compromises
too easily. While Brizan seems to lack the dynamism desired by
most Grenadians in their political leaders, he nevertheless is
appealing to many Grenadians for his down-to-earth nature,
according to Embassy reporting. Moreover, Brizan has acted to
broaden his base of support by advocating some of the more
1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
? 25X1
popular social welfare policies of the Bishop regime and calling
for the integration of former NJM and PRA members into society.
These actions have caused some opponents to accuse the NDP of
being communist. Despite Brizan's appeal to youths and the
strong support he enjoys in St. Georges, we believe he must also
bulk of
th
e
develop support among rural Grenadians--which form
t
y.
the population--before the NDP can become a major par
The Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM)
A former exile organization based in Trinidad and Tobago and
the United States during the Bishop regime, the GDM is led by 37-
year old professor and lawyer Francis Alexis. The GDM and its
youthful, well-educated leaders are largely unknown in Grenada
and so far have had little impact, according to the US Embassy.
Moreover, Embassy reporting indicates the party's credibility has
suffered from criticism by many Grenadians who resent the return
of GDM members from exile only after the US-led intervention. In
our judgment, although the GDM currently does not represent a
viable political party, its leaders have a variety of skills and
expertise that could benefit the coalition. GDM leaders probably
hope that the alliance with Blaize in the NNP will improve their
image. We believe the party has been willing to accept a
minority role in the coalition because its leaders perceive that
they could not win any electoral seats on their own.
Eric Gairy and the Grenada United Labor Party (GULP)
In the early 1950s, Gairy formed the GULP and rose to power
by skillfully exploiting the class divisions in Grenadian
society. By capitalizing on the animosity of the peasant and
labor classes toward the wealthy and politically dominant elite,
Gairy built a substantial power base among the rural poor. Once
in office, however, Gairy became obsessed with power and his own
self-aggrandizement. His erratic administration in the 1960s and
1970s was marked by gross mismanagement and neglect
country's finances, according to Embassy reporting.
Gairy built support largely on party patronage, abused the
privileges of office in order to consolidate power, and amassed
personal wealth. He became infamous throughout the Caribbean for
his flamboyance and preoccupation with mysticism and
extraterrestrial activity. A skillful demagogue, Gairy used
money and force to retain the roots of power long after popular
discontent to his rule had taken root. Thus, when he was finally
forced from power by Bishop and a small band of armed
2
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
accomplices, public opinion strongly favored the illegal coup.
When Gairy returned from exile in the United States about a
year ago, he encountered widespread animosity from a cross-
section of the Grenadian population--mostly in the middle and
upper classes and among youths. He, nonetheless, was able to
revitalize his party, and GULP candidates began campaigning long
before the moderates were ready. According to the US Embassy,
the GULP gained support primarily by resorting to its past
strong-arm tactics of manipulation and buying votes. Embassy
officials believe that Gairy remains essentially unchanged
despite his five-year absence from power. In a series of
interviews, Gairy's ramblin conversations led the US officials
to question his stability.
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
Appendix B
Constituency Forecast of the Election
Using statistical probability analysis, we have estimated
the likely outcome of the December election in each of the 15
districts. The probabilities assigned to these estimates are
confidence levels based on the number of persons interviewed in
each district in August and mid-October by a reputable
Trinidadian polling firm. The analysis indicates that the NNP is
likely to win at least nine seats, the GULP could win as many as
five, and one constituency is too close to call. If the present
trend of declining support for the GULP continues, however, the
NNP could win a larger majority of the seats.
Constituency
St. Georges City
St. Georges NE
St. Georges South
St. Georges NW
St. Georges SE
St. Andrew SE
St. Andrew SW
St. Andrew NE
St. Andrew NW
St. Patrick East
St. Patrick West
St. John
St. David
St. Mark
Carriacou
Likely Winning Party
NNP (95-100%)
NNP (95-100%)
GULP (80-85%)
NNP (95-100%)
NNP (95-100%)
NNP (80-85%)
NNP (95-100%)
GULP (95-100%)
GULP (75-80%)
NNP (90-95%)
GULP (90-95%)
Too Close to Call
NNP (95-100%)
GULP (95-100%)
NNP (95-100%)
4
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3
SUBJECT: Grenada: Elections Prospects
1 - NIO/LA, 7E62
1 - NIC/AG. 2G40
Distribution:
Original - Charles A. Gillespie, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Caribbean Affairs, Rm. 6263 Dept. of State
1 - Richard Brown, Director, Office of Caribbean
Affairs, ARA/CAR, Rm 3248 Dept. of State
1 - Doug Rohn, ARA/CAR, Rm. 3248 Dept of State
1 - David Smith, INR, IAA/MAC
1 - Constantir-Menges, NSC
1 - Lt. General Jack N. Merrit, USA, JCS
1 - Nester Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Inter-American Affairs, Rm. 4C800 Pentagon
1 - Col. Brian Bosch, DIO/DIA, Rm. 2C238 Pentagon
1 - Executive Director, 7E12
1 - DD/CPAS/ISS, 7G50
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS, 3F38
1 - ALA Research Director, 3F44
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB, 7G02
1 - C DDI PES, 7F24
1 - ,
1 - OCR/LA/HOL, lH39
1 - C/MCD
1 - DC/MCD
1 - Division Files
4 - Branch Files
DDI/ALA/MC/CAR (19 November 1984)
5
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000100450001-3