CRIME CRACKDOWN IN CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000201190001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
January 31, 1984
Crime Crackdown in China
China has undertaken a massive campaign against crime in
which thousands of people have been arrested and a large number
executed.. The crackdown stems from the perception of Deng
Xiaoping and other senior leaders that there has been a breakdown
in social order and discipline that threatens the party's rule.
The campaign reaches beyond ordinary crime to social and
political misbehavior as well, particularly among youth. Tough
measures taken by local law enforcement and judicial ' authorities,
have, in many cases, gone beyond the bounds of due process as
mandated under. China's legal system. Such actions have created 25X1
controversy within the party and government, vitiated the
generally positive reaction.to the crackdown among the the Dovulace
Since last August, the authorities in China have been
carrying out a harsh campaign against crime. and social
disorder. In the past few months thousands of persons, mostly
youth, have been arrested in police sweeps through urban areas.
Hundreds have been executed, often before massed audiences. The
crackdown is c.ontinuing--embassy.and consulate reporting
This memorandum was prepared by[ of the China
Division, Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and questions
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Domestic Policy
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la three-year campaign is planned. Ordinary street
crime is not the only target; people have also been arrested for
crimes of a political nature and even for behavior which, while
not illegal, the security authorities'find objectionable. Some
in the.party evidently have misgivings but editorials and
speeches have firmly repudiated their objections.
China's "Crime Wave"
The severity of the campaign attests to the leadership's
conviction that China is facing a. crisis situation that demands
strong measures. Reliable crime-statistics do not exist for
China; however, in recent months the press has carried an
unusually large number of stories about crimes. While the media
campaign, it probably also reflects a real crime problem.
Generally, crimes fall into one of three categories: 25X1
economic crime--including corruption, smuggling, profiteering;
street crime--rape, murder, burglary; and crimes against social
order. The final category includes crimes like rioting, viewing
or selling pornography, and disturbing the peace. It also
includes dissident activity, although this aspect is not
discussed or admitted by the authorities. The social disorder
category is exceedingly broad, giving security authorities an
excuse for clamping down on activities, such as wearing long hair
or dancing which the dislike but which are not specifically 25X1
criminal.
As in other countries, a disproportionate number of crimes
are committed by the young. China's high unemployment rate,
inadequate schools, the drift to the cities from the countryside,
and the maturing of a generation severely disillusioned by the
Cultural Revolution and' its aftermath all combine to exacerbate
youthful discontent. Increasingly this discontent has found its
outlet in criminal and antisocial behavior; many unemployed urban
youth have turned to robber Prostitution, extortion or other
crimes for a living. 25X1
Motives Behind the Crackdown
We believe the campaign stems from long simmering leadership
discontent with social order and'the performance of the security
services in China. A number of stories as to what precipitated
the crackdown are in circulation, ranging from an attack on Deng
Xiaoping himself to impassioned pleas to the Politburo by crime
victims. Whatever the case, it is clear that the campaign. was.
begun at the highest levels of Chinese leadership and directed
from the top down--Deng and Chen Yun are, as far as we know,'the
leaders most directly responsible for the initiative. They
'apparently were convinced that criminal behavior was getting but
of hand and that emergency measures were.needed. The resultant
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crackdown exemplifies?the way in which China's decisionmaking
structure concentrates authority not only over general policy but
even over the details of Its im lementation in the hands of a
very few elderly leaders.
While the authorities acted in part out of sincere concern
over criminal disorder, the. campaign is also driven by. the
party's need to repress dissident thinking and by a distaste for
youthful attitudes and fashions--"crimes of attitude"--
combinedwith the puritanical moral outlook of the aged leaders.
We surmise that the leadership saw the crime problem as evidence
that it was losing control of Chinese society in fundamental
ways, particularly as regards those under 30--about two-thirds of
China's population.. The congruence of the anti-crime campaign
with two other current campaigns--the rectification of the party
broader aims of Beijing's policy.
The anti crime campaign has also been used to strike at
political dissidents, though Chinese officials deny this. One
case that attracted considerable attention was the arrest of
several Tibetans whom the Dalai Lama claimed were dissidents who 25X1
advocated greater autonomy from China. The US embassy reports
that dissidents are clearly subje t; to arrest but has. no
Hence any have been executed.. 25X1
the majority of arrests
factional element.
Propaganda has linked .the anticrime campaign with class
stuggle and called criminals "class enemies," in Marxist terms
the most dangerous enemies of socialism. This linkage is
'
the propaganda since
especially noteworthy because the thrust of
1981'has been that class stuggle is of limited significance in
socialist China. The language of these commentaries was
extraordinarily harsh, reminiscent of the rhetoric of the
Cultural Revolution. Although we do not expect a recurrence of
the turmoil of that era, bringing class struggle into the.
Some evidence exists that factional politics,, at both the
highest and at lower levels, is.-involved. There have been 25X1
indications that the top leadership is divided over the crime
problem, with Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun taking a hard line and
Hu Yaobangn" degianated heir--favoring a more liberal
approach.
Hu favored restricting the campaign to common crime u
Deng, .overriding-him, insisted on adding the political
dimension. 25X1
Some cadre reportedly believe that the sudden crackdown on
crime represents a slap in the face to Hu's policies, which
favored addressing unemployment and youthful disillusionment--the
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causes of crime--as well as enforcement. They see a loss of
confidence in Hu on Deng's part, and a concomitant loss of .
status, possibly even imperiling Hu's position. A recent story
crediting Hu with initiating the campaign has begun to circulate,
perhaps indicating an attempt by Hu's.supporters to undercut this
speculation and place Hu on the right side of the issue.
Leading cadre at all levels, even the very highest, have
been affected by another aspect of the crime crackdown, the
attack on criminal activities of cadres' children and
relatives. Delinquency by privileged youth has been.a major
problem in China at least since the end of the Cultural
Revolution. In the latest crime drive, Deng Xiaoping has-warned
that no one will be able to hide behind influential parents-- 25X1
though he warned the Ministry of Public
Security off an investigation of his own children. Relatives of
several top military and civilian leaders have been implicated in 25X1
criminal activity. Even the Politburo Standin Committee has
been involved. The US Embassy has heard
a grandson o e ianying was 25X1
executed recently for plotting against Deng and that a nephew of
1i Xiannian ot, with his uncle's consent, for c0'rruption.
25X1
Attacks on cadres' relatives can be used as a weapon in
factional infighting.. At lower levels this tactic is common, and
it has been employed at the national level as well. Beijing will
have a great deal of difficulty preventing this abuse in its
drive against crime, but serious inability to prevent it will
discredit the campaign, heighten tensions already high because of
rectification, and po ibl dilute the long-term effectiveness of
the crime crackdown.
China has carried.out periodic drives against crime and
corruption since the Cultural Revolution, most notably in 1980
and 1981, but none has been as large-scale and intense as the
current one. Information from thr h t China indicates its
severity. One estimate puts the number of 25X1
executions at 5000 since.t a start of the campaign. Fragmentary
statistics, support high estimates: for example, Embassy Beijing
reports over 60 executions took place in that city during the
first 20 days of January. Several cadres have referred to arrest
quotas--levied by Beijing--which local security organizations
have had trouble filling with genuine criminals. In some cases
they have taken to arresting people engaged in minor public
disturbances or who make injudicious political remarks.
Morever, security forces have used tough new tactics in
carrying out the campaign. Some.arrests have taken place in
night-time dragnets; sometimes relatives are not informed for
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several days. In Shanghai, police and PLA troops reportedly
arrested more than 8000 people in September alone. Another wave
of arrests was in progress in January according to consulate
reporting. A public security official said that many arrests
were made on the basis of lists submitted by local party
secretaries. In Fujian, because police are arresting suspicious
looking youths, Chinese residents have observed that barber shops
are full of local would-be dandies getting haircuts.
. Some Chinese have reported the campaign has strained
security resources, overwhelmed detention facilities, and clogged
the fledgling legal system. According to a resident of Shanghai,
PLA troops have been called on to assist in making arrests and
guarding prisoners, even though this responsibility was
supposedly taken from them and given to the resuscitated People's
Armed Police last year. In one area, according to a security
cadre, police have been using athletic fields as emergency 25X1
camps in Xinjiang s rained'the capabilities of the security 25X1
apparatus in that province, requiring it to request additional
funds and to call on. the paramilitary Production and'Construction'
Corps for additional manpower. In one group of.10,000 prisoners
transported to Xinjiang, over 100 executed en route, and an
unknown number committed suicide. 25X1
The mass arrests and Beijing's desire for speedy prosecution
and punishment have placed n on hina's judicial system. 25X1
A legal official in Fujian,
]so-called "first-line Public ecuri y caare-- are
carrying ou arrests; these first- line cadre are formerly 25X1
unemployed urban youth who reportedly take a hard line toward
suspects, aart-icularly the offspring of China's privileged
classes. police 25X1
officials, when they make an arrest, ave sometimes ed the
suspect's name from his household register--a drastic move that
in effect makes it illegal for him to reside in. the city, where 25X1
made it even more perfunctory than before.
rectification, had ceased because of the heavy load of criminal 25X1
cases. The case load has not slowed the.tcia ess. but only
21n China, a person brought to trial on criminal charges is
assumed to be guilty. Trial proceedings are in many cases little
more than sentencing hearings.
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Executions are often carried out immediately after
sentencing, and sometimes in front of large crowds. A grim rumor
has it that families of executed criminals must pay 80 yuan--more
than the average worker's monthly wage--to recover the body. The
free hand granted security authorities has.also enabled them to
take advantage of opportunities for corruption--some families are
reportedly paying "fines" to local security personnel in exchange
demonstrate repentance--are to be executed.
As part of the crackdown, tough sentences are being imposed
for relatively minor crimes. People have reportedly been -
executed for pimping, prostitution, and robbery,, while lesser
crimes like pickpocketing and even disorderly conduct have earned
transgressors exile to remote labor camps. Mild sentences are
being reviewed and strengthened by higher level courts; in
Zhejiang province, two criminals who appealed prison sentences of
seven and five years were sentenced to death after a State
Council order to stiffen punishments. One law enforcement
official claimed that under the*new policy, all nonpolitical
criminals sentenced to life or death with a two-year reprieve--a
Many youth are being sent to labor reform camps without any 25X1
trial, some merely because they'had served time in labor reform
The Sixth National People's Congress (NPC) adopted a new
constitution last year; one-of its provisions, which received
heavy propaganda coverage, was the establishment of new legal
codes and a return to the rule of law in China. But in September
of this year the second session of the NPC promulgated revisions
to the code that in effect suspended due process in the criminal
realm and removed limits on maximum sentences for serious
innocent are being arrested along with the guilty.
The Societal Impact
Public reaction to the wave of arrests and executions has
been mixed. According to the Chinese press and some embassy
reporting, the 'campaign is supported by the general populace,
many of whom welcome the move as long overdue. Social .status,
education, and age affect the attitudes adopted toward the
crackdown, with older, less well educated people more inclined to
look favorably on it. Some express skepticism that the campaign
will last long enough--or reach high enough--to diminish crime in
the long run. Some party members and intellectuals, however, are
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There is considerable opposition within the party to the
heavy-handed tactics of the campaign. The leadership is
particularly sensitive to the charge that it has abandoned its
commitment to the rule of law. In early December, Chen P'ixian,
Secretariat member in charge of legal and security affairs,
defended the crackdown in a speech to the China Law Society.
Chen frankly discussed some of the criticisms aimed at the
campaign. He said there is a viewpoint that the struggle has
ruined overnight the newly established legal system" and that
some people have labelled the campaign "feudalistic, vindictive
punishment." His counter-argument--that the campaign strengthens
the legal system because it helps to maintain order and. because
the people favored it--has been widely carried in the press.
Some articles in the provincial press have criticized p
members for harboring reservations about the crackdown.
China has also reacted sharply in its international
propaganda organs to foreign critics of the crackdown, which have
included Amnesty International and the foreign minister of
Sweden. These replies have stressed two main points: that the
problem is a Chinese one to be solved by Chinese in accordance
with their own laws and traditions, and that all normal legal
Costs of the Campaign
Beijing claims the crackdown has had the desired effect of
cutting the crime rate, but it also may have unintended.
consequences. Intellectuals' confidence in the party's
commitment. to the rule of law has been shaken, and their
willingness to commit themselves to the reforms the -leadership is
counting on so heavily to modernize China is more open. to
question. There will be no overt opposition to the campaign but
many will adopt a cautious, noncommittal approach that will do
little to advance economic, governmental or intellectual
The abuses of. the campaign and the use of the campaign to
pay off factional or personal scores will add to the residue of
.conflict still remaining from the Cultural Revolution. Since
many of the "crimes" involve urban youth and intellectuals, and
since many of the security troops are drawn from uneducated
unemployed youths, increased social tensions seem to be built
into the conduct of the campaign,.
The nature of the crackdown, its targets and its tactics,
indicate that part of China's leadership is still hypersensitive
to any perceived loss of control, suspicious of the young and
their attitudes, and unwilling to confront or even acknowledge
the deeper causes of declining social order. The party's old
guard still harks back to a golden age and is ready to use heavy-
like--disciplined, committed. to revolution, puritanical.
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Crime Crackdown in China
EA M 84-10020
Department of State .
1 - Director, INR Hugh Montgomery)
1 - Director of Research, INR (Weaver Gim)
1 - Chief, Northeast Asia Division Office of Analysis for East
Asia and Pacific, INR (Robert Randolph)
1.- INR/EC/RE (Emil. Erickson)
1 - Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asia and
Pacific Affairs (Donald Anderson)
1 - Chief, Economic Section, Office of Chinese.'Affairs
Defense Intelli ence A enc
- DID or ast Asia. an Pacific
1 - Chief, DE3
Department of Defense
1 - Director, East Asia and Pacific Affairs,-'International
Security Affairs (Stewart Ring)
Central Intelligence Agency
1 =
2 - C/OEA/CH
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOR
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEF
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV
1 - D/OEAA
1 - D/NIC
5 - OCO/IMB/CB
1 -
1 - OEA/NA
1 - OEA/SE
1 -.C/PES/DDI
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