CHINA: THE NATIONAL POLITICAL SCENE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000201270001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 24, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL
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Central Intelligence Agency
WashingonD C2aSO5
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 February 1984
China:' The National, Political Scene
Summary
Recent political developments in China have
followed a path well marked by Deng Xiaoping, who,
at 79 and after five years. as the party's undisputed
leader, displays no.,intention of retiring. Deng's
ambitious political' agenda for 1984 includes a
nationwide party "rectification" and the extension
of party and government reorganization to'the local
level. The recent drive to contain-Western
influences has exposed tensions within the central
leadership, but, within the context of subtantial
agreement on most national goals, disagreements
appear manageable. Although Hu Yaobang and Zhao_
Ziyang seem secure as Deng's political heirs, they
still must remain .responsive to powerful
conservatives within the central leadership. Deng's
support remains essential as Hu and Zhao seek to.
consolidate their leadership.
Priorities
Since his ascendancy in 1978, Deng has controlled the
political agenda, and his policy preferences form the core of
current Chinese political efforts. Deng seeks to remake the po-
lity along lines that will promote--rather than interfere with--
economic development. This year, having already completed an
initial shakeup in both the central and provincial bureaucracies,
Beijing has turned its attention to county-level organization.
Village administration too is scheduled for sweeping overhaul as
This memorandum was prepared by of the China
Division of the Office of East Asian na ysis in response to a
Treasury Department request. Questions and comments are welcome
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China's more than 50,000 communes revert to a more traditional
form of village government under a mayor. China will continue
its drives against official corruption and street crime.
Deng has also mandated a party rectification that will
recruit new members, reindoctrinate old ones, and purge the
corrupt or politically unreliable. Inaugurated in October', the
drive is scheduled to last three years. Party reform is an
important element in the attempt of China's reformers to transfer
power from the generation of aged revolutionaries to younger,
better educated; professionally more competent officials. Deng's
handpicked successors, party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and
Premier Zhao Ziyang, have a chance to improve their political
bases through the promised personnel turnover of the,
rectification process.
Resistance
In the Provinces. Although Deng and his allies have placed
supporters in key central and provin.icial positions, their
political and economic reforms remain controversial and have been
implemented unevenly.. .In Beijing's analysis, the main locus of
resistance is at the middle and lower levels of administration.
Through political connections and long, undisturbed tenure in
office, many local officials are immune to central discipline;
consequently, they often defy Beijing without fear of
retribution. Unless local-officials are absolutely certain that
the national leadership is united behind a measure, they often
respond to central initiatives in ways that suit their own
personal interests. Obstacles to reform, these lower level
officials--and especially those with "leftist" Cultural
Revolution backgrounds--are the main, targets of the current
rectification campaign.
The recent campaign against "spiritual pollution"--the
spread.of undesirable Western ideas and-tastes--again .
demonstrated the tendency of local officials to go their own
way. Many reacted to Beijing's imprecise guidelines by simply
criticizing anything not distinctly Chinese: stylish clothing,
curly hairdos, classics of Western literature, and--most
troublesome from Beijing's perspective--economic policies that
rely on material incentives to spur production. .
In the Central Leadership. The spiritual pollution campaign
also has exposed apparent strains within Deng's ruling
coalition. Exactly why Deng called'for a national drive to
criticize Western influences--at the same October party session
that ratified rectification guidelines--remains unclear. The
timing of 'the propaganda push against spiritual pollution-and its
brief ascendance at the expense of the party rectification drive
at least suggests disagreement, within the Politburo over the
conduct of party reform.
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The Politburo contains powerful members of the party old
guard, such as Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen, who, while sharing most
of Deng's.goals, disagree with him on some important issues. In
our view, party traditionalists are leery of a full scale-
rectification for reasons that amount to a fear-of the,
uncertainty and political instability implicit in airing party
shortcomings. Traditionalists may seek to deflect party reform
to a less divisive course, perhaps one that. concentrates solely
on inner party disciplinary measures rather than exposure of
party malfeasances, to public scrutiny.
Issues
Deng presides over.a relatively collegial decisionmaking
process. He cannot dictate'his will on a given issue and"
generally has tried to reconcile a range of opinions. Key issues
now before the leadership include:
Control. The program of China's reformers revolves around a
differentiated approach to economic, political, and social
controls that some within the central leadership find
objectionable. Control is close to the center of nearly all
political questions in China. For example: How far should the
party go toward strengthening other institutions when it may, in
effect, dilute party control? How much independent discretion
can the central leadership permit to organizations below the
national level? What are the limits to individual artistic or
economic initiative? Beijing is still groping for politically
acceptable answers to these and similar questions.
The Economy." China's "open door".to the West and domestic
relaxation of economic restraints remain politically
contentious. During the recent drive to criticize spiritual
pollution, Beijing felt it necessary to defend repeatedly the
open. door policy against unnamed critics. Similarly, the rise of
newly wealthy peasant families--a result of Beijing's successful
agricultural policies-- has occasioned a positive media
discussion of income inequalities in the countryside and renewed
criticism of rural officials who have resisted the new
policies. Many other economic questions remain politically
controversial, including the relative priority given heavy and
light industry in the budget, the role of material incentives,
the devolution of economic decisionmaking, and the dismantling of
the commune system in the countryside.
Organizational Reform. Party rectification and bureaucratic
reorganization are issues that affect the livelihood of millions
of officials. So the shakeup of central and provincial
administration that began two years ago has produced mixed
results, in part because some officials simply refuse to retire
or be reassigned. Beleaguered bureaucrats will continue their
search for means to blunt the force of threatening personnel
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measures. They look to Beijing for both tacit and actual support
from some central leaders who themselves have resisted retirement
or rectification.
Social Order. The anticrime drive that began last September
has resulted in a wave of arrests and executions. There are no
precise numbers, but a collation of fragmentary press,
diplomatic, and other reporting suggests that from 5,000 to
10,000 criminals have been executed. Beijing claims that crime
rates have dropped sharply as a result. Some Chinese, however,
are troubled by the state's disdain for recently codified legal procedures that are touted by the reformers as an important
corrective to arbitrary public security practices.
Intellectuals. Much of what Deng.seeks to accomplish
depends upon winning, the support and cooperation of China's
intellectuals who, in 1978, were officially redesignated members
of the working class and therefore acceptable partners in the
modernization drive. Educated Chinese remain fearful, however,
that the party will again reverse itself, criticize intellectuals
for being incorrigibly tainted by "liberal" or anti-socialist
attitudes, and return to a policy of persecution--a course of
action probably favored by many of the party's still
predominantly peasant rank and file.
Ideology. Ideological drift remains troubling to the
party. Since the death of Mao, the discrediting of many of his
ideas, and the emergence of a results-oriented leadership in
Beijing, China has had no true ideological anchor. Party
moderates and intellectuals welcomed the relaxation of
ideologicial constraints and a decrease in the state's-once
incessant efforts to prescribe every manner of values. Other
more ideologically orthodox party members, however, decried the
downgrading of dogma and the party's forfeiture of its right to
dictate standards of behavior. Again, the recent campaign
against spiritual pollution brought these simmering differences
within the party.to the surface. The mix of idealism and
political expedience among defenders of a more rigorous orthodoxy
makes the issue a useful lever against reform and reformers and
ensures further political battles.
Army-Party Relations. Under Deng's leadership, army-party
relations have been on an even keel. The Chinese military is
well-represented in the top leadership and has generally
cooperated in Deng's effort to professionalize the armed
forces. The military leadership accepts current economic
priorities that place the importance of military modernization
well down the line but expects that, as China's economy grows,
the army will ultimately receive its share of the budgetary
pie. Deng and his allies nevertheless continue to move steadily,
if cautiously, to reduce the political influence of the senior
soldier-politicians. Beijing has already made good progress
toward ensuring that the military will not be the decisive factor
in Chinese politics, as it was during the Cultural Revolution.
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"Crisis of Confidence". From its own experience and from
the past-five years in Poland, the Chinese leadership has learned
that a party cannot lead without the respect of those it
governs. Many of Deng's policies--including reorganization of
the party and state, efforts to coopt intellectuals, and economic
reform--have the rehabilitation of the party's public image as
their collateral goals. Many party leaders recognize that the
party has gradually eroded its own legitimacy through wildly
vacillating policies and political warfare within the central
leadership. In seeking to solve their legitimacy problems,
however, the top leaders seem split on whether to impose the
party's primacy in a heavy-handed, Leninist manner or to persuade
the Chinese with words and deeds that the party is fit to rule.
Succession
Some observers believe that Hu Yaobang himself was in
political difficulty during the spiritual pollution campaign. If
so, he has rebounded smartly. After a long silence, his
exposition of spiritual pollution proved to be authoritative and,
indeed, presaged the campaign's curtailment. According to a
generally reliable Hong Kong journal, Hu convened an emergency
meeting of the Politburo in November to rein in the campaign
after it had gotten out of hand in the provinces.
Although Hu has placed a number of trusted supporters in
positions of influence, he remains unpopular among some members
of the party ol.d,guard,.who regard him as too liberal, impolitic,
and disrespectful of- party tradition--including the place of Mao.
in the mythology of Chinese Communism. Hu could not, in our
judgment, face down the conservatives within the Politburo
without the solid backing of Deng. We are uncertain of the
numerical strength of Hu's probable opponents, but it is probably
insufficient to budge Deng from backing his man.-
Should Deng die soon, his place as first among euqals within
the top leadership would probably gravitate to a generational
peer such'as?Li Xiannian or Peng Zhen, a member of the old guard
whose seniority and personal connections in the party approximate
Deng's. We believe the leadership would choose to avoid a
divisive power struggle, and Hu would likely remain the titular
head of the party, presiding rather than ruling, in much the same
way as he serves under Deng. In the longer term, Hu is well
situated to inherit Deng.'s political power, because, like their
Soviet counterparts, China's gerontocrats will soon begin. to-fade
from the scene, leaving Hu as the leading figure of the successor
generation.
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Distribution:
Department of Treasury
1 - Steven Canner, Director, Office of East-West Trade
National Security Council
1 - David Laux, Senior Staff Assistant for China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong
Central Intelligence Agency
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/EA
.1 - D/OEA