URBAN TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 17, 2009
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 3, 1984
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1.pdf231.18 KB
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Approved For Release 2069/03/17 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1 wash nsoo.o c zosos DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE 3 December 1984 Urban Terrorism-in the Philippines Summary Several recent violent incidents in Philippine cities raise the issue of whether radical groups, and especially the Communist Party of the Philippines, have reached a decision to embark on a campaign of urban terrorism. Evidence from a variety of sources indicates that many of the incidents are not?the work of terrorists and we do not believe that in the aggregate they indicate the beginning of a Communist urban terrorist. campaign in Manila. Up to now, the Party appears to'have concluded that the benefits from such a campaign. would be outweighed, by the damage that'harsh' government reprisals would inflict against an exposed Party apparatus. Nevertheless, the Party's growing military tactical capability, the vulnerability of,Manila to urban terrorism, and evidence of a debate within the party over the advisability of more violent tactics suggest that the potential for such a campaign.will remain high. Evidence From Recent Incidents. A spate of recent violent incidents in Manila, Davao, and several other cities has.sparked concern among many Philippine observers that radical groups in the country have embarked on a new wave of urban terrorism. Manila had'exper.ienced a,f-lurry of This memorandum was prepared by Southeast Asia Division, Office of East Asian Ana ysis, an -was coordinated with the Office of Global Issues. Information available as of 29 25X1 November 1984 was used in " its. preparation. 'Comments and queries - are welcome and may be directed to Chief, Southeast Asia Approved For Release 2009/03/17 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1 Approved For Release 20 purposes--has remained at low levels in recent years. The recent incidents began with the assassination last June .of Manila Police General Karingal. The government claimed that the New.People's Army had assassinated Karingal to avenge the deaths of, several leftwing labor members who were killed during 25X1 Karingal's death was followed by the assassination of opposition leader Alexander Orcullo.last October in Davao City. Orcullo's assassination received widespread media attention and has served to underscore 'the deteriorati.ng security situation in Davao--.a city long known to'be infested by the NPA. The assassination of Zamboanga City Mayor Cesar Climaco two weeks ago has also fueled speculation that urban terrorism is on the rise. Climaco's death--highlighted by'his heavily attended funeral--has been the most widely publicized event in the series of incidents. Thus, far, no group has claimed responsi.bility for dormant since 1981--and the Communist.Party.* To complicate matters, a series of hotel fires.have'erupted. in Manila and Baguio since early November. Although no group has claimed responsibility, government off-icials have determined that the fires were deliberately set. A Police Constabulary task- force has been formed to investigate several'. groups, including the remnants of The April 6thLiberation?Movement and the Light A-Fire Movement--two rightwi,ng terrorist groups that have been -most - oft he hotel'fires were probably arson conducted to coll.ect'insurance. Approved For Release 2009/03/17 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1 suggests'that it is continuing to avoid a campaign of violence in the capital while concentrating Party efforts'on political . have been instigated by militant student groups who are demanding that the Communist Party take a more confrontational, stand during rallies. Increasing evidence, moreover, suggests that the Party has become concerned in.recent organization. There is basis for concern, however, that the 25X1 party might eventually choose to embark on anew phase of urban terrorism. Clashes between protestors and police at. least considering urban terrorism as a way to gain new momentum. ongoing debate within the Party over whether or not. to move into a phase of urban terrorism, with some arguing that the current situtation in Manila has deteriorated to the point where the destablizing effects of'urbaq,._';;:::: terrorism would be worth-the cost of a potentially harsh 25X1 l ' s willingness to c aim government crackdown. The Party y$^h 1 responsibility for the Karingal assassination &25X1 ay reflect this view. r w 25X1 Approved For Release 2 has clearly embarked on an urban terrorist campaign is'Davao City. The frequent "liquidation" of uncooperative'village captains or corrupt local officials has ion been common to Davao and is a hallmark of Party strateLrV. 25X1 25X1 Prospects In all likelihood, the Davao campaign will continue to undermine stabilit on Mindanao fore ears to come. The costs for the party in mounting a broader urban i n-- articular) `in the it l-- amDaiz terror' hi h. Approved For Release 2009/03/17 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1 Party. organization and cadre would be exposed to a dose of government retaliation which the Party has up to now taken pains to-avoid. The Party will continue to'weigh the tradeoffs of ,a full- fledged urban, terrorist campaign and may resort to violent tactics if it perceives that tensions--heightened by Marcos's recent health crisis, the implication of General Ver in the Aquino assassination', and the bite of harsh austerity measures-- can be aggravated to a degree that threatens the government's ability to maintain peace and order in.Manila. We.bel`ieve there. are several' key signs that would leave no doubt within the. Intelligence Community, or for that matter in the Philippine Government, that an urban terrorist campaign was",underway. In. Manila, we would.watch.for: Coordinated attacks on government officials and government' buildings. --The singlingout for attack of projects-associated with Imelda Marcos, such as the Manila Cultural Center, which tend-to be scorned by most Filipinos. Other buildings that would be obvious targets for urban-terrorists are the offices. of the Ministry of Human Settlement's, which Mrs .. Marcos' heads.' --Attacks against corporate headquarters and other'." -private 'inteiestsof President Marcos's key cronies, including coconut king Eduardo Co'uan co and sugar czar Roberto Benedicto. Approved For Release 2009/03/17 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1 r? is Over the longer term the campaign would likely extend to US citizens, installations, multinational corporations, and other foreign financial institutions. This would be a major shift in tactics--the Party traditionally has not targetted US buildings or citizens. But anti-US rhetoric increasingly. figures. in Party propaganda, and the Party's decision to move in earnest to a stage of urban terrorism in our opinion would inevitably lead to a targettin of the US installations. Approved For Release 2009/03/17 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1 South China Sea Province boundary o 10 Philippine Sea bCatanduanes Malaysia Bohol O Luzon Strait ci Indonesia r Approved For Release 2009/03/17 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1 Approved For Release 2009/03/17 CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1 1--DCI (7D60) 1--DDCI (7D6011 Original--OEA/SEA/IB '1--OEA/SEA/ITM 1--Ch/OEA/SEAD 1--DC/OEA/SEAR 1- 1--C/NIC (7E62) 1--NIO/EA (7E62) 5--CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07) 1--C/PES/DDI (7F24) 1--DDI (7E44) 25X1 1--Executive Director (7E12) 1--CPAS/ILS (7G215) 1--OEA/NEA (4G43) 1--OEA/CH (4G32) Outside: State: 1--Honorable Paul Wolfowitz 1--John Monjo 1--John Maisto 1--Thomas Hubbard 1--RAIN Jonathan T. Howe 1--Rod Huff ' 1--Weaver Gim 1--Allen Kitchens 1--Bob Carroll 1--Corazon Foley,. 1--Hugh Montgomery 1--Anthony C. Albrecht Treasury: 1--Douglas P. Mulholland 1--Gaston Sigur 1--Richard Childress 1--Richard Armitage Approved For Release 2009/03/17 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1 1--Don Gregg 1--Robert Emery 1--David Laux 1--James Kelly Commerce: 1--Eugene K. Lawson 1--David Peterson 1--William Brown Approved For Release 2009/03/17 : CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1