URBAN TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP04T00367R000201630001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 17, 2009
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 3, 1984
Content Type:
MEMO
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Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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wash nsoo.o c zosos
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 December 1984
Urban Terrorism-in the Philippines
Summary
Several recent violent incidents in Philippine
cities raise the issue of whether radical groups,
and especially the Communist Party of the
Philippines, have reached a decision to embark on a
campaign of urban terrorism. Evidence from a
variety of sources indicates that many of the
incidents are not?the work of terrorists and we do
not believe that in the aggregate they indicate the
beginning of a Communist urban terrorist. campaign in
Manila. Up to now, the Party appears to'have
concluded that the benefits from such a campaign.
would be outweighed, by the damage that'harsh'
government reprisals would inflict against an
exposed Party apparatus. Nevertheless, the Party's
growing military tactical capability, the
vulnerability of,Manila to urban terrorism, and
evidence of a debate within the party over the
advisability of more violent tactics suggest that
the potential for such a campaign.will remain
high.
Evidence From Recent Incidents.
A spate of recent violent incidents in Manila, Davao, and
several other cities has.sparked concern among many Philippine
observers that radical groups in the country have embarked on a
new wave of urban terrorism. Manila had'exper.ienced a,f-lurry of
This memorandum was prepared by Southeast
Asia Division, Office of East Asian Ana ysis, an -was coordinated
with the Office of Global Issues. Information available as of 29 25X1
November 1984 was used in " its. preparation. 'Comments and queries -
are welcome and may be directed to Chief, Southeast Asia
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purposes--has remained at low levels in recent years.
The recent incidents began with the assassination last June
.of Manila Police General Karingal. The government claimed that
the New.People's Army had assassinated Karingal to avenge the
deaths of, several leftwing labor members who were killed during 25X1
Karingal's death was followed by the assassination of
opposition leader Alexander Orcullo.last October in Davao City.
Orcullo's assassination received widespread media attention and
has served to underscore 'the deteriorati.ng security situation in
Davao--.a city long known to'be infested by the NPA. The
assassination of Zamboanga City Mayor Cesar Climaco two weeks ago
has also fueled speculation that urban terrorism is on the
rise. Climaco's death--highlighted by'his heavily attended
funeral--has been the most widely publicized event in the series
of incidents. Thus, far, no group has claimed responsi.bility for
dormant since 1981--and the Communist.Party.*
To complicate matters, a series of hotel fires.have'erupted.
in Manila and Baguio since early November. Although no group has
claimed responsibility, government off-icials have determined that
the fires were deliberately set. A Police Constabulary task-
force has been formed to investigate several'. groups, including
the remnants of The April 6thLiberation?Movement and the Light
A-Fire Movement--two rightwi,ng terrorist groups that have been
-most - oft he
hotel'fires were probably arson conducted to coll.ect'insurance.
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suggests'that it is continuing to avoid a campaign of violence in
the capital while concentrating Party efforts'on political .
have been instigated by militant student groups
who are demanding that the Communist Party take a more
confrontational, stand during rallies. Increasing evidence,
moreover, suggests that the Party has become concerned in.recent
organization. There is basis for concern, however, that the 25X1
party might eventually choose to embark on anew phase of urban
terrorism. Clashes between protestors and police
at. least considering urban terrorism as a way to gain new
momentum.
ongoing debate within the Party
over whether or not. to move into a phase of urban terrorism, with
some arguing that the current situtation in Manila has
deteriorated to the point where the destablizing effects of'urbaq,._';;::::
terrorism would be worth-the cost of a potentially harsh
25X1
l
'
s willingness to c
aim
government crackdown. The Party
y$^h 1
responsibility for the Karingal assassination &25X1
ay reflect this view. r w 25X1
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has clearly embarked on an urban terrorist campaign is'Davao
City. The frequent "liquidation" of uncooperative'village
captains or corrupt local officials has ion been common to Davao
and is a hallmark of Party strateLrV.
25X1
25X1
Prospects
In all likelihood, the Davao campaign will continue to
undermine stabilit on Mindanao fore ears to come.
The costs for the party in mounting a broader urban
i n-- articular) `in the it l--
amDaiz
terror'
hi h.
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Party. organization
and cadre would be exposed to a dose of government retaliation
which the Party has up to now taken pains to-avoid.
The Party will continue to'weigh the tradeoffs of ,a full-
fledged urban, terrorist campaign and may resort to violent
tactics if it perceives that tensions--heightened by Marcos's
recent health crisis, the implication of General Ver in the
Aquino assassination', and the bite of harsh austerity measures--
can be aggravated to a degree that threatens the government's
ability to maintain peace and order in.Manila. We.bel`ieve there.
are several' key signs that would leave no doubt within the.
Intelligence Community, or for that matter in the Philippine
Government, that an urban terrorist campaign was",underway. In.
Manila, we would.watch.for:
Coordinated attacks on government officials and
government' buildings.
--The singlingout for attack of projects-associated
with Imelda Marcos, such as the Manila Cultural
Center, which tend-to be scorned by most Filipinos.
Other buildings that would be obvious targets for
urban-terrorists are the offices. of the Ministry of
Human Settlement's, which Mrs .. Marcos' heads.'
--Attacks against corporate headquarters and other'."
-private 'inteiestsof President Marcos's key cronies,
including coconut king Eduardo Co'uan co and sugar
czar Roberto Benedicto.
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r? is
Over the longer term the campaign would likely extend to US
citizens, installations, multinational corporations, and other
foreign financial institutions. This would be a major shift in
tactics--the Party traditionally has not targetted US buildings
or citizens. But anti-US rhetoric increasingly. figures. in Party
propaganda, and the Party's decision to move in earnest to a
stage of urban terrorism in our opinion would inevitably lead to
a targettin of the US installations.
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South
China
Sea
Province boundary
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Philippine
Sea
bCatanduanes
Malaysia
Bohol
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Luzon
Strait
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Indonesia r
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1--DCI (7D60)
1--DDCI (7D6011
Original--OEA/SEA/IB
'1--OEA/SEA/ITM
1--Ch/OEA/SEAD
1--DC/OEA/SEAR
1-
1--C/NIC (7E62)
1--NIO/EA (7E62)
5--CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1--C/PES/DDI (7F24)
1--DDI (7E44)
25X1
1--Executive Director (7E12)
1--CPAS/ILS (7G215)
1--OEA/NEA (4G43)
1--OEA/CH (4G32)
Outside:
State:
1--Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
1--John Monjo
1--John Maisto
1--Thomas Hubbard
1--RAIN Jonathan T. Howe
1--Rod Huff '
1--Weaver Gim
1--Allen Kitchens
1--Bob Carroll
1--Corazon Foley,.
1--Hugh Montgomery
1--Anthony C. Albrecht
Treasury:
1--Douglas P. Mulholland
1--Gaston Sigur
1--Richard Childress
1--Richard Armitage
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1--Don Gregg
1--Robert Emery
1--David Laux
1--James Kelly
Commerce:
1--Eugene K. Lawson
1--David Peterson
1--William Brown
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