THAILAND AND MALAYSIA: COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000301730001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 15, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
15 June 1984
Thailand and Malaysia: Counterinsurgency Operations
Summary
After a four-year break, Thailand last December
renewed joint military operations with Malaysia
against Malaysian Communist guerrilla bases in
southern Thailand. The cooperation is limited,
however, and both countries' troops have remained on
their respective sides of the border during these
new operations. But Bangkok's willingness to
cooperate appears to signal the beginning of a long-
term effort to control southern Thailand's most
bothersome insurgent problem.
Renewed Joint Operations
The Thai and Malaysian Armies last winter began a series of
joint military operations aimed at dislodging Malaysian Communist
guerrillas from their longtime sanctuaries in southern
Thailand. The first action was launched on 28 December, when
This memorandum was prepared by Southeast Asia 25X1
Division, Office of East Asian Analysis, n ormation available
as of 11 June 1984 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, Southeast Asia
Division, OEA 25X1
84-10123
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it
1,000 Thai Army troops and paramilitary rangers conducted a two-
week operation against the Communist Party of Malaya's* 12th
Regiment in the central border's eastern Betong salient. One
thousand Malaysian troops acted as a blocking force on their side
of the border. The effort, controlled by a joint headquarter
southern Thailand, resulted in the seizure of several camps.
A second joint operation, from 15 April to 6 May, was
directed against Communist Party of Malaya/Marxist-Leninist
guerrillas in western Betong. Again, Thai Army troops, rangers,
and police conducted a sweep with Malaysian troops providing the
blocking force on their side of the border. In addition, Thai
troops were supported by airstrikes from aircraft participating
in a simultaneous joint air exercise. Three major guerrilla
camps were captured.
Cooperation and Confrontation
Cooperation over the past two decades between the Thai and
the Malaysians--and thus Bangkok's control over Thailand's
southern provinces--has been difficult to achieve. The southern
provinces contain a large ethnic Malay Muslim minority--in four
provinces actually a majority--that identifies more with the
Malays to the south than with the overwhelmingly Buddhist, Sino-
Thai speaking ethnic Thai majority to the north. Tensions
between these two communal groups have often resulted in
violence.
In 1959, the two countries created a Joint Senior Staff
Committee to formulate policy and a Joint Border Operations
Committee to plan operations.**
Under the terms of a border agreement signed in
1977 troops could penetrate up to 15 miles inside their
neighbor's border in "hot pursuit" of guerrillas, or other armed
groups.
In practice, the Malaysians most often mounted such
operations. Residents in the Thai border provinces demonstrated
against such Malaysian troop forays, and in January 1980 the
operations abruptly ended following a series of incidents
*The Communist Party of Malaya split into three factions in
1970. The largest kept the original name--Communist Party of
Malaya--and is the only one officially recognized by Beijing.
The other two--the Communist Party of Malaya/Marxist-Leninist and
the Communist Party of Malaya/Revolutionary Faction--are smaller 25X1
but more agressive. These two groups announced their merger as
the Communist Party of Malaysia on 5 December 1983.
**These committees changed names in 1965 to General Border
Committee (meeting annually) and Re ional Border Committee
(meeting semiannually). 25X1
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involving Malaysian troops and Thai civilians. Any hopes of
renewing cooperation evaporated with the arrival in 1981 of a new
Thai 4th Army Region commander,. Lieutenant General Han Linanon.
Han, a native southerner,.echoed the resentment of many Thai
officers, who considered their Malaysian counterparts arrogant
and condescending and believed that the Malaysians operating
inside Thailand were behaving like garrison troops
During the next two years, the Thai military and police
conducted unilateral counterinsurgency operations, including
sweeps against Thai Communists and dissident Muslims--targets
that the Malaysians had been unwilling to consider. These
unilateral sweeps are continuing: the latest--involving 2,000
Army troops--started 26 May.
A Change of Heart
Thailand's decision to resume joint operations was in part a
result of a change in command of the Thai 4th Army. Han was
replaced last October by Lieutenant General Wanchai Chitchamnong,
who according to the US Embassy, considered Han unnecessarily
confrontational in his dealings with the Malaysians. Wanchai
abandoned Han's demand that Kuala Lumpur, in exchange for Thai
participation in operations against the Malaysian Communists,
first agree to joint operations against Thailand's Muslim
separatists. Furthermore, Unlike Han--who clearly intended to
pursue a political career based on a southern constituency--
Wanchai appeared willing to take southern Thai criticism by
demonstrating his openness to cooperation with the Malaysians.
Another reason for Thai willingness to cooperate may be the
decline of the Thai Communist insurgency in the north and
northeast. Massive defections during the past two years have
reduced the Communist threat in these two regions and focused
attention on the south, which now has the largest concentration
of armed dissidents in the country. According to Thai estimates,
the south is home to 1,000 to 2,000 Malaysian Communists, 300-400
Muslim separatists, 700 Thai Communist insurgents, and an
uncounted number of smugglers, bandits, and pirates. In
addition, Thai officials believe that the Malaysian Communists
may be developing closer relations with Thai Communist elements
in the south.
Finally, Thai Muslim separatist activity--a major irritant
in bilateral relations--has waned. Ironically, according to the
US Embassy, Han' s policy of combining social reforms with
military action is largely responsible. Instead of opposing
Muslim cultural activities as they often had in the past, Thai
officials now not only tolerate but support them; the most recent
occasion being the 4th Army's sponsorship this February of a
three-day religious meeting that attracted over 100,000
Muslims. This new policy, and the Malaysian government defense
of Bangkok's treatment of its Muslim minority at such
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international forums as the Islamic Conference earlier this year,
has lessened Bangkok's concern about a potential minority problem
and its suspi cial Malaysian connivance with the
separatists.
More Pressure--Less Animosity
We expect the joint operations to continue. But although
the Malaysians probably will provide support if
the operations are successful, we do not see a return o the
massive, crossborder sweeps of 1977-80 for several reasons:
-- Southern Thai politicians, who dominate the Democrat
Party, a member of Thailand's ruling coalition, would
worry that large Malaysian incursions might provoke a
popular reaction against the government that would
undermine the party's political base.
-- Malaysia no longer considers the Malaysian Communists as
great a security threat as it did in 1977-80.
-- The present coordinated operations, while not producing
spectacular results, seem to be considered effective
enough by both governments to lessen the need to adopt
combined operations.
As a result, the insurgent problem will not soon be
eliminated. But if the joint operations do prove effective
enough to force the Malaysian Communists out of their border
hideaways, the most formidable group of armed dissidents inside
Thailand will be seriously weakened, making Bangkok's control
over the border area the strongest it has been in many years.
The Thai military initially hoped that the Malaysian
Communists would crack as their Thai counterparts did once the
Army put on the pressure. There have, however, been few
defectors from the Malaysian insurgents and a Thai offer of
lenient surrender terms has been virtually ignored. Guerrillas
of the Communist Party of Malaya/Marxist-Leninist, in fact, have
demonstrated their willingness to counterpunch and have inflicted
casualties on the Thai government troops harrassing them.
Moreover, the rugged jungle terrain of the border area makes it
difficult to locate and engage the guerrillas except on their own
terms. 25X1
Nonetheless, these operations--and the increased non-
military pressure on the insurgents (four districts in
southernmost Yala Province are now subject to tight controls over
the importation of medicines and food, and local businesses are
being required to submit biographies on their employees)--will
disrupt the smuaaling. robberies, and terrorist activity in the
border area.
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SUBJECT: Thaila
nd and Malaysia: Counterinsurgency Operations
Distribution:
Original -
OEA/SEA/ITM
1 -
Alan Kitchens, State
1 -
Frazier Meade, State
1 -
Joseph Winder, State
1 -
Corazon Foley, State
1 -
Paul a Causey, State
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Lt. Col. William Wise, Pentagon
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
Lt. Col. Richard Rice, Pentagon
Lt. Col. Denny Lane Pentagon
1 -
1 -
OEA/SEA
1 -
OEA/SEA/IB
I -
1 -
OEA/NEA
OEA/CH
1 -
D/OEAA
1 -
OEA/Research Director
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
C/NIC
1 -
NIO/EA
1 -
DDI
1 -
Executive Director
1 -
CPAS/ILS
5 -
CPAS/IMD/CB
1 -
C/PES/DDI
1 -
OCR/ISG
1 -
C/EA/RR
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