JAPAN: THE DECLINE OF SPECIAL TAX INCENTIVES AS A TOOL FOR INDUSTRIAL TARGETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000301840001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 3, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence ency
Washington, D. C. 20S05
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 July 1984
Japan: The Decline of Special Tax Incen*,,,--
as a Tool for Industrial Targeting FUNCODED
Summary
Japan's use of special tax measures to promote
the development of selected industries has been
limited in recent years by budgetary constraints and
the increased involvement of a diverse set of
interest groups in formulating tax policy. As
revenues have risen, special incentives have
declined from the equivalent of over 6 percent of
corporate tax collections during 1965-75 to less
than 3 percent last year. At the same time, tax
measures have begun to serve a wider range of
purposes. In the late 1950s and through the 1960s,
tax benefits were designed explicitly to help basic
materials and manufacturing industries become
efficient enough to compete in world markets. Since
then, the increasingly complex collection of groups
involved in setting Japan's tax agenda has forced
the use of special tax measures to serve a broader
range of national objectives. The greater diversity
in objectives has made it difficult to concentrate--
target--benefits in the hands of specific
industries.
This memorandum was prepared byl (Japan Branch,
Northeast Asia Division, Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 3 July was used in its preparation.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Japan Branch, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
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Background
Tax incentives in the 1950s and 1960s were largely designed
to serve the postwar consensus in favor of economic growth as a
national priority. Special tax measures supported development of
technologies considered crucial to Japan's economic development,
rationalization of potential export industries to reduce
production costs, and promotion of exports. They had an impact
either by freeing additional funds for research and development
and capital investment, or by stimulating demand for new
products. The most expensive measures within these categories
were special treatment for income from exports (a $949 million
revenue loss--i.e., subsidy--during the 1960s), special
depreciation for machinery necessary to rationalize production
facilities ($333 million), and incentives for research and
development ($189 million). MITI's foremost objective in the
1950s and early 1960s was the development of heavy industries
such as steel, electric power, shipbuilding, chemicals and
petrochemicals. In FY 1970 these high priority industries
enjoyed relatively low tax burdens--under 4 percent of the
valued-added--in contrast to the 4.7 percent average for all
industries and 5.3 percent for all manufacturing firms.
Japanese companies' practice of borrowing several times
their equity during the late 1950s and 1960s meant that special
tax measures were more important than revenue loss data
suggested. Every dollar in revenue sacrificed by the government
enabled companies to expand borrowing by several times that
amount. During recessions, when added borrowing capacity was
irrelevant, the added cash flow provided by tax incentives was
sometimes crucial to a company's ability to pay interest on
existing debt. In the 1970s, however, the importance of special
tax measures declined as the debt-equity ratios of Japanese
companies declined. The inflation of land and common stock
values during the years of high growth also has meant that the
market value of corporate equity is today far in excess of the
book values upon which debt-equity ratios are based. Consultants
with experience analyzing the finances of Japanese companies have
noted that the debt-equity ratios of leading Japanese firms are
not so different from those of US firms.
Broader Goals
MITI's ability to pursue industrial targeting through
special tax incentives has been reduced by a diversification of
national goals over the last decade. Recognition of the
widespread damage to the environment that occurred during the
years of rapid economic growth focused attention on the need to
protect the environment. Correction of regional inequalities in
economic development and improvement of housing and welfare
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facilities also have become major objectives. Special tax
measures have been devised to promote all these objectives.
These broader goals for tax policy have become particularly
evident since the oil crisis. The higher cost of oil since 1973
and Japan's heavy dependence on suppliers in the unstable Persian
Gulf region have dictated the diversion of government financial
assistance, including tax incentives, to the development of
alternative energy sources and suppliers. The economic viability
of energy-intensive basic materials industries such as aluminum
refining, petrochemicals, pulp and paper, chemical fertilizers,
and cement has been undermined by high energy costs. As a
result, MITI is assisting the capacity reduction efforts of these
depressed industries, which further dilutes its ability to aid
selected growth industries.
While the uses for tax benefits have expanded, the absolute
level of tax subsidies has stagnated. Faced with increasing
budget deficits, the Ministry of Finance has lobbied to prevent
increases in the value of special tax subsidies and to reduce
their number. The absolute value of special tax subsidies today
is slightly less than it was in 1974. Because tax revenues have
risen in the interim, the level of special tax subsidies relative
to corporate tax revenue has fallen from 5.4 percent in 1974 to
less than 3 percent in FY 1983.
Tax Incentives
There are three major categories of tax incentives
benefiting corporations--added depreciation, tax-free reserves,
and tax credits. These special measures cost the national
treasury 258 billion yen ($1.09 billion) in lost revenues in the
fiscal year that ended in March. About 60 percent of the loss
was due to special depreciation. Today special depreciation
measures generally favor small business, while R&D-oriented
credits and deductions favor big firms.
Special Depreciation: In contrast to special measures of
the past, which generally granted accelerated depreciation for
the acquisition of machinery MITI designated as "important" and
increased initial depreciation for "important" industries,
current measures usually serve purposes other than the promotion
of specific industries. Increased initial depreciation, which
permits an industry to write off a higher than normal portion of
the cost of new equipment in the year of purchase, demonstrates
some of the broader goals tax policy is currently designed to
achieve:
-- The government offers 16-18 percent increased initial
depreciation for buyers of waste processing facilities
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and industrial machinery designed to prevent
environmental damage. Under this provision, for example,
a manufacturer purchasing a non-jolting molding machine
can depreciate 27 to 38.6 percent of its cost in the
first year, compared with ordinary rates of 9 to 20.6
percent. The revenue loss was an estimated $140 million
in FY 1983.
-- Another tax measure allows 14 percent increased initial
depreciation for machinery acquired by small businesses
(generally firms with no more than 300 employees and no
more than 100 million yen--$425,000--in capital). The
rate rises to 30 percent for acquisition costs in excess
of average yearly costs for the past five years. The
estimated subsidy associated with this provision was
about $360 million for FY 1983.
-- Increased initial depreciation is also allowed for
production facilities built in underdeveloped areas,
severely depressed areas, or Okinawa. Rates for
machinery range from 18 percent in underdeveloped areas
to 50 percent in free trade zones on Okinawa. Rates range
from 8 to 50 percent in the case of factory buildings.
Revenue losses were estimated at $64 million for FY
1983.
Even plans to aid high-technology industries are becoming
diluted by the growing number of special interests influencing
tax policy formulation. For example, one measure included in the
revisions of the Special Taxation Measures Law for FY 1984
provides 30-percent increased initial depreciation for new
machinery that designated high-technology industries install in
factories in areas (technopolises) for which an official
development plan has been approved. The revenue loss in FY 1984
is estimated at $4.5 million. Although the provision's reference
to designated high technology industries could allow
concentration of assistance in a few industries, political
pressures already have expanded the list of designated industries
to 70--too long to be truly selective. They include engineering
plastics, high-quality agricultural chemicals, optical fiber and
optical fiber cable, special refractory materials, printed
circuit board materials, nuclear power generation equipment,
industrial robots, solar cells, and digital audio and video
discs. They do, however, encourage firms in a broad range of
industries to move into product lines with a fairly high degree
Accelerated depreciation--a $38 million subsidy in the last
fiscal year--is also being made available to a wider range of
beneficiaries because of pressure from special interests. Under
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accelerated depreciation, a purchaser of a depreciable asset may
increase the amount of depreciation by a specified percentage for
a specified period--usually five years. The rate for the first
five years is 32 percent in the case of machinery purchased by
enterprises participating in industry rationalization plans for
small businesses or firms participating in structural improvement
projects for the textile industry. Other provisions allowing
accelerated depreciation are intended to encourage employment of
the handicapped, urban renewal, the construction of grain silos
and fireproof warehouses, and the construction of rental
housing.
Finance Ministry data for the fiscal year ending in March
1982 shows that small business benefits from both initial and
accelerated depreciation much more than big business,
particularly in manufacturing industries (see table 2). This
reverses the pattern of a decade ago, when the largest
companies--which tend to be more export oriented than small
firms--were the biggest beneficiaries. In the early 1970s the
construction, steel, and machinery industries topped the list for
these subsidies. Today, in no manufacturing industry do the
benefits accruing to the largest firms approach the 2.5-percent
average for special depreciation as a percentage of all
depreciation declared by manufacturing industries.
Furthermore, the distribution of benefits by industry (see
table 2) indicates that the industries MITI would most like to
develop are not the primary beneficiaries of special
depreciation. Electrical machinery, for example, which includes
the favored computer, telecommunications equipment, and
semiconductor fields, ranks only sixth among the listed
industries. Printing-publishing appears at the top because it
has many small businesses that are in a position to enhance
productivity by introducing computerized printing processes. As
in printing-pubishing, small businesses produce much of the
output of the metal products manufacturing, general machinery,
and ceramics-stone-cement industries. Small businesses produce
most of the textile industry's output as well, and because some
important textile producing regions are located outside major
metropolitan areas, many textile firms benefit from tax measures
intended to aid regional development as well as small business.
Special depreciation contributes to an industry's
development in one of two ways. For companies buying new
machinery, it lowers the initial after-tax cost of an
investment. Lower costs, in turn, make faster growth possible.
For producers of machinery, lower costs for their customers
should lead to higher sales. Thanks to this increased demand,
manufacturers of capital goods such as robots, numerically
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controlled machine tools, and computers become secondary,
beneficiaries of special depreciation for small business .
Tax-Free Reserves: Tax-free reserves continue to benefit
several growth industries but are also now used to support
development of industries serving wider national objectives. For
example, the largest beneficiary is currently the electric power
industry--which plays the central role in Japan's efforts to
develop alternate sources of energy. Sixteen percent of the
construction costs of nuclear power plants can be credited to a
tax-free reserve that does not have to be added back to income
until seven years after the completion of construction. The
reserve will cost the government $123 million in revenue this
year, according to Ministry of Finance estimates. In addition,
manufacturers of nuclear power generation equipment should
benefit from increased demand.
The computer industry benefits from reserves for losses
resulting from the repurchase of computers and the correction of
defective software. The percentage of a computer's sale price
that can be placed in the reserve is determined by actual
experience with losses. Thirty-five percent of the development
cost of an operating system and 22 percent of the cost of a
program can be placed in the reserve for corrections. Such
reserves enable Japan-based computer manufacturers to lower
selling prices and to offer equipment to customers on a trial
basis. Although these reserves favor the computer industry over
other Japanese industries, they do not discriminate against
imported computers. Sellers of imported computers and software
also can maintain reserves. Most other special reserves either
serve a general, non-industry-specific policy objective, are
slated for abolition, or are no longer causing a loss of
government revenue.
Tax Credits and Deductions: Special credits and deductions
provide greater benefits to large firms, especially those
involved in research and development. Because of the decline in
size of all tax benefits, however, the advantages are
insignificant compared with those offered in the United States.
1 The revenue loss estimates cited here as a measure of the
value of special depreciation provisions only take into account
the benefit accruing to the buyer, not the seller. We expect to
launch a new research project shortly that will attempt to
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The biggest tax credit Tokyo offers is for incremental research
and development expenditures, which is expected to cost $162
million in FY 1983. Since hitting a low of $75 million in FY
1978, usage of the credit has been rising faster than private-
sector spending on R&D. The Japanese credit, however, is less
generous than a similar US credit. A company with continually
growing R&D expenditures could claim a 25 percent credit on
expenditures above the average expenditure in the past three
years in the United States, but only 20 percent of a higher
base--the previous year's expenditures--in Japan. In addition,
the credit in Japan can never exceed 10 percent of income, while
there is no limit in the United States. A National Science
Foundation study estimates that the US credit produces a $2
billion annual tax incentive in contrast to the $162 million that
the Finance Ministry expected to lose in FY 1983 because of
Japan's credit.
Through March 1986 small businesses acquiring qualified
industrial robots and electronic equipment are eligible for a tax
credit equal to 7 percent of acquisition cost or a 30 percent
special depreciation allowance. The Ministry of Finance
estimates the revenue loss for FY 1984 at $90 million.
The Politics of Balance
The growing diffusion of tax incentives among types and
sizes of industries reflects the multiplicity of groups that now
have a say in developing tax policy. The actors in the process
fall into four major categories.
The Bureaucracy: Each May the director general of MITI's
Industrial Policy Bureau issues policy guidelines for the fiscal
year that begins the following April and solicits comments from
business and trade associations on specific proposals already in
hand. During this process each bureau or agency within MITI
tends to act as a proponent of its own clients--the Small and
Medium Enterprises Agency pushes incentives for small business,
the Basic Industries Bureau works on behalf of steel and
chemicals, and the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau
promotes the electronics, computer, and machinery industries. As
a result, MITI itself supports tax incentives that benefit a
broad spectrum of industries, not just a chosen few. Small
business generally fares well because small businessmen are
important electoral supporters of the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP). On the other hand, the auto industry and large
electrical machinery manufacturers, whose workers are represented
by unions supporting a middle-of-the-road opposition party, often
have less clout than their size suggests.
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Although MITI may take the initiative in proposing a special
tax incentive, revisions of the Special Tax Measures Law are
actually drafted in the Finance Ministry's Tax Bureau. The
Ministry's draft takes into account requests from MITI and other
ministries, interest groups such as the Japan Medical Association
or the Japan C.hamJP' of Commerce, and the LDP's Taxation Research
Council.
The Tax Bureau's draft also considers the macroeconomic and
fiscal needs of the government. From the Finance Ministry's
perspective, the gap between revenues and expenditures that first
developed in FY 1975 is the dominant economic and fiscal
reality. Political considerations initially dictated that
efforts to close the gap be concentrated on the revenue side.
The Finance Ministry's inclination has been to reduce the size
and number of special tax measures benefiting business because
this is one of the easiest ways to increase revenues. The
existence of termination dates for all special tax measures
places on interest groups the burden atedly justifying the
special incentives they enjoy.
The Tax Advisory Commission: Broader public interests are
also injected into the process of tax policy formulation when Tax
Bureau officials submit their list of alternative policies to the
Tax Advisory Commission. The commission's members, all appointed
by the prime minister for three-year terms, include former
government officials, academic experts on public finance,
journalists, bankers, businessmen, union leaders, agricultural
representatives, and local politicians. The broad composition of
its membership makes the commission useful as an arbiter among
diverse interest groups and as a builder of consensus on broad
questions of tax policy.
The LDP's Taxation Research Council: In addition to
government ministries and the advisory commission, a small group
of LDP politicians dubbed the "tax mafia" by the Japanese press
plays a key behind-the-scenes role in setting tax policy.
Because many of the politicians involved are former Finance
bureaucrats, they share the concern of that Ministry and the Tax
Advisory Commission for fiscal restraint. As politicians,
however, they also recognize the value of tax incentives for
politically popular programs such as housing, small business, and
regional development.
Each September the council's secretariat collects proposals
to revise the tax laws from interest groups such as the
Federation of Economic Organizations and the Central Association
of Agricultural Cooperatives. Last fall, approximately 1,000
items proposed by some 150 organizations were included in the
"telephone book" put together by the secretariat. The book is
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given to the Tax Bureau for item-by-item review. Each item is
marked to indicate acceptance, rejection, or the need for further
consideration. The council then reviews the bureau's grading and
may call in Finance Ministry officials to explain a decision. On
some items the council may force the bureaucrats to change a
ruling.
Interest Groups: Special interest groups also inject a wide
range of views into the tax policy formation process. Interest
groups lobby during public hearings held by the Tax Advisory
Commission each fall and also take opportunities to influence
Changing Tools of Industrial Policy
Both the industries MITI selects for promotion and the tools
it uses to promote them change over time. In recent years, for
example, MITI has established special offices to identify ways in
which government intervention would assist the fine ceramics an
biotechnology industries.
We doubt, however, that MITI will be able use other tools to
compensate completely for the limitations on the effectiveness of
special tax measures. The pressures that lead to the dispersion
of tax subsidies among a wider spectrum of industries affect
other tools as well. For example, broader political
considerations prevent budgetary subsidies--about $2 billion a
year at present--and loans from official institutions from being
concentrated on high priority industries. The computer and
semiconductor industries, which MITI has been promoting for over
a decade, receive a share of the $5 billion in subsidies directed
toward the manufacturing industry proportionate to their
contribution to total value-added by manufacturing. Computer and
integrated circuit manufacturers accounted for over 1.6 percent
of value-added by manufacturing, but the $60.5 million in the FY
9F,)(1
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1983 budget for research and development on fourth and fifth
generation computers, a high-speed scientific computer, new
semiconductor elements and software development projects was only
1.2 percent of all budget items related to manufacturing
industry . Moreover, manufacturing industry takes a back seat to
agriculture-forestry-fisheries, which received 48 percent of the
$18 billion allocated in FY 1983 for industry and technology-
related programs, and the transportation and communications
sector, which received 21 percent--Drimarily to cover the deficit
of Japan National Railways.
The same inconsistency between the widely touted objective
of promoting high technology and the actual distribution of
benefits exists in the case of official financing. Of the $89.8
billion government financial institutions are authorized to loan
out in the fiscal year that began in April, 25 percent will be
for housing, 19 percent for small business, and 14 percent for
environmental improvement. The diversity of objectives in
general also is present in the lending programs of the Japan
Development Bank and the Small Business Finance Corporation, the
institutions established specifically as instruments of
industrial policy. In order of magnitude, the largest
beneficiaries of Development Bank loans are electric power
companies, maritime shippers, private railroads, real estate
companies, oil refining, steel and chemicals. Metal products,
general machinery, and cement lead in the case of the SBFC.
2 The 1.2 percent would be higher if the $88 million that Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone, the government-owned telecommunications
monopoly, allocated for data processing technology and integrated
circuit research was included. We exclude it because NTT
research is funded by the fees paid by users of its services
rather than taxes and because the allocation is determined by the
NTT bureaucracy which, subject to the approval of the Diet, sets
its priorities outside the industrial policymaking process
dominated by MITI.
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Table 1
Special Tax Measures
In Perspective
In billion US$
FY 1974 FY 1983
GNP 471.6 1,175*
General Account Expenditures 67.5 212.7
Total General Account Revenue 65.6 136.4
Corporate Tax Revenue 19.9 40.1
Revenue Losses Due 0.9 1.1
to Special Tax Measures
*
A forecast. All other figures are initial budget values.
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Table 2
.Special Depreciation As a Percentage of Total
Depreciation by Industry and Size of Firm in FY 1981
Industry
Size of Firm (Paid-in capital in Million Yen
Industry
Average
Under 2
2-5
5-10
10-50
50-100
100-1,000 Over 1,000
All Industries
2.8
1.4
2.4
4.0
4.4
4.2
1.7 2.4
Manufacturing
2.5
3.0
4.6
5.4
6.4
7.4
2.4 0.6
Food Products
2.7
1.8
3.2
4.4
3.5
10.0
2.0 1.1
Textiles
5.8
-0-
3.2
7.6
9.9
11.1
1.7 2.2
Apparel
2.4
-0-
7.7
0.6
0.8
2.7
- 2.0
Lumber & wood
3.1
2.1
-0-
1.6
7.4
2.9
2.0 1.1
Pulp & paper
2.0
-0-
-0-
3.7
4.6
8.9
3.6 0.1
Printing/
publishing
9.0
11.1
7.3
14.5
12.9
11.9
0.5 1.1
Chemicals
0.8
-0-
-0-
3.5
3.3
5.5
1.4 0.1
Oil refining &
coal products
1.4
-0-
0.8
2.9
1.9
2.6
1.9 1.4
Ceramics, stone
& cement
3.5
-0-
7.9
0.5
5.0
3.6
5.8 1.9
Steel
0.6
2.3
-0-
1.5
5.1
5.5
2.4 0.1
Nonferrous metals
manufacturing
1.2
-0-
-0-
13.1
6.4
2.9
2.5 0.7
Metals products
manufacturing
3.8
2.1
5.2
6.8
4.5
4.7
1.5 1.2
General machinery
3.8
3.3
5.5
6.2
8.5
5.5
2.6 0.9
Electrical
machinery
3.4
0.4
14.2
1.8
6.6
18.8
6.0 1.3
Transportation
machinery
1.7
2.4
3.9
10.5
13.6
7.7
1.7 0.1
Precision
machinery
2.7
-0-
0.9
5.2
6.3
5.7
2.3 0.8
Shipbuilding
1.0
-0-
-0-
0.6
4.1
5.6
1.1 0.9
Source: Ministry of Finance survey of corporate finances.
Small Businesses have a paid-in capital under 100 million yen.
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Table 3
Disposition of Tax Changes for FY 1983
Requested by the Japan Machinery Federation
Item
1. Extension of special first year depreciation
for computerized machinery including high-performance
computer-controlled robots and computer-aided
design equipment
Action: Abolished.
Remark: Encouraged companies to buy advanced equipment,
which could be imported as well as domestically
produced. Probably abolished because of the attention
that the Houdaille petition focused on such special
provisions. This year the Diet approved a similar
provision for small businesses only effective for two
years beginning in April 1984.
2. Extension of provision allowing maintenance of
accounting reserves to cover losses from the return
of electronic computers.
Action: Extended for two years, but size of reserve was
reduced.
Remark: Considered necessary by the federation to
strengthen market position of domestic manufactuers
threatened by the introduction of IBM 308X series and as
compensation for reduced tariffs on computers.
3. Extension of provision allowing companies
to maintain special accounting reserves for
correction of computer programs.
Action: Extended for two years, but size of reserves was
reduced.
Remark: Considered essential to Japan's effort to upgrade
software capabilities.
4. Addition of the facsimile manufacturing
industry to those allowed to maintain accounting
reserves for the repair and guarantee of products.
Action: Added.
Remark: Enables manufacturers to expand the use of
guarantees as a sales tool. Effect is to speed the growth
of an already fast developing product line.
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5. Extension of 30-percent additional depreciation
(or a 7-percent tax credit) for acquisition of
certain energy-saving machinery or facilities by
small business.
Action: Action deferred because measure does not expire
until March 1984.
Remark: In early 1984 the Diet approved extension of the
program for 2 years.
6. Extension of special first-year depreciation for
pollution prevention equipment, non-polluting
production facilities, and waste reprocessing facilities.
Action: Eligibility of specific types of machinery to be
reexamined.
Remark: A response a widespread public concern over
pollution. Primary beneficiaries are probably basic
materials industries such as steel and chemicals.
7. Extension of special first-year depreciation
allowance for investments by small business in excess
of a firm's level for the past five years.
Action: Rate was increased from 14 to 30 percent and
extended for two years.
Remark: A macroeconomic rather than an industry-specific,
measure intended to spur capital investment by small
business, which was much weaker than that of big business
in the recent recession.
8. Extension of provision allowing small businesses
to maintain accounting reserves for development of
overseas markets.
Action: Extended for two years.
Remark: MOF will try to abolish in FY 1984 as part of its
campaign to.eliminate export promotion measures.
9. Reduce the depreciation period for integrated
circuit production equipment.
Action: No action taken.
Remark: Would substantially increase cash flow of
semiconductor makers who are spending large sums to get
the 256K RAM memory chip into mass production before US
competitors. No action taken because present period
accurately reflects real useful life.
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10. Extension of a reduction in the commodity tax
on electric passenger cars and an expansion of the
scope of the provision.
Action: Extended for two years. Combination passenger-
cargo vehicle also made eligible for the reduction.
Remark: Development of electric cars is being promoted as
a means of reducing both exhaust pollution and energy
consumption.
11. Increase to $1,275 the maximum value of assets
with a useful life of less than one year which are
eligible to be treated as an expense in the period of
acquisition.
Action: Unknown.
Remark: Limit was originally set at $425 in 1974. The
provision simplifies accounting procedures.
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/06/10: CIA-RDP04T00367R000301840001-7
 Approved For Release 2009/06/10: CIA-RDP04T00367R000301840001-7
SUBJECT: Japan: The Decline of Special Tax Incentives as a
Tool of Industrial Policy
Distribution:
1 - C/OEA/NA/Japan
I - C/OEA/NA
1 - C/OEA/NA/K
1 - C/OEA/CH
I - C/OEA/SEA
1 - OEA/Research Director
1 - D/OEA
1 - DDI'
1 - Executive Director
1 -
1 - NIO
I - C/PES
1 -
1 -G
1 - CPAS/ILS
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 -
1 -
1 - William Brooks, Department of State
1 - Jack Croddy, Department of State
I - Cora Foly, Department of State
1 - Byron L. Jackson, Department of Commerce
1 - McClellan A. DuBois, Department of Commerce
I - Joseph Masse United States Trade Representative
DDI/0EA/NA/ (3 July 1984)
Approved For Release 2009/06/10: CIA-RDP04T00367R000301840001-7