CHINA LOOKS TO UPCOMING ARKHIPOV VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000302290001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 6, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 December 1984
China Looks to Upcoming Arkhipov Visit
Summary
If the visit of Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov takes place, the
Chinese will do all they can to make it a "success," probably signing a
number of new economic and trade agreements. We believe Beijing would like
to restore momentum to stalled Sino-Soviet relations in order to enhance
China's image of evenhandedness in dealing with the two superpowers and to
retain some maneuvering room within the strategic triangle. Neither side
has announced the dates for the trip, although they have agreed privately
that he would arrive 21 December. The trip could still be jeopardized if
the Soviets or Vietnamese. undertook provocative military activity that
demanded a strong Chinese response. Failing this, we expect Beijing to
continue to limit its military activity along the Sino-Vietnamese border
for the time being.
What's Different This Time?
A chain of events led to Moscow's postponement of Arkhipov's earlier
visit--originally slated for last May:
-- The Soviets had just conducted a joint amphibious exercise
with the Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin coinciding with a
Vietnamese offensive in Cambodia that provoked China into
increasing military pressure on the Sino-Vietnamese border.
-- Arkhipov would have arrived in the shadow of Beijing's warm
welcome of the US President.
This memorandum was prepared by (Foreign Affairs
Branch, China Division, Office of East Asian Analysis. Information is
available as of 6 December 1984. Comments and questions are welcome and
should be directed to Chief, China Division, OEA
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This time, although the Vietnamese'dry season campaign in Cambodia is
off to an early start, the Chinese response thus far--artillery shelling
along the border with Vietnam and a modest increase --
has been measure
A note of caution is in order, however, in assessing whether the visit
will occur and if it does, weighing the likely magnitude of its results for
Sino-Soviet relations. Both Beijing and Moscow would appear to have
compelling reasons to exploit an Arkhipov visit to demonstrate that they
have maneuvering room within the triangle, but that is not the only factor
in their calculations. The initial visit became hostage To both sides
overriding determination to prove that neither could provoke or attempt to
intimidate the other with impunity.
Both have taken actions in recent weeks that the other could take
offense
Concurrently, the Chinese are continuing to give
low-key but none he ess, provocative publicity to their evolving military
relationship with the US.
The military situation on the eve of the Arkhipov visit is less
charged than at the time of the initial cancellation, but the fact that
Moscow and Beijing still seem intent on playing a "tit for tat" game in the
region suggests that broader political and security considerations could
upset the apparent logic of the planned visit. The fact that dates for the
visit have yet to be formally announced suggests that both sides are unsure
of the other's intentions and that the risks and benefits of an Arkhipov
visit are still being weighed.
What do the Chinese Want from the Visit?
The Chinese would like this visit to show domestic and foreign
audiences that relations with Moscow are not frozen. Beijing also would
like to demonstrate that China is not "tied" to the US and retains the
freedom to maneuver to its advantage within the Sino-Soviet-US triangle.
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Indeed, Beijing may want to balance an anticipated visit of several high-
ranking US military officers in January, a visit that will lend new impetus
to the evolving US-China military relationship.
To a certain extent, a reasonably successful visit by Arkhipov would
provide the leadership elbow room for further progress in the US-China
security relationship. The visit should assuage those in Beijing wary of
overreliance on the US, and who presumably argue that Beijing should keep
its Soviet option open. At the same time, others inside the leadership
might believe such a visit is useful as a signal to Washington that China
cannot be taken for granted.
The Chinese possibly also hope that such a visit, because it would
coincide with Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia, might exacerbate
tensions between Hanoi and Moscow. The Chinese apparently believe that
Moscow pressed Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach--during his trip to Moscow
in late October--to aut with restraint in Cambodia before and during
Arkhipov's visit to China. Beijing replayed in its domestic media the
communique issued after the Thach visit, which called for the Soviets and
Vietnamese to "synchronize their political watches," a passage suggesting
Soviet concern that Vietnam could still disrupt Arkhipov's trip.
Finally, although remote in our view, the Chinese may hope to induce
the USSR to engage in bidding against the US for Chinese favor. Although
Beijing almost certainly recognizes that this is unlikely, they may
calculate that Moscow--concerned about evolving US-China military
relations--might offer more than would have been the case earlier. At a
.minimum, the Chinese--frustrated over Soviet refusal to address the
security issues that divide the two sides--want to see what economic
inducements to better ties the Soviets have to offer.
The Chinese Cannot Lose
In Beijing's view, Moscow's agreement to send Arkhipov while the
Chinese still hold Vietnamese territory already represents a diplomatic
victory. In that sense, Beijing almost certainly derives satisfaction from
the irritation this is causing Hanoi. Moreover, Beijing probably feels
that it has driven home the point to Moscow that it will not be intimidated
by Soviet bluster.
Even if the trip were cancelled, China would not lose much. China's
room for maneuver within the triangle would not be enhanced but the Chinese
would be quick to point up their continued readiness to normalize relations
and other established forums of Sino-Soviet consultations are unlikely to
be affected. The leadership in Beijing has already decided that economic
modernization will be accomplished with US and Western technology, and do
not believe that the Soviets can be of much assistance.
In short, we believe the Chinese are prepared to put the trip at risk
by reacting firmly to any provocative Soviet or Vietnamese military
activity around their periphery. If the Vietnamese were to launch large-
scale attacks in Cambodia involving intrusions into Thailand, for example,
the Chinese would retaliate. By the same token, if the Soviets decided to
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mount a show of force against the Chinese, either along their mutual border
or elsewhere, Beijing is likely to respond with a counter-demonstration of
its own. Beijing's objective would be to force Moscow to make a difficult
choice between again postponing the visit--and allowing Beijing to reap a
propaganda victory by placing the onus on Moscow--or to go ahead with the
trip despite the Chinese action.
It is less likely, in our view, that the Chinese are planning to
mousetrap Arkhipov by allowing hid to come and then launching an unprovoked
offensive against Vietnam during his stay. Such a step would not promote
Chinese security interests. Indeed, it would belie Beijing's claim that it
sincerely seeks to normalize Sino-Soviet relations, and would deny Beijing
some additional room to maneuver inside the strategic triangle,
undercutting China's "independent" foreign policy.
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