THE CUBAN ECONOMY: A SOVIET SHOWCASE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00367R000302420001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington.D.C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 August 1984
THE CUBAN ECONOMY: A SOVIET SHOWCASE?
Summary
Despite,25 years of effort and $33 billion in Soviet aid,
Cuba's economic outlook is now bleaker than ever. Prospects for
significantly increased hard currency funds--either from export
earnings or foreign borrowings--are gloomy, as are the chances
that Soviet economic largesse will increase by very much over
recent levels. The Castro regime is highly unlikely to institute
economic liberalization measures sufficient to deal with the
consequences of this prolonged foreign payments problem. Thus,
Havana will experience little real growth during the next several
years and will be forced repeatedly to reschedule both its hard
and soft currency debts. For the average Cuban, this means a
continuation of the austerity of the past quarter of a century--
rationing of basic necessities, shortages, and long lines.
This memorandum was requested by Ken Skou h Coordinator for Cuban
Affairs, State Department. It was prepared by of the Cuba-
Caribbean Branch, Middle America-Caribbean Division ALA, and was ooorinated
with Sava
STAT
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The Soviet Aid Record
One of the goals of Fidel Castro's revolution--to make the
Cuban economy independent of foreign powers--has become
increasingly distant after 25 years of his rule. In 1958, for
example, 70 percent of Cuba's trade was with the United States;
today, the USSR accounts for the same portion. Investment, once
supplied primarily by private US residents, now comes mostly from
the USSR. In addition, there are several thousand Soviet
economic advisers and technicians on the island, directly
involved in day-to-day economic management. Cuba's deepened
economic dependence on the USSR, however, is most evident in its
need for direct aid: whereas US economic aid to Cuba in 1958 was
equivalent to less than 1 percent of national output, Soviet
economic aid in 1983--valued at about $4.2 billion--corresponded
to more than 30 percent of Cuba's real output. Overall, this
aid--comprising trade subsidies and development assistance and
totaling over 833 billion since 1960--has increased significantly
since 1974, becoming by far the most important source of economic
assistance Cuba now receives. Without it, Havana would be hard
pressed to meet even basic consumption and investment needs.
Cuba depends on the Soviet Union for about 70 percent of its
total trade. Moscow supplies Havana with nearly all of its crude
petroleum and petroleum products, grain, lumber, and much of its
industrial, agricultural, and transport equipment. In turn, Cuba
exports half its sugar crop as well as the bulk of its nickel and
citrus production to the USSR. Nearly all of this trade is
conducted in soft currency through a bilateral clearing account.
Since the mid-1970s Soviet economic aid to facilitate this
commerce has consisted primarily of Moscow's paying artificially
high prices for Cuban goods while pricing its exports to Cuba
below world market levels. These subsidies represent implicit
grants, allowing Cuba to reduce its trade deficit by increasing
the value of key exports and decreasing the cost of some
imports. Together they have totaled over $23 billion since 1961,
reflecting the differences between Cuban-Soviet trading prices
and world prices for sugar, nickel, and petroleum.
Cuba claims--and trade data reported by Havana and Moscow
indicate--that the general pricing formula (and basis of
subsidies) established in Cuba's current five-year (1981-85)
trade agreement with Moscow is indexed in a wav that Havana
maintains its purchasing power of 1974-75--the period of record
world sugar prices and oil prices that averaqed $11. per
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U III %,I- A JJLf J. LU
barrel.1 In 1982, for example, the USSR paid over five-times the
world market price for Cuban sugar and nearly twice the market
price for nickel. In addition, Moscow charged Havana only about
three-fifths of the OPEC benchmark price for oil.
Moscow also provides Cuba--both directly and through Cuba's
participation in CEMA--materials, equipment, and advisers for
projects relating to export development and import
substitution. This aid is extended in the form of long-term
credits (up 'to 25 years) with grace periods as long as 10 years
and at interest rates of no more than 4 percent. According to a
Soviet official, over 200 projects and enterprises were
constructed or expanded during Cuba's First Five-Year Plan (1976-
80) through Soviet assistance. According to the official--as
well as to Soviet trade statistics--this aid amounted to 1.2
billion rubles, or about $1.7 billion during the period. Plants
built or modernized with Soviet participation since Castro took
power in 1959 account for 100 percent of the output of sheet
metal, 95 percent of steel, 50 percent of fertilizers, and 40
percent of electric power.
In addition, that part of Cuba's annual ruble trade deficit
with the USSR not covered by development project credits is
financed on favorable terms. The determination of the amounts to
be financed in this way apparently occurs during both annual and
five-year bilateral trade negotiations. Cuban officials have
indicated that these credits are to be repaid over 15 to 17
years, including a five-year grace period, at zero interest.
Overall development assistance--project aid and trade
deficit financing--has totaled over $9 billion since 1960,
according to Cuban and Soviet trade data. About 40 percent of
the total has accrued since 1979, owing partly to increased
deliveries for project aid but primarily to the failure of Cuba's
1This means that for every $1 per barrel increase in the price
Moscow charges Havana for its 2000,000 b/d of oil imports, the
USSR will increase the price it pays Cuba for its annual 3.5
million metric tons of sugar imports by 1 cent per pound. The
price charged Cuba for its oil imports from the USSR is based on
the CEMA formula--a moving average of the world price of oil over
the previous five years.
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I ' d % 1 L _ L I-L/
soft urrency exports to keep pace with its imports from the
USSR.
In addition to these forms of aid, the Soviet Union has
helped alleviate Cuba's financial pressures in dealing with the
West: ..
-- It has purchased some sugar outside the protocol for hard
currency.
-- Moscow has also provided Havana with convertible currency
for oil it saves from its protocol allotment. Last year
Cuba received $570 million--two-fifths of its total
foreign exchange export earnings--from this special
arrangement.
-- The USSR also has eased Havana's hard currency constraints
by intermediating its purchases. Thus, Cuba receives over
1 million tons of grain annually from Canada, with Moscow
paying Ottawa hard currency but charging Havana soft
currency, saving Cuba $200-300 million a year.
Other Sources of Aid
Although the USSR is by far Cuba's largest donor, East
European countries--through CEMA and bilateral channels--have
delivered sizable amounts of soft currency economic aid. Cuban
data indicate that Eastern Europe provided about $600 million in
development aid and trade credits during 1976-80 and nearly $1
billion already during the first three years of the 1981-85 Five-
Year Plan. In addition, these countries pay a preferential price
for sugar and nickel, although generally not as high as the price
Moscow pays. Trade subsidies totaled $735 million in 1976-80 and
$553 million in 1981-82.
Hard currency aid from Western nations and organizations is
of a much smaller magnitude. Official development assistance
disbursed to Cuba by individual OECD and OPEC countries and
2The portion of this assistance that accrued before 1973--about
3.4 billion--was rescheduled by the USSR in December 1972.
Moscow terminated all interest charges and postponed initial
repayment until 1986.
UNCLASSIFIED
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multilateral organization has totaled $280 million during 1971-
82. About half of this amount is allocated through bilateral
programs, with Sweden and the Netherlands the largest
contributors. Projects funded include training for tourism,
equipment for the sugar industry, and laboratory equipment for
medical research. The remainder is from various UN agencies.
Programs financed include educational development, an
experimental paper plant using bagasse (a sugarcane processing
byproduct), and renovation of Old Havana. This aid probably will
continue to'f'luctuate, but is unlikely to rise about the $50
million annual levels of the late 1970s, due to the plight of
needier countries elsewhere and the limit of funds available to
multinational organizations.
Despite the large scale of all this aid, the Cuban economy
was not able to grow faster than other non-OPEC LDCs, which
achieved an average annual real growth of 4.7 percent for the 3
1976-80 period compared to our estimated 3.4 percent for Cuba.
Moreover, Cuba's hard currency debt increased by about 140
percent over the same period--nearly the same as the 145-percent
average of non-OPEC LDCs financing oil imports. The centrally
planned economy and low worker productivity probably were the
main factors behind Havana's lag.
Deteriorating Economic Relations with the West
Because about 80 percent of Cuba's trade is with Soviet Bloc
countries where its terms of trade are protected, Havana was not
affected as negatively as other LDCs by the drop in commodity
prices after 1980. As a result, Cuban growth for 1981-83
averaged about 2.5 percent compared to 1.2 percent for non-OPEC
LDCs. Nevertheless, Havana was not totally sheltered from
international market and financial conditions during this period,
which worked to deteriorate its economic dealings with the West
and make Soviet aid increasingly important.
31n 1981 Cuba received about $165 per person in official
development assistance (not including trade subsidies) from the
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the West, or about six and a
half times the amount received by the averge middle-income
developing country. When trade subsidies from the USSR and East
Europe are included, per capita aid rises to $512 or nearly 20
times more than the average.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Cuba's current economic downswing began in late 1980 with
the sharp fall in the world price of sugar--until then, the
source of over half of Havana's hard currency export earnings.
Constrained by export restrictions imposed by the International
Sugar Organization, export obligations to soft currency
customers,:. and the size of its harvest, Cuba was not able to
increase the volume of world market sugar sales enough to offset
the 70-percent decline in prices between 1980 and 1982.
Increased hard currency flows from the USSR and China and
earnings frofi'Havana's other major sources of foreign exchange--
nickel, seafood, tobacco, and tourism--did not fill the gap.
At the same time, interest payments on debt increased by
over 50 percent from 1979 to 1982, and many of Cuba's requests
for new credits were turned down as lenders became more wary
about Third World and Communist countries. Moreover, in 1982
international bankers withdrew over $500 million of the short-
term deposits in Cuban banks, or 35 percent of the 1981 level.
To deal with these changes, Havana slashed its imports from
the West by about 40 percent from 1980 to 1982 and cut other
convertible currency expenses such as embassy budgets. These
measures proved insufficient and domestically costly, however, as
growth dropped to an estimated 1.4 percent in 1982 from 5.4
percent in 1981, largely due to the reduction in imported inputs
vital to such basic industries as steel and construction.
Lacking sufficient inflow of funds, the Castro government
drew down its foreign exchange reserves by 75 percent between
1981 and mid-1982 to cover immediate financial obligations
according to Cuban statistics released to its creditors. With
reserves sufficient to cover only six weeks of imports, Havana
requested a rescheduling of and stopped principal payments on its
medium- and long-term debts in August 1982. Accordingly, Cuba
reached an agreement in March 1983 with its government creditors
that provided for the rescheduling of 95 percent of the principal
due on its medium- and long-term debt from September 1982 to
December 1983 (about $400 million). A similar agreement for
rescheduling almost $200 million with commercial banks was
reached in December 1983.
Even with the payments relief provided by the debt
rescheduling, Havana's economy remained troubled last year. The
Castro government's claim that the economy grew by 5.2 percent in
real terms is highly suspect. Heavy.rains and high winds
substantially damaged the important sugar and tobacco crops as
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well as many vegetable crops for domestic consumption. Moreover,
convertible currency exports were down and hard currency imports,
which even Castro has admitted are essential for growth, rose
only slightly from 1982's depressed level and remained 30 percent
below the amount imported in 1981.
Havana may have achieved some growth last year--perhaps 1 or
2 percent--through increased activity in the construction sector,
much of which was funded by Soviet and CEMA aid. Cuba also was
successful i'n' shifting the composition of its hard currency
imports so that intermediate goods imports from the West rose by
25 percent while total convertible currency imports increased by
only 6 percent. This permitted production by industries
dependent on Western inputs to continue, though some probably
were affected by equipment breakdowns as imports of capital
machinery and parts from the West declined by 31 percent.
Cuba's trade and current account balances ($512 million and
$238 million respectively) were positive last year, though not as
favorable as in 1982. Sugar and nickel exports nosedived due to
production and marketing problems, causing Havana to fall short
of the export target set in the 1983 rescheduling agreement.
Without the income from the special oil arrangement with Moscow,
Havana's current account balance would have been $335 million in
the red.4
Outl ook
The dreary economic picture shows no signs of improving this
year, and recognizing this, Havana again rescheduled its medium-
and long-term debts maturing in 1984--about $365 million.
Information released by Cuba to its creditors shows that the
island's foreign exchange earnings are projected to fall again
this year. The volume of sugar exports should recover somewhat
from 1983's low level, but world prices have fallen even
4 Cuba could not have obtained enough new loans to finance a
deficit of the magnitude, and its reserves would have financed
only a portion of i t. Thus, without the cash infusion from the
USSR, Cuba would have been forced to halve its already low hard
currency imports, bringing them well below the level that even
Cuban officials admit is necessary to maintain production
throughout the economy.
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further. Nickel earnings for 1984 are projected to drop slightly
from last year's already reduced level due to the loss of some
markets. Cuba also projects that tobacco, naptha, coffee, and
service earnings will decline. Havana will thus continue to rely
on Moscow for a substantial portion of its hard currency
funds--it.-expects to draw $475 million for the oil deal this
year.
Even though convertible currency export earnings are
expected to'decline, Havana plans to increase--albeit
slightly--its imports from the West this year. Raw material and
intermediate goods imports will rise, but capital goods imports
will fall again. This increased reliance on the Soviet Union for
machinery and equipment is likely to decrease the quality,
efficiency, and reliability of Cuba's capital stock. Havana may
achieve limited growth again this year, but in the near future
this policy will cause even slower economic activity and will
thwart efforts to diversify the economy.
Continued foreign payments problems almost certainly will
force Havana to request another debt rescheduling in 1985.
Prospects for a significant increase in sugar earnings are dim as
experts predict that the world market price will remain low.
Nickel production should increase next year as a new nickel plant
comes on line, but exports to the West are likely to increase
only slightly, due to probable continued marketing problems.
Havana has ready markets for its seafood and its world-famous
tobacco, but is unable to produce substantial additional
quantities of either. Cuba will continue its efforts to expand
revenues from tourism, but the island's lack of first-rate
accommodations and entertainment will prevent it from attracting
affluent visitors and keep its earnings from rising much above
last year's $52 million. Havana also hopes to boost its earnings
from its construction personnel abroad, but will have problems
since its primary customers--Libya, Iraq and Algeria--have
retrenched development plans in the wake of plunging oil
revenues. Cuban revenues from this service dropped from $60
million in 1979 to only $16 million last year, and are not
expected to pick up for at least the next few years.
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Beyond 1985, Cuba's economic prospects become even-more
grim. In 1986 the grace periods expire on both last year's
rescheduled debt to the West and the payments rescheduled by
Moscow in 1972. Cuba will then need to come up with about $400
million in hard currency to repay Western banks and governmgnts
in addition to $100-150 million extra in goods to the USSR.
Havana is not likely to be able to expand export production
enough to meet these payments. Moreover, the chances of hard
currency infusions from Moscow rising much are not good:
.4
-- The special oil arrangement expires in 1985 and is not
likely to be renewed. The Soviet Union probably
implemented this arrangement to encourage Cuban
conservation and thus pave the way for future cuts in oil
shipments without imposing upon Havana the hardships of
abrupt declines.
-- In light of the magnitude of Havana's recent trade
deficits with Moscow, the USSR probably will demand from
Cuba a higher trade protocol commitment for sugar in the
1986-90 trade agreement. This will decrease the ad hoc
hard currency purchases.
Thus, the Castro government at a minimum is likely to have to ask
Moscow to postpone debt repayments again. Because this probably
will not free enough resources for Cuba to meet the hard currency
repayments, Havana probably will request another rescheduling
from Western countries and banks.
Additionally, the composition and level of soft currency aid
from Moscow will change somewhat in coming years. The petroleum
subsidy should approach zero by 1985 because the moving average
price charged by the USSR will become roughly equivalent to the
world price. Barring a change in pricing policies, the sugar
subsidy will continue to increase, however, as world market
prices remain depressed and Havana's sugar production and exports
to Moscow increase. The nickel subsidy will also rise somewhat
as the volume of Cuban exports to the USSR expands.
5 The $400 includes $100 million of the debt rescheduled in
1983, along with $300 million of maturities that fall due in
1986.
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Moscow may draw the line on Havana running such large trade
deficits during the next five-year plan however. While the
Soviet Union undoubtedly will continue to assist in the
development of the Cuban economy, the Castro regime probably will
have to settle for considerably less than it would like and needs
for long-t.erm sustained growth. An indication of this occurred
during the recent CEMA summit meeting in Moscow where Cuba's
pleas from more rapid industrialization were apparently denied,
wedding it for the indefinate future to its traditional role as a
producer of 'basic commodities.
Economic Reforms?
A logical course of action for the Castro regime to follow
in dealing with the consequences of this prolonged slump would be
to allow greater individual initiative and rewards in order to
help meet critical shortages and spur workers' productivity.
Debate over economic policy is likely to increase in the Cuban
leadership with pragmatists and technocrats pressing for more
material incentives, greater autonomy for enterprise managers,
and reduced restrictions on private enterprise activities.
However, such policies go against the ideological gra61'n of the
dominant "hardliners" and are unlikely to be adopted.
Havana has implemented a few economic liberalization
measures in recent years, probably at the behest of the
p rag ma ti s ts:
6 The so-called hardliners are primarily ex-guerrillas from
the struggle against Batista. More than three-fourths of the
Politburo fall into this category. Most are politically
unsophisticated, tend to view the world in black and white terms,
and are intensely anti-American. Moderates in the hierarchy
include veterans of the pre-Castro Communist Party and a younger
group of "technocrats" who are largely responsible for the daily
operations of the economy. The "old communists" are prone to
represent Soviet interests in policy discussions and have a more
solid background in economic and political administration.
Because of their advanced age, however, they are steadily fading
as a political factor.
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A general salary reform was instituted in 1980 that ties
wages more closely to skills and performance, and allows
for bonuses for production above standards.
Farmer's free markets were established in 1980, allowing
private farmers to sell production in excess of their
state quotas in a market where prices are determined by
supply and demand.
Statd4enterprises have been permitted to contract for and
dismiss labor directly since 1980.
-- A law permitting up to 49 percent foreign ownership of
Cuban enterprises was implemented in 1982.
Actions taken by the Castro regime subsequently, however,
indicate that it intends to pursue a hardline approach over the
next several years and that prospects for more reforms are
bleak. For example, despite the evident success of the farmers'
free markets in stimulating productivity, a major crackdown was
waged on these markets two years after they were implemented.
The ideological purists in the regime apparently judged that the
negative political and "moral" effects--the rise of "capitalist"
behavior, for example--outweighed the benefits. The markets were
virtually shut down for several months. Activity has since
resumed, but several restrictions were placed on the farmers,
decreasing their incentives. In addition, last year state-run
"parallel" markets were opened that compete directly with the
farmers' markets. Also, in a move targetted at individuals
living illegally in Havana and engaging in black market
activities, the government announced that it would begin
enforcing a law previously ignored to prevent the illegal
occupation of vacant government-owned building and other property
in Havana. Moreover, even with considerable promotion by the
Cuban government, Havana has failed to attract a single foreign
investor yet, primarily because the existing legislation does not
provide enough freedom to prospective foreign partners. The
Castro regime certainly recognizes this, but has not acted to
remedy it.
-Although Fidel Castro is more pragmatic and sophisticated
than the purists, he generally sees any movement toward economic
liberalization as a necessary evil that serves only to resolve
short-term problems. Like his hardline colleagues in the
hierarchy, he fears that such reforms will lead to a popular
desire for additional liberalization and a decentralization of
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Soviet Assistance Delivered to Cubaa
Average
"'-
Annual
b
1961-
1961-70
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1983
Development aidc
225
450
565
430
295
150
185
230
320
460
830
1,415.
975
1,000
9,555
Trade susidies
102
120
49
181
43
914
1,384
2,040
2,626
2,718
2,633
3,145
3693
3,200
23,766
Sugar"
102
51
0
71
-408
577
989
1,638
2,427
2,324
1,165
1,366
2,580
2,800
16,600
unc
Petrole
0
42
27
62
411
310
374
378
164
381
1,480
1,657
1,006
300
6,592
a
Nickel
0
27
22
48
40
27
21
24
35
13
-12
122
107
100
574
Total eoonanic aid
327
570
614
611
338
1,064
1,569
2,270
2,946
3,178
3,463
4,560
4,668
4,200
33,321
aBased on official Cuban and Soviet trade data.
bPreliminary.
CBased on (a) estimated balance-of-payments aid necessary to cover Cuban trade deficits with the USSR, (b) Cuban purchases of capital goods from Moscow, and
(c)public statements by Cuban and Soviet officials concerning the amount of development aid extended. This aid is repayable but terms are highly
ooncessional. Projection for. 1983 is based on preliminary trade data.
dSugar and nickel subsidies are estimated as the difference between the price Moscow pays for these commodities and their. world market value. The
difference is considered a grant and not subject to repayment.
erhe petroleum subsidy reflects the difference between the value of petroleum purchased from the USSR and the value. of these imports at world market
prices. It is considered a grant and not subject to repayment.
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Soviet Hard Currency Flows to Cubaa
Average
Total
Annual
b
83
1961-70
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1961-
Total
55
62
69
73
123
601
343
546
290
356
375
703
773
837
5,701
Soviet sugar
purchases
0
0
0
0
0
424
159
223
126
134
0
168
291
16
1,541
Grain/flour exports
55
62
69
73
123
174
173
216
133
213
234
319
266
2,855
2,855
Other
0
0
0
0
0
3 ,
11
107
31
9
141
216
216
571
1,305
aBased on Soviet and Cuban trade data
bpreliminary
cPrimarily money for oil saved fran protocol allotment
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Table 3
Million US$
Hard Currency Debt Outstanding as of 30 December) 1983
TOTAL
3,320.0
Official bilateral
1,682.9
Intergovernmental Loans
204.4
Credits for Development Aid
32.2
Export Credits with Government Guarantee)
1,446.3
Official Multilateral
27.7
Suppliers Credits
118.2
Financing Institutions
1,490.4
Bank Loans and Deposits
1,426.5
Medium-term Bilateral and Commerical Loans
543.8
Short-term Deposits
882.7
Credits for Current Imports
63.9
1Preliminary.
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Value of Exports by Major Camaditya
1957
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983b
Total
818
691
1,050
861
840
1,372
2,707
3,572
3,284
3,677
4,575
4,829
5,593
5,406
5,928
6,416
Sugar
654
591
806
657
622
1,032
2,336
3,209
2,855
3,067
3,957
4,144
4,677
4,269
4,560
4,730
Raw and refined
629
579
785
634
602
1,011
2,299
3,183
2,832
3,038
3,931
4,090
4,624
4,225
4,526
4,717
Molasses
25
12
21
23
20
21
37
26
23
29
26
55
53
44
34
13
Minerals
47
50
175
136
125
190
171
169
201
238
212
223
270
409
347
,360
Nickel
32
40
173
136
124
182
167
164
193
232
206
213
260
400
339
352
Other
15
10
2
NFX3L
1
8
4
5
8
6
6
10
10
9
8
8
Tobacco
48
33
33
32
40
62
73
63
74
85
92
83
51
72
124
119
Raw
37
19
15
14
15
23
25
22
26
34
29
30
8
24
54
37
Manufactured
11
14
18
18
25
39
48
41
48
51
63
53
43
48
70
82
Foodstuffs and Beverages
2
5
29
31
45
86
120
131
153
171
208
241
255
301
312
372
Of which:
Fish and shellfish
7
3
19
22
29
40
59
63
79
83
113
132
124
126
117
122
Citrus
2
1
3
3
5
10
15
14
16
22
39
47
58
99
118
137
Otherc
57
12
7
5
8
2
7
0
1
116
106
138
340
355
585
835
aExports are f.o.b.
bPreliminary.
cIncludes reexports. In recent years, Cuba has reexported sane
of its petroleum imports.
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 Approved For Release 2009/03/24: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302420001-2
Hard Currency Current Account Balance
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983a
Exports, f.o.b.b
272
304
389
492
1,175
1,576
904
929
792
939
1,759
1,799
1,627
1,431
Socialists
0
0
0
0
0
405
104
308
168
155
141
422
747
600
Imports, f.o.b.d
406
418
300
505
1,062
1,832
1,612
1,456
973
802
1,242
1,435
900
920
Interest payments
-26
-35
-40
-55
-70
-45
-55
-105
-190
-243
-371
-432
2409
-288
Other current
transactionse
20
20
20
25
25
10
25
40
-332
-84
-213
132
41
14
Current account balance
-140
-129.
69
43
68
-291
-738
-595
-703
-190
-67
64
359
237
aPreliminary.
b1978-83 data based on Cuban balance of payments statistics;
CHard currency purchases of Cuban goods from Socialist countries. Primarily sugar purchases from the USSR and China.
dFor 1970-77, imports c.i.f. For 1978-83 imports f.o.b. and transportation included in service account (other current transactions).
eIncludes primarily receipts from tourism, ship chartering, and construction, and payments for transportation.
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 Approved For Release 2009/03/24: CIA-RDP04TOO367ROO0302420001-2
Figure 1
Cuba: Share of Total Trade by Major Area
1957
1965
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1.978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Other Communist
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 Approved For Release 2009/03/24: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302420001-2
Figure 2
Cuba: Total Trade Balance Adjusted for
Soviet Price Subsidies
~~~A total
trade balance
Total trade balance adjusted
to exclude subsidies from USSR
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I-
-5 1961-70.71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
(Average
annual)
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 Approved For Release 2009/03/24: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302420001-2
Figure 3
Cuba: Per Capita Soviet Economic Assistance
I I I I I I I I I I I I
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 Approved For Release 2009/03/24: CIA-RDP04T00367R000302420001-2
Subject: THE CUBAN ECONOMY: A SOVIET SHOWCASE?
.s
Distribution:
DDI/ALA/MCD,
Ken Skough
Executive Director
NIO/LA
NIC/AG
C/DDI/PES
DDI/CPAS/ILS
D/ALA
ALA/PS
ALA Research Director
CPAS/IMC/CB
DIVISION FILES
MC/RI
Branch Files
MC/MX
MC/CA
(15 February 1984)
STAT
STAT
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