HOW CHINA MAKES FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000100530001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Intelligence 25X1
How China Makes
Foreign Policy F I
Secret
EA 85-10010
January 1985
Copy 2 4 4
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How China Makes
Foreign Policy F I
Division, OEA, on
This paper was prepared by Office of
East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, China
Secret
EA 85-10010
January 1985
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 20 December 1984
was used in this report.
How China Makes
Foreign Policyn 25X1
Decisionmaking in China is-and always has been-highly centralized.
Since his return to power, Deng Xiaoping has called most of the shots, es-
pecially in foreign policy. Over the past few years, however, Deng has
begun delegating more power and responsibility to his handpicked succes-
sors, party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang. Of
the two, Hu is the real heir to Deng, with Zhao apparently destined to play
the role of chief administrator, much like the late Zhou Enlai under Mao.
Together Hu and Zhao are making the foreign policy apparatus more
responsive to their wills and are attempting to coordinate and rationalize
the process. They have a long way to go, however, in remaking what
remains a complex, overlapping, and fragile decisionmaking structure.
Key institutions to emerge from their efforts are the new Foreign Affairs
Small Group administered by Zhao and the reestablished party Secretariat
under Hu. They are now responsible for formulating policy and making
most of the important day-to-day decisions, helping Hu and Zhao place
their stamp on policy and bolstering their image as leaders. Other
institutions that play a major role include:
? The Politburo Standing Committee, the party's top decisionmaking body.
? The International Liaison Department. Under Hu Yaobang's activist
leadership, this once moribund party agency plays a major role in areas
such as relations with North Korea.
? The Foreign Affairs Coordination Point. Under the state apparatus, this
informal group hashes out the details of daily diplomacy and economic
relations.
? Think tanks, especially those led by officials personally close to Deng,
Hu, and Zhao. They often have direct and substantial influence.
foreign policy making,
The military-long cast by some observers as resisting Deng's foreign
policies-does not appear to wield much influence in this area. Historical-
ly, some soldier-politicians have been influential, but the military as an
institution does not-and apparently never has-played a key role in
Personal relationships still count for as much, if not more, than institutions
in policymaking. China's tradition of rule by a strongman continues to
apply, making even major changes in the direction of foreign policy
relatively easy to initiate and rendering the policy process unpredictable.
Secret
EA 85-10010
January 1985
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Indeed, persons with close ties to individual leaders at the top often go out
of channels and submit uncoordinated proposals that can become policy.
Similarly, the leadership uses trusted representatives-especially their
offspring-to perform particularly sensitive missions rather than rely on
officeholders in the formal chain of command. Foreign policy professionals
with few exceptions have not entered the narrow circle of the leadership's
trusted advisers.
The conservatives in China's leadership who have resisted some of the
reformist initiatives appear to us more concerned with the domestic social
effects of foreign policy than with the policy itself. These leaders also have
a jealous regard for China's sovereignty and are quick to react when they
believe it is slighted. Politburo Standing Committee members Chen Yun,
79, and Li Xiannian, 75, stand out in this regard, although their influence
on foreign policy appears to have declined recently.
Another senior leader who could prove increasingly troublesome, is the
independent-minded Peng Zhen, 82, rumored to be responsible for intelli-
gence and a candidate for membership in the party's Politburo Standing
Committee. Peng has a record of emotionally tinged anti-US remarks.
Chinese leaders take their own counsel and rely on a handful of close
advisers who share their strategic outlook and for the most part do not rep-
resent institutional interests. Foreign policy professionals, with few excep-
tions, have not entered the narrow circles of the leadership's trusted
advisers.
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Summary iii
Introduction 1
The Foreign Policy Hierarchy 1
The Party ... 1
The Politburo Standing Committee 1
The Politburo
The Secretariat 3
The Foreign Affairs Small Group
The Foreign Policy Research Group
The International Liaison Department 4
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and 6
Trade
Conclusions and Implications for the United States
7
8
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How China Makes
Foreign Policy F
Since the founding of the People's Republic, China's
leaders have had enormous personal scope in shaping
foreign policy. In the early years, this reliance on the
judgment of one or a few individuals was not a great
handicap because of China's limited international role
and its acceptance of the Soviet lead in many areas.
The opening of China to the West since the end of the
Cultural Revolution, however, has greatly increased
the importance of the decisions of Beijing's leaders
and its foreign policy apparatus.
Deng's twin objectives-economic modernization and
a smooth succession to party General Secretary Hu
Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang-have, however,
prompted him to delegate some of his authority to
these two men and the bureaucracies they head. But
the process of creating a foreign policy establishment
responsive to Hu and Zhao is far from complete. This
paper looks closely at China's foreign policy institu-
tions as they are evolving and then discusses the roles
of the major players
The Party ...
The Politburo Standing Committee. This is the apex
of decisionmaking in China. Three of its six mem-
bers-Deng, Hu, and Zhao-together make the ma-
jor decisions in foreign policy, with Deng the domi-
Deng has gradually shifted responsibility for foreign
affairs onto the shoulders of Hu and Zhao. Zhao told
a US scholar last July that he and Hu are on the "first
line" of decisionmaking. The other four, older Stand-
ing Committee members, on the "second line," now
decide "only a few" issues.
The Politburo. Since the reestablishment of the party
Secretariat in early 1980, the once-strong role of the
Politburo has steadily diminished, its functions limit-
ed largely to approving what the Secretariat submits
to it. Its 24 full members and three alternate mem-
bers, often powerful individuals in their own right, are
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Figure 1
China's Foreign Policy Decision Making Hierarchy
Legend
- Formal bureaucratic line of command
-- Intermittent participant
Informal channels of real influence
State Council
[(Zhao Ziyang)
Inner Cabinet Foreign Affairs Small
(Zhao Ziyang) Group
Foreign Affairs Policy Research
Coordination Point Office
(Ji Pengfei ) (Deng Liqun)
Politburo Standing
Committee
(Deng Xiaoping)
Secretariat
(Hu Yaobang)
Ministry of State
Security
(Ling Yon)
Foreign Policy International Liaison
Research Group Department
(Huan Xiang) (Qian Liren)
Ministry of Foreign Ministry of Foreign Ministry of National
Economic Relations Affairs Defense
and Trade (Wu Xueqian) (Zhang Aiping)
When Muhua)
Institute of Contem- International Studies Beijing Institute of
porary International Research Center International and
Relations (Huan Xiang) Strategic Studies
(Chen Zhongjing) (Wu Xiuquan)
Think Tanks-
Can send papers to
any level of party or
state and prompt
policy changes.
Party/State Military
Commissions
(Yang Shangkun)
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collectively quite elderly (average age 75), and no
effort is under way to make the membership younger.
Although troublesome Politburo members are treated
gingerly, the reformist-dominated Secretariat has
fairly successfully circumvented the group as a whole.
In recent years, the Politburo has met infrequently
and usually only in connection with larger gather-
ings-so-called expanded Politburo meetings-that
include Secretariat members and a variety of other
party, state, and Army figures. These large meetings
appear to dilute the impact of the Politburo delibera-
tions, effectively packing the meeting in Deng's favor
The Secretariat. On all issues, this is now the key
policy formulation body in the Chinese party. We
believe that the Secretariat shapes and oversees the
implementation of nearly all major departures in
foreign policy-such as opening China's cities to
foreign investment. Its governmental counterpart is
the State Council. The membership and staff of the
who are not closely identified with Deng and Hu. For
example, General Political Department head Yu Qiuli
is often associated with President Li Xiannian, and
Vice Premier Yao Yilin seems to be close to Chen
Yuri.
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two organizations overlap,
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The Foreign Affairs Small Group. Li Xiannian pre-
sides over this group, but in fact it is headed by
Premier Zhao and is the most important body review-
ing day-to-day issues. Its members include the leaders
of all organizations dealing with foreign affairs:
The Secretariat is the central coordination mecha-
nism for all party activities and is the bureaucratic
power base for General Secretary Hu. Its 11 members
and alternates include some senior figures, however,
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Standing midway between the party and state, it
coordinates the activities of all organizations con-
cerned with foreign policy matters. Zhao identified
this group as a party organization and outlined its role
as exchanging views, studying problems, and commu-
nicating with one another. According to Zhao, "It
25X1 does not decide what concrete measures are to be
taken."
Despite the establishment of the small group, many
Chinese in the ministries still complain to scholars
and US Embassy officials about the lack of coordina-
tion in the Chinese foreign policy establishment.
Reports and studies on virtually any topic from any
organization continue to be channeled directly to the
top leadership through networks of personal relations
without notification to other elements of the bureau-
cracies or peer review. As a result, Deng and other
leaders sometimes issue policy statements that come
as a surprise to China's diplomats.n
The Foreign Policy Research Group. This group
provides staff support primarily for Hu and the party 25X1
Secretariat.
The International Liaison Department. The ILD has
a unique role in the policy apparatus: supervising
China's dealings with foreign Communist parties and
some Communist-ruled countries. With the decline in
the international Communist movement and the
breakup of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the 1960s, the ILD
lost its main role and much of its policy influence,
confining its activities to party intelligence work and
contacts abroad with less significant parties.
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Under Hu Yaobang's activist leadership and the daily
oversight of Hu Qili, however, the ILD is making a
comeback. It is in charge of Beijing's more ecumeni-
cal approach to foreign parties and now deals not only
with pro-Soviet parties in Europe but with any party
China hopes to influence.
Hu's personal involvement in relations with North
Korea also has increased the prominence of the ILD.
According to a US Embassy source, the ILD drafted
all of the papers prepared for Hu's trip to North
Korea last May. In November 1984, moreover, an
"unofficial" visit to China by Kim II-song, the Korean
party leader, took place under the ILD's aegis. F-1
Qian Liren, a follower of Hu Yaobang since their
time together in the Communist Youth League in the
1950s, heads the ILD.
=Qian's youth activities abroad and previous
experience in the ILD make him one of the better
informed officials in Hu's circle of trusted associates.
...and State
The State Council. The Council is an unwieldy body
comprising more than 50 members. It is sometimes
called upon to place a stamp of bureaucratic approval
on broad policy measures, such as supporting Deng's
opening to the outside or Zhao's economic reforms. A
less cumbersome "inner cabinet" of about 15 State
Council members meets twice a week. This largely
technocratic group reportedly works to solve nuts-
and-bolts questions that need attention by relatively
senior officials. The Premier takes a strong hand in
supervising this body
The Premier's principal foreign affairs aide in State
Council work is Deputy Secretary General Chen Chu,
a veteran diplomat. Despite his position, Chen appears
to exercise little influence.
According to Premier Zhao, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Economic Rela-
tions and Trade meet with Ji frequently to discuss
foreign affairs. Their positions make them among the
best informed and potentially most influential govern-
ment officials in the foreign affairs arena. Zhao said,
"When there are problems they cannot solve, they
raise them with the State Council." We suspect,
however, that their concurrent positions in the Small
Group permit issues to go directly there, short-
circuiting the State Council.
The MFA's lack of political clout, moreover, makes it
just one of a number of bureaucracies clamoring to
bring their interests to the attention of the leadership.
Officials have complained to US Embassy officers 25X1
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that they are unable to control even the publication of The Ministry also prepares a portion of the policy and
25X1 articles on foreign policy in China's authoritative briefing papers on regional issues for leadership meet-
media to ensure a unified line.F____1 ings. Some of the products of the American and
Oceanian Affairs Department, and possibly the Soviet
and East European Affairs Department, receive limit-
ed, high-level distribution and are considered impor-
tant in the foreign policy community. Observers
agree, however, that there are no effective functional
bureaus in the Ministry.F-I
We believe the influence of the MFA should not be
discounted too much. As the chief representative of
the Chinese Government in dealings with the outside
world, it is a source of ideas and reporting that help
form the leadership's agenda.
Conferences of senior MFA officials, including am-
bassadors assigned abroad, are held periodically in
China, usually to receive instructions but sometimes
to put forth views on policy. We believe that over time
these are influential.
The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and
Trade (MFERT). Given the regime's preoccupation
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with modernization of the Chinese economy and its
constantly reiterated policy of opening to the outside,
the recently created (1982) and bureaucratically enor-
mous MFERT has the potential to become very
powerful. It has line responsibility for China's bur-
geoning foreign trade and modest foreign aid pro-
The Military. How the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) formally interacts with the foreign affairs
community is unclear, apparently by design. Among
foreign observers and even Chinese officials, there is
considerable uncertainty about the military's influ-
ence on foreign policy. Although many have imputed
to the PLA a variety of views on the basis of very thin
evidence, we have no hard evidence that the PLA as
an institution has historically promoted or obstructed
a particular foreign policy line, even during the era
when Lin Biao led the military.
Other individuals within the military are increasingly
performing sensitive foreign affairs tasks at the behest
of the leadership. Middle-level officers involved in the
developing Sino-US military relationship, for exam-
ple, include a striking number of the offspring of
senior leaders. In our view, this channel does not
represent an expression of PLA institutional interest
in expanding the relationship with the United States
as much as it does a traditional Chinese inclination to
use trustworthy officials to oversee sensitive policy
matters. F-1
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Individual soldier-politicians may take positions on
military-related foreign issues, often representing spe-
cial interest groups within the armed forces. In order
to obtain needed equipment quickly, some line officers
appear willing, for example, to become increasingly
dependent on arms and technology from abroad, while
military-related production ministries have vested in-
terests at home to protect against foreign competition.
Their respective influence depends, however, on their
personal prestige and connections at least as much as
on their institutional affiliation. On balance, we be-
lieve the PLA as a whole focuses its energies on
domestic issues of more pressing importance to it,
25X1 such as the budget and military modernization. F-1
The Ministry of State Security is headed by a career
public security official, Ling Yuri. Ling was Deng's
special assistant for security during his visit to the
United States in 1979 and presumably is still trusted
to look after Deng's interests in the Ministry.n
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The security apparatus, in turn, is the political respon-
sibility of National People's Congress Standing Com-
mittee Chairman and Politburo member Peng Zhen
and Secretariat member Chen Pixian. The Chinese
media routinely identify these men as presiding over
the public activities of the security ministries.
The Institute of Contemporary International Rela-
tions has functioned since the late 1940s as a center
for producing all-source finished intelligence.0
it falls bureaucratically under
the insti-
tute produces current intelligence and long-term stud-
ies based on classified reporting presumably obtained
through an arrangement with the security apparatus
and Foreign Ministry. It is said to be the largest
foreign affairs institute in Beijing, with 300 analysts
and support staff who tend to be young and well
regarded for their expertise.
the institute has 400 employees
overseas as well, in some cases, we believe, holding
full-time MFA assignments, but also in most in-
stances presumably collecting intelligence under Min-
istry of State Security auspices. 71
Research Institutes. Since the end of the Cultural
Revolution, institutes for foreign affairs research have
proliferated (see figure 2). Most do not participate
actively in policymaking. As a group, however, they
are able to send materials directly to the leadership-
depending on personal relationships. If a leader like
Deng or Chen Yun endorses a particular point in a
paper, according to US Embassy reporting, his in-
scription will receive wider dissemination and become
a factor that must be addressed in policy.=
In I I effort to coordinate the
increasing flow of these products, Beijing established
the International Studies Research Center. Huan
Xiang directs this organization, as well as the Secre-
tariat's Foreign Policy Research Group.'
Huan's bureaucratic breadth as a foreign policy spe-
cialist is unmatched in China.
however, he has been frustrated to a
of information and papers more effectively.
degree by various organizations that continue to
bypass his Research Center. Given the determination
of Hu and Zhao to impose increasing coordination on
the bureaucracies, Huan may come to control the flow
The Defense Ministry has an institute of its own, the
Beijing Institute of International and Strategic Stud-
ies (BLISS), headed by veteran soldier and diplomat,
Wu long headed military intelligence and still
appears to oversee it through Deputy Chief of the
General Staff Xu Xin. BIISS has only a small staff of
about 20 and no quarters of its own thus far. Its
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Figure 2
China: Foreign Policy Research Institutes Under the State Council
Ministry of Foreign Ministry of National Ministry of State International Affairs Ministry of Foreign Chinese Academy of
Affairs Defense Security Research Center Trade Social Sciences
Institute of Beijing Institute of
International Studies Strategic Studies
Shanghai Institute of
International Studies
Chinese People's
Institute of Foreign
Affairs
Institute of
Contemporary Inter-
national Relations
Institute of Interna- Institute of World
tional Trade Research Economy and Politics
Institute of World
History
Institute of the Soviet
Union and Eastern
Europe
Institute of West Asia
and Africa
Institute of South
Asia
Institute of the USA
and Canada
Institute (if Latin
America
Institute of Western
Europe
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Bence, with very limited analytical capability.
Finally, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS), established in 1977 as the font of many of the
reform camp's most important ideas, houses some
specialized foreign affairs institutes. The head of
CASS, Ma Hong, is an economist who is not regarded
as a foreign policy actor.n
One of the institutes under CASS is the Institute of
American Studies, a small and ill-funded organization
according to its director, Li Shenzhi. Li is well
regarded within top foreign policy circles, according
to many reports. He was close to Zhou Enlai in the
1950s and 1960s and traveled to the United States
with Deng in 1979 and with Zhao in 1984. He also
helped to author Hu Yaobang's speech to the 12th
Party Congress in 1982, setting out China's independ-
ent foreign policy line.' Despite the high regard in
which he is held, Li has been slow to acquire bureau-
cratic authority. One CASS official believes Li may
soon rise to a leading position in the Academy. Li
seems to be a protege of Huan Xiang.0
Ad Hoc Groups. The leadership frequently forms
special study or policy groups to wrestle with issues of
broad scope or particular sensitivity. These fall into
two general categories: departmental and ministerial
representative meetings and senior leadership teams.
Broadly based representative meetings appear intend-
ed primarily to build a consensus and overcome
bureaucratic cleavages on issues. According to the US
Embassy, for example, a visiting US scholar was told
that the State Council organized a task force before
announcing Premier Zhao's agreement to visit the
United States.n
In another case, representatives of the Foreign Minis-
try's desk, the Institutes of International Studies, of
International Relations, and for Contemporary Inter-
national Relations prepared an assessment, under the
direction of Huan Xiang, on the prospects for the
reelection of President Reagan. The task force con-
cluded that the President would be reelected and that
China should prepare to deal with him for another
five years. Similar ad hoc groups are formed to
coodinate papers in advance of visits by important
figures, such as Vice President Bush and Prime
Minister Thatcher.)
Ad hoc groups composed of top leaders are not a new
phenomenon and seem to reflect China's traditional
reliance on a few powerful individuals.
Dissent Mechanisms. China's political culture stress-
es conformity, despite the efforts of the leadership
occasionally to encourage initiative. When a single
leader is dominant, as Deng is now, the tendency is to
avoid challenging his line on issues such as foreign
policy. When the leader is weak, however, political
opponents look for issues to exploit as cudgels in their
battles. Debates can occur completely out of our view,
but some differences emerge when senior leaders
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make public remarks that are out of step with the
prevailing line.4 n
The conditions of comparative stability in China
today have reduced visible dissent to a minimum.
Under these conditions, perhaps the safest and most
commonly used means of publicly debating an issue,
especially one that has not been finally decided upon
by the leadership, is the use of allegorical articles in
China's media. In August 1984, for example, an
article appeared in Red Flag ostensibly to commemo-
rate China's National Day, but it went on to dredge
up unpleasant memories about the stationing of US
forces in China before 1949. Although the intent of
such pieces is usually masked, this article seemed
written to warn the leadership about the potential
adverse consequences of a military relationship with
the United States.n
approval by someone in authority.
We know very little about the interplay between
senior leaders and those who express dissent from
below. Long after specific policy or factional battles
have been fought, however, information has often
emerged linking the authors of allegorical articles, for
example, with top leaders who are struggling with
their colleagues. Gaining access to the official media
to publish allegories appears to require at least tacit
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Conclusions and Implications
for the United States
The creation of new coordinating mechanisms has
strengthened the role of the reform group under Deng
in the foreign policy making process. It has not,
however, fundamentally altered the system's tendency
to rely, in an almost chaotic fashion, on individuals
rather than institutions. By regularizing much of the
flow of information and policy papers, the Deng group
has reduced, to a degree, the potential for confusion,
error, and opposition mischief. It also has helped Hu
and Zhao to place their stamp on policy, bolstering
their image as national leaders.n
Tighter management of the process, we believe, has
also made implementation of policy toward the Unit-
ed States more effecti,,--. By including suspected
skeptics of the relationship in the policy generation
process and by appointing study groups across bu-
reaucratic lines, the regime is able to channel and
control dissenting views within the system.n
with Taiwan.
At the same time, the concentration of authority in
the hands of Deng, Hu, and Zhao gives these lead-
ers-especially Deng-the authority to stare down
domestic critics, for example, on the decision to play
down China's reaction to quiet, unofficial US dealings
It is too early to tell whether the new institutions
created by the reformers will last. China's tradition of
rule by a strongman, combined with a tendency to
treat foreign policy as his special preserve, still makes
even major changes in the direction of foreign policy
relatively easy to initiate. The complex pattern of
personal relationships that exist throughout the sys-
tem remains, in our view, more durable and influen-
tial than the institutions themselves.n
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Appendix
An Illustration of the
Decisionmaking Process
In June 1984, Outlook magazine published a highly May 1980
unusual article chronicling China's decision "to fur-
ther open to the world" 14 coastal cities. We believe
this decision provoked particularly intense behind-the-
scenes arguments, because of the major domestic
implications of the competition and opportunities
brought by increased contact with the world. Some August 1980
officials evidently also believed that special economic
zones would become "special political zones" for
foreigners. By detailing the stages of decisionmaking
and consensus building, the reform leadership appar-
ently wanted to demonstrate to skeptics that the 1981-82
policy was firm, broadly based, and no longer to be
questioned. At the same time, Hu and Zhao presum-
ably sought to portray themselves as presiding over a
smooth governmental process with the blessing of all
the top leaders.
The article documented the emergence of the Secre-
tariat as the central party body to shape the initiatives
of the leadership. It also demonstrated how inscrip-
tions on policy documents by top leaders influence
policy debates. Finally, it showed how the Politburo
was circumvented and maneuvered into functioning as 1982
a rubberstamp.
December 1978 The watershed Third Ple-
num of the 11th Central
Committee approved the
notion of opening to the
outside world.
Deng Xiaoping proposed February 1983
creating special zones to
entice foreign capital and
technology to China.
"Soon afterwards" Central Committee and
State Council sent work
teams to investigate es-
tablishing "special zones
for exports."
The Central Committee
and State Council issued
document establishing
"special economic
zones."
The Standing Committee
of the National People's
Congress gave pro forma
approval of zones.
Central Committee and
State Council issued fur-
ther stipulations and
regulations.
Hu Yaobang told the
Secretariat, "On the ba-
sis of self-reliance, we
must widen our field of
vision from China to the
world."
Chen Yun inscribed in-
structions on a document
urging the zones be run
"more successfully."
Top leaders Hu Yao-
bang, Ye Jianying, Deng
Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang,
Li Xiannian, and others
conducted personal inves-
tigations of the zones.
Hu Yaobang said, while
touring the Shenzhen
zone, "Be bold in explor-
ing and blazing new
trails."
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January-February 1984 Deng Xiaoping, Wang
Zhen, and Yang Shang-
kun inspected the zones.
Deng wrote an inscrip-
tion saying, "Our policy
in establishing special
economic zones is
correct."
24 February 1984 "Leading comrades of
the central authorities"
attended a "forum"
where Deng instructed,
"We must make clear
that our guiding ideology
is to open wide and not to
restrict."
"Not long afterwards" The Secretariat and
State Council began con-
crete preparations for a
forum of coastal city
leaders.
26 March-6 April 1984 The Secretariat and
State Council held a fo-
rum of coastal city and
provincial officials to-
gether with responsible
and leading officials from
the special economic
zones and central organs.
Deng Xiaoping and Li
Xiannian attended the
closing. Zhao Ziyang
called Deng's proposal to
open additional cities a
"major policy."
30 April 1984 Finally, Hu Yaobang and
Zhao Ziyang presided
over a Politburo meeting,
also attended by "leading
comrades" of the Secre-
tariat, the State Council,
the Central Advisory
Commission, and "other
organs" to endorse
Deng's proposal.
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Secret
Secret
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