THE PHILIPPINES: PREPARING TO TEST PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000100560001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
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The Philippines:
Preparing To Test
Presidential Succession
ec
EA 85-10022
February 1985
COPY 2 0 6
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Philippines:
Preparing To Test
Presidential Succession
Global Issues.
Office of East Asian Analysis, with contributions by
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 85-10022
February 1985
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The Philippines:
Preparing To Test
Presidential Succession
Key Judgments President Marcos's insistence on keeping political institutions weak-
Information available as including maintaining an ambiguous succession mechanism-points to a
of 15 January 1985 rocky road to new leadership if he dies or becomes incapacitated. The
was used in this report.
jockeying during his current health crisis has intensified widespread
anxiety about the soundness of the succession process. Because we believe
Marcos's health will probably show only transient improvement, we expect
this concern will continue to eclipse all other key national issues-including
severe economic problems and a growing insurgency-during the next
year.
The arguments in favor of a constitutional succession-the emergence of
independent leadership within the ruling party, General Ver's diminished
status in the military, and Acting Chief of Staff Ramos's pledge to uphold
the Constitution-might prevail in the immediate aftermath of Marcos's
death. Nonetheless, a breakdown of the process is possible if Marcos's
inner circle determine that they cannot settle the leadership question
before the National Assembly moves ahead on election procedures.
We believe Marcos's permanent incapacitation would be more likely to
increase temptations within his inner circle to circumvent the constitutional
process. Imelda Marcos and her brother, Ambassador to the United States
Benjamin Romualdez, probably would be the prime movers in such a
scheme, and they almost certainly would depend on General Ver to deliver
military support.
Although Marcos has not openly supported his wife's succession maneuver-
ing, we believe recent moves on his part are designed to pave the way for
Mrs. Marcos to succeed him, if the succession mechanism is activated
before 1987. His refusal at a ruling party caucus in January to consider
proposals to strengthen legal succession and to hold a presidential election
before 1987 suggests that he is trying to gain time to allow Imelda Marcos
to improve her position in the ruling party and with the public.
On balance, we believe the continued strengthening of political institu-
tions-including the tightening of the succession process-will take more
time than events surrounding Marcos's health will allow. For that reason,
we believe that a chaotic succession contest is probable.
Secret
EA 85-10022
February 1985
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The Philippines:
Preparing To Test
Presidential Succession
has touched off an intense round of political
posturing since last November as key groups in the
Philippines gear up for a transition to new leadership.
In particular
debate over the prospects for a constitu-
tional succession recently has dominated the agenda
of senior officials in the military, the Cabinet, and the
ruling party. The absence of a strong legal succession
mechanism-a vice president will not be elected until
presidential elections in 1987-makes it difficult to
predict succession outcomes.' It is possible, however,
to evaluate the pressures for and against the legal
process that Marcos's demise or incapacitation would
Concern over the issue within the National Assembly
is evident in two ruling party resolutions and two
opposition resolutions designed to clarify the succes-
sion that have been introduced recently in Assembly
sessions. Although none of these measures have been
enacted, Philippine press reports indicate that one
opposition resolution calls for the establishment of a
panel of military physicians to examine Marcos-
should he be in "seclusion" for several days-and
then report its findings to the National Assembly. The
press has also reported a ruling party resolution that
deals with the succession in the event the Speaker dies
activate.
The Constitution calls for the Speaker of the National
Assembly-currently Nicanor Yniguez-to act as
caretaker president if Marcos dies or is officially
termed "incapacitated" before his term expires in
1987. The National Assembly under the law is to
agree on special election rules within seven days, and
the Speaker is then required to set the date for the
election within 60 days of Marcos's demise. Constitu-
tional provisions prevent the Speaker from declaring
martial law, dissolving the Assembly, and using the
power of presidential decree.
while acting as caretaker president.
It appears that only skillful political maneuvering by
Deputy Prime Minister Rono prevented some ruling 25X1
parity members from forcing debate on the succession
Iasi
~A strong performance by Marcos at a party
caucus in January apparently forestalled further party
debate on succession legislation. Nonetheless, we ex-
pect the opposition to keep pressing the matter in the
National Assembly, if for no other reason than to
continue focusing public attention on the weaknesses
in the existing system.
The key threat to the constitutional succession is that
those with the most to lose from the legal transfer of
power when Marcos dies are in the best position to
intervene in the process. Imelda Marcos and General
Ver, in particular, are potentially the two greatest
losers in the post-Marcos period because neither has a
strong independent power base. Imelda Marcos's per-
sonal popularity has suffered in the aftermath of the
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1972
Marcos declares martial law under provisions of the
1935 Constitution, citing danger of a violent over-
throw of the government by Communist rebels. Parti-
san political activity is suspended and the office of
the vice president abolished.
1978
Interim National Assembly begins to function in
parliamentary system; Marcos retains power to rule
by decree f the legislature is deadlocked.
1981
Martial law is lifted; Marcos retains authoritative
powers, including the power to legislate by decree. An
executive committee is created in case Marcos dies or
is incapacitated. Cesar Virata-as newly appointed
Prime Minister-heads the committee; Marcos also
names nine others, including Imelda Marcos, Defense
Minister Enrile, and Deputy Prime Minister Rono.
Plebiscite ratifies constitutional amendments, includ-
ing transfer of authority from Prime Minister to
President; President can now be elected to indefinite
number of six-year terms.
Marcos adds three more representatives to the execu-
tive committee; National Assembly passes procedural
rules for the executive committee and defines presi-
dential incapacitation.
businessmen,
and the church call for the abolishment of the
executive committee and the restoration of the office
Aquino assassination, and many ruling party mem-
bers began viewing her as a political liability when she
failed to deliver Manila's vote in the National Assem-
bly election last May. General Ver's position has also
steadily eroded since the assassination, and this de-
cline has accelerated since the release of the Agrava
of the vice president. Marcos reluctantly abolishes
the executive committee and declares that the Prime
Minister will succeed if the President dies or is
incapacitated. This does not satisfy most critics,
including several KBL leaders, who continue to call
for a consititutional amendment clarifying the suc-
cession. The Interim National Assembly-with its
overwhelming ruling party majority passes a consti-
tutional amendment that revives the office of the vice
president in 1987 and establishes the current succes-
sion arrangement.
1984
Plebiscite ratifies the new succession mechanism,
which provides for the Speaker of the National
Assembly to act as caretaker president if Marcos
dies. New National Assembly is elected in May with
an increase in opposition representation from 12 to 60
out of a total of 183 elected seats. Marcos's health
crisis in November sparks new round of succession
anxiety. Several bills further clarifying the succes-
sion process are introduced in the Assembly
Ruling party
sponsors a resolution that would synchronize provin-
cial, local, and presidential elections, but Marcos
declares that provincial elections in 1986 and presi-
dential elections in 1987 will be held on schedule.
1986
Provincial elections will test ruling party discipline.
1987
Marcos's presidential term ends and new elections
are scheduled.
Board's majority report last October, which implicat-
ed Ver and other military officers in the Aquino
assassination.
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Nonetheless, both continue to command political and
military assets that would allow them to intervene as a
succession scenario plays itself out.
Armed Forces Chief of Staff.
for example, give her an
inside track. She has also assumed several highly
visible official duties during Marcos's convalescence,
which has improved her political standing within the
ruling party considerably in recent weeks, according
to the US Embassy. Some ruling party officials are
almost certainly interpreting her new prominence as
having the backing of the President, but we have no
evidence to indicate this is the case.
In addition, the Assembly Speaker has longstanding
political ties to Mrs. Marcos and may be willing to
manipulate the constitutional provisions to her advan-
tage. She would also be able to rely on the consider-
able political and financial resources of her brother,
Ambassador to the United States Benjamin Romual-
dez.
General Ver's tenure as Chief of the Armed Forces
since 1981 has allowed him to weave a network of
political alliances among senior officers that-al-
though weakening-might still afford him the clout to
alter the outcome of a succession contest. He almost
certainly would be urged by other inner circle mem-
bers-including Imelda Marcos or presidential crony
Eduardo Cojuangco-to defend their interests if the
leadership question is not settled before the National
Assembly moves ahead with deciding on election
In our judgment, the legal succession mechanism
would have extensive support in the event of Marcos's
death. For one thing, the military has traditionally
kept its distance in political affairs.
would be unlikely to oppose a legal successor unless
peace and order in Manila were seriously threatened.
Much of the support for the Constitution would come
from Marcos's own ruling party-the KBL. Marcos's
death would place initial control of the government in
the hands of the party, which, through its majority in
the National Assembly, would determine the proce-
dures for the special election. The commission that
oversees elections (COMELEC), moreover, is a ruling
party creation-thus increasing the opportunity for
manipulating election results. This suggests that pres-
sures for extraconstitutional measures initially would
not be great, provided that those at the helm of the
party determine that they can control the election.
procedures.'
Ver, with the help of Imelda Marcos, has been
engaged in an extensive media campaign to refurbish
his image in what appears to be a bid to return as
Pressures to circumvent the
' Cojuangco probably is a billionaire and owes much of his financial
success to his privileged relationship with Marcos, whom he has
supported politically for more than a decade.
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Imelda Marcos
Still harbors presidential ambitions ... likely to rely on General Ver's support in
a bid for power and continues to advance Ver's political "rehabilitation"... close
ties to the current Assembly Speaker, Nicanor Yniguez ... can also rely on the
considerable financial support of her brother, Ambassador to the United States
Benjamin Romualdez.
General Ver
Remains on leave from post as Armed Forces Chief of Std"... likely to support
Mrs. Marcos's bid for the presidency, especially if Marcos designates her his
successor ... almost certainly wants to be reinstated as Armed Forces Chief if
Imelda Marcos succeeds the President.
Defense Minister Enrile
Several recent actions-including widespread media campaign-underscore his
presidential ambitions ... recent harsh exchange during ruling party caucus with
Imelda Marcos over the growth of the Communist insurgency interpreted by
ruling party members as a direct challenge ... longstanding relationship with
agricultural magnate Eduardo Cojuangco may provide substantial financial
resources in a campaign bid ... also reportedly on good terms with Acting Armed
Forces Chief Fidel Ramos
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Acting Chief of Staff Ramos
Has pledged to uphold the Constitition in a succession contest ... has not publicly
come out in support of any potential candidate ... longstanding animosity toward
Imelda Marcos ... has been working closely and reportedly smoothly with Enrile
since assuming chief of staff position.
Deputy Prime Minister Rono
Marcos's right-hand man and shrewd player in the ruling party ... has shown no
inclination to support Imelda Marcos or Enrile but would be a valuable ally for
either contender ... probably would back whomever he perceives to be the most
likely to succeed.
Eduardo Cojuangco
Principal member of Marcos's inner circle and one of the cronies ... immensely
wealthy with substantial financial and political resources ... more likely to be a
kingmaker than king ... recently reported to be allied with Enrile should a
succession contest occur.
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discipline breaks down.'
Several key KBL members who we believe will
emerge as presidential candidates are Defense Minis-
ter Enrile, Deputy Prime Minister Rono, and Foreign
Minister Tolentino-each of whom has much to gain
from the constitutional process. Rono is reportedly
well respected within the party, as is Tolentino, and
both will probably receive support from party king-
pins. Other reporting suggests that Enrile is not as
popular. Recently, however, he has reportedly been
mending fences within the party and taken a lower
profile in the National Assembly in an effort to make
himself a more palatable presidential candidate. In
addition, Enrile recently has made himself available
to US officials-including talking to Embassy offi-
cials about the growing Communist insurgency-
probably in an effort to garner US support for his
candidacy. We believe that members within this
group will seek to build alliances from ruling party
factions, and perhaps will begin seeking support from
within the business community, the church, and the
moderate opposition.
Other advocates of an orderly succession would in-
clude members of the moderate opposition, who will
view Marcos's demise as their first real opportunity to
share power since the declaration of martial law in
1972. Most opposition leaders reportedly are con-
vinced that the succession mechanism, however im-
perfect, will probably prevail, and they have begun
contingency planning in the event of Marcos's death.
? Party discipline has steadily eroded since the assassination of
Benigno Aquino and the KBL's poor showing in National Assembly
election in May 1984. Nonetheless, no further reporting on the
composition of two factions is available at this time, but we suspect
that they reflect support for Imelda Marcos or Defense Minister
Enrile, both of whom have been actively engaged in campaigns to
According to the US Embassy, members of the
business community are also planning for the succes-
sion. The Embassy says that leading businessmen-
including Jaime Ongpin, brother of Minister of Indus-
try and Trade Roberto Ongpin-are playing a key
role in organizing opposition efforts to unify in the
event that Marcos is unable to complete his term in
office.
businessmen figured prominently in the selection
of a "convenor group" composed of Jaime Ongpin,
Cory Aquino-widow of Benigno Aquino-and for-
mer senator Lorenzo Tanada to oversee the selection
of potential opposition candidates if special elections
are called. 0
Although the Communist Party of the Philippines
does not appear to be currently engaging in contingen-
cy planning, Marcos's deteriorating health may soon
force party leaders to reassess their long-term strate-
gy.~
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Some Philippine observers have speculated that Mar-
cos will leave the country for medical treatment if his
health continues to deteriorate. The political climate
in Manila, however, would make the political costs of
such a move extraordinarily high. We believe the
ruling party, the opposition, and the military would
interpret his decision as an admission that he is
desperately ill and no longer capable of effectively
running the government. In our judgment, Marcos
probably would leave some letter of instruction with
military and ruling party leaders in an effort to
maintain peace and order in his absence, and such a
letter may already exist, although we have no evi-
dence suggesting this. Nonetheless, opposition leader
Aquilino Pimentel claimed in the local press last
November that Marcos had arranged for a military
junta to act as caretaker government while he sought
medical treatment in the United States. In any case,
it is unlikely that Marcos would depart without
trying in some manner to protect his family and his
political power base.
If Marcos's caretaker arrangement consisted of a
coalition of independent KBL and military leaders
such as Acting Chief of Staff Ramos, we believe it
might satisfy opposition leaders and help quell the
The picture will be more complicated-and prospects
for the Constitution less promising-if Marcos is
incapacitated. Only a declaration of Marcos's inca-
pacitation by the first family or a formal determina-
tion by the National Assembly that Marcos is unfit to
rule will trip the legal succession mechanism. Imelda
Marcos, therefore, would be strongly tempted to hide
Marcos's medical condition in order to gain time and
anxiety that would almost certainly arise following
his departure. In this case, the government probably
would continue to function in his absence. We believe
any attempt by Marcos to designate General Ver or
Imelda Marcos as sole caretaker-a less likely possi-
bility because of their declining popularity-would
meet with strong opposition from the National
Assembly.
On the other hand, an extended absence on Marcos's
part would eventually set into motion opposition and
ruling party calls in the National Assembly for
clarification of the succession process, including a
determination of Marcos's incapacitation. Under
these circumstances, we believe the political climate
in Manila would become increasingly tenuous and
could result in military intervention.
Regardless of what instruction Marcos leaves if he
seeks medical treatment outside the Philippines, it is
likely to involve a direct role for the military.
Although it is impossible to predict whether military
leaders would be inclined to support the constitution-
al process under these circumstances, they may be
more likely to act if they believe that they hold a
presidential mandate to do so.
maneuvering room for a succession struggle. Conceal-
ing the seriousness of Marcos's incapacitation under
such circumstances would work to the disadvantage of
other inner circle members.
We believe the political climate in Manila would
become increasingly unstable as anxiety about the
true status of Marcos's health mounted. If violence
erupted under these circumstances, the military could
choose to intervene to maintain order. Widespread
civil unrest, we believe, would almost certainly force
the military to assume the role of principal power
broker, even if it were disinclined to do so.
We cannot rule out the possibility that Mrs. Marcos
would try to seize power if she determined that she
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could not win support from the ruling party. In such a
power play, she would almost certainly call on Gener-
al Ver for support. General Ramos is more likely to be
responsive to the wishes of both opposition leaders and
ruling party officials such as Prime Minister Virata.
The longstanding enmity between Ramos and Imelda
Marcos
All considered, we believe Marcos is content to keep
the succession mechanism weak. His refusal to allow
the ruling party to introduce clarifying legislation
during its caucus in January underscores his desire to
ensure that the leadership question in the Philippines
remains unsettled. In our judgment, Marcos may
hope that a mechanism that is open to manipulation
will enable Imelda Marcos to effect a dynastic succes-
sion. He almost certainly is aware of her unpopularity
with party leaders and probably believes that an
ambiguous succession mechanism will improve her
chances to succeed him.
We also believe that Marcos had the succession in
mind when he announced at the ruling party caucus in
January that provincial elections-scheduled for
1986-and presidential elections-scheduled for
1987-would be held as planned.
A decision by
Marcos to hold an early presidential election would, of
course, lend credence to the speculation that he is
seriously ill, a condition the Malacanang Palace has
consistently denied. In any case, the opposition is
convinced that early elections will still be called,
despite the President's announcement. According to
the US Embassy, the opposition interprets Marcos's
announcement as an attempt to lull them into believ-
ing that they have plenty of time to prepare for the
succession.
For his part, Marcos probably hopes that, by adhering
to the current schedule for elections, Mrs. Marcos will
have time to boost her political standing and garner
more support within the ruling party for her candida-
cy. Among other things, he may believe that she will
be able to capitalize on an upswing in the economy by
1987.6 Furthermore, we believe that Marcos's state-
ment on the election schedule is designed to forestall
further succession maneuvering within the party. He
almost certainly hopes that the announcement, and
his announced candidacy for 1987, will stem growing
factionalism within the ruling party-but we do not
believe this tactic will work. Provincial elections next
year, in any case, will force the ruling party to get
ready for elections, thus preparing it for an early
presidential election, should one be necessary.
Can a Leadership Crisis Be Avoided?
One of the leading factors in support of the constitu-
tional succession mechanism is that several key actors
who would be involved have recently moved to bolster
its prospects. The Speaker, for example, has met with
key military leaders, including Ver and Ramos, to
solicit pledges to uphold the Constitution during a
succession. He received such pledges from both men,
with General Ramos publicly stating that the military
will uphold the Constitution. In any case, General
Ver's continued unsettled status weakens the chances
of military intervention in a constitutional succession
contest. Although Ver loyalists control key commands
in Manila, it is not clear that these ties would
automatically translate into support for an extracon-
stitutional bid for power. Furthermore
already suggests that, as Ramos's ten-
ure lengthens, Ver's control over the military is
becoming increasingly tenuous
6 Based on an econometric model that simulates the effects of the
Philippines' recent debt rescheduling, we believe that the economic
outlook through 1986 is bleak. Our analysis indicates that national
output will decline by 2 percent this year, and the economy will
grow no more than 2 percent in 1986 because of financial austerity
measures required by the IMF. A nascent economic recovery could
be under way by the 1987 presidential election if the country's
political problems ease, favorable economic conditions prevail
abroad, and the Philippines continues reforms pledged to its foreign
creditors.
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In addition, much institution building has taken place
over the past year, probably more than most observers
of the Philippines had expected after nearly a decade
of martial law. The new National Assembly is a far
more vigorous body than its predecessor, and both
ruling party and opposition performances have stirred
memories of the open-and, according to many crit-
ics, freewheeling-premartial law congress. At the
same time, several recent actions of the Supreme
Court and the legal proceedings that have accompa-
nied the release of the Agrava Board's majority
findings point to a more independent judiciary.
On balance, however, the continued strengthening of
political institutions-including the tightening of the
succession process-will take more time than events
surrounding Marcos's health will probably allow. For
that reason, we believe that a chaotic succession
contest is probable. The levers that were built into the
current Constitution, including a weak succession
mechanism, afford room for large-scale manipulation
of the system. The military's potentially conflicting
role in domestic politics, moreover, makes it probable
that pressures to short-circuit the constitutional proc-
ess will be high.
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