(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000200710001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Sect Directorate of it-
Intelligence
China's Independent
Foreign Policy
Behind the Rhetoric
EA 85-10083
May 1985
Copy 2 5 7
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Directorate of
Intelligence
China's Independent
? Foreign Policy
Behind the Rhetoric
This paper was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, China Division, OEA~--
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Secret
EA 85-10083
May 1985
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China's Independent
Foreign Policy-
Behind the Rhetoric
Key Judgments ? . _ t China has presented its foreign-policy in a variety of ways over the past
Information available decade for both domestic and foreign consumption. But, stripped of their
as 41'5 April 1985.
was used in this'report 'ideological veneer, these policies have always been based on Chinese
.
leaders.' keen appreciation of the need to use the United States as a
. . counterweight to the Soviet Union.
-Since 1982 Beijing has claimed to be pursuing. an "independent foreign
policy." But we believe the main thrust of Chinese policy has changed little
in practice. Chinese leaders still -regard the Soviet Union as the principal
long-term threat to China's security and, in our view, are still interested in
developing strategic links with the United States-albeit on a less overt
basis than in the past. Beijing now seems to. want both to keep the Soviets
,guessing about the extent of US-Chinese military cooperation and to be
able to plausibly deny that any such. ties exist.
The Chinese readily admit in private that China and the United States are
pursuing parallel policies in Southeast and Southwest Asia designed to
check' Soviet expansionism. They have also told senior US officials they
support the current US conventional buildup in the Pacific as a counter-
-weight to the dramatic increase in Soviet naval and air power in the region
over the past decade. Finally, over the past year Beijing has shown
increasing interest in encouraging exchanges; between the US and Chinese
military, and in obtaining US weapons technology. They in fact have
already paid for site surveys for three US, weapons-related systems. In
. doing .so, we believe they are not just seeking-help to counter Soviet
advantages in armor and airpower but want to exploit longstanding Soviet
concerns over possible US-Chinese military cooperation to strengthen their
leverage in. dealing with Moscow on security. issues.
We believe China's decision in 1981 to abandon its explicitly anti-Soviet
"united front" approach and to adopt an, ostensibly more independent
foreign policy, therefore, was largely- tactical. Chinese leaders were
particularly unhappy at the time with US policy toward Taiwan, which
.they regarded as a sign that at least some senior US officials discounted
' ; China's value to,the.United States.. We-believe Beijing wanted to remind
Washington that China's alignment with the West could not be taken for
granted and that China was: not; prepared to tolerate greater official US-
Taiwan ties as the price for US security support.- Beijing also saw an
,.opportunity to reduce, tensions with Moscow, and to probe Soviet willing-
ness to accommodate some of. China's longstanding security concerns.
Secret
EA 85-10083
May 1985
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Since then Moscow has sought to woo Beijing with offers of technical
assistance and increased trade but has not addressed the security problems
that divide them. As a consequence, the main anti-Soviet thrust of Chinese
foreign policy has changed little, in our view-despite attempts by Beijing
to appear more evenhanded in its public treatment of the two superpowers
and recent efforts to improve the atmosphere surrounding its relations with
Moscow. China remains deeply suspicious of Soviet intentions and at least
privately maintains that Moscow must accommodate Chinese security
interests as a precondition for major improvements in relations.
The change in Beijing's rhetoric, meanwhile, has given China more tactical
flexibility in conducting its foreign policy. By emphasizing China's inde-
pendence, Deng Xiaoping and his allies-in our view-have managed with
varying degrees of success to:
? Keep Moscow engaged in a dialogue with China, both to reduce Sino-
Soviet tensions and to increase Beijing's manuevering room in the Sino-
US-USSR triangle.
? Foster a consensus on foreign policy within a leadership that holds
conflicting views on China's relations with the two superpowers.
? Finesse the Taiwan issue and thus reduce the leadership's vulnerability to
charges of not protecting Chinese interests in dealing with the United
States.
? Restore China's credibility in the Third World-tarnished in Beijing's
view by its previous close public identification with the United States-
and ability to compete more effectively against the Soviets for influence
in this arena.
? Give China greater flexibility to expand its ties to other socialist and
Communist parties and states-especially in Eastern Europe-in order to
encourage them to adopt a more independent course from Moscow.
This more pragmatic tack parallels the Chinese approach to reform at
home. As long as the Chinese see tactical advantages, we expect them to
tout their independent policy line. There is little likelihood, therefore, of
China's openly aligning itself again with Washington, as it did from 1979
to 1981. With the accession of Gorbachev, we expect China instead to
continue to probe for new flexibility in Soviet policy toward China and to
seek ways to keep tensions with the USSR manageable. At a minimum,
trade and economic cooperation are likely to increase-limited, however,
by the barter nature of Sino-Soviet trading arrangements and China's
preference for Western technology.
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Despite the recent improvement in the tone of Sino-Soviet relations, we
doubt that the two will be able to reach a full rapprochement any time
soon, if at all. Such a development would require both sides to make more
far-reaching compromises on security issues than we believe they are now
prepared to make. We doubt, moreover, that Deng and other Chinese
leaders want to put their expanding ties with the West at risk by moving
too far or too quickly toward better relations with Moscow.
Should Moscow unexpectedly adopt a more flexible approach to Chinese
security concerns, however-especially to the presence of Soviet forces in
Mongolia-we believe Beijing would readily agree to resume the long-
stalled border negotiations and perhaps reinstitute party-to-party contacts.
Chinese leaders-in our view-would seek to capitalize on such an
expanding dialogue with Moscow to buy time for China to concentrate on
internal development and eventually to increase their leverage with both
Moscow and Washington.
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China's Independent
Foreign Policy-
Behind the Rhetoric
Origins of the Independent Line
Before 1981 Beijing emphasized the need for a
"united front against hegemonism" in the belief that
US resistance to Soviet aggression needed to be
stiffened, partly through a US defense buildup and
partly through overt strategic cooperation between the
United States and China. At that time, the Chinese
perceived the Soviets as strong and aggressive and the
United States as weak and indecisive. The Chinese
saw the honeymoon period immediately following
normalization of relations in 1979 as an opportunity
to solidify the strategic relationship with the United
States and encouraged Washington to do more
against Moscow
eral Secretary Hu Yaobang publicly unveiled it at the
12th Party Congress in September 1982. Its basic
propositions require China to:
? Play down strategic links with the United States in
public while counting implicitly on the United
States as a counterweight to the USSR.
? Seek a more "normal" but still fundamentally
adversarial relationship with Moscow.
? Stress solidarity and cooperation with the Third
World:
Several factors prompted China finally to drop its
openly anti-Soviet "united front" rhetoric in favor of
the independent line. We believe Chinese dissatisfac-
tion, for example, with US policies-especially
toward Taiwan and the transfer of dual-use technol-
ogies to China-caused Chinese leaders to question
whether the new US administration valued China as a
strategic asset. Chinese leaders repeatedly complained
to US officials that US technology transfer rules
discriminated against China (a proclaimed friend) in
favor of India (a Soviet client).I
Moreover, the Chinese perceived a change in the
global balance of power that rendered a key element
of the old united front passe. By late 1982 the United
States had adopted a more assertive posture toward
the Soviet Union and had taken measures to regain
the strategic initiative in Europe and the Pacific.
Chinese press commentators also began to stress that
the Soviet Union was so preoccupied with a host of
internal and foreign policy problems, such as Poland
and Afghanistan, that it posed a less immediate threat
to Chinese security. This has been reflected more
recently in the Chinese media, as Beijing's spokesmen 25X1
focus on factors favoring "world peace" rather than
war.
Advantages of the Independent Foreign Policy
The new independent foreign policy line allows the
Chinese to address a number of problems the old line
could not. It also increases China's maneuverability
and flexibility in meeting new situations as they arise. 25X1
We believe the Chinese see the independence line as a
way to increase their leverage in the strategic triangle,
where they are the weakest element. By giving them-
selves room to maneuver between the superpowers,
they can attempt to assure the United States will not
take them for granted. Beijing used talks with the
Soviets in 1982, for example, to signal discomfort with
US-Taiwan policy. With the resumption of US-USSR
talks in Geneva, the Chinese probably hope that
recent gestures to Gorbachev improving the atmo-
spherics of Sino-Soviet relations will remind the Unit-
ed States of China's interests in the outcome of the
By the same token, distance from the United States
reduces Washington's leverage over Beijing. Moves
toward Moscow create at least the appearance of an
alternative to strategic reliance upon the United
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States, and the Chinese seem to believe that this, in
turn, gives the United States an incentive to be more
forthcoming on technology transfer and Taiwan.
By shedding their "united front" rhetoric and old
ideological polemics, moreover, the Chinese hold out
to Moscow the prospect of more normal relations that
allows them, at a minimum, to manage tensions in the
relationship more effectively. Recent Chinese over-
tures to Gorbachev, including the willingness to play
down the "three obstacles" publicly and to refer to the
Soviet Union as "socialist" for the first time since the
1960s, are a logical extension of this effort. We doubt
that the Chinese harbor any illusions about the
Soviets going very far toward accommodating Chi-
nese security concerns-especially in the short term.
Moscow has too much invested in its relations with
Vietnam to put at risk its strategic interests there-
especially in the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay-in
exchange for the uncertain benefits of better political
relations with Beijing. Nor are the Soviets likely to
give up other strategic advantages they have gained in
the Far East by reducing, for example, their SS-20
forces to accommodate China. The Chinese know full
well those forces are there to counter the United
States and Japan as well as China.
As long as the Chinese leadership, however, can
demonstrate its ability to manage relations with Mos-
cow through diplomatic means, we believe it helps the
economic reformers to deflect demands from the
Chinese military for increased defense spending to
close the growing qualitative gap between Soviet and
Chinese military capabilities. China's media frequent-
ly refer to the need to hold down defense spending to
its present level-12 percent of the overall budget-so
that China can concentrate first and foremost on
modernizing the civilian economy. The current
reform-minded leadership under Deng has long held
the view that China's prospects of becoming a world
power hinge on developing a strong economy.F_
We believe the independence line also meets domestic
political needs.
Chinese leaders, including Ye Jianying and Li Xian-
nian, were unhappy with China's close identification
with the United States, symbolized by Deng's trip to
it easier for Deng to satisfy his critics, particularly as
he guides China toward closer military ties to the
United States.
By disassociating themselves from US policies the
Chinese believe to be unpopular in the Third World,
such as US support for Israel, the Chinese believe
they can regain the position as a Third World leader
they compromised when, in the late 1970s, they
openly aligned with the United States and aggressive-
ly pushed their Third World friends to join an anti-
Soviet united front. As China grows increasingly
dependent on trade and technology ties with the West,
moreover, the rhetoric of independence probably helps
assuage the traditional strong Chinese fear of depend-
ency on outside powers.
China also capitalizes on its professions of independ-
ence and improvements in relations with Moscow to
reestablish ties to Eastern Europe and expand its
contacts with pro-Soviet parties in Western Europe
and Soviet clients in the Third World such as Cuba
and Angola. China has signed new trade agreements
and expanded party contacts with all the East
European states over the past two years.
In some cases, China has reestablished contact in
order to burnish its independent image or to undercut
Taiwan, which still retains diplomatic relations with
several Latin American countries. It has sought to
induce Nicaragua, for example, to break relations
with Taipei by offering increased trade and by criti-
cizing US policy toward Central America
But, by emphasizing its own independence, we believe
China also seeks to encourage some of these states
and parties to adopt a more independent course from
Moscow. The Chinese publicly hold up Romania and
Yugoslavia as countries pursuing "independent poli-
cies" and privately point to some of the Warsaw Pact
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states, such as East Germany, as beginning cautiously
to exercise more autonomy. We know from authorita-
tive Soviet media comments that Moscow is well
aware of Chinese motives and is closely monitoring
and trying to control the expansion of East European
contacts with Beijing.
Independence in Practice
Initial concern that the new independent foreign
policy foreshadowed a shift toward a genuinely inde-
pendent, evenhanded Chinese approach to the super-
powers has, in our judgment, not been borne out by
events. Beijing still sees itself locked in an adversarial
relationship with Moscow and, by supporting insur-
gent groups fighting against Soviet troops in Afghani-
stan and Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, is actively
opposing Soviet efforts to make inroads around
China's periphery . Chinese leaders, moreover, have
repeatedly expressed private support to US officials
for the US conventional military buildup in the
Pacific designed to counter the dramatic increase over
the past decade in the Soviet military presence,
especially air and naval forces, in the Far East
Moscow's continued refusal to address any of China's
principal security concerns has, in effect, left Beijing
no choice but to continue to rely tacitly on the United
States as a strategic counterweight. Despite their
occasional denials, we believe the Chinese are very
worried not only about the relentless Soviet buildup of
strategic theater forces (SS-20s and Backfire bomb-
ers) in the Far East but also by the pace of moderniza-
tion of Soviet conventional forces along their border.
China cannot afford to match the Soviets, nor does it
have the technological know-how yet to develop the
sophisticated weaponry it needs to counter the latest
Soviet systems. The Chinese privately admit to US
officials that they feel particularly vulnerable to
Soviet armor and airpower
Even if China succeeds in acquiring the weapons
technology that it wants from the United States and
Western Europe, it is our judgment that it would take
the Chinese years to produce and absorb such weap-
ons in sufficient numbers to make a difference. That
places a premium, in our view, on China relying in the
meantime on political means to handle any Soviet
attempts at military and political intimidation. Re-
ducing tensions with Moscow is one way. But by
seeking to develop an arms relationship with the
United States-which Moscow is likely to see as
having strategic overtones-we believe the Chinese
want to signal the Soviets that they are not isolated
and susceptible to pressure.
We believe China's military pressure on Vietnam, in
turn, is intended in part to demonstrate to Washing- 25X1
ton and the ASEAN states that it can and does play a
useful role in attempting to contain Soviet expansion-
ism. But more important, it also sends a message to
Moscow that China will not be intimidated. Last year,
for example, a joint Soviet-Vietnamese amphibious
exercise in the Tonkin Gulf provoked China to seize
some Vietnamese territory and conduct an amphibi-
ous exercise of its own, leading to the last minute
postponement of a long-awaited, high-level Soviet
visit to China. This year, by contrast, the varying
degrees of Chinese military pressure on Hanoi are
without fanfare or Beijing's public discussion of
Soviet support for the Vietnamese. This restraint fits
into a broader pattern suggesting a Chinese willing-
ness to improve relations with the USSR as long as 25X1
the Soviets avoid confronting China on basic security
issues. 25X1
The Sino-Soviet talks over the past two years have led
to some lessening of tensions and increased trade and
cultural exchanges. But even in the economic sphere,
the Soviets are at a distinct disadvantage in compet-
ing with the West. Although Sino-Soviet trade has
steadily increased over the past few years, it remains
only a small fraction of China's overall foreign
trade-about 2 percent in 1984
Beijing has been much more aggressive in seeking
Western technology and wooing Western companies
to invest in China. Since last November, for example,
China has signed contracts worth more than $11
billion with Western firms for major development
projects under the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90).
Direct foreign investment in China nearly doubled to
$4 billion by the end of 1984. By contrast, the Chinese
are still talking to the Soviets about renovating a
handful of Soviet-equipped plants built in the 1950s.
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Chinese requests for advanced US technology, more-
over, have risen dramatically since Washington liber-
alized its technology transfer policy in mid-1983. The
total value of high-technology export licenses ap-
proved by the United States for China in 1984 rose to
at least $1.5 billion-more than the total amount of
trade between China and the USSR for the same
year.
While maintaining and expanding ties, including mili-
tary, with the United States, China has not and will
not shy from vocally criticizing US policy. We expect
China will continue to criticize US foreign policy
largely in areas where China has little strategic
interest, indulging in a form of name calling. The
Chinese have been most sharp in their commentary on
US policy in southern Africa, Central America, and
the Middle East.
We expect the Chinese to be especially vocal when
they believe US policy is counterproductive and
harms the anti-Soviet effort. These include arms
control in Europe, where the Chinese think the US
position on theater nuclear forces plays into the hands
of neutralists
We expect the Taiwan issue will remain on the back
burner unless the Chinese perceive new US efforts to
raise the level of officialdom in dealings with the
island or to increase the quality and quantity of arms
sold to Taipei beyond the limits set out in the Sino-US
communique of 17 August 1982. Beijing will continue
to raise the issue with visitors in a pro forma fashion,
but we believe the Chinese are not likely to try to turn
US policy toward Taiwan into a test of the US-
Chinese relationship any time soon
Potential for Fundamental Change
Given the advantages the Chinese believe they derive
from posing as independent and nonaligned, we expect
them to hew to their current line. But China might, in
our opinion, reevaluate its strategic position and possi-
bly produce fundamental changes in its foreign policy
if:
then began to cut back forces in areas of importance
to the Chinese, particularly in Mongolia where the
Soviets have five divisions.
? The United States moved toward detente with the
USSR and reached an accord on arms control that
Beijing believed seriously compromised Chinese
security.
? The United States accorded Taiwan greater official
status and/or increased arms sales to-Taipei.
? The succession to Deng brought to power a 'more
xenophobic government committed to a tougher
stand on Taiwan or a more genuinely independent
foreign policy posture.
? China's economic development program, including
the opening to the West, failed, especially if caused
by protectionism in the markets China is banking on
for future economic growth.
None of these cases is highly likely and certainly
would not come about overnight. Moscow, for exam-
ple, has refused to offer even modest concession to
Beijing, believing-probably correctly-that such
concessions would only whet China's appetite. To
withdraw from Afghanistan, or reduce aid to Viet-
nam, or reduce forces in Mongolia or elsewhere along
the Sino-Soviet border as the Chinese demand, more-
over, would run directly counter to Soviet efforts to
establish a position of military dominance in Asia and
the Pacific. While Moscow may be prepared to make
some conciliatory gestures, we do not believe Soviet
leaders are prepared to give up these strategic gains in
exchange for the uncertain advantages of improving
relations with China. Soviet officials in fact have
indicated privately that they regard China as simply
trying to play off the superpowers against each other,
hoping to trigger a bidding contest between Moscow
and Washington for Beijing's favor-a game they'
have made clear they will not play.
There is room, however, for manipulation of the Sino-
Soviet relationship short of resolving their fundamen-
tal security issues. Upon Gorbachev's selection as the
new Soviet party leader, for example, the Chinese
? Moscow agreed to accommodate key Chinese secu-
rity concerns by slowing down its deployment of new
weapons and forces on the Sino-Soviet border, and
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were quick to improve the atmosphere surrounding
their relationship in order to probe for change in the
Soviet position, enhance their maneuverability in the
strategic triangle, and keep tensions with Moscow
they. would know that they were running a serious risk
of leaving themselves vulnerable to Soviet pressure.
low. In the months ahead,
he two sides will increase the frequency and
raise the level of official exchanges, with both capitals
presumably seeing tactical advantages to be gained in
their relations with Washington. Foreign Ministers
Wu and Gromyko will probably meet this summer,
and a meeting of Chinese and Soviet premiers could
eventually occur.
Even in the unlikely. event that radicals returned to
power, they would-face the same sobering options of
seeking to maintain some kind of strategic relation-
ship with the United States, attempting to bluff a
threatening Soviet Union, or accommodating them-
selves to. Soviet dominance. In short, China's military
weaknesses vis-a-vis the Soviet Union would impose
serious constraints on whomever was in power in 25X1
Beijing.
A US-Soviet arms accord that undermined China's
own deterrent capability probably would strain Sino-
US relations. Beijing, for example, made it very clear
two years ago that it opposed any agreement on
intermediate-range ballistic missiles that would allow
the Soviets to transfer their SS-20s deployed in the
European theater to the Far East. China is also
beginning to show serious concern about the Strategic
Defense Initiative, fearing that if the ABM Treaty is
abandoned Moscow will boost its antimissile defenses
to the point where it could neutralize China's limited
but-from its point of view-extremely valuable
nuclear deterrence.
If the United States reversed its policy toward Taiwan
by granting it greater official status or agreeing to sell
the island advanced weaponry that violated the -1982
August communique, US relations with China would
be seriously damaged. At a minimum, we believe the
Chinese would suspend any developing security dia-
logue and probably threaten, at least, to downgrade
relations as they did in 1981. They also probably
would suspend any arms purchases and pull whatever
diplomatic and economic levers at their disposal to
change US policy.
It is more difficult to predict what impact a change in
leadership could have on foreign policy. The present
policy clearly bears the stamp of Deng Xiaoping. If
his chief lieutenants-Hu Yaobang and Zhao
Ziyang-became locked in a power struggle with
others over the succession, it is conceivable that they
might try to shore up their domestic position by
adopting a tougher stand on Taiwan that adversely
affected both security cooperation and economic rela-
tions with the United States. In doing so, however,
Were the leadership's economic reform program, in-
cluding the opening to the West, to collapse, for
whatever reason, the conservatives who favor a return
to more Stalinist economic policies would be in a
strengthened position. This in turn would weaken the
pull toward interdependence that Western markets
and technology now exercise on Chinese foreign
policy. Although the strategic imperatives that still
largely drive US-Chinese relations would remain, the
reformists-assuming they remained in power-
would be forced to operate under greater fiscal and,
presumably, political constraints. That would at a
minimum inhibit their ability to pursue further mili-
tary cooperation and an expanded arms relationship
with the United States.
Outlook
We believe Beijing's adherence to a pragmatic,
nationalistic foreign policy is likely to endure for some
time and certainly as long as the present reform-
minded leadership retains power. Paradoxically,
China's foreign policy has remained remarkably con-
sistent over the past 15 years. Even for periods of
strong leftist influence during the Cultural Revolu-
tion, Chinese foreign policy was colored by a strong
anti-Soviet hue and marked by a tendency to look to
the United States as the only worthwhile counter-
weight to the security threat posed by the USSR. The
present policy has the virtues of enjoying a broad base
of support among Chinese leaders of various ideologi-
cal stripes and of giving Beijing greater tactical
flexibility in conducting its relations with both super-
powers that we believe any Chinese leader probably
would try to capitalize on.
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In practice, this means that the Chinese will probably
continue to pursue close economic and political ties to
the West in order to obtain advanced Western tech-
nology and capital investment and to ensure greater
access to Western markets for their exports as long as
these policies continue to produce results. We expect
them also to move ahead, but more cautiously, in
expanding US-Chinese military cooperation. They
will probably remain wary, however, of making com-
mitments on security cooperation against the Soviet
Union and will be sensitive to international percep-
tions on this score.
In any event, we think there is little likelihood of
China openly aligning itself again with Washington,
as it did from 1979 to 1981. Instead, we expect it to
continue to play down the nature and extent of
whatever security cooperation develops. The Chinese
also will probably continue to probe for changes in
Soviet policy toward China now that Gorbachev has
assumed power and seek ways to reduce tensions with
the USSR, as long as they do not have to sacrifice
anything of importance or kowtow to Soviet bluster.
Trade and economic cooperation should, therefore,
increase-limited, however, by the barter nature of
the trading arrangements and China's preference for
Western technology. We cannot rule out the possibili-
ty, moreover, that Beijing might agree to resume the
long-stalled border negotiations. In maintaining and
expanding the dialogue with Moscow, Chinese leaders
probably would rationalize such a tack as buying
valuable time for China to concentrate on internal
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