CHINA: THINKING ABOUT A NEW SUCCESSION PACKAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000301960001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 22, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 July 1985
China: Thinking About a New Succession Package
Deng Xiaoping seems to have had second thoughts about the
succession arrangements he has put in place over the past five
years. Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao
Ziyang, once slated to lead China into the post-Deng period, now
may resign their posts as early as September at a national
conference of party delegates. In June, Zhao disclaimed any
plans for a top leadership shakeup. Still, the reports persist,
package:
Hu will take Deng's place as Chairman of the party
Military Commission, and Zhao will replace Li Xiannian
as state President.
Hu Qili, a Hu Yaobang protege, is to be promoted to
General Secretary, while Vice Premier Li Peng is slated
for the premiership.
-- Deng will retain his post as head of the Central
Advisory Commission (CAC), presumably to be joined
there by several Politburo elders who haveopposed 25X1
aspects of Deng's reform program.
The apparently altered succession arrangements probably are
Den 's response to mounting o itical pressure, although he may
be accelerating plans he formulated some time. ago:
This memorandum was prepared byl (Domestic Policy
Branch, China Division, Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments
and questions are welcome and should be addressed to the Chief,
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Duplicate of C05422707:
RIP
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-- Party conservatives have criticized Deng's reforms for
producing undesirable sideeffects--inflation, capital
construction cost overruns, and widespread official
corruption.
-- Hu and Zhao, as the most conspicuous proponents of
reform below Deng, have drawn fire for the economic
problems.
-- Hu may now be a political liability to Deng. His
provocative political style and his advocacy of extreme
reformist positions tend to overshadow the policies
themselves, and his aggressive partisan-ship has
provoked the anger of party elders.
Whatever the mix of pressures on Den he nevertheless can
present, in conventional re ormist terms a compelling case for
changing the succession ineup, and thus make a virtue of
necessity:
-- Hu and Zhao are both close to 70, and Deng may reason
that Hu Qili and Li Peng, both 56, will provide policy
continuity well into the post-Deng period.
-- The new package distributes succession powers among
four mutually reinforcing top positions rather than
allowing only two men to bear full responsibility.
-- Deng may calculate that appointing Hu Yaobang to the
Military Commission will be a step toward strengthening
civilian control of the military, and that keeping the
post out of the General Secretary's hands will meet
potential objections that Hu would hold too much power
if he had both jobs.
-- Deng almost certainly has drawn lessons from the
spectacle of Soviet succession, during which major
Soviet strategic gains of the 1970s were eroded under
the unsteady leadership of three successive ailing
general secretaries.
-- The changes may help institutionalize a regular system
of leadership retirement based on specific age limits.
-- Hu Qili and Li Peng are models of the relatively
youthful leaders Deng has sought to cultivate since the
1982 Party Congress--solid party men with college
educations--and their promotions will demonstrate the
seriousness of Beijing's intent.
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Packaging, selliLS_L and implementing a new succession lineup
will pose some tricky problems for Deng:
-- Timing and Signals. In our view, it would be difficult
for Beijing to manage a transition this year without
appearing to have retreated under political pressure
and sending all the wrong signals to the bureaucracy
and foreign observers. The 13th Party Congress,
scheduled for 1987, remains the best place to effect an
orderly transfer of power.
-- Status. A new party pecking order must be sorted
out: Although Hu Yaobang and Zhao will remain powerful
figures, they will be viewed as having been demoted.
This in turn may reduce their political credibility, a
key concern especially for Hu, who must attempt to lead
a military establishment already reluctant to follow
him.
Continuing Controversy. Available evidence suggests
that Hu's appointment to chair the Military Commission
remains controversial, even though it has been under
consideration since 1980. It is difficult to pinpoint
a locus of opposition to Hu, but if the overall package
unravels, it may be over this issue.
-- Li Peng. Although Li's record is solidly pro-reform,
some reporting associates him closely with Chen Yun and
Yao Yilin. If true, this will reinforce the impression
that Zhao was fired under duress and may raise
questions about the future course of reform in China.
Peng Zhen. As Chairman of the National People's
Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, Peng is the odd man
out--all top positions except his appear slated for
change. However, Secretariat member and NPC Vice
Chairman Chen Pixian has been groomed for Peng's post,
and his promotion may be part of the overall package.
Prospects. All indications are that Deng will seek to have
the new arrangements endorsed in September. The turnover may not
be implemented immediately, however. Public announcements may be
stretched out over time. Moreover, high appointments typically
require the appropriate procedural venue for formal endorsement
and announcement: a party plenum or a session of the NPC.
A revised succession package may be the price Deng has paid
to lure the party old guard into retirement:
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-- Deng probably expects Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen to join
him on the CAC, but only Deng will remain a Politburo
Standing Committee member. If Li and Peng retire, Deng
probably calculates that party elder Chen Yun will also
be pressured to leave the Standing Committee and join
the CAC.
-- In the past, however, similar political deals have
fallen through following last minute
reconsiderations. The new package will not be clinched
until the public announcements.
-- In seeking to institutionalize his reforms in the face
of political opposition, Deng will continue to have Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in strong supporting roles.
Both men will remain members of the Politburo Standing
Committee--Hu by provision of the party constitution,
and Zhao because of the prestige of the Presidency--and
will be powerful voices for policy continuity through
the transition period.
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SUBJECT: China: Thinking About A New Succession Package
Distribution:
1 - Gaston Sigur, NSC, Room 302, Old EOB
1 - David Laux, NSC, Room 302, Old EOB
1 - Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State,
Room 6205
1 - Honorable Michael Armacost, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, Room 7240, Department of State
1 - James Lilley, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of
State, Room 6205
1 - Donald Anderson, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs
(EAP/C), Department of State, Room 4318
1 - Howard Lange, Deputy Director of Economic Affairs, Office
of Chinese Affairs (EAP/C), Department of State Room 4318
1 - Honorable Morton Abramowitz, Director, INR, Department of
State, Room 6531
1 - John J. Taylor, Director, Office of Analysis for East
Asia and the Pacific, INR, Department of State, Room 8840
1 - Mark Pratt, Director, EA/RA/Taiwan Coordination, Room
4312, Department of State
1 - Chris Clarke, INR/EAP/CH, Department of State, Room 8840
1 - John Danylyk, Chief, INR/EC, Communist Economic Relations
Division, Department of State, Room 8662
1 - James Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Room 4E817, Pentagon
1 - Douglas Mulholland, Special Assistant to the Secretary
(National Security), Department of Treasury, Room 4326,
Main Treasury
1 - Office of Intelligence Liaison, Department of Commerce,
Room 6854
1 - Chief B4121, Room 2S010-2, National Security
Agency, Ft. Meade
1 - DDI (7E44)
1 - Executive Director (7E55)
1 - NIO/EA (7E62)
1 - NIO/ECON (7E62)
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
2 - C/OEA/CH (4G32)
1 - OEA Research. Director (4G48)
1 - C/OEA/SDS (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DE,F (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOR (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/NA (4G43)
1 - C/OEA/SA (4F38)
1 - PDB Staff (7G30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G50)
1 - C/EA/RR (5D10)
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1 - C/EA/CORR (5D38)
1 - C/PES (7G15)
1 - OCR/ISG (1H19)
1 - C/DO/PPS (3D01)
1 - D/OLL (7B24)
1 - FBIS/AG/CB (212 Key)
1 - FBIS/NEAD/CB (212 Key)
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
DDI/OEA/CH/DOM
(22 July 1985)
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