CHINA: DEVELOPING AND EXOCET-LIKE MISSILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000302130001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 20, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central lntelllgrnce Agency
China's first tactical naval weapon heavily influenced by a Western design
may be ready for deployment as early as 1987. Under development since
1978, the solid-propellant C-801 antiship missile looks similar to the
Summary
French Exocet, and we believe it results from close scrutiny of an
air-launched Exocet Beijing
hopes export sales
will offset the cost of equipping its own Navy with the missile.
Successful development will demonstrate China's capacity to
reverse-engineer some advanced weapons, and deployment of the missile
will markedly upgrade China's coastal defenses.
This memorandum was prepared by (Office of East Asian Analysis,
Off
preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 November 1985
China: Developing an Exocet-Like Missile
ice of Scientific and Weapons Research, and
Information available as of 20 November 19 was used in i s
Defense Issues Branch, China Division, OEAJ
Copy 4y of 90
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C-801 Antiship Missile
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China's First Cruise Missile Submarine
The first evidence of China's plans to build a cruise missile submarine
(SSG) was seen on satellite photography in December 1982. An R-class
submarine being rebuilt at Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan was fitted with six
cruise missile launchers--three on each side of the sail.
Technical deficiencies, however, will limit the effectiveness of the
submarine. The 1950s-era Soviet equipment on board the SSG makes it more
difficult to detect, track, and evade enemy warships than on more modern diesel
submarines. In addition, the C-801 missile will not provide Chinese submarines
with the large warhead and long-range attack capability to threaten major naval
targets--such as an aircraft carrier protected by escorts. To remedy these
defects, the Chinese probably plan to develop a longer-ranged version of the
C-801 and an encapsulated version suitable for launch from a submerged
submarine.
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China's R-Class Cruis
Missile Submarine
40 50 60 70 76.8 meters
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Borrowing From a French Design
Unveiled last October during the military parade in Beijing, the C-801 outwardly
resembles the French AM-39 Exocet air-launched antiship cruise missile, and we believ
it has many of the same characteristics.'
inc u ing Mirage aircraft, Matra air-to-air missiles, and Crotale
a copy of the Exocet for
exploitation as well. Similarities include the mounting of a relatively small warhead
(compared to the Styx-derivative missiles), a similar second-stage propulsion system,
and use of a radar altimeter for low-altitude flight. According to weapon characteristics
the performance of the C-801 is also
comparable to that of the AM-39 Exocet. Like the Exocet, the C-801 flies at subsonic
speeds and on the final approach skims the ocean's surface to avoid radar detection.
The Chinese missile is, however, designed for surface launch and has an added dropoff
booster to propel it to cruising altitude. It also has over twice the volume of the Exocet,
probably to compensate for China's inability to sufficiently miniaturize missile
components and develop more efficient solid-propellant fuels.
New Dimensions for the Chinese Navy
The C-801 missile will enhance the already substantial capability of the Chinese
Navy to accomplish its primary mission--defense of the Chinese mainland against
conventional surface attack. China's R-class submarines provide the outer perimeter of
China's naval defense zones and are its only credible naval defense against enemy task
forces with standoff strike capabilities. With the C-801, the submarine fleet will become
even more effective, for it will acquire its own standoff capability, striking surface
targets from 50 kilometers away instead of the 4 to 8 kilometers required for a torpedo
The middle and inner rings of China's defense zones also will be reinforced by
the C-801. Beijing is likely to replace many of the outdated liquid-propellant Styx
missiles 2 --China's main shipborne surface-to-surface missile--on Chinese destroyers,
frigates, and missile patrol boats with the C-801 because of its substantial advantages:
2 The Chinese will probably retain the Styx missile--with its longer range and greater
destructive power--for land-based coastal defense and possibly as a second missile
system aboard larger surface combatants. 25X1
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? The C-801's sea-skimming abilities and its small size make it far more difficult to
detect on approach.
? The C-801's solid-propellant fuel is safer, raising the readiness level of ships that
heretofore only fueled their missiles just before combat. The C-801 also allows
the possible reloading of launchers at sea.
? The C-801's size--roughly half that of the Styx--allows Beijing to double the
number of missile launchers aboard each warship.
Table 1
Comparison of C-801 and AM-39 Exocet Characteristics
Range 50 50-75
(kilometers)
Speed Mach 0.9 Mach 0.93
Total
Weight 825 655
(kilograms)
Volume 1.0 0.45
(cubic meters)
Warhead
Weight 160 165
(kilograms)
Final Approach
Altitude
(meters)
*Depending on sea state
The Chinese are aaaarently enthusiastic about their new missile system, for,l 25X1
they are planning to install it on two new frigates 2bAI
currently under construction in Shanghai. 25X1 ,
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A New Arrow in the Arms Export Quiver
Beijing plans to export the C-801, probably to hel finance a ui in its own
Navy with the missile.
in an initial sales pitch, the
Chinese Precision Machinery Import and Ex Dort Cor orati n exhibited scale m
the C-801 at the Paris Air Show in June.
but probe y nave not yet signs a contract.
This is not the first time Beijing has developed new weapons for its own forces
with the export market in mind. Since 1980, China has developed a series of improved
tanks and armored fighting vehicles, hundreds of which have been shipped to Iraq, while
only a few, as yet, have entered service with China's military. Large overseas sales
allow Beijing to lower production costs, invest additional monies in research and
development, and, in some cases, test the weapon in combat. Moreover, as Beijing has
done with other weapon systems, it probably will be able to produce an Exocet-like
missile at one-half to two-thirds the cost of most Western antiship missiles, iving
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China significant marketing leverage with prospective Third World buyers 25X1
The apparently successful development of the C-801 also demonstrates the
improving capabilities of China's defense industries. Set back by 10 years of internal
problems caused by the Cultural Revolution, China's defense sector is only now
beginning to unveil the products of revitalization begun by Military Commission
Chairman Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. The successful reproduction of the Soviet
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SA-7 surface-to-air missile and the indigenous design of a 152-mm self-propelled
howitzer are prime examples of the resurgence of China's defense industries. Weapons
development in China will continue to be an extremely slow process, but the
development of the C-801 indicates Beijing has the ability and resolve to copy advanced
weapon systems based on samples acquired from abroad.
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SUBJECT: China: Developing an Exocet-Like Missile 25X1
National Security Council
Copy 1 Gaston Sigur, Senior Staff Member, East Asia, EOB Rm 302.
Copy 2 Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice-President,
White House Rm 298.
Copy 3 David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong
EOB Rm 302.
Department of State
Copy 4 Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, Rm 6205.
Copy 5 AMB Morton Abramowitz, Director INR, Rm 6531.
Copy 6 Herbert Levin, Policy Planning Staff, Rm 7330.
Copy 7 David N. Schwartz, Office of Policy Analysis, Rm 7430.
Copy 8 Donald M. Anderson, Director, EA/CH, Rm 4318.
Copy 9 AMB H. Alan Holmes, Director, Bureau of Political
and Military Affairs, Rm 7327.
Copy 10 Richard Devillafranca, Bureau of Political Military Affairs,
Room 7430.
Copy 11 Mark Pratt, EA/RA/TC, Room 4312.
Copy 12 Mark A Sigler, INR/PMA, Room 6524A.
Copy 13 Jack Sontag, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840.
Department of Defense
Copy 14 Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA,
Rm 4E808, Pentagon.
Copy 15 Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy, Rm 4E838, Pentagon.
Copy 16 James Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, ISA,
Rm 4E817, Pentagon.
Copy 17 Major General Perroots, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Rm 4A932, Pentagon.
Copy 18 Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Rm. 5C572, Pentagon.
Copy 19 Lieutenant General Sidney T. Leinstein, Army Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Rm 2E466, Pentagon.
Copy 20 Lieutenant Colonel Eden Y. Woon, Office of Joint Chief Staff,
China Plans and Policy, FESA J-5, Rm 2E973, Pentagon.
Copy 21 Lieutenant Colonel Gary Weis, ISA, Rm 4C849, Pentagon
Copy 22 John J Sloan, Defense Intelligence Officer, East Asia and
Pacific, Rm 2C238 Pentagon.
Copy 23 Frank Jiordano, JSI-3A, Rm 1C945, Pentagon.
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Copy 24
Copy 25
Copy 26
Copy 27
Copy 28
Copy 29
DIA/DB-2B2, Rm C2-814, DIAC.
DIA/DE-2, Rm B6-832, DIAC.
DIA/AT-3/China, Rm 1120, Pompano Plaza West.
Chief, NSA/B-Group, Rm 3W106, Fort Meade.
Chief, NSA/B72, Rm 2SO40, Ft. Meade.
Chief NSA/B721, Rm 2SO40, Ft. Meade.
Copy 30 Hal Leach, NISC-OOW, Rm 2006, Suitland.
Copy 31 Karen Steelberg, Chief, NOIC/04, Rm 1650, Suitland.
Department of Energy
Copy 32 Douglas Faulkner, DOE/DP-421, GA-257, Forrestal Bldg.
National Photographic Interpretation Center
Copy 33 Chief, NPIC/IEG/EAD,
Copy 34 Chief, NPIC/IEG/EA
Central Intelligence Agency
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DDI (7E44)
C/ACIS (6F20)
NIO/EA (7E62)
NIO/USSR-EE (7E62)
C/EA/RR (5D 10)
C/DDO/E (5D38)
,Ar
DDO/EA (5D54)
C/PES (7F24)
NIC/Analytical Group (7E47)
PDB Staff (7F30)
CPAS/ILS (7G50)
Copy 47-49 CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
Copy 50-51 OCR/ISG (1H19)
Copy 52 C/OCR/DSG/EA (11-1118)
Copy 53 D/SOVA
Copy 54 C/SOVA/TWAD/A (4E12)
Copy 55 C/SOVA/TWAD/T (4E28)
Copy 56 D/OSWR (5F46)
Copy 57-
Copy 67
Copy 68
Copy 73
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D/OEA (4F18)
C/OEA/PROD (4G48)
C/OEA/NEA (4G43)
C/OEA/SEA (4F38)
C/OEA/CH (4G32)
C/OEA/CH/DOM (4G32)
C/OEA/CH/FOR (4G32)
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Copy 80 C/OEA/CH/DEV (4G32)
Copy 81-90 C/OEA/CH/DEF (4G32)
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