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US AND OTHER WESTERN INVESTMENT IN CHINESE OIL: HOW MUCH INTEREST REMAINS?

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
24
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 19, 2011
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 1, 1986
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8.pdf1.2 MB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Directorate of Intelligence US and Other Western Investment in Chinese Oil: How Much Interest Remains? EA 86-10020 May 1986 C o p y 2 1 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Directorate of Secret Intelligence US and Other Western Investment in Chinese Oil: How Much Interest Remains? Division, OEA~ This paper was prepared by I Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, China Secret EA 86-10020 May 1986 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 US and Other Western Investment in Chinese Oil: How Much Interest Remains? Scope Note Domestic demand and foreign exchange needs in recent years have pushed the Chinese to increase oil production and exploration, and to seek greater participation by foreign companies. This paper evaluates China's latest strategies for attracting foreign cooperation in oil, and examines the threats to these strategies posed by the current falloff in international oil prices. Secret EA 86-10020 May 1986 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 US and Other Western Investment in Chinese Oil: How Much Interest Remains? Key Judgments The Chinese have been trying to attract increasing cooperation in oil Information available exploration and development-onshore as well as offshore-because as of 21 April 1986 of their: was used in this report. ? Reliance on foreign exchange earnings from oil exports. ? Growing domestic demand. ? Disappointment over the results so far of offshore exploration. We believe, however, that falling world oil prices are undercutting Chinese hopes of attracting the cooperation they need, at least over the near term. China, in fact, probably will be forced to grant more favorable terms for new contracts just to sustain the interest of the few large Western firms- mostly American-that are still financially able and willing to take the necessary risks. maintain production in existing mature fields. A falloff in Western interest onshore will, we believe, force Beijing to reexamine its long-term plans for onshore oil development. Most at risk are Chinese plans for developing in the 1990s the massive oil basins in the re- mote northwest-considered by many world geologists to have extremely rich potential. If these plans are pushed back, Chinese efforts to sustain high oil production beyond 1990 would, we believe, hinge less on new oil finds and increasingly on the use of improved recovery techniques to development of these resources by as much as a decade. China's oil industry officials, meanwhile, probably will devise contingency plans to develop the northwestern basins with only limited foreign involve- ment in testing and planning. We believe the Chinese could undertake such an independent effort only at enormous cost and very slowly, delaying discoveries to date. ? US firms have sold China over $700 million in oilfield equipment. US oil firms will be affected more than other foreign companies because they are more deeply involved in China. They have provided expertise, equipment, and most of the direct foreign investment in the search for oil: ? US firms have taken the lead on most offshore oil surveys. ? Total US investment obligations for the first round of offshore oil cooperation ran $800 million, almost half of foreign commitments. ? Consortiums led by US firms have found four of China's seven offshore Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 As a result of the drop in oil prices, only the large, mainly US, oil companies are likely in our judgment to maintain an interest in China. Indeed, most foreign firms so far have found the results of investing in China's offshore oil industry to be mixed at best, with few of them earning enough to cover their costs. Many Western firms have sustained losses in the tens of millions of dollars. And scant reliable data about onshore prospects-frustrating all attempts to predict oil potential-will, we be- lieve, discourage all but the largest companies from investing in further exploration over the short to middle term. Among US specialty firms, those selling oil equipment face poor prospects within a year or two. We judge that China will be forced by budget cuts- despite its priorities-to reduce purchases of equipment for its existing onshore fields and will increase efforts to obtain manufacturing know-how to begin producing its own. In the meantime, we expect the Chinese to meet some of their immediate needs by buying used equipment from small US independents that are in financial difficulty. As the Chinese are forced to rely increasingly on their own resources, on the other hand, we think US oil exploration consultants will be in a strong position to sell their services to Beijing. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Key Judgments MOPI's Bureaucracy Battles 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000200720001-8 Figure 1 The Path of Foreign Cooperation in Oil Exploration Flo .i7i,~ c;% 3 SiTis ,]a s ':fy Op fl 'iO iv,' ic;n 7.s Bid block Oil basin Oilfield Survey-area limit Province-level boundary 0 500 Kilometers 0 500 Miles Zhongyuan? A9hdngli j Lrhro/opy .:r1r,' zrrt'i;7ir "Z Yellow irn o, a ']60 c is irr. Sea ons;torc ~r or:'s!c_ior7 Hunan\ `Jiangxi o1siDYO 'o Fujian ;]LitliCrii pi'O!rii7CCBu N GuaSngdong Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative, A Gaging AFuyu Ji"i3h Oru I! kns i