THE DEVELOPING VIETNAMESE ARMY: GROWTH PAINS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000200880001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ecmt
Intelligence
The Developing
Vietnamese Army:
Growth Pains and Implications
for Regional Security
EA 86-10037C
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August 1986
Copy 7 ? A
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
for Regional Security
The Developing
Vietnamese Army:
Growth Pains and Implications
Asia Division, OEA~
Office of
Office of
Imagery Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Southeast
East Asian Analysis, and
This paper was prepared by
Secret
EA 86-10037C
IA 86-10049C
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August 1986
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The Developing
Vietnamese Army:
Growth Pains and Im lications
for Regional Security
Key Judgments China and Thailand are the nations most affected by the growing military
Information available power of the Vietnamese Army, which with over 1 million men has
as of 15 July 1986 emerged as the largest and most powerful army in Southeast Asia.
was used in this report.
Although we believe the odds are overwhelmingly against large-scale
Vietnamese military action against Thailand, Vietnam has decided superi-
ority and probably could rout Thai defenses along the Cambodian border
with forces already deployed there. But several factors will restrict into the
1990s Hanoi's ability to bring its growing military power to bear on other
nations in the region. Most important, we believe that Vietnam is eager to
end its diplomatic isolation and reopen Western aid and trade channels.
The normalization of relations with the United States tops Vietnam's
international political agenda, in our view, and Hanoi almost certainly
realizes that military moves against vital US regional interests would dash
its already remote propects for achieving this goal. In addition:
? Vietnam will remain outmanned and outgunned by China indefinitely,
and we rate the chances for rapprochement between the two as extremely
low for the next several years. As a result, the bulk of Vietnamese combat
power will be tied down in the north, defending the border with China.
Hanoi appears confident that its forces can do the job, however.
? The Vietnamese military's ability to project conventional power in the
region is extremely limited and almost certainly will remain so indefinite-
ly. Air Force and Navy assets are primarily defensive, and their
development will be hindered by severe budget limitations.
? Several member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
are concerned over growing Vietnamese military power, but they appear
to recognize Hanoi's limitations. In fact, Malaysia, Indonesia, and some
officials in Thailand still consider China their major long-term threat
despite Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Those Thai officials who see
Vietnam as the main threat are more concerned about subversion than
conventional invasion.
We believe Vietnam's progress in developing modern conventional forces
will be steady but slow. A continuing influx of Soviet weapons over the past
few years has helped ease serious equipment shortages in the Vietnamese
Army, but Hanoi is tackling more difficult problems that require funda-
mental changes in organization and doctrine. We believe reformist trends
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EA 86-10037C
IA 86-10049C
August 980
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within the Army will continue, as increasingly professional soldiers emerge
from the Army and fill the ranks of the Vietnamese Communist Party. We
also believe residual resistance to reforms will erode with the passing of
party ideologues more closely associated with Vietnam's struggle for
independence and reunification:
? The adoption of a Soviet-style one-man command system underscores
more than any other factor the Army's increasing professionalism and
autonomy, because it enhances the military commander's authority and
places limits on political cadres. Overall party control of the military
remains unchallenged, however.
? The Vietnamese are refining training methods to emphasize the develop-
ment of competent combat officers well versed in military doctrine and
strategy, the operation of modern weapon systems, and leadership. But
improvement will be slow because of the lack of qualified instructors,
resistance to new training programs, and a shortage of training materials.
? The Army also has been experimenting with Soviet-style combined-arms
doctrine, but the full integration of infantry, armor, and artillery remains
elusive.
Although Hanoi will continue to rely heavily on its unique "people's war"
doctrine, we believe Army modernization will proceed along Soviet lines,
largely because of Vietnam's dependence on Soviet materiel and advisers.
We estimate that Moscow provides between $600 million and $800 million
annually in military aid and has 2,500 advisers working with Vietnamese
Army units down to regimental level. In return, Vietnam affords the
Soviets access to facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and political support in
international forums.
Hanoi probably is discomfited by its nearly total dependence on the Soviets
because this gives Moscow leverage that could be used to control Vietnam-
ese military activities or to regulate the pace and extent of force
modernization. We believe, however, that the Soviets would use their
leverage only in the most extreme circumstances because they realize their
access to Cam Ranh Bay would hang in the balance.
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Secret
Key Judgments
Background
Preparing for Modern Warfare
The Regional Security Equation
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Figure 1. "We must accelerate the development of our Army into a
revolutionary people's Army that possesses an unshakable will to
win, strict discipline, and a serious bearing, an Army that becomes
more regular and modern with each passing day and is constantly
achieving a higher state of combat readiness ... we must establish
the proper relationships between size and quality, between the
Army's revolutionary character and its regular force and modern
character, between manpower and weapons/technical equipment ...
only in this way can our Army meet the requirements of the
people's war...... Tap Chi Cong San, December 19841
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The Developing
Vietnamese Army:
Growth Pains and Implications
for Regional Security
Background
The People's Army of Vietnam began over 40 years
ago as a collection of guerrilla bands organized by Ho
Chi Minh and his chief military adviser, Vo Nguyen
Giap, under a united front called the Viet Minh.
These forces implemented Ho's strategy of combined
armed and political action by the entire population in
an effort to win independence and, later, to reunify
the country. With a standing force of over 1 million
troops, however, the Vietnamese Army has evolved
into a conventional army that is now among the five
largest in the world and an institution second in
importance only to the Communist Party of Vietnam.
The Army plays a pivotal role in internal security and
national defense and is a major tool of Vietnamese
foreign policy in the region, with nearly 200,000
troops propping up client regimes in Cambodia and
Laos (see inset).
Preparing for Modern Warfare
Strategists in Hanoi several years ago realized that
the Army must keep pace with modern conventional
warfare doctrine to ensure national security. Most of
Vietnam's early military success stemmed from the
use of guerrilla tactics in long wars of attrition, but
Hanoi's strike in 1975 into South Vietnam demon-
strated to the Vietnamese the importance of conven-
tional forces. Moreover, China's foray in 1979 into
Vietnam underscored that Hanoi was unprepared to
defend against a large conventional attack. As a result
of the Chinese threat, Vietnam launched the largest
buildup of conventional forces in the history of the
Army as it scrambled to strengthen its defenses
against a potential "second lesson." In addition to the
massive amount of Soviet equipment that has flowed
into Vietnamese inventories over the past several
years, Hanoi has undertaken a number of steps that
entail fundamental organizational and doctrinal
changes to modernize the Army.
Army efforts
to implement sweeping reforms in doctrine and orga-
nization are hindered by numerous problems. We
believe ideologues oppose efforts to improve profes-
sionalism within the Army, to streamline command
and control, to revamp training methods, and to
develop modern conventional forces, probably in part
because these reforms go against basic precepts of
party ideology and tradition. In addition, efforts to
improve the officer corps and recruit training pro-
grams are impeded by a serious shortage of qualified
instructors and training materials. Faculties at mili-
tary academies include teachers with no basic train-
ing, no practical experience, and, in some cases, no
high school education. Moreover, the academies lack
textbooks, their training does not adequately simulate
actual combat conditions, and they are mired in
redtape
Greater Autonomy for the Military. Vietnam's most
radical reform has been its redefinition of the tradi-
tional relationship between the Vietnamese Commu-
nist Party and the military. The Army in 1980
formally adopted the one-man command system that
increases the independence and authority of unit
commanders and places limits on the party's political
cadres. According to the Vietnamese press:
The new mechanism of party leadership in the
Army entrusts the execution of military politi-
cal tasks to a single commander. The function
of political commissar is abolished. The unit
commander leads and manages all military,
political, logistic, and technical activities and is
responsible for them to the party and the state.
In this way, he can fully display his sense of
initiative and take timely decisions in all cir-
cumstances. The party basic organization ...
takes no decision on operational plans, targets,
and measures concerning production and
technique.
The move was intended to streamline command and
control and, in our judgment, signifies, more than any
other factor, the emphasis on increasing professional-
ism within the military. It also signals Hanoi's admis
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Vietnamese ground units in Cambodia can be charac-
terized as a separate, second Army because their
organization and mission are markedly different
from forces in Vietnam. Military deployments appear
to be based on economy of force, because Hanoi's
130,000 to 140,000 troops can retain control in
Cambodia and can ensure the survival of the Heng
Samrin regime but are unable to defeat the resistance
or even to secure the countryside. Moreover, these
units have a counterinsurgency mission, while those
in northern Vietnam are charged with defending
against a conventional invasion. Vietnamese forces in
Cambodia are undermanned and ill equipped for the
most part. For example, infantry divisions vary in
size from 6,000 to 8,500 troops compared with 10,000
for divisions in the three northern military regions.
Much of their equipment is obsolete and ill main-
tained, coming from captured US inventories, al-
though some more modern Soviet weapons, such as
D-30 artillery pieces, have been seen in Cambodia. In
addition, enlisted ranks are filled almost exclusively
by poorly trained and unmotivated conscripts from
southern Vietnam while the officer corps is from the
north.
Kampuchea (PRK) groups throughout Cambodia to
help maintain internal security and to groom PRK
units for an increased security role. The groups
consist of between four and 10 infantry battalions, a
headquarters, several support companies, and Viet-
namese advisers to the PRK local militia. Depending
upon their location, manning levels in the groups vary
from less than 100 to 3,000, suggesting that their
organization is mission specific. For example, those
groups in the more secure eastern provinces are
smaller than those in areas where the resistance is
more active.
For the past 10 years or so, Vietnam also has
maintained 40,000 to 50,000 troops in Laos to bolster
the Vietnamese-installed regime there. The low level
of insurgency activity in Laos permits Hanoi to
delegate primary responsibility for counterinsurgency
operations to the Lao People's Army so that Viet-
namese troops can maintain a relatively low profile.
Nonetheless, Vietnamese units are active in opera-
tions against the resistance, and, although the insur-
gency is little more than a nuisance for the govern-
ment, we believe the internal security situation in
Laos would deteriorate markedly if the Vietnamese
withdrew and turned over all security responsibilities
The Army also has created organizational structures
that are unique to Cambodia. For example, the Army
has formed joint Vietnamese-People's Republic of
sion that its tradition of decision by consensus is
inappropriate for successful conventional warfare.
Moreover, we believe the new command structure
underscores the paramount importance of national
security because Vietnam has opted to improve mili-
tary effectiveness at the expense of a basic precept of
party ideology.
We believe the trend toward greater autonomy for the
Army will continue. Despite some differences of
opinion, the one-man command structure that alters
Ho Chi Minh's military blueprint was adopted by
staunch revolutionary ideologues who were longtime
members of Ho's inner circle.' As the Politburo's old
guard gives way to leaders not as closely identified
with the struggle for Vietnam's independence and
to the far less capable Lao Army.
reunification, we believe residual resistance to reforms
that challenge the traditional party-military relation-
ship will erode further. Moreover, the party draws
most of its members from the military, according to
US diplomats, and this ensures future support for the
Army's development and reform programs.
' Although the new command system was endorsed by Vietnam's
top leadership, we believe the decision sparked a continuing debate
between military reformers and party ideologues. The debate often
surfaces in Vietnamese press articles with ideologues emphasizing
the importance of party control over the military while reformers
insist that developing an effective modern army should be Hanoi's
top priority. But, despite disagreements on the proper role of
military commanders and political cadres, overall party control of
the military remains unchallenged. In fact, military journalists,
who take great pains to underscore the party's pivotal role in
national security, generally portray the new system as a measure to
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Figure 2. ". . . improving the quality of the corps
of cadre ... is the key [to] improving the quality
of our Army. "Tap Chi Cong San, December
1984F__1
Developing the Officer Corps. The Vietnamese also
are moving to improve their corps of military leaders.
Over the past year or two, we have noted increased
emphasis in Vietnamese military publications on the
need for professional combat officers. The Army
apparently believes its officers are unprepared to lead
its larger and technically more complicated conven-
tional forces. For example, the former director of
schools for the Defense Ministry admits that many
units are still commanded by noncommissioned offi-
cers or officers with no basic training. Moreover,
there appears to be dissatisfaction at senior levels
within the Army with the quality of trained commis-
sioned officers. Some have been criticized for their
lack of practical skills, leadership ability, and knowl-
New Emphasis on Training Recruits. Vietnam is also
refining the quality of training for both recruits and
units. Recent Vietnamese military media articles call
for improvements in both the content and methods of
training by incorporating lessons from combat with
the Chinese and the Cambodian resistance. They also
have mentioned a more personalized "new method" of
training that tailors curriculum levels to individual
abilities. The essays hint that specialized combat
training has been introduced in the standardized basic
training package of political subjects, combat skills,
and infantry tactics. Reform advocates argue for a
more uniform and structured application of supple-
mental training, probably in conjunction with basic
training, rather than after recruits are assigned to
combat units.
The training task is formidable. Vietnam's million-
man Army requires a constant flow of new recruits to
maintain force levels (see figures 3 and 4). Although
actual numbers are difficult to ascertain, we believe
that as many as 200,000 draft-eligible youths, nearly
one-third of those who reach age 17 annually, are
inducted into the Army-most of them destined for
the 66 infantry divisions. Although Vietnamese media
and defector reporting indicate some inadequacies in
achieving conscription goals, the Army appears capa-
ble of meeting present manpower requirements and
reportedly shortens the training process during crises.
edge of military theory.
Because of these deficiencies, Vietnamese officials
have called for a transformation of the military's
approach to selecting and training its officers. Al-
though candidates almost certainly must meet strin-
gent political standards, Hanoi clearly is emphasizing
the development of combat officers well versed in
military doctrine and strategy, the operation of mod-
ern weapon systems, and leadership. The prominence
accorded this issue in military journals suggests a
fundamental change in Vietnamese thinking that will
further the cause of professionalism in the Army.
Hanoi almost certainly recognizes, however, that its
system for training officers will take years to correct,
ruling out rapid improvement in the officer corps.
the Army has been experimenting
with the combined-arms concept for the past two
decades, but moving from organization to full integra-
tion of infantry, armor, and artillery remains an
elusive goal.'
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fitness, and political indoctrination.
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training battalions average 400 recruits per training
cycle with three or four cycles annually, for a total of
1,200 to 1,600 trained recruits per year. The larger
training centers have as many as 12 training battal-
ions and the capacity to turn out 14,000 to 19,000
graduates city of
the center vary
from regimental- to divisional-strength units.
The training centers run new recruits through a three-
month training cycle that stresses military drill, rifle
training, infantry tactics, grenade throwing, physical
According to defectors, most graduates of the mili-
tary region and army corps training centers are
assigned to operational infantry units, where they
may receive some additional training specific to the
unit's combat mission. Replacements for units in
Cambodia are drawn from military regions 4, 5, 7,
and 9, and replacements for units in Laos are drawn
from military region 4.
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according to press reports, the Chief of the General
Staff praised the combat training department for
"research and experiments on combat tactics of inter-
arms units in offensive and defensive units," indicat-
ing Soviet combined-arms doctrine is still in the
"Vietnamization" process.
Nevertheless, defector reporting
indicate that three motorized infantry divisions
have been formed (see figure 5), one in each strategic
army corps in northern Vietnam.
the deployment of Soviet-manufactured
armored personnel carriers and self-propelled antiair-
craft artillery in the north in recent years (see figure
6).
Backup for the Regular Army. The Vietnamese have
also emphasized the need to develop the reserve forces
that play a critical role in their defensive strategy. We
believe the militia and self-defense forces, drawn
respectively from the rural and urban population,
have three missions: to defend their locales against
foreign invaders, to provide internal security, and to
engage in industrial and agricultural production (see
figure 7). We estimate the membership of the two
groups is about 1.6 million and most of them are in
the north. A recent Vietnamese military essay on the
defense achievements of Binh Tri Thien Province
alleged 9 percent of the province's population of 1.8
million were members of the militia and self-defense
units; this was touted as an accomplishment, because
two-thirds of the population of the reconstituted prov-
ince were formerly under the control of the Republic
of South Vietnam. In the northern provinces, figures
for membership in reserve forces of over 50 percent of
the inhabitants are claimed for "good combat villa-
ges."
The size and quality and the weapons of militia and
self-defense units appear to vary according to geo-
graphic location and to the proximity of the enemy.
According to Vietnamese defectors, southern units are
armed only with light infantry weapons, and lower
echelon units are underarmed. In contrast, Vietnam-
ese military media claim that militia and self-defense
units along the Chinese-Vietnamese border are well
organized, well equipped, and prepared to defend
their "home areas," although they acknowledge tech-
nical and tactical weaknesses among such units.
least the next several years.
Vietnamese military media essays extolling an offen-
sive role for the militia and self-defense forces are
overstating the capabilities of these units, in our view.
Within the context of a "people's war" doctrine, those
units that were well trained and well organized would
be able to conduct guerrilla warfare against an enemy
invader, in addition to providing support and assis-
tance to main force units. Because of their better
equipment, advanced training, and higher motivation,
we believe paramilitary forces in the north are the
most adept at their assigned role. Meanwhile, equip-
ment shortages and recruit indifference will continue
to degrade the proficiency of southern units for at
The Soviet Umbilical Cord
Vietnamese efforts to develop modern conventional
forces depend almost entirely on Soviet materiel and
advisers. We estimate that Moscow provides between
$600 million and $800 million annually in military
assistance, and 2,500 military advisers are working
with Vietnamese units down to the regimental level.
In return, Hanoi provides the Soviets access to Cam
Ranh Bay and political support in international fo-
rums.
Vietnam's adoption of the one-man command system
and its motorized infantry divisions and a Spetsnaz-
type commando unit are signatures of Soviet influence
on Vietnamese military development.' Much to
developing a Soviet-style Spetsnaz (Special Purpose Forces) com-
mando unit that provides an airborne unconventional warfare
capability. The 1,500-man unit reportedly was formed in 1980 and
a defector reports that its wartime mission is to infiltrate behind
enemy lines to collect intelligence and to conduct sabotage opera-
tions. Thailand and China were identified as possible theaters of
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Figure 5
Estimated Organization of a Vietnamese
Motorized Infantry Division
Divisional
Headquarters
Motorized
Infantry
Regiment
Motorized
Infantry
Regiment
90 to 120 armored 90 to 120 armored
vehicles a vehiclesa
Antiaircraft
Company
Antiaircraft
Company
Motorized
Infantry
Regiment
90 to 120 armored
vehicles a
Antiaircraft
Company
4 ZSU-23/4sb
4 ZSU-23/4s5
Transportation
Battalion
Engineer
Battalion
Signal
Battalion
Artillery
Regiment
Antiaircraft
Regiment
Antitank
Battalion
36 122-mm 36 to 42 37/57-mm 12-18 guns
guns
Reconnaissance
Battalion
Tank
Battalion
Rocket
Launcher
Battalion
30 to 40 armored 30 to 40 armored 1 2 BM-2 I s
vehicles ? vehicles
Maintenance
Battalion
Medical
Battalion
Vietnamese military media indicate that at cAccording to the same re ort, the reconnaissance battalion is equipped
least one regiment in each of the three known motorized infantry division with BRDM-2s, BTR-60s, PT-76s
is fully equipped with BMPs. The remaining regiments may still have and/or MIUs may still be part of the unit's assets.
BTR-60s, BTR-152s, or troop-carrying cargo trucks in their inventory.
Note: Dashed boxes indicate units may not be present.
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LDA I
Moscow's dismay, however, the stubbornly indepen-
dent Vietnamese have made it clear that there are
limits to the desirability and practicality of adopting
Soviet doctrine. Although military journals openly
encourage the armed forces to consider Soviet meth-
odology, they are careful to emphasize that Vietnam's
unique situation requires a unique Vietnamese solu-
tion. The Vietnamese also draw extensively on what
they consider their own illustrious military history in
fashioning a doctrine best suited to their circum-
stances.
In any event, we judge that Vietnam will remain
almost totally dependent on the Soviet Union for
military hardware and supplies. Even if
the US-led Western trade and aid embargo were
lifted, it would be difficult for Hanoi to replace
Moscow's $2 billion annual economic and military aid
package. Moreover, Vietnam's embryonic defense in-
dustries will be unable to compensate for even a
modest reduction in Soviet material assistance, at
least through the turn of the century.
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Figure 6
Equipment of Vietnam's
Motorized Infantry Divisions
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Hanoi probably is uncomfortable with its dependence
on the Soviet supply line because it gives Moscow
leverage that could damage Vietnamese interests. The
Soviets can regulate the pace and extent of Vietnam-
ese military modernization by regulating the type and
amount of equipment they provide. Moscow has al-
ready constrained Vietnamese Air Force moderniza-
tion by refusing to provide MIG-23 aircraft
citing the similarities in
capabilities between the MIG-21 and Chinese fighter
aircraft. But larger Soviet and Vietnamese strategic
goals also make for a degree of mutual dependence.
We believe that, as a result, Moscow would use its
leverage only in the most extreme circumstances
because it realizes that access to Cam Ranh Bay
hangs in the balance.
The Regional Security Equation
Several factors will restrict Vietnam's ability into the
1990s to bring its growing conventional military
power to bear on other nations in the region. The
major constraint on the Vietnamese, in our view, is
their overriding concern for the security of their
border with China, whose forces are quantitatively
superior at least and are in the midst of an ambitious
modernization program. We rate the chances for
rapprochement between the two historical adversaries
as extremely low for the next several years, and,
therefore, we believe the Chinese threat will continue
to be the most important factor in Hanoi's strategic
calculations and will keep the bulk of Vietnamese
combat power tied down in the north.
Vietnam appears confident that its forces are capable
of defending against a Chinese invasion, however, and
probably judges that its present defensive scheme has
raised the potential costs and reduced the chances of
success enough to deter a large-scale Chinese assault
across the border. Hanoi's confidence probably was
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Figure 7
Vietnamese Regional Forces
and Militiawomen
"Increasing the comprehensive quality and fighting strength of the
militia and self-defense forces is one of the most important tasks
... [they] will become an impressive element in a military trap laid
out to decimate and destroy the enemy. " Nhan Dan, May 1984 P
bolstered by its strong showing against the Chinese
during the brief 1979 border war, when Vietnam had
less than 10 combat divisions in the north-it now has
over 40 divisions there-and before the Army's inten-
sive expansion and modernization effort of the past
seven years (see inset The lack of a
decisive Chinese reaction to Vietnam's unprecedented
1984/85 dry season offensive in Cambodia undoubt-
edly has bolstered Hanoi's assessment of Chinese
reluctance to expand the conflict. Since then, sus-
tained Chinese military pressure along the border has
not deterred the Vietnamese from operations in Cam-
bodia they deem necessary, largely because China has
signaled clearly that no "second lesson" is in the
offing by limiting its operations to the remote and
strategically unimportant border area near Malipo.
Even if the Chinese military threat were removed as a
constraint on the Vietnamese, Hanoi's capabilities to
project power by air or by sea are minimal. The
Vietnamese Navy is primarily a coastal defense force
with few major combat and transport ships. Hanoi has
formed a fledgling Marine Corps and intends eventu-
ally to improve and expand this force and to develop
amphibious landing capabilities, according to military
press reports. But we believe the Navy will continue to
focus its modernization efforts primarily on antisub-
marine warfare and we doubt that it will be able to
conduct seaborne offensive combat operations or even
successfully to reinforce and defend its holdings in the
Spratly Islands any time soon."
The Vietnamese Air Force is equipped primarily with
MIG-21s, which are best suited for air defense,
although they have a limited ground attack capability.
The Air Force does have 40 SU-22 Fitter fighter-
bombers and 30 MI-24 Hind helicopter gunships, but
the Vietnamese rarely conduct joint-service exercises
to practice close air support. The Air Force also has a
small airlift capability with about 150 medium- and
short-range transport aircraft. Finally, we believe
development of the Air Force and Navy will continue
to be seriously hindered because on Vietnam's defense
budget priority list these services rank a distant
second and third, respectively, behind the Army.
Vietnam's continuing low-level hostilities with China
and its limited capability to project power markedly
reduce the conventional Vietnamese threat to most
other nations in the region, in our view. Several other
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Vietnamese media,
indicate that the specter of a large-scale
Chinese invasion has prompted Hanoi to formulate
comprehensive defense plans that in effect transform
the northern provinces into armed camps.
anoi's defense preparations, however, go
well beyond the deployment of over 40 infantry
divisions. Vietnamese military media continue to
issue dramatic calls for the defense of the "Father-
land," the implications of which cast each citizen as a
combatant. The people of the northern districts are
expected to provide for their own defense, including
the troops and the logistics. Current Vietnamese
media extoll the ideal of defending the northern
provinces with militia, self-defense, and regional
forces, backed by the output of the combat villages,
combat enterprises, and combat factories. This mobi-
lization of society requires a population base that is
lacking in the northern provinces. Hanoi's answer to
that problem is population redistribution-a program
to move thousands of people from populated lowland
Southeast Asian nations apparently agree with this
assessment. Both Indonesia and Malaysia rank China
as their major security problem despite Vietnam's
growing military power. Although Thailand claims
frontline status because of Vietnam's occupation of
Cambodia, many Thai officials believe that China
presents the most serious long-term threat.' On the
other hand, those officials who consider Vietnam to be
the major threat are far more fearful of Vietnamese
subversion than invasion
and this concern probably would intensify if
Although we believe large-scale Vietnamese military
action against Thailand is extremely unlikely, Hanoi,
in our view, could easily rout Thai defenses in the
central border region-the strategic approach to
'China supported Communist insurgent groups in Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, and Thailand for years and still refuses to renounce party-to-
provinces to new economic zones in the northern
border provinces and other sparsely populated areas.
However, building up the soldier-worker population
along the border through resettlement is a long-term
solution.
Over the short term, Hanoi will defend the border
with a mix of main force divisions, regional forces,
and provincial militia. The strategic army corps will
remain a mobile strike force, a role shaped by current
military doctrine, which recognizes terrain limita-
tions. Meanwhile, Hanoi is striving to extend the
range of the Army's mobile formations by improving
the road network.
indicate t e construction of
new "strategic" roads, apparently designed to permit
the rapid movement of troops and logistics to threat-
ened areas and improve lines of communication in the
border provinces.
the "on-the-spot "forces will not only be expect-
ed to bear the brunt of the initial onslaught, but also
contain and harass the enemy while the strategic
corps prepare to launch a counteroffensive.
Bangkok-with Army units already in Cambodia.'
But Vietnam's political and economic agendas, as
much as any other factor, will inhibit its use of force
against Thailand, in our judgment. Hanoi clearly is
eager to end its international isolation-in part, to
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reopen Western economic aid and trade channels
closed by its invasion and occupation of Cambodia.
We believe the Vietnamese also realize that large-
scale military action against Thailand probably would
entail even more severe international political and
military costs. For example, the Vietnamese almost
certainly believe such a move against vital US region-
al interests would dash their already remote prospects
for achieving official diplomatic relations with the
United States-a goal that, in our view, is at the top
of Hanoi's international political agenda.
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Secret
Secret
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