PHILIPPINE COUNTERINSURGENCY: PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT UNDER THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000200890001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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......,..,rte
Directorate of S " .,
Intelligence
Philippine Counterinsurgency:
Prospects for Improvement
Under the Aquino Government
EA 86-10040
September 1986
192
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Philippine Counterinsurgency:
Prospects for Improvement
Under the Aquino Government
This paper was prepared by
Reverse Blank Secret
EA 86-10040
September 1986
the Office of East Asian Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, on
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STAT
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Philippine Counterinsurgency:
Prospects for Improvement
Under the Aquino Government
Scope Note This paper is intended to provide) an estimate of 25X1
Philippine counterinsurgency capabilities as the new leadership in Manila
is attempting to set a more effective course for the armed forces. I 25X1
Secret
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September 1986
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Philippine Counterinsurgency:
Prospects for Improvement
Under the Aquino Government
Key Judgments In our judgment, the Aquino government in its first six months in power
Information available has made modest progress in efforts to reform the military so it can stop
as of l August 1986 the spread of the Communist insurgency and restore government control
was used in this report.
throughout the country. The almost overwhelming challenge the govern-
ment faces is the longstanding politicization of the armed forces under
former President Marcos, which institutionalized favoritism, graft, and
corruption among senior officers and created a military short on the
motivation, leadership, supplies, training, and operational intelligence
needed for a successful counterinsurgency campaign.
To improve the professionalism of the Army, President Aquino has:
? Replaced senior officers extended on duty past retirement with combat-
experienced professionals selected by her Chief of Staff, General Ramos,
and Defense Minister Enrile.
? Approved a reorganization of the Defense Ministry and the military and
civilian intelligence apparatus.
? Ordered the transfer of men and equipment from largely ceremonial
duties in Manila to field units.
? Approved a counterinsurgency plan based on small unit operations in
place of the large sweep operations that had frequently been more
effective in driving civilians into the arms of the Communists than in
inflicting damage on the insurgents.
According to Embassy and these efforts have 25X1
helped convince many military officers of the seriousness of Aquino's
intention to eliminate the worst military abuses and have increased public
respect for the military.
Aquino also has changed her position against military aid, now favoring
increased US assistance. Recognition that the military needs more counter-
insurgency resources regardless of the outcome of her cease-fire strategy
provides an important opportunity for the United States to restore its once-
close relationship with the Philippine military and to encourage a more
realistic counterinsurgency strategy. Through training at US facilities in
the Pacific and the United States, a younger generation of Philippine
military leaders could acquire needed combat skills and close ties to and
confidence in the United States.
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On the negative side, the fact that the insurgency has gained considerable
momentum over the past three years and that Aquino and her closest
advisers are inexperienced in military affairs complicates the outlook for a
counterinsurgency campaign. In our judgment, it will take time for
professionalizing reforms to take hold throughout the military. Moreover,
the government has not abandoned using the military for political ends, as
seen in Aquino's recent decision to override the military's seniority system
and promote a relatively junior marine colonel who had won the admiration
of some of her civilian advisers, even at the expense of her image of
commitment to military professionalism.
Aquino faces other obstacles to successful counterinsurgency operations,
and she can tackle them only when relations between the military and the
civilian government improve. The most important task, in our view, is for
the government to devise-and fund-a coordinated counterinsurgency
strategy that includes a heavy dose of civic action and rural development
programs, a strategy similar to that used to defeat the Huks in the early
1950s. Financing the broad range of needed improvements is in principle
not beyond the capabilities of the Philippine Government, but the weak
economy and competing demands for resources from civilian agencies will
make increased funding problematic.
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Contents
Key Judgments
New Opportunities, Potential Pitfalls
The Role of the New Leadership
Some Priority Tasks
Appendixes
A. Major Armed Forces Problems
D. Dealing With the NPA Political Base
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Figure 1
Combat Force Ratio of AFP: NPA
and RUC Boundaries, Mid-1985
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP):
New People's Army (NPA)
18:1 and above
6:1 to 18:1
Regional Unified Command
(RUC) boundarya
0 150 Kilometers
0 150 Miles
a RUC boundaries follow regional
administrative boundaries.
708015 (A02387) 7-86
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Philippine Counterinsurgency:
Prospects for Improvement
Under the Aquino Government
New Opportunities, Potential Pitfalls
The change in government in February 1986 brought
hope to many in the Philippine military that the rapid
growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and
its military wing, the New People's Army (NPA),
could be reversed.' President Aquino has identified
defusing the insurgency as one of her major priorities
and has commenced a thorough shakeup of the armed
forces through the Chief of Staff, Gen. Fidel Ramos,
and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile to accom-
plish this. The new leadership, however, must work
with much of the same institutional apparatus and
most of the same personnel, particularly at the unit
level, that conducted counterinsurgency operations
under former President Marcos, and it is not yet clear
that Aquino will have any more success.
We do not expect dramatic progress in the counterin-
surgency effort any time soon, especially in ameliorat-
ing its systemic problems: rooting out corruption;
alleviating financial constraints; and executing a com-
prehensive, civil-military approach to the insurgency.
(See appendix A for a detailed treatment of each.) The
fact that Aquino and her closest advisers have much
to learn about military affairs complicates the out-
look. Despite plans to create a Committee on National
Reconciliation and the military's preparation of a new
counterinsurgency plan, for example, the govern-
ment's approach so far has been to place the military
on the defensive while trying to encourage the insur-
gents to surrender. In addition, Aquino's decision to
create a National Security Council-long urged by
military leaders-is steeped in political consider-
ations. The US Embassy reports that the Council is
viewed by most Filipinos as an attempt to placate
Defense Minister Enrile, and thus it is unlikely to
make significant progress in formulating a long-range
amnesty program, an economic response to the causes
of the insurgency, and coordinating counterinsur-
gency at the national level.
In our judgment, the government's lack of a compre-
hensive counterinsurgency strategy reflects Aquino's
reluctance to use military force against the insurgents
while she remains preoccupied with organizing and
running her government. Struggles for power and
influence within her Cabinet and among government
ministries continue to slow policy formulation and
implementation, while Aquino's doubts about Enrile's
integrity have made her reluctant to seek his advice or
grant him too much authority to formulate counterin-
surgency policy. Moreover, Aquino's dissolution of the
National Assembly and her replacement of elected
provincial officials with government-designated offi-
cers in charge have galvanized the political opposition,
further diverting attention in the Cabinet from coun-
terinsurgency issues.
year.
Fiscal constraints are likely to preclude a significant
expansion or force upgrade of the armed forces for the
near term, and they also are likely to reduce sharply
the immediate effectiveness of government amnesty
and civic action programs. For example, in 1984 the
government in real terms spent only about two-thirds
of what it spent on the military in 1980 and approxi-
mately half what it spent near the end of the Muslim
rebellion in Mindanao in 1977. Philippine defense
expenditures continue to be hard hit by budgetary
restraints mandated by the International Monetary
Fund and, although exact figures are unavailable, real
dollar expenditures are likely to decline again this
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The New Armed Forces of the Philippines (NAFP)
consists of approximately 150,000 personnel divided
among a Presidential Security Group and four co-
equal services-the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Constabulary.
Presidential Security Group
? Formerly afive-battalion, 2,000-man Presidential
Security Command that protected Marcos and
senior VIPs.
? Reduced in March 1986 to a company-size unit
responsible only for protection of President.
Army
? 70,000 men organized into five infantry divisions,
one Scout Ranger regiment, one light armor regi-
ment, two engineer brigades, and a signal group.
? Combat operations executed by 44 infantry battal-
ions assigned to 12 Regional Unified Commands
(RUCs).
? Most battalions only half-strength at 500 men;
many units short weapons, ammunition, radios,
trucks, fuel, food, uniforms, and boots.
Navy
? 28,000 men, including 3,000-man Coast Guard and
9,300-man Marine Corps.
? Active fleet consists of 135 ex-US Navy, World
War II-era escorts, patrol boats, and landing craft.
Even with additional assistance from the United
States, the armed forces are likely to require several
years before the supply, logistic, and maintenance
systems are capable of supporting expanded counter-
insurgency operations. Infrastructure development,
agricultural reforms, and job creation programs in the
civil sector are also likely to require an extended
period before they significantly improve living condi-
tions for many Filipinos. Finally, a continued soft
market for the Philippines' two major exports-coco-
nuts and sugar-seriously threatens the prospects for
the kind of economic recovery needed to solve many of
the problems that have led to the insurgency.
Navy (continued)
? Capable of conducting only limited defensive
operations.
? Eight battalion Marine Corps regarded as most
professional NAFP element.
Air Force
? 16,400 men and approximately 175 active aircraft.
? Major aircraft include 24 C-130s, 13 F-5s, 18 F-8s,
and 84 helicopters.
? Close air support, transport, and air defense roles
routinely hampered by fuel shortages, inadequate
training and maintenance, and personal use of
aircraft by senior officers.
Constabulary
? Oldest AFP element; total manpower about 38,500.
? Organized nationwide into 225 companies of about
90 men each.
? Frequent insurgent target because its units are
small and widely dispersed and have a history of
corruption and abuse.
? Responsible for training and administering the
Integrated Civil Home Defense Force (ICHDF), a
70,000-man, paramilitary, village-level protection
force. ICHDF units are infamous for poor disci-
pline, corruption, and abuse.
? Merged with 50,000-man Integrated National
Police (INP) in 1975.
Prospects that the Aquino government will regain the
initiative over the Communist insurgents are better
over the longer term, in our judgment. The military
gained significant prestige as a result of its role in
removing Marcos, and Ramos and Enrile have contin-
ued to garner popular support by appointing military
professionals to replace senior officers discredited by
their close association with Marcos. Moreover, the
new government's willingness to move against former
Marcos political allies and military personnel accused
of corruption and human rights abuses has helped it
retain public approval outside Manila, according to
Embassy reporting.
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The key question, in our judgment, is whether the
government or the insurgents will be the first to
address their respective root problems. (Appendix B
provides a detailed assessment of Manila's counterin-
surgency successes and failures.) The Communist
Party continues to attempt to reconcile differences
over strategy in the wake of Marcos's fall from power.
If history is any guide, the party is likely to overcome
internal differences and return to capitalizing on
government mistakes and shortcomings. This suggests
that Aquino will have only a brief period to develop
and implement an integrated civil-military counterin-
surgency strategy while simultaneously attempting to
correct serious deficiencies in military transportation,
maintenance, logistics, and communication.
Although bureaucratic inertia and fiscal constraints
are likely to continue to restrict improvements in
many areas for the near term, the entry of a new
generation into the senior ranks of the armed forces
during the next several years could lay the ground-
work for major changes later this decade. Aquino has
already improved military leadership at the senior
level by replacing most of the senior officers Marcos
had extended on duty past retirement with combat-
experienced professionals selected by Ramos and
Enrile. Officers like Vice Chief of Staff Mison and
Army commander Canieso, for example, are represen-
tative of the many combat-experienced professionals
occupying the middle and senior grades in the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines (NAFP)-a title
chosen to highlight a break with the past under
Marcos. Several are graduates of US service acade-
mies, and nearly all acquired combat experience
during the Muslim insurgency on Mindanao during
the 1970s.
(Appendix C
compares the Aquino and Marcos military leader-
ships.)
In a move aimed at eliminating corruption and im-
proving administrative efficiency, Aquino has ap-
proved Enrile's reorganization of the Defense Minis-
try and his selection of highly respected, retired Gen.
Rafael Ileto as Deputy Defense Minister. She'also
abolished the National Intelligence and Security
Authority (NISA)-the onetime power base of former
Chief of Staff Ver-and reduced the Presidential
Security Command from several thousand to several
hundred, which has allowed redeployment of the
troops to the field.
Ramos and Enrile, meanwhile, have begun to tackle
problems caused by abuses of authority and shortages
of manpower and equipment. In March 1986 they
issued directives to disarm and disband private armies
and paramilitary groups such as the notorious "Lost
Command"; to forbid Home Defense Forces, Con-
stabulary, and Police personnel from being used as
private guards; to limit military powers of search and
seizure in criminal matters; and to relieve from duty
military personnel accused of human rights violations.
In what apparently is both a budgetary and a disci-
plinary move, Ramos has directed local commanders
to screen thoroughly all members of the Civil Home
Defense Force, and to retain only those qualified to
assist in security operations. Orders also have been
issued requiring promotions and assignments to be
based on merit and performance, and plans were
prepared for providing instruction on democratic val-
ues to all personnel. Enforcing these directives has
been difficult in some areas of Luzon and Mindanao,
however, because of deep-seated loyalties to Marcos,
according to the US Embassy.
To improve combat capabilities of field units, Ramo25X1
has begun to reassign excess clerical and administra-
tive personnel from Manila to the field. Additional
manpower and equipment are being provided by the
removal of military personnel from guard duty at
government businesses and casinos. According to
press reports, some of the excess equipment from
Manila, including armored personnel carriers, had
already reached the field by mid-March. The defense
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Ramos and Enrile:
Architects of a New Fffort
The change in government that brought Aquino to
power also transferred control of the armed forces
from Marcos and Ver to Ramos and Enrile. Both
have brought to their new positions shared concerns
about the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort
and the coordination of that effort within the govern-
ment. For example, Ramos-as Acting Chief of
Staff-worked to increase the number of Army bat-
talions available for the counterinsurgency, while
also moving to tackle longstanding problems such as
corruption, human rights abuses, and civil-military
relations. For his part, Enrile initiated an effort to
use Marcos-approved civil-military organizations
and security plans in an effort to improve local
counterinsurgency coordination.
Ramos recently has achieved partial success in his
effort to improve counterinsurgency assets by activat-
ing six new battalions, setting up a third engineer
brigade, and completing plans for activating five more
maneuver battalions out of a planned eight new
infantry battalions, three engineer battalions, and
four Scout Ranger companies. Last October, Ramos
also formed new units called Special Field Reaction
Forces, which consisted of Constabulary and Nation-
al Police personnel who had received special counter-
insurgency training similar to the Army's Scout
Rangers.
During his tenure as Acting Chief of Staff, Ramos
also moved to reestablish an emphasis on profession-
alism by tackling equipment shortages, pay and
benefits issues, corruption, favoritism, and human
rights abuses. Although he never was able to imple-
ment major reforms, such as the removal of senior
officers extended on duty past retirement or the
replacement of personnel accused of corrupt or abu-
sive behavior, Ramos firmly established the reform
issue on the military's agenda. Among other things,
he:
? Obtained over 2,000 new M-16 rifles for distribu-
tion to the Constabulary and Integrated National
Police, and began distribution to field units of some
of the 250 used cargo trucks acquired from the
United States.
? Established a system of cash incentives to reward
successful combat performance against the
insurgents.
? Announced a 32 percent pay raise for soldiers and a
17 percent raise for officers, as well as an increase
in combat pay from $7 to $14 per month.
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? Created a system of disciplinary barracks and
retraining and reeducation programs designed to
instill professionalism and punish abusive person-
nel and demoralized troops.
? Established a seven-man committee at AFP Head-
quarters to investigate complaints of military
abuses. He also added new members to existing
Police and Constabulary boards dealing with pro-
motions and military conduct.
? Granted increased authority to local commanders
to screen and train Civil Home Defense Force
recruits and to investigate and punish criminal and
abusive behavior.
The military also has scored several public relations
successes in the last year, despite public cynicism and
resource constraints. Among the more notable
achievements were:
? Establishment of a Defense Ministry propaganda
unit to coordinate all government media releases
about the insurgency and government counterinsur-
gency programs.
? The showing of the movie The Killing Fields by
AFP Civil Relations Service field personnel as part
of the effort to increase public awareness of the
dangers of a Communist victory.
? The release of a "White Paper on the Insurgency"
to educate the public on the background of the
insurgency.
? The creation of a "Filipino ideology" campaign for
government employees and military personnel in an
effort to counter negative self-images fostered by
NPA propaganda.
? The provision of medical and dental assistance by
AFP personnel to nearly a quarter million persons
in remote areas.
? Disaster relief in Central and Northern Luzon
following destructive typhoons.
? Announcement of a $55 million National Civic
Action Plan designed to enhance economic develop-
ment in insurgent areas by using military engineer
assets to build roads, bridges, and schools. The
plan was to be jointly administered by the military,
Defense Ministry, National Economic Development
Authority, and the Ministry of Public Works and
Housing.
? The establishment of an amnesty program that
rehabilitated and resettled approximately 500 in-
surgents and their supporters.
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Embassy reports. One key to improving the NAFP's
performance against the insurgents lies in shifting the
Figure 2. Architects of the revolution: former
Armed Forces Vice Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos
and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile an-
nounce their break with President Marcos, Feb-
ruary 1986
attache reports, however, that units in the field find
they lack the infrastructure necessary to absorb the
men and equipment being sent from Manila
to replace Marcos's Operation Katatagan. The new
plan-named Mamamayan-shifts the focus of
counterinsurgency operations from large-scale mili-
tary sweep operations to using the Army, Air Force,
and Marines to support expanded operations by the
Constabulary, Police, and Home Defense Forces.' The
Navy and the Air Force, moreover, are to be reduced
in size and reassigned as support elements for the
ground forces. The Regional Unified Command struc-
ture will be retained for the time being to facilitate
the other aspects of the plan.
Although we judge that professionalization and ade-
quate financing of the armed forces are the critical
elements in improving counterinsurgency effective-
ness, several other tasks are virtual "musts" in the
near term, according to numerous
armed forces from their focus on both internal and
external defense to a more narrowly focused counter-
insurgency strategy.
none of the forces c
forces will be prohibitively expensive.
defense, and efforts to modernize or replace these
roles-approximately two fighter squadrons and eight
ex-US Navy destroyer escorts-provides a credible
Ramos and Enrile and the service chiefs al-
ready have decided to reduce expenditures for exter-
nal defense programs; the Navy, for example, has
been directed to defer the modernization of old ships
and the purchase of new vessels, while the Air Force
has been asked to investigate the sale of its mainte-
nance-intensive fleet of 20-year-old, US-built F-8
interceptors.
large-unit (brigade
s the shift in combat tactics from
and battalion) sweep operations
launched from statically defended fixed installations
to small-unit (company and platoon) tactics. All too
often, the sweep operations have sought to use heavy
firepower and airstrikes to compensate for the short-
age of troops on the ground, rather than to coordinate
air-ground operation. By shifting to small-unit com-
bat tactics and emphasizing the use of air and naval
forces to enhance mobility rather than firepower, the
NAFP-assuming it adequately trains, equips, and
supports the small units-should be able to wage a
less costly and more effective fight against the insur-
gents. Moreover, the shift to small units offers the
prospect of reestablishing a more permanent military
presence in the countryside, which just as in the war
against the Huks 35 years ago-will provide the
security for the government to restore political control
outside Manila. (Appendix D examines the difficulties
associated with such a task.)
Despite Enrile's and Ramos's start at rooting out
corruption, the NAFP's ineffective, outdated, and
easily corrupted supply systems remain intact and
chronically short of equipment and materiel. The
logistic problem, according to th
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Figure 3. Armored advantage: Army V-150
"Commando" armored car in use during opera-
tions in the Cagayan Valley, Northern Luzon,
1985. The NAFP recently has tried to allocate
one V-150 to each Army battalion to increase
unit responsiveness and survivability during NPA
goes beyond simply the shortage of funds to provide
the basic supplies-food, fuel, spare parts, arms,
uniforms, boots, or bullets-to troops in the field.
Major improvements to the logistic and maintenance
systems-particularly'in the field-will be required if
equipment such as radios, armored cars, and helicop-
ters are to be kept operational and the NAFP is to
take advantage of the reforms it may make in tactics,
training, and intelligence.
Correcting transportation and communications short-
falls is essential to providing the armed forces with the
mobility and command and control it requires to
engage insurgent forces more actively. Without im-
provements in these areas, the military will remain
tied to a static, defensive strategy, and it will be less
capable of ferreting out and attacking platoon and
company-size NPA units before they ambush military
forces or strike government installations. Moreover,
improved mobility and communications will remain
critical even if the military retains its current tactics,
because these would offset the insurgents' advantage
of surprise by improving the government's ability to
reinforce immediately units under attack.
In addition to tactical radios and cargo trucks, the
NAFP will require more light armored personnel
carriers, scout cars, and helicopters if it is to contest
Figure 4. AFP tactical mobility: Philippine
Navy LST delivers Army M-35 truck of the 46th
Infantry Battalion, Panay, 1985. On average,
each Army battalion (approximately 500 to 600
men) has two of these trucks to provide tactical
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actively NPA control of areas on Mindanao and
Northern Luzon, 25X1
More of these vehicles and aircraft also will be 25X1
necessary to offset combat losses as well as to provide
field units with adequate direct fire support, close air
support, resupply, and medical evacuation.'
One of the military's most urgent requirements is to
restructure its training system. The current system
provides neither adequate instruction nor motivation
for soldiers because it requires poorly equipped, de-
moralized units to provide on-the-lob training to new
recruits, according to Once
a recruit is assigned to a unit, individual opportunities
for advanced training are limited because of manpow-
er constraints and combat requirements.
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In our judgment, solving this problem requires ade-
quately equipped, fully staffed, central training facili-
ties for basic and advanced individual and unit train-
ing. Although this would be costly and time
and press reports, insurgents on 25X1
Mindanao already have destroyed government armored vehicles
with homemade landmines, and several helicopters are reported to
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consuming and would compete with combat require-
ments for manpower, over the long term it appears to
offer the best prospects for improving morale and
combat effectiveness. Such facilities would provide
the military with adequate time and resources to
teach ground forces personnel-Army, Constabulary,
and Police-the basic combat skills and advanced
counterinsurgency tactics, including intelligence and
psychological operations, and to develop both the
individual pride and unit cohesion that the current
system has failed to deliver. At a later date, the
government could expand this training to the Navy,
Coast Guard, and Air Force if resource constraints
permit. We believe Marines and Army Scout Rangers
would benefit less from these training centers because
their existing training programs already provide suffi-
cient combat instruction and individual motivation.
As for intelligence, the effort remains in disarray
because of Aquino's mistrust of the intelligence com-
munity.
Intelligence Coordination Authority-a new national
level, control and coordination body-is capable of
focusing intelligence collection and operations against
the insurgency.
In our judgment, the government can use Aquino's
popularity, along with a cease-fire and amnesty pro-
gram, to complement existing intelligence efforts to
develop a detailed, tactical order of battle on the
insurgency. At the same time, the government must
reestablish an intelligence capability in the country-
side with the human and financial resources necessary
to acquire, and the communications capabilities nec-
essary to exploit rapidly, information in support of
Philippine Intelligence: An Asset?
progovernment newspapers have reported that the
NPA's fear of government penetrations on Mindanao
last year led the insurgents to institute restrictive
screening procedures for accepting government desert-
ers and even to execute guerrillas suspected of being
government informers. Communist leaders now may
be even more concerned about government intelli-
gence operations, particularly if popular support for
Aquino and continued insurgent violence against
civilians lead many lower level guerrillas and guerril-
la supporters to inform on their superiors.
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Figure 5. Civic action in action: Philippine Army
officer distributes medicine to villagers, Luzon,
military and security force operations. In our judg-
ment, the government will be unable to restore an
effective civil presence to the countryside without
such an intelligence effort.
Government civil relations efforts go hand in hand
with intelligence activities. Civic action programs-
medical assistance teams, road repair, or school con-
struction-establish a climate favorable to intelli-
gence activities, while civil relations personnel at-
tached to military units can serve as buffers between
the military and local populations, thereby reducing
Figure 6. Counterpropaganda: editorial cartoon reminding the
people of Cebu that the NPA also has committed its share of
the prospects for military human rights abuses. Final-
ly, counterpropaganda and psychological operations
personnel-working with local elected officials-must
be available to counter Communist propaganda and
present the government's response to Communist-
instigated rumors and charges of military abuse.
Military aid from the United States, Australia, and
Indonesia already has helped the NAFP maintain at
least a minimum combat capability, and the future
level of multilateral assistance will be a key factor in
determining the success of Manila's counterinsur-
gency capabilities. US military assistance, by far the
largest amount, is equal to more than 15 percent of
the Philippine military budget for 1986, compared
with an assistance contribution averaging 10 percent
of the budget over the previous five years. From
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Since 1980 the United States has provided Manila
$265 million in foreign military sales (FMS) credits,
$75 million in military assistance program (MAP)
grants, and $340 million in US-bases-related eco-
nomic support fund (ESF) assistance under terms of
the 1983 bases review. In 1985 the United States
provided the armed forces more counterinsurgency-
specific assistance in the form of over 250 used cargo
trucks to help improve their limited transportation
capability, and individual-issue items such as boots
and uniforms were provided to overcome materiel
shortages and to restore morale and combat effective-
ness. The United States also provided mobile training
teams, technical specialists, and contractor support to
help the AFP correct training, maintenance, and
supply deficiencies. A Philippine request to use some
$21 million in ESF appropriations to purchase heavy
construction equipment for three new military engi-
neer battalions remains under consideration
Australian military assistance to the Philippines in-
creased from $780,000 in the period 1978-79 to
approximately $1.3 million in 1984-85, an inflation-
adjusted increase of about 26 percent. Most of these
funds were used to provide technical training and
professional education in Australia for Philippine
personnel, although Canberra dispatched technicians
and support personnel to the Philippines to instruct
the AFP in the operation of Australian-supplied
communications and electronics equipment. Accord-
ing to the press, Australia intends to resume the
nonlethal military assistance that it suspended dur-
ing Marcos's last days. This assistance reportedly
could include medical supplies, portable radios, spare
parts, and possibly trucks and transport aircraft.
Indonesia-the most recent donor-in mid-January
1986 provided the Philippine Air Force two light
transport aircraft complete with crews and mainte-
nance personnel on a 90-day loan. According to the
US Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia provided the
aircraft to reinforce contacts between the two coun-
tries' armed forces and to encourage similar assis-
tance from other members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations. Further Indonesian aid
remains problematic because of budget austerity
brought on by Jakarta's declining oil export revenues.
We judge, nevertheless, that Jakarta has established
an important precedent for the rest of non-Commu-
nist Southeast Asia by attempting to institute a
military-to-military approach to supporting Philip-
pine counterinsurgency programs.
Manila's perspective, the political risk associated with
accepting further assistance is heightened by growing
nationalism and leftist-inspired propaganda. Senior
Philippine military officers have made it clear to US
Embassy officials that they want US assistance, but
they have also stated that they are in the best position
to decide what equipment is needed and how it should
be used.
Despite these constraints, the Aquino government's
desire for increased military assistance provides the
United States an opportunity to restore its formerly
close relationship with the Philippine military. We
believe this relationship suffered over the last decade
as the Philippines under Marcos and Ver became
more of a political instrument of the former President
confirms that an entire generation
of junior and midlevel officers-including reformist
officers involved in the ouster of Marcos-have a
more nationalistic, less positive impression of the
United States. Such an impression has important
long-range implications because many of these offi-
cers will influence Philippine policy during the re-
sumption of the base negotiations in 1987 and 1988.
Offsetting these benefits, however, are the dangers of
too close a relationship with the NAFP. An increased
US advisory presence in the Philippines-particularly
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were it to involve training and assisting combat units
in the countryside-almost certainly would result in
attacks on these personnel by Communist insurgents.
he Communist leader-
ship already has approved such attacks if US person-
nel are involved in assisting Philippine military opera-
tions against the NPA.
The Communists are not the only group concerned
about closer US relations with the NAFP. According
to the press, Aquino and many of her closest advisers
remain uncomfortable with the military because of its
record of abuse under Marcos. Close ties between the
US military and the NAFP thus could reinforce the
belief among many Aquino supporters that the mili-
tary-and the United States-has too great an influ-
ence over government counterinsurgency strategy.
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Appendix A
Major Armed Forces Problems
Manila has not failed in its bid to turn back the NPA
for lack of planning. As early as 1982, for example,
continuing Communist insurgent activity prompted
the armed forces leadership to develop a nationwide
government plan-Operation Katatagan-designed to
integrate civil and military counterinsurgency compo-
nents. Previous military operations had proved that
the insurgency could be suppressed-at least tempo-
rarily-with troop deployments. But they highlighted
the need for a coordinated effort by senior military
and government officials to restore public confidence
in the government to undercut the insurgency's mass
appeal. The plan called for a joint effort by military
and civilian ministries at the national level and pro-
vided a framework for:
? Reinvigorating government infrastructure to pro-
vide health care, timely administration of justice,
and new legislation to address issues such as land
reform-all of which are grievances exploited by the
NPA.
? Changing traditional combat tactics from the use of
small rifle squads to larger infantry battalions and
broadening soldiers' responsibilities to include civic
action duties.
? Improving overall military performance by provid-
ing specialized training in psychological warfare,
intelligence, and counterintelligence.
? Tightening military discipline by more vigorous
training for troops and harsher disciplinary action
against military personnel suspected of committing
human rights abuses or involvement in illegal activi-
failure holds many of the keys to correcting armed
forces deficiencies. Despite initial efforts, the govern-
ment's guidelines for military reform-including bet-
ter training for soldiers and stricter disciplinary action
for human rights abuses-were not vi rpus1v g -
sued by most military commanders,
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reports that the civic action programs that were to
complement Katatagan-including plans to aid farm-
ers suffering from a severe drought in 1982/83-
never got off the drawing board or fizzled before
completion.
Meanwhile, the expansion of military operations un-
der the auspices of Katatagan served to further
alienate much of the rural population. Most combat
units, for example, received a rapid influx of poorly
trained troops who soon committed human rights
abuses against civilians under the guise of ferreting
out subversives. These incidents rapidly alienated
rural youth, thus swelling the ranks of the insurgents.
highlight Manila's lack of commitment to the
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large troop deployments and government claims of
impressive victories, reports indicate that both opera-
tions failed to improve the security situation or change
the military balance in either region. Government
claims of several hundred insurgents killed or cap-
tured were widely exaggerated, according to the
nd the Communist party political
_
and military infrastructure were hardly shaken. F
Because Katatagan-still in place when the new
government assumed power in February 1986-of-
fered a broad spectrum of counterinsurgency assump-
tions and prescriptions, we believe understanding its
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Examples of Two Operational Failures
Luzon. According to a reliable source, operation
Hammerhead -undertaken in 1984-was designed
to break the Communist Party's political and mili-
tary structure in Northern Luzon and to reassert
government authority over a major highway that was
under insurgent control. It combined the military
resources of two regional commands, including sever-
al infantry battalions and a Philippine Air Force unit.
The defense attache reports that the plan consisted of
several large sweep operations, daily foot patrols by
smaller units, and an airstrike against an insurgent
base targeted by military intelligence. The govern-
ment reported progress throughout the three-month
operation and claimed in the end to have secured the
road and "cleansed the area" of insurgents
In view of subsequent reporting by the Embassy and
the defense attache, the military actually achieved
few tangible results. Government troops encountered
few insurgents because the insurgents' better intelli-
gence allowed them to avoid the military's airstrikes
and search and destroy efforts. According to a reli-
able source, field commanders complained about
inadequate signaling devices, insufficient foul-weath-
er gear, and shortages of combat rations, medicine,
and tactical communications equipment. The source
reports, for example, that communications difficul-
ties forced military units to schedule and coordinate
operations by synchronizing their watches, while the
insurgents routinely used commercially procured or
stolen government tactical radios to communicate.
offensive began with the deployment of three infantry
battalions and a marine brigade. Later additions
increased the operation to division siz
As in the Luzon offensive, the government claimed to
have killed hundreds of NPA members andfrequent-
ly released press reports detailing impressive vic-
tories. US officials traveling in the area said, howev-
er, that the government failed to destroy any NPA
formations, capture significant weapons, or perma-
nently regain the territory identified as under Com-
munist influence. Although the NPA avoided major
confrontations with the government, it continued to
carry out frequent "arms grabbing" raids and assas-
sinations of local officials-suggesting that govern-
ment forces also failed to prevent routine operations
by the insurgents
The government's goals and committments to this
operation were questionable, in our view.F_
e teve t at t o operation was estgne o
protect the business interests of several of Marcos's
personal associates rather than respond to a deterio-
rating situation. The NPA reportedly had attacked a
logging concern owned by Defense Minister Enrile
and a coconut plantation owned by close presidential
associate and agricultural magnate Eduardo Co-
juangco. According to Philippine military personnel,
a company of Marines continued to protect Cojuang-
co's plantation long after the operation ceased.
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Mindanao. A major 1984 operation took place after
the NPA conducted several battalion-sized (100 to
300 men) raids. The military's planned 60-day
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After reviewing the failures of numerous military
operations, we judge that reducing the gap between
counterinsurgency theory and practice requires major
changes in strategy and tactics, communications,
maintenance, logistics, supply, training, intelligence,
and-most important-a dramatic reduction in cor-
ruption. In general, we believe the shortcomings of the
armed forces can be divided into two categories, one a
group of mutually reinforcing systemic problems that
cannot be easily rectified, and another a group of
tactical problems that are more amenable to correc-
tion by the new leadership.
Corruption. The most daunting challenge facing the
government is improving professionalism by reducing
corruption, which has abetted the breakdown of mo-
rale and discipline and thus severely reduced combat
effectiveness. The martial law period expanded the
military's opportunity for graft and abuse, as the
armed forces absorbed the responsibilities, power, and
benefits of the civil government and the oligarchic
families; little has changed since.'activi-
ties of senior officers include accepting kickbacks and
payoffs for multimillion-dollar arms purchases and
construction contracts; ensuring centralized control
and sole-source bidding on purchase contracts; charg-
ing fees to expedite routine civil and military matters;
selling military supplies (fuel, ammunition, guns) for
personal gain; confiscating unit supplies and salaries
for their personal use; and selling assignments-
avoidance of duty in Mindanao, for example.
roops whose
salaries and allowances have been embezzled or con-
fiscated in turn extort food and money from civilians,
further alienating Filipinos from the government. In
many instances this has bred open hostility to the
government and active support for the NPA.
Corruption also has undermined counterinsurgency
operations by redirecting resources needed for legiti-
mate military functions. For example, a series of
articles in the press has traced poor conditions at the
AFP Medical Center in Manila to corruption and
kickbacks in purchasing of supplies and equipment,
favoritism in physician assignments and hiring, and
the sale of stolen hospital supplies on the black
market.
Field reporting also confirms that in many cases
corruption has directl undermined combat opera-
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mid-1985 confirmed-the use of Air Force helicopters
by senior officers to make personal visits to their
fishery investments, to give rides to local politicians,
or to take VIPs on picnics. Pilots told the press they
resented being used as "taxi drivers" when their
services were needed more to support ground opera-
tions. The pilots reported several instances in which
they were unable to airlift reinforcements to besieged
Army units because their helicopters were being used
by senior officers for personal business. They also
complained these activities consumed scarce fuel and
other resources from the already tight NAFP budget,
further reducing resources for the counterinsurgency.
Inadequate Financing. Reducing corruption will re-
quire that the armed forces meet its second critical
challenge, correcting the problem of inadequate fi-
nancing-a product of a weak economy and a poor
revenue collection effort by the national government.
Philippine defense budgets have been
the lowest in non-Communist East Asia for the last
decade. More important, Philippine defense expendi-
tures have remained at or near the bottom regionally
in terms of dollars spent per individual member of the
armed forces.' For example, in 1984-a busy year for
counterinsurgency operations-the government in
real terms spent only about two-thirds of what it spent
on the military in 1980 and approximately half what
it spent near the end of the Muslim rebellion in
Mindanao in 1977.6
' Junior enlisted personnel receive about $40 per month, a sergeant
about $75 per month, and a full colonel about $170 per month.
6 Filipinos often derisively referred to the AFP as "sunshine sol-
diers" because the military seldom conducted operations at night or
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Figure 7
The Philippines: Real Defense
Spending, 1975-86
50 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86a
a Estimated.
Low pay, inadequate subsistence and housing, short-
ages of supplies and equipment, and poorly equipped
and understaffed medical facilities have devastated
morale and eroded the will of many soldiers to fight.
Earlier this year, for example, Ramos ordered several
police and Constabulary units on Bataan disarmed
after they refused to fight the NPA without adequate
resources and support.
Officers who have watched their pay shrink with
inflation and whose promotion opportunities have
been stymied by repeated extensions of senior officers
past retirement have often turned to graft to maintain
their standard of living. Even when military personnel
have avoided significant corruption, concerns about
their careers and making ends meet have distracted
them from their professional responsibilities, and fos-
tered, for example, a desire for assignments to Ma-
nila, where supplementary job prospects are better
and where promising officers can be assigned better
paying positions in civilian ministries.
The most telling effect of inadequate financial re-
sources emerges in armed forces hardware. Combat
operations have been severely hampered by shortages
of operational armor, trucks, aircraft, and communi-
cations equipment. During the Marcos years, these
items were seldom acquired in sufficient numbers,
and those acquired usually remained in Manila to
protect the government rather than being distributed
to field units.
Much of the equipment outside Manila, moreover,
remains only partly usable because of parts shortages,
supply difficulties, and poor maintenance.F
that, because of parts shortages and inadequate main-
tenance only about half the military's helicopters and
field radios were operational. Paramilitary units such
as the Constabulary and Police appear to have fared
little better; during a visit to the Zamboanga City
Police headquarters early this year,
an
only one operational telephone line
no functional field communications equipment. In
some regions military personnel simply appropriate
civilian vehicles and equipment rather than try to
repair their own or obtain new ones from Manila.
A shortage of funds for ammunition and fuel has
reduced the ability of air and naval forces to support
ground force operations. Fuel and ammunition short-
ages also have curtailed operational training to the
extent that combat support-when provided-often is
of such poor quality that it is useless against the NPA.
ast year, for
example, estimated it would require at least eight
weeks of continuous training with no constraints on
ammunition or fuel before one of the Philippine Air
Force's best helicopter units could meet minimum US
readiness standards.
To complicate matters, law enforcement and intelli-
gence operations came to a virtual standstill during
the last quarter of 1985 after these organizations
exceeded their 1985 budgets,
Some operations appear to have resumed only
after Marcos released funds for use during the 1986
snap presidential election.
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Figure 8. Not dressed to kill: Philippine soldiers on patrol,
Northern Luzon, 1985. Note lack of boots, helmets, uniforms, and
web gear. Chief of Staff Ramos recently decreed that all NAFP
personnel in the field should wear helmets to distinguish them
Tactical Shortcomings
Government strategy traditionally has been concerned
with using regular ground force units (Army and
Marines) to complement Constabulary efforts to con-
trol the insurgency at the local level. This approach-
what then Constabulary Chief Ramos later described
as being based on the "Five Pillars Approach"-was
discarded by then Chief of Staff Ver with support
from Army Chief Ramas in 1983.' Counterinsurgency
operations under their plan favored large-scale mili-
tary sweep operations intended to keep the insurgents
off balance and prevent them from massing their
forces.
using local police, prosecutors, courts, correction officials, and
residents to combat insurgent political and military activities in the
provinces. This strategy, of course, favored the Constabulary and
Integrated National Police over the other armed services in the
effort to reestablish government presence in the countryside.
Ramas probably supported Ver's strategy because he expected it to
result in organizational realignments that would transfer manpower
The "clear-hold-consolidate-develop" approach de-
mands large, well-equipped, highly mobile forces that
move from area to area defeating insurgent forces,
while leaving smaller "territorial forces"-the
Constabulary, Police, and Civil Home Defense
units-to maintain after-action security. To support
this strategy, Manila deactivated the Constabulary's
13 combat battalions and one long-range patrol bat-
talion, dispersing their men and equipment to small,
isolated Constabulary companies throughout the
countryside. At the same time, the government direct-
ed the formation of the 12 Regional Unified Com-
mands (RUCs) and a National Capital Region Com-
mand in order to increase its control over military
operations and personnel nationwide.
In our judgment, the 1983 strategy and reorganiza-
tion of the armed forces-which remain part of armed
forces doctrine-did little to improve the military's
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Figure 9. What the well-
dressed soldier wears. Elite
military units such as the Ma-
rines and Army Scout Rangers
generally have not experienced
the severe manpower and equip-
ment shortages of regular
Army field units. Compare the
appearance of these troops with
performance against the insurgents. For its part, the
NPA has simply avoided the large, highly visible
government search and destroy operations, often re-
turning to the same area once the military has left.
Moreover, by focusing on conventional military opera-
tions, the strategy has failed to develop and support
the local security, civic action, and psychological
operations forces that could remain in an area to
prevent NPA reinfiltration after the military has
moved on. Because the military did not simultaneous-
ly undertake improvements to the notoriously outdat-
ed and inadequate supply, logistic, transportation,
maintenance, and communication systems, the armed
forces never acquired the firepower, mobility, and
command and control assets necessary to execute
their new strategy effectively.
The Regional Unified Command structure also ap-
pears to have accomplished little more than instituting
a series of confusing, overlapping layers of authority.
are assigned operational control of all forces in their
region, while administrative control was retained by
each unit's parent organization. The chain of com-
mand is thus poorly defined, leaving operational
commanders without the full authority to obtain
manpower and resources to support regional opera-
tions. With decisionmaking and access to resources
thus centralized at regional headquarters and in
Manila, local commanders often have had little incen-
tive-or reason-to demonstrate initiative.
The military's use of large-scale, short-duration,
search and destroy operations also has played into
insurgent hands by denying government forces the
elements of surprise and continuing presence in the
countryside. Because the troops involved in these
operations usually stage from areas that are under
guerrilla surveillance-and because government plans
are usually known in advance because of poor military
security-the local NPA commander is able to deter-
mine ahead of time whether he will stage an ambush
or avoid battle.
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Once a sweep operation is completed, the government
typically declares the area free of NPA and the
military moves on to the next assignment, leaving
small, widely dispersed Army, Police, and Constabu-
lary units to prevent the NPA from returning. The
insurgents typically reinfiltrate immediately, occa-
sionally overrunning the poorly defended government
forces in response to local complaints about military
abuses during the sweep operation. In other cases, the
NPA may simply harass the garrison, or leave it alone
after working out a mutual noninterference agree-
ment with local military officials.
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Appendix B
Secretary of National Defense and gave him a blank
check to reinvigorate the government's counterinsur-
In 1942 the Philippine Communist Party (PKP)
formed the Hukbalahap-or People's Anti-Japanese
Army-to conduct guerrilla warfare against Japanese
occupation troops. The "Huk" insurgency that began
in the aftermath of World War II initially was formed
from the remnants of these guerrilla forces. Although
some of the PKP's leaders were committed to
Marxist-Leninist ideology, many insurgents were
World War II guerrillas who became disenchanted
when President Roxas prevented the party from as-
suming seats it had won in the country's first post-
independence Congress. At its height in 1950, the
Huks' military wing-the People's Liberation
Army-numbered close to 12,500 full-time troops
with a support base of about 100,000 out of a national
population of approximately 19 million. The insurgen-
cy was centered in densely populated Central Luzon,
but, as the movement gained momentum, party lead-
ers attempted to expand into Southern Luzon and the
gency effort.
Once in charge, Magsaysay quickly implemented a
comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency plan:
? He tightened discipline and improved morale in the
military by personally assuming authority over all
officer promotions. He performed surprise inspec-
tions of frontline units and promoted or demoted
soldiers and officers as the situation warranted.
? He improved the military's operational performance
by emphasizing persistent patrolling and ambushes
and long-range patrols by elite forces, and by
expanding intelligence capabilities. He reassigned
8,000 Constabulary troops to the Army, expanding
its combat-ready status to 25,000 men, and then
granted the Army exclusive control over
counterinsurgency.
Visayan Islands.
The Philippine Army, in dissarray after the war, was
being rebuilt when the Huks began launching military
operations in 1946. At that time, the task of counter-
insurgency largely fell to the Philippine Constabu-
lary-a force of about 12,000-which was plagued by
inadequate logistics and supply, low pay, poor morale,
and a legendary reputation for abusing the civil
populace. From 1946 to 1950, government counterin-
surgency initiatives were ineffectual and vacillated
between periods of truce and harsh crackdowns,
which further alienated the local population.
? He improved intelligence collation and dissemina-
tion by assigning the Military Intelligence Service
as the focal point for all collected and disseminated
intelligence. This ensured that interservice rivalries
and bureaucratic snafus did not restrict the timely
flow of information.
? He moved to better military-civil relations by en-
forcing strict guidelines for interaction between
military forces and local populations. This effort
reduced military abuses and increased public sup-
port for the counterinsurgency effort.
By the late 1940s the Huks had established shadow
governments-areas containing an insurgent military
presence and party control over the local government
apparatus-throughout substantial areas in Central
Luzon. They then began expanding operations south-
ward with the hope of overthrowing the government.
In 1950 President Elpidio Quirino-frightened by
rapid political and military gains by the insurgents-
appointed Congressman Ramon Magsaysay as
? He offset Communist claims that government poli-
cies made land unavailable to peasants by creating
the Economic Development Corporation in 1950.
This body eventually resettled an estimated 5,000
insurgents and their families to government land on
Mindanao.
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Figure 10
Insurgent Operating Areas
o p
? Huk (Hukbalahap/People's Anti-Japanese
Army/People's Liberation Army), 1950-53
Communist Party of the Philippines/
New People's Army (CPP/NPA), 1985
Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), 1985
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? He countered Communist exploitation of local
grievances by attaching a Civil Affairs Unit to every
battalion. These groups were responsible for psycho-
logical warfare operations, advising commanders on
civilian issues, and reporting troop discipline and
behavior directly back to the Defense Secretary.
? He restored the legitimacy of the government by
having the military vigorously safeguard the results
of the 1951 congressional elections.
The 1951 elections were the turning point in the
counterinsurgency campaign, and most observers
credit Magsaysay with facilitating the most honest
election in Philippine history. The results, although
devastating for Quirino's Liberalista Party, under-
mined the Communists' claim that the government
was unable to hold a fair election and bolstered public
faith in the democratic process.
The combination of the popular attitude toward the
government and improved military tactics rapidly
eroded support for the insurgency and led to divisive
infighting within the PKP. By 1952 the balance had
tipped in the government's favor. The Huks, con-
cerned about dwindling support for their cause, then
shifted to a disastrous strategy of engaging govern-
ment forces in large-scale conventional warfare.
These tactics played into the hands of the military,
which, as a result of US assistance, was by then better
trained and equipped to conduct conventional opera-
tions. The mopping-up process was further propelled
by Magsaysay's election to the presidency in 1953 and
his later enactment of a liberal land reform program.
The final indication that the Huk insurgency had
been virtually defeated came when one of its key
leaders-Luis Taruc-surrendered in 1954.
Containing the MNLF
Unlike the Huks, who sought to overthrow the govern-
ment, the Moro National Liberal Front, a loose
coalition of ethnically diverse Muslim rebels who
believe that Manila's Christian-dominated govern-
ment will never treat them equitably, attempted to
establish an autonomous Muslim state in the south-
ernmost regions of Mindanao. It was Marcos's decla-
ration of martial law in 1972, however, that prompted
the factionalized Muslims to band together as the
MNLF and take up armed struggle against the
government.
The Muslim insurgency peaked after a cease-fire was
arranged in 1976 to facilitate Libyan-sponsored peace
talks. By that time, the approximately 21,000 full-
time armed guerrillas had forced Manila to commit
over 75 percent of its military combat units-account-
ing for roughly 35,000 to 40,000 troops from Army,
Marine, and Philippine Constabulary commands-to
Southern Mindanao. Marcos effectively ended the
insurgency in 1977 by paying off many of the rebel
leaders while using the peace talks to restrict financial
support to the MNLF. Although the MNLF broke off
negotiations and ended the cease-fire in 1977, mili-
tary encounters between government forces and Mus-
lim rebels have never returned to previous levels.
Nevertheless, the MNLF today retains influence
throughout Southwestern Mindanao and the Sulu
archipelago.
One innovation that the government implemented to
contain the MNLF was to transfer greater security
responsibilities to local civil defense forces. These
forces-which in 1985 numbered about 90,000 na-
tionwide-were first formed on Mindanao after mili-
tary units sustained heavy casualties during tactical
operations. Military planners believed the home de-
fense units would be more effective than regular
troops because they would be familiar with the area
and its residents and thus less likely to abuse the local
population and build popular resentment against the
government.
Along with military operations, Marcos worked to co-
opt politically several of the movement's larger fac-
tions by offering their leaders large sums of money
and land in exchange for their accepting government
amnesty proposals..As this dual strategy gained
ground, the government began reducing the security
responsibility of military units in the area, in part to
deploy troops to the Visayas and Luzon to combat the
fledgling NPA. By 1981 military units in the Muslim
areas of Mindanao had been reduced to approximate-
ly 25,000 troops, and by early 1986 this was down to
fewer than 3,000 men
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Manila's military efforts against the MNLF were
aided by a series of highly successful diplomatic
initiatives orchestrated by Marcos in the Middle East.
By conducting personal diplomacy with several Arab
leaders, including King Khalid of Saudi Arabia in
1982, Marcos capitalized on competition between
moderate and radical Arab states to undercut political
and materiel support for the MNLF. He achieved
much of this in 1976 after concluding the Tripoli
agreement-a pact that promised the Muslims re-
gional autonomy within the framework of the Philip-
pine Constitution. Although Manila subsequently re-
neged on much of the agreement, striking the deal
was sufficient to convince moderate states such as
Saudi Arabia that the Philippine Government had
made concessions to the MNLF. These efforts were
an important factor in reducing foreign weapons
supplies from countries such as Syria and Libya.
Because the initial efforts of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) in the early 1970s to build a
political and military organization mirrored the earli-
er Huk effort by being centered in Central Luzon, the
military was able to concentrate its forces against the
movement and deal it several costly defeats. The party
responded by dispersing its few political and military
cadres throughout remote areas of Luzon, the
Visayas, and Mindanao while substantially restricting
all military operations. Meanwhile, party efforts to
construct a grassroots political organization continued
uninterrupted.
The military was preoccupied with subduing the
MLNF throughout most of the 1970s and paid little
attention to the then seemingly dormant NPA. By
mid-decade, however, the tide in the Muslim insur-
gency had turned and Marcos reportedly decided to
demonstrate his political and military strength by
cracking down on all opposition, including the Com-
munist insurgency. Between 1976 and 1977, 13 Com-
munist Party Central Committee members were ar-
rested, including the movement's leader, Jose Maria
Sison. The government also captured the NPA's
Commander, Bernabe Buscayno, and Victor Corpuz,
a Philippine Military Academy instructor who defect-
ed to the NPA and became its top guerrilla instructor.
(Sison, Buscayno, and Corpuz have since been
released by Aquino.) After the arrests, Marcos an-
nounced that the Communist insurgency had been
defeated and he focused nearly all the military's
resources on defeating the MNLF. As late as 1979,
for example, only eight battalions, or about 4,800
troops, were assigned to areas of NPA activity.
The government's belief that it had broken the back
of the CPP began to erode during 1980. In that year
the party declared that the NPA was ready to engage
government troops in combat, and almost immediate-
ly the number of violent incidents rose sharply. The
government responded to the increased violence by
deploying an additional 12 battalions, or about 7,200
men, to Communist insurgent areas by 1982. Most of
these deployments reflected the government's concern
over the CPP's change in tactics, although some troop
movements were a natural consequence of the decline
in Muslim insurgent activity.
After several embarrassing encounters in 1980 be-
tween the military and insurgents on the central
island of Samar, Marcos ordered the creation of the
Eastern Visayas Command. Troops were deployed
from Muslim areas to Samar to conduct sweep opera-
tions against the insurgents. Communist insurgent
efforts to build a strong grassroots organization on
Samar paid off, however, and the military encoun-
tered a populace unwilling to assist in the fight
against the NPA.' Despite little support from the
public, the situation quieted down substantially after
several encounters between the insurgents and the
military, and by 1982 most observers believed that the
insurgents had been defeated. Troops were dispersed
to other areas-including the Bicol Region in South-
ern Luzon-that were also experiencing increased
insurgent activity.
' Manila traditionally has ignored the sparsely populated island and
provided little in the way of services for the locals. The military
reportedly has committed several widely publicized human rights
violations on the island and is feared by many inhabitants
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This move proved premature.
from Luzon to the region, raising to 16 the number of
combat battalions-about 9,600 men-active against
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had merely gone underground and insurgent political
and military infrastructure had remained unscathed
by military operations. These concerns have since
been confirmed by renewed and larger scale NPA
activity over the past several years. Samar has been
the site of several recent spectacular insurgent raids
involving groups of several hundred guerrillas.
The government launched its next drive against the
Communist insurgents in the Bicol Region in mid-
1982. The military deployed 10 battalions to the
area-out of a total of 36 pitted against the NPA-
intent on stamping out the Communist presence
threatening Manila's southern doorstep. The opera-
tion was touted as Marcos's pilot counterinsurgency
program, to be tested in the Bicol and then employed
nationwide. Marcos noted in widely circulated press
releases that more than a military effort was neces-
sary to defeat the NPA, which, according to the
President, had grown mainly out of poor economic
conditions in the countryside. Marcos announced a
four-phase military/civic action program that called
for:
? Military operations to stabilize the region by rout-
ing out the NPA.
? Restoring local order by instituting legal proceed-
ings against CPP/NPA members and sympathizers.
? Rebuilding civilian administration to answer local
needs.
? Providing long-term economic development to pre-
vent the return of the NPA.
As in the Samar experience, NPA activities abated
somewhat in the Bicol after the government's deploy-
ment of troops. Little was accomplished, however, in
the way of lasting civic action programs or the
reestablishment of government authority in areas
frequented by insurgents.
In response to an NPA offensive in Northeastern
Mindanao in late 1982, meanwhile, Manila rede-
ployed five battalions from Muslim areas in the south
and dispatched a combat-tested Marine battalion
the NPA on Mindanao by mid-1983.
Manila also took several other steps to improve the
security situation in eastern Mindanao:
? The Southern Command relieved the Philippine
Constabulary, notorious in the region for its poor
human rights record, of many of its operational
combat responsibilities on Mindanao.
? Marcos ordered the military to coordinate a civil
and military response to the NPA.
? The head of the Southern Command, established an
advance command post in Davao City that, accord-
ing to US officials, boosted public confidence in the
government.
? Local paramilitary Home Defense Forces were ex-
panded with new recruits and given frontline de-
fense responsibilities such as patrolling and partici-
pating in regular military operations. They also
began collecting intelligence on Communist person-
nel and organization.
Insurgent political and military infrastructure appar-
ently suffered little damage from the counterinsur-
gency operation. Although government tallies of vio-
lent incidents rose marginally after operations
began-indicating that the government was indeed
engaging the enemy more frequently-the NPA suc-
cessfully avoided major encounters with government
troops. The increased concentration of military per-
sonnel, moreover, provided the insurgents with in-
creased opportunities to steal arms from the govern-
ment or-according to press reports-even to buy
them from poorly paid government troops.
Manila's efforts on Mindanao to involve local officials
in the effort and improve civil-military relations also
met with little success. For example, Marcos appar-
ently made no effort to enforce his civic action decree,
according to the US Embassy, thus ensuring that poor
administrative and social service practices remained
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unchanged. In addition, the political gains made by
relieving the Constabulary from operations were more
than offset by the new and more serious crop of
human rights abuses perpetrated by the newly ex-
panded Home Defense Forces.
Current Philippine Government estimates of full-time
guerrillas on Mindanao underscore the government's
failure to undercut insurgent growth on the island. In
late 1982 the government estimated that there were
about 2,500 full-time guerrillas on the island, concen-
trated in Northeastern Mindanao and in the Zambo-
anga Peninsula. In early 1986 military intelligence
estimated the number of NPA regulars on Mindanao
to be in excess of 9,000 men
Guerrillas operate freely in many areas of the island,
Spectacular
raids-including several against poorly defended mili-
tary garrisons in the northeastern part of the island-
demonstrate the NPA's advanced capabilities. Several
Philippine officers, moreover, told[
area y a
sta emate t e go a-rnmen in many areas of
Mindanao.
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Appendix D
Dealing With the NPA
Political Base
Armed forces attempts to neutralize the NPA politi-
cal base in the countrysideare severely complicated
by abuses of the local population. Because of corrup-
tion, reasonably designed but poorly executed military
operations to isolate the insurgents from their source
of local support often have alienated large numbers of
even progovernment Filipinos with heavyhanded and
insensitive actions.
Relocation and "evacuation" schemes, for example,
were first used during the 1970s to protect small
farmers on Mindanao from NPA intimidation. By
1981, however, the initial voluntary programs had
degenerated into forced relocations of persons sus-
pected of supporting the NPA, or into evacuations of
areas to permit the AFP to establish "free-fire zones"
where it could operate against the NPA without
concern for civilian casualties. The most widely publi-
cized relocations and evacuations took place around
Davao del Norte, where the AFP attempted to forc-
ibly relocate some 20,000 small farmers and their
families between September 1981 and March 1982.
Similar relocations-some voluntary, but most
forced-were reported on other parts of Mindanao, in
Abra Province on Northern Luzon, and on Samar and
Panay Islands. In March 1982 the government or-
dered a halt to the Mindanao relocations after the
press began to refer to them as "strategic hamlets"
similar to those used by the South Vietnamese during
the 1960s.
Despite curtailment of the large-scale Mindanao relo-
cations, field commanders continued to relocate or
evacuate families and communities to further tactical
operations. In September 1985, for example, Manila
newspapers reported that approximately 1,000 per-
sons on the island of Leyte had been relocated to
protect them from retribution by NPA tax collectors.
In other areas of Leyte, however, many locals evacu-
ated their homes only after the military told them
they would be declared NPA sympathizers if they did
not leave. According to other press reports, an earlier
evacuation of some 1,000 persons near Bacolod in
Negros Occidental Province last June was undertaken
After its wqr with the Moros in the 1970s, the armed
forces augmented its regular military forces with
scores of paramilitary groups and provided covert
support to irregular units of questionable ability and
reputation. Some groups the armed forces openly
sanctioned, such as the North Cotabato CHDF unit
formed from the 300 members of the Ilagas (rats)
gang of the Manero family. With other groups,
however, government support was covert in an effort
to dissociate the military from violent, abusive, and
extralegal activities
The most notorious of these covertly supported
groups is the "Lost Command, " a violent band of
perhaps some 50 "rehabilitated"former servicemen
led since its inception by retired Constabulary Lt. Col.
Carlos Lademora. According to the US Embassy,
since 1975 the Lost Command has operated on
Samar and Leyte Islands, and in Agusan del Sur,
Suriago, Davao, and Cotabato Provinces on Northern
Mindanao. The unit acheived its greatest notoriety in
September 1981 when it reportedly massacred more
than 35 men, women, and children near Sag-od in
Northern Samar Province, while providing security
for a logging firm associated with Defense Minister
Enrile. The massacre reportedly was a reprisal for an
earlier NPA attack that wounded several unit mem-
bers. The Embassy reports that by late 1984 the unit
had such a reputation for violence and abuse that
most of its high-level patrons ceased using it to secure
their properties in the south. The Command's last
known assignment was to protect goldfields in its
home province of Agusan del Sur. Chief of Staff
Ramos in March 1986 issued a directive that out-
lawed this and similar groups and forbade military
personnel from associating with them.
to create free-fire zones.
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To improve the timeliness of tactical intelligence,
nonuniformed AFP members frequently rounded up
large numbers of suspects and intensively and often
abusively interrogated them until they obtained the
desired information. Popularly called "zoning," these
dragnet operations also were used to neutralize local
NPA troops and their supporters by forcing the
suspects to return to their communities and identify
those who cooperated with the insurgents. According
to press, this tactic was widely used last year to
support government sweep operations in Abra and
Bataan Provinces on Luzon, and in Davao and Misa-
mis Oriental Provinces on Mindanao.
Food blockades-or "resource control" in the jargon
of the military-are another tactic local commanders
were permitted to use in areas where the NPA
commands support. Rather than evacuate or relocate
villages, this tactic stressed blockading communities
and consuming or destroying excess food to limit
supplies to the NPA. According to the press, this was
employed most frequently in Northern Luzon and
Northeastern Mindanao. During August and Septem-
ber 1985 it also was employed by Task Force Samat
against several communities in Bataan. Although the
food blockades were useful in denying support to the
insurgents during AFP tactical operations, the fre-
quently overzealous, arbitrary, and abusive manner in
which they were implemented only further strained
AFP relations with local communities. General
Ramos responded to criticism of this tactic by repeat-
edly emphasizing that resource control was used by
local commanders only on a case-by-case basis, and
that it was not a national policy.
In our judgment, relocation and evacuation, zoning,
and food blockades fail as counterinsurgency instru-
ments because they focus armed forces attention on
the movement and control of people rather than on
how to protect them once relocated. For their part, the
civil authorities-few in some areas and short of
resources in all areas-frequently decided the relo-
cated, evacuated, or blockaded persons were the mili-
tary's responsibility. As a result, the civil government
failed to provide the required health care, housing,
food, and jobs, while the military failed to provide
protection or prevent NPA reinfiltration. All too often
the final outcome was to undercut popular support for
the goverment by disrupting viable communities, in-
creasing unemployment, and furthering economic
dislocation.
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