BRAZIL: THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000100240001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP04T00907R000100240001-6
Directorate of
Intelligence
Brazil: The Changing Dynamics
of Civilian-Military Relations
An Intelligence Assessment
ALA 87-10032
June 1987
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
Brazil: The Changing Dynamics
of Civilian-Military Relations
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
South America Division, Office of
African and Latin American Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Brazil
Branch,
Secret
ALA 87-10032
June 1987
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 15 May 1987
was used in this report.
Brazil: The Changing Dynamics
of Civilian-Military Relations
Secret
When Brazil's President Jose Sarney came into office in early 1985, the
country saw 21 years of military rule come to an end. In the opening days
of his new government, President Sarney began the process of institutional-
izing civilian rule. Sarney moved quickly to cultivate military good will by
working with the Congress to oppose human rights trials of military
officers and substantially increase defense budget outlays. With an
expanded budget, according to US defense attache reporting, military
leaders turned their attention to building up their fighting capability and
increasing their professionalism. Simultaneously, the military high com-
mand maintained a highly influential, but low profile, political advisory
role in the Sarney administration.
Until last November, all seemed to be going well. Sarney's record was one
of important accomplishments?passage of political and agrarian reforms,
orderly national elections, economic growth, and price stabilization. With
the collapse of the Cruzado Plan, which had allowed wages to rise while
freezing prices, new and unpopular economic adjustment measures an-
nounced late last year unleashed a series of strikes and violent demonstra-
tions. Although publicly supporting Sarney, the military grew increasingly
alarmed over government drift.
Against this backdrop, the Brazilian military is now facing a dilemma as it
tries to reconcile its support for Sarney?in order to safeguard the gains it
has made under his administration?with the risk of associating too closely
with the President as his political support erodes. In light of these
conflicting forces, we judge that the high command will soon have to
decide what role to play in Brazil's unfolding political drama.
The military is almost certain to become more involved in politics, although
the institutionalization of civilian rule has reduced the risk of an outright
military takeover. Under the most likely scenario, the military will opt to
stay largely on the sidelines and defer to the Constituent Assembly on the
presidential succession question. The military's leaders will probably
continue to back the President through the remainder of his term, while at
the same time actively lobbying party leaders to safeguard their interests
into the next administration.
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ALA 87-10032
June 1987
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Despite our cautious optimism, we believe that a sudden economic or
political slide could prompt the military into bolder actions. For example, a
sharp acceleration of inflation, violent strikes, or serious threats from the
radical left could provoke a more interventionist policy. Under these
conditions, the high command, acting in concert with key congressional
leaders, could move legally to remove Sarney from office before the end of
1987. In a variant on this theme, we believe that a legislative deadlock on
the question of an early end to Sarney's term could cause the military to
demand civilian leaders to remove the President. In this scenario, the
interim president?either civilian or military?would be a consensus choice
and most likely would serve only until the next presidential election,
probably in late 1988.
The possibility of an outright military takeover?although currently
remote, in our view?would increase if civil order began to unravel. In such
a case, military intervention could end up following the Brazilian historical
norm?a military government for a temporary period, possibly one to two
years. Popular desire for democratic government combined with the
military's reluctance to take on Brazil's difficult social and economic
problems would probably lead the high command to hand power back to
the civilians soon after the political crisis had calmed.
Despite greater behind-the-scenes influence exercised by the military in
our first three scenarios, we judge that any civilian government that might
replace Sarney in the near term will not offer major concessions to
Washington to resolve a wide range of bilateral irritants. Popular senti-
ment in favor of high economic growth and restrictive trade and investment
practices is likely to continue to produce nationalistic policies detrimental
to US interests. However, the democratic transition will remain on track,
serving as an example for other countries in the region and setting the stage
for improved bilateral military cooperation in the long term.
Should the military return to power by force, Washington's support for
democracy in the region would suffer a serious setback. Nevertheless, such
a military government?probably less responsive to populist pressures?
might implement orthodox economic adjustment measures to brake gallop-
ing inflation and pursue more moderate debt policies than did its civilian
predecessor.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
111
Introduction
1
Institutionalizing Civilian Rule?The Sarney Record
1
The Military's New Role
3
Modernizing Forces
3
Instilling Professionalism
6
Advising the Executive
8
Lobbying the Congress
10
Growing Civil-Military Tensions Amid Economic Crisis
10
Drawn Into a Crisis
10
Worry Over a Government Adrift
11
Prospects for Military Intervention
12
Exercising Power From the Sidelines
12
Constitutional Solution
13
Institutional Coup
13
Taking Power by Force
13
Implications for the United States
14
Appendixes
A. Impact of Sarney's Early Departure From Office
17
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