KEY QUESTIONS IN THE FALL OF CHINA'S HU YAOBANG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Directorate of
Intelligence
China's Hu Yaobang
Key Questions in the Fall of
An Intelligence Assessment
EA 87-10018
May 1987
Copy 17 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
China's Hu Yaobang
Key Questions in the Fall of
25X1
Office of
25X1
East Asian Analysis, with a contribution from0
25X1
= Office of Leadership Analysis. Comments and
25X1
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, China Division,
25X1
Secret
EA 87-10018
May 1987
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Key Questions in the Fall of
China's Hu Yaobang
Scope Note This paper uses a question and answer format to discuss key questions
surrounding the ouster of Hu Yaobang: What were the causes of his fall?
What are some of the short-term costs and benefits and potentially more
serious long-term consequences? And what does this episode say about the
contradictions within the reform leadership that is trying to modernize
China? Many of our answers are speculative.
We have sought to assess information ~
from Chinese propaganda and press leaks by Chinese officials,
_125X1
25X1
25X1;1
2bA1
to reconstruct the events leading to Hu 25X1
Yaobang's ouster. Because reformers had control of the propaganda
machinery 25X1
much of our information has tended to have a. re- 25X1
formist bias. Moreover, hindsight inevitably colors information that has
become available since Hu resigned. 25X1
25X1
Finally, the paper lists some important indicators we
believe will give us a better fix in the months ahead on the balance of forces
within the leadership and the direction the reform program will take 25X1
Secret
EA 87-10018
May 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Key Questions in the Fall of
China's Hu Yaobang
Key Judgments We still know relatively little about the events that led to Hu Yaobang's
Information available dismissal as General Secretary in January 1987. Chinese officials and the
as of 20 April 1987 Western media have offered a range of explanations from a falling out
was used in this report.
between Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and Hu to a conservative attack on
Deng that forced him to sacrifice Hu.
We believe that over the last two years Deng gradually lost confidence in his
protege, Hu Yaobang. In particular, Deng was angered by Hu's repeated
public gaffes on policy issues, including relations with the United States, and
apparently had increasing doubts about the abrasive Hu's ability to hold the
reform coalition together. Indeed, as General Secretary of the party, Hu had
alienated the old guard with his anticorruption campaign and angered some
reformers by meddling and by monopolizing patronage. He never did win
the confidence of the military.
According to reliable information and press reports, the situation apparently
became more serious last summer, when longstanding policy differences
between the two widened, and, most important in our judgment, Hu pressed
Deng to retire.
We can only speculate on why Deng advanced his timetable by 10 months. It
is conceivable that differences over how to respond to the student
demonstrations in December so angered Deng that he moved immediately.
We think it more probable, however, that Deng feared Hu would try to
reverse his ouster by rallying his many supporters before the Congress.
Conservative leaders undoubtedly lobbied Deng, but we doubt press specula-
tion that they forced his hand,
Other Chinese leaders, most notably Deng himself, have bounced back after
a fall, but we doubt Hu will. He lacks the prestige and widespread respect
within the party and other important constituencies, especially the military,
that Deng used to make his own comeback.
In weighing costs and benefits, we speculate that Deng may have calculated
that he would gain in the long run by removing the one leader most likely to
unite the opposition and disrupt the reform camp. By moving when he did,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Deng may believe he avoided a more bitter showdown at the party congress,
and that in Zhao he has a man who can repair the damage done to the
reform program.
In our judgment, however, Deng has incurred some significant costs. He has:
? Shaken the confidence of reform supporters in the party and government,
especially those identified with Hu, who have worked hard to support
Deng's policies.
? Undercut public faith in the permanence of the reform program, a key to
its success, and alienated many of the talented people whose cooperation
and innovative ideas are needed to maintain the program's pace.
? Created an opening for conservative opponents of reform to attack both
the program and its advocates.
? Removed an immediate threat to the reform coalition but, paradoxically,
increased the potential for a power struggle after his death.
The circumstances of Hu's fall underscore how shallow the roots of reform
are and illuminate some of the new fissures created by it and the inherent
contradictions in it-such as the tension between the need for party control
and the need to decentralize decisionmaking and encourage new ideas. We
also see a generational cleavage over such basic questions as the pace and
scope of reform and even divisions among the reformers, with the possibility
of a split between Hu and Zhao backers. These factors reinforce our belief
that the party has only a limited capacity to reform itself and devolve power.
Moreover, when faced with a choice between the risks of a more open policy
and ensuring control, the party has always opted to assert control
As we analyze how events may unfold, we start from the basic judgment that
Deng remains the most powerful figure in China, and that, although the
conservative forces have gained, Deng, who is still a reformer, is not
hamstrung by them. The reform camp is under pressure but committed to
opposing the conservative challenge, and Zhao will, in our judgment, remain
General Secretary. We believe the following will be important indicators of
the balance of power in Beijing and the direction of policy:
? The choice of premier and other senior personnel appointments. The
choice of Vice Premier Li Peng, for instance, would suggest conservative
strength, while the appointment of a party elder like Wan Li could indicate
an inability to agree on a permanent replacement.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
? The continuing high visibility of conservative spokesmen and their domi-
nance of the propaganda apparatus.
? The duration and intensity of the current campaign against "bourgeois
liberalism." Zhao and the reformers are trying hard to restrict and cut
short this conservative campaign.
? The political health of prominent Hu Yaobang associates.
? Economic policy pronouncements. The reform camp wants to launch some
new measures this year but would probably settle for protecting existing
policies. The struggle for control of this area will probably be one of the
most intense.
? Antiforeign, particularly anti-Western, articles in the press would suggest
an increase in conservative influence.
? A delay in holding the 13th Party Congress would suggest unbridgeable
differences in the leadership.
Absolutely critical in all this is Deng's own assessment of the situation and
the tactics he chooses to pursue. Deng has voiced his support for reform in
meetings with several foreign leaders since January, and has said that some
reform goals such as rejuvenation of the bureaucracies will be on the agenda
in October. However, he has not yet given a clear indication of what tack he
might take or what specific plans he might have. As the date for the
Congress draws closer, his goals-and strength-should become clearer.
vii Secret
25X1
i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Scope Note
Why Did Deng Decide To Remove Hu in Mid-January?
3
Could Hu's Conservative Opponents Have Forced
Deng's Hand?
3
What Role Did Zhao Ziyang Play in Hu's Downfall?
4
What Did Deng Gain by Cashiering Hu?
5
What Costs Has Deng Incurred by Firing Hu?
5
Sharpening Contradictions
8
Signposts
10
Hu Yaobang's Resignation-A Chronology
13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
aVtJ Vt
Key Questions in the Fall of
China's Hu Yaobang
Why Was Hu Ousted?
We still know little about the heated debates and
fierce political infighting within the Chinese leader-
ship that preceded Hu's ouster in January as party
General Secretary. Deng may have acted hastily, and
even in anger, but we doubt that he fired his designat-
ed heir primarily because of the student unrest or
conservative pressure. Rather
we believe that the student
demonstrations crystallized Deng's determination to
force Hu out because the two were increasingly at
odds over power and the succession.
We believe Hu over the past several years had become
increasingly impatient with the old guard's clinging to
power. As a result, he sought to create his own power
base to ensure his succession to Deng and to exert
greater influence over policy. In the process, we
suspect Deng gradually lost confidence in Hu, in part
because Hu antagonized too many other leaders of the
reform coalition and in part because of his repeated
gaffes on foreign policy issues.
for example, both Chen Yun and
Zhao Ziyang sharply criticized Hu for acting without
authorization in publicly warning the United States in
November 1983 that the impending trip of Premier
Zhao to Washington might be canceled if the US
administration did not dissociate itself from a US
Senate resolution calling for self-determination for
Taiwan.
Hu made
many enemies among party conservatives and the
military old guard, including those close to Deng, by:
? Monopolizing party patronage and aggressively pro-
moting his own proteges, such as Hu Qili, to
powerful positions and flaunting his power instead
of coordinating with and building bridges to the
other leaders.
? Making deprecating remarks about the old guard in
an interview he gave to a Hong Kong journalist in
1985. Hu even denigrated the importance of the
military and especially the party's military commis-
sion, which Deng heads and that contains many of
Deng's oldest and closest comrades in arms, such as
Yang Shangkun and Wang Zhen.
? Zealously pursuing the anticorruption campaign in
1986, especially against a number of children of the
conservative cadre.
Hu used the campaign to attack his oppo-
nents-and even Zhao Ziyang-at a Politburo
meeting early last year.
? Stifling the "spiritual pollution" campaign in 1984
and encouraging the freewheeling debate in the
media in the summer of 1986 over political reform
that some intellectuals used to question the value of
Marxism and to criticize the role of the Chinese
Communist Party (CPP)-a debate that triggered
the current conservative-led campaign against
Western "bourgeois liberalism."
Signs of friction between Deng and Hu surfaced as
early as 1983, when they apparently disagreed over
the need for a harsh crackdown on intellectuals and
on crime-two separate but linked campaigns. We
believe Deng's two-tier plan for the succession, which
surfaced in the winter of 1984/85, indicated second
thoughts about Hu's abilities.' At the time, we argued
that one goal of Deng's plan was to institutionalize the
succession process and to groom younger leaders in
whom Deng had confidence to carry the reform
program into the next century, well after he and other
senior leaders, including Hu and Zhao, had retired or
' On the basis of press I reporting, we believe that
Deng had developed a succession package. According to the plan,
Zhao Ziyang would have assumed the presidency from Li Xian-
nian; Hu Yaobang would have taken over the Military Affairs
Commission chairmanship from Deng; Li Peng would have become
premier; and Hu Qili was slated to become party general secretary.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
secret
Reformers and Conservatives in China:
What the Terms Mean
We use the terms "reformer" and "conservative"for
convenience to describe groupings within the Chinese
leadership. All members of the leadership in fact are
reformers who came to power after the fall of the
Gang of Four in 1976 with the aim of dismantling the
Maoist system and promoting political and economic
stability. Very quickly, however, differences in ap-
proach and goals surfaced, and the leaders began to
separate into two loosely organized camps. There is
considerable overlap for instance, there are many
who are "liberal" on economic reforms but "conser-
vative" when it comes to political affairs. Deng
Xiaoping is generally thought of as the chief reform-
ist, but has recently demonstrated a decidedly conser-
vative bent in ideological matters.
The group that we call reformers, liberal reformers,
or progressives generally favors close relations with
the West, the introduction of market forces into the
economy, and a sharp reduction in the party's role in
economic matters and day-to-day governmental ad-
ministrative decisions. Its members are more relaxed
about ideological matters and more tolerant of intel-
lectuals' tendency to test the limits of dissent. They
are willing to consider extensive revisions of the
died. But we also speculated that Deng may have been
trying to ease Hu out by proposing that Hu succeed
him as chairman of the Military Advisory Commis-
sion-a move that would have cut Hu off from his
power base in the party and put him in "charge" of a
group composed mainly of Deng's cronies. Indeed, we
suspect Deng feared that the abrasive, tactless, and
impulsive Hu could not manage the reform program
and hold together the disparate elements of the
coalition he had forged. Deng may well have conclud-
ed that, if Hu succeeded him, the leadership would
separate into factions and become embroiled in a
power struggle that might destroy all he had sought to
build.
political system for example, real elections for dele-
gates to the provincial people's congresses ("legisla-
tures" that have some advisory role but are largely
rubberstamp bodies).
Those we lump together as conservatives or tradition-
alists want to maintain a strong role for central
planning in the economy, though they are willing to
experiment with market forces around the margins.
They recognize the need for Western technology and
access to our markets, but some believe China should
improve relations with the Soviet Union-especially
in trade, so China can obtain some of what it needs
without using scarce hard currency reserves. They
believe that dissent should be strictly controlled and
that intellectuals should look to the party for guid-
ance. Most favor closer party oversight of economic
and governmental matters than do the "reformers, "
and they do not believe an overhaul of the political
system is necessary or advisable. A common thread
in their thinking is fear of instability if party control
is weak.
Since Hu's dismissal, additional information has sur-
faced to support this speculation. It now appears that
Deng and Hu had become increasingly estranged
until, by early last fall, their relationship reached the
breaking point. Two recently acquired accounts indi-
cate that Deng had already decided and gained
preliminary party approval last November-well be-
fore the student demonstrations-to replace Hu with
Zhao as party chief at the 13th Party Congress in
October 1987. Press reports
indicate there were heated exchanges last summer at
the leadership meetings at Beidaihe over political
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
secret
reforms and succession issues.
:::::: Deng's old military cronies-many of whom
had previously voiced their opposition to Hu's suc-
ceeding Deng as head of the military commission-
again refused to accept Hu. In a slightly different
account, the Japanese press reported that Hu refused
to take the job, which suggests he may have been
angry that Deng had not offered him a more impor-
tant and influential post in exchange for giving up his
position as party General Secretary. Other Japanese
press reports indicate that Hu pressed Deng last
September to retire and give him the chairmanship of
the Central Advisory Commission. Deng reportedly
solicited the support of many of the old guard to turn
aside Hu's demand.
Two other events in retrospect point to rising tensions
between Hu and Deng:
? In the fall of 1986 Deng began to signal that he
would not retire as soon as he had planned, citing
calls from many within the party for him to stay on.
In an interview with an American newsman in
September 1986, Deng said he hoped to retire at the
13th Party Congress, but probably would not be
able to do so.
? Last fall, Zhao's appointment as the head of the
"political reform leading group," directed to come
up with proposals for implementing political reform,
may have been another sign of Hu's slipping posi-
Why Did Deng Decide To Remove Hu in
Mid-January?
We can only speculate on the reasons. It is possible
that differences over the student demonstrations may
have brought the tensions between Hu and Deng to a
flashpoint. Hu acknowledged he had made mistakes
in a self-criticism he gave at a leadership meeting on
the demonstrations in early January, according to
some press reports, but these accounts also suggest Hu
adopted a defiant rather than a repentant tone. That
may have fueled Deng's anger and provoked him to
demand Hu's immediate resignation.
We suspec
that it is more likely that Deng moved because he
feared that Hu planned to rally his supporters within
the party between now and the party congress to try to
reverse Deng's decision to replace him. Hu, in fact,
has salted the party, including the central party
organs, with many of his supporters and could well
have mounted a damaging challenge to Deng's power.
Press reports claim Hu was pressing Deng to retire,
and we know that someone in the leadership ordered
Chinese officials abroad to poll their units on whether
Deng ought to retire. Hence, Deng may have seen a
mounting threat and believed he had to take preemp-
tive action. As it was, the US Embassy in Beijing;
heard that Deng was unable at a meeting of the
Politburo in December/January to gain a decisive
vote against Hu and, therefore, called an extraordi-
nary "enlarged" Politburo meeting, packed with his
supporters, to oust Hu and demonstrate his power.
Could Hu's Conservative Opponents Have Forced
Deng's Hand?
One line of speculation in the Western press is that
conservatives such as Chen Yun and Peng Zhen, or a
broader cross section of the old guard, forced Deng to
oust Hu. Given the list of Hu's enemies, it would be
surprising if they had not been trying to undermine
him. Hu came
under increasing attack from conservatives in the
summer and fall of 1986 for encouraging media
debate on political reforms, which ultimately contrib-
uted to the demonstrations. We suspect that some
members of the old guard, including those close to
tion.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Figure 2. Western commentary
on political reform in China.
Source: The Philadelphia In-
Deng who generally support the reform program,
criticized Hu for lending legitimacy to heretical ideas
that they feared would undermine the authority of the
party. Deng probably shared their concern, judging by
the way he lashed out at the three intellectuals Fang
Lizhi, Liu Binyan, and Wang Ruowang-he ordered
them expelled from the party for encouraging the
students. We believe many other conservatives were
more concerned about Hu's anticorruption campaign,
which targeted a number of their children. Opposition
to Hu from these disparate elements could have
coalesced in the wake of the student demonstrations,
compelling Deng to sacrifice Hu to protect himself
and the reform program.
We doubt, however, that Deng would have acquiesced
in Hu's removal if he had not concluded that Hu had
become a political liability and a threat to his author-
ity. The reports of differences between Deng and Hu
since the fall of 1986 and of the decision to name
Zhao to replace Hu indicate that Deng had already
made the decision to dump Hu. Although the popular
perception in China seems to be that the conservatives
forced Deng's hand, we believe he needed little
encouragement.
What Role Did Zhao Ziyang Play in Hu's Downfall?
We have no evidence that Zhao played a role in
engineering Hu's ouster, although we believe neither
Zhao nor his supporters are entirely unhappy to see
Hu go. We suspect that many of Zhao's supporters
and perhaps Zhao himself did not hold Hu in high
regard and probably resented his attempts to meddle
in economic policy matters. Over the longer run,
moreover, Zhao stands to gain the most by Hu's
departure. He appears to have the inside track as
Deng's eventual successor, if he plays his cards skill-
fully. Zhao's reputation as an able administrator; his
moderate, balanced style; and the fact that,
he has had amicable personal
relations with the old guard favor him and are
probably why Deng chose him to replace Hu. He now
has the unenviable job, however, of trying to repair
the damage and keep the reform program he strongly
supports from stalling.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Can Hu Make a Comeback?
Although Hu has Deng's own history as a model, we
believe he is more likely to go the way of his
immediate predecessor Hua Guofeng, who has be-
come all but invisible since he fell from power in 1981.
In our opinion, Hu lacks the prestige and the wide-
spread respect within the party and other important
constituencies, especially the military, that Deng had
when he made his comeback. Thus, although many
party cadre owe their positions to Hu's patronage, we
believe a good many will soon begin to shift their
allegiances to other leaders, if they have not already
done so. Hu Qili, Hu's heir apparent as party chief,
has already sought to distance himself from Hu
Yaobang. We believe, moreover, that Zhao is putting
out lines to Hu's supporters. In late January speech
Zhao appeared to be making an elliptical appeal that
Figure 3. Zhao Ziyang concur-
rently serves as Premier and
Acting Party General Secre-
At a minimum, we believe Deng has removed the one
personnel issue that united conservatives in the party
and the Army-opposition to Hu's succeeding Deng.
Although Zhao by virtue of his new position is likely
to be a target of some conservative criticism, Deng
may calculate that he is in a better position to divide
and conquer conservatives on policy and personnel
issues. If so, we would expect him to begin soon to
curb the conservative-led antibourgeois liberalization
campaign. Zhao's efforts to limit the campaign to the
party and his declaration that reform policies are off
limits may, in fact, reflect Deng's effort to do just
they come over to his side.
What Did Deng Gain by Cashiering Hu?
From Deng's perspective, he has removed the one
leader most likely to disrupt his efforts to maintain a
consensus between reformers and conservatives on an
overall (albeit gradual) reform course. By removing
Hu in January, moreover, Deng may have:
? Forestalled a much more bitter and potentially
destabilizing fight at the October party congress.
? Avoided a party-wrenching purge of Hu's
supporters.
? Bought time for the reform wing to close ranks and
work out a new modus vivendi with conservatives
that allows the Dengists to continue to control the
reform agenda.
that.
Deng may even calculate that he can use the concern
aroused at home and abroad by dumping Hu to force
agreement at the top on how to proceed. Deng has
always stressed the importance of stability and has
believed the reforms needed to be carried out gradual-
ly, on an experimental basis. In the wake of the
student demonstrations, we believe he is telling the
reformers to avoid the kind of headlong disruptive
pace Hu Yaobang advocated-a message also de-
signed to co-opt conservative criticism while telling
conservatives the reform program will continue. Deng
has also sought to discourage student and particularly
worker activism by sending a strong signal that he will
not tolerate threats to stability and party control.
What Costs Has Deng Incurred by Firing Hu?
Whatever Deng's gains in the long term, he will, in
our judgment, pay a high price in at least the short
run for cashiering Hu the way he did. The cumulative
impact of firing Hu, the expulsion of three liberal
intellectuals from the party, and the subsequent con-
servative-led campaign against "bourgeois liberalism"
have, in our judgment, shaken the confidence of
reform supporters in the party and bureaucracy--
especially those identified with Hu Yaobang, who
have worked hard to implement policies Deng sup-
ports. In the short run, at least, they will be looking
mainly for ways to protect themselves rather than
continuing to push reform. Hu Qili, a Hu protege and
one-time Deng choice to succeed Hu as general
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
secretary, has already begun to take a more conserva-
tive line in public. And so to a lesser extent has
another Hu protege, Minister of Culture Wang Meng.
Even if most of Hu's supporters survive the present
uncertainty, we wonder whether they will be prepared
to promote reform as aggressively as they did before
Hu's fall.
We have long believed that the success of Deng's
program depends heavily on convincing all Chinese,
especially the talented, that the policies will not
change and that it is safe to be an advocate of reform.
In our judgment, the purge of the top reformer is a
major blow to this effort. The initial reaction among
many intellectuals and students-whose cooperation
and ideas the reformers need to maintain the momen-
tum of China's modernization drive-has been in-
creased cynicism and disillusionment, according to
the US Embassy in Beijing. Deng and Zhao are likely
to have greater difficulty tapping the talents of these
groups, which we believe will be more wary now of
advocating new approaches to problems for fear of
becoming the victims of conservative attacks. Several
accounts also indicate that some party members in
overseas posts are confused and shocked over Hu's
resignation and may be looking for ways to avoid
returning to China.
Conservatives at all levels of the party, in our view,
will attempt to take advantage of this opportunity to
stall or roll back reforms they oppose. We believe
local party secretaries, who saw their authority erod-
ing as a result of the factory manager responsibility
system, probably have already begun to reassert
themselves. Resistance from lower levels of the party
was a major obstacle to the implementation of the
urban reform program even before Hu's fall. In fact,
it was a key reason Deng himself called last year for
"political structural reforms" to remove party hacks
from interfering in day-to-day economic decision
making. We believe the almost inevitable postpone-
ment of political reforms will make this resistance just
that much harder to overcome.
Foreign firms will probably think even harder about
investing in China as long as the domestic situation
remains unclear, and especially as long as the current
attacks on Western ideas and some reform leaders for
taking the "capitalist road" continue. New investment
had already declined sharply in 1986, in part because
of foreign companies' concern over the profitability of
operations in China and the lack of adequate legal
safeguards for their investments.
Perhaps most serious, we believe, is the damage Deng
has done to his efforts to institutionalize power, which
he saw as important for ensuring leadership stability
and protecting his modernization plans. With his own
succession plans in tatters, the potential for a power
struggle after his death is probably much greater.
Deng and Zhao recognize the harm Hu's ouster has
caused and are trying to limit the damage. Both men
have repeatedly stated publicly that China's opening
to the outside will not change. According to a pro-
China newspaper in Hong Kong, Zhao also has taken
steps privately to limit the impact of the current
antibourgeois liberalism campaign and to reassure
intellectuals that there will not be a widespread party
purge. In his public appearances since his purge, Zhao
has repeatedly voiced his determination to prevent the
campaign from affecting economic reforms or turning
into a disruptive political movement like those of the
past.
Hu's downfall reminds us that, despite nearly 10 years
of reforms, important features of Chinese politics-
especially the nature of power-have not changed
much under Deng. More important, we believe it
highlights inherent contradictions within the reform
leadership-not just between moderate and more
conservative reform advocates but also among moder-
ates themselves over such basic issues as the pace and
scope of reform, the role of the party, and power
sharing. These contradictions raise questions-many
of which we cannot answer at present with any
confidence-about the prospects over the longer term
for China's reformers in implementing far-reaching
systemic changes-particularly those that weaken the
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Figure d. flu Faohan,g (tit
II i~clrrn-.ctrle suite rorlronls
his detractors at an enlarged
tills tare Commission meeting
in l)ereniher 1986 Hu xa.c
sharply (riliri:ed he military
leaders including Ding- ~
power of the party and even about the durability of
some existing reforms. Given the present uncertainty,
our observations are intended less to answer these
questions than to stimulate further debate and
analysis.
Power
A principal aim of the reform program has been to
ensure that there would never be a repetition of the
chaos of the Cultural Revolution, which many Chi-
nese leaders blamed on the concentration of power in
the hands of one man, Mao Zedong. To this end,
Deng has sought ways to vest power in positions
rather than in men, to institutionalize collective lead-
ership, and to regularize the transfer of power. Deng's
ouster of Hu demonstrates not only how weak the new
institutional and legal structures created by reform
are, but also to what a great extent individual power
depends on personal connections rather than on one's
official position. Deng, who was nominally Hu's sub-
ordinate--although no one in or out of China ever
took that seriously-ousted him by drawing on a
network of supporters among powerful party elders
built up over many years.
That many of these party elders no longer occupy any
important official position underscores this point. Hu
spent years building a network of supporters down
through the party, and his associates dominated all
the key party organs. This was of little use to him in
the end because he failed to build strong personal ties
across the top. The events of December and January
make it plain that the concentration of authority in
one man, in this case Deng and consequently that
man's ability to do great harm or great good is likely
to remain characteristic of the Chinese system for the
foreseeable future.
The episode also demonstrates that, although the
broad political influence of the military has been
reduced under Deng, its support is still necessary for
succession arrangements. Many of Deng's confidants
are military elders; Hu's failure to win their respect
was a major factor in Deng's loss of confidence in
him. We do not believe the military can impose its
choices on the party as a whole, but what happened to
Hu indicates that it can probably block arrangements
that it strongly opposes
Finally, the struggle between Deng and IN highlights
a major contradiction in Deng's attempt to institute
succession arrangements. For them to work, we be-
lieve Deng himself must be willing to step down,
relinquish power, and allow his successors to assume
full authority--something neither he nor other party
elders have been willing to do. When faced with a
choice in January 1987 between protecting his power
or upholding a fragile constitution and legal system he
has helped put in place, Deng chose to protect his
power, thereby undermining both his succession ar-
rangements and the very institutions he has sought to
strengthen.
We suspect Deng has rationalized his decision to
dump Hu as necessary to protect the reforms, and he
may also believe he has become indispensable to the
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Figure 5. Hu Yaobang (seated, center) plays
bridge with Deng Xiaoping (right) in better times.
reforms. In our opinion, other senior leaders eager to
retain their power will certainly encourage him to
believe so because they realize that if Deng retires
they would be under intense pressure to follow. The
implication of this may be that Deng may be even
more reluctant to entrust great power to others and
will, in turn, have a much more difficult time con-
structing viable succession arrangements. Indeed, in
our judgment, any chosen successor-whether it is
Zhao Ziyang or someone else-will have to labor
under some of the same burdens Hu did. That is, he is
likely to be dependent on Deng's support and become
a target for those opposed to reform and thus a
potential scapegoat when problems arise. Any succes-
sor, moreover, will have to accumulate power much
the way Deng has, by establishing lateral as well as
vertical networks of support within the party and state
bureaucracy. Yet he will have to tread carefully lest
he arouse the suspicion and distrust of Deng and other
party elders.
Sharpening Contradictions
We believe Hu's fall and the conservative offensive
illuminate the inherent contradictions in the reform
program and new fissures created by it. The senior
leaders most responsible for shaping China's reform
program since 1980-Deng, Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang,
and Zhao Ziyang-all agreed at the outset on the
central goal of their modernization drive: to create an
economically strong and powerful China capable
sometime in the next century of playing a major role
in international affairs. They probably also agreed on
key elements of a basic strategy: to promote science
and technology; to expand economic ties to the outside
world, particularly the West; and to attract foreign
investment and technical expertise. But, as the reform
program has unfolded and new problems have
emerged, the thinking, particularly of some of the
younger reformers, has evolved, creating, in our judg-
ment, a generational cleavage over such basic ques-
tions as the pace and scope of the reform program.
Although Deng and more conservative party elders
clearly disagree on some key issues, we believe they
are agreed that the reform program should remain
firmly grounded in Marxism, and that they are trying
to create a socialist society with "Chinese characteris-
tics." They agree that borrowing from capitalist soci-
eties is permissible but that to "go too far" would be a
betrayal of all they have fought for during the
revolution and since, and that the party must retain a
central role in China's modernization drive-which
underscores our belief that the party has only a
limited capacity to reform itself and devolve power.
Some of the younger reformers-encouraged by both
Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang-have been much
more willing to stray from Marxist ideological moor-
ings, in order to allow greater experimentation and
even questioning of basic principles in the pursuit of
effective policies. They seem more willing to entertain
the possibility of promoting greater pluralism and
allowing greater dissent than do party elders.
One issue that Deng and Hu parted company on was
the issue of how much latitude to give intellectuals to
express their views and even to criticize the party. We
believe Hu tended to see such criticism as healthy and
not as a threat to the party's power. Deng and other
party elders, however, did not. In our view, it points
up one of the dilemmas party leaders have always
faced: how to harness the support of intellectuals
without relinquishing too much control. Whenever
faced with a choice between ensuring control and
giving intellectuals more freedom, the leadership has
always opted to assert control, which has disillusioned
and alienated many intellectuals.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Deng and Hu have been closely associated since
before the founding of the People's Republic of China
in 1949. During the 1930s both men served together
in the 8th Route Army, the prestigious army that
fought in many of the Chinese civil war's most
famous battles, and they made the Long March
together. After 1949 both men assumed party posts in
Sichuan Province. In 1952 Deng and Hu were trans-
ferred to Beijing-Deng as a vice premier and Hu as
head of the Chinese Communist Youth League.
While serving as director of the CYL, Hu aided
Deng 's efforts to promote economic and political
ideas more liberal than those of CCP Chairman Mao
Zedong by appointing Deng s supporters to numerous
grassroots party posts. During the Cultural Revolu-
tion, Hu's association with Deng-one of the main
targets of the movement-was a major reason for his
being purged. Red Guards accused Hu of following
Deng 's political line and criticized him harshly be-
cause of the close personal relationship between the
two men. Among other things, Hu and Deng were
chastized for questioning Mao's infallibility-and
also for establishing a private club so they could play
bridge.
As hard as Deng and other reform leaders have
worked to raise the level of political debate and to
break the old cycle of relaxation and repression, they
have had only moderate success. Although memories
of the Cultural Revolution have exerted a moderating
influence on factionalism, the circumstances of Hu's
ouster indicate, in our view, that there is still a strong
tendency among Chinese politicians to seek revenge
rather than compromise and conciliation. Moreover,
as the short-lived spiritual pollution campaign of
1983-84 and the present conservative-led antibour-
geois liberalization campaign illustrate, the regime
has a tendency to launch potentially disruptive cam-
paigns whenever leadership tensions rise. Each new
campaign, moreover, takes its toll: fueling ancient
grudges and generating ill will, raising doubts about
In 1972 Hu returned to political life as a member of
the National People's Congress Standing Committee;
Deng's rehabilitation came the following year. During
the next four years Deng consolidated his position
within the national bureaucracy partly through the
support of newly appointed party officials-many of
whom had been trained in the CYL under Hu. During
leadership struggles following Mao's death in 1976,
the two men were again purged, only to be rehabili-
tated the following year. In 1978 Hu was elected to
the Politburo, and Deng regained his posts as vice
chairman of the CCP and Politburo Standing Com-
mittee member. Two years later Deng had Hu named
a member of the Politburo's Standing Committee and
General Secretary of the CCP.
Throughout their long association, Deng had ample
time to assess Hu's personality and politics. Indeed,
we believe that one reason Deng selected Hu for the
top party job was precisely because of Hu's activist,
charge-ahead personality and his lack of fear of the
old guard. While these traits were useful to Deng, he
protected Hu's position. Even now that Deng has
moved against Hu, stories circulate that the two men
remain personally close.
the stability of the system, absorbing enormous ener-
gy, and reducing reform gains since the last cam-
paign. These recurring struggles seem likely to per-
sist-at a minimum, hampering the more iconoclastic
reformers' ability to implement their ideas; quite
possibly setting very narrow limits for future reform
that could cause the program to stall and stagnate; or,
less likely, seriously disrupting and discrediting the
reform program.
Hu's downfall, moreover, indicates, in our judgment,
that tensions and differences are not limited to moder-
ates and conservatives. There are fissures within the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Figure 6. Hu makes his first public appearance
since his downfall at the National People's Con-
Dengist wing of the reform camp as well. The differ-
ences that emerged between Deng and Hu over how
much latitude to give intellectuals and, by extension,
perhaps, what shape "political structural reform"
should take, is only the most obvious example. We
believe that friction also existed between Hu and
Zhao over priorities and methods of achieving reform
goals. Differences in temperament and responsibility
explain some of this friction. Hu was impatient and
impetuous, prone to act rashly. Zhao is much more
deliberate and cautious. But competition for power-
who, in fact, will set the agenda at the top-may also,
in our view, have played a part. Such tensions may be
reflected in divisions we are unaware of between Hu's
and Zhao's supporters in the party and the bureaucra-
cy. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the
moderate reformers will be able to pull together to
fend off the current conservative challenge or whether
the strains caused by Hu's downfall will create new
and deeper fissures within the moderate camp itself.
As we analyze how events may unfold, we start from
the following four basic judgments about the political
situation:
? The reform camp is increasingly subject to strains
and divisions but, as a whole, remains committed to
resisting a challenge from the conservatives.
? Party traditionalists have for the moment gained
ground and will seek to capitalize on their position
but are not as united and strong as they appear;
thus, Deng, although he cannot ignore their influ-
ence, is not hamstrung by them.
? Zhao will remain as General Secretary and a new
premier will be appointed at, or soon after, the
October party congress.
Although we believe the precipitating cause of Hu's
dismissal was his attack on Deng's personal power,
the incident has renewed the debate over reform
policy. Each side has advantages and weaknesses.
Reformers have a proven record in bettering China's
economic performance, and most Chinese recognize
that improvements in their standard of living owe
much to reform policies. A large and diverse group of
officials, intellectuals, farmers, and resurgent small
businessmen owe their positions to reform and will
resist any drastic rollback. Their long dominance of
central government and party organs has enabled
reformers to put many of their supporters in positions
throughout the bureaucracies. Finally, the fact that
most of the conservative leaders are well over 70 will
work in the reformers' favor as the elders pass from
the scene.
On the other hand, many reform policies are at odds
either with the socialist tradition that China has
developed over the past 38 years or with aspects of
traditional Chinese customs. Reform demands move-
ment, whereas conservatives have the easier task of
obstructing or slowing change. Moreover, although
the beneficiaries of reform have been more prominent,
there are losers, as well, whose support the conserva-
tives can enlist. In this group we include, for example,
many middle-ranking officials and party cadre who
resent the diminution of their power, some members
of the military who distrust the rapid pace of reform,
workers who do not welcome changes in the system of
? Deng has incurred costs but is still the final arbiter
of power among competing groups.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
lifetime employment, and farmers who prefer the
security of a more controlled rural economy-and
who have not prospered as much as their neighbors
under reform.
We see four scenarios possible in the wake of Hu's
dismissal:
? The antibourgeois liberalism campaign will contin-
ue with ritual pronouncements in the press, but
reformers will quickly reassert themselves. Howev-
er, because of economic problems, the reformers will
proceed cautiously and not initiate any dramatic
new reforms.
? Conservatives will continue to exert influence for
several months, but reformers will be able to re-
group by next October's party congress and will
largely succeed in controlling policy by then.
We do not know how much Deng may have been
weakened by recent events, or whether, in fact, re-
moving Hu's divisive influence will prove a net gain.
Although he has affirmed his support for reform in 25X1
general terms, Deng has not yet made clear what his
next steps will be or what sort of reforms he is willing
to back. As preparations for the party congress go
forward, Deng's position-in particular, whether he
has had to cede significant influence to old-guard
conservatives-should become clearer. We will be
looking, for example, for evidence that he is taking a
personal role in shaping the agenda and personnel
appointments for the 13th Party Congress.
Other key indicators of the strength of the traditional-
ist and reform camps include:
? A prolonged period of infighting and policy uncer-
tainty will lead to paralysis and stagnation.
? The conservatives will be able to consolidate their
gains and restrict both the scope and the speed of
reform.
Indicators we expect to see in the next few months
should enable us to track the struggle over power and
policy. Probably the most important will be the choice
of a new premier. The selection of a younger, reform-
minded premier would be a strong indicator that the
reform camp is still ascendant. The choice of a more
conservative candidate such as Li Peng would suggest
at a minimum that the reformers have had to make
important compromises. Selection of one of the party
elders, even a reformist like Wan Li, would probably
mean a deadlock, with neither side able to impose a
candidate of its choice from the next generation. If
Zhao relinquishes the party slot and returns to being
premier-which we believe unlikely-we would see
that as a sign of dissatisfaction with Zhao's leader-
ship. In our opinion, the chances of an orderly and
lasting succession would be reduced.
25X1
? Continued prominence and control of important
sectors by old-guard retreads. Many traditionalists 25X1
who had been relegated to the shelf have been
brought back. If these leaders remain near the
center of power, it would suggest conservative
strength.
? The duration and intensity of the campaign against
bourgeois liberalism. Continued play of conservative
slogans and resurrection of heavily ideological pro-
paganda themes such as the call to emulate Lei
Feng, a mythical model soldier of the 1960s, will be
a sign that the reformers are on the defensive.
? Success in containing the purge of Hu Yaobang's
supporters, as Zhao has called for, would show
reform strength.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
? Economic policy pronouncements-recently a num-
ber of conservative signals have been sent in eco-
nomic policy. For example, a recent State Council
circular called for strengthening control over vege-
table prices and setting a ceiling on the negotiated
price of grain. Economic factors are also involved in
the slowing of reforms, but we believe an absence of
initiatives or a rollback of previously announced
policies would also indicate increased traditionalist
political strength.
? Although in this area reformers and conservatives
are probably closer than in domestic policy, changes
in foreign policy that reflect anti-Western suspicions
would reflect diminished reformist influence.
? Whether the reformers are able to impose their
agenda on the 13th Party Congress, or are forced to
postpone the conclave beyond October, will be per-
haps the most telling evidence of the political situa-
tion.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Appendix
Hu Yaobang's Resignation-
A Chronology
Deng kicks off spiritual pollution campaign in a
speech to the Second Plenum of the 12th Central
Committee in October-claims spiritual pollution ex-
ists mostly in fields of ideology, arts, and literature-
attacks the fear of countering rightist ideas, and calls
for the removal of party leaders preaching or tolerat-
ing erroneous ideas. On 26 October the party issues
Central Document 36, providing guidance on spiritual
pollution eradication.
Coverage of the anniversary of the January 1935
Zunyi party meeting includes a reference to Hu
Yaobang, who is presiding, as an old soldier-proba-
bly an attempt to build Hu's stature with the military.
Party ideologue Hu Qiaomu delivers a speech in
February attacking the excessive publicity given the
rural "10,000-yuan households," criticism in part
aimed at Hu Yaobang, who had tirelessly praised
wealthy peasant entrepreneurs during rural inspection
Hu Yaobang speaks to Communist Youth League
leaders on 13 December, reportedly places limits on
the opposition to spiritual pollution to avoid going to
"extremes."
Hu publicly warns in November that Zhao Ziyang's
impending trip to the United States might be canceled
because of a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee
resolution on the future of Taiwa
A June Hong Kong press article claims Chen Yun is
unhappy over Hu's placing Communist Youth League
cadres in key positions.
Hu Yaobang tells Japanese reporters in September
that the coming party meeting will make a decision on
holding a party congress in 1985, information that Hu
says is "top secret."
Hu claims in Octo-
ber that Deng Xiaoping has asked him to take the
chairmanship of the party's Central Military
Commission.
trips.
Xiaoping.
During an April news conference, Hu claims the
United States has agreed to send only conventionally
armed warships to call on China. Another probable
gaffe is Hu's statement during a New Zealand visit in
April that China plans to reduce its armed forces by
1 million-the announcement was probably supposed
to have been made in China, possibly by Deng
In a remarkably frank interview in May with Lu
Keng, a Chinese journalist from Hong Kong, Hu
suggests the mainland may eventually resort to force
to bring about reunification with Taiwan, makes
backhanded comments on several senior leaders, and
states that "there are not a lot of things to do in the
Army"-a comment that seems to denigrate the
military.
in late spring and 25X1
ends to readjust 9FX1
China's leadership, including replacing Hu Yaobang 25X1
with Hu Qili as party general secretary. Hu, in turn,
is slated to take Deng's position as head of the party's
Central Military Commission. These changes are to
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
be announced at the September party meetings, ac-
cording to information reportedly distributed through
party channels.
Probably reflecting criticism of Deng's efforts to
appoint Hu to the Central Military Commission, a
June Liaowang article cites the historical analogy of
Zhuge Liang's appointment of Ma Shu as "military
consultant," despite Ma's tendency to overstate
things. The article claims that "the appointment of a
person who indulged in empty talk and exaggeration
was an important error committed by Zhuge Liang."
The Japanese press reports in July that Deng tells a
visiting Japanese legislator that Zhao and Hu will be
replaced in September.
Following party conservative Hu Qiaomu's attack in
the fall on the "Ma Ding" article-which had cited
limitations of Marxist theories to deal with modern
economic problems-Hu Yaobang reportedly defends
the right of academics to publish controversial views.
Deng Xiaoping reportedly agrees with Hu, and ex-
tends the protection to writers.
During key party meetings in September, reformers-
including Hu Yaobang's proteges-make gains in the
Central Committee and the Politburo. No movement
is reported on the plan to replace Hu and Zhao with
younger leaders, however. Chen Yun attacks the rural
reform policies for contributing to a decrease in grain
production in 1985.
Beijing announces an anticorruption drive under the
control of the party Secretariat (led by Hu Yaobang)
aimed at central party, government, and military
organs. The drive is to last from six months to one
year. A leading group to deal with corruption in the
central departments is established at the "8,000 Ca-
dres," meeting in January. The group is reportedly
headed by Qiao Shi-frequently linked to Hu Yao-
bang.
Deng Xiaoping tells New Zealand Prime Minister
David Lange in March that "political structural
reforms" are needed, kicking off a wide-ranging
discussion on these reforms. Hu Yaobang and Hu Qili
take the lead in pushing the political reform agenda.
Evidence of mounting leadership tension over the
anticorruption campaign includes the reported state-
ment by Deng in an April Politburo meeting that
mismanagement of the campaign amounts to a con-
spiracy to shake the government.
Deng decides not to press charges
against a prominent military leader's daughter to
avoid provoking countercharges from conservatives.
Qiao Shi is appointed Vice Premier in April "to give
better guidance to the country's political and legal
work."
According to the Hong Kong press, Hu tells a meeting
in Sichuan in May that 110 to 120 members of the
Central Committee should be replaced, implying that
those over 60 should retire-an indicator of Hu's
pressuring the party old guard to step aside.
Zhao Ziyang tells reporters on 1 June that press
reports of high-level leadership changes are ground-
less, and that Zhao, Hu Yaobang, and President Li
Xiannian will hold their positions until their terms
expire in 1987.
While visiting the United Kingdom in June, Hu
Yaobang tells a press conference that he and Zhao
should start stepping back beginning next year, and
should be gradually retired "a few years later."
Propaganda Chief Zhu Houze-a Hu Yaobang prote-
ge-claims in July that "patience" and "one year of
study" will be needed on questions of political reform
and spiritual civilization. Zhu defends the expression
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
of differing opinions and suggests that conservative
views expressed in the party journal Red Flag are not
necessarily those of the central leaders.
According to a Japanese press report, in September
Hu Yaobang urges Deng to retire as head of the
Central Advisory Commission and to appoint Hu to
the position. Conservatives Deng Liqun and Hu
Qiaomu support Deng's refusal.
In a September interview with a US newsman, Deng
states that, although he hopes to retire in the fall of
1987, he probably would not be able to.
According to a Japanese press report, in September
Hu urges Deng to retire from the Central Advisory
Commission to allow Hu to assume this position, after 25X1
stepping down as party head. Several newspaper 25X1
articles referring to Deng's retirement may be relate-
to behind-the-scenes maneuvering on this proposal-a
Guangzhou newspaper carries an article in September
referring to Deng as "your excellency" and asking
him to "stay a bit longer." In October, a Shenzhen
newspaper carries an article in response, calling for
Deng's retirement. 25X1
According to diplomatic sources, a leading group to
study political structural reform is formed under the
leadership of Zhao Ziyang in the fall. Although Hu
Yaobang may be in the group, his failure to head it
The document of the Sixth Plenum of the 12th
Central Committee held in September calls for build-
ing a "spiritual civilization"-a theme championed by
Hu Yaobang and his supporters. Conservative lan-
guage in the document, including a reference to the
problem of "bourgeois liberalization," suggests great-
er compromise than Hu had hoped for, however.
Official guidance on propagandizing the document
reportedly stresses giving it a low-key approach, and,
contrary to usual practice, no instruction is given to
propaganda workers on how to interpret the docu-
ment-further signs of the lack of consensus.
Deng Xiaoping delivers a speech on the need to
oppose bourgeois liberalization on 28 September. Hu
reportedly has a hand in keeping the speech from
being publicized-it is later released as Central Docu-
ment 2 following Hu's resignation in January.
probably reflects his political weakness
An election held in Hefei, Anhui Province, in late
November triggers student dissatisfaction with nomi-
nation procedures and leads to student protests in
early December. Local grievances, a news blackout,
and missteps by officials lead to protests in Shanghai,
climaxing in over 30,000 demonstrators protesting on
21 December. Smaller protests subsequently break
out in Beiiine.
A Hong Kong magazine reports that a late November
Secretariat meeting approves a decision to replace Hu
with Zhao as party head at the 13th Party Congress.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
An enlarged meeting of the Central Military Com-
mission held 11-26 December, attended by some
7,000 Army cadres down to Army corps commander
level, fails to accept Hu's appointment as Commission
Chairman, according to a variety of information. The
Japanese press reports that Hu was not allowed to
address the meeting, and his name dropped below
Deng's in reports of the meeting-signs of low stature.
Deng Xiaoping convenes a series of Politburo meet-
ings in January to receive Hu Yaobang's self-criticism
and resignation. According to Japanese press reports,
Deng addresses the meetings on four occasions be-
tween 6 and 16 January, criticizing Hu Yaobang for
forming a faction, for his economic policies, and for
Hu's mistakes in handling China's relations with
Japan. Deng reportedly claims that the Hu Yaobang
issue cannot be delayed until next fall's party con-
gress. the Politburo voted 11
to 9 to oust Hu, but Deng wanted a larger majority
and called an "expanded" meeting packed with his
Other signs of criticism of Hu include a 14 January
meeting of conservative journalists that attacks the
"premature closing" of the spiritual pollution cam-
paign in early 1984, and claims that highly respected
leading party comrades objected to the party direction
of "constructing spiritual civilization" at the 1985
National Party Conference, but were overruled.
on the Politburo standing committee.
A communique of the enlarged Politburo meeting
announces Hu's resignation and Zhao's appointment
as acting party chief on 16 January. The communique
states that decisions will be submitted to the "next
plenary session of the CCP," and Hu retains his seat
Central Document 3 dated 19 January reportedly
contains a list of Hu Yaobang's six errors-Hu
encouraged "bourgeois liberalization," he failed to
combat rightist ideas, his economic policies promoted
dangerously high rates of growth, he undermined the
principles of collective leadership and the rule of law,
he spoke on foreign affairs questions without authori-
zation, and he failed to respect decisions made by
party and state leading bodies. The document also
reportedly carries portions of Hu's self-criticism.
25X1
25X1
25X1
supporters.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/22 : CIA-RDP04T00907R000200130001-7