THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES -- A BASELINE FOR MONITORING DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000200400001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
in the Philippines
A Baseline for
Monitoring Developments
The Communist Insurgency
A Research Paper
EA 87-10054
December 1987
?py 2 4 y
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The Communist Insurgency
in the Philippines
A Baseline for
Monitoring Developments
of East Asian Analysis, with a contribution by
Office of Global Issues. Comments and
Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 87-! 0054
December 1987
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The Communist Insurgency
in the Philippines-
A Baseline for
Monitoring Developments
Scope Note
/ri/ormation available as
of lS December 1987
was used in this report.
This latest paper assesses the insurgency after what for the Communists
has been almost two years of uncertainty and introspection since President
Aquino came to power. It is intended to give policymakers a baseline
against which to judge the ebb and flow of the insurgency and the impact
of the government's counterinsurgency efforts.
Secret
EA 87-10054
December 1987
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The Communist Insurgency
in the Philippines-
A Baseline for
Monitoring Developments
Summary The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People's Army
(NPA) grew rapidly during the final years of the Marcos regime, more than
doubling in size from 8,000 to 17,000 insurgents between 1981 and 1986.
This rapid growth slowed after "people power" swept Corazon Aquino into
office in February 1986 and the Communists lost their principal agent for
growth-Marcos. In urban areas, for example, the size of the CPP's legal
mass organizations eroded as many party sympathizers took await-and-see
attitude toward Aquino.
Faced with a new political environment, the NPA has taken several steps to
regain its lost momentum:
? It has adopted a more hardline, militant posture emphasizing armed
struggle.
? The NPA is attacking economic targets such as bridges, railways, and
powerlines.
? The Communists are targeting Americans because of allegations of US
meddling in Philippine politics and the delivery of US military assistance,
and they were responsible for killing three American servicemen near
Clark Airbase in October 1987.
Although the intensity of the insurgency varies from region to region, the
Communists' renewed vigor enables them to meaningfully challenge the
government on several fronts:
? The CPP has established "shadow governments" in some rural areas that
directly compete with the legitimate government at the local and regional
levels.
? Communist assassination teams are attacking government officials, the
military, and police in Manila and other urban areas, and have killed 120
such people in 1987.
? The Communists intend to participate in the local elections that will be
held in January 1988.
We will be watching selected indicators to monitor trends in the insurgency
threat to the Aquino government. Key measures of progress in addition to
expansion of armed strength and the number of people under Communist
control include the election of members or sympathizers in the local
elections and acquisition of foreign military support.
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Summary
Dimensions of the Military Threat
The Regional View
The Insurgents' Dilemmas
Targeting US Officials
Civilian Anti-Communist Groups
Looking Ahead
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1 Ilocos Norte
2 Abra
3 Ilocos Sur
4 Mountain
5 La Union
6 Benquet
7 Pangasinan
8 Batanes
9 Kalinga-Apayao
10 Cagayan
11 Isabela
12 Ifugao
13 Nueva Vizcaya
14 Quirino
15 Zambales
16 Tarlac
17 Nueva Ecija
18 Pampanga
19 Bataan
20 Bulacan
21 Aurora
22 Rizal
23 Cavite
24 Laguna
25 Batangas
26 Quezon
27 Mindoro Occidental
28 Mindoro Oriental
29 Marinduque
30 Romblon
31 Palawan
32 Camarines Norte
33 Catanduanes
34 Camarines Sur
35 Albay
36 Sorsogon
37 Masbate
38 Antique
39 Aklan
40 Capiz
41 Iloilo
42 Negros Occidental
43 Negros Oriental
44 Cebu
45 Bohol
46 Siquijor
47 Northern Samar
48 Samar
49 Eastern Samar
50 Leyte
51 Southern Leyte
52 Zamboanga del Norte
53 Zamboanga del Sur
54 Basilan
55 Sulu
56 Tawitawi
57 Camiguin
58 Surigao del Norte
59 Misamis Occidental
60 Misamis Oriental
61 Agusan del Norte
62 Bukidnon
63 Agusan del Sur
64 Surigao del Sur
65 Davao Oriental
66 Davao
67 Davao del Sur
68 South Cotabato
69 Lanao del Norte
70 Lanao del Sur
71 Maguindanao
72 North Cotabato
73 Sultan Kudarat
Region boundary
Province boundary
US facility
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 Miles
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The Communist Insurgency
in the Philippines-
A Baseline for
Monitoring Developments
Current Trends
The Philippine Communist-led insurgency has contin-
ued to expand since February 1986 despite the "peo-
ple power" that swept Corazon Aquino into the
presidency. Although the insurgency's growth has
been slower than in the final years of the Marcos
regime, the number of insurgents has increased since
early 1986 by nearly 10 percent, to 17,000 full-time
guerrillas, of which about 12,000 are armed with
modern weapons.
the insurgents are capable of conducting aggres-
sive and well-coordinated, small-scale military opera-
tions in nearly all of the country's 73 provinces. These
regular units are supported by an estimated 30,000 to
50,000 local guerrillas and village militia that operate
in 63 guerrilla fronts.'
Responding to the CPP's Executive Committee deci-
sion in March 1987 to increase the armed struggle in
rural areas, the NPA has stepped up attacks against
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), particu-
larly arms-grabbing efforts, which appear to be the
objective of most NPA operations. In addition, the
NPA has increased assassinations in urban areas.
During one two-week period in June 1987, for exam-
ple, government officials attributed murders of 13
police and military officers in Metropolitan Manila to
Figure 1
Growth of Communist Party of the Philippines'
Control of Barangays, June 1983 -June 1987
Jun 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
NPA "sparrow" assassination teams. Although the
intensity of the insurgency, as measured by the
number of incidents and fatalities per month, has not
reached the high levels of mid-1985, it is similar to
the last months of the Marcos regime, when there
were about 300 incidents and 325 fatalities a month.
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Figure 2
Violent Incidents Involving Philippine
Communist Insurgents
\umhrr nlinriclrnta~
75(1
0 J1~~~1~~ti1JJvSl)NDJFM,4MJJASOVDJI'MAMJJ:~
1985 1986 1987
A typical NPA operation is either a raid, an ambush,
or a combination of the two. Raids are normally
against small military outposts or townhalls in isolat-
ed villages. In the past several months the NPA has
shown an increased ability to conduct coordinated
raids on multiple targets such as the attacks on two
bridges in Camarines Sur Province in the Bicol
Region of Luzon and the Constabulary outposts in
Quezon Province, adjacent to the Bicol.
most successful NPA operations in recent months
have been raids against small, isolated outposts, often
followed by ambushes of the reinforcing units. For
example, 16 soldiers were killed in March in Quezon
Figure 3
Deaths Caused by Philippine
Communist Insurgency
J I"viAMJ JASONDJ FM~MJ JASONDJ FMAYIJ JA
1985 1986 1987
' Casualties include Integrated National Police and
Civil Ilome Defense Forces.
Province when their truck was ambushed as they
raced to relieve a Constabulary outpost under attack.
So far, the NPA has mounted few operations against
civilian targets, and those have generally been limited
to companies that do not pay their "revolutionary"
taxes. However, in early September the NPA at-
tacked several electrical pylons on Luzon and
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damaged several bridges in the Bicol Region, which
could indicate a change in tactics toward more eco-
nomic targets.
The Regional View
The growth and intensity of the insurgency vary from
region to region, and among islands within regions.
Diverse economic and political conditions and the
extent of Aquino's popularity affect the Communists'
exploitation of local social, political, and economic
grievances. In addition, the ability of local officials to
extract resources from the central government, and to
provide services and security, greatly affects the
success of the Communists, as has, of late, the
emergence of civilian anti-Communist vigilante
groups in some areas . No region of the country,
however, is immune to the Communist threat.
the Aquino government
and the CPP/NPA realize that this populous island is
the key to the political and military struggle. The
record of recent military incidents indicates that the
NPA can mount attacks throughout the island but is
concentrating on strengthening its position in the
provinces near Manila.
Central Luzon Region. Although infrequent fighting
makes the insurgency appear insignificant in the
Central Luzon Region, the CPP has emphasized
political organizing in the area in preparation for later
armed stru gle. For example,
the number of political cadres and armed
NPA in Bataan has increased as well as has the
openness of their proselytizing, and the Communist-
dominated KMU labor union is attempting to orga-
nize labor at US military facilities in the Central
Luzon Region.
The NPA has strengthened its logistic network and
support activities in provinces near Manila over the
past year, particularly in areas south and east of the
city, apparently as part of a long-range strategy to
isolate the capital from the countryside.
the NPA is establishing safe
used to support urban terrorism.
Bicol-NPA Stronghold. Bicol, the key transporta-
tion route between Manila and the southern islands, is
one of the areas under the heaviest Communist
influence Re-
cent unusual attacks against infrastructure targets
such as bridges and powerlines suggest an NPA
strategy of demonstrating its strength or of diverting
AFP attention and resources away from Manila and
Central Luzon. In Albay Province in the central Bicol
Region, nearly two-thirds of the villages are reported
to be controlled by Communists. Ambushes of mili-
tary vehicles are a constant threat even on major
roads, where guerrillas dressed in military uniforms
operate roving checkpoints; political propaganda ac-
tivities are widespread; farmers and businesses are
forced to pay taxes to the NPA; and many local
officials are under the control of the Communists. The
Army has stationed approximately 4,500 troops in
Bicol that have begun to increase patrols in rural
areas to reassert government presence, but they have
little effect on NPA operations. Moreover, the inef-
fective and corrupt local government undercuts gains
made by the military, and the Communists, already
entrenched by more than a decade of successfully
exploiting economic discontent, continue to expand
their influence even though the depressed coconut-
based economy has improved over the past two years.
over the past year in Cagayan and may have been
meant to embarrass former Defense Minister Enrile
by showing that he was unable to protect his home
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region. In much of Ilocos, the home area of former 25X1
President Marcos, the NPA has moved out of its
mountain strongholds and recruited more openly and
in greater strength. Until last year Ilocos was unfruit-
ful territory for Communist organizing because of the
government's heavy spending there. Now, attacks by
the NPA and a shortage of funds prevent provincial
leaders from delivering services to remote villages and
from countering Communist propaganda.
Manila-The Threat of Urban Terror
Over the past 18 months the NPA has beefed up its
support network to mount an urban terrorism cam-
paign. the party's
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Special Operations Department since 1983 has built a
supply and communications network in the city to
support its specially trained "sparrow" urban guerrilla
has launched a series of attacks that may have killed
as many as 70 people, mostly police and military, in a
show of capability. Moreover,
large areas. They have been less successful in Cebu
and in northern Leyte, but evidence suggests that
CPP/NPA operations there are on the rise.
Negros-A Picture of Contrasts. In the depressed
sugar-growing province of Negros Occidental, mas-
sive unemployment-estimated at well above the na-
tional rate of 11 percent-provides fertile ground for
skilled Communist propaganda teams. They use a
blend of teach-ins, rallies, and other proselytizing
techniques to recruit youth into Communist ranks and
encourage support from the population. The effort in
Negros Occidental probably is the most sophisticated
Communist political organizing work under way in
the Philippines, and the local party committee appears
to be giving it more priority there than the armed
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Visayas
The insurgents have long operated out of strongholds
on Samar, southern Leyte, Negros, and Panay, where,
they control
struggle.
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several years.
On the other side of the island, in the province of
Negros Oriental, the insurgency has made little pro-
gress, according to the US Embassy. The economy is
stronger because agriculture is diversified and more
farmers own land, and the military has taken aggres-
sive actions against the Communists over the past
Figure 4. Disarmed police in Licab, Luzon,
guarded by New People's Army (NPAJ raider in
Panay-Failing Local Government. The island of
Panay-with a diversified agricultural economy-has
been under increasing Communist Party influence
since the first party cadres arrived over a decade ago.
The Embassy reports that in many areas the govern-
ment's representation has been reduced to a hollow
shell, and military commanders travel in armored
personnel carriers. Manila and local governments
have been hampered in their efforts to deliver much-
needed food and health services because hundreds of
armed guerrillas roam freely through villages. In
addition, the NPA presence prevents local officials
from collecting taxes, forcing some town governments
to depend entirely on Manila to fund social services.
Samar and Leyte-NPA Strongholds. In the eastern
Visayas, Samar is a traditional insurgent hotspot.
Small guerrilla units reportedly are returning to
southern Leyte, a province the military claimed in
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third of the 4,400 villages are believed controlled by
the insurgents. The Philippine military is concerned
that the security situation will deteriorate further,
particularly in northern Leyte where there have been
increased sightings of armed Communist propaganda
teams. However, in
some areas of Samar, the NPA is having problems
maintaining support for its guerrillas.Ofood
and ammunition shortages have surfaced as local
citizen defense forces have formed to counter the
insurgent threat.
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Cebu. Of all the major islands in the Visayas, Cebu is
the least affected by the insurgency; less than 2
percent of the villages are controlled by the Commu-
nists and 25X1
less than half of the island is organized into a
Regional Party Commission. Economics and geogra-
phy work against the NPA there. Cebu City's relative
prosperity enhances the economy of the entire island;
the deforested hills around the city provide little cover 25X1
or concealment for the guerrillas; and the interior is
sparsely populated and without enough agriculture to
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presence on the island is growing and urban guerrillas
have become more active in Cebu City. Small NPA
units also operate in the towns near Cebu City, and
Communist-influenced labor unions have at times
disrupted significant portions of the urban manufac-
turing economy.
Mindanao
Mindanao, the country's second-largest island, is the
island most seriously threatened by Communist insur-
gents. The insurgents have developed a formidable
political base and effectively control large
areas. Government counterinsurgency efforts are
complicated by a separate, centuries-old Muslim re-
bellion that flares often. So far, alliances between the
Communists and the Muslims have been limited to
the tactical level, and even those have broken down
quickly. Nonetheless,
NPA-Muslim cooperation is a great
pressed to contain both at the same time.
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Figure 8. New People's Army
(NPA) guerrillas train at camp
nearly half
of all guerrilla fronts are located on Mindanao. They
involve approximately 7,200 full-time insurgents, or
40 percent of the NPA's total strength-a sharp
increase from Manila's estimate in 1982 of 2,500
guerrillas on the island. The Communist Party con-
trols 25 percent of Mindanao's villages and nearly 40
percent of those in the southern part of the island.
taxes collected from
loggers, planters, farmers, and fishermen have made
the Mindanao commission the best financed regional
party.
The growth of the Communists' influence, however,
has not been without its problems.
'the CPP's influence had
extended to as many as 90 percent of the districts of
Davao-the Philippines' third-largest city-before
the civilian anti-Communist organization Alsa Masa
("masses arise") began operating earlier this year.
Now the Communists have been virtually eliminated
as an active or visible force there.
Since 1986, the party has purged
its local ranks, reportedly executing as many as 400
suspected agents. The discovery of mass graves re-
ceived extensive local press attention and dealt the
NPA's public image a severe blow, according to the
US Embassy, and reduced insurgent morale. ~
The insurgents make effective use of Mindanao's
mountainous terrain and extensive forests-which
cover nearly 40 percent of the island-in their guerril-
la campaigns. Government forces, conversely, are
hampered by a lack of air and road mobility. The
military has only about 20 helicopters, for example, to
ferry troops and supplies on an island the size of
Virginia.
Regional Communist Party commissions-acting as
shadow governments--collect taxes, mete out revolu-
tionary justice, and conduct propaganda activities.
Some reporting also suggests that the NPA's strength
in Mindanao has declined as a result of Aquino's rise
to the presidency and her several visits to the island to
rally support for the government and its programs. In
addition, church and private-sector groups sponsor
programs that provide land, job training, and financ-
ing to NPA guerrillas who surrender.
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Figure 9. New People's Army
(NPAJ guerrillas practice ma-
Nevertheless, the NPA remains a strong force and is
capable of conducting battalion-size raids of 100 to
300 men. The Philippine military now has approxi-
mately 17,000 combat troops-about 40 percent of its
combat forces-on the island.
however, the military is probably
unable to decisively defeat the NPA there without
additional equipment, training, and motivation. The
situation will probably persist unless the island's
potentially rich agricultural economy improves
enough to undermine the appeal of the insurgency or
the government implements a comprehensive counter-
insurgency program to defeat it.
policy change resulted largely from an internal CPP
assessment that the party cannot grow in size or
capability without expanding the scope of the insur-
gency, providing weapons to unarmed NPA guerrillas,
and countering increased counterinsurgency opera-
tions by the Philippine military. Moreover, the party's
timetable, although flexible, anticipates moving
within two years from its current "strategic defensive
phase"2 to the "strategic stalemate phase."' Meeting
the timetable requires that the NPA acquire greater
quantities of high-powered firearms, antiarmor weap-
ons. and better communications eauinment.
z The first of three phases in the party's concept of protracted
warfare. This stage includes the launching of an armed struggle
against the government by the CPP/NPA. In this stage the NPA is
smaller and weaker in arms and manpower than the government,
and small NPA units wage tactical attacks against small and
isolated AFP units for the purpose of seizing weapons. The
CPP/NPA divides this phase into three subphases: early substage,
' The second phase of protracted warfare. According to CPP/NPA
theory, it is reached when CPP/NPA forces become more or less
equal to the AFP and neither side is capable of defeating the other.
In this stage, the NPA will have large formations of Regular
Mobile Forces, stable and extensive district bases in all principal
islands, and district bases that occupy more than half of the
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Pyongyang and Hanoi are the two likeliest candidates
to provide military materiel to the NP
The Communists, despite their claims of having more
than 2,900 party workers in Manila, have had little
success with their stepped-up political organizing and
propaganda work. In our view, their organization in
Manila is the weakest link in the nationwide insurgen-
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Only a few AK-
47 assault rifles have been captured, and these are
believed to be from a shipment of 100 sent by the
Palestine Liberation Or anization in 1981 as a ges-
ture of goodwill
Since Aquino came to power the CPP has sought
ways to regain its political momentum. The downfall
of Marcos, who was the target of the CPP's propagan-
da and the rallying point for the activities of its
disparate legal front groups and organizations and its
illegal forces, removed the unifying symbol of leftist
Philippine opposition groups and placed them in oppo-
sition to a very popular government. As a result,
membership in Commu-
nist-influenced mass organizations shrank from a high
of 3.5 million in 1985 to about 1.4 million as of early
1987.
In urban areas, the party's efforts to recoup and to
strengthen its legal and illegal fronts-traditionally
weak areas-have been complicated by the level of
popular support for Aquino. Party documents, for
example, make it clear that many potential middle-
class sympathizers are waiting to determine whether
Aquino or the party stands a better chance of imple-
menting economic, political, and social policies that
will benefit the middle class, according to the US
Embassy.
for example, have organized effective labor strikes
and other protests in the capital area but have not
exploited the instability associated with the five coup
attempts against the Aquino government.
According to US Embassy reports, the party's at-
tempts to expand links to labor federations and unions
in Manila, as well as civic and professional organiza-
tions, have been only moderately successful, and
party-sponsored rallies, cultural events, and lectures
generally are not well attended. In addition, the many
openly identified Communist front groups that oper-
ate in the capital are increasingly vulnerable to
military penetration. The military and police are
particularly sensitive to the Communists' attempts to
infiltrate labor groups. According to the US Embassy,
10 percent of organized labor, for example, is in some
way connected with Communist-backed unions.
The complexity of the Communist political threat
increased with the participation of its legal front
party, the Partido ng Bayan, or People's Party (PNB),
in the May Congressional election and the likely
participation of the Communists in the local elections
scheduled for January 1988. Since the PNB has
become clearly identified with the CPP and because
of its poor showing in the Congressional election-
electing only two members to the House of Represen-
tatives-the Communists may run candidates for
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local elections through front groups other than the
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The strategy adjustments necessary to cope with the
drastically changed political environment when
Aquino assumed power have challenged the cohesion
of the party's leadership. For at least six months after
the establishment of the Aquino government, the CPP
leadership was largely preoccupied with debating who
was at fault for the decision to boycott the February
1986 presidential election,
the party has not altered its main strategy to wage
protracted warfare, the poor showing in the Congres-
sional elections has led it to question the role of
parliamentary struggle in the long-term strategy for
seizing power.
Targeting US Officials
The Communists claimed responsibility for killing
three American servicemen near Clark Airbase on 28
October. A party spokesman said the killings were in
The expansion of the party's control in rural areas
often resultsfrom government neglect. Front groups
fill the vacuum where no local government exists,
often through shadow governments, to provide ser-
vices such as security, justice, health, education, and
information. the
Communists' political structure is probably most
developed in northern Luzon, Samar, and Mindanao.
The Communist Party oj'the Philippine's (CPPJ has
been particularly adept at tailoring services to local
needs. For example, in the Visayas, the CPP prints
copies of its nationwide newspaper in the local dia-
lects, the only newspaper to do so.
response to a CPP Executive Committee decision
made in June 1987 to target Americans assisting
Manila's counterinsurgency efforts. The party decid-
ed that the time was right to attack Americans
because of recent deliveries of United States military
aid and public allegations of US meddling in Philip-
If the Communists are convinced that the risk of
retaliation by the United States is minimal, they may
see valuable political and psychological gains in fur-
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The National Democratic Front (NDFJ focuses much
of its effort on infiltrating and co-opting cause-
oriented groups. Constituting most of the Philippine
political left, these groups include human rights,
legal aid, and church groups; labor, student, and
teachers unions; and other professional organiza-
t i ons.
Manila has a large proportion of the membership in
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPPJ and
has traditionally been an area of heavy recruitment
efforts. The NDF considers as a target of opportunity
any group or aspect of society that may be dissatis-
fied with the government, particularly workers, peas-
ants, students, ethnic groups, the church, and foreign
aid groups. The NDF typically recruits its leadership
from intellectuals, students, lawyers, clergy, journal-
ists, labor, and government bureaucrats.
Student and labor groups under NDF control regu-
larly attempt to stir up actions that could attract
supporters. The Kabataang Makabayan (KMJ youth
organization and the League of Filipino Students
Civilian Anti-Communist Groups
The popularity and growth of civilian anti-Commu-
nist organizations have caused severe problems for the
CPP/NPA, he
unexpected success of these groups caught the Com-
munists offguard, and they have been slow to develop
a counterstrategy.
The most notable example of popular backlash to the
guerrillas is in Davao City, a major urban center in
Mindanao that, for all practical purposes, had been
controlled by the Communists. The most prominent
armed anti-Communist group, Alsa Masa, came into
existence there,
and took revenge by killing an NPA
half dozen people witnessed the execution
leader. Subsequently, with the support and encour-
agement of local government officials, the group
became immensely popular among Davao residents
weary of NPA terrorism and taxation.
(LFSJ, for example, organize street demonstrations,
strikes, and rallies, and infiltrate related groups to
recruit followers for the NDF. These groups also
focus on protest themes in universities and then
organize campus mass actions.
Party cadres have penetrated legal organizations
connected with the Catholic Church that obtain aid
from foreign and domestic sources. This not only
indirectly funds the party but also targets church
members for NDF recruitment and even party mem-
bership. Liberation theology is used for possible
revolutionary indoctrination and is propagandized by
sympathetic priests and nuns.
Another theme the NDF uses for recruitment in-
cludes playing on potential anti-US feelings. The US
bases, which have consistently been an issue of
domestic debate, are a key target for NDF propagan-
da. The NDF's antibases propaganda campaign is
likely to intensify as Washington and Manila move
toward negotiations on the bases in 1988.
The well-publicized success of the armed Alsa Masa
group in the Davao area, combined with increasing
resentment of taxation and abuses by the Communist
insurgents, has encouraged the spread of similar
groups-both armed and unarmed. Just south of
Davao, unarmed citizens have formed a group called
NAKASAKA, the Philippine acronym for "People
United for Peace," that alerts local security forces to
insurgent activity. The group claims its activities have
encouraged more than 2,000 Communist supporters
to surrender and have cut off rebel tax collections. US
Embassy officers report, after field visits, apparent
broad-based support for NAKASAKA, and that the
late Secretary of Local Government Ferrer had in-
structed officials throughout Mindanao to form simi-
lar groups. President Aquino has provided $2.5
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The Alsa Masa civilian defense organization, some-
times referred to by its detractors as vigilantes, has,
at least for now, driven Communist guerrillas out of
Davao, the Philippines' third-largest city. Since 1984,
Davao had been virtually controlled by the Commu-
nists, who were carrying out several killings a day by
1985. Alsa Masa was formed in 1986 and now has
9,000 members-more than a third of them .former
insurgents-with many, if not most, armed. Its mem-
bers conduct security patrols, identify Communist
guerrillas, and are reported to carry out assassina-
tions of suspected Communists. The local Philippine
Constabulary commander oversees the organization
and provides arms, and local businessmen donate
.funds. Although reported abuses have been few, some
residents.fear Alsa Masa may become a criminal
gang iffunding dries up or control breaks down.
The success of Alsa Masa is tied to several, possibly
unique, .factors that may not exist outside of Davao.
By /986, Davao :s population was disillusioned by
growing Communist taxation and arbitrary killings.
Potential Alsa Masa ranks were also swelled by
.former insurgent guerrillas driven from the party by
bloody internal purges in neighboring provinces. The
local Constabulary commander proved adept at har-
nessing the popular groundswell and directed it effec-
tively against the Communists. Moreover, he was not
shackled by public relations concerns because Davao
has traditionally had a "wild west" atmosphere
relativelylreefrom the critical scrutiny of the Manila
and international presses. Although efforts are under
way to form similar citizen seU-defense groups out-
side Mindanao, such groups have not been as success-
ful as the Alsa Masa.
million in additional economic development assistance
to Davao del Sur Province for NAKASAKA's role in
the counterinsurgency effort.
According to the US Embassy, the Philippine military
is considering organizing self-defense groups in Ma-
nila, especially to help ferret out Communist assassi-
nation teams that have become more active there.
Citizen watch groups also are appearing in the sugar-
growing region of Negros and in Cebu. In addition,
Tadtad, an anti-Communist religious cult known for
its violence, has regained prominence in Cebu and
Mindanao.
The CPP, through the NDF, is intent
on recapturing former supporters and allies who it
believes are becoming disenchanted with Aquino's
perceived move to the right. From the CPP's perspec-
tive, Aquino's actions since the August coup attempt,
including removing two leftist advisers, declaring all-
out war against the Communist insurgents, and her
tough speech in October to the business community,
are evidence of this shift in her government. Major
issues we anticipate the CPP to exploit are the $29
billion foreign debt, land reform, and the review of the
future status of US bases.
the NDF is lobbying the Philippine Congress to
repudiate all or part of the debt and to pass a radical
land reform program-measures we doubt the Philip-
pine Congress will pass.
fter the suc-
cess of their operations in the Bicol against economic
and infrastructure targets, they may conduct similar
attacks in central Luzon. In addition, they may be
planning to increase the level of violence in Manila
Indicators To Watch
The Philippine Government's success in countering
the Communist insurgency will be measured more by
the progress of its political and economic programs
than by statistics on the size of the NPA and the
number of people living in Communist-controlled
areas. Among the lessons learned in several decades of
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Civilian and military sectors of the government have
been developing .strategies for an overall counterin-
surgency plan. Civilian government plans are for a
rural development program that is intended to weak-
en the appeal of the insurgents. Coordinated by the
National Economic Development Authority, it in-
cludes land reform, job training, infrastructure
development, and amnesty and returnee programs.
These are all on a limited scale, however, because of
financial constraints.
Civilian planning is embryonic. The emerging plan is
premised on rural economic development and close
cooperation between local civilian and military offi-
cials with national supervision. Some attempts to
coordinate and manage the counterinsurgency effort
are being tried. For example, the government has
formed a National Security Council, headed by
Emmanuel Soriano, as the focal point for all plans,
but it lacks a stc~'and authority. The Philippine
Constabulary and the Integrated National Police
may be transferred out of the Defense Department to
the not-yet-created Department of Public Suety,
according to the newly adopted Constitution, which
could enhance their credibility and make them more
useful in local policing efforts. President Aguino has
also formed the National Reconciliation and Devel-
opment Council, which will implement her offers for
amnesty and returnee programs.
insurgencies are, we believe, that statistics tend to be
unreliable indicators of citizens' loyalty to the govern-
ment and country or of the warring sides' control over
people and territory
Over the near term, discrete events as they occur or
not are likely to be better indicators than statistics of
the insurgency. For example, the following would
suggest that the counterinsurgency is going in the
government's favor:
? Military
- Increased foreign assistance for the AFP.
- Improved training, discipline, and leadership.
- More aggressive military operations.
- Use of unconventional tactics by the AFP.
The military, because of differing points of view
among its leadership, has not agreed on the elements
of a coordinated strategy.
Without aclear-cut strategy, the AFP is mounting
unproductive, limited offensives where there are
known guerrilla strongholds or where the NPA is
known to be planning strikes. We believe these opera-
tions are unsuccessful because the tactics are inap-
propriatefor counterinsurgency at this stage and the
NPA has advanced warning and slips away.
Overall, the AFP does not have enough forces to
carry out a simultaneous nationwide counterinsur-
gency plan. Furthermore, forces are spread out in a
fashion that does not necessarily reflect the threat to
a particular region. For example, the force ratio in
Manila of about 36:1 is grossly disproportionate to
the level of NPA threat there, while in the NPA-
irtlzltrated Bicol the ratio is 2:1.
? Political
-Improved civilian-military relations.
-Unified management of counterinsurgency
programs.
- Congressional priority and funding for the
counterinsurgency.
-Honest local elections.
? Economic
-Solid rural development results.
-Increased foreign investment.
- Equitable and efficient land reform.
- Rising prices for commodity exports.
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Of course, the converse of these events would work to
the insurgents' advantage, but we will also be looking
at specific indicators from the CPP's perspective:
? Military
- Muslim insurgency picks up.
-NPA and Muslim insurgents form military
alliance.
- Encounters with the AFP consistently favor
NPA.
-NPA receives significant military aid from
abroad.
? Political
-CPP gains belligerency status.
- Real or fronted CPP success in local elections.
- Policy debates among CPP leadership are
resolved.
-CPP develops formal and close relations with
foreign governments and parties.
? Economic
-Widespread graft and corruption evident in Phil-
ippine Government.
-CPP/NPA taxation and confiscation increase.
The most important indicators for monitoring the
Communists are the receipt of significant military
assistance from abroad and their level of success in
the local elections. Large amounts of military assis-
tance would easily tip the balance in favor of the
NPA, while success in the local elections will improve
their ability to control areas of the countryside. For
the government, improved civilian-military relations
and unified management of the counterinsurgency
program are the most important indicators. Without
both, the other indicators are unlikely to occur or have
little effect and the Communists will continue to gain
ground.
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Figure 10
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPPf NPA) Operating Areas
1984
~~" ~~
~` ~~,Leyfe
1986
~' ~ ` -Luzon
~ 1
~<
lea
OlongapQ~
~ ,~Man~a~~?~
~';~
\o~M~
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 Northern Lu2oa Commission (PLC)
A NLC Provincial Committeerlfront
1 Supra Party Commission-SPC DIZON
a Ilocos Norte Committee (INC)
b Komiteng Larangan SilangangCagayan (KLSC)
c Komiteng Larangan Cagayan-Apayao (KLCA)
2 Supra Party Commission-SPC LOPEZ
d Komite Sa Silangang Larangan (KSL)
e Komite Sa Kanlurang Larangan (KKL)
3 Supra Party Commission-SPC OPLE
4 Isabela Provincial Party Committee (IPPC)
5 Ilocos Strip Provincial Party Committee(ISPPC)
Central Luzon Commission (CLC)
B CLC Provincial Committee/front
6 Provincial Party Committee - PPC ITEMCOP
7 Provincial Party Committee- PPC ATLAS
B Qrovincial Party Committee, PPC PHELPS
9 Provincial Party Committee - PPC PICOP
10 Provincial Party Committee - PPC FILIPRO
South'~rn Luion. Commission (SLC)
C Soul ern Tagalog Regional Party Committee {STRPC)
D Min oro Islatld Party Committee (MIPC)
E Bico7 Regina/ Party Committee (BRPC)
11. Kampilan
12'~ ete
'\~~
1
150 Miles
clq~an 'r
1 `w`e
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Secret
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